A New Critique of Theoretical Thought. Deel 4. Index of Subjects and Authors

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Sackmann, II, Voltaire, 269.

Sacral Sphere, The, III, among primitive men, 33, 34.

Salin, E., II, Geschichte der Volkswirtschaftslehre, 292.

Salin, E., II, points to a reversion of meaning in Weber's Sociology of Religion, 293.

Salus Publica Suprema Lex Esto, I, in Wolff, 321.

Salus Publica, III, as the highest law of the State according to Locke, 442-445; in Kant; its limits; raison d'Etat; Wolff; Hobbes; Rousseau; Locke; Kant; the Liberals; totalitarianism; Plato; Fichte; Aristotle; Hugo Grotius, 442; Pfufendoff; Aristotle; Wolff, 443; the interest of the State is a sufficient quiet and safe life, 444; and distributive justice; P. Duez, 445.

Sanchez, Thomas, III, Spanish canonist; marriage is the traditio corporum, 317.

Sarcoma, III, an organic disease, 647.

Sartre, I, Le néant against l'être, 53.

Sartre, III, has a subjectivistic view of man's corporality, 779.

Sassen, Ferdinand, I, Wijsbegeerte van dezen tijd, 526.

Sassen, Ferdinand, I, supposes that there is an inner connection between the philosophy of the Cosmonomic Idea and that of Maurice Blondel, 526.

Satz des Bewusztseins, I, in Immanence Philosophy, 109.

Satz des Bewusztseins, II, definition, 536; its pernicious effects: juridical person; causality; will; juridical volition, 537; ‘psycho-physical’; ‘forms of thought’; super-temporal ideas; naïve experience misrepresented; positivistic views; phenomenological conceptions, 538.

Saussure, F. de, II, Cours de linguistique générale, 224.

Savigny, Von, II, System des heutigen römischen Rechts, 397, 398; Zeitschrift für Geschichtslehre, Rechtswissenschaft, 1815, Band I, 278.

Savigny, Von, II, and Puchta, considered juridical interpretation as essentially theoretical; the Historical School, 138; Von Savigny did not agree with the attack on the reception of Roman Law in Germanic countries, nor did Puchta, 234, 277; nature and freedom, their synthesis in historical development, and their deeper unity; he took over Kant's moralism, 278; this idea carried through in the theory of law, 278; the jurist's activity at a higher stage; legislation; a conservative nationalistic idea of the Volksgeist, 279; Savigny and Puchta on subjective right as the particular will power of the individual apart from the interest served by it, 397; personal and real rights; personal right is control over a person; jus in rē identified with absolute right, 398; confusion between subjective right and competence (= authority over persons); subjective right merged into juridical law, 398.

Scales; hairs; feathers, III, as objective formations, 774.

Scepticism, I, was stopped by Descartes in his ‘cogito’, 12; its self-refutation, 144, 147; Greek Sophistic scepticism, 145; refuted by Augustinus and by Descartes, 196; Pyrrhonic scepticism tended to deny any criterion of truth, 275; of Hume and Kant, 340.

Scheler, Max, I, Die Stellung des Menschen im Kosmos, 51, 52; Der Formalismus in der Ethik und die materiale Wertethik, 111.

Scheler, Max, I, human personality is ‘a monarchical arrangement of acts one of which at every turn takes the lead’; he overlooks the transcendent character of the ego and conceives of the ego as an immanent centre of its acts only, so that its radical unity disappears, 51; the human mind can oppose itself to the ‘world’ but even makes into a ‘Gegenstand’ the physiological and psychical aspects of human existence itself; the Gegenstand relation is the most formal category of the logical aspect of mind (Geist), 52; the concept of the subject and the selfhood in irrationalist phenomenology; the selfhood is not a substance in the Kantian sense, but ‘pure actuality’; as such it is transcendent to the cosmos as ‘world of things’, 111; sociology of thought, 165; his foundation of philosophy, 543, 544.

Scheler, Max, II, Phänomenologie und Erkenntnistheorie, 488, 597; Der Formalismus in der Ethik und die materiale Wertethik, 545, 546, 547, 570; Der Formalismus in der Ethik, 585, 586, 587, 588, 589, 590, 591; Die Stellung des Menschen im Kosmos, 591, 592, 593, 594, 595, 597.

Scheler, Max, II, his version of the metaphysical dichotomy of body and soul, 112; his view of an adequate Wesensschau, 488; dis-

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tinguishes between pure logic and pure axiology, through the influence of Dilthey; the contents of the emotional acts of valuation; the a-priori is the whole of all the units of signification and sentences given in an immediate intuition of their essence; the origin of the differences between essences is in the things in which they appear as universal or individual; feelings also have their own a priori content, 545; the a-priori is pure and immediate experience; the a-posteriori is dependent on the senses, 546; only in the coalescence of the intended an the given can we become aware of the content of phenomenal experience, 570; his view of the absolutely individual character of truth; he accuses Neo-Kantianism of subjectivism: its totality of the cosmos is only a subjective idea; the cosmos has not actually been given us, 585; he individualizes and personalizes Husserl's transcendental consciousness, 587; truth is held to be individual; his view of cosmic reality; microcosm and macrocosm; the personal correlate of the macrocosm, 588; the idea of God; every unity of the world without an essential regression to a personal God is a contradictory hypothesis; Malebranche influenced this period of Scheler; God's concrete revelation can only make us experience the Idea of God; from this he finds his way to an inter-individual essential community of persons founded in their communion with God as the correlate of the macrocosm; all ‘other communities of a moral or juridical character’ have this possible communion with the personal God for their foundation, 589; his idea of God and that of ‘person’ are neo-Scholastic metaphysical; God is the ‘Person of all persons’ and subject to the same ‘essential phenomenological law-conformities’; the essential individuality of a human personality must be distinguished from an in-individual ‘I-ness’ which pre-supposes a ‘thou’, a ‘body’, and an ‘outer world’; personality is hypostatized above its ‘I-ness’; object and Gegenstand are identified; this is neo-Scholasticism, 590; in the final stage of his thought Scheler abandoned the Christian religion; individuality is the absolute pre-requisite in the ‘concrete essential structure’ of human experience, i.e. in the transcendental horizon of experience, which is at the same time the transcendent religious horizon to Scheler's metaphysics, which is an irrationalistic standpoint; thus individuality is ultimately elevated above the law, cf. Blondel, 591; his Idea of God is a deus ex machina to pave the way to a macrocosmic experience and avoid solipsism; he shows affinity with Liebniz' ‘vérités’ eternelles’; he speaks of all ‘possible worlds’ and ‘all possible personalities’, and in so doing he tries to hypostatize the theoretical transcendental horizon of our human experience of reality; his Idea of a phenomenological possibility of the being of God as the ‘person of all persons’ is nothing but a manifestation of human hybris; the contrast between a micro and a macro-cosm is unserviceable in Christian philosophy, it can be traced back to to Greek philosophy, Philo, etc. and it passed into medieval Scholasticism, 592; and Humanism; according to Scheler man is the personal correlate of an absolutely individual cosmos; his idea of God, 593; and the societal structure of the individuality of human experience, 594; his ‘intuition of the essence’ gives us the essence in an a-symbolical way, 595; the actual datum of what is intended in the immediate evidence of intuition is above the contrast true-false; Spinoza's dictum quoted: ‘truth is its own criterion and that of falsehood’; an inquiry after a criterion is only meaningful if the matter has not been given itself but only its symbol, 597.

Scheler, Max, III, Lehre von den drie Tatsachen, 53; Introduction to the collective Work: Versuche zu einer Soziologie des Wissens, 289.

Scheler, Max, III, his view of the copy theory of naïve experience; he protests against the views that consider natural things in our naïve experience as the products of a theoretical synthesis; but he gets no further than a somewhat impressionistic image of the plastic horizon, 53; he thinks that all the objects given in natural observation are given as singular and individual ‘Gegenstände’; but this is an abstraction, 54; he transformed some ideas of Leibniz' monadology in an irrationalistic dynamical sense; Newton's influence on Scheler, 70.

Schelling, I, Vorlesungen über die Methode des academischen Studiums, 471.

Schelling, I, his speculative nature philosophy; mechanical necessity and creative freedom; their dialectial union; Volksgeist; historical consciousness; in a work of art the tension between necessity and freedom is reconciled ultimately, 208; the development in the conception of the Idea continues its course in dialectical tension, also in Schelling, 329; aesthetic irrationalism, the morality of genius, ‘the beautiful soul’, dug itself a wide channel in the most recent philosophy of life by way of Schelling, 465; Schelling's organological Idealism provided the equipment for the view of the Historical School with its doctrine of the unconscious growth of culture, 469; he became the leader against formalistic transcendental Idealism; the ‘intellectual intuition’ comprehends the absolute totality of meaning by a single all-embra-

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cing glance; Schelling appeals to a method of genius for scientific insight, 471; by a speculative method of an intuitive grasp of the absolute, all attention is drawn to the individual disclosure of the ‘Spirit’, of the ‘Idea’, 472.

Schelling, II, System des transzendentalen Idealismus, 278.

Schelling, II, his idea of a hidden law of Providence as the foundation of history and giving its coherence; his transcendental Idealism, 232; his romantic Idealism; nature as the ‘werdender Geist’; nature and history are at bottom identical, 278; he aimed at a new aesthetical culture as the goal of history, 278; his Humanistic cosmonomic Idea, 593.

Schelling, III, organological view of a ‘Gemeinschaft’ adopted by Tönnies, 186; his concept of ‘spiritual organism’ influenced the German Historical School, e.g. Gierke, Tönnies, 245; his use of the term ‘organism’, 406; his idea of totality and that of Hans Driesch, 748, 749.

Scheltema, H.W., III, Beschouwingen over de vooronderstelingen van ons denken over recht en staat, 383.

Scherer, R. von, III, Handbuch des Kirchenrechtes, 313.

Schichtentheorie, II, of Nic. Hartmann, 19.

Schichtentheorie, III, of Nicolai Hartmann influenced Woltereck, 762.

Schiller, I, Die Räuber, 453; Kallias Letters to Körner, 1793, 463.

Schiller, I, his modern Humanist aestheticism was ruled by the motive of nature and freedom, 123; his ‘Räuber’ says: the law has not yet formed a single great man, but freedom has, 452; his aesthetic Humanism is the embodiment of the irrationalistic and aesthetic conception of the personality ideal within the formal limits of transcendental Idealism, in the Idea of the ‘Beautiful Soul’; the basic denominator of the modal aspect is shifted to the aesthetic aspect viewed exclusively from its individual subject-side; ‘beauty is freedom in appearance’ (phenomenon); the fulness of human personality and of the cosmos becomes evident in the aesthetic play-drive; man is really man when he is playing, when the conflict in him between sensuous nature and rational moral freedom is silent; Kant's rigorous morality holds only for immature man; but in the ‘Beautiful Soul’ (463) nature is so much ennobled that it does good out of natural impulse; this refined stage is the fruit of education, 464; in Schiller's more mature period aesthetic irrationalism was still held within the limits of transcendental Idealism, 465.

Schiller, II, his doctrine, 278; the reconciliation of mind and sensibility, of freedom and nature, in fine art; this aesthetic Idea was to replace Kant's moralistic homo noumenon, 278.

Schilling, III, Naturrecht und Staat nach die Lehre der alten Kirche, 230, 424.

Schilling, III, his misrepresentation of the Stoic theory of the uncorrupted natural state, 230; his interpretation of the Stoic and patristic theories of the State and of absolute natural law, 424.

Schlegel, Friedrich, III, Lucinde, 318.

Schlegel, Friedrich, III, his Romantic ideal of free love in its high-minded harmony of sexual sensuality and spiritual surrender, 318.

Schleiermacher, II, Dial., 443.

Schlick, M., II, criticized Mach and Avenarius for having ignored the analytical qualification of the principle of logical economy, 123.

Schlossmann, II, Subjective rights, 397.

Schmalenbach, Hermann, I, Leibniz, 229.

Schmalenbach, Hermann, I, wrongly sought the root of Leibniz's arithmeticism in ‘Calvinistic religiosity’, 229.

Schmalenbach, Hermann, III, shares Troeltsch's and Weber's views concerning the individualistic character of Calvinism, 247.

Schmitt, Carl, III, Verfassungslehre, 383; Nazionalsozialismus und Rechtsstaat, 431.

Schmitt, Carl, III, expressed the relativistic destruction of the entire ideology of the State founded in the Humanistic faith in reason; his view of statute law, 383.

Schmitt, Francis O., III, Erforschung der Feinstruktur tierischer Gewebe mit Hilfe der Röntgenstraleninterferenz-Methoden, 726.

Schmitt, Francis, irradiation of nervous tissue, 726.

Schmidt, P.W., II, Die geheime Jugendweihe eines australischen Urstamms, 317.

Schmidt, Richard, III, Allgemeine Staatslehre, 382.

Schmidt, Richard, III, ‘modern political theory emancipates itself from the speculative view; it leaves alone the metaphysical question about the Idea of the State and restricts itself to the empirical world’, 382.

Schmidt, W., III, Die Stellung der Pygmaënvölker in der Entwicklungsgeschichte der Menschheit, 331, 332, 333; Völker und Kulturen, 334, 338, 341, 357, 361, 362, 363, 364, 365, 366.

Schmidt, W., III, refuted the evolutionist theory of

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marriage, 331; among pygmean peoples monogamy is the rule; pygmies are among the oldest extant representatives of the human race, 332; matriarchy in Further India, Malay and North-America, 338; matriarchy and polyandry among the Indian Nayar castle, 341; secret men's societies as a reaction against matriarchal organization, 349; the sib chieftain embodies the magic power of the clan; the family bond has the leading rôle also in totemistic clans; clan mates refuse to fight each other in case of an inter-clan-war, 357; among the andamanese the weapons of excited men are sometimes taken away, 361: division of labour is adapted to the difference between man and woman, 362; boys are forbidden to obey their mothers; men's societies were originally aristocratically organized associations, 363; they impose secrecy on their members at the peril of their lives; ‘Vehmgerichte’; cruelty at initiation; ancestor worship; skull cult and feasts, 364; men's clubs are resistance organizations to woman rule in matriarchal cultures; the political structure takes the lead in men's clubs, 365; men's unions are a political reaction in the old matriarchal culture; their divergent forms are denaturations; at the culmination of their power these unions were a ‘state within the state’; a secret power opposing the legal power of the chief and his council; they deprived the latter of their power and made propaganda outside of their own sib; they opposed European influence and guarded their tradition; later they submitted to the faith and cult structure implied in them; or they became differentiated organizations, 366.

Scholasticism, II, Augustinian, 9; in Husserl's method, 17; the ens realissimum; the highest of the transcendentalia, 20; on being, 20, 21; Augustinus, Thomas, Duns Scotus, Avicenna, Albertus Magnus, 21; universal determinations of being, 21; on analogical concepts, 55; on the faculty of imagination, 514, 515; Albert of Saxony, Suarez, on the a priori, 542.

School, The, III, a school is a differentiated organized community of a typical tuitionary character; historically founded and morally qualified; the moral function is typically focussed on the formativeness of the community; comradeship among pupils; mutual attachment between masters and pupils; educational differentiation is determined by the instructional tasks of the different schools, 287; they prepare for functions in free society and in State and Church; ancient and modern state education rejected; the communal sense acquired in the family circle is the deepest temporal sounding-board to which any other education to a communal sense has to appeal, 288.

School-Life, III, moral bonds among tachers and pupils; different types of school, 287.

Schoonenberg, P., S.J., III, Een gesprek met de Wijsbegeerte der Wetsidee, 73.

Schopenhauer, I, his treatise concerning the fourfold root of the principle of sufficient ground is practically a faithful reproduction of Crusius' schema, 340; influenced Nietsche's first period, 465.

Schopenhauer, II, his cosmonomic Idea, 593.

Schreier, Fritz, II, Grundbegriffe und Grundformen des Rechts, 343.

Schreier, Fritz, II, his pure theory of Law; only yielded in eidetic juridical logic, 342; his four fundamental legal concepts; legal theory turned into mathematics, 342; a juridical norm is an exact law, on a level with the laws of mathematics, 343.

Schulthess-Rechberg, III, Luther, Zwingli, und Calvin in ihren Ansichten über das Verhältnis von Staat und Kirche, 518.

Schulze, Gottlieb Ernst, I, was oriented to Hume's psychologistic criticism and attacked Reinhold's theory, 413.

Schurtz, H., III, Alterklassen und Männerbünde, 363, 365.

Schurtz, H., III, the origin of men's societies among primitive tribes is the ‘dichotomy of the sexes’; this view is refuted, 365.

Science, I, depreciated by Rousseau, 67; special science in Rickert, 130.

Science, III, as the self-transillumination of the human mind, according to Litt, 249, 250; and culture; and the State, 488, 489; science as an integrating factor, a concrete social phenomenon; science is logically qualified, 592, 594; and materially differentiated, 597.

