A New Critique of Theoretical Thought. Deel 4. Index of Subjects and Authors

T

Taboo, II, is the negative counterpart of mana, 317.

Taine, Hyppolite, II, on the spirit of classicism, 345.

Talion, II, is a primitive principle implying juridical economy, 67.

Tao, II, is the identification of retributive justice (in the order of nature) and inescapable necessity, found, a.o., in the old Chinese idea of Tao, 133.

Tarwad, III, the tarwad house and tarwad property; and polyandry, 341.

Task of the State, III, and the structure of the body politic, are confounded by Jellinek, 432.

Taste, I, is the basic faculty for ethics and aesthetics, in Shaftesbury, 463.

Taxis, III, is an ordering principle concerning the distribution of authority and benefits, 208; Aristotle's concept is a general metaphysical idea, applied in his discussion of body and soul, 209, 211; its sociological sense is an analogy, 212; accepted by Thomas Aquinas, 219.

Taxon, III, in biology, 80, 81.

Technè, II, is not purely objective; its norms; its communal character; progress and reaction; authorities, 258; is only a formative factor if discovery or invention is generally accepted in society, 259.

Technical Economy, II, the intermodal coherence between economy and technique is only developed at a higher stage of culture, 67.

Technique, II, technical economy, 67; technical authorities, industry; tools, norms, 258; inventions, 259; technicizing of economic life, 361; technique, its excessive power, 362.

Technique, Modern, III, and the correlation between differentiation and integration, 593.

Teleology, I, ‘the formal teleology of nature’; dictates the law of specification, in Kant, 389.

Teleology, II, is opposed to causality in Stammler, 16, 17.

Teleology, III, versus destination, 60; teleological world-plan in Diogenes of Apolonia; he applies Anaxagoras' idea to the interpretation of particular natural phenomena, 633.

Tenderness, III, in the family tone, 285; family feeling is opened by the moral function into tenderness, 293.

Terminism, II, Occam ascribed an exclusively intentional existence to the universalia as symbolical signs (i.e. termini) by which only empirical things are signified; he is inclined to identify the intentional concept with the actus intelligendi, 388.

Termites, II, the remarkable works built by beavers and termites in social cooperation do not have a cultural character, 198.

Territorial System, III, of Lutheran church government, ousted the Episcopal system, and was inspired by the wish to guarantee tolerance to the Pietists, 517.

Testament, The Old and the New, I, form an unbreakable unity, 177.

Tetens, II, faculty psychology, 111.

Theism, I, of Descartes and Leibniz, 122.

Theodicy, I, of Leibniz, 252, 259, 260, 261.

Theologia Naturalis, I, in Occam, 67; in Thomas Aquinas, 180.

Theology, I, in Aristotle, 72; and philosophy, in Augustinus, 178; the queen of sciences, 510.

Theology, II, is a theory based on the synthesis of the logical function of thought and the temporal function of faith, 562.

Theology, III, a philosophical difference cannot be reduced to a theological difference; Marlet and Robbers try to do so, 73.

Theoria, I, in Greek thought claims autonomy with respect to popular faith; versus pistis, in Parmenides, 35; in Greek thought was dominated by the form-matter motive since Aristotle, 36; enables man to attain the union of human thought with the Divine pure Form, 72.

Theoretical Activity, I, is hypostatized as an immortal ousia or substance, 44.

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Theoretical Analysis, I, in theor. analysis reality appears to split up into various modal aspects, 3.

Theoretical Antinomies, I, their source, 45, 46; in Kant; mathematical and dynamical antinomies, 368.

Theoretical Attitude, I, of thought, 35.

Theoretical Concept, I, what it defines, 30.

Theoretical Intuition, II, plays no part in Kant's functionalistic critique of knowledge, 501.

Theoretical Knowledge, I, is only ‘image’ in Fichte, 457.

Theoretical Reason, I, is not an unproblematic datum, 40; it was Kant's basis of theoretical synthesis, 49.

Theoretical Synthesis, I, its starting point in immanence phil., 45, 46.

Theoretical Thought, I, reality appears to split up into various modal aspects in theor. thought, 3; this thought is impossible without conceptual determination, 5; concept formation rests upon a sharp distinction among the aspects and a synthesis of the logical with the non-logical aspects; the process of theor. thought is anti-thetical; the non-logical aspects are made into a Gegenstand, 18; in the philosophical-theoretical attitude we approximate time - and temporal reality - only in an analytical setting asunder of its modal aspects, which nevertheless continue to express their coherence in their intrinsic structure, 34; the first transcendental problem of theoretical thought, 38; the anti-thetical attitude of such thought: Gegenstand is that which resists our analytical function and is opposed to it; the theoretical antithesis can only present itself within the temporal total structure of the act of thinking; the anti-thetical structure is intentional, not ontical; in logical analysis the aspect which is opposed to the logical function is distinguished theoretically from the remaining aspects, 39; x opposite to y, and both to the logical function; the resistant, i.e. the Gegenstand, continues to express its coherence with the other non-logical aspects that have not been chosen as the field of enquiry, 40; the first transcendental problem as to the theoretical attitude is the ‘Gegenstand relation’, (cf. sub voce); what do we abstract from empirical reality and how is such abstraction possible; confrontation with the naïve attitude; (cf. sub voce), 41; dogmatic theory of knowledge considered the theoretical attitude as an unproblematic datum, eradicated the difference between theoretical and naïve attitudes and identified the subject-object relation with the antithetic Gegenstand relation, 43; to this fact it is to be ascribed that philosophical and theological anthropology had a dichotomistic conception of human nature as a composition of a material body and an immortal rational soul; Plato and Aristotle (cf. sub voce) hypostatized the theoretical activity of thought in its logical aspect as an immortal ousia or substance; Thomas Aquinas held that the entire rational soul, characterized as it was by the theoretical activity of thought, must be an immortal and purely spiritual substance; this conclusion was directed by the dualistic form-matter motive, 44; the antithetical attitude offers resolute resistance against every attempt to reduce one of the aspects to another; it avenges absolutizations by involving theoretical thought in internal antinomies; theoretical synthesis is a union, but not a deeper unity of the logical and non-logical; it pre-supposes a supra-theoretical startingpoint; absolutization points to such a starting-point, 46; theoretical distinction of the non-logical aspects presupposes an insight into their mutual relationships and coherence, i.e., a basic denominator for comparing them; they cannot be distinguished unless they have something in common; this denominator is the cosmic time-order; on the immanence standpoint another denominator is sought, e.g., by absolutizing one of the aspects; in Greek metaphysics by accepting the metaphysical concept of being as a so-called ‘analogical unity’; the theoretical vision of reality is the vision of the abstracted modal aspects in the totality of their coherence, 47; the theoretical vision in pure mathematics; different schools: logicism, symbolistic formalism, empiricism, intuitionism; ‘isms’ in logic; in ethics, aesthetics, and theology, 48; Kant started from theoretical reason as the basis of every theoretical synthesis, 49; the central problem of theoretical thought is concerned with the relation between the thinking ego and its theoretical-logical function; the antithetic structure of theoretical thought obliged Kant to oppose the logical function to the other aspects of thinking, but he identified the act with a purely psychical temporal event which could become a Gegenstand of the transcendental logical ‘cogito’; the real act can never be a ‘Gegenstand’ of its logical function, 50; as long as theoretical thought is directed to its ‘Gegenstand’ only, it remains dispersed in a theoretical diversity; it must acquire the concentric direction to an ultimate unity of consciousness lying at the root of all modal diversity, i.e., to the thinking ego; human I-ness is a central and radical unity, as such transcending all temporal aspects; the way of critical self-reflection only can lead to the discovery of the true starting-point of theoretical thought, 51; the concentric

