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Jaap de Hoop for NATO

Appearing to a journalist, who has reported on Dutch politics for 50 years, the rosy accolades in The New York Times and other media about Jaap de Hoop Scheffer have a hollow ring to them and pertain to no connection with reality. In fact, to hail this man as a diplomatic genius, as Lord Robertson has done, is perfectly ridiculous. Of course, the outside world has never heard of him. But we in de field ofjournalism, have met him, and followed his career for the past quarter century. To the average Dutchman, Jaap is a decent guy with no particular achievements to his name. Worse, his diplomatic and political career ended rather abruptly two years ago, when he was finally kicked out of the top post of his party (cda). Informed circles were unanimously in assuming that he had outlived his usefulness and all that was left for him to do was writing memoirs.

The story of how his recent resurrection came about is a weird and puzzling one. De Hoop is the discovery of the new us envoy in The Hague, Clifford Sobel. This man made a fortune in shop window displays, donated 360,000 dollars to the Bush campaign and was rewarded with an ambassadorship. All in line with the silly us tradition to saddle foreign capitals with dumbass diplomats. It turned out that Sobel was an exception. He also had particular clout with the Bush White House. In brief: he was (and still is) a man to watch.

Clifford developed a habit of unceremoniously dropping in on Dutchmen who attracted his attention. He paid a call on controversial politician Pim Fortuyn, whose platform in the 2002 elections was based on getting rid of most of the armed forces, including the Air Force, with the exception of the Navy. Obviously, Fortuyn's political ideas clashed head-on with the vision of the White House, especially after Bush launched in 2001 the War on Terror. Sobel's primary assignment in The Hague was to pressure the Dutch to buy the Joint Strike Fighter for the price of 10 billion dollars.

Fortuyn had written in his election platform: ‘Discontinuance of the Royal Dutch Air Force’ (page 175). This alarmed Sobel

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as well as his superiors. Pim was seen as an obstacle to us defense designs, especially if he had a chance, as seemed to become ever more likely, to indeed become prime minister of Holland. A few days prior to the 2002 election, he was conveniently assassinated, leaving the political field open to Jan Peter Balkenende, who had unseated De Hoop Scheffer as leader of the cda. When Balkenende did become prime minister, instead of Pim, he offered an olive branch, the post of foreign minister to Jaap. For him, this development was true Alice in Wonderland stuff. Together Balkenende and De Hoop Scheffer soon got parliament to approve the purchase of the Joint Strike Fighter, just as Bush and Sobel wanted them to do. Their cordial cooperation encouraged Sobel to pay a personal visit to Jaap.

It is rumored in The Hague, that the two men developed remarkable chumminess and personal relations. Jaap, at the time, had no clue that he was being eyed by the us ambassador as a possible replacement for departing Lord Robertson at nato. Washington was looking for another loyal, inconspicuous errand boy to do its bidding in Brussels. Jaap, it seemed to Sobel, fitted the bill perfectly. Not too bright, blindly pro American, and as a diplomat, always having held jobs as secretary to higher ups.

When former Dutch prime minister Ruud Lubbers was proposed in 1995 to become secretary general of nato, he was unanimously vetoed in Washington, as far too bright, far too independent, and far too knowledgeable. Too much brains. Condoleezza Rice even seemed to have come up with Jozias van Aartsen, a former Dutch foreign minister, as possible sg for nato. But, he too, was too intelligent, too independently minded for Washington's liking. So, as seen from the White House, Sobel made the right choice. As a close friend of Bush, he engineered the American president to personally invite De Hoop Scheffer to become secretary general of nato, reports nrc Handelsblad tonight.

However, in the Dutch media and on television, jokes are circulating about Balkenende and De Hoop Scheffer operating as lapdogs for Bush. ‘Why should Bush decide who is the next 8 years sg. in Brussels,’ said one commentator on television. ‘Of

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course, we are pleased, he picked one of us, even if Jaap is stupid.’ Another called the behavior of the White House smelling off dictatorship. ‘Bush goes it alone in Irak, un or no un. He disregards other nations, refuses to listen to others apparently believing that he himself knows best, while he is a man, who comes from nowhere and obviously knows nothing. No wonder George and Jaap get along fine.’

23-9-2003

In februari 2009 zegt Richard Armitage, ex-onderminister van Buitenlandse Zaken van de Verenigde Staten, dat de politieke steun van Nederland aan de inval in Irak, zeker geholpen heeft bij de benoeming van Jaap de Hoop Scheffer. Een opmerking die tot verontwaardiging heeft geleid in Den Haag en de media. De uitspraak van De Hoop Scheffer in april 2003 in een verklaring waarom Nederland niet aansloot bij Frankrijk, Belgie, Luxemburg en Duitsland om een Europees defensiepact te vormen: ‘Belgium and France will not guarantee our security,’ he said. ‘Germany will not guarantee the security of the Netherlands. I cannot imagine a world order built against the United States.’ (International Herald Tribune, 30 april 2003) heeft de Amerikanen ongetwijfeld als muziek in de oren geklonken.