Science and Philosophy, I, the philosophy of a special science examines the philosophical pre-suppositions of this science in the light of a total theoretical vision of temporal reality, which vision is ruled by the transcendental basic Idea and the basic motive; the supposed independence of special science with regard to philosophy; its historical arguments, 545; Modern Humanism recognizes this claim to independence on the part of special science; Hans Driesch opposes this view, 546; epistemology being orientated to the ‘Factum’ (or the ‘Fieri’, as the Neo-Kantians say) there is no possibility of independent philosophical critique of method and constructions in mathematical natural science; philosophy does not guide but it follows special science; the latter is taken to be neutral, 547; Rickert and Litt; the need of an integral empirical method in philosophic investigations; no science is able to investigate a

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specific modal aspect ‘with closed shutters’ toward all the other modalities, 548; philosophic and scientific thought in mathematics and its problems; ‘pure mathematics’, 549; mathematics is not a ‘fait accompli’, not a ‘factum’; a theoretical scientist will maintain, perhaps, that he only works with technical concepts and methods not implying philosophical or religious pre-suppositions, 550; but behind such concepts and methods are hidden very positive philosophical postulates; e.g. the principle of ‘logical economy’ and fictions not corresponding to the ‘states of affairs’, 551; behind the so-called ‘non-philosophical’ positivist standpoint is hidden a philosophical view of reality which cannot be neutral with respect to faith and religion; the mask of neutrality and the mischief done by the technical pragmatic conception of scientific thought; difference between the concept of an individuality structure and the modal concept of function; in a modal aspect we can distinguish the general functional coherence of individual functions of things, events, social relations, etc., 552; structural differences are only to be understood in terms of typical individuality structures; examples taken from the jural modus, and from the physical aspect, 553; a tree, an animal, an atom, a molecule, a cell, have physical-chemical functions but other functions as well: they are typical individuality structures, 554; under the influence of the positivistic view of the task of science and in keeping with the continuity postulate, the concept of function was used to eradicate the modal diversity, and the typical structures of individuality were erased; e.g. in ‘pure theory of law’, and ‘pure economics’ modal functional and typical structural views are confused; the Austrian School of economics; Kelsen's Reine Rechtslehre, 555; the absolutization of the functionalist viewpoint is not neutral with respect to philosophy or to religion, but is the fruit of a Nominalist view of science; the positivist school of Ernst Mach; and of the Vienna School; Driesch's ‘conception’ of ‘organic life’ as an ‘entelechy’; Woltereck's conception of organic life as a material living substance (matrix) with an outer material constellation and an inner side of life experience; are examples of the illegitimate introduction of a specific structural concept of individuality as a functional one; in modern times psychology and the cultural sciences have reacted against the complete domination of the functionalistic science-ideal, mainly from the irrationalistic antipode; empirical science depends on the typical structures of individuality, 556; twentieth century physics abandoned its classic functionalistic concept of causality, matter, physical space and time; relativity and quantum theory reduced Newton's physical conception to a mere marginal instance; Planck, Heisenberg; radio activity; Mach and Oswald oppose the acceptance of real atoms and light waves and try to resolve the physical concept of causality into a purely mathematical concept of function, because of their positivist-sensualistic standpoint in philosophy, 557; the principle of logical economy in the positivist and empirico-critical sense of Mach and Avenarius is not the only criterion in physics; the discussion about causality (Planck, v. Laue, Lenard, and Schrödinger, Heisenberg, Jordan), 558; science pre-supposes a theorical view of reality; B. Bavink holds natural science to be autonomous with respect to philosophy; he overlooks that physics has eliminated the naïve view of reality, 559; in Bavink's view the physical world is opposed to human thought as ‘a world in itself’; he considers ‘nature’ to be ‘rational’ in its deepest foundation; this is like ‘critical realism’, 560; but physical reality cannot be comprehended apart from a subjective insight into the mutual relation and coherence of the modalities within the cosmic temporal order; physical phenomena have an objective analogon in the sensory ones, they must be subjectively interpreted in scientific thought and thereby logically opened; the experimental method is one of isolation and abstraction; it is pointed to the solution of theoretical questions which the scientist himself has raised and formulated, 561; modern physics rests on epistemological pre-suppositions that have been generally accepted since the days of Galileo and Newton; but they imply a purely quantitative and functionalistic view of reality which became the content of the Humanistic rationalistic science-ideal; the appeal to ‘reality’ in scientific investigations is never free from a philosophical and religious prejudice; Ranke said that historical science has only to establish how the events have really happened; but the word ‘really’ is ambiguous: in historical science we do not grasp an event in its full reality, only in a particular aspect, 562; it pre-supposes a theoretical view of reality of a philosophical character; Historicism; the Historical School; the view of the State in which the latter is identified with its historical aspect of power, 563; biology offers many examples of a functionalistic view of reality; evolutionism; holism; mechanists and neo-vitalists; Driesch denied that organic life can be reduced to a physical-chemical constellation of matter, and proclaimed it to be a reality in itself, an immaterial entelechy; this was an ‘immaterial substance’ and the result of a new absolutization; holism wanted to conquer Driesch's dualism by a conception of structural totality; but

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holism fell back on a functionalism that construed the whole of a living organism by levelling its different aspects; any special science has to solve the problem concerning the limits of its field of research and the modal structure of this aspect; empirical phenomena have as many modal aspects as human experience has; only the theoretical Gegenstand relation gives rise to fundamental divisions of the non-logical fields and to the philosophical problems implied; in the empirical phenomena the inter-modal coherence is realized and the typical structures of individuality can only be studied in their empirical realization; philosophy can, therefore, not ignore the results of special scientific research, 565; philosophy cannot be restricted to the problems implied in the special sciences, since it has also to give an account of the data of naïve experience; Christian philosophy and science should mutually penetrate; the modern Humanistic division between science and philosophy cannot be maintained, 566.

Scotus, John Duns, I, De Rerum Principio, 186; Opus Oxioniense, 186.

Scotus, John Duns, I, a more consistent realist than Thomas, held to the primacy of the will; his doctrine of the potestas Dei absoluta, 185; this potestas absoluta was distinguished from the postestas Dei ordinata and bound to the unity of God's holy being (essence); the lex aeterna originates in this Essence; absolute truth and goodness are grounded in the Divine Being; this potestas cannot have any Nominalistic purport, 186.

Scotus, John Duns, II, Quaestiones sup. Metaph., I, IV, q. 1., - 21.

Scotus, John Duns, II, on being, 21.

Scriptures, The, II, Reveal God's act of creation; appeal to our religious root of existence; tell us about man's place in the cosmos; the fall into sin, redemption, 52.

Sculpture, III, its structure, 111 ff.; it is an enkapsis, 111; its objective implicitly intended vital function, 117; Aristotle's failure to account for its reality, 126; a sculptor has to open the natural structure of the material, 126.

Sea-Hog's Eggs, III, Driesch's experiments, 735, 753.

Secondary Qualities, III, these qualities were adduced as an argument to refute naïve experience, 36, 37; in Locke; Müller's specific energies of the sense organs, 39.

Secondary Radical Types, III, of art, 110.

Secret Men's Societies, III, the so-called ‘Mannerbunde’; are under the leading of a political structure; the skull-cult; initiation rites for boys, according to Loeb; ancestor worship; Vehmgerichte; cruelty at initiation, 363-366.

Sectarian Conventicles, III, were favoured by Luther's theory of the Church, 513.

Section. II, ‘section’ in the system of rational numbers is the ‘irrational’ function of number, which can never be counted off in finite values in accordance with the Archimedean principle, 90.

Sects, III, in Troeltsch and Weber sects are viewed as independent sociological types, 527, 528, 529, 530; they nearly always arise through the fault of the Church, according to Kuyper, 532; they as a rule approach the institutional church in the second and third generations, 534.

Secular Government and the Church, III, secular authority in the Church, according to Thomasius, 517.

Secularization, I, of Nominalism by John of Jandun, and Marsilius van Padua, 188, 190.

Secularization of Political Conviction, III, is furthered by ignoring the ultimate fundamental questions of belief; this fact justifies Christian party formation, 624.

Segmentary and Organic Types, III, of social forms, in Durkheim, 175.

Seignorial Rights, II, in the Netherlands, 236.

Sein und Sollen, III, in modern political theory, 385; this dualism of Neo-Kantianism is criticized by Hermann Heller, 388: and accepted by Siegfried Marck, 401.

Self-consciousness, I, as absolutely free ego in Fichte, 414.

Self-consciousness, II, cosmological self-consciousness, 473; unity of self-consciousness, and Kant's synthesis, 494, 495; cosmic and cosmological self-consciousness, logicized in Kant, 498; Kant's definition, 500; he excludes sensibility, 501; its unity; the cogito in Kant, 519; and the self, according tot Heidegger, 523; Heidegger's interpretation of Kant on the finite ego in the transcendental unity of self-consciousness, 528; Kant did not conceive the transcendental unity of self-consciousness to be sensible, 535; not a single aspect transcends self-consciousness, 539; cosmic and cosmological self-consciousness, 540, 541; pre-theoretical and theoretical experience rooted in self-consciousness, 560; cosmic self-consciousness and the selfhood, 562; and the knowledge of God, 562; this self-knowledge and the knowledge of God restores the subjective perspective of human experience, 563; its transcendent freedom, 574; man's self-

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consciousness becomes more and more individual; his individuality has a sociotal structure, 594.

Selfhood, I, is supposed to be reducible to an immanent subjective pole of thought, 6; as pure actuality in Scheler, 111.

Selfhood, II, in Heidegger: finite; its essence is historical time, 524, 525; only in theoretical abstraction Heidegger holds reality to be accessible to the selfhood, 527; his self is the origin and identical with time; our self and time, 531; his ‘existential’ time is not ‘cosmic time’, 531; the transcendence of the religious selfhood above time, 535; sensory phenomena and the selfhood, and cosmic time, 539; the transcendental phenomenological subject or ego, 543; the subjective a-priori of the intentional content of the acts, 544; intersubjectivity of egos as mental monads, 545, cf. 549; the absolute transcendental subject is an absolutization, 546; the religious root of human existence, 549; our selfhood is under the law, 552; intermodal synthesis and selfhood, 554; the transcendent horizon of the selfhood, 560; the individual ego has been integrated into the religious selfhood and self-consciousness, 562; man in his full selfhood transcends the temporal earthly cosmos in all its aspects and partakes of transcendent root of this cosmos, 593.

Selfhood, III, is the individual religious centre of human existence and experience; this existence is a ‘stare extra sē’, 6.

Self-knowledge, I, we do not possess real self-knowledge in the transcendental-logical concept of the thinking ego, according to Kant, 54; depends on knowledge of God, 55.

Self-reflection, I, philosophy cannot do without critical self-reflection; Γνῶϑι σεαυτόν, know thyself; how is selfreflection possible, if it does not transcend the concept, and we cannot think in a theoretical sense without conceptual determination, 5; self-reflection pre-supposes that our ego directs its reflecting act of thought toward itself; in this act philosophical thought finally transcends its own limits, 7; the way of self-reflection is the only way leading to the discovery of the true starting-point of theoretical thought, 51; the concentric direction of this thought, necessary for critical self-reflection, must spring from the ego as the individual centre of human existence, 55; the selfhood gives this central direction to theoretical thought by concentrating on the true, or on a pretended absolute Origin of all meaning; self-knowledge is in the last analysis dependent on the knowledge of God; a real account of ths fact is only given in the Biblical Revelation of man as the image of God, 55; critical self-reflection started by Locke concerning the root of the science-ideal, 271; it went no further than the idea of the sovereign personality, 500.

Self-reflection, II, intuitive self-reflection on the modalities and theoretical synthesis; the modal aspects are our own and do not transcend the self; they refer to the selfhood; in the foundational direction there is no free synthesis; analysis remains at rest in the synthesis of the given; enstatic Erleben of individuality structures; Hineinleben, 474; Erleben lacks theoretical insight into modalities; conscious Erleben, or intuition, 475; our experience of identity, 500; in phenomenology, 544; Fichte and Husserl, 549; radical religious self-reflection, 550; and the access to the intermodal synthesis, 554; Husserl follows Descartes' solipsist selfreflection, 584.

Self-Feeling, II, is psychological phenomenon which manifests itself in a concentric direction to the ego; but the ego escapes every attempt to grasp it in a psychological view, 115.

Self-sufficiency, I, of philosophical thought, 12, 14; is an absolutization of meaning, 20; of philosophic thought, within its own field, 20, 22, 23.

Self-sufficiency, II, this postulate cannot be epistemologically accounted for; it forces its religious a-priori on us in the disguise of a ‘pure theory’, 492.

Self-surrender, I, absolute self-surrender is religion, 58.

Semen Religionis, II, has been preserved in the human heart thanks to God's gratia communis; and in many apostate religions important remnants of the original Word-Revelation have been retained, 311.

Semi-manufactures, III, e.g. planks, 131, 132.

Semon, III, ‘mnemism’, 733.

Seneca, I, shows a theological preference for theoretical philosophy of nature, 539.

Seneca, II, Epist., 102 (Lib. XVIII, 2), - 392; De Benef., 3, 20 ff, - 411.

Seneca, II, on slavery, 411, 412.

Seneca, III, Epist. 102 (bib. XVII,2), 227.

Seneca, III, developed the idea of an uncorrupted natural state as a society under the leadership of the best and not as an aggregate of a-social individuals, 229, 230 (note).

Senensius, Petruccius, III, on ‘universitas’, 233.

Sensations, II, are distinguished from feelings in psychology, 116.

of movement, 112; feeling, 347; sensory Sensibility, II, in the sensory experience

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imagination, and objectivity, 425; pure ‘sensibility’ in Kant, 495.

Sensorium Dei, II, in Newton's thought, 96.

Sensory Images, II, of movement, 168.

Sensory Images, III, there is no logical identity in sensory impressions as such; they do not furnish a logical foundation for the application of the fundamental logical norms to a judgment, 450; are not preponderant in naïve experience, but anticipate the symbolical aspect; their degrees of clarity, 38; qualitative and modal differences between sensations, in Helmholz, 43; Müller's law, 44; sensations are signs, according to Riehl, 45; symbols, 46; Riehl rehabilitates the sensory aspect of experience, 47, 48.

Sensory Picture, II, of the destruction of a cultural area by some natural catastrophe is perceived as a disaster, a calamity, 379.

Sensualism, I, Nominalistic sensualism in Marius Nizolius, 244.

Sertillanges, A.D., O.P., III, S. Thomas d'Aquin, 12.

Servet, M., III, Calvin's struggle against Servet's pantheism, 72.

Servitutes, II, praediorum rusticorum compared with servitutes praediorum urbanorum, 426.

Set-Theory, II, Cantor's set-theory, criticized by Skolem, 340.

Severijn, Dr., III, Ernst Troeltsch over de betekenis van het Calvinisme voor de Cultuurgeschiedenis, 531.

Sextus Empiricus, I, Pyrrhonic Hypotyposes, 275; Adv. Math. 7, 16; 275, 536.

Sextus Empiricus, I, ‘being is appearance’; this Pyrrhonic scepticism had the ultimate intention of denying every criterion of truth; it was adopted by Hume and Berkeley; in 1718 Sextus Empiricus' work was published in a Latin translation, in 1725 in a French version, ascribed to Huart, 275; he states that the first explicit division of philosophy into ethica, physica, and logica, was made by a pupil of Plato's, Xenocrates, 536.

Sexual Intercourse, III, was at first promiscuous, according to Bachoven, 331; sexual communism instead of individual marriage is nowhere to be found, according to Lowie, 332.

Sexual Propagation, II, an original type of biotic modal individuality of meaning, its substrata display anticipatory types of meaning individuality, 424.

Shaftesbury, I, sought the ethical faculty in the moral sentiment, 338; ethics is psychologically and aesthetically grounded in the ‘feeling of beauty’, 339; he converted the Humanistic personality-ideal irrationalistically into that of the aesthetic morality of genius and turned against every supra-individual norm and law; true morality consists in a harmonious, aesthetic self-realization of the total individuality; this was his transformation of the Greek ideal of kalokagathon; virtuosity is the highest disclosure of the sovereign personality in Shaftesbury's thought; not a single power and instinctve tendency is allowed to languish; they are all brought into harmony by means of a perfect life, and thereby the welfare of the individual as well as of society is realized; the source of moral knowledge is in the subjective dephts of individual feeling, 462; morality is brought under a subjective and aesthetic basic denominator; the morally good is the beautiful in the world of practical volition and action; the good, like the beautiful, is harmonious unity in the manifold; it is the object of an original approbation rooted in the deepest of man's being: taste is the basic faculty for both ethics and aesthetics, 463.

Shaftesbury, II, his aestheticism, 276.

Shapers of History, II, Caesar, Galileo, Rembrandt, Luther, Calvin, 243, 244; and historical economy, 286.

Shell-Lime, III, as an enkaptic structural totality; it possesses a typical embracing form totality, 702.

Sib (or Clan), III, organized community but with an undifferentiated qualification; kinship in it is usually unilateral; maternal or paternal; it is not patriarchal or matriarchal; patrilinear sibs are called gentes among the Romans, 353; Lowie's error, 354 [cf. s.v. Lowie] common descent is a fiction; the sib or clan is not found at the lowest level of primitive cultures, but the conjugal family and kinship community are found, 354; sibs are often very large; they cannot exist without comprising a considerable part of the natural kinship; members must be born in the sib; there is sometimes adoption; the sib is dominated by the family mind; once a sibmate always a sibmate; the rule of clan-exogamy: sibmates must not marry with each other; such a marriage is incest, 355; the sib is a peace relationship between sibmates; it executes the vendetta; this testifies to the presence of a political structure interwoven in the sib; the sib-chieftain leads ritual and is a magician; the sib encloses a business organization in agriculture or in hunting; totemistic clans are centres of mana belief, etc., 356; the leading structure in the sib is the family bond; what structures are combined in it depends on societal conditions; clans are extremely changeable units; common descent is a fiction,

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357; sibs have a leading structural principle, not a leading function; its collective responsibility in case of a blood-guilt; the leading structural principle is the unilateral family bond, 358; this is a parallel to the relation between foster parents and their foster child; adoption of a child incorporates it into either the father's or the mother's clan; the fiction of common descent proves the supra-arbitrary nature of the clan's structural principle; its foundation is a power organization, 359; sibs are not economically founded; their foundation is a power organization uniting the power of the sword, that of faith, economic power, etc. in an undifferentiated total structure, 360.

Sidgwick, N.V., III, The Electronic Theory of Valence, 700.

Sievers, E., II, modern phonology, 224.

Siger of Brabant, I, an Averroist; disrupted Christian faith and Aristotelian metaphysics, 260.

Signifying, II, Husserl considers it as a psychical act which can only intend the linguistic meaning but belongs as such to psychology; but the intending and signifying function is not identical with an act; the change in the intentional meanings of symbols is adapted to the cultural development by virtue of the inner structural moment of lingual formation; the reference of the symbol to what is signified is made only via the meaning intention and subjective signifying, 226.

Signs, I, have universality in Berkeley, 273.

Signs, III, like Occam, Riehl distinguishes arbitrary and natural signs, 45.

Sigwart, II, Logik, 442, 444.

Silico Skeletons, III, 774.

Silico Lattices, III, 773.

Similarity, III, in the culture of different peoples are not due to derivation, 332, 333.

Simmel, Georg, I, Hauptprobleme der Philosophie, 127.

Simmel, Georg, I, philosophy is ‘a temperament seen through the picture of the world’, 127.

Simmel, Georg, II, Soziologie, 210; Die Probleme der Geschichtsphilosophie, 211, 212; Der Fragmentcharakter des Lebens, 212; Logos, Band V, 212.

Simmel, Georg, II, his form-matter scheme in sociology; geometrical form used to distinguish formal sociology from material social sciences, 210; social forms are a priori conditions in the historical psychical life of social individuals, as elements of socety. Society is their synthesis; psychical interaction is the fundamental social category; was Simmel's material historical?, 210; form and content scheme; his Neo-Kantian scheme for the epistemology of history; the individualizing view of reality as ‘objective mind’, 211; theoretical cognitive and non-theoretical cognitive forms; he cannot differentiate between sociology, history; cultural sciences, 212; on history, 252.

Simmel, Georg, III, Über soziale Differenzierung, 242; Soziologie, 242.

Simmel, Georg, III, his concept ‘social form’, 172; on the unity of societal communities, 241; he is the ‘father’ of the formalistic school of sociology; the true realities in society are the separate individuals; the concept of society vanishes; an organism is a unity because of the interaction between energies of its organs being more intense than that with any exterior being, 242.

Simon, Saint, I, tried to combine Restoration historical thought with the naturalistic scientific view of the Enlightenment, transforming into the rationalistic Idea of progress the irrationalistic idea of development of Romanticism and the Historical School; his school started a positivistic sociology, 209.

Simon, Saint, II, his positivistic view of culture, 200; his view of worldhistory, 269.

Simon, Saint, III, Oeuvres de St. Simon et d'Enfantin, 455.

Simon, Saint, III, society is an organism, 163; the constitution of the state is of secondary importance, 452; economical factors in ‘civil society’ gave rise to authority and subordination; property is the origin of class-distinctions; authority belongs to the ruling classes; the natural scientific method in sociology, 453; politics will turn into economics; government into the administration of common interests; the State will vanish, 455.

Simplicity, II, Classicist aesthetics was guided by the science ideal and by analysis penetrated to the functional character of aesthetic meaning. It discovered modal analogies in the aesthetic sphere: unity in multiplicity, economy, simplicity and clarity, frugality, 347.

Simplicius, III, In Categorias Arist., 68 E, 227.

Sin, I, wiped out the image of God, 4; the possibility of sin; sin as privatio; the law of sin; a dynamis; there is no contradiction between creation and fall, 63; Descartes' explanation, 236; in Leibniz' sin is due to metaphysical imperfection, 237.

Sin, II, the curse of sin, 32; sin is not mere privatio; is sinful reality still meaning?, 33; sin is both privation, and, positive, i.e. apostasy, a power; but not independent of the meaning character of creation, 33; Common Grace, 33; world, flesh, and sin, 34; sin and legal order,

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134; sin is not a counter power to creation, 302; it is a disconcerting resistance, 35; sin and law in the opening-process, 335; 336; the fall into sin and our horizon of experience, 549.

Sin and Meaning, II, Sin is not merely privatio; it is also a positive guilty apostasy insofar as it reveals its power, derived from creation itself. Sinful reality remains apostate meaning under the law and under the curse of God's wrath, 33.

