Herinneringen en dagboek (3 delen)

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Bijlage 47

8 September 1936

Brief van Heldring aan Virgil Jordan, President National Industrial Conference Board, New York
(vgl. p. 1198)

My dear President,

In reply to your letter of 21st ult. I beg to say that the uneasy feeling caused in the United States of America by the political situation in Europe is shared over here. It is perhaps best illustrated by the fact that, whereas last year shipowners could insure their entire fleet employed in the Mediterranean, the then danger zone, against six months' warrisks at a low premium, a higher premium is asked to-day for single voyages and no risk for any long period is taken at Lloyd's.

It is more the absence of visible solutions of complicated positions than the threat of imminent warlike actions that make people gloomy. There is no bellicose spirit even with Mussolini, but one never knows what dictators may do overnight. I am, for one thing, persuaded that Russia does not want war and that she encourages the communists in France not to increase the difficulties of the Blum government which she wishes to be strong against Hitler, who is obsessed by the Russian danger. I do not deny that it exists but it is not immediate, as Russia is not ready to wage war on two fronts - Japan being Germany's probable ally. Meanwhile Russia is gradually turning bourgeois; although coupled with ruthless dictatorate methods, Germany is a greater danger owing to Hitler's actions about the Russian revolutionary influence, the alleged need for an increase of territory for the German people at the expense of Russia and his habit (or perhaps his necessity) of keeping the Germans enthusiastic by successful stunt. The supply of such stunts, ending peacefully, is getting exhausted, but happily there seems to prevail a tendency towards moderation. Dr. Schacht's trip to Paris and the very recent relaxation of the strained relations between the Nazis and the thurches are signs of it. England tries to increase this tendency but unfortunately her prestige has suffered by her unsuccessful bluffing policy vis a vis Mussolini and there is the possibility of a sash action owing to Hitler's impulsive nature, his feeble understanding of foreign nations and the influence of Nazi hotheads, often, but not always, counterbalanced by the moderates. Taking all in all I do not think that Germany is out for war at

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present, but something may occur at any moment overthrowing the position. The approaching Nurnberg meeting will be an important test. The future of Germany is also uncertain in connection with the approaching end of the artificial armament-boom. It is said that the people have taken the two year's military service decree none too well. Prices have risen in Germany, but not wages, the financial situation is most unsatisfactory.

France is, of course, most anxious to keep peace, but she is reaping the fruit of her inconsiderate postwar policy of suspicion and oppression against Germany (for which some excuse is justified seeing that she was psychologically suffering at the time of the peace and England and the United States of America did nos sufficiently correct the absurd peace treaty). Her internal political and economic position is precarious and according to current opinion a storm is expected in October or November, if not before, but wealth is too divided to make anarchy likely.

The difficulties are greatly augmented by the civil war in Spain, which may last long. While it lasts there is the danger of inmixtion of Italy or Germany, both sympathizing with the Whites. France is openly accused by the German press of allowing the Spanish government being supplied with arms and munitions, although she preaches abstention. In reality I suppose there is very little sympathy with the Spanish anarchists anywhere, but the fact that the Whites are called fascists makes their possible triumph scarcely more popular with democratic opinion than that of the Reds. Nor do the Whites seem to have an eminent leader, like the murdered Calvio Soltelo promised to be.

The position in Italy is obscure. Outwardly her attitude is that of the victorious conqueror, inwardly it is from the point of view of finance and economics, no doubt very bad. However, a strong personal government, if successful in the eyes of the crowd, can carry on for a while with a wrong policy as wasteful military expenditure and autarchy is, but the day of reckoning will come. The danger is that Mussolini, prompted either by the desire to divert attention to spectacular undertakings abroad or by his consciousness of the mission reserved for Rome as the nations' arbiter, interferes in Spain or elsewhere in Europe without the League being able to restrain him.

As to Great Britain she is undoubtedly a peace factor but the hope that under her lead the great peace organization would be powerful enough to keep Japan and Italy within bounds when they pursued their policies of conquest in disregard of their obligations towards the League, has been shattered and the notion prevails that she lacks the great statesman necessary to play the role which ought to fall to England in the present situation. The same must be said of every other country. Demo-liberalism has ceased to yield the great men necessary to neutralize the influence on world affairs of the dictators.