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direction of theoretical thought cannot have a theoretical origin; it springs from the ego as the individual centre of human existence, 54; the selfhood can only give this central direction to its theoretical thought by concentrating upon the absolute Origin of all meaning; self-knowledge depends on the knowledge of God; both exceed the limits of theoretical thought and are rooted in the ‘heart’, i.e., the religious centre of our existence; this central supra-theoretical knowledge penetrates the temporal sphere of our consciousness, 55; the alleged vicious circle in our transcendental criticism; we have only proved that the concentric direction of thought in self-reflection cannot originate from the theoretical attitude of thought itself; it can only issue from the ego as a supra-theoretic individual centre of human existence; only the contents of the supra-theoretical pre-suppositions can be questionable, but not their necessity, 56; the thesis that the startingpoint of theoretical thought is only to be found in the central religious sphere of consciousness is no longer to be proved theoretically, because this insight belongs to self-knowledge and transcends the theoretical attitude; without such knowledge the true character of the chosen starting-point remains hidden from us, 57; the concentric direction in theoretical thought must be of religious origin, although it is always bound to the anti-thetical Gegenstand-relation; critical selfreflection in the concentric direction of theoretical thought to the ego necessarily appeals to self-knowledge; here lies the point of contact between philosophic thought and religion; the supra-individual character of the starting-point; the selfhood has an intrinsically ex-sistent character; so the starting-point of philos. thinking is not in the individual ego alone; the I-ness shares in the Archimedean point in which the whole cosmos centres, 59; philosophy can be cultivated only in a community; the starting-point is supra-individual; our I-ness is rooted in the spiritual community of mankind, first in Adam, in whom the whole of the human race has fallen, then in Jesus Christ, in Whom the new humanity is rooted as the members of one body; our I-ness lives in the -We- directed to the divine -Thou-, 60; (cf. sub voce ‘Gegenstand’); the I-ness penetrates with scientific thought deeper into its Gegenstand and reveals its own deficiency in comparison with naïve experience, 84; theoretical thought should not dominate a life and world view, says Litt, 155; theoretical thought was believed to be impartial and infallible, in the Enlightenment, 170.

Theoretical Thought, II, is religiously determined, and not selfsufficient, 41; is bound within the limits of the temporal coherence of meaning, 41; speculation rejected by St Paul in Romans 9, 42; cannot be emancipated from the cosmic temporal order, 47.

Theoretical Truth, I, identified with theoretical correctness in Litt, 139.

Theoretical Vision, I, of reality, 46-48.

Theory of Law, Pure, II, is antinomous in H. Kelsen, 17; is a logification of the jural aspect, 46.

Thieme, Hans, III, Naturliches Privatrecht und Spät. scholastik, 314.

Thing, II, corporeal and incorporeal things in Roman Law, 394.

Thinghood, I, is only due to impressions separated in time but united by associational relations, in Hume, 293.

Thinghood, III, is theoretically explained away as a category of relation; or as a metaphysical concept of substance; a fictitious union of associated impressions; a constant system of functional relations; thinghood is experienced in the naïve attitude in its integral individuality structure, 28; Husserl's misinterpretation of the thing structure; naïve experience of a linden tree; focussing our theoretical attention on it, implies theoretical abstraction, for the tree is not experienced as a separate independent entity; the ‘simple’ only occurs in the full complexity of a universal interlacement of structures, 54; the different subject and object functions of the tree do not together constitute it as a thing; not even its modal individuality in the aspects; the functional coherence seemingly absorbs the tree's individual functions, 55; a tree's last subject function, 56; its object functions; its logical object function cannot be eliminated, 57, 58; the internal modal typical opening process and the modal anticipations, the structural coherence; our implicit inarticulate awareness of this structure, 59; a thing's integral unity; the leading, qualifying function indicates the intrinsic destination of a thing in the temporal world-order; no teleology or entelechy; external teleological relations lie outside a thing's internal integral actual unity although they play an essential part in our naïve experience; we do not confound the inner nature of a tree with the needs of other beings which it may satisfy because of the subject-object relations of naïve experience, Aristotle's entelechy of a living thing, 60; but the structure of individuality of a living thing is incompatible with Aristotle's conception of the ‘inner telos of a natural ousia’; metabolism in a living organism does not eradicate the boundaries between its modal functions; sphere-sovereignty, 61; there is not a hidden entelechy or vital force which can explain metabolism in its physical chemical

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structure; there is no encroachment of vital energy on this physical chemical structure; Stoker's concept of substance; individuality structures belong to another dimension of our experience than the modal structures, 62; modal irreducibility is founded in the same temporal order as the plastic horizon of human experience; the seeming contradiction between modal sphere sovereignty and the internal unity of a thing is only due to the Gegenstand-relation; the theoretical epochè of cosmic continuity; every modality of an individual whole has a bottom-layer in the continuous inter-modal coherence of cosmic time; the internal thing-causality is not parallelism nor modal interaction of functions, 63; the problem of body and soul arose from the absolutization of the Gegenstand relation; Stoker's objections; time is not an external cause in the structures of individuality; but the various functions are intrinsically temporal; the continuity of cosmic time is intermodal but not empty, 64; reality has its intermodal bottom-layer in the continuity of cosmic time; the individual identity of a thing receives its determination from its internal structural principle and is intuitively experienced in the naïve attitude; the transcendental Idea of the individual whole is the cosmological a priori of the theoretical analysis of its modal functions; we are unable to isolate the cosmic temporal bottom layer of a thing structure, nor can we theoretically isolate our intuitive faculty, 65; the possibility of the internal unfolding process in a tree is an unsolvable problem; to grasp a thing's temporal unity within the functional diversity of our cosmos, we must appeal to the naïve experience of time; philosophy cannot replace naïve experience, 66; the individuality structure of a tree embraces all the modal aspects in subject-object relations of naïve experience; it individualizes the modal functions and groups them together in a typical way within the cadre of an individual whole, 76; this individuality horizon is the ground of a thing's temporal unity in the diversity of its functions; modern vitalistic holism rejected; the structural unity of a thing has a law- and a subject-side; its modal functions can only become its internal structural functions insofar as they express the structural unity as an individual whole, 77; see further sub voce: Individuality-structure.