Sin and the State, III, the sword power of the State is because of sin, 423.

Sinzheimer, Hugo, III, De Taak der Rechtssociologie, 577.

Sinzheimer, Hugo, III, wants to prove that empirical sociology can study societal human relationships apart from any normative legal viewpoint; he adduces the figure of a criminal organization, 577.

Si O2 Formations, III, of radiolaria, 108.

Skolem, II, criticizes Cantor's set-theory, 340.

Slavery, II, a human being can never be a juridical object; Lactantius and Seneca against slavery; the Christian Church opposed slavery indirectly, 411.

Smend, Rudolph, III, Der Staat als Integration, 259, 387; Verfassung und Verfassungsrecht, 389, 400.

Smend, Rudolph, III, applied Litt's theory to the state, considering the latter as a universal integrational system unified by subjective and objective factors; later he appealed to the state's functional territorial organization of power according to the historicist view, 259; he founded the Berlin School, and introduced the dialectical cultural scientific method in his Integrationslehre, 387; the State is in a perpetual process of renewal, 389; State and law are two independent and different aspects of communal life, 399; State and law cohere but are self-contained provinces of spiritual life, 400.

Snail Houses, III, as objective structures, 774.

Snowden Incident, Philip, III, and internal relations, 486.

Social Aspect, II, in Stammler, 16, 67; control, command, power, a modus of sociality, 68; social individuality structures, 69; convential and ceremonial economy; lingual expression and social contact, 113; empathy, 113; social refers to human intercourse, 140, 141; sociality and history; forms of intercourse differ with time and place; social norms require positivizing formation, which is a historical retricipation; forms of intercourse have meaning, a lingual retrocipation, 227; in its closed structure history need not be signified to continue its course; closed social intercourse is inevitably significant; social behaviour varies with time and place: there is a history a social intercourse; therefore intercourse is not history, 228.

Social Categories (transcendental), III, are the conditions of systematic investigations; further distinctions should not be imposed on social structures in a subjective and a priori way, but as a result of structural investigation, 565; transcendental social categories do not pertain to the ultimate genera embracing different radical types, but refer to the transcendental societal categories in the plastic horizon: thing, event, enkaptic intertwinement, internal structural causality, etc., 566; these categories are the links between the modal and the plastic dimension of the temporal order; they are not related to the metaphysical idea of being, nor to the constitutive formative function of a transcendental subject of experience (Kantian or Husserlian); but to the modal and the plastic structures; the most fundamental category is the correlation between communal and inter-communal or inter-individual relationships, which are founded in the modal aspect of social intercourse; the contrast between differentiated and undifferentiated social relationships is founded in the historical aspect; the categories of natural and organized communities, institutional and non-institutional relatonships impart a typical direction to primary categories towards individuality-structures; natural and institutional communities are sharply to be distinguished from free associations, 567; differentiated and undifferentiated communities of an historical foundation are not essential to every society; there are non-institutional natural communities e.g., those founded in a neighbourhood in a vital spatial sense; in the genetical order historically founded communities are always preceded by natural ones; and institutional natural communities precede those of a non-institutional character; a differentiated society cannot exist without the stable foundation of institutional organized communities; the primary condition of a society is its relative stability, 568; the categories of societal form and social interlacement are also transcendental, apart from their typical variable realization; the latter requires a genetic and an existential form; these forms are the nodal points of enkaptical interlacement between societal relationships of a different radical or a dfferent geno-type; the category of voluntary associations is not a genus proximum, 569; the term ‘voluntary association’ implies a close connection with human purposes; this category pertains to the genetic form of organized communities which only originate in the free individualized and differentiated inter-

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personal relations, 570; the category of societal form assumes a typical transcendental relation to a well defined category of societal individuality structures; Tönnies' category of ‘Gesellschaft’ is the product of an individualizing and rationalizing process in the inter-individual and inter-communal relations of society; the purposes pursued in these organizations are to be freely chosen and extremely varied, according to the variation of human needs in the process of cultural disclosure, 571; the genetic forms constituting voluntary associations have an abstract character; purpose and means must be indicated to relate them typically to the organized community to be formed; juridically they imply a social compact, which functions in the sphere of common private law; institutional organized communities have priority over differentiated voluntary associations; voluntary organizations may be associatory or authoritarian in form; the latter require a labour contract or a contract of enrolment to grant membership; such contracts are genetic forms constituting a communal relation; here voluntary associations may assume an indirectly compulsory character in their existential forms; the contractual character of their genetic forms is a transcendental condition of differentiated voluntary associations, 572; a contract of association is a collective interindividual act of consensus constituting a unified will of a whole, bound to a common purpose; agreements not directed to the formation of voluntary organized communities do not constitute a unified will of a whole bound to a common purpose; Tönnies holds all associatory bonds in the ‘Gesellschaft’ to be based on the do ut des principle; Binding and Triepel called the genetic form of an association a Vereinbarung, i.e., a unifying act of the will; two parties have opposite interests and aims; such a contract they held to be based on the principle of do ut des; these opinions are wrong; Binder and Triepel extend their concept ‘Vereinbarung’ even to the parties in a law suit; but only voluntary associations are strictly bound to the genetic form of a ‘Vereinbarung’, 573; the Humanist natural law doctrine was too one-sided; it assumed that institutional communities, too, could only arise from individualized inter-individual relations; in modern society the genetic form of marriage is an agreement; this agreement is not sufficient in most countries to constitute a marriage; the natural law doctrine of the contractual genesis of a State has been generally reliquished; the leading function of a voluntary association is not identical with the purpose that its founders had in view; such a purpose gives form to the internal structural principle and means the free choice of the type of association; a modern mining industry has a supra arbitrary structure: an historical (subjective-objective) organization of power comprising capital, management, division and coordination of labour; its genetic and existential forms shape its internal relations as well as its external relations in an enkaptic interlacement, 574; its internal structure is realized in a necessary correlation of communal and inter-individual relationships; the example of a modern department-store; the limits within which the subjective purposive plan of the founders plays an individual formative rôle; the purpose of a voluntary association is not restricted to the internal life of the organized community to which it refers; it is necessarily directed to the correlation of internal communal and external inter-individual relationships, 575; the genetic form of a closed club is constituted chiefly by the aim and means of the founders and is a nodal point of inter-structural intertwinements; the internal leading function of a trade-union is the moral bond of solidarity between the labourers typically founded in their organized historical vocational power to elevate labour to an essential and equivalent partner in the process of production, 576; purposes like the promotion of the intellectual and bodily development of the members, etc., do not qualify the internal community; only the chief aim has a typical relation to the leading function without coalescing with it; the typical relation between purpose and internal structure of a criminal organization; Sinzheimer's sociological and Hauriou's institutional view of a criminal association; it is not possible to establish the factual existence of a criminal organization without the aid of norms functioning in the social order; a positivist might consider norms as factual rules of behaviour in a society that has accepted them, 577; but this does not explain the ‘code of honour’ and the internal authoritative order in a criminal organization; this code has a supra arbitrary foundation in the structural principle of their internal communal sphere independent of criminal purposes and not different from that of a ‘lawful’ industrial organization; it is given an illegitimate positive form; Hauriou distinguishes between purposes and internal ‘institutional idea’; this idea is neo-Platonic and becomes an ‘idée d'oeuvre’ in an organized community; but this metaphysics cannot explain a criminal organization, 578; Tönnies' contractual view of ‘Körperschaften’; the relative truth in this view. Voluntary assosiations formed for a subjective purpose pre-suppose a process of individualization in the inter-personal societal relations guaranteeing the individuals a sphere of private liberty outside of all institutional

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communities; an historically closed society embraces almost the whole temporal existence of its members in communal relationships; in the individualizing process a real emancipation takes place, 580; primitive societal forms shut people off in a kind of exclusive symbiosis; the breaking up of the undifferentiated institutional communities is connected with the rise of associatory organizations; man's emancipation is in line with the opening process of history and with his vocation; this process is much more accellerated in a city than in a town; a patriarchal family of agriculturists, and a metropolitan family; a medieval town and a modern city, 581; the dissolution of the guilds; the complicated picture of modern city life and society; the political institutional bond is a really integrating bond in such a city; a rural village community; metropolitan relations are largely impersonal; the process of expansion and emancipation is not necessarily un-Christian; it breaks through narrow-minded nationalism, opposes the defiication of temporal societal relationships, 582; temporal societal relations should express the religious supra-temporal unity of the human race; the Corpus Christi; Jesus' parable of the Good Samaritan; the opening process of society increases the individual man's needs, and his dependence on others; division of labour Hegel's dialectical idea of the ‘bürgerliche Gesellschaft’; the ‘strategem of reason’ (List der Vernunft); he tries to reconcile Hobbes' naturalistic individualistic construction with the Humanistic idea of law and morality in Kant's conception, 583; the ‘bürgerliche Gesellschaft’ drives the individual out of family life and raises him to a higher spiritual level pointing to the ‘Vernunftstaat’; in this state the antithesis between the subject and the norm has been cancelled in the substantial (and no longer formal) moral freedom of everybody as a part of the whole; Hegel's State conception as the organized administration of justice and ‘Polizei’, 584; the three main structures of civil society in Hegel; society and the absolute State, division of labour; social classes; a logical triad, 585; Korporationen; society and family are parts of a whole; vocational class honour; a single unorganized person; individual and universal interests reconciled by civil law, 586; criticism of Hegel's view; his masterly interpretation of the modern individualized inter-individual societal relations; his evaluation of the influence of the Christian idea of free interpersonal relations on the individualizing process; his universalistic deification of a national State, his logicistic speculative scheme of three social classes; over-emphasis on economic motives is oriented to the idea of the homo economicus; he forces voluntary organizations into his three classes, 587; Hegel discovered a structural law of modern society: viz. the generalizing and integrating tendency in the free societal purposes which forms the necessary counterpart of the increasing individualizing tendency; the normative law of correlative differentiation and integration; individuality structures in the differentiated inter-individual and inter-communal relationships (free market relations, publicity, fashions, sports, competition, the press, traffic, musical and theatrical performances, private philanthropy, diplomacy, etc.), 588; these individuality structures possess two radical functions; fashion and sports are qualified by a typical function of social intercourse; free market relations, publicity, etc., are qualified by the economic function; social philanthropy by the moral aspect; missionary activity is an activity of faith; all these structures are of a typical historical foundation; individual acts display different individuality structures: saluting a friend is qualified as a typical act of social intercourse; a purchase agreement, a lease contract, are economically qualified; a public performance of music is aesthetically qualified, an alms in public is morally qualified, etc.; these structures are not based on organization; the acting individuals act in essential coordination in a cooperative or in an antagonistic sense; they follow the same direction (in fashion, e.g.); supplement each other (division of labour), or are at strife (competition), 589; primitive inter-individual relations are undifferentiated and interwoven with the undifferentiated order of the narrow tribal or folk community and share its isolating and limiting character; they vary from tribe to tribe; those of one community are experienced as alien or hostile by another; each tribal relationship has its vertically individualized, miniature ‘society’; modern Western society tends to expand their sphere of validity horizontally; they have an international tendency; leading groups set the pace and are generally followed, 590; the leading houses in Paris, London, Vienna, etc., lay down the norms of fashion; they cannot create norms in a perfectly arbitrary way, but are bound by dynamic principles of taste, social distinction, efficiency, etc., and by the various societal individuality structures; extravagances never have a normative function; they have a patent expansive, international character; there are no national fashions; but there are folk dresses, 591; fashion is an integrating factor in inter-individual social relations; v. Jhering treats fashion as a social excrescence in contrast to folk dress, and as originating from impure motives of class pride and vanity; but fashion is not a sign of decadence, nor a

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symptom of the ‘mass man’; fascist and national socialist salutes were a foolish set-back caused by the setting up of national barriers; fashion is only radically qualified as a structure of social intercourse; it is geno-typically and phenotypically differentiated in particular subject-object-relations and in its interweavings with other structural types of inter-individual relations, e.g., a fashion in sporting dress, evening dress, travelling-costumes, lounge suits, etc.; such differentiation bears an expansive cosmopolitan character; this is the result of the integrating process manifest in modern society; the differentiating factors in the integrating process are the individuality structures of the inter-individual relations (592) especially in those of social intercourse; national and local forms not founded in climatic or other natural factors are experienced as obsolescent peculiarities; in the typically economic relationships the correlation between integration and differentiation is very marked owing to modern technique, modern traffic, trade, industry; the integrating tendencies in these structures are founded in the economic power of the leading entrepreneurial groups; customary stipulations, standard contracts, general conditions in individual economically qualified agreements; little scope is left to the private autonomy of the contracting parties; contrats d'adhésion, 593; the organized industrial groups bring about a horizontal integration in the contents of the individual agreements; this integration is differentiated according to the horizontal branches of industry or trade; Duguit supposes that such integration is an intrinsical transformation of civil law into an economically qualified social law; but in this case there is only question of an enkaptic interlacement of industrial and commercial law with civil law; outside of the internal sphere of civil law there is no equality of the coordinated subjects in the inter-individual societal relations; science is a necessary integrating factor presenting itself as a concrete social phenomenon in the correlation of interindividual and organized communal relationships; science is theoretically-logically qualified and materially differentiated, and is the foundation of the individuality structure of modern technical progress; the opening and individualizing process is a rationalizing process, 594; it is destined to disclose and realize the potentialities and dispositions inherent in social relations according to the divine world-order; as far as the formation of law is concerned the Historical School pointed out the necessary part played by scientific jurists; their inference that theoretical jurisprudence is a formal source of positive law was erroneous; Puchta; von Jhering; modern individualization and integration should be counterbalanced by the unfolding of organized institutional communities and voluntary associations; otherwise they will result in an individualistic process of disintegration; hence the extremely individualistic and merciless capitalistic form of the industrial sector of Western society, 595; the class struggle; labour became impersonal market ware; the labour community was affected by the individualistic contractual view; unlimited competition created the Hobbesian ‘homo homini lupus’; family, kinship, and the State were also affected by this social disease; the ‘sacred’ egoism of the separate States; all these abuses revealed the Civitas terrena; modern society is forming voluntary associations to counter-act this destructive individualism, 596; employers and labourers are organizing; trusts, world concerns, are international; cartels exercise restraint on competition, but may become a menace to healthy market relations; collective bargaining between employers and the employed; this was stimulated by the Christian idea of solidarity in opposition to Marxism; but there was some misconception of an entire branch of industry being a ‘natural community’, and ‘organical part of the national whole’, which error was an after effect of the universalist-Romantic view of human society current in the Christian historical trend of thought during the times of the 19th century Restauration, 597; a public legal organization of industrial life is not a ‘natural community’; it has no public legal competence on its own account; the Romantic view cannot be interpreted in terms of the principle of sphere-sovereignty, a misconception on the part of the Protestant League of Trade Unions in the Netherlands; medieval political autonomy as a subjective right of the guilds only suited an undifferentiated society; public legal authority can never be derived from the inner nature of a private organization of industrial life; the Dutch Public Industrial Organization Act of 1950, 598; the organs of such an organization have delegated autonomy; the State combines a horizontal public legal integration with a compulsory vertical organization of national production processes; the State can only bind the industrial (and agricultural) relationships as far as they are enkaptically interwoven with the State's structure; the political integration displays international tendencies; since the second world war individual States are more interdependent than formerly, 599; international political relations are increasingly being integrated; the second article of the Charter of the United Nations; international security and the position of the leading powers; the integrating function of the U.N.O. in the non-

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political spheres; the Uno is not an all-inclusive society, but a voluntary organization of individual States; it is qualified by an international public legal function and founded in an historical international organization of power; but it is not an institution; nor has it any monopolistic organization of armed force or a territory, 600; it is not endowed with real governmental authority over the separate States; it is not a civitas maxima; its inner nature is determined by the juridical principle of international public interest; its integrating function displays a promoting and supporting character, not a compulsory trait of State regulation; modern society shows continuous tension between differentiation and integration processes, between individual and organizational bonds; individualism and universalism; more than a third part of mankind is delivered to totalitarian power, 601; Western democracy tries to integrate its military forces; communism is a secularized eschatological faith; dialectical Western humanism has been swayed between universalism and individualism; its ideas of freedom and authority have been undermined by Historicist relativism, 602; the doctrine of unassailable human rights cannot check the absolutization of temporal communal relationships; the Biblical view excludes individualism as much as universalism; such a voluntary association as a club touches man's temporal existence only superficially; accupational organizations (trade unions, e.g.), are very important, and animated, at least partly, by a spirit of community and solidarity; the typical foundation of a restricted club is an historical form of organized social power, 603; its leading function is that of social intercourse within a closed communal circle; the club's authority is vested in the board and the general assembly; the exclusion of a member from any personal social intercourse deprives him of his internal societal rights; the requirements for membership and the grounds of expulsion have a typical internal juridical character; the ballot in connection with the social position of an applicant, for admission; this internal social law has its reverse side in civil legal inter-individual relations, 604; a political party shows an enkaptic interlacement with the State guaranteed by its primary aim of influencing the State's policy; also in the party's genetic and existential societal forms; undifferentiated unions are no political parties; Sorokin's view criticized, 605; a party is not a faction; there are factions in a Church, in a school, in a trade union, etc. Ostrogorski's definition mentions as a party aim ‘the attainment of a political goal’, but ‘political’ remains an undefined general concept in its ignoring the typical trait in a party's structure; this structure is bound to that of the State as a res publica; the rise of parties manifests the interest and the sense of responsibility of the founders and members with respect to State affairs, 606; James Bryce argues the indispensibility of parties in a free country; parties awaken the public spirit in the people; their discipline is a remedy against political egoism and corruption; - the debate between parties promotes mutual correction and the finding of a common basis for practical cooperation; Kelsen attributes this situation to a universal axiological relativism inherent in democracy; he says that autocracy is founded in the belief in an absolute verity; why this view is wrong, 607; Kelsen's appeal to the principle of proportionality is unwarranted by his relativistic view of democracy; without belief in an absolute supra-theoretical Truth and supra-arbitrary norms the political struggle would be meaningless, 608; the factual grouping of the population into political parties may or may not coincide with the differentiation into ‘religious groups’; opposite parties may have the same religious basis, and the same party may embrace Christians and atheists; but the radical antithesis between the Biblical and the apostate religious motive is decisive; the dualistic motive of nature and grace may blur the line of division; it is not always necessary to form separate Christian parties; a political party has an historical foundation; its unity is dependent on the power of a political conviction concerning the policy of the State, 609; it does not rely on military power; a military organization is not a political party; the possibility of an anarchistic political party, 610; a farmer party, a labour party, a middle class party are only variability types which are enkaptic interweavings between a political party and occupationally differentiated interests; the meanings of the adjective ‘political’, 611; the party bond is never of a theoretical political character; because the party takes sides in practical politics; the Anti-Corn-Law-League of 1838 was not a political party but an organization ad hoc for the realization of certain transitory political aim; so was the Eastern Question Association of 1878; a genuine party requires some total view of the State and its policy to guarantee the party's relative stability; inner divergences regarding practical politics, between conservative and progressive opinions, etc., cannot affect the inner unity so long a compromise remains possible, 612; opposing parties may make a mutual, inter-communal compromise ad hoc, solong as the latter does not concern fundamental principles; the leading functionis not that of faith; i.e., political faith; political organization is not really pisteutically qualified; a common politi-

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cal belief is not the leading function, 613; political divergence is possible between members of the same Church; the party's qualifying function is the moral aspect; the typical moral bond of a political conviction is indispensable, 614; Sorokin overestimates legal rules; the moral bond of political conviction is a non-original, retrocipatory individuality type of the moral aspect; referring to the nuclear type of formative power in a typical politico-structural sense; the party community implies an historical vocation; the moral political bond produces a mind of politic-ethical solidarity; a totalitarian party discipline contradicts the moral guiding function, 615; organizational stratification should not muzzle independent thought and creative criticism; overstrained party discipline changes the individual member into a negligible quantity; and the leaders are mediocrities and hypocrites, says Sorokin; this seems to be an unwarranted assertion, 616; very big parties are apt to affect the integrity of the moral bond by the formation of a dictatorial elite; the Russian Communist party has acquired a monopoly, grants its members certain privileges and advantages, but exercises an extremely rigorous party control over its members, 617; exclusively personal interests cannot explain the loyalty of American citizens to their parties; notwithstanding the ‘spoil’ system; pressure groups and deceitful slogans and promises endanger the party's moral bond; a party is a voluntary association and therefore not a part of the State, 618; the prohibition of a party has a dubious effect; there may come underground activity; in elections and the formation of a new cabinet political parties have a typical enkaptic function within the constitutional sphere of the State; the parliamentary system of government is insolubly bound to the parties; this side of party life does not belong to the inner sphere sovereignty of a party, for its public legal functions are derived from the State and depend on the public function of the electorate; historically the parties arose from local election committees; these were their genetic forms; a monopolistic party in a totalitarian State is an extremely close enkaptic interlacement similar to that of a Church-State, 619; the monopolistic party is the chief organ of the totalitarian State, and it rules the whole machinery of the body politic; but in its inner sphere it remains a closed community qualified by a moral bond of common political conviction, which conviction it cannot impose on all the citizens of the State; the term ‘ecclesiastical parties’ is confusing; since it has various meanings; the task of the Church with respect to politics, 620; why a political party cannot be bound to a Church confession; the Catholic national party is closely bound to the Roman Catholic Church, 621; the Anti-revolutionary Party is independent of ecclesiastical authority; a party's political belief is conditioned by the life- and world-view of its members which is rooted in a basic motive, 622; the appeal to a common belief deepens and strengthens the moral bond, checking an overstrained party disciplin; in Anglo-Saxon countries there is little interest in the deeper fundamentals of party principles; public opinion there is partly Christian and partly Humanistic, but generally anti-totalitarian; Bryce observes that the party system of the U.S.A. has contributed to the unification and homogeneity of the population; but there is no real political education of the members; parties are oligarchically ruled and require blind obedience to their discipline; the French Revolution and Marxism have stimulated Europeans to reflect on the spiritual fundamentals of party formation; the antithesis between liberalism and conservatism in the English dual party system is too superficial now that Western society is faced with the threat of totalitarian ideologies, 623; the secularization of political conviction is furthered by political parties ignoring the ultimate questions of belief; this is the justification of a Christian party formation, 624.

