A New Critique of Theoretical Thought. Deel 4. Index of Subjects and Authors

V

Vaihinger, II, his emendation of a text of Immanuel Kant, 499.

Vacuoles, etc., III, vacuoles nucleoles, and other para-plasmatic material particles, 724.

Validity, I, and being, 76.

Validity, II, legal validity and its retrocipations, 166.

Validity, Absolute Universal, I, of mo-

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dal laws even for God, is mere speculatial metaphysics, 92.

Validity, Universal, I, cannot be claimed for a life and world view, according to Litt, 126; in Kant, is independent of all empirical subjectivity, 158; in the phil. of the Cosmonomic Idea, 160.

Valla, Lorenzo, I, De Voluptate, 198.

Valla, Lorenzo, I, deified nature as the sphere of expansion of the personality ideal; he borrowed heavily from Epicurean ethics, 198.

Valuation, II, emotional acts of valuation in Scheler, 545.

Value, I, and reality in Neo-Kantianism, 76; according to Litt, 125; in Rickert, 136.

Value, III, value and reality according to Rickert, 50.

Values, II, the disintegration of values at the end of the 19th century; J. Burckhardt's insight, and Masus's observation, 282.

Value, Absolute Truth, I, according to Rickert, 135.

Variability Type, III, points to enkapsis, 127.

Vassalage, II, the Carolingians conquered two dangers (the invasions of the Arabs, and the rising power of the Frankish lords) by the introduction of the compulsory incorporation of the private vassals into the Frankish army, 252.

Veda, II, its conception of the gods Varouna and Mitra as the guardians of rita, the astronomical world-order, 324.

Vehmgerichte, III, in the Middle Ages, 364-366.

Velzen, Cornelis van, III, Institutiones theologiae practicae, 315.

Vendetta, III, in the Clan (or Sib); proves the presence of a political structure in the clan, 356; among primitive tribes, 361.

Verband, III, is an organized community, 178; (cf. s.v. community; and: organizations), 179.

Verde, Giuseppe Lo, III, Die Lehre vom Staat im neuen Italien, 431.

Vereinbarung, III, Binding and Triepel's concept; it is a unifying volitional act, 573.

Vernunft (Reason), II, in Neo-Hegelianism, 213.

Veronese, II, extended Cantor's theory of transfinite numbers; this theory is antinomic, 87; the convergent infinite series is considered as an arithmetical concept, 91.

‘Verstand’ (cf. s.v. Understanding), I, is the logical function of thinking in Kant, 53; its usus logicus, and its usus realis, in Kant, 348; it brings unity to the phenomena by means of rules of understanding under principles, 363.

Verworfenheit (the state of Rejection), II, in Heidegger's philosophy, 22.

Verworn, III, he calls the hypothetical ‘protomeries’ by the name of ‘bio-molecules’, 643, 722.

Vicinage, III, an undifferentiated organized community, 367.

Vicious Circle, I, ascribed to our transcendental critique, 56.

Vico, II, and the idea of historical development, and historical individuality, 276.

Vitoria, Franciscus de, III, Reflectiones Theologicae, 314.

Vierkandt, Alfred,, II, Die Anfänge der Religion und Zauberei, 314.

Vierkandt, Alfred, III, Gesellschaftslehre, 243, 290, 353, 357, 358,

Vierkandt, Alfred, III, opposes von Wiese's view, 243; calls Litt's standpoint an ‘immanent universalism’, 255 (note); is influenced by the naturalistic utilitarian viewpoint in his Gesellschaftslehre; his theory of reciprocity as a biological necessity; his evolutionism: personal groups had their precursor in the animal herd from which we can imagine the human horde to have descended as the primal form of human societal life, 290, 291; Vierkandt's reasoning approaches that of Hobbes' instinct of self-preservation; but in this theory it is taken for granted that the vital conditions for a member of the group are not guaranteed by natural, pre-logical factors; in animal groups reciprocity is absolutely maintained by pre-logical factors; not so in a human group; biotic and psychic aspects of humans have an entirely different structure from that of animals; Vierkandt's evolutionism is thereby refuted; he denies the blood tie in the family as a foundation; and refers to the unmarried father's indifference; and to the love of foster parents, 291; his unfounded attack on naïve experience, 292; parental love is called forth by continual interaction favoured by sexuality and reproduction; criticism of this view; his concept ‘foundation’ has a natural causal sense, 293; Unterordnungstrieb (submissive instinct), 294; ancestor cult implies that the community continues that of the family beyond the grave, 353; the sib chieftain embodies the

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magic power of the clan, 357; on the collective responsibility in a clan, 358; Vierkandt confounds subjective motives with foundational relationships to the communal structural principle, 360.