Thomas Aquinas, I, De Instantibus, 26.

Thomas Aquinas, I, time as the numerical measure of motion can have real existence only in the soul, although it has a fundamentum in re in the motion of matter, 26; following his teacher Albertus Magnus, Thomas Aquinas sought to adapt to Christian doctrine the speculative Aristotelian philosophy in interrelation with neo-Platonic, Augustinian and other motives forming the common property of Christian thought in the patristic period: the lex aeterna with the lex naturalis, Christian and pagan ideas were seemingly made to converge, 173; compare sub voce Christian Philosophy, pp. 179-181; the lex naturalis, immanent to natural substances, relates to a transcendent lex aeterna (the plan of creation in the Divine Mind); this lex aeterna is Divine reason; the obligating force of the lex naturalis is derived from the will of the Creator; providence is the teleological natural order and hierarchy of substantial forms; the Divine Origin of this order is the first cause and final goal of the whole temporal movement in nature from matter to form, 182; in the sphere of supra-natural grace the Divine Origin is conceived in the light of Revelation, the lex naturalis has its complement in the lex charitatis et gratiae, 183; he accepted Aristotle's axiological view of theory and practice, 538.

Thomas Aquinas, II, Quaestiones disputatae de veritate, 21, 566, 567; Summa Theologiae, 21, 85, 386, 419; Expositio in Metaphysica, 21; In Sent. II, dis. III, q. 2., a. 2., 386, 419; Quaestiones sup. Metaph., 389.

Thomas Aquinas, II, on ‘being’; metaphysical unity, etc. as grounds of being, 21; on object and subject; esse intentionale et esse subjective, 367; principium individuationis; formae separatae, 419; and the human soul, 419.

Thomas Aquinas, III, Summa Theologiae, 6, 12, 321, 707, 714; De ente et essentia, 12, 16; Summa c. gent., 12, 221; De Regimine principum, 219, 221; Comm. Aristot. Politica, 219, 221; cf. 323.

Thomas Aquinas, III, accepted Boethius' definition of personality, 6; held substance to be unknowable, 12; form is the cause of the being of matter; matter is the principle of individuality, 16; but then ‘substance’ is not possibly: individuality structure; Thomas accepts Aristotle's principium individuationis; and also the creative Ideas in the Divine Logos of Augustinian Scholastics; the result was insoluble antinomies in the view of the soul's immortality; dialectical dualism in the explanation of the Aristotelian Thomistic categories, 17; he accommodated Aristotle's theory of organized communities to the Christian conception of the human race as the ‘body of Christ’; nature and supra-natural grace, 214; Thomism combined the universalistic view of the Church institution with Aristotle's conception of the State; Aristotle's ‘substantial essential form’ of human nature; the

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household is the germ of the State; guilds are called organic components of the State; the city-state and the Holy Roman Empire were both perfect autarchical communities (societas perfecta) in the ‘natural’ sphere; Church and faith are the sphere of ‘grace’; the State is an organic ‘unitas ordinis’, even man is ‘unitas ordinis’, 218; Aristotle's concept ‘taxis’ is accepted by Thomas; the controlling part makes the components to cohere and to form a unity for the purpose of the communal good; analogy to the unitas ordinis in the human body; reason produces the State as the perfect and supreme natural community; the State is higher than all other communities and includes them all as its organic constituents, 219; the Thomistic theory of organized communities only knows about autonomy of the lower communities, not-about sphere-sovereignty; its universalistic ‘natural society’ idea; the supplying of temporal goods as a basis for striving after eternal salvation; one single limitation of the State's task; the Church is the perfect society in the supra-natural sphere of grace; and can elevate natural life to supernatural perfection; it decides which affairs are natural and which are supernatural, 220; the Church is the infallible interpreter of natural law and the limits of the State's competence; the Greek absolutization of the State is broken through; Thomas recognizes subjective natural rights of individual man; positive law is bound to natural law; but there is no natural sphere of the lower communities exempt from the State's authority; the autonomy of medieval corporations; its difference from sphere sovereignty, 221; his definition of res publica, 227; universalia only exist in abstracto, 233; Aristotle's view of the family and of education was supplemented by its supra-natural completion of educating children to be good sons and daughters of the church as the institution of grace; a teleological view, 267; Roman Catholic moral philosophers conceived of love as an effect of pleasure in a corresponding good originating in a sensory knowledge of such good which rouses sensual appetite; spiritual love derives from spiritual knowledge through reason (nous) affecting the appetitive faculty, 321; he holds that the essential structure of marriage can be deduced from the cosmic principle of propagation; this view eradicates the difference between marriage and family; he calls posterity essential to the marriage bond; but allows sexual intercourse in a barren marriage, 323; he calls woman ‘mas occasionatus’, only ‘aliquid viri’; not ‘civis simpliciter’, 329; a substance can only possess one single substantial form, 707; a plurality of ‘substantial forms’ is incompatable with the ‘unity of substance’, 714.

Thomasius, II, law regulates external behaviour, 151; on subjective rights, 395.

Thomasius, III, his criterion of law as a coercive regulation; adopted by Kant, 427; his Humanistic idea of tolerance, 517; the secular government authority in church maters has to maintain the external peace in the Church; it has to abstain from any maintenance of doctrinal discipline except for the purpose of safeguarding he external peace in the interest of the State; this task was entrusted to the secular governors ‘sine concursu necessario Theologorum’; this is the territorial system, 517.