Social Contract, I, this theory has to reconcile the mathematical science ideal with the personality ideal; criticized in Hume, 311; in Hugo Grotius, 311, 319; in Locke, 318; in Hobbes, in Pufendorff, 319; in Rousseau, 320.

Social Contract, III, in Hobbes, 182, 232; Rousseau, 236.

Social Dynamics, III, the historical development of human society is the subject of Social Dynamics, 187.

Social Forms, II, Simmel assumes that social forms are a priori conditions included in the historical-psychical life of the social individuals themselves, 210.

Social Forms, III, von Wiese's concept; Simmel's 172; social forms are positivizations of structural principles, 173-175; segmentary and organic social forms in Durkheim, 175-178; they are nodal points of enkaptic interlacements, 405.

Social Group, III, this concept and the various criteria of a general classification lack any transcendental foundation, 176.

Social Impulse, III, in Aristotle; was denatured in Stoicism to the ‘appetitus socialis’, 224, 226, 232.

Social Mediation, III, by means of symbols, 243, 250-253; in a ‘closed sphere’; in a Gemeinschaft; is conductive to its interwoven structural unity, 253, 254; this mediation criticized, 260, 272.

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Social Prejudice, I, in philosophy and in a life and world view, 165.

Social Process, III, according to Fr. Oppenheimer, 166.

Social Psychology, II, psychology deals with its logical, historical, lingual, social, economical, aesthetical, juridical, moral, and faith anticipations, 115.

Social Restriction, III, this idea of Litt's is crypto-normative, 272.

Social Whole, III, a communal whole is never an object; it is realized in the social coherence of typical human acts and modes of behaviour, and bound to objective social vehicles or conductors; especially to the lingual subject-object relation, 198; the polis embraced all other communities and individual men as parts of a whole, in Aristotle, 201; the State determined the nature of the household; the conjugal relations and those between parents and children are equalized with the relation of master and slave, 202; homogeneous and heterogeneous wholes distinguished by Anaxagoras, Aristotle, 638.

Socialism, II, conservative liberalism evoked the reaction of socialism and communism, 362.

Socialist Revolution, III, in it private and public law will vanish, according to St. Simon, and in Marxism, 455.

Social Types, III, Weber's ‘ideal type’, 82.

Societal Relationships, III, and sociology, 157; interlacements and the irreducibility of their radical and geno-types, 164; sphere-sovereignty and inter-structural coherence; enkapsis; mankind; realization, 170; difference from animal types of symbiosis; soc. relationships require human formation and are omni-functional, 172; positivization, 173; constitutive and existential forms; geno-types, 174; communal, inter-individual, and intercommunal relationships, 176; community, 177; intercommunal relationships and inter-individual relations, and enkapsis, 181.

Societal Structure of Human Knowledge, II, the individuality of human experience within the temporal horizon has a societal structure excluding any possibility of a hermetically closed ‘microcosm’, 594.

Society, I, a universalist conception of society in Fichte, as a whole in relation to its parts, 489.

Society, III, is the system of free market relations according to Locke, 452.

Society, Modern, III, its generalizing and integrating tendency is a structural law, 588.

Sociological Method, III, intertwinements of individuality structures cannot be posited a priori, but must be discovered in a continual confrontation with empirical reality, 264.

Sociology, General, II, form-matter scheme applied by Georg Simmel, 210; Von Wiese, Formal Sociology, 212.

Sociology, General, III, sociology investigates societal relationships as such; in their totality and as a specific view; the positivist ‘factual’ view and that of a normative ideal socio-cultural phenomenon, 157; the modern pseudo-natural scientific concept of structure in sociology; ideal types; structure is then ‘constellation’ of elements; theoretical sociology and biology, 158; sociology as a total science of society; causality; structural causality pre-supposes a total view, and can only be handled as a transcendental Idea; Sorokin takes the societal components in a cultural-social sense; the structural constellation of interacting subjects (= persons), meanings, values, norms, social vehicles or conductors and ‘causal interaction’; his notion of socio-cultural causality is multivocal, 159; Sorokin over-estimates the rôle of legal norms in organized groups; only a particular secondary radical type has the legal aspect for its central leading function, 160; the typical sociological problem of totality; Sorokin minimizes the divergence between the various sociological schools and their -isms; these -isms are not specific viewpoints of a pure societal nature, arising from the variety of the sciences concerned with sociology (psychology, history, etc.), but they originate from the absolutization of specific modal aspects applied to a totality view, 161; Sorokin follows Rickert: his sociology tries to deal with the super-organic or mental vital phenomena; his socio-cultural universe; meanings, values, and norms are super-imposed on biotical properties; human subjects and material vehicles; sociology is a generalizing science, history is an individualizing science; this is neo-Kantianism; Sorokin loses sight of the totality problem, 162; S. Simon and Aug. Comte proclaimed society to be an organic whole; their irrationalistic freedom-Idealism and rationalistic science ideal; is there a cultural community?, 163; Comte's positivism intended to re-integrate Western culture by assuring it a mental solidarity; a cultural community cannot be all-embracing; the universal interlacements of all temporal societal relationships cannot detract from the irreducibility of their radical and geno types, 164; Gurvitch; particular and all-inclusive groups; groups and societies, 164; an all-inclusive society is a definite historical cultural community; fascist and capitalist ‘societies’, 165; Fr. Oppenheimer: all natural

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sciences are related to biology; in the same way all the activities of the human masses constitute the ‘social process’; life is unique and has many forms in plants, animals and men; a society is a species of human mass living socially, i.e. united by psychical interactions; his metaphysical substance concept ‘Life’, 166; human society is a secondary immortal substance; the errors committed by Oppenheimer's view; his metaphysical vitalism; Universalistic sociology may consider humanity as an all-inclusive temporal community (Comte); it may be founded in ontological universalism; and it may be accompanied by axiological universalism, 167; Plato's consistent ontological universalism, an inconsistent universalist in sociology; his Phaedo rejects the axiological universalism of the polis; mankind is not the all-inclusive temporal whole of human society; the Biblical ‘from one blood’ is not intended in a universalistic sense; the three transcendental problems of a theoretical view of human society: of the basic denominator for a comparison of the types of societal relationships; their mutual relation and coherence; their radical unity and meaning-totality, 168; the central religious community of mankind in its creation, fall and redemption; the Stoic conception in conflict with the Christian view; Christian revolution and the Stoic idea of mankind; the Greeks absolutized polis; the basic denominator is the temporal world order rooted in the Divine order of creation, 169; the mutual relation between the social individuality-structures: sphere sovereignty and inter-structural coherence; enkapsis; radical unity and meaning-totality in the central religious community of mankind; sphere sovereignty and undifferentiated societies; the inner natures of the typical societal relationships may not all of them have been factually and fully realized; but at any stage of their realization they depend on their internal structural principles, 170; marriage displays its own structure even in its defects and deterioration; the internal structures of a marriage, a church, a state, etc., cannot be identified with their variable and often sinful factual realizations; structural principles are not ‘ideal types’, 171; animal types of symbiosis differ from the normatively qualified societal relationships; the latter require human formation (a historical foundation) and function in all the aspects of our social experience; Simmel, Von Wiese, etc., and the concept ‘social form’; interpreted as ‘social elements’, 172; transcendental structural principles and subjective socio-political principles; the latter may contradict the structural principles founded in the Divine World-order; positive norms constitute social relations; societal forms that the typical structural principles assume in the process of their positivization; they are the necessary link between the structural principles and the factual transitory relationships subjected to them, 173; genetic (or constitutive) forms and existential forms, and phenotypes; civil and ecclesiastic marriage; industrial and farmer -families; pastoral family, etc., 174; the Dutch East- and West-Indian Companies; the medieval church; Durkheim's segmentary and organic types of social forms; Max Weber's ‘ideal type’ and antique and medieval forms of ‘political life’, 175; communal and inter-individual or inter-communal relationships; their correlativity; the term ‘group’, 176; Gemeinschaft, Gesellschaft; community, society; a new definition of the term ‘community’, viz., a more or less durable societal relationship joining its members into a social unity, irrespective of the degree of intensity of the communal bond; inter-individual and inter-communal relationships function in coordination, 177; antagonistic behaviour within the marriage bond is something quite different from such behaviour outside of marriage between a man and a woman; the factual behaviour of people occurs within the cadre of an intricate network of typical structures of correlated communal, inter-communal, or inter-personal relationships; superficial and untenable generalizations; Sumner Maine's theory of the evolution from status to contract; Durkheim's view; Tönnies' Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft; organized and unorganized communities; ‘Verband’, 178; natural (unorganized) communities are of all times; marriage, cognate family, kinship family; neighbourhood community of colonists; vicinage; guild; the concept ‘natural community’ in Aristotle's view; friendship is not a natural community, 179; public legal organization of industry or agriculture; comparison of a natural community and the public legal organization of a branch of industry or agriculture; cognatic family, extended family bond; organization makes a community independent of the lease of life of its individual members; authority and subordination in organized communities; and in marriage and family, 180; authority of the magistrate, of a factory manager; natural law of freedom and equality; communal and inter-individual relationships and their enkapsis; non-integrated inequality and diversity in social position; inter-personal and inter-communal relations have their counterpart in a communal bond, 181; human society cannot exist as an unintegrated diversity; unity and diversity form a transcendental correlation and condition of any possible human society; the relation of a societal whole and its parts; sociological universalism over-

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estimates the communal relationships; sociological individualism absolutizes the inter-individual relationships; the individualistic concept of ‘elements’; the denial of the reality of communities; ontological individualism in Leibniz' monadology combined with axiological individualism of personality;Hobbes' sociological individualism, axiological primacy of his State as a fictitious super-person construed by a compact between individuals, 182; sociological individualism, or universalism and nominalism or realism; community is not a natural fact but a normative task; Max Weber wants to eliminate the idea of community, 183; Tönnies' Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft; cf. s.v. Ferdinand Tönnies, 184; social Dynamics, 187; institutional and non-institutional communities; an institution encompasses its members intensively, continuously and for a large part of their lives independently of their will; e.g. the familistic community; the State; the institutional Church; the conjugal community, 187; undifferentiated organized communities are a secondary type of institution, 188; among the organized communities only the State and the Church are institutions; all other organizations are voluntary associations; based on the principle of freedom to join and leave, 189; compulsory organizations; enkapsis with the State; indirect compulsion; associatory and authoritarian non-institutional organizations; employer, manager, labourers in a factory; an organized community with its essential structural subject-object relation to buildings and machines (e.g. a factory), 190; is most often an authoritarian organization; the freedom to join or to leave is frustrated by the situation of the ‘labour-market’; this frustration is not caused by the structural principles but by factual positive situations; indirectly compulsory organizations; the State; associatory and authoritarian voluntary or indirectly compulsory organizations may be enkaptically interwoven with each other in the genetic form of a free association, 191; naïve experience of organized communities, as continuous units, not as pluralities; and their subject-object relations; a church and its building; household; these subj.-object relations are actualization relations, 192; naïve experiences cannot explain the internal continuous unity of a societal whole; the naïve conception of organized communities as the totality of their united members; this resembles the naöve view of a man's inheritance as including all the separate objects belonging to it, 193; in primitive tribes the individual man is only known as an outcast, an outlaw; sociological universalism eliminates the correlativity between communal and inter-communal or inter-personal relationships; we experience the close community of family life against the background of inter-individual intercourse, 194; all temporal societal relations are concentrically related to the radical spiritual solidarity of mankind in creation, fall, and redemption by Christ in the religious communion of the Holy Spirit; more extensive communities show a lower level of morality than those of a more intense character, 195; universalism. absolutizes the temporal communal relationships and replaces the radical unity of mankind by a theoretically devised temporal one; the totalitarian ideology implied in universalism is often camouflaged as an ‘organic’ view; the human I-ness is never an ‘organ’; the biological analogy fails at the critical point of the transcendental Idea of totality in universalism; the membership of the ‘Corpus Christi’ is independent of all temporal communal relationships, 196; comparison of organized societal units with a thing structure; inter-communal and inter-personal relationships do not resemble thing structures; things lack subject functions in the post psychical aspects; they are only ‘objects’ in the typical human societal relationships; perhaps a thing lacks any subject function in the post physical spheres; for the term may be restricted to ‘dead’ objects, 197; the human body is qualified by the act-structure, and not a ‘thing’; temporal communal human relationships function in the mental and in the pre-logical spheres; a communal whole is never an ‘object’; it is realized in the social coherence of typical human acts and modes of behaviour; it is bound to the objective social ‘vehicles’ or ‘conductors’ mentioned by Sorokin; especially to the lingual subject-object relation, 198; the conception of the Greek polis; Protagoras depreciates the gentilitial organization; form-matter motive, 199; Plato's ideal universalistic state, 200; Aristotle's view of the polis is universalistic, 201; his conception of the household (οἰϰία), 202; Aristotle's state is the perfect community directed to the good life, his conception of the marriage and family bonds, 203; friendship; authority and obedience; property, 204; his ‘organic’ theory and Scholasticism; division of labour and corporative occupational classes, 205; the sociological fictitious person-theory, cf. s.v. fiction theory, 233-236; societas inaequalis et societatis aequales, Locke, Wolff, 237; problems about the unity of an organized community; universalism and individualism; Othmar Spann's views, 240; modern individualistic nominalism, its conception of reality; unity of an organized community is explained in terms of psychological interaction as a category of consciousness; or in a functional juridical sense, 241; as the functional logical unity of a system of legal norms derived from

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an original norm; Simmel's conception: unity is merely interaction between elements, 242; Von Wiese says: these social interhuman formations exist only in the minds of men, 243; Greek universalism viewed an organized social whole as a composite ‘corpus’, organic in structure, rooted in a metaphysical form (eidos); its unity was in its controlling part; modern universalism qualifies an organized community as a ‘Gesammtperson’; an ‘Überperson’ is the State; Hegel's view; this is an hypostasis, 244; the German adherents of the Historical school viewed the state only as the political form of a national community; and gave the transpersonalistic conception of an organized community a pluralistic elaboration, recognizing the autonomy of non-political and lower political associations; whose substance is found in a common or general will; the concept ‘spiritual organism’ as a corporative personality originates in Schelling's philosophy; Gierke's theory, 245; on a radical Christian standpoint the dilemma between universalism and individualism is meaningless; man's personality transcends the temporal horizon of reality; tranpersonalism rests on an irrationalistic hypostatization of temporal communal relationships; modern individualism reduces man to an atomistic self-contained thing, or to a system of functional interactions or to an autarchical metaphysical combination of matter monads and a central soul monad; or to a self-sufficient moral individuum, or to such a moral ego; these views deny the inner communal structures of temporal society; Othmar Spann's criticism of such individualism, 246; there is no polar tension in the Christian view; no antithesis between universalism and individualism, 247; the faithful are members of reborn humanity, elected in Christ; Weber arranges the term individuality under the meanings of individualism, which is greatly confusing, 248; Th. Litt calls sociology the foundation of the ‘Geisteswissenschaften’ (socio-cultural sciences), 248; sociology must examine the spiritual world in which the I-hood lives and in which subject and object are identical; it must start with the totality, the coherence of spiritual reality, necessary for the understanding of the relative self-sufficiency of its moments; scientific thought in here the self-transillumination of the human mind; the ‘moments’ are interlaced in dialectical tensions, 249; the egos' psychical experiences are united with the timeless social meaning signified in the sensory symbolism of social forms of expression; the latter possess a transpersonal character; the ego is a monad living solely in its psychical acts, interweaving past experiences with those of the present; intertwined in a real reciprocity of perspectives with the other egos, the ‘thou’; these perspectives are not similar or comparable, but correspondent, 250; these reciprocating perspectives are realized in the symbolically expressive movement in which I and thou unite spiritually and understand each other in the world of timeless meaning; the social interwovenness of the ego in the Gemeinschaft (community) of the closed sphere, 251 (cf. s.v. Gemeinschaft, 251 ff.); a summary of the various theories of a communal whole; individualism versus universalism; rejection of the religious transcendence of the human I-ness in immanence philosophy, 260; Litt's theory of social interwoveness is valuable; a comparison of the present situation in sociology with that of Plato and Aristotle, 261; the relation between social philosophy and positive sociology; attempts to delimit sociology from ‘social-cultural’ sciences have failed; elimination of the normative viewpoint blocked theoretical approach to social reality; Simmel's formalistic view also failed; philosophy of human society has to give ‘empirical’ (or rather: positive) sociology a solution to its transcendental basic problems, 263; structures of individuality and types of intertwinement are philosophical subjects and the necessary pre-suppositions of positive sociology both for descriptive and explanatory science; individuality structures and intertwinements cannot be discovered in an a-priori way; but in continuous confrontation with empirical social reality; theory makes them explicit, 264; the institutional natural communities of marriage, family, kinship are to be distinguished from the undifferentiated organized communities, 265.

Sociology of Thought, III, Karl Mannheim's views, 289.