As to the small countries they are allright so far as situated in Western Europe, although in constant fear of being involved in a coming struggle. I think one may also that those in Central and Eastern Europe are desirous of peace, but they are weakened by the existence of their minorities' grievances of which perhaps the most likely to lead to early trouble is that of the

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3 million Germans in Czechoslovakia living on the border of the Reich. The case of Austria is special, one must hope that her recent agreement with Germany is sincere and will keep Austria as a bufferstate between that country and Italy.

Not belonging to Europa but none the less a country apt to cause trouble, not necessarily restricted to Asia, is Japan. Her present attention is fixed on China. If she goes too far in Western direction she may force Moscow to react with possible counteraction on the part of Germany. The hands of the cabinet at Tokio may also be forced by the army or the navy. The latter looks southward towards the Philippines and the Dutch archipelago, but any warlike action in those parts is likely to provoke Great Britain whose naval base at Singapore will, however, not be ready till 1938. The menace is constant, but in my opinion not imminent.

The above tries to portray very incompletely the present surface position. The question which occupies every throughtful being is: Can peace be maintained and by what means?

If life and strength could be blown into the League of Nations, the greatest possible safeguard against war would have been secured, but after its failures - not through her fault but through that of her members and the lack of assistance on the part of the U.S.A. (in the case of Japan) it is unlikely that this is possible unless by long preparation. A more amical ‘ambiente’ should be created first between some of the major powers. I do not exclude the possibility of an agreement between Germany, France and Great Britain if Germany can be induced to waive any designs on Russia, as propagated in ‘Mein Kampf’ and Russia ceases to foster bolshevism outside her borders. The mandated of some African territories should then be transferred to Germany and immigration on a large scale into the U.S.A. and other countries fit for European settlement should be allowed to Germans (and others). If such an agreement could be reached without the international equilibrium being previously upset by some incident, there would be a fairly solid guarantee against war, especially if Italy joins. The way to restoration of the League's position would be paved. The chances of such a solution being attained are doubtful. More is required than a political rapprochement.

Economic and monetary agreements through which greater freedom of trade and stability are secured are indispensable. I am sceptical about huge conferences, but the United States of America, Great Britain and France should start, with Germany coming in fourth. Great Britain is not likely to agree to a de jure stabilisation in the near future, but she can and should agree to an arrangement which would prevent competition in devaluation in the event of a reasonable devaluation of the franc or the guilder. Whether it will be possible to push the lowering of trade barriers further than the U.S.A. are doing today through bilateral treaties, seems uncertain. There is ample evidence of the disastrous consequences of these barriers; in fact the abandonment of freetrade, together with a reckless creditpolicy and an unworkable peace treaty, is at the bottom of the international trouble, but the world is once more having eyes without seeing and ears without hearing. Some governments are violently protectionist and autarchic, devoid of sound

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economic views, others profess liberal opinions and shed tears over the necessity (eagerly availed of) of instituting quotas and raising duties in favour of insatiable industrial or agricultural parties, others again honestly believe that they cannot act differently, everybody else treating them likewise. The present commercial policy pursued by the United States of America is to be hailed with satisfaction, but further international understanding to improve world conditions is necessary to save the world from a greater breakdown than we have witnessed so far. It should not be started on too large a scale and most carefully prepared if any success is to be expected. American cooperation to effect is indispensable. It is my firm opinion that if it had not been withdrawn in 1919 in the political sphere and had been exercised to improve the terms of peace, not followed by tariff increases and credit inflation, we would have a better world to-day.

You will please take the above remarks as not coming from an insider but from a businessman with a good many connections in Europe and the Far East. They are strictly confidential, but if you think it desirable to show them to one or the other of the members of the Board I have no objection. I am sending confidentially a copy to Prof. Murray Butler, having the honour of being on the European Advisory Committee of the Carnegie Endowment.

Yours sincerely,