Thomism, I, in the proper use of natural reason philosophy can never come into contradiction with supernatural truths of grace in the Church-doctrine; Aristotelian metaphysics is accommodated to the ecclesiastical dogma, 36; Thomistic metaphysics will deny the religious foundation of the transcendental Idea of totality and origin of the modal diversity of meaning in its internal coherence; it will argue that our thought has an immanent and autonomous transcendental concept of a whole that is more than the sum of its parts; but this concept hides the relation between modal diversity and totality and unity of meaning; Thomism considers the transcendental concept to be implied in the analogical concept of being; this argument criticized; the Aristotelian metaphysical concept of being, 71; is ruled by the form-matter motive, which is religious; pure matter and pure form; pure matter is the principle of potentiality and imperfection, pure form is identified with God as pure actuality, the unmoved Mover of material nature; the proofs of the existence of God as the unmoved Mover; they leap from the relative to the absolute and pre-suppose the conception of God which should be proved; Heraclitus deified matter but could never ask for an unmoved Mover as prime cause of empirical movement; Aristotle's Metaphysics speaks about the mystical moments of union of human thought with the divine pure Form through theological theoria; Thomas' view of the autonomy of natural reason implied a meaning of autonomy quite different from the Aristotelian conception; the analogical concept of being does not explain in what way the theoretic meaning diversity can be concentrated on a deeper unity; it cannot even explain he modal coherence which is the pre-supposition of a true analogy, 72, 73; Medieval Thomism and Greek thought, 173; compare sub voce: Christian Philosophy, pp. 179-181; the intrinsic dialectic of the Scholastic basic motive of nature and grace created polar tendencies but they were effectively checked by ecclesiastical excommunication; in the late Middle Ages the medieval ecclesiastically unified

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culture began to collapse; 14th century Nominalism turned against realistic Scholasticism with its doctrine of the reality of the universalia (i.e. the universal forms); Petrus Aureoli and Durandus of St Porcain took up the Nominalist tradition; William of Occam became the leader; Nominalism became a cultural factor of worldwide significance, 183; Occam attacked the metaphysical conception of the Aristotelian ‘substantial forms’ on which the Thomistic Idea of the understructure of the order of grace was based; Occam's views, 184 ff; Thomism held to the primacy of the intellect; Occam defended the primacy of the will; this antithesis was originally unrelated to the conflict between realism and nominalism; Duns Scotus, a more consistent realist than Thomas, contended the primacy of the will, like the Augustinian School; Occam and the Nominalists criticized Thomism so that the motives of nature and grace were separated; Humanism then developed the line of ‘autonomous natural thought’, 187; the Aristotelian-Thomistic ‘substantial forms’ were based in a lex aeterna, and differed fundamentally from the super-temporal ‘substance’ in Modern Humanistic Philosophy, 202; in the Aristotelian Thomistic doctrine of natural law the body politic is founded on the substantial form of human nature; the doctrine of the appetitus socialis, 311.

Thompson, R.E., III, A History of the Presbyterian Churches in the United States, 521.

Thompson, R.E., III, asserts that the church elders are representatives of the church in the same sense as a nation has its representatives in Parliament, 521.

Thon, II, Rechtsnorm und subjektives Recht, 400, 403.

Thon, II, on subjective rights, 397; subjective rights in the claim granted by the lawgiver to the individual by permitting other norms to be enforced in case the primary norms protecting him are infringed, 400; showed that the power of disposal may occur apart from a subj. right; e.g. the conveyance of fraudulently converted personal property to a bona fide third party; he carried to absurdity the doctrine that the power of enjoyment is essential to a subj. right, 403; his positivistic psychologistic theory of subj. right cancelled the power of enjoyment, contained in the concept of subjective right, 403; Hobbes' view shared by Thon, 403.

Thorbecke, III, Aanteekening op de Grondwet, 679, 690.

Thorbecke, III, the ‘visible’ church is an ordinary civil society, a ‘corporation’ in the sense of the Civil Code; its internal regulations have a civil legal character; private law is identical with civil law, 690.

Thrownness, I, of man, according to Existentialism, 215.

Thurston, III, Castes and Tribes of Southern India, 340.

Thurston, III, the practice of polyandry was to prevent the splitting up of the family property, 340.

Tillich, III, Kirche und Kultur, 539.

Time, I, is the medium through which the meaning totality is broken up into a modal diversity of aspects, 16; in Aristotle time cannot exist outside the soul, 25; in Thomas Aquinas, 26; as a fourth dimension; in Bergson it is the psychical duration of feeling; in Humanistic thought; in Kant it is a transcendental form of intuition, 27; as order and as duration in organic life; the temporal order of birth, maturing, adulthood, aging, and dying, 28; in the logical aspect, 30; as an existential of the ‘authentic’ ego, 58; in Einstein's theory, 85; Augustinus broke with the Greek vision of time and paved the way for an Idea of historical development, 179; in Hume, is an ‘Idea’ formed out of the sequence of changing sensory ‘impressions’ and ‘ideas’, 286; a synthetical form of the inner sense, in Kant, 347.

Time, II, the continuity of cosmic time, 4; mathematical time is simultaneity, 85; kinematical time, 100; time in the numerical and in the spatial sphere, 102, 103; indications of time in language, 127; historical time, 193; time according to Oswald Spengler, 283; historical time is the essence of the selfhood in Heidegger, 525; time and our selfhood, 531; our selfhood transcends time, 535.

Time, III, in Russell; he identifies psychological with physical time, 24; time is not an external cause in the individuality structures and it is not empty, 64; cosmic time is the intermodal bottom layer of reality, 65.

Tissue Cells, III, 772.

Tisza Incident, III, and international relations, 486.

Tolerance, III, the Humanistic idea of tolerance in Thomasius; Spener was opposed to this Humanism, 517.

Tönnies, Ferdinand, III, Einführung in die Soziologie, 245, 571, 573, 579; Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft, 346, 408, 409; Handworterbuch des Soziologie, hrg. v. A. Vierkandt, Tönnies' Treatise: Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft, 346; Kritik der öffentlichen Meinung, 490.

Tönnies, Ferdinand, III, Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft, 178; his concept of ‘community’, 183; Gemeinschaft is an essential ‘social organism’ in which the individual is in-

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grown; Gesellschaft is the mechanical aggregate of transitory social ties and relations that are the products of human arbitrariness; Wesenswille and Kürwille, 184; examples of Gemeinschaften: marriage, family, domestic relationship, mark-community, sib, village, ancient and medieval cities, guilds, religious community, church. Gesellschaft is destructive to culture; two periods of cultural development; examples: modern city with trade and industry; politics; cosmopolitan life; Tönnies' view passes into a philosophy of history; he extols medieval corporations and depreciates the process of differentiation, 185; his Marxian pessimism of the development of the ‘capitalist’ society; Gemeinschaft as ‘organism’ is Schelling's idea; differentiated and undifferentiated societal relationships, 186; social Dynamics, 187; corporate persons like organized authoritative communities have a unity capable of volition and action, at least to the minds of their members they are persons similar to individual men; Tönnies means this equalization only in a fictitious sense, 245; his irrationalist romantic conception of ‘Gemeinschaft’ is normative and opposed to ‘Gesellschaft’; the former completely realized in medieval society, 271; family life is a standard example of a ‘Gemeinschaft’ but may show such defects that its real community is destroyed, which fact is unaccountable in Tönnies' view, 272; Gemeinschaft rests on an instinctive basis and is ruled by a ‘natural will’; prototypes are the immediate family and the extended kinship; he includes the domestic community, the mark-community, the medieval town with its guilds; but his concept of community has no typical structural character, 346; [cf. sub voce: Undifferentiated Organized Communities], his distinction between community and association (Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft) is given a peculiar turn by Darmstaedter, 408-410; Tönnies cannot appreciate ‘public opinion’ because of his rationalistic individualistic view of the ‘Gesellschaft’, 490; he adopts Weber's ideal-typical method and does not sufficiently distinguish free organizations from institutional communities, 571; Tönnies says that a ‘Gesellschaft’ is based on the principle of do ut des, 573; he considers the contract containing the external rational purpose the exhaustive explanation of the ‘Körperschaften’ without a ‘communal mind’; he calls their internal unity a ‘construction of thought’, 579.