Socrates, I, he gave a new introspective meaning to the Delphic maxim, 51, 52; with him the primacy passed over to the form-motive, 67; in the culture religion the concept of law was that of ‘order’, and assumed a teleological sense with respect to ‘natural subjects’, 112, 113; Socrates' ethics has no affinity with Kant's, 123; he inquired whether his ego was related to the wild Typhon or to Apollo: his interests were directed to culture, ethics, and politics; he wished to regain fixed norms, in the philosophical theoria, as to the good, the true, and the beautiful; and to elevate philosophy to epistème, a science; virtue must be directed to the divine Idea of the good; the true, the beautiful, 534; Socr. did not distinguish between theoretical and practical philosophy, 535.

Socrates, II, the kalokagathon, 10; on the Demiurge or form-giving nous, 56.

Socrates, III, his idea of a teleological world-order is handed down to us both by

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Xenophon's Memorabilia and Plato's Philebus; it was probably influenced by Anaxagoras and Diogenes, 633.

Sohm, III, Kirchenrecht, 515, 521, 545, 551, 552.

Sohm, III, holds that Calvin seeks the sovereignty over the Church in the collective will of the Church-members; and that in in the presbyterial organization of the church the elders are the representatives of the congregation in the modern sense of the political representative system in the State, 521; he summarizes the misconceptions of Calvin's thoughts on church government, 545; legal order and the church are mutually exclusive; law Gospel are antithetically opposed like spiritual and secular, 551; his historical investigations concerning ecclesiastical organization beg the question; he identifies the temporal Church institution with the Kingdom of Heaven, 552.

Sokolowski, P., III, Sachsbegriff und Körper in der klassischen Jurisprudenz und der modernen Gesetzgebung, 226, 229.

Solger, I, contests the dualism of the universal and the particular, 471.

Solidarity, III, the radical spiritual solidarity of mankind, 195; solidarity is a Christian idea, in opposition to Marxism, 597.

Sombart, W., II, Der moderne Kapitalismus, 293.

Somlo, Felix, II, Juristische Grundlehre, 240.

Somlo, Felix, II, broke with Rousseau's and Kant's natural law view of statute law, 142; follows Windelband; difference between legal rules and social conventions and logical, moral and aesthetical standards: empirical and absolute, 239; arbitrary accidental and universally valid; but a norm cannot be arbitrary and accidental; absolute norms is a contradictory designation, all norms depend on the others; aesthetic norms vary with time and place: Renaissance, Middle Ages, Antiquity; Aristotle on the Drama, 240.

Somló, Felix, III, Juristische Grundlehre, 370.

Somló, Felix, III, the primitive primary norm; this norm can only be explained by the individuality structures of undifferentiated societal relations; Somló considers the primitive primary norm as ‘law’, not as ‘Sitte’; law to these primitive people is an undifferentiated complex of norms, 371; these norms originate from a supreme power; legal rules are the sum total of such norms; then norms are juridical; and laid down by an arbitrary supreme human authority; this view is refuted by the facts, 372.

Sophists, I, inferred from Parmenides' logicism that the proclamation of logical meaning as the origin of the cosmic diversity is tentamount to the elimination of the modal diversity and consequently to the abandoning of theoretical thought itself, 19; their sceptical relativism denied any norm of truth; they were irrationalists in the epistemological field; this position leads to antinomy, 145.

Sophists, III, Polos, Trasymachos, and Kallikles were radical individualists; they gave primacy to nature as an orderless vital process in which the stronger individuals have a natural right to oppress the weaker; the matter motive is unchecked by the form-motive; Protagoras, 199; they repudiated societal life, 223; the contract theory of the State was started by the Sophists according to Plato, 232.

Sorbonne Chapel, The, III, built by Lemercier, 142.

Sorge (Care), II, in Heidegger's philosophy, 24.

Sorge (Care), III, (Care or concern) in the struggle for possession, 5.

Sorokin, P.A., III, Society, Culture and Personality, 158, 160, 305, 608; Théories Sociologiques Contemporaines, 495.

Sorokin P.A., III, his sociology, 159-162; vehicles or conductors, 198; on kinship groups, 305; his criticism of modern biologistic political racial theories, 495; his conception of a political party, 608.

Sororate, III, a form of marriage, 339, 340.

Soul, I, and body, in Descartes, 218; the human soul has three original faculties, the cognitive faculty, the feeling of pleasure and pain, the desiring faculty, in Kant, 388.

Soul, II, Aristotle's view, 11, 12; in the Bible it is the religious centre of human existence; it is not the Gegenstand of psychology; it has nothing to do with the metaphysical Greek ‘psychè’, 111; the ‘rational’ soul and the virtues, and happiness, in Aristotle, 145; Thomas Aquinas' conception of individuality contradicts his Scholastic Christian view of individual immortality of the rational soul as form and substance, 419; Husserl calls ‘material thing’ and ‘soul’ different regions of being, 454.

Sources of Law, III, and genetic forms of interlacement, 664; agreements for cooperation are formal sources of law, 665; different theories, 666, 667.

Souvenirs, III, function in the subject-object relation; pretium affectionis, 294.

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Sovereignty, I, Bodin's concept, 311.

Sovereignty, III, Bodin's absolutist theory, 396, 398.

Sovereignty in the Church, III, Kampschulte's erroneous interpretation of Calvin's views, 520, 521, 546.

Sovereignty of the People, I, in Rousseau, 320.

Spatial Aspect, I, the spatial was absolutized by Parmenides; the eternal being has no coming into being nor passing away and is enclosed in the ideal static spatial form of the sphere; but the spatial is not supra temporal, it implies simultaneity in the mode of continuous dimensional extension; spatial relations have subjective-objective duration of time in temporal reality; even in abstract geometry, where spatial relations are viewed apart from transitory things and events, 31; i.e. according to their modal structure alone, they express the spatial temporal order of greater or less in simultaneity, 32; space and time, in Einstein, 85; an arrangement of coexistence in Leibniz, 231; Hume: the copy of sensory impressions of coloured points, 284; minima sensibilia, 287; an a-priori order, in Leibniz, 342; space and time are a priori forms of thought, 343; space is a synthetical forms of the ‘outer sense’, time of the inner sense, in Kant, 347; space is filled with things; an a priori form of intuition, 348.

Spatial Aspect, II, spatial figures display a modal coherence, 7; its different meanings, 55 ff.; ‘formal space’, 63; original and analogical meanings of the word space, 64; sensory space; spatial analogies; the physical ‘world space’ exceeds sensibility, the term ‘territory’; historical and legal space cannot be perceived and must be signified; the national flag on a vessel, 65; spatial analogies, 76 (note); mathematical space in Kant is an a priori intuitional form of sensibility, 77; a priori synthetical Euclidian axioms in Kant; non-Euclidean geometries in the 19th century; Carp's view; Russell's; Max Black; Brouwer; intuitionist arithmetizing of geometry; logification of arithmetic and geometric, 78; the general notion ‘empirical space’ is scientifically useless, 79; in Aristotelian Scholasticism number implies spatial extension, 83; original space is mathematical; its nucleus is continuous extension; its time is simultaneity; formal mathematics has eliminated space, 85; original space is not sensorily perceptible; dimensional extension; dimension is an order; not a figure; it is a law, 86; spatial magnitude, spatial point, subject-object relation; magnitude is a numeral retrocipation, 87; space and number, 89; Natorp logifies number and space, 91; Newton's ‘absolute space’; Natorp holds that matter fills space, 95 (note); Kant's view of space; topological space, space is not an a priori receptacle (Hume), 96; directions of movement are retrocipations to space and number, 98; physical space and relativity, relativity theory; Gaussian coordinates are physical anticipations in geometry; incongruity between the theory of physical continuous space and that of relativity, 101; space may be discontinuous; discrete positions in space; points are numerical; spatial time; numerical time, 102; anticipation of spatial time to kinematical time; geometry of measure and that of position, 103; biotic space, 109; movement of thought implies logical space; analytical dimensions; numerical analogy, 120; kinematic space is a retrocipation, 165; space and irrational numbers, 170; space and motion, 185; space perception, 371, 373; a point in space; magnitude; arithmetic may approach the meaning of space, 384; no objective retrocipatory analogy of movement in space; the movement of thought, 384; spatial magnitude as ‘variable’ in the anticipatory function, 386.

Spatial Aspect, III, in classical physics the substance fills space, 19.

Spann, Ottmar, III, Gesellschaftslehre, 222, 238, 239, 240, 241, 243, 246; Fundament der Volkswirtschaftslehre, 480, 481.

Spann, Ottmar, III, on the opposition of individualism to universalism; his twofold error, 222; individualism is the autarchy of individual man, 238; in universalism the individual person retains his inalienable inner value, his own life, his moral freedom, 239; this observation on moral freedom concerns the axiological not the sociological view; Spann says that universalism does not necessarily deify the state; such deification is an individualistic remnent in inconsistent universalism; Medieval universalism identified the church with the kingdom of God in the idea of the ‘Corpus Christianum’; Spann sees in the state a partial whole and the manifestation of the unity of all organizations, the remaing partial whole of society is unorganized; the State is an organic part of the total society including universalistically conceived natural communities with inter-individual and inter-communal societal relationships, 240, 241; he does not distinguish between functionalistic individualism and the older substantial individualism, 243; his criticism of individualism, 246; in economic life the State is merely a capital of a higher order, and therefore itself ‘economy’; economy is the devotion of means to ends according to a scale of needs ordered in conformity to a balancing and sparing mode of estimation, when there is a scarcety of means, 480, 481.

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Special Science, I, its task; and philosophy, 85.

Special Science, II, seemingly handles its own criterion of truth, 576.

Species-concept, The, III, in biology; diagnostic: taxon; phylogeny: phylon; genetics: isogenon; Johannssen's ‘reine Linie’, 80; cf. s.v. Type-concept, and.: Individuality structure.

Specific Energy, III, of the sense organs, in Müller's theory; and Locke's doctrine of the secondary qualities, 39; the theory is criticized by A. Riehl, 42, 43.

Speculation, is to be rejected, 42.

Spemann, III, experiments with the transplantation of cells from the so-called blastopore, 723, 735, 752; his hypothesis that the blastopore must contain the organizing centre, 753.

Spencer, Herbert, II, founder of the biologistic school of sociology, 260; introduced Darwinism into the conception of history, elevating British liberalist economic industrialism to the final purpose of history, 269; and Wells, 270 (note).

Spencer, Herbert, III, on ‘Social Dynamics’, 187.

Spener, III, opposed the Humanistic Idea of tolerance, 517.

Spengler, Oswald, I, Untergang des Abendlandes, 103.

Spengler, Oswald, I, his historicism only accepts different realms of historical development, 103; his historicist relativism, 118; western culture is doomed to decline, 214.

Spengler, Oswald, II, Der Untergang des Abendlandes, 24, 175, 195, 218, 219, 220, 221, 585.

Spengler, Oswald, II, historic explanation of logic, 175; history is a stream of life, 195; historicizing of science; cognitive activity depends on and is determined by a particular culture; history of physics; systems of numbers vary with civilizations, 218; there are no a priori forms of cognition; systematical and ethical periods of philosophy followed by the historical relativistic age, 219; there are only truths with respect to a particular type of mankind; this view excludes the concept of history; his absolutization contradicts his concept formation, 220; destroys history; he speaks of a diversity of cultures and the science of history; he keeps theoretical distance from historical phenomena to understand them; his historicism is self-refuting, 221; his parallels of culture; no causality; only fate; his view of simultaneity; of time, 283.

Sperm-Cells, III, 772.

Spider's web, A, II, a spider spins its web with faultless certitude, 198.

Spider's web, A, III, as objective structures, 107.

Sphere-Sovereignty, I, is the expression of the relation between the aspects, 101; of the modal aspects, 102; as a basic problem, 104; it makes no sense in the fulness and radical unity of meaning, 106.

Sphere-Sovereignty, III, and coherence, radical unity and meaning totality; and enkapsis, 170; and autonomy, 221, 222; the principle of sphere sovereignty was formulated by Althusius, 663; the original spheres of competence cannot be isolated from each other hermetically; sphere sovereignty only functions in the cosmic coherence, 692, 693.

Sphere Universality, II, of feeling, 115; of sensory perception, 377.

Spinoza, B. de, I, had a geometrical conception of the root of the cosmos; all things must be understood as modi within the two attributes (250) thought and extension of the sole substance (the deity), and as such they are an eternal mathematical consequence derived from the essence of the deity; empirical investigation does not increase our knowledge of eternal and unchangeable geometrical truths, so that Spinoza excludes the empirical changes of things from his mathematic ideal of science; Leibniz opposed this view, 251; idealists called Spinoza an atheist; Hume refutes such an assertion, 295.

Spinoza, B. de, II, his thesis: ‘truth is its own criterion and that of falsehood’, 597 (note).

Spirit, I, Fichte's metaphysics of the Spirit, 472.

Spirit of the Earth, The, III, in Fechner's speculative thought, 631.

Spiritual, I, the sense of freedom and the feeling of moral power prove the spiritual character of the human soul, in Rousseau, 314.

Spiritual, II, the spiritual community of mankind, 200; the ‘objective Spirit’ in history, 245.

Spiritualism, I, in Luther's view of Law and Gospel, 511; of Maine de Biran; French Spir. gave rise to the thought of Maurice Blondel, 525.

Spiritual Organism, III, this concept of the Historical School derives from Schelling, 245.

Spoil System, American, III, cannot explain the loyalty of American citizens to their parties, 618.

Sponges, III, 774.

Stability, II, the cosmological a priori character of the modal aspects, in contra-distinction to all modal individuality of meaning is manifest in its structural stability in contrast with all that is variable in temporal reality, 553.

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Stahl, Fr. von, II, on God's guidance in history, 233; as an unconscious process in man, 249.

Stahl, Friedrich Julius, I, his philosophy of history borrowed the Fichtian conception of the hidden conformity to a law of historical development, unknowable from rational concepts, as a hidden telos making the transcendent values visible in the individual temporal formations of culture; this is a Humanistic perversion of the Christian faith in Divine Providence; it makes the law a simple reflection of the individual free subjectivity disclosed in the ‘irrational process’; Stahl adopted this view under the influence of Schelling's Romanticism; ‘God's guidance in history’ is thus an irrationalistically conceived unconscious operation of God's ‘secret counsel’ and yet it is accepted as a complementary norm for human action; this theory influenced the ‘Christian-historical’ trend in political theory in Germany and the Netherlands, 488, 489.

Stahl, Friedrich Julius, III, Philosophie des Rechts nach geschichtlicher Ansicht, 429; Die Kirchenverfassung nach Lehre und Recht der Protestanten, 516, 517.

Stahl, Friedrich Julius, III, defines the law State, 429; public administrative law is merely formal and opposed to material law; the Decalogue contains the principles of material law, 430; he is in favour of the episcopal system of church government, 516 (note); he says that in Calvin the general priesthood of the believers is the constitutive element of the church ordinance, 521.

Stalin, III, the Marxian communistic community is incompatible with the State institution and in itself Utopia, 464.

Stammler, Rudolph, II, Wirtschaft und Recht nach der materialistischen Geschichtsauffassung, 209; Lehrbuch der Rechtsphilosophie, 210.

Stammler, Rudolph, II, his concept of law; legal aspect reduced to volition as the teleological form of thought, opposed to the causal form of physics; social, moral, religious and juridical categories, 16, 17; positive law is a historical economic material in the legal form, 208; of thought, 209; he applied the form-matter scheme to law, 209; on slavery, 411.

Staudinger, H.J., III, considers a virus is a micro organism that has degenerated, 84.

Stanley, III, and Wyckoff's discovery of the virus, 84.

Stärke, C.N., III, criticized L. Morgan's constructive theory of the rise of the human family, 331.

State, The, I, composed of individuals by means of a social contract, in Hobbes, 217; in Rousseau, Hobbes, 315, 316; its basic law according to Chr. Wolff, 320.

State, The, II, the State is auniversal competence in Hegel, 396.

State, The, III, and the polis in Plato, 164; the Greek polis, 169; its internal structure has various realizations, 171, 173, 175; in Hobbes' view, 183; as an institution, 189, 191; Protagoras and Plato on the State, 199, 200, 201; Aristotle's view of the State, 201 ff.; Plato's three ranks: philosophers, soldiers and labourers; the unity of the polis, 207; Aristotle's concept of taxis 208-212; forms of government, 209-212; Humanistic natural law resulted in State absolutism; from the individualistic state of nature the social contract led to the civil state, excluding the very notion of societal relationships independent of the state, and even the church; Hobbes' Leviathan; Rousseau; Marsilius of Padua; John of Jandun, 236; societas inaequalis and societates aequales; the state's aim is the organized protection of the innate rights of man to life, freedom and property; Locke; salus publica as the highest law of the state; in the utilitarian sense of the ‘Staatsräson’; Wolff's police and welfare state abolished individual freedom, 237; Othmar Spann's view of the state, 240; the modern universalist view of the state as an Überperson; a hypostasis; Hegel says that the state becomes a person only in the monarch; the state is the highest realization of the ‘objective spirit’, the present divine will; breaking (244) through the boundaries of family and civil society, the real ‘communal’ will, its universal validity independent of the changing subjectivity of its individual members, 245; the State is a typical historically founded community of a differentiated character exhibiting an institutional nature; patriarchal joint families, sibs, and primitive domestic communities have institutional traits; also tribal organizations and medieval guilds; but all these are undifferentiated organized communities; the State is a differentiated organization, 379; Platonic and Aristotelian views consider the State as the totality of human society; Aristotle's polis is the societas perfecta, autarchic, aiming at the ‘good life’; but lacks any internal structural limitation; the State is a non-natural institution; this last fact is not realized in Aristotle's view; in Plato's and Aristotle's view of the State there is a supra temporal metaphysical idea as the normative essence of the State, 380; Plato is aware of the structural principle of the State when he mentions the idea of justice and the monopoly of the sword power, which are radical typical for the State; the first theoretical crisis in the Greek view of the State was started by the left wing sophists; the decay of Athenian democracy; Macchia-

