Advaita and Neoplatonism

A Critical Study in Comparative Philosophy

5. On synthesis and choice

In comparative philosophy several constituents of the standard consciousness determine the approach, consciously or unconsciously. One of the most important of these is the underlying aim of the student in which is embodied the answer to the question: in the search for truth, should philosophies be synthetised, or should a choice be made between them? We have voted already for the second alternative. But when scholars conclude appa-

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rently logically on apparently purely phenomenological grounds, that we can arrive at a world philosophy by synthetising the main philosophical trends, or alternatively when scholars arrive at the acceptance of one philosophy while rejecting the others, such ‘conclusions’ merely manifest deeper lying and generally hidden attitudes of synthesis or choice.

Western consciousness possesses in the first place a constituent of choice, and only in the second place one of synthesis. This could be shown by historical analysis, which would at the same time show the subordinate place of the synthetising attitude, and the repeated reactions against, it. A short summary of this development will be given below. It will be shown in the second and third parts²⁹ that in Indian philosophy in general, but in the philosophies under consideration in particular, the synthetising attitude prevails.

As for choice, the essential dependence of Western philosophy upon the ‘tertium non datur’ and the ‘principium contradictionis’ must be emphasized: Aristotle said ‘Each statement is either true or untrue’³⁰ and ‘The same attribute cannot at the same time belong and not belong to the same subject in the same respect’.³¹ Aristotle has shown that even those, who would, ‘seriously or for the sake of argument’ oppose these principles, accept them in fact and utilize them unconsciously. His argument remains largely valid, whereas it seems that the reaction against it culminating in the multi-valued logics based upon the intuitionism of L.E.J. Brouwer, remain as yet secondary trends in Western philosophy.³²

29 See esp. II 13.

30 De Interpretatione 9, 18 a 37-38.

31 Metaphysics Г 3, 1005 b 19-20.

32 I cannot agree with the thesis of C.T.K. Chari (On the dialectical affinities between East and West, Philosophy East and West 3 (1953-1954) 199-221, 32-336), that there is a kind of parallelism between the multivalued logics and some Oriental modes of thought, for the following reasons: (1) in a three-valued logic, which is itself a meaningless formal system like its generalisations into multivalued logics, only one meaningful interpretation in the semantics can be given to the third value ‘u’: it means ‘undecided’, and this means in general: ‘not yet decided’, and possibly: never to be decided. But this is not in contradiction with the law of contradiction; as nobody doubts that the truth value, once the decision may have taken place, will be either ‘t’ (true) or ‘f’ (false). The difficulty arises, as Brouwer has pointed out, because we are dealing in such cases with infinite sets. (2) When a mystic affirms: God is neither a nor non-a, the logical meaning of this statement can only be that God transcends such attributions, which does not contradict the law of the excluded middle. Example: ad (1): define a number A as follows: A = 1, if anywhere in the decimal development of π a sequence of five sevens occurs; A = 0, if nowhere in the decimal development of π a sequence of five sevens occurs. Now to the statement ‘P’, meaning: ‘A = 1’ the truth value ‘u’ has to be assigned; but nobody doubts that we may be either able to prove A = 1, and hence the statement P obtains the value t; or that we may be able to prove A = 0, and hence the statement P gets the value f. There is no possibility that both are realizable whereas the value ‘u’ is preserved to express the fact that no proof is yet realised. - ad. (2): if we say ‘God is light and God is not light’ it does not mean that we expect that we will one day be able to prove that God is light and to refute the reverse, or conversely; but it means that God can in some respect be said to be light, and in some other respect not to be light. But this does not contradict the law of contradiction, because it is exactly for this reason that Aristotle had added the clause ‘in the same respect’ (katà tô autó). - See also below II, 11: 120.

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Just as the foundation for the logical attitude of choice was laid by Aristotle, the foundation for the existential attitude of choice was laid by Christ.³³ This is observable throughout the New Testament, e.g., in: ‘Think not that I am come to send peace on earth. I came not to send peace, but a sword. For I am come to set a man at variance against his father, and the daughter against her mother, and the daughter-in-law against her mother-in-law. And a man's foes shall be they of his own household. He that loveth father or mother more than me is not worthy of me; and he that loveth son or daughter more than me is not worthy of me’.³⁴ Such passages are not lacking in other religions, but they have perhaps never been taken so seriously and so much emphasised as in Christianity. This becomes especially clear in the scenes of Christ's temptations by the devil, where three alternatives are offered and rejected in three acts of choice.³⁵ Dostoievski has given an existential interpretation of these passages and has thereby shown how this attitude has remained of central

33 The existential choice is also announced in Greek philosophy, as I hope to show elsewhere.

34 Matth. 10.34-37; Cf. Luke 12.51-53; 14.26,27; Micah. 7.6

35 Math. 4.1-11; cf. Mark 1.12,13; Luke, 4.1-13.

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significance in the West.³⁶ In the Faust legend the choice for the devil shows how negative choice is as decisive and existentially irrevocable as positive choice. Reacting against the synthesizing efforts of Hegel, Kierkegaard considers choice, which was already announced by Pascal, the decisive factor of human existence. Existentialism has developed this and expressed it in a more philosophical way.

With Plotinus, who was in this respect a forerunner of Hegel, the synthesizing attitude becomes predominant in Greek thought. In his age, syncretism, for which Alexandria was the symbol, had become widespread. The synthesizing attitude of Plotinus is connected with his traditionalism which will be studied below.³⁷ This holds similarly for many currents in Indian philosophy, and in particular for Śaṅkara's Advaita.³⁸ The synthesizing attitude is still more characteristic of Śrī Aurobindo.³⁹

The synthesizing attitude, a minor trend of thought in Europe, has become important in the United States. The historical reasons for this are clear. The American quest for a world-philosophy, as expressed for instance in the East-West philosopher's Conferences held in Hawaii, ‘Attempts at World Philosophical Synthesis’, by scholars like C.A. Moore, E.A. Burtt, F.C.S. Northrop and others,⁴⁰ has found little response in Europe. On the other hand, the philosophies which emphasize choice, e.g., existentialism, have been often misunderstood in the United States (and in the English speaking world in general).

36 in: The Brothers Karamazov, Book 5, Chapter 5: The Great Inquisitor.

37 See below III 1.

38 See below II 13.

39 See below p. 134-5, n. 444 and p. 137, n. 449.

40 Cf. the journal: Philosophy East and West - A Journal of Oriental and Comparative Thought, published by C.A. Moore in Honolulu, Hawaii.