A New Critique of Theoretical Thought. Deel 4. Index of Subjects and Authors

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Ueberweg, I, Hist, of Philosophy, 241.

Utra Vires, II, retribution and ultra vires in Heraclitus and Parmenides; and Petraczicky's attributive imperative function, 134.

Umbgrove, Dr J.H.F., III, Leven en Materie, 736.

Una Sancta Ecclesia, III, the Church as the Body of Christ, 510.

Unam Sanctam, III, Boniface VIII's bull, and the theory of the two swords, 512.

Understanding, II, is free, active, spontaneous in Kant, 496.

Understanding and Intuition, II, according to Paul Hoffmann, 29.

Undifferentiated Organized Communities, III, Tönnies distinguishes Gemeinschaft from Gesellschaft, but not in a normative sense; his concepts ‘standard types’, or ‘normal concepts’; immediate family and extended kinship are his prototypes; they are no structural typical concepts; they also include ‘household, mark community, village- and city-guilds, etc. [cf. sub voce Tönnies], 346; the members of an undifferentiated organized community consider one another as genuine blood relatives though there is no real kinship among them; there is a natural communal mind; yet their societal relationship has only an historical foundation and is morally qualified; such societies perform structural functions that at a higher stage of cultural development belong to more than one organized community of different structures; they are ‘supra-functional’, but not ‘all-inclusive’; they are interlacements of social structures, 347; their difference from differentiated communities is not merely modal, but it is structural, and above all typical structural; a differentiated organized community may adopt typical structural functions of other societal relationships; e.g. a state owned public school, or industry, an established Church, etc. These are pheno-types; their foundational and leading functions are genotypically differentiated, 348; undifferentiated communities combine the most heterogeneous structutes in one and the same organization; these structures are interlaced in an intra communal sense, not in an intercommunal way; they are founded in some power-formation, closely bound to biotic conditions; the patriarchal ‘joint family’, the sib, etc. The predominance of a political structure in secret men's societies; problems concerning these communities, 349 [cf. sub voce W. Schmidt; and also: Kulturkreislehre]; the joint family displays a more complicated structure than the kinship; the patriarch's authority; the right of primogeniture; authority is connected with economic factors, 350; the aul among the Kirghiz has an indivisible common property belonging to from six to ten families jointly; yet the aul is not economically qualified, 351; it implies a political structure with armed power in the case of the Kirghiz ‘aul’; but the whole of it is permeated by the family mind; Fustel de Coulange describes the ancestor worship of an Undiffer. Organ. Comm. among the

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Greeks and Romans; all the generations of one and the same ‘gens’ form an ‘eternal’ whole, 352; the agnatic kinship community is its leading and central structure, 353; sibs or clans are posterior to family and kinship, 354; sibmates by birth or through adoption; sibs are dominated by the family mind; clan exogamy, 355; vendetta; a political structure is included in the sib; the sib chief: ritual; business organization; totem clans; mana belief, 356; the family bond takes the lead, 357, 358; a structural principle is not a complex of subjective motives; the sib's foundational structure is a power organization, 359; different kinds of power are united, 360; sibs are peace-organizations, 361; their division of labour, 362; secret men's societies (Männerbünde), are under the leading of a political structure; skull-cult; ancestor worship; Vehmgerichte; cruel initiation, 363, 364; they are antagonistic to matriarchy, 365; they deprive the sib chief and his council of any real power, 366; the medieval guilds, primitive vicinages, prefeudal and feudal manorial communities (villae, domaines) and seignories, etc. are also undifferentiated organized communities, 367; Aristotle's theory of society refers to the undifferentiated relationship of the Greek household, 368; the phylae and phratries; the polis; dissolution of the phylae; the ancient Roman curiae with their gentes, 369; quirites; the primitive Urnorm (primary norm); Somló's view, 370, 371; Malinowski's criticism, 371; Somló influenced by Austin's conception of sovereignty; Fritz Münch's view, 372, 373; primary primitive norms are not structural norms; the structural unity of the internal norms of the natural family, 374; primitive primary norms are interweavings of various structural norms; in a sib there are fraternal norms, internal industrial, political, cult, club norms, etc.; they are realized in the concrete structure of one and the same primitive community, 375; this structure covers up the modal aspects in the communal consciousness; comparison with norm ‘complexes’ of different structural rules destined for various differentiated communities, e.g., an Established Church in which the government of the State may enact certain ecclesiastical norms, 376.

Ungerer, E., III, Die Erkenntnisgrundlagen der Biologie. Ihre Geschichte, und gegenwärtiger Stand, 733, 735.

Ungerer, E., III, uses an ‘empirical’ criterion of organic vital phenomena as ‘autonomous totality phenomena’, 733; the theory of a specific vital force was not meant in a metaphysical-vitalistic sense, 735.

Unified Science, II, Encyclopedia of Unified Science; Foundations of the Unity of Science; Erkenntnis; Journal of Unified Science; professes a logical unity of scientific language; O. von Neurath, 59; Scientific Empiricism; Logistic; the uncritical name of ‘physicalism’; metaphors, etc., 60; this movement criticized, 60; why ‘physicalism’ is the wrong term the Un. Sc. Movement; its various schools, 60.

United Nations, III, the Charter; international security; Uno; not a civitas maxima, 600, 601.

Unity, I, arithmetical unity is the copy of a single impression, in Hume, 287.

Unity, II, of mankind, 262.

Unity of the Roman Church, III, and its hierarchy, 234, 235.