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velli's naturalistic theory of the absolutist power State, 381; it was the outcome of another crisis, prepared by medieval individualistic nominalism; the decay of the Holy Roman Empire and the rise of the modern bureaucratic State; the name ‘Stato’; the recent crisis in the Humanistic theory of the State; the decline of the civic law state; relativism and historicism; natural and rational law depend on history; post-Kantian freedom idealism proved to be historically conditioned; there was no room for an invariable normative structural principle of the State, 382; Carl Schmitt on the relativistic destruction of the ideology of the State of the Humanistic faith in reason, 383; the modern shibboleth of scientific political theory is the elimination of all normative evaluations; all individual historical phenomena are manifested in social individuality structures which as such are not modal historical; e.g. the Battle of Waterloo; variable social forms realizing the State institution are not to be confounded with the State's structural principle; modern Roman Catholic institutional theory; M. Hauriou was first influenced by Comtian positivism, then by the philosophy of life, and finally founded his conception of the State in a semi-Platonic metaphysical State-idea; G. Renard's ‘La théorie de I'institution’ accommodates Hauriou's theory to traditional Thomism, 384; the structural principle of the State makes possible our experience of its transient formations; modern political theorists separated ‘Sein’ from ‘Sollen’, i.e., an empirical and a normative sociology of the State; Georg Jellinek could not indicate the starting point for a synthesis of these two; the State was either conceived as a subjective synthesis of social psychical relations into a teleological unity; or as a logical system of legal norms, 384, 385; Ludwig Waldecker's nominalistic functionalistic theory; he levels the State with ‘all other organizations’, and even calls the Church a State; Max Weber calls a modern state a large scale business; Kelsen agrees with this, 386; Laski: the State is like a Miners' Federation; Kelsen: the State is a logical system of legal norms; Heller: ‘a plébiscite de tous les jours’; a structural not a historical phenomenon, 387, 388; Smend: the State is in a perpetual process of renewal; Heller: the structure of the State is a cross section of the stream of history, 389; its functions and structure are changeable, 390; an open configuration, 391; its moral juridical principles are not supra-historical, 392; also Heller speaks of the decision of the moment being superior to any principle; his scholastic classification, 393; he adheres to the absolutist theory of Bodin, 394, 395, 396; the crisis in the theory of the State was connected with the political crisis and the economical crisis between the two world wars, 396; Fascism and National socialism meant a barbarian subversion of all values in the Christian and Humanist traditions; their background was modern irrationalism with its political myths and technical mass psychology; the totalitarian state; sacrificing individual man, and appealing to the spiritually uprooted mass-man; the basic problem of political theory is the relation between might and right; the contrast between law State and absolutist power State, 397; Kallikles' super-man; Plato's justice-ruled State; Plato and Aristotle did not overcome the totalitarian idea of the State; the Greek form-matter scheme implied a religious absolutization of the cultural aspect whose nuclear meaning is power; the polis had unlimited competence; which gave rise to a dialectical tension with the idea of justice; the contrast between might and right in Humanism; the naturalist ‘Staatsräson’; Bodin's absolutist notion of sovereignty; the alternate supremacy of the personality and of the science ideal, 398; the personality idealists opposed ‘inalienable human rights’ to the absolutist sovereignty of the State without denying such sovereignty; Macchiavelli's ‘raison d'état’; Fascism and National Socialism tried to adapt their totalitarianism to the idea of the law state; different conceptions of the law State; and of the power State; Gierke's view; he would not sacrifice the idea of the law State to ‘historical reality’; but he opposed the actual State to the legal order, 399; the State is the historical political aspect of a national community; the internally contradictory dualism of might and right in the ‘empirical’ and normative juridical theory (Laband, Gerber, Buys, Jellinek), 400; the fierce controversy between the juridical and the naturalistic schools; Kelsen; Marck, 401; Christian theories of the State were vitiated by synthesis philosophy; the error of the ‘dialectical theology’; constraining power is not per se demonical; Emil Brunner's view; he denies the possibility of a Protestant philosophy of law and of the State; Roman Catholic theory of the State starts from Aristotelian ‘natural law’; in the State Reformed thought finds three factors: communion (due to creation); legal constraint (related to sin); and a semi demonic craving for power; (the State's essential nature is here power), 402; Emil Brunner relapses into the theory of the State which synthesizes his Christian view with the immanence standpoint; he projects his own dialectical view into Christianity; he is infected by the contrast between nature and grace; his commandment of love of the moment and law as such; the structure of the State, however, cannot be internally anti-nomic; Brun-

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ner confuses structure and its positivization, 403; he derives the power of the State from the divine will and at the same time he calls the State secular, not sacred; power he calls an irrational product of history; his law concept is neo-Kantian positivism; his idea of community is irrationalistic phenomenological; organization is the typical foundation of the State, 404; social forms are realizations of the societal structural principles and have a phenotypical character; such forms are nodal points of enkaptic, interlacements; the structural aspect of the State's radical type has no factual duration; but is a structural condition of any body politic; its organization is the historical foundation of the State; organization is not founded in nature, but the result of the historical formgiving activity of man; in Heller's and Plenge's theory ‘organization’ lacks any structural meaning, 405; organization versus organism in Romantic philosophy; Fichte replaced Schelling's term ‘organism’ by ‘organization’; Marx ‘mechanized’ the term ‘organization’; Gierke considered all organized communities as ‘personal spiritual organisms’; under the influence of Schelling he wrote that ‘originally States arise and grow, without any cooperation of a conscious creative will, as the natural product of the unconscious social impulse’, 406; positivism identifies ‘organization’ with ‘social ordering’, 406; psychical conventions or norms bring about a certain regularity in social behaviour, which is the social ‘organism’; jurists understand the social organism in a functional juridical sense; the unity of the organization is then fictitious; Heller denies the identity of organization and ordering; organization is a collective unity of action, 407; its ‘organs’ and its ‘unity of action’; Tönnies' ‘association’ and its arbitrary volition, opposed to ‘social organism’ with its ‘natural volition;’; Siegfried Marck's antithesis between organization and organism; Fr. Darmstaedter's interpretation of this contrast is related to the Kantian opposition between autonomy and heteronomy, 408; the law State partakes of the nature of an ‘organism’; the power State is an organization; the State is self-contained; Darmstaedter relates State and law as natural reality to values, viz. those of regulation and governmental power; its natural reality is: a multitude of people; law is a value commanding or prohibiting certain ways of behaviour; the value attached to the State is the power of the magistrate; thus there arises an internal antinomy between might and right, 409; the value law and the value State are mutually exclusive; the State must be an instrumental value with regard to law as a value in itself; criticism of this view, 410; Church and State differ radically; they do not differ only specifically; the term ‘organized communities’ denotes a transcendental difference from ‘natural’ communities; there is no ultimate genus of organized communities; radical types are the ultimate genera of the individuality structures, 411; a rising State structure destroys tribal and gentilitial powers, etc. the State is a res publica; political authority is a public office, not a private property; ancient Asiatic empires; Merovingian and medieval kingdoms; they were no real States; res regia versus res publica, 412; radical and geno-types; the State is a genotype of societal relationship, the State is a typical historical power organization; other power organizations, 413; sword power over a cultural area within a territory; this power implies a task, a vocation; German myth of blood relationship as the foundation of the State was not meant in a mere biotical sense; the racial Nazi ideology was not naturalistic, but irrational-historicistic, 414; the myth of Italian fascism fell back on the old idea of the eternal Roman empire; both wanted to elevate ‘the cultural race’ (or in the Italian version the ‘national State’) to a ‘spiritual’ power; Walter Hamel conceives State and people as dialectically connected, 415; though political power is all-sided, its components are different: the State has control over economical, moral, faith- and other forms of power; variability types of the State, 416; but non-political organizations have types of power that are no internal constituents of the power of the State; they may be hostile to the State; a rich State may be weak; the myth of the totalitarian State, 417; the monopolistic organization of military power within a particular cultural area coheres with the leading function of the State, i.e. the foundational power function is opened and anticipatory; the differentiation in social structures can only occur in the anticipatory direction, 418; the seeming antinomy in this state of affairs; the opening process deepens and does not abolish the original foundation of the State; the leading function lacks a nuclear type of individuality; the parallelism between the State and natural communities, 419; the basic function of the State cannot be ignored; military organizations within the State's territory weaken the State's power; revolutionary chaos, 420; preparation for a revolution by propaganda and by systematic influence on the national conviction; revolution can only succeed when the revolutionary leaders collar the military power, 421; subjective military bearers of power actualize the objective military apparatus, but they require the support of a law abiding army, members recognizing their authority as legitimate; organ-

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ized military power is not mere armed control, but has an anticipatory structure; armed power and the State's territory, 422; the State's military power is related to man's fall; the Divine Covenant with Noah; the meaning of the phrase ‘because of sin’; Christian synthesis philosophy and the Aristotelian idea of the State, 423; the coercive power of the State belonged to relative natural law i.e. natural law modified by sin; the metaphysical schema of the whole and its parts; an indeterminate idea of totality; the fourfold use of a fruitful idea of totality; a. the meaning totality; b. the structural moments of a meaning aspect; c. the idea of the whole of a thing, occurrence, or an individuality structure of social life; d. of the integration of human societal relations, 424; the qualifying function is not the end human beings try to reach in the State; the theory of the purpose of the State; the a-priori and axiological character of this theory on the immanence standpoint; Scholasticism assigned a higher rank to the Church than to the State, 425; Humanistic natural law theorists made the Church an instrument in the hands of an individual or a community; the Classical liberal idea of the law State; the welfare State; the culture State; in the Classical natural law stage of the ‘law State’ the purpose of the State construed in the social contract was to be limited by the ‘innate human rights’; the old liberal non-interference in society outside the political sphere; the development of this theory is traced by J.P.A. Mekkes' standard work, 426; law was viewed as a purpose outside of the State; Locke's law State; Kant's view identifies public and civil law; Thomasius' criterion of law; Kant's pronouncement on the contents of public law, 427; in Montesquieu's trias politica the executive authority is an alien element; only the legal coercion in this view reminds us of the internal structure of the State; legal coercion is the negation of a negation of freedom (injustice); Kant's view: in external relations to other States the body politic is only a power state; Kant definies the State as a ‘union of a multitude of a people under legal rules’, ignoring its foundational function, 428; the idea of the formal legal State; the legal order limits the activity of the magistrature; Friedrich Julius Stahl on the law-State, 429; Otto Bähr and Rudolph Gneist; legal and utility questions in the theory of administrative judicature and the theory of the law-State, 430; State and law are identified in the last phase of the theory of the law-State; logicist formalism of Kelsen's school; a dictatorial State is here also called a law State, 431; the Italian fascist and the German National Socialist State pretended to realize a material, universalistic conception of law; the old liberal theory could not stem the rising tide of the totalitarian idea of the State; criticism of Kelsen's theory, 432; a State can only serve any purpose if its exists as such; rejection of the objective metaphysical ideology of the State and of the State as an absolute end in itself; Hegel's conception is objectionable; so is the organological theory of Romanticism, 433; the State as a res publica has to guarantee the stability of its public legal order so that its armed force must be subordinate to the civil government; its military power cannot be its leading function; its stable legal order is also the ultimate criterion of its existence in international law; Kelsen showed that the legal viewpoint is indispensable; the State's leading function is the juridical function; difference from an organized gang of armed robbers; this difference is radical, not specific; coherence of leading function with foundational function is expressed in the structure of its authority, 434; governmental authority over subjects by the strong arm; Gierke's discussion of the ‘Obrikeitsstaat’ in contrast with the ‘Volksstaat’ is misleading terminologically and historically; the State idea shows a tendency to incorporate itself in the whole of the people; Gierke is thinking of the Roman autocratic imperium idea in opposition to the democratic form of government, 435; the State displays a typical juridical character; the will of the State is an organized unity of volitional direction in the organized action of a social whole; in a State there is no government apart from a people, and vice versa; the people form a political unity only in the territorial organization of government and subjects, 436; the basis of the unique universality and totality of the internal legal community of the State; and the sphere sovereignty of non political societal structures, 437; the State's people are all the citizens irrespective of family relations, church membership, philosophical convictions, trades, professions, class distinctions, social standing; the State constitutes a typical integrating political unity; this integration is bound to structural typical principle; i.e. to the public juridical function and in the ‘public interest’, 438; the structure of the internal public law; public interest gives a typical material legal meaning to the internal public law of the State; it embraces legal organizational and behaviour norms regulating the organization and competences of the State's organs; different branches of the State's task; Kelsen's formalistic view of public law; Krabbe's and van Idsinga's historicistic psychological view; the appeal to medieval legal conditions; the petitio principii in the supposed ‘objective’ historical demonstration; Von Below's studies of ‘medieval German

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State’; the modern British legal system, 439; British ‘common law’; what does it mean? Dicey's erroneous praise of this system; the French Conseil d'Etat's application of typical public legal principles to the State's responsibility; Von Below's error; yet he insists on the necessity of some structural theoretical insight into the nature of the State and on some juridical training of historians, 440; different periods and conditions in the Middle Ages; the real meaning of the absolitist idea of the State and the true idea of the law-State, 441; public interest and its limits; salus publica and reasons of State; Wolff's natural law theory of the police State; Hobbes' and Rousseau's Leviathan State; Locke's and Kant's liberal constitutional State; modern totalitarian theories; Plato and Fichte defended State-education; Plato abolished marriage in the public interest; just like Aristotle; Rousseau wanted to destroy all private associations; Wolff wanted the government to control everything human; even to fix the church-confessions, Hugo Grotius and the salus publica, 442; S. Pufendorff; the antinomy in Wolff's doctrine; Aristotle's autarchical ‘perfect community’ for the ‘good life’; this view knows no freedom outside of the State; Rousseau's idea of ‘salus publica’, equality, the exclusion of private individual privileges; the general will; absolute power of the State; Chr. Wolff: eudaemonist theory of natural law; his mention of a collisio legum; necessity breaks law, 443; salus publica is: a sufficient, quiet and safe life; Kant wished to give the idea of public interest a non-eudaemonistic and anti-absolutist meaning; the constitutional principle should contain the a-priori juridical norms realizable as a duty prescribed by the categorical imperative; his law-State with the idea of the trias politics, 444; salus publica and distributive justice; the proportional distribution of public communal charges and benefits; Paul Duez' on this public legal standard; it is an integrating principle; externally the State's task cannot be delimited; but governmental interference with the life of the nation is subject to the inner vital law of the body politic, 445; State activity must be guided by the idea of public social justice; and recognise the sphere sovereignty of the various societal relationships; public health matters; public law is correlated with private common law, 446; the Carolingian State; the Roman republic; the law of the twelve tables; Clovis' lex Salica; jus gentium developed the idea of common private law; then a world law granting legal equality to free men; this world law is connected with ius naturale; a Stoic conception, 447; the inner nature of the Roman ius gentuim, 448; public and private law in Rome; private law bound to the res publica; outside of the res publica there was no room for an inter-individual common legal sphere based on the natural law principle of equality and freedom of all free individuals as such; jus gentium superseded the jus civile; Justinian's code; classical private common law was the work of the Roman lawyers, 449; the task of the praetor in private common law; Roman law influenced continental legislation; in England Roman law had only little influence; here feudal law was transformed into common private law also by the formative activity of judicial organs of the State; another example is given by the Scandinavian States; there is a difference between popular tribal law and common private law, 450; common private law is by its nature bound to the State; it binds any specific (non-juridically qualified) private law enkaptically to the principles of inter-individual justice, legal security, and equity; but the internal spheres of specific kinds of private law remain exempt from the State's competence; the State as an instrument of oppression; depreciation of the principles of public intrest, civil freedom and equality in positivistic sociology; the Humanist natural law doctrine of the 18th century absolutized the State's private common law; Bodin's idea of sovereignty, 451; Bodin and Montesquieu continued to identify the res publica with the whole of human society in the classical Roman way; Locke broke with this tradition; the State was marked off from non-political civil society, which latter was an economic system of free market relations; St. Simon and Auguste Comte, 452; St. Simon held that political changes depend on economic factors in ‘civil’ society; Comte added: and on a change in ideas; the State is a secondary product of ‘civil’ society; civil property creates different social classes; the ruling class assumes political authority; Galileo and Newton's natural scientific method should be applied in sociology without assuming any norms; then they combined the new sociology with historical thought (of the Restoration); Comte's view of sociology, 453; the three stages; law of continuous progress; a military, theological stage; a metaphysical phase; an industrial type of society; polytheism produces many military States; Christian monotheism separated priestly and secular power, restricted war by feudalism, abolished slavery; towns arose; then came industrialism; the intermediate period is inorganic, metaphysical, 454; St. Simon predicted the disappearance of the State and its substitution by an economic planning organization; Comte said that a new morality will arise; social duties will take precedence of private rights; Comte rejects communism; private property is a

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social function; there will be a universal European political community; there will not be a civil law order; Marxism; after socialism has destroyed the capitalist class, society will be communistic; public and private law will vanish, 455; the united world proletariat; Marxian Hegelianism; his historic materialism; the State is an escape from civil society torn by class struggle, 456; Engels describes the origin of the State in primitive society; the State serves the interests of the ruling class; Marxism holds the State to be a mere ideology; Engels predicted that the State will die out; also its civil legal order will disappear; Marxism agreed with John Locke, 457; Locke thought that the highest duty of the State was the protection of property; Rousseau sought its origin in the sanctioning of the crime of forceful seizure; Proudhon said ‘property is theft’; Bolshevist view of the State, penal and private common law; Pasjoekanis bound law to commodity exchange; its determining principle is equivalency; the origin of the State is the extension of a market community embraced by the class-organization of power; market relations between the State industries necessitate civil and public law; the Soviet Community demands rules called ‘economical law’ as long as they are maintained with coercion; Stalin's policy inspired the work: ‘The Law of the Soviet State’ written under the guidance of Wysjinkij; in it the division into civil and economic law is condemned; the Soviet Civil Code of 1923 influenced by Duguit, 459; civil rights serviceable to Soviet social economic aims are protected by the State; Emile Durkheim's views; Duguit denies the human rights of the natural law doctrine, viz. freedom and equality, as metaphysics; there is only ‘objective’ law originating in the laws of solidarity; in primitive society there is solidarity by similitude; in differentiated societies there is solidarity by division of labour; the former has penal law; the latter contractual order, 460; Duguit thinks the State is the factual relation of force between stronger and weaker individuals; coercion and obedience; objective law is social law; composed of socio-economic rules and customs of propriety in industrial and occupational life; these rules are felt to be just; they become legal rules; Duguit's concept of sovereignty of the law from a naturalistic sociological viewpoint; Krabbe from an ethical psychological, and Kelsen from a normological viewpoint; law needs no human formation, for it is a spontaneous reflex of social relations; the Romantic doctrine of the Historical School, 461; Beseler and Gierke; in Duguit's ‘Traite de droit constitutionel’ the formative factor in law is again recognized; normative and constructive legal rules; he describes the transformation of civil private law and public law; jus naturae et gentium and the State proved to be no mere metaphysical ideas; his ‘sovereignty of law’ is only the sovereignty of the typical industrial legal sphere, 462; his transformation of the State is its abolition; subjective civil rights cannot be abandoned; Louis Josserand on subjective civil rights; they should be in accordance with the social-economic function; Josserand on the abuse of rights; his view had its prototype in the first article of the Russian civil law Code of 1923; it is rejected by the Dutch Supreme Court, 463; the Russian State has not become a communist society nor a syndicalistic organization in the sense of Duguit; the Russian State industries are real industrial organizations enkaptically bound by the body politic, the State being proprietor and entrepreneur; a socialist State can only exist according to its structure as an authoritative public legal community founded in a monopolistic organization of military power; it cannot exist without a public legal order; Lenin and Stalin realized this fact; the Marxian community is Utopia; although consistently conceived; political pluralism, 464; pluralism wants to eliminate the State's structure from the projected syndicalist federation; this means ‘economic monism’; E. Berth: ‘the State is dead’; Laski calls political pluralism ‘guild socialism’; he, too, overstrains the economic aspect; Duguit also believes in political pluralism, 465; we cannot understand the structure of the State apart from its enkaptic interlacements; the body politic is always liable to the influence of class interests; but it cannot exist at all if it is not a res publica; Lorenz von Stein realized that the State will always try to elevate itself above class interests; the theory of constitutional law introduced the formal juridical method; problems that require insight into the structural principle of the State: sovereignty, the parliamentary system; basic rights; etc.; sociological political theory eliminates the structure of the State; ‘organic suffrage’; and medieval craft-guilds, 466; the State structure expresses itself in the moral sphere: love of country; reawakening of patriotism; a struggle for freedom; J.F. Herder's discovery of national individuality, 467; he considered the nation as a ‘natural organism’ with an entelechy of its own; the Historical School considered the ‘national spirit’ as the source of culture; this was irrationalism, in direct opposition to Rousseau, etc.; difference between a primitive folk and a nation; folklore and ethnology; Gurvitch supra functional view of a national community; influenced by the Historical School, 468; what is a national

