De patriottentijd. Deel 1: 1776-1784

[p. 374]

Bijlage III.
Yorke aan Lord Suffolk, 25 Augustus 1778. (Public Record Office, Londen).

(Most Private).

.... The Letter to the Pensionary from the American Agents in Paris was undoubtedly suggested by the Court of France, upon which, tho' no Deliberation was held, yet as Copies were distributed privately to the Towns of Holland, the Idea of the possibility of a commercial Treaty with America was circulated. The Duke de la Vauguyon, being young and eager, was desirous to push Matters, but M. de Maurepas check'd his Vivacity, and advised him to proceed gently¹⁾, for fear of giving an Alarm too soon, and so defeating the Project at the Outset. The Tools with which he works are the Pensionary of Amsterdam van Berckel, and his protector Burgomaster Temminck; and Dumas is the Agent and Gobetween, to convey Letters and Messages to and from Amsterdam, as well as between Amsterdam and the American Agents at Paris. All this is kwown to very few, as the Plot is not yet ripe for Execution, but I am very certain it is kwown to the Stadtholder, Prince Lewis, the Great-Pensionary, and to the Greffier Fagel. The Great-Pensionary is not in the Plot, and I hope the Conviction of its Existence, and that the Leaders of Amsterdam have of late offended him personally, has made him change his Sentiments, and rather wish to counteract than to favour them. I have no reason therefore to believe the Ministers are so weak or so wicked as to have a thought of joining in such Measures, but your Lordship has long since perceived how insufficient their good Wishes have been to resist the force of Amsterdam. At the same time I must suppose that upon such a capital point, which would not only throw this Country into the hands of France, but overturn the present form of Government, and annihilate the Stadtholdership, they would exert a little more, and with a little Exertion they would soon be supported.

H.M.'s Ambassador is very singularly circumstanced in such a Situation. His Instructions, the Interest of his Country, his own Wishes, all unite to bind him to the Stadtholderian Party, and yet the little Union which is permitted in that Party, and the total Want of Concert, leave him almost without assistance to counter-act the Ambassador of France. The great difficulty of all proceeds from the want of Firmness in the Prince of Orange, who with the best Intentions, a thorough knowledge of his Country's and his own Interest, and convinced of the existence of the Intrigue and its consequences, takes no step whatever to stem the Torrent, but contents himself with thinking and saying, that tho' he has not the

1) Het in dezen volzin beweerde moet voor rekening van Yorke blijven; er zijn mij geen bewijzen van voorgekomen.

[p. 375]

force to carry what he wishes, he has however a Liberum veto to reject whatever may be improperly proposed by others. All this may be true, and I am not so timid as to be afraid of my Shadow, but still it is possible that a Situation may arise, in which a determined Opposition, supported by a powerful Neighbour, may force a Measure, which at another time they would not dare even to whisper. All I can do is to forewarn with Temper and Friendship, and to endeavour to rouse them from a Lethargy which may be fatal.

To be sure the Country at large, tho' it may have reason'd falsely upon the American Quarrel, thro' Ignorance and Prejudice, is not equally blind upon a French one; and when you start the Apprehension I am writing upon as a probable Conjecture, it is always rejected as an impossibility. The Stadtholder too, if he pleases to appear, can resist with efficacy such a Plot; but then he must appear, and that remains to be done. None of the Provinces are informed of what is passing, even Holland is unacquainted with it, but in this last Province, the Leaders of the principal Towns, as Dort, Haerlem, Leiden, and others, follow implicitly the Vote of Amsterdam, and every Complaint (of which we must expect many) which may come in, of Interruptions to their extensive Navigation, will add Fuel to the Fire, and assist the French Party, because it will always check the Zeal of our Friends, for fear of appearing partial to those who are represented as curtailing the Profits of their Trade.

The Prince of Orange will soon return here for the meeting of the States of Holland. I shall lay hold of that opportunity to press him home, and I hope Prince Lewis, who knows the Aversion the Leaders of the Faction at Amsterdam bear him personally, will assist in rousing him. One should be laugh'd at for supposing this last had no Influence with him, and yet I pass my Life in hearing him declare the contrary. The Pensionary too, if I may believe Prince Lewis and the Greffier, is highly alarmed, and convinced that the Actors in this Intrigue are guilty of Treason, and cannot but join heartily in preventing the Consequences.

It may upon this occasion be naturally asked, from whence arises this Change in the Conduct of the Republic from former times? My way of accounting for it is this:

Religion, the Fear of France, the Union of the Barrier Treaty, and an habitual and intimate Intercourse in Political Affairs, which has subsisted between the Republic and England ever since the Revolution, kept the two Countries united till the Peace of Aix-la-Chapelle in 1748. The first has lost its Relish throughout Europe. Since the last War, France has ceased to be an object of Fear. The Barrier Treaty is annihilated, and from the moment that we were left by Austria, and joined Prussia, there has been no intimate Concert or Connexion between us and the Republic. We have gone on alone and prosperously without their assistance, which has excited their Jealousy, and thy have profited by an unarmed Neutrality which has increased and strengthened their Cupidity. They are all literally Merchants or Money-getters at present; their Poli-

[p. 376]

tics are bounded at those Objects, and though they have to deep a Stake in our Existence to wish us Bankrupts, they would not be sorry to share in the freedom of an American Trade.

If I may be allowed, before I conclude, I would take the liberty to suggest one way of rousing the Prince of Orange at least to a sense of his own Danger, and of his Duty to himself, his Family, and his Country. In the present Contest in Germany, the King has openly and generously espoused the Prussian Cause; His Prussian Majesty surely owes some return to H.M. for such a conduct. Nobody would have so much weight with the Prince of Orange as he could, and as his Niece and her Children have so deep a Stake in the Game, he has at least a right to give his Advice. His Prussian Majesty has always I believe preached up a Neutrality here, but then it was an armed one he recommended, and never an Union with France. The private Correspondence that Monarch keeps up at times with his Niece, as well as with the Prince, opens a door for Advice, which could not be so safely or so forcibly conveyed through the Medium of a Minister.

lord suffolk aan yorke. - St. James's Sept. 1^st, 1778. (Most Private)..... The interference of His Prussian Majesty is a point of some Delicacy, and I don't think the Time is ripe for having Recourse to it. His Prussian Majesty confines his Expressions of Cordiality to H.M. in his quality of Elector only; all his Communications in the Dispute with the Court of Vienna have been limited to H.M.'s Electoral Minister; the Servants of the Crown have been strictly excluded, and His Language with regard to this Country is very little changed. Many things therefore must happen (to speak openly to Your Excellency) before He can be enough considered as a Friend to be applied to in the Manner you suggest.