Vinci, Leonardo Da, I, and the Idea of the ‘uomo universale’, 192; he considered nature as a teleological whole animated with life, and anticipated Galilei's mathematical mechanical analysis of empirical phenomena, 198.

Virtue and Beatitude, I, are united in the concept of the highest good, in Kant, 382.

Virtues, II, in Aristotle virtues consist in the permanent control of the lower sensory functions (the passions) by the will in conformity to the rules of practical reason; dianoetical or logical virtues, 144, 145.

Virtuosity, I, is the highest disclosure of the sovereign personality, in Shaftesbury, 462.

Virus, III, in Bernard Bavink; is a degenerated micro organism; causes mosaic disease in tobaccoplants, 84; and plants or animals, 649.

Visible Church, III, in Luther's views, 512; is not limited to the Church institution, 534; according to A. Kuyper, 539; as a ‘corporation’, according to Thorbecke, with a civil legal character; the visible Church is an institution with an internal legal sphere apart from civil law, according to Savornin Lohman, 690.

Visio omnium rerum in Deo, I, of Malebranche, 525.

Vital Matter, III, the problem of vital matter; Kolzoff; Driesch; Woltereck, 732.

Vitalism, II, in Driesch; is antinomous, 110.

Vitalism, III, misinterpreted by Driesch, 733 (note); older and Neo-vitalism, 734, 735; Woltereck's vitalism includes in life every possible phenomenon: spiritual-psychical phenomena; shell-formations; protozoa movements; temple; book; sonata; a strategic plan, etc., 764.

Vitalistic Holism, III, is to be rejected, 77.

Vitules, III, Meyer's concept, 722.

Vivo, II, replaces the cogito in Dilthey's Historism, 19.

Vleeschauwer, H.J. de, I, L'évolution de la pensée Kantienne, 341.

Vloten, J. van, I, a 19th century Spinozist who interpreted Spinoza in a rationalistic way, 250.

Voetius, G., III, Politica Ecclesiastica, 315.

Vogel, Paul, III, Hegel's Gesellschaftsbegriff, 585.

Volkelt, J., II, Erfahrung und Denken, 303; Die Quellen der menschlichen Gewissheit, 303; Gewissheit und Wahrheit, 303, 431, 475, 476.

Volkelt, J., II, identifies faith with cognitive intuition, 303; ‘reine Selbstgewissheit’ is absolutely free of thought and a-logical, 431 (note); he contrasts logical necessity with intuitive certainty, 475, 476; his view of intuition, 477.

Volksgeist, I, in Schelling's philosophy, 208, 469.

Volksgeist, II, in the Historical School of jurisprudence, 397.

Vollendung, I, and Rickert's philosophy, 131.

Vollenhoven, D.H.Th., II, De Noodzakelijkheid eener Christelijke Logica, 464.

Volenti non fit injuria, I, the general will is every citizen's own will and cannot do injustice to any one, in Rousseau, and Kant; in Marsilius of Padua, 323.

Voltaire, II, Essai sur les moeurs et sur l'esprit des nations, 352; Traité de Métaphysique, 351.

Voltaire, II, his Idea of worldhistory, 268; how he found his factual material, 269; his Idea of historical development, 350; on tradition and manners, morals; invariable principles in culture, 352; his zeal for accuracy in the description of morals and manners; extensive universality of history, 354; the original defect in his developmental idea, 354.

Vorhandene, Das (that what is given), II, in Heidegger, 22; human life is at the mercy of this datum, 524.