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science, art, industry, Church? the genotypical structure of a nation and its enkaptic interlacements with other societal individuality structures; the meanings of the term ‘national’; a nation is not a natural community but the result of political form-giving; its individuality reveals itself in its enkaptic intertwinements with other societal relationships, 469; the irrationalistic universalistic view of a nation; R. von Jhering described his conception of the Roman national character; his error; the geno-typical characteristics of a nation; of the Dutch nation; State and nation have the same radical type; in a democratic constitution only the nation has original political competence; the Humanistic sovereignty of the people, 470; the former Danube monarchy was a pluri-national State; love of country depends on the political structure; national struggle for freedom; true patriotism; its way may lead through blood and tears; the State is ‘on account of sin’; the demonic joy in the ‘strong State’ is anti-Christian, 471; love of country is not objective, but subjective in the State's people; principium exclusiae collisionis officiorum; limits to love of country; Aristotle's view, 472; love between Church members; between the members of a family; there cannot be a collisio officiorum; because of the principium exclusiae antinomiae; but there may arise painful tensions; conflicts lie on the subject-side of social life; international relations, 473; states have external intercommunal relations; difference between internal and foreign policy; Kant's individualistic project of a league of nations; we must distinguish between international private relations and public interests; the danger in ‘reasons of State’, 474; obligatory arbitration in disputes, in the Acte gènèrale of 1928 of the former League of nations; the San Francisco Charter and the position of the small nations; the United Nations, 475; the old individualist dogma of sovereignty; the ‘sacred egotism’ of the States; the internal vital law of the State is not a law of nature, but bears a normative character; Kaïn's policy is no fate; love of country has its counterweight in international love of one's neighbour among the nations; absolutized patriotism becomes blind chauvinism; the commandment of temporal love is valid also internationally, 476; the norm of love does not require submission to a usurper; constitutional forms; the organization of political power; enkapsis with other forms of power (e.g. economic power); v. Haller's patrimonical theory of the State, 477; Groen's view, and its later change; the notion of ‘the medieval town’; the political power of the guilds, 478; Aristotle called democracy the rule of the poor; the relation between the State and economically qualified classes; franchise and property; economical types may be interwoven with types of political power; the modern view of social democracy; the aesthetic aspect of the State; Plato's aesthetical idea of social classes; Aristotle's Politica requires politics to be a ‘symphony’; the Romantic exaggeration of the aesthetic motif, 479; Calvin pointed to the aesthetic aspect as a ‘well-ordered condition’, opposed to anarchy; political ‘symmetria’, ‘proportia’; political economy; Ottmar Spann's view of the State and economy, 480, 481; Hermann Heller also holds the State and economy to be autonomous; free economic market relations and the State are only enkapticaliy bound; the State's structure necessarily expresses itself internally in the economic aspect; internal political economy is a territorial compulsory economy opened in the typical direction to the public juridical leading function of the State: taxation; income and capital, 481; the modal economical principle of a frugal administration of scanty means, in the alternative choice of their destination, according to a well-balanced scale of needs; the economical value of the military apparatus, the police, roads, etc., for the economy of the State; deviation from the prices in the free market may be justifiable; ‘the State's economy wants to attain non-economic purposes’ is a destructive view; for it excludes the question as to what (not how) is economic; the integration of the State in political economy; the absolutist economical-State-autarchy, 482; modern large scale ordering of national economy; the danger of totalitarianism; ordering should be led by the juridical idea of public interest; complete economical autarchy is impossible; autarchy implies the subservience of economic production to the power policy; Fichte's closed commercial State; its disastrous effect on States poor in raw materials, 483; its counterpart is an imperialistic foreign policy; Rudolf Kjellen defends the autarchical principle as concerned with the individuality of the State; but he warns against making autarchy into the worship of a fetish, 484; Woldemar Koch's description of Fascist economic programme; it depends on the power of the nation and complete autarchy is impossible to Italy, 484, 485; German Nazi autarchy; Heinrich Stoll's book; the State's function in the aspect of social intercourse: public ceremonies, honours to national symbols, national festivals; national honour; an offence to the national honour concerns the entire structure of the State, and ultimately affects the honour of God as the Sovereign, 485; national honour in international relations; discourtesy to ambassadors created a casus belli in ancient

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Rome; David's punitive war against the Ammonites; in the individuality structures of human society all the modal norms are indissolubly interwoven; army rules of discipline and the State's qualifying function; the State is a typical integrating whole uniting a plurality into a unity also in its internal aspect of social intercourse, 486; the State cannot abolish class-distinctions; but only integrate them in the structure of political intercourse; a compulsory manner of saluting imposed on non-political intercourse rouses aversion and ridicule; the State's lingual function: objective symbols; Smend called them symbolical summaries of ‘material integrating factors’; titles, badges; the State's integration of verbal languages within its territory should be bound to juridical public justice, 487; the Belgian revolution against Holland is an example of political failure in linguistic matters; political cultural unity of the nation; national musea; monuments; national festivities, anniversaries; national history taught in schools; science and art are promoted; the public interest and public justice should guide these activities of the State, 488; the cultural task of the State should respect the sphere sovereignty of non-political organized communities; the political function of communal thought; disintegrating effects of party strife, economic class-warfare, etc., 489; ‘public opinion’ influences the political will of the nation; modern formers of public opinion; press, radio, television; in autocracy and in democracy public opinion is important; especially in dictator ridden nations; politicians and parties mould public opinion, 490; public opinion is not composed of a number of opposing ‘public opinions’ formed by classes or parties; it is not a party-cry; it is the communal opinion of the leading groups; it transcends difference of parties and of interests; it has an integrating function under the guidance of public societal justice; Hegel's view, 491; public opinion may be led astray; the thought of the day is not public opinion; the government's formative task with regard to publ. opin.; it cannot govern in opposition to a truly national conviction; but public opinion does not govern although it has an integrating function: it is a strongly emotionally bound thought founded in the political emotional structure; the naturalistic sociological theories conceive of the State as a system of intensive psychological interactions, 492; or as the chance of a unified physico psychical process of human cooperation; or as a biotic organism; as the product of racial struggles or class warfare; Kelsen's criticism of this view is irrefutable; the natural aspects of the State cannot be understood functionally; only in a normative juridically qualified individuality structure; they are the result of formative political activity; the naturalistic conception is crypto-ethical political, says Kelsen; psychical interactions do not stop at the State's frontiers; the feeling of national solidarity binds government, country, and nation, 493; this feeling only reveals itself in the modal historical and juridical anticipatory spheres of the psychical aspect; and is related to the State's sensory objectivity, - in the subject-object relation; - this feeling is enkaptically interwoven with international relations; its biotic aspect: the State also functions as a vital community of government, country, and nation; as such it is not a natural datum but a structural aspect of political formation; the State's territory is the objective vital space of the nation, 494; as a politically opened and organized space; a political form of life; the racial problem; three original main races; primary or natural races; grounded in blood relationship; ‘racial’ soul; ‘racial mind’; anatomical criteria, 495; Alfr. Rosenberg's racial theory used to justify Hitler's anti-semitic cruelties; Chamberlain's pan Germanism and anti-semitism; Pearson's theory of the right to exterminate ‘inferior’ races; the baseless hypotheses of the polygenetic origin of the human races; fallacious assumption of Nordic or Aryan race was based on linguistic theories concerning Sanskrit; Günther's and Wolff's political theories on races; H. St. Chamberlain's feelings about ‘race’ in his ‘own heart’, 496; differences between the races; inferiority of the negro, although education can disclose capabilities; the racial problem in South Africa; is an obstacle to national political unity; natural law ideas cannot be realized there; a white minority is in a precarious condition; the formation of a national biotical type; assimilation of foreign elements; the State and the nation create ‘the blood’, 497; bio-politics; negro and kaffir problems in Sth. Africa and the U.S.A.; integration depends on the normative leading function of the State; tyranny, 498; the doctrine of the State's territory; 1. the object theory; 2. the subject theory; 3. the competence theory, 499; the territory of the State has an objective public juridical qualification; its political geometrical structure: boundaries, extent, political centre, peripheral parts; in faith the structural principle of the State points to the religious root of the State institution, 500; because it is a societal structure of man's own temporal existence; this structure enables the State to function as such in faith; must the State be a Christian community? - the State and the Church, 501; the Christian character must not be imparted to the State from outside; not even from the Church; the

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structure of the State can express itself in a Christian faith community; the possibility of truly Christian politics; pseudo arguments against the idea of a Christian State, as well as in favour of an ecclesiastical State, 502; the State's faith is not always Christian, it may be pagan; but the State always functions in some faith; it is never neutral; its modal revelational principle assumes a political type of individuality; God is the Origin of all authority, the Holy Avenger of iniquity; might and right find their unity in the Divine Sovereign as well as their self-sufficient fulness of being; this Revelational principle is the politico-pisteutic norm; it is revealed in the Divine Word; the State is ‘on account of sin’; outside the Written Revelation the political revelational principle turns into a law of sin, the idolatry of Mars or of Dikè, etc.; the State's structure can only reveal itself at a disclosed level of culture, 503; God's sovereignty over the State can only be accepted by us in its true sense if we recognize the ‘regnum Christi’; a merely ‘natural’ belief is apostasy; Christ is the ‘Prince of the Kings of the earth’, 504; the State cannot have a church confession; in a truly Christian life the sphere sovereignty of the various societal structures is respected; a Church should have a binding confession; the Christian State unites the whole nation into a Christian political faith community in the confession of God's sovereignty in Jesus Christ as the Sovereign of all earthly sovereigns, 505; Christ is the King of common grace; common grace and special grace; not two realms; the State belongs to the general temporal life of the world, like the family and other non-ecclesiastical societal structures; the State has a general soteriological vocation; a pagan State remains a State; the Church can only be Christian; common grace embraces ‘the good and the evil together’ and is restricted to temporal life; special grace concerns the renewal of the religious root of the creation in Christ Jesus, 506; particular grace is the real root and foundation of common grace; a State divorced from the new root of life owes its apostatic manifestation to the civitas terrena; its structural office is maintained; hence our duty to struggle for a Christian State; the religious antithesis in the political struggle; the Christian conception must secure historical power in the national conscience as the basis of Christian politics, 507; official prayer should not ignore Christ's kingship; the life of faith is not merely individual, but also communal; this holds for a Christian Church community as much as for a Christian State, 508.

State Education, III, defended by Fichte, 442.

State of nature, I, bellum omnium contra omnes, - in Hobbes -, 317.

Statute-Law, I, in Rousseau, 322.

Stein, Heinrich von, II, Die Entstehung der neueren Aesthetik, 346.

Stenzel, J., II, on phonemes, 224.

Stephani, Joachim, III, Institutiones juris canonici, 515.

Stephani, Matthaeus, III, Tractatus de jurisdictione, 515.

Stephani Brothers, III, Church government, ad interim since the Peace of Augsburg, had devolved upon the Protestant sovereigns as an extension of the jus advocatiae; the sovereign has secular authority jure proprio, and ecclesiastical authority concessione imperatoris lodged with him instar depositi; this is the episcopal system, justified by an appeal to the nature of the matter and to Holy Scripture, 516.

Stern, W., III, Die differentielle Psychologie in ihren methodischen Grundlagen, 81.

Stimulus and Sensation, III, adequate and inadequate stimuli of the sense organs, 41; the necessary relation between stimulus and sensation according to Riehl, 44.

Stoechiometrical Laws, III, of Lavoisier, Proust, Dalton; and the conclusion that atoms do not change essentially, 704.

Stoicism, I, Stoic motives in Renaissance thought, 198; its idea of the ‘Golden Age’ in Rousseau, 317.

Stoicism, II, the rights of man as such and the rationalistic Idea of Humanity had been derived from the Stoical Idea of world-citizenship and from a secularized Christian view of freedom and personality, 358.

Stoicism, III, the Stoics idea of mankind, 169; Aristotle's ‘social impulse’ was denatured in the Stoic theory of the ‘appetitus socialis’; Aristotle's nous, eidè, orexis, became: immanent world logos (with its pneuma); the Stoic logoi spermatikoi; orexis became syndesmos or material coherence, 224; cosmic pneuma with its tension permeates matter (hypokeimenon as the principle of paschein, the passive undergoing) internally, and limits it externally; inorganic nature with pneuma as cohesion (hexis); in plants physis or growth; in living feeling beings psychè (or soul); in man logos or reason; logos in man is the product of evolution from perceptions and representations; Middle and Late Roman Stoicism classifies things into corpora unita, corpora composita, and corpora ex dis-

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tantibus [this classification is a transformation of Aristotle's taxis doctrine;] world soul, inorganic things, plants, animals, men; - inorganic things made by man; - composites whose unity has been given to them by the craftsman; - lastly the universitates rerum aut personarum, things without mutual sensory points of contact, e.g., communal relationships of human society; and of animals; their names express the tenor binding them into a unity; the functional-juridical bond holds the individuals together, 226; in Stoic psychology reason is given hegemony; the theory of the inner tonos originated in pantheistic universalism in keeping with a naturalistic monism, permits the essences of individual things to fuse together, 227; it is cosmopolitan; the autarchical sage does not require any external means for his happiness; his inclination to live up to the lex naturalis enables him to be independent of positive human social relationships; also of the State, 228; the Stoics taught the substantial unity of all things; the appetitus socialis is not the foundation of social relationships in their particular inner structure, but in terms of an external functional point of view, 228; they valued the influence of positive law in the State, 228; their cosmopolitan ideal of society; viz. a world kingdom in which men live like a grazing herd under the common law, without marriage, family, temple or judicature; they equallized veritable organized communities with coordinate inter-individual societal relations; their theory of natural law, original freedom and equality of all men in the ‘golden age of innocence’, 229; the late Stoic theory of the State and of organized communities shows no special relation to their psychology, 231; the relation of authority and subordination is based on the legal order restraining human dissoluteness; natural law does not permit subordination; Stoicism tended towards the theory of the social contract, 231; Roman stoicism was influenced by the republican theory of Roman jurists basing the authority of the State in the consensus populi, 232.

Stoker, Dr H.G., I, The New Philosophy at the Free University, 94; The Philosophy of the Idea of Creation, 94.

Stoker, Dr H.G., I, he thinks the Idea of creation all-embracing and the cosmonomic Idea a narrower basic Idea, 94; his question about the refraction of the meaning totality into coherent modal aspects by cosmic time, 106.

Stoker, Dr H.G., II, on the substance concept, 32.

Stoker, Dr H.G., III, Die Wijsbegeerte van die Skeppingsidee, 66, 67.

Stoker, Dr H.G., III, his concept of substance, 62; time is not the cause of the continuous unity of a thing; time is not empty; Stoker thinks that time is added to the modal structure; this is an error, 64; his Idea of Creation conceives of the unity of a thing in a new concept of substance, apart from the modal horizon of our experience; does created reality only possess meaning? substance is conceived as an other conic section of the cosmos according to Stoker; his substantial causality in a thing structure, 66; his substance is not metaphysical ousia; he calls the substantial unity of a thing ‘force’, ‘dynamic reality’, ‘will’, ‘love’; presumable influence of Scheler; of neo-Scholasticism; Stoker cannot agree with our rejection of the dichotomy of body and soul, 67; he assumes a hidden energy, etc., in the substantial core of created things behind ‘meaning’ and behind the essential meaning coherence determining the existence of all things; he thereby tries to transcend the meaning horizon by means of the absolutization of analogies; energy, force, and love, and will cannot be the same within the temporal meaning horizon, if these terms have a general sense, we can build a whole speculative theory on them, 68; the imago Dei; criticism of Stoker's ‘will’ concept, 69; the attempt to find a substantial kernel of things created beyond the meaning horizon is meaningless; Stoker denies the metaphysical character of his substance concept, 69; his terminology is influenced by irrationalism, e.g. his conception of force as the substantial kernel of things, 70; he identifies volitional force with love; this view is a speculation borrowed from a romantic turn in the Humanist freedom motive; he speaks of the ‘autonomous being and value of the cosmos with respect to God’, 71; Roman Catholic writers raise the same objection to the cancellation of the substance concept as Stoker does, 72; summary of the objections against Stoker's substance concept, 74; Stoker rejects the central position of mankind in our earthly cosmos; he wants to view everything ‘in its immediate relation to God’ without the intermediary of Christ; his two ‘conic sections of the cosmos’, 75; Stoker's view runs the risk of landing in theism, 76.

Stoll, Dr Heinrich, III, Deutsches Bauernrecht, 485.

Stoll, Dr Heinrich, III, German national socialistic idea of autarchy was to be accomplished by means of a compulsory organization of the farmers in a ‘Reichsnährstand’ and by the ‘Erbhofrecht’, 485.

Stratagem of Reason, III, in Hegel; the correlation between the individualizing process and the increasing interweaving of the interests of individual persons, 583.

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Structural Principles, II, and norms, and principia, 237; eternal principia, 238; absolute and empirical norms, 240.

Structural Principle and Subjective Purpose, III, are distinguished by Hauriou, 578.

Structure, III, as the correlation of elements is a modern pseudo-natural scientific concept in sociology, 158; and factual reality, 171.

Struycken, A.A.H., II, Het Rechtsbegrip, 400.

Stufentheorie, III, or Emergent evolutionism, of Woltereck, 733; a genetic monism accepting irreducible levels of becoming; life is then a new level of reality, and also an emergence of physico-chemical constellations; this rise of different autonomous levels of reality is ruled by ‘structural constants’ called ‘autonomous powers’, determinants, imagoids, ‘ideas’; this view is antinomic, 762.

Stumpf, II, on space perception, 373.

Sturm und Drang, I, its typical representatives: Lavater, Hamann, Jacobi, influenced Fichte; they glorified the activity of ‘genius’; their titanic activity motive and strong voluntaristic tendency; their activistic ideal of personality; Goethe's Faust; their ‘ego drama’; activity and selfhood are the two poles in this world of thought; the ideal ‘ego’ is absolutized in a limitless subjectivism and elevated to ‘genius’ having in itself a perfectly individual moral measure of action bound to no general norm; Schiller's ‘Räuber says: the law has not yet formed a single great man, but freedom hatchess colossuses and extremities’; Hamann's ‘Socratic Memorabilia’; enthusiasm of the deed; its optimism, 452; this movement still bound to Rousseau by the naturalistic view of the personality ideal expressed in the watchword ‘natural forming of life’; the subjective individuality in nature is absolutized; the depths of this subjective reality can be grasped by feeling only; Goethe's Faust: ‘Gefühl ist alles’; subjective ethical freedom is demanded, unconditional freedom of feeling from all dependence; its Humanistic personality ideal is irrationalistic and oriented to the aesthetic view of nature, in polarity with (453) the rationalistic science ideal; but this personality ideal is not definitively liberated from its counterpole; antinomy is accepted; Faust and Prometheus become the favourite problems; Klopstock's formulation; their irrationalist idea of humanity is derived from feeling; their boundless reverence for all that man is; the Idea of nation (Volk) and State; the individual is part of the totality of an individual community; empathy as a method of the historian; Herder; his humanity ideal, 454; his impulse toward a sympathetic understanding of every individuality in the cultural process, 455; Jacobi's emotional faith and philosophy of feeling, 458, 459, 460; Kant's Critique of Aesthetic Judgment offered a point of contact to the feeling philosophy of the Sturm und Drang; Schiller's aesthetic Idealism elevated the aesthetic Aspect to the root of reality; here Shaftesbury's aesthetic ethics asserted its influence on Kant, 462.

Sturm und Drang, II, in Germany, and the irrationalizing of the personality ideal, 272.

Style, III, in art; a typical historical analogy in aesthetic structures, 121; style Louis XIV, 141, 142.

Suarez, Francisco, I, Disputationes Metaphysicae, 203.

Suarez, Karl Gottlieb, II, projected the ‘Preussisches Landrecht’, 358.

Subject, I, is a term used to denote the subjection of everything created to the Divine law; in Immanence phil., 108, 109; is epistemological in Kant's Kritik d.r. Vernunft; it is the homo noumenon in his Kritik d. pr. Vernunft, 109; this concept is turned into that of the law in a special modality in Rationalism, 466.