Tool, II, wherever tools are found to control nature, be it in ever so primitive a form, we are on historical ground, in a cultural area, 258.

Totality and Chance, III, their dualism in Driesch, 747.

Totality Idea, I, the coherence of all the aspects refers to a totality, 4; the self is a subjective totality lying at the basis of all the functions, 5; philosophical thought is theoretical thought of the totality, 7; thought must be directed to the idea of totality; I must choose my standpoint in the meaning totality of our temporal cosmos; I must participate in this totality; but I must not lose myself in the modal speciality, which I must transcend; this standpoint is the Archimedean point of philosophy; the totality view is not possible without a view of the origin or ἀϱχή of totality and speciality of meaning, 8; the metaphysical concept of totality, 71; is logically formalized in Husserl; the philosophical idea of totality, 73.

Totality Idea, III, its fourfold use, 424.

Totalitarian States, III, in Aristotle, 398; rule more than a third part of mankind, 601.

Totemism, II, in totemism the members of a clan identify themselves with the totem-animal or the totem-plant. They are storks, kangoroos, coconut palms, etc. They have a diffuse personality awareness, 318; according to Durkheim, 318; in totemistic communities, Cassirer supposes that all individuality of the members is absorbed by the group, 320.

Totemistic Clans, III, arose from economic causes according to Koppers, 359; they may be divided into matriarchal phratries; age-groups; secret men's societies, 363, 364.

Tourtual, III, distinguishes two kinds of sense impressions, 43.

Toynbee, II, his concept of the challenge, 252; and mission, 253.

Trade Unions, III, are qualified by the moral bond of solidarity between labourers, 576.

Tradition, II, is what is handed down from generation to generation, 202, and progress; vital and dead elements, 232; tradition is not a norm, 242; its struggle with progress, 243, 250, 256; tradition and manners and morals, in Voltaire, 352.

Transactions of the Unity of Science, II, start from the idea that there is a logical unity of scientific language, 59.

Transcendence of the Selfhood, I, overlooked by Rickert; is not appreciated on the immanence standpoint, 23.

Transcendence of the Selfhood, II, of the selfhood, in Nic Hartmann has been lost, 20; of the selfhood, in Heidegger, 531.

Transcendence of the Selfhood, III, God's transcendence is supposed to have been overemphasized by Calvin, according to Marlet, 72.

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Transcendent versus Transcendental, I, with reference to criticism, 37, 88.

Transcendent Super-Temporal I-ness, II, is the pre-supposition of the intermodal meaning synthesis as an actus, 472.

Transcendent, II, the ideal form world in Plato has transcendent being in the Eleatic sense, and includes the numbers themselves (eidetic numbers) together with the exact geometrical figures, 9.

Transcendent Horizon, II, of experience, 552; encompasses the cosmic temporal, the modal and the plastic horizon, 560.

Transcendent and Transcendental Horizon, II, both identified in irrationalism, in Scheler, e.g., 591.

Transcendent Root, I, of human existence is the rational moral function of sovereign personality, in Kant, 356.

Transcendent Root, The, II, and the fulness of individuality has been saved in Christ, 418.

Transcendentalia, II, in Scholasticism, in Occam, 388, 389; in Thomas Aquinas and in Aristotle, 566.

Transcendental basic Idea, The, I, religious basic motives control the immanent course of philosophic thought, 68; through the medium of a triad of transcendental Ideas: the coherence, the totality and the Origin of all meaning; these are related to the three stages of critical self-reflection in theoretical thought, 69; analogia entis, 71; the abstract character of the transcendental basic Idea, 82; the transc. basic Idea implies a relation to the cosmonomic side as well as to the factual subject side of temporal reality, the subject side is by nature individual; the transc. basic Idea is also a basic Idea of type and individuality, 83.

Transcendental basic Idea, The, II, and the continuity of cosmic time, is the hypothesis of philosophical thought, 4; of the meaning totality, 8; the transcendental Idea of Christian philosophy, 25; refers to the totality and to the arche and is concentrated to the transcendent reality; transc. Id. of the meaning coherence, 42; and the concept of Gegenstand, 44; the transc. Idea of the Origin implies that of the human ego as the centre of the empirical world; the Idea of creation guides our philosophy; man is the lord of the creation, 53; transc. id. of the totality turns thought in a transcendental direction, 54; transc. id. of time is the Idea of the cosmic order of succession of the aspects, 54; the transc. idea of a modal function, 486.

Transcendental Basic Motive, I, the influence of dialectical basic motives on the philosophical conceptions of time: the Greek form-matter motive, 25; in Albert the Great, Thomas Aquinas, Augustinus, 26; the Humanistic basic motive of nature and freedom; Kant's Kritik der reinen Vernunft; Bergson's vitalistic view of time; Dilthey, Heidegger, 27; the form-matter motive and Thomistic anthropology, its dichotomy of body and rational soul, 44; the motive of form and matter in Greek thought and culture; the Christian motive of the Divine Word Revelation: creation, fall and redemption, 61; the modern Humanistic life-and-world-view with its motive of nature and freedom; the Humanistic basic motive; the Roman Catholic motive of nature and grace; the Christian motive of creation, fall, redemption, 63; the origin of the religious dialectic in idolatrous basic motives (cf. s.v. Religion, 64); the R.-C. Scholastic motive of nature and grace; why this motive fails to realize the central place that the Biblical revelation assigns to the human heart; the dichotomistic conception of the relation of body and soul, 65; the antithesis between Thomism and Occamism; and that between K. Barth and E. Brunner; the ascription of the primacy to one of the antithetic components of the dialectical ground-motive entails the depreciation of the other; Ionian philosophy held to the primacy of the matter-motive, 66; Dionysian and Orphic movements; Ionian philosophy deprived the form-principle of its divine character; the true god is form-less, the eternally flowing stream of life (water, air, fire) or in Anaximander an invisible ‘apeiron’ flowing in the stream of time and avenging the injustice of the transitory individual forms; in Socrates, Plato and Aristotle the form has primacy; the deity is ‘pure Form’; matter loses its divinity; Occamism depreciates ‘natural reason’, he rejects metaphysics and natural theology, although the autonomy of natural reason is maintained to the utmost; the grace-motive retains the primacy, but not in a synthetic hierarchical sense as in Thomism; in modern Humanistic thought the antithesis between autonomous science and autonomous personal freedom is at first hardly realized; Rousseau depreciated science and ascribed primacy to the freedom-motive, the main spring of his religion of feeling; Kant follows Rousseau, depriving all nature from any divine character and denying its divine origin; God is a postulate of the practical reason, 67; the freedom motive has the absolute religious primacy in modern phil. of life, and in existentialism; the meaning of each of the antithetic components of a basic motive depends on that of the other, 68.

