A New Critique of Theoretical Thought. Deel 4. Index of Subjects and Authors

R

Racial Problem, III, primary or natural races, 495; Rosenberg; Chamberlain; Pearson; Günther; Wolff, 496; racial differences, and education; South Africa, 497.

Radical Evil, I, Kant's pessimism, 347; is the tendency to subject the will to sensory inclinations, 385.

Radical Evil, II, in Kant's philosophy, 150.

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Radical Types, III, of individuality in naïve experience; matter, plants, animals, 83-85; of products of human formation, like music, literature, etc., as secondary radical types, 122.

Radio Activity, I, in modern physics, 557.

Radio Activity, III, is not influenced by external functional factors, 100; the duration of the existence of a radio-active element is independent of its free or bound condition, 704.

Radiolaria, III, 107, 108; their SiO2 formations, 724; and mineral formations, 730.

Radloff, III, the Kirghiz formed ‘auls’, a kind of ‘joint family’, an interlacement of different structures, under the authorithy of a patriarch, 351.

Ramus, Petrus, I, developed a semi-Platonic mathematical method in logic, in which ‘invention’ played the main part, 198.

Ranke, II, Weltgeschichte, 281.

Ranke, II, national individuality only begins to unfold in an opened historical development, 276, 277; Ranke's idea of development derives from Hegel; he restricted history to Asia Minor and the Occident; history starts when there are written documents; he synthesized Lutheran belief in Providence with the modern idea of humanity, 281; he absolutized the dominators of Western culture, 282; his pupil J. Burckhardt, 282.

Rational Animal, III, is man, in the Stoic-Aristotelian view, 217.

Rationalism, I, absolutizes the law-side of time, 28; reduces the subject-side of reality to the law-side, 98.

Rationalists, I, think that ethical norms can be proven a priori and ‘more geometrico’; - Hume's criticism, 309.

Ratzel, III, he tries to prove that the spread of similar elements of culture is due to emigration and derivation; he remained entangled in the environment-theory, 333; a quotation from Ratzel by W. Schmidt proves that this theory shows a lack of historical insight, 335; he calls political geography ‘geopolitics’, 500.

Ratzenhofer, III, Wesen und Zweck der Politik, 492.

Ratzenhofer, III, his naturalistic psychological explanation of public opinion, 492.

Räuber, I, Schiller's Räuber, 453.

Ravaisson, I, developed neo-scholastic thought in an increasingly anti-rationaliistic sense, 525.

Reaction, II, historical reaction, 237.

Reading Book, A, III, contains the intentional conception of its author; variability types; a cultural foundation and a symbolic qualification, 151.

Realism, II, Scholastic realism is sometimes called conceptual realism; universalia ante rem and in rē Augustinus and Aristotle; Divine Logos doctrine; metaphysical eidos (essence) gives matter its form; Plato's extreme realism; Scholastic formae separatae split up reality into noumenon and phenomenon, 387; intentio and the intended objective contents; copy theory of concepts; erroneous view of the Gegenstand, 388; Gegenstand and substance are identified; the transcendentalia; philosophia prima; the objects of the actus intelligendi, 389; realism versus nominalism, 386, 387, 419.

Realism, Critical, III, of Al. Riehl, 46.

Reality, I, in Rickert, 97.

Reality, II, as a category in Kant; but possibility and necessity can be thought of in every meaning modus; reality can never be modal, 551.

Reality and Meaning, II, that which makes reality into meaning lies beyond the limit of time; meaning is ‘ex origine’ the convergence of all temporal aspects of existence into one supertemporal focus, which is the religious root of creation, 30.

Reality of a Thing, The, III, is a continuous process of realization, 109.

Reallasten, II, in Germanic Law a jus in rē may be vested in an immovable in such a way that it is independent of the particular person entitled to it, and remains valid even when he is temporarily lacking; this is instanced by the so-called ‘Reallasten’ of Germanic Law. 408.

Real Rights, II, the will-power theorists identified jus in rē with absolute rights, 398.

Reason, I, alone can never be a motive to any action of the will, 306; in Hume reason is the slave of passion, 307.

Reason, II, Vernunft, nous, ratio, 11, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 26; Kant's idea of reason, 42; the idea of reason in rationalistic metaphysics is antinomic, 43; reason and understanding, 43; natural reason and natural ethics, 144; reason and faith; the act of thinking includes its faith aspects, 564.

Reason of State, III, Macchiavelli's theory, 399.

Reason, Pure, I, in Kant, is never related to ‘Gegenstände’, but only to the a priori concepts of ‘Gegenstände’, 364.

Reasonable Belief, I, in Kant, 91, 339, 350, 363, 364, 372, 383, 385.

Reciprocity of Perspectives, III, of the ego with other egos, in Litt; they are

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realized by means of symbols, 250, 251; this reciprocity is a biological necessity according to A. Vierkandt, 290, 291.

Recompense and Punishment, II, in Polak's view, 130.

Redemption, I, in Christ abrogates the antithesis between sin and creation, 523.

Reflection, I, in Hume, is in image of sensation, 282.

Reflexive Permission, II, and subjective right in Von Jhering, 404.

Reflexive Thought, I, and objective thought, in recent philosophy, 86; and critical self-reflection, 87.

Reformation, The, I, took over the Scholastic motive of nature and grace, 188, 511, 512, 514.

Refraction, I, of the meaning totality by cosmic time, 101, 105.

Refraction, II, law of refraction of cosmic time, 6.

Regalia, II, medieval regalia were considered as rēs in commercio, 410.

Regeneration, II, reverses the direction of the faith function, 311.

Regenerative Phenomena, III, and Driesch's experiments, 646.

Regions, II, the delimitation of the phenomenological ‘regions’ in Edmund Husserl, 17; material regions of being delimited by material ‘synthetical categories’ in Husserl, 454.

Regions, III, in Husserl, and the thing-structure, 54.

Regius, I, the innate ideas are present at birth; his polemic with Descartes, 222.

Rehm, III, Geschichte der Staatsrechtswissenschaft, 211.

Rehm, III, on Plato and Aristotle's sociology, 206; he overlooked the kernel of Ar.'s view of democracy, 211.

Reichenau, E., III, Protozoa, 721, 773.

Reicke