Subject, II, the cognitive subject is Reflektionspunkt of being in itself, in Hartmann, 21; a radical antithesis in the subject-side of the root of the earthly cosmos, 32; Malan mixes up subject and law, 84, 85; dimensionality in space is not a subject, but a law-order, 87; spatial magnitude of a figure belongs to the modal subject-side of the spatial aspect, 87; biotic phenomena are subjects, 108; behaviour is subjectivity; Behaviourism, 113; a legal subject is no real person, 124; subjective feeling of extension, 168; the Subject as the transcendental pole of thought in Kant, 368; a modal subject cannot become an object in the same law-sphere, 370.

Subjective Individuality, I, in Irrationalistic positivism is not bound to laws, and mocks at all ‘concepts of thought’, 110.

Subject-Object Relation, I, is the pre-supposition of the integral character of naïve experience, 42; identified with the antithetic Gegenstand relation in dogmatic theories of knowledge, 43.

Subject-Object Relation, II, in space, 87; in sensory space, 168; semasiological subj.-obj. rel., 227; subj.-obj. rel. and the historical meaning of natural events, 251; subj.-obj. rel. occur both on the subject and on the law side: visual objects and subjective sight; sensory space is an objective analogy connected with subjective spatial feeling; subjective symbolizing and objective sign; cultural activity and its object, 366; the Humanistic schema of subject and object serves as a first orientation; it is im-

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posed on reality; Descartes, 367; a schema of theoretical and of practical reason; in modern thought an object is that to which our mental activity in thought or volition is directed; in Scholasticism the intentional object of cognition is distinguished from the subjective reality of things (esse intentionale, esse subjective, in rē); in Descartes; Franz Brentano, 367; before Kant the subject was hypokeimenon (substance); since Kant the object has been identified with Gegenstand; things are gegenständlich because products of the formative process applied to sensory intuitions, 368; objectivity becomes universal validity, opposed to individual subjectivity; Fichte: the object is the non-I; the material of our duty; thing in itself, 368; or ‘substance’, either a thing (rēs), or the ‘bearer of accidentia’; a real extramental Gegenstand of thought or will; this view was chiefly grammatical; the predicate only refers to accidentia; Kant turned the relation into an epistemological direction; subject is the transcendental pole of thought, its object is the counter pole, 368; Humanist phil. distinguishes cognitive from volitional objects, and adapts this distinction to the scheme of science and personality to construct the cosmos; there is no cosmological analysis of modality structures; object becomes a general notion; the basis of objectivity: substance, transcendental logical synthesis, tension between nature and freedom, transcendental consciousness, or being, 369; a modal subject cannot become object in the same law sphere, 370; and vice versa; object is not ‘Gegenstand’; objectivity is not universally valid law-conformity; in concrete reality subject and object are individual, 370; the individuality of an object is indifferent to that of the subject in the same sphere; the relation as such may become individual; the subj.-obj. relation in the psychological sphere of sensory perception, 371; perception, representation, remembrance are acts, not modalities, 372; our sensory picture of space; psychical objectification is bound to the retrocipatory structure of the feeling-aspect, 373; numerical, spatial, kinematic, physical, organic object functions implied in the spatial picture, 373; the organic function cannot be objectified in any other way than in a modal spatial picture; also the pre-biotic functions; pre-psychical subj.-obj. relation: a mother-bird feeds its young ones; objectified in the sensory image; it is related to a subject's sensory perception, 374; the biotic subj.-obj. relation cannot be reduced to sensory impressions (psychological empirism), 374; hallucination: no identity sense on the part of the psychol. subject; dreams; imagination; the representational relation; the objective perceptible image does not represent the actual pre-psychical subject- and object-functions; a sensory representation is the optic copy of an individual image within another individual objective perceptual image; the inversed copy on the retina is another image than the original objective image, 375; a sensory copy is an implicit dependent psychical object-structure; can post-psychical functions be objectified in feeling?, 376; not in the same way as the pre-psychical, 376; modal sphere universality; pre-psychical objectifications are given in a natural way; naïve concept formation is bound to the sensory image; this image has anticipatory objective expressions of logical characteristics; this expression is given as a possibility; subj. log.-feeling must actualize it; there are axiological moments in perception; the human face shows logical thought in a concrete act of thinking, 377; human laughing and weeping are rational in the expression of the face; sensory exterior of things shows axiological traits: culture; cultural traits in things find an anticipatory epxression in their sensory picture, 378; the sensory image of a destroyed cultural area is perceived as a calamity, 379; objectification of symbolical and post-lingual anticipations in a sensory image; a courtesy and its implied symbolism; a conventional explicit symbol; explicit; non-conventional symbolism in music; implicit musical symbolism; and its aesthetical anticipations; abstract symbols, 380; the modal structure of a symbolical subj.-obj. relation; a symbol has cultural and logical analogies; the objective beauty of a landscape; abstract symbols belong to a system; its foundation; abstract symbols are qualified by their symbolic function, 381; post-lingual functions; symbols in a disclosed society; objectified aesthetic functions; forms of social intercourse; faith; cult; prayer; their anticipatory expression in the sensory image; objectifications in various spheres, 382; in space; this relation occurs in those aspects which have retrocipations in earlier spheres; a point is a spatial object, i.e., an objectification of number in space, 383; a point's objective spatial function cannot be isolated from a subjective spatial figure, 384; spatial magnitude; continuum of points is antinomic; a point has dependent objective existence, 385; subj.-obj. relation in logical aspect; Realism versus Nominalism, 386, 387; Subj. Obj. rel. in personal rights in Roman law, 393; v. Jhering eradicates the subj.-obj. rel. 401; the meaning of slavery; Lactantius and Seneca's statement; Stammler's view, 411; modern personality and property rights; their peculiar subj.-obj. relation; Kohler's view; copy-right and right to a patent, 412; the impossible

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right to personality; Gierke's definition; Reinhardt's view, 413; Subj. Obj. rel. and the gnoseological Gegenstand relation, 460; Volkelt ignores the Subj. Obj. relation, 476, 478.

Subject-Object Relation, III, the subject-object relation of naïve experience must not be identified with the Gegenstand relation, nor with an ontological theory of naïve realism, 22, 27, 32; copy theory, 34, 35, 36, 38; 44, 46, 47; modal object functions of a tree, 56, 57; the tree has a sensory aspect in an objective macroscopic perceptional image in relation to human sensory perception, 98; the structure of a thing has subject functions that are objectified with a plastic structure in its objective sensory image, so that the biotic function becomes its qualifying aspect, 105; objectively qualified things, e.g. beaver dams, ant hills, etc., 107; the objective thing-structure of a sculpture, 109-129; that of useful objects, utensils, furniture, etc., 129-145; a chair; its objective sensory function is not given in nature; its anticipates the two typical radical functions of the chair, 134, 135; the objective empirical reality of a thing and the subjective actualization of its objective qualification, 146; intentional representation, unfolding, and actualization, 148, 149, 150; the actualization of a book's destination happens when we open the book, turn the pages, and read, 152, 192.

Subject-Object-Relation, Enkaptic, III, between animals and plants and their objective formations e.g.: the shells of molluses, 650; the subject-object-relation does not detract from the enkaptic form-totality, 776.

Subjective and Objective Juridical Facts, II, this distinction is required by the modal subject-object relation, 415.

Subject-side, I, of meaning and the cosmonomic side, 101.

Submissive Instinct, II, power over men has a social psychical substratum in the feeling drive of submission to the leadership of superior figures, 247.

Submissive Instinct, III, McDougall's theory; Vierkandt's view, 294.

Substance, I, ousia or substance in Aristotle, 44; substance or noumenon, 109; in Aristotle's Metaphysics the subject is identified with ‘substance’; composed of form and matter, 113; every natural substance strives after its own perfection enclosed in its essential form in Aristotle; his idea of a hierarchy in which the lower form is the matter of a higher form, 181; in Thomism substance is the central category of being, 182; the Aristotelian-Thomistic concept of substance was rooted in the Greek form-matter motive, 201; the Modern Humanistic concept of substance as super-natural ‘essence’ in Leibniz' Monadology; it is the concept of function in the new scientific method, and it serves as a common denominator for the different modal aspects; Leibniz calls this ‘substance’ the ‘abiding law for a series of changes’; up to Kant the ‘substance’ remained conceived of as ‘Ding an sich’; this was due to the lack of self-reflection of Humanistic thought; Descartes' definition of a substance as a ‘rēs’ that exists in itself and is not in need of anything else to exist; this resembles Johannes Damascenus' view, but must be taken in an entirely different sense, 202; Suarez' definition has rather the same formulation in Aristotle; but again of a fundamentally different meaning; the substance-concept is not essential to the Humanistic science ideal, 203; the sole substance with its two attributes, viz., thought and extension, in B. de Spinoza, 250, 251; in Hume substance is called a false concept, 291; the concept substance is antinomous, 301.

Substance, II, a metaphysical concept; founded in the absolutization of the Gegenstand relation; excluded from the naïve subj.-obj.-relation; Aristotle's ‘soul’ concept, 11; subst. is not the ‘genus proximum’ of its ‘accidents’, 14; Stoker's substance concept, 32; substance and accidents, 58; matter in classical physics is the substance of occurrence; Natorp on this, 95 (note); the metaphysical concept of substance caused great confusion in the discussion of life phenomena, 109; Driesch conceives phenomena of life as a substance with entelechy, 110; epistemol. criticism inferred that the substance is cognizable or not, 430; Subst, and accidentia in Aristotle; was adopted by Kant in a modified form, 445; the substance is independent of human experience in pre-Kantian metaphysics, 467; substance or ousia in Aristotle; thought is related to substance; Ding an sich is a substance in Kant, 496, 506.

Substance, III, the origin of the metaphysical concept; ousia; the search for true being, 4; in Neo-Scholasticism, substance is the human personality in its concrete unity and identity, 5; Boethius' definition; that of Thomas Aquinas; August Brunner, 6; the term ‘substance’ first appeared in Quintilianus Inst., 7; primary substance in Aristotle; eidos; secondary substance, 9; this primary substance is foreign to naïve experience; ousia is the primary category of being; its accidentalia; thing in itself; its sensibility is purely epistemological; its accidents are independent of possible perception; qualitates occultae; difference between substance as ‘thing in itself’ and the naïve thing experience; substance is the first temporal Gegenstand of theoretical logical thought; ousia synthetos or composite substance, 10; Thomas Aquinas holds the substance to be unknowable; the whole and its components; substance in

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Aristotle, is antinomous, 12; forms is the cause of matter, is ousia, 13-15; Marlet's interpretation of substance, 16; matter is the principium individuationis, also in Thomas; materia quantitate signata; the subst. concept is a fundamental depreciation of individuality, 17; thing and substance; function; Russell, 18, 19; the concept ‘energy’ has replaced that of ‘matter’ in modern physics; Russell's view; he holds the distinction between physical and mental to be unreal, 20; his concept ‘event’; matter and mind are logical structures of relations between events; Whitehead distinguishes events from objects, 21; a thing with aspects is as useless a concept to Russell as a substance, 22; Newton's ‘material units’; substance in modern biology, 23; the modern mathematical concept of function serves to obliterate the idea of the modal and the plastic horizons of experience; Aristotle's ousia was meant to account for individuality structures, 26; Descartes' conception of substance; Humanistic soul substance before Kant; metaphysical concept criticized by Hume, who influenced Russell; Hume's relations of resemblance and contiguity between impressions; Kant's category of substance, 27; Ritter on thing and substance, 28; substance in Stoker's view, 68; Albers; Marlet, 72; Bavink; Kant, 100; individuality structures are not substances, 108; Fr. Oppenheimer calls human society a secondary ‘immortal substance’, 167; Kjellen applies the substance concept to the State, 197; the State is founded in the substantial form of human nature, in Aristotle, 201; the generic relation of ruler and subject joins a plurality to the unity of a community of men whose material bodies are ruled by a soul as substantial form; the relation between ruler and subject is called taxis, it is a kind of law, in Aristotle, 208; the State is not a natural substance; the taxis is the constitution, 209; taxis has to explain the unity of a composite substance, 211; Aristotle considers an organized community as an analogy of a natural substance, 212; in Thomas the theory of the organic character of human society acquires its foundation in the ‘substantial form’ of human nature, 218; the authoritative structure of an organized community has its metaphysical foundation in Aristotle's substantial form, 223, 230, 239, 244; Litt rejects this metaphysical hypostatization of the human ego into a substance, 250; a substance can only possess one single substantial form, in Thomas, 707; substance precludes insight into enkapsis, 710; substance in Driesch, 736-741.

Substantial Forms, I, attacked by Occam, 184; in Thomism, based on a lex aeterna, 202.

Substantial Matrix, III, in Woltereck's theory, 24.

Substratum and Superstratum Spheres, II, the earlier modal spheres are the foundation of all the later modal aspects in an irreversible coherence of meaning, 51.

Suffrage, Organic, III, and medieval Craft guilds, 466, 467.

Super-Man, I, in Nietsche, 211, 466.

Super-Man, III, in Kallikles, 398.

Super-natural, I, faith in the super natural is given up in the Renaissance, 191.

Super-Personal Life, III, is the only entelechy, according to Driesch, 740.

Supply and Demand, II, an economic law was positivized as a basic norm of the economic determination of prices, 361.

Suppositional Logic, I, of Petrus Hispanus, 184.

Supra-Temporal, The, I, in the religious sphere of our consciousness we transcend time; the ‘pre-functional’ can only be experienced in the religious concentration of the radix of our existence upon the absolute Origin; even the idolatrous absolutizations of the temporal cannot be explained from the temporal horizon; eternity is set in the human heart and that is why he directs himself to things eternal; the religious centre is not rigidly static; Parmenides' conception of the eternal divine form of being is immobile, like Plato's world of the eidè and the immortal soul (cf. Phaedo); this view is antinomic, as Plato pointed out; Parmenides absolutized the modal spatial aspect, 31; the term: ‘central trans-cosmic time’ is not serviceable, 32, 33; supra-temporal unity of the aspects, 101.

Supra-temporal Norms, II, according to Windelband the logical, aesthetic and ethical norms have an absolute character, because elevated above time, and therefore not subject to change, 239.

Supra-Theoretical, I, judgments, 70.

Suspension Theory, III, and entelechy, 745.

Swanton, R.J., III, The Social Organisation of American Tribes (American Anthropologist; N.S. VII; 663-673), 332.

Swanton, R.J., III, refuted the constructive evolutionist theory of the rise of the human family, 331; the matriarchy and promiscuity theory is untenable as regards North-America, 332; he is a follower of Boas, 333.

Swedenborg, I, was humorously criticized by Kant; he was a ‘visionary’, 334.

Swords, The Two, III, of the Corpus Christianum, in the Middle Ages; a Scho-

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lastic problem, 218; in the Bull ‘Unam Sanctum’, 512.

Symbiosis, III, Parasitical symbiosis; an example of a natural and an unnatural kind of interlacement, 93; animal types of symbiosis are not normatively qualified societal relationships, 172; symbiosis is interwoven with correlative enkapsis between a living being and its environment, 648; Althusius' theory of human symbiosis, and sphere-sovereignty, 662, 663.

Symbolical Anticipations, II, in history, 284.

Symbolic Aspect, III, of the structure of the State; ‘material integrating factors’, according to Smend; verbal languages within its territory, 487; Belgian Revolution, 488.

Symbolic Logic, II, why useful; restricted II, in logicism, 339.

Symbolic Logic, II, why useful, restricted to the logical form of propositions, etc., 59, 452-455; [cf. s.v. Whitehead and Russell, Husserl;] is not purely analytical, 452; on the whole and its parts, 451 ff.

Symbolic Substratum, II, of the beauty of nature, 139.

Symbolism, II, juridical relations are only possible when signified; the smashing of a window pane, the getting into a public means of conveyance, have a juridical signification as a delict, and as the indirect expression of the intention to make an agreement of conveyance respectively. These significations are founded in language, 137; cultural symbolism, 285.

Symbols, I, in positivism formulas and concepts are mere symbols in natural science, 213; in Leibniz, 240; are representative and make knowledge possible, 273.

Symbols, II, incomplete symbol, Malan, 84; objective sensory phenomena are symbols of physical states of affairs, 100; the numerical symbol -i-, 173, 174; sensory symbols in primitive law, 183; historical memorial symbols, 223; cultural and lingual symbols, 285; symbols in art, 348; conventional, unconventional, explicit, implicit, abstract symbols, 381; social symbols, 382; symbols of reality are the universalia post rem in Thomism, 387.

Symbols, III, objective sensory phenomena (e.g. colours) are symbols of the pre-sensory aspect of energy (i.e. physics), 37; symbolical anticipations in sensory impressions evoke a name, 38; Occam's division of signs, 45, 46; from a natural-scientific viewpoint, objective sensory phenomena are only symbols referring to imperceptible physical relations, 46; naïve experience is not destitute of names for things but implied the symbolically signifying aspect as well, 51; a tree has a symbolical object-function because it can be named, 57; in the genetic process of human life the cultural function precedes the lingual modus, 78; books, scores, etc., are symbolically qualified, they signify the aesthetic structure of a work of art in an objective way and cannot actualize it, 110, 111; literary works of art show a typical cultural foundation and formation of lingual means of expression which is modally different from the formative moment inherent in symbolic signification as such, 123; the relation between intuitive and symbolic knowledge; the routine view of modern daily life must not be confused with actual naïive experience; this fact implies a loss in entensity with respect to naïive experience; but it does not affect our experience of things essentially familiar to us, 144, 145; the relation between the internal structural principle and the modal foundational system in the subject-object relation of symbolically qualified things, e.g., a book, 150-153; as means of social mediation, 243, 250-253, 272; realize reciprocity of perspectives, 250; in a ‘closed sphere’ a symbol becomes objective, transpersonal, constant, enabling the sphere to expand, 252.

Sympathy, II, according to Bergson intuition is an immediate subjective psychical ‘empathy’ penetrating with ‘intellectual sympathy’ into the ‘durée’, i.e. he creative qualitative vital stream of time, 481.

Synods, III, German Synods and congregational representation in the 19th century; ‘Synodal Konsistorial System’ in the modern Lutheran Church, 548.

Synolon, II, in Aristotle: the substantial form of a natural being, as such, lacks individuality and must be combined with matter into a synolon (tóde ti), 419.

Symphonophora, III, and animal colonies, 649.

Synthesis, I, requires self-reflection, 51; attempts to accomplish a synthesis of antithetic motives, 65; between natural necessity and freedom accepted in Kantian epistemology - rejected in his ethics, 90; of pagan and Christian motives began to lose ground in the Renaissance, 189; Kant did not really solve the problem of the epistemological synthesis, 423; between Kantianism and Existentialism and Christian doctrine, in Emil Brunner, 520.

Synthesis, II, a-priori synthesis, in Kant, 13; analytical and inter-modal synthesis, 434; synthesis precedes analysis in Kant, 443; synthesis is the combination of a plurality and transcendental logical unity; the pre-requisite of analysis; logical synthesis and the imagination (in Kant), 497;

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logical synth. and intermodal synth. are not distinguished by Kant, 498; synthesis speciosa and synthesis intellectualis, 514; the primary meaning-synthesis between ‘pure’ sensibility and ‘pure’ thought; they are modi of the transcendental imagination which is essentially time and selfhood, 528; intermodal synthesis and selfhood, 559.

Synthesis Philosophy, III, on the State, 402-406.

Synthetical Judgments, I, in Kant, and analytic judgments, 73.

Synthetical Judgments, II, in Kant; Maimon denies that they are a priori applicable to sensory experience, 449; they play a constitutive rôle with respect to objective experience, 568.

Systasis of Meaning, II, logical systasis, 390; is intermodal, 429; is prior to synthesis, 431; of meaning, 433; the logical objective systasis of a rose, 450; systasis and distasis, 471, 472.

Systatic Consciousness, III, in the naïve attitude, 36.