Transcendental Consciousness, II, is the origin of ‘form’ in Kantian sense, a transcendental condition of universally valid sensory experience, a constructive

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a-priori, 12; constitutes the ‘Gegenstand’, according to Husserl, 467; is hypostatized to the super-individual subject proper of theoretical knowledge, 583; individualized and personalized by Scheler, 587.

Transcendental Critique, I, the first way of a transcendental critique of philosophic thought, 3-22; no philosophical thought is possible without a transcendent starting point, 22; the first way started from the position that philosophy is necessarily directed to the meaning totality, to the selfhood and to the Archè, 34; the second way starts with an examination of the structure of the theoretical attitude of thought as such, 35; the dogma concerning the autonomy of theoretical thought, 35-37; difference between transcendent and transcendental criticism; the necessity of transcendental criticism of the theoretical attitude, 37; the Gegenstand-relation, 38; it is intentional, 39; the first transcendental basic problem; naïve and theoretical attitude compared, 41; subject-object relation in naïve experience, 42, 43; the second basic problem, concerning the starting-point of theoretical synthesis, 45; the source of theoretical antinomies, and various ‘isms’, 46; the basic denominator, 47; Kant's starting-point, 49, 50; starting-point and critical self-reflection, 51; the third basic problem about the possibility and nature of critical self-reflection, 52, 53, 54, 55; the alleged vicious circle in our transcendental criticism, 56; the supra-individual starting-point, 59; the religious basic motive, 61; the form-matter motive; the Humanistic motive of nature and freedom; the Christian motive; the Scholastic motive, 62, 63; the dialectical character of apostate basic motives; religious and theoretical dialectic; attempts to achieve a synthesis; the motive of nature and grace, 65; the shift in the primacy, 66, 67; the three transcendental Ideas of theoretical thought are the medium for the control of this thought by the religious motive, 68; they form a tri-unity; they answer the three fundamental problems as three directions of one and the same transcendental basic Idea; this Idea also lies at the basis of the various special sciences, 69; the sciences are dependent on philosophy in their theoretic conception of reality and of the method of forming concepts and positing problems; the transcendental critique can pave the way for a real contact among the various philosophical trends of thought; it unmasks dogmatic prejudices of a supra-theoretical character; it sharply distinguishes between theoretical judgments and supra-theoretical ones, 70; transcendental critique of the metaphysical concept of the analogia entis, 71-73; opens the way to a better mutual understanding of the various schools of thought, 526.

Transcendental Deduction, I, in Kant, was intended to explain why the categories are necessarily related to the ‘Gegenstand’, 353.

Transcendental Determinations, II, in Aristotle's metaphysics, e.g., the being true, and the being good; Augustinus' Veritas est id quod est, identifies ‘truth’ and ‘being’, 20; there are three of them in Kant, 58.

Transcendental Direction, II, of time, 186.

Transcendental Ideas, I, a transcendental Idea is a limiting Concept, 24; the transc. Idea of religion, 57; transc. Id. in Kant; the three-unity of the transcendental Ideas; their content depends on supra-theoretical pre-suppositions, 89; in Cohen the transc. idea is the self-consciousness of the logical concept, 91; the absolutized logical category, 363.

Transcendental Ideas of Possibility and Necessity, II, are conceived in the cosmonomic Idea; they become speculative metaphysical as soon as they absolutize the horizon of human experience into an internal rational order, 551.

Transcendental Idealism, I, assumes that since Kant and Fichte the fundamental antinomy between the science and the personality-ideal has been solved, 205; transcendental freedom-idealism was inaugurated by Kant, 325; it was the first trend to penetrate to the foundation of the science-ideal, 499.

Transcendental Idealism, II, is guilty of identifying a modal Idea with the meaning totality of the cosmos, 187; stands and falls with the acceptance of a transcendental-theoretical consciousness which ‘constitutes’ the world as its ‘Gegenstand’ and eventually constitutes itself, 549; on universally valid, transcendental truth, 573.

Transcendental Imagination, II, the problem of the intermodal synthesis in Kant's doctrine of the ‘transcendental imagination’, 513 ff.; the transcendental imagination is the original essential unity of the stems of knowledge in Kant, according to Heidegger's explanation, 525.

Transcendentalism and Moralism, II, in Kant, 278.

Transcendental Level of Truth, II, we cannot say that transcendental verity consists in an adequatio intellectus et rei; the Christian cosmonomic Idea requires us to to formulate another definition of transcendental truth, 573.

Transcendental Limiting Concept, I, is an Idea, 8.

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Transcendental Logic, II, in Kant, 503.

Transcendental Logic of History, I, developed by Fichte, 492.

Transcendental-Logical Categories, II, of Kantian philosophy, 459.

Transcendental logical Ego, I, is the logical unity of the thinking subject, 16.

Transcendental logical Subject, I, is a reduction of the thinking ego, and is nothing but the bare concept of the subjective logical unity of thought pre-supposing the thinking ego; a pseudo-concept, since it is incapable of analysis; it is a meaningless abstraction involved in internal contradictions, 7; transcendental logical ego in immanence philosophy, 16; transcendental cogito neglects the basic transcendental problem concerning the relation of the ego and its logical function of thought; this does not transcend the modal diversity of meaning, 17; also the transcendental logical function is a logical unity of philosophical thought to which we must ascribe theoretical logical meaning; there is an immanent logical diversity in the logical meaning of thought; but it cannot exist apart from a cosmic meaning diversity, 18; logical and cosmic diversity must not be identified; such identification leads to antinomy; the proclamation of logical meaning as the origin of the cosmic diversity is tantamount to the elimination of the modal diversity and consequently to the abandoning of theoretical thought itself; the intermodal synthesis pre-supposes the modal diversity and cannot be introduced into the logical aspect; transcendental logicism can only be maintained by a shift of meaning, 19; Archè and Archimedean point coalesce in transcendental logicism, 20; the logical function cannot be a Gegenstand of theoretical thought; only the abstracted, purely intentional, modal structure of the logical function; we never arrive at a ‘transcendental logical subject’, detached from all modal structures of time and sovereign and absolute, 40; Kant's transcendental logical subject of thought, 53, 54; and in Litt, 78.

