Advaita and Neoplatonism

A Critical Study in Comparative Philosophy

6. On influences

Those who are interested in comparative philosophy have often occupied themselves with possible influences of philosophies upon each other. The problem of the possible historical influences of Indian thought upon Advaita will be discussed below in an

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appendix. However a general remark may be made about this problem, though it is not primarily a philosophical question. The treatment of problems of influence and of origination depends on philosophical convictions, and therefore, in the case of comparative philosophy, on constituents of the standard consciousness.

The constituents concerned are those regarding causality. Here opinions range between two extremes: the docrtine of the ‘preexistence of the effect in the cause’⁴¹ and the doctrine of ‘creatio ex nihilo’.⁴² Whoever is inclined, perhaps unconsciously, to the first view, will tend to stress points which are common to a certain field and its preceding background, and interpret these as effect and cause respectively; whoever is inclined to the other view will stress the differences and try to show that there are elements of the later phenomenon counterparts of which cannot be found in the earlier phenomenon. The first view stresses causality and is especially appropriate for scientific explanations; rationality requires a certain amount of identity. Whoever holds the second view is in a better position to understand phenomena such as creativity and freedom. In these cases the approach determines the result up to a degree which varies with each case. It will be seen how far our comparative study depends upon the view which stresses ‘creatio ex nihilo’; for in comparisons we will often stress the differences.

The same consideration applies to the different views on possible Oriental origins of Greek civilisation. It becomes clear how Westerners, stressing the novelty of phenomena in general, came to speak about ‘le miracle grec’ for denoting the increase of creativity in Greek culture during the fifth and fourth centuries B.C. The impact of these constituents is considerable and should not be underrated. It should not be concluded, however, that statements concerning influences and origins can never be valid conclusions from phenomenological observations.

One other factor has to be considered. When influences are supposed to exist, it is not enough to prove this supposition by

41 e.g. the Indian Satkāryavāda. See below II. 12: 126.

42 The theistic (Judaic, Christian, Muslim) doctrine; and the Nyāya ārambhavāda.

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showing that similarities exist, that historical contacts took place, that more direct influences cannot account for a certain development and that the creativity and originality of the philosophers concerned were not a sufficient explanation. In addition to this the susceptibility, by which a certain existing influence was also accepted and absorbed, must be explained. This can only be done by studying the philosophical characteristics of doctrines supposed to have undergone influence. Philosophical investigations into parallels and similarities should therefore precede historical investigations into the problem of actual influences. In short the capacity to be influenced has to be understood as a possible development of the entity which has undergone an influence.