Advaita and Neoplatonism

A Critical Study in Comparative Philosophy

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4. Method

In the previous sections several references have been made to method. As in this matter everything is interconnected, we have touched upon some topics under different headings. Now a survey will be given of four points which are of primary importance in dealing with comparative philosophy.

(A). The ‘Standard Consciousness’

It passes our understanding how scholars have been able to compare two philosophies, without realising that a standard of comparison is needed resulting from a third philosophy (which, in special cases, may be the same as the first or the second). That this has generally not been realised can only mean that this third philosophy remained unconscious and manifested itself only indirectly in the principles of comparison, in treatment, methods, order, and evaluation of what is considered as important and finally in the conclusions. Our first aim is to become conscious of this ‘standard philosophy’ and to make it explicit.

The ‘standard philosophy’ cannot be chosen arbitrarily, as we have stressed before: it is the attitude of the modern Westerner, in as far as it implicitly contains a philosophy. This ‘standard philosophy’ manifests itself in the ‘standard consciousness’ of the modern Occidental. To describe it fully would mean to describe what (better: who) the modern Westerner is, which is of course impossible in the present context. This ‘standard consciousness’ can be considered as consisting of a great number of ‘constituents’. It is our task to investigate which are the most important of these in the present context. An example mentioned before is the ‘rectilinear concept of time’, which can be called one of the (very important) constituents of the standard consciousness.

The discovery of these constituents is a matter of enlarging our consciousness; it can be brought about by phenomenological analysis and study of the history of Western philosophy. It may lead to the awareness of what might be called ‘cultural apriorism’. The importance of comparative philosophy lies for a great part in this discovery of ‘cultural a prioris’ - concepts and ideas which are considered as self-evident in a certain culture, but which may

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become relativised when other cultures are studied. What is most interesting in comparative philosophy is not the comparison (a purely academical achievement), but the better understanding of the compared terms and of one's own ‘standard consciousness’.

(B). The existential attitude.

An existential attitude requires the absence of what has been referred to as relativistic indifference, esthetic approach, and dogmatic traditionalism, as well as the presence of a readiness to accept what is studied as a ‘claim upon ourselves, affecting all that we are’. This readiness is essential; whether we are ‘totally affected’ depends of course on our subject and on our own nature. This attitude can be specified in two respects which are each other's complements.

Firstly, we should not only have an ‘open mind’, i.e., a tolerant attitudes but we should also possess what could be called an ‘open personality’, i.e., a personal attitude of studying a certain philosophy in complete freedom, ready to accept that what we find may be the truth and may have to replace what we accepted as true before. As this requirement is not easy to fulfil, it is useful to realise always that philosophy is intended for human beings as a standard and guide to life. Nothing is better, therefore, than actual contact with these human beings, a possibility which can be realised in the case of all ‘living’ philosophies.

The ‘open personality’, however, entails as its corollary a second attitude. If we are not personally involved, we can study and compare many philosophies. But if we are personally involved, we cannot escape choice. After the readiness to accept what characterizes an open personality, we have to choose which philosophies or doctrines we are going to reject or accept ourselves. Remembering Nietzsche's remark we may say that no philosophies of the past are generally accepted in their totality. But each detail and aspect can claim the right to be accepted or rejected, i.e., to be taken seriously. To hesitate because of an attitude of prudence and precaution, which the self-criticism of the sciences has produced, can be considered an aspect of this attitude of choice, provided hesitation results from a personal conflict (in

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the sense in which Pascal said, that there is no living belief without doubt), and not from a desire to escape.

This kind of choice was first stressed by Kierkegaard.

(C). The historical character.

Constituents of the standard consciousness can be discovered through a phenomenological analysis of the treatment of ‘foreign’ philosophies. However this can be achieved more easily through historical analysis of the background of standard consciousness, i.e., through studying relevant parts of the history of one's own philosophy. A Westerner must study the main lines of development of Western philosophy before he is able to approach Oriental philosophies. Then only does he know the answers and attitudes of Western thought which influence his approach. Only then can he know in how far he understands other philosophies and in how far he is a priori in a position to understand them. Without this preparation there will be no adequate understanding and nothing is reached but the mistake of which Faust was reproached by the vanishing spirit:

You resemble the spirit, whom you understand already, Not me!²⁶

This happens frequently when Westerners deal with the Orient, though there may be no spirit to tell them so.

26 Goethe, Faust I: Du gleichst dem Geist den du begreifst, Nicht mir!

(D). The circular procedure.

When we stressed a certain difference in the concept of time between Indian and modern Western philosophy, which would have to be taken into account when approaching Indian thought, it may have seemed that a grave methodological error was made: we used a certain knowledge of Indian philosophy in order to understand Indian philosophy - apparently a vicious circle. Likewise, in other sections of this first part some knowledge of Advaita will be presumed and utilized.

This is however not a mistake but an inevitable procedure inherent in our method. As soon as some knowledge of Indian philosophy is acquired it produces a certain attitude which influ-

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ences our views with respect to Western as well as Indian thought. It is therefore impossible to give a linear enumeration of subjects in a philosophical treatment. Philosophical knowledge is always a process, which is never achieved and in which everything is interconnected. The reason for this is that a personal connection with ‘the material’ is desirable, so that all previously acquired knowledge, which has become part of the investigator's consciousness, has to be taken into account. A treatment which would not consider the interdependence of all terms would be unconsciously dependent upon other factors than those dealt with at the moment.

Thus we shall utilize throughout a certain knowledge of Advaita as well as of Neoplatonism. Arriving at the comparison itself, our procedure will consist in a gradual refinement and a continuous testing of initial ‘working’ opinions. This procedure belongs to the method used here, for it is the actual procedure developing in the mind, before an artificial shifting and selecting, philosophically obscure and phenomenologically not given, will take place.

Those who object to this apparent impurity can realise its inevitability by reflecting upon the analogous ‘circular procedures’ which have been manifest throughout Western philosophy, for instance in Parmenides' fragment: ‘for me it is common, wherever I start; for there I will again return,²⁷’ and likewise in Hegel, Dilthey and Heidegger.²⁸

27 5. 1-2 (Diels).

28 See e.g., the beginning of the Hegel-monograph by T, Litt. Cf. Śein und Zeit, par. 7 et passim.