Transcendental-logical Unity of Apperception, I, is the logical unity of the thinking consciousness, 16; (in Kant), is a subjective pole of thought in the logical function of thinking, of the understanding, 53, 358.

Transcendental Logicism, I, absolutizes the logical function of theoretical thought, 19; Archè and Archimedean point coïncide, 20.

Transcendental Motive, II, Kant was led by a transcendental motive in his doctrine of the Theoretical Ideas, 432.

Transcendental Problems, I, the first transcendental problem is concerned with the Gegenstand relation; what do we abstract in the theoretic antithesis from the structures of reality and how is this abstraction possible?; the naïve attitude confronted with the theoretical, 38, 41; the subject-object relation in the naïve attitude, 42, 43; the consequences of ignoring the first transcendental basic problem in the traditional conception as to the relation of body and soul in human nature, 44; the second transcendental problem: from what standpoint can we re-unite synthetically the logical and the non-logical aspects of experience opposed to each other in the theoretical antithesis; this question touches the kernel of the inquiry; the true starting-point should transcend the two terms of the theoretical antithesis; it cannot be cosmic time, nor the cosmic coherence, 45; the third transcendental problem: the possibility of critical self-reflection, and the true character of such self-reflection; Kant ignored the third basic problem together with the first, and as a result he was unable to bring the second problem to a critical solution, 52-54.

Transcendental Problems, III, three transcendental problems of sociology, 168.

Transcendental Schema, II, in Kant, 517, 519.

Transcendent Subject of autonomous moral Freedom, I, in Kant, is law-giver to human action, 359.

Transcendental Subject of Thought, I, does not satisfy the requirements of an Archimedean point, 16; is merely an abstract concept, 20; in Kant's philosophy, 109.

Transcendental Subject of Thought, II, is the absolutization of the theoretic-phenomenological attitude of thought, 546.

Transcendental Synthesis, II, in Kant's precedes analysis, 443.

Transcendental Thought, I, in Rickert, it is the Archimedean point and the Archè of the theoretical cosmos, 14; pure transcendental thought is always meant in a logical sense; the logical function of the act of thought does not transcend the modal diversity of meaning and so it lacks the unity above all multiplicity which characterizes the central ego, 17; the transcendental logical subject of thought is conceived as a ‘Transzendenz in der Immanenz’, 18;

Transcendental (-Theoretical) Truth, II, its accordance with the principium exclusiae antinomiae, 579-582.

Transcendental Unity of Self-consciousness, II, is identified with the cogito, by Kant, 499; is not sensible, 535.

Transfinite numbers, II, Cantor's conception; and in that of Veronese, 87; in H. Weyl's theory, 340.

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Transpersonalism, III, is universalistic, and absolutizes temporal society, 240; it rests on an irrationalistic hypostatization of temporal communal relationships, 246.

Transzendenz in der Immanenz, I, all modal diversity of meaning is irreversibly dependent on the ‘transcendental subject of thought’, 17; and in respect to this subject we can speak of a ‘Transzendenz in der Immanenz’, 18.

Trasymachos, III, Sophistic radical individualist, 199.

Tree, I, is a typical individuality structure, 554.

Tree, III, a tree has a central biological function, 56; its object functions, 57; and the opening relation, 58; its sensory aspect, 98, 104, 105; its wood in a piece of furniture; sawn wood has a secondary natural structure, 129-132.

Tremendum, I, the experience of the ‘Tremendum’ is identified with religion by R. Otto, 58.

Triangle, II, and ontological analytical judgments, according to Pfänder's interpretation of Kant, 441; the concept triangle is a generic concept whose meaning is limited by the original spatial modality, 458, 459.

Trias Politica, III, of Montesquieu, 428.

Tribal (Organized) Community, III, the folk unit embraces a small number of individual families; the leading rôle falls to the natural family bond or the kinship bond; exogamy is only local; tribal chiefs or elders are merely mediators in a conflict; the vendetta punishes a killer, 361; division of labour is adapted to the difference between man and woman; in most cases the whole people are owners of the soil; the cult community with its initiation rites is guided by the structure of the natural family; so that the political structure is extremely weak; in the patriarchal totemistic clans the political structure has taken the lead, 362; there is an amount of antagonism to the natural family and to the kinship family; totem clans may be subdivided into matriarchal phratries; the introduction of age-groups emancipates boys from the family community; young men's houses; youths live as bachelors up to the age of thirty; sometimes at initiation they are forbidden to obey their mothers; secret men's societies have broken every tie with the structure of the immediate family and the wider kinship community, 363, 364; they are organized resistance clubs to matriarchy and have an aristocratic form; H. Schurtz on their origin, 365.

Trichotomy, III, of physis, psyche and spirit, in Theodor Haering, 635.

Trieb, I, a self-producing striving in Fichte, 441.

Triepel, III, cf. Binding; associations are based on the principle of do ut des, 573.

Tri-Unity, II, in theology, is an analogical term, 63.

Troeltsch, Ernst, II, Der Historismus und seine Probleme, 206, 270; Hauptprcbleme del Ethik, 206; Die Aufklärung, 352, 355.

Troeltsch, Ernst, II, merges all values and norms into the creative development of culture; his unprovable faith in the coherence with the Absolute, 205, 206; in primitive cultures the biotic retrocipations of historical development come to the fore, 270; his absolutely autonomous Idea of culture, 282.

Troeltsch, Ernst, III, Die Soziallehren der Christlichen Kirchen und Gruppen, 228, 247, 315, 513, 515, 527, 529.

Troeltsch, Ernst, III, on early Christian sociology, 217; his view that radical individualism and universalism is as such without articulation, 228; individualism and universalism lie hidden in an inner tension in the basic idea of Christianity; Calvinism is individualistic, 247; his exposition of Luther's standpoint is obsolete, 513 (note); his views on Church and sects are oriented to Simmel's ‘formal tendency’, 527; there is a radical tension in Christianity between individualism and universalism; the Church is an institution of saving grace; membership usually starts at birth, which necessitates a compromise between the Evangelical standards and Stoic or Aristotelian conceptions of the lex naturalis; the Church type embraces all other societal relationships as lower stages of the Christian community of grace, 528; the Church type is called universalistic; the sect is individualistic; a sect relies on the personal conversion and dignity of the members; the infinite value of an individual person as a child of God renders all social differences negligible; Troeltsch borrows his ideal type of a Church from medieval Roman Catholic conceptions; according to his historicistic ‘Religionssoziologie’, 529, 530; he generalizes the typical Roman Catholic social form of a Church and is thereby disqualified to explain the Church formations issued from the Reformation; he has wrenched the Gospel from its context in the whole of the Divine Word revelation and posits a dilemma which is alien to Christianity; his interpretation of Calvin is erroneous, 531.