Universal, I, and particular were connected through the teleological Idea of the Intellectus, Archètypus in Kant, 405.

Universal and Individual, II, according to Aristotle, 11.

Universalia, I, are denied a ‘fundamentum in rē; Petrus Hispanus; they are mere signs in Occam; they are conceptus or intentiones animae; copies of traits in things, 184; do not have a model in natural reality, 242; are symbols of relations in Leibniz, 247.

Universalia, II, in Nominalism, Occam, 387, 388; realism pre-supposes a final hypostasis in which the nous, as the noèsis noèseoos and as the divine origin, is separated from the temporal coherence of reality in an absolute choorismos, 387.

Universalism, III, of St Simon and Aug. Comte, 163; G. Gurvitch's opinion, 165; Oppenheimer's universalism based on the substance ‘Life’, 166, 167; mankind as an all-inclusive temporal community; Comte; sociological, ontological and axiological universalism, 167; Plato's universalism, 168; absolutization of the Greek polis and the three transcendental basic problems, 169; sociological universalism cannot account for our pre-theoretical experience of a communal relationship, 182,194; the dangerous implications of such universalism, 195, 196; Plato's universalistic State, 200; and Aristotle's universalistic view of the polis, 201-203; of the conjugal and the family bond, 203, 204 and 205; the influence of the universalistic view on Aristotle's theory of the forms of government, 210; the universalistic view of the ‘Holy Roman Empire’, 217; Thomas, 218; Stoic universalism, 224; individualism versus universalism in the modern view of human society, 222-238; Othmar Spann, 239, 240; the concept of substance was revived in some modern universalistic views of society; its basis, 243; Gesammtperson and Ueberperson; the higher self-sufficient whole and its ‘organic’ constituent bodies, 244; Hegel, 244, 245; Gierke's ‘Collective Person’, 245; Othmar Spann's

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criticism of individualism, 246; Litt's theory is a kind of universalism, 254, 255; his final or highest social unity, 258; his functionalistic universalism, 259, 262.

Universalistic View of the Church, III, in Troeltsch; it embodies the medieval synthesis with the Greek ‘perfect society’, 532.

Universality, II, the universality of history because a merely extensive, geographical matter in the Enlightenment, e.g., in Voltaire, 354.

Universe (the Idea of a), III, the interstructural coherence and the idea of a universe, 627; does it embrace all temporal things, occurrences, actions, and societal relations? or is it a diversity which is not enclosed in a temporal individual totality? this is the dilemma ‘universalism’ versus ‘individualism’; Plato's idea of the world as a macrocosm and man as a microcosm; the world soul and the human soul; the idea of an autozooion; in his Politeia the State is the connecting link between macro- and microcosm; this ‘mesocosm’ embraces all societal relations as its component parts, arranging them according to the Idea of justice in its concentric relation to the Idea of goodness; the world reason is the leading part of the world soul; Plato attempted, 628, to embrace the temporal world in a totality; his view was universalistic; to Kant the universe evaporates into a theoretical limiting concept of reason only pointing to the totality of transcendental conditions of the experience of the ‘outer world’; this idea is related to the classical natural scientific concept of function; it is of an individualistic character as a cognitive ideal, 629; the individualistic conception of the universe evaporates the totality of the cosmos to a subjective limiting concept; at least insofar as any rationalistic metaphysics of the mathematical science ideal is rejected (Descartes, Leibniz); within the temporal order individuality is bound to a structural diversity lacking any integration into an all-inclusive whole; the earth and all other celestial bodies have been created in systems of physico-chemically qualified individuality structures; they cannot be construed from a functionalistic hypothesis of their origin (Kant, Laplace), nor as somato-spiritual super beings, 630; with man as a ‘part of the earth’ (G.Th. Fechner); Fechner's universalistic conception is pantheistic, 631; the universal order of interlacing coherence of all the temporal individuality structures that we call cosmos (ordered universe) cannot itself be contained in an all-embracing individuality structure, for the latter bears a type character presupposing a diversity of types; the temporal cosmos is the condition of the possibility of the order of coherence embracing all structural typicality; the transcendental idea of possibility is entirely determined by the cosmic world order; the idea of meaning totality points above itself to the temporal coherence of all the modal spheres and to the fulness of meaning in the transcendent religious root and to the Origin of creation; in a similar way the idea of individuality structure points to that which embraces all such structures and to the root and the Origin of all individuality, 632.

Socio-Cultural Universe, III, Sorokin's erroneous idea, 161.

Universitas, II, the Stoic view, 392.

Universitas, III, in Stoicism: collectivities of things without mutual sensory points of contact; the functional juridical bond holds the individual members together, 226; the Canonistic view; it is considered as a juridical name, not a person; its unity in Johannes Andreae, 233.

Upanishads, II, the speculation of the Indian Upanishads about the selfhood; the âtman (I-ness) is an absolutely abstract supra-temporal, actual centre of the contemplative intuition of essences, participating in the Brahman, the spirit of world, 324.

Uomo Universale, I, in Leonardo Da Vinci, 192.

Urbild und Abbild, III, of a sculpture, 114.

Urnorm, III, according to Somló, 370, 374-376.

Useful Object, III, is historically founded and socially qualified, 143.

Utilitarianism, II, in the disharmony of the disclosure of the economic sphere the Enlightenment only recognized inter-individual relations; the principle of supply and demand and that of the free market became an ‘unalterable law’; morality became utilitarian and autonomous, 361.

Uxkull-Gyllenband, W. Graf, II, Griechische Kulturentstehungslehren, 263.