Troll, Wilhelm, II, Allgemeine Biologie, 108.

Troll, Wilhelm, II, biotic phenomena belong to a sphere which transcends physics and chemistry, 108.

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Troxler, I, explicitly appeals to Jacobi, sets the arch-consciousness or immediate knowledge in opposition to reflecting and discursive thought, 471.

Trubetzkoy, II, Phonology, 224.

Truth, I, the principle of truth in Cohen implies a continuous coherence between logos and ethos, 75; identified with theoretical correctness, in Rickert; as an ‘absolute’ value, truth in Rickert, is timelessly valid and rests in itself, 134; in Aristotle, Hobbes, Kant, Hume, Descartes, Hegel, Litt; and the transcendental basic Idea, 150; as integral consistency, 154; Descartes' mathematical concept of truth, 191; truths of facts and truths of reason, in Leibniz, 250; necessary and contingent truth, according to Leibniz and to Wolff, 251; two kinds of truth in Peter Bayle's thought, 260.

Truth, II, theoretical truth depends on super-temporal truth; hypostatized ‘truth’ is a lie; there is no selfsufficient partial truth; religious fulness of meaning is bound up with temporal reality; the Divine Word-Revelation in the garb of human language; the Incarnation; our experience is limited by, but not restricted to the temporal, 561; human cognition is directed to the absolute truth, or, in apostasy, to the spirit of falsehood, 562; Christ is the Truth; standing in the truth is the pre-requisite for the insight into the horizon of experience, 564; the logical criterion of truth owes its meaning to the structure of the experiential horizon; the error of opposing super-natural truth to natural, 565; accommodations to the Biblical Revelation; Christian religion should penetrate philosophy; Thomas Aquinas' definition of truth as the agreement between thought and being; based on the confusion of Gegenstand and substance, 566; Aristotle's view: the adequacy between the conceptual form and the essential form of the ousia; the homoioosis of the intellect to the real being; knowledge is noeta, 566; Scholastic adequation; vis cognitiva and vis appetitiva; Thomas calls the true and the good transcendentalia; convenientia entis ad animam, 566; the basis of Aristotle's and Thomas' conception; Kant's rejection of this view; the problem posited by Kant, 567; he restricts truth to the a priori theoretical horizon and to the sensory phenomena; a priori synthetical judgments on objective experience guarantee the correspondence between knowledge and Gegenstände; these judgments are true a priori, i.e., universally valid and necessary; the source of all truth; empirical truths are relative; the experiential process is directed towards an absolute ideal, viz. the perfect correspondence between the representations in the object, 568; Husserl's rejection of Kant's views of truth, 569; his own absolutization of theoretical truth, 570; the Christian Idea of verity, directed to the fulness of the meaning of Truth; truth has the same perspective character as our horizon of experience; then the transcendental horizon must be made transparent by Divine Revelation; the religious fulness of truth liberates the horizon of human experience and is concerned with our full selfhood; in Holy Scripture truth means steadfastness, certainty, reliability, 571; Divine Revelation enters our temporal horizon only through faith; God is the Origin; Christ the perfect Revelation and the fulness of truth; 2 × 2 = 4 becomes an untruth if it is absolutized into a truth in itself; Christian science, 572; the traditional definition implies that truth in its transcendental a priori structure transcends reality; another definition of the transcendental a priori structural level of truth, 573; depends on a normative relation of our subjective cognition to its structural laws; it requires the transcendent light of Divine Revelation, 573; the transcendent freedom of human self-consciousness; our insight is fallible; the investigator's Archimedean point; the transcendental horizon must be opened by Christ, 574; truth and theoretical truth; Kant's Principles of Pure Understanding are functionalistic, 575; the a priori criterion of theoretical truth, 576; special sciences handle different criteria of truth, but only seemingly so; they lack a transcendental criterion; they use an a priori subjective theoretical synthesis: 576; the accordance between the subjective synthesis and the modal structure of the Gegenstand within the temporal horizon and in relation to the religious fulness of Truth; theoretical judgments and sphere sovereignty; there is no truth in itself; the perpective structure of truth and subjectivism, 577; the hypostatization of the Idea of Verity, 578; absolutely individual truth in Scheler, 585.

Turgot, I, had in passing formulated the law of the three stages elaborated by Comte, 209.

Turgot, II, followed Voltaire's view of history, 269.

Tylor, E.B., II, evolutionist history, 270.

Type Concept, III, interlacement of typical individuality structures, 55; the typical leading function of a tree in the opening process, 59; the earth as a typically qualified physical-chemical energy constellation, 78; the internal structural principle and the typical groupage of the aspects into a unity, 80; the typology of human personalities in psychology and psychiatry; W. Stern; type and class; a logistical foundation of the type concept as an ‘Ordnungsbegriff’ in Hempel and

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Oppenheim's Der Typusbegriff im Lichte der neuen Logik, 81; the ideal typical method in sociology introduced by Max Weber; social types; Weber's are arbitrary; generic and specific type concepts in jurisprudence and theory of law; Von Jhering's view of them; different types of legal spheres; modern theories and the unscientific concept of sovereignty; sociology of law, 82; the ultimate irreducible genera and their criterion founded in the plastic dimension of the temporal order is only to be found in the typical structural groupage of the modal aspects within the structural whole; radical types are determined by their typical leading function; they encompass the structural orbits of things or other individual totalities as kingdoms: inorganic, biotic, psychical kingdoms (mineral, vegetable and animal kingdoms); border cases present themselves in the micro world outside of the naïve attitude, 83; the virus causing the mosaic disease in tobacco-plants; Stanley and Wyckoff's discovery; B. Bavink's view, 84; the three kingdoms and their criteria; these criteria concern only the sensorily perceptible characteristics, they are not valid without exception but related to the radical types of our plastic experiential horizon; no pan-psychism; animal behaviour is distinguished from vegetative reactions in the naïve attitude; materialistic behaviorism, 85; the basic denominator of radical types, 87; there is no radical type ‘man’, 87-89; secondary radical types are related to man's social life, 89; nucleus, retrocipations, anticipations and the qualifying function of an individual whole, 90; the anticipatory structure of the foundational function does not affect its nuclear type of individuality, 91; radical type of individuality, 91; radical type, primary or genotype, variability type; natural and unnatural variability types, 93; radical type ‘animal’ and geno-types; sub-types, 94; two meanings of ‘genotype’ in biology; pheno-type; Diemer's use of the distinction between geno- en pheno-types and radical types, and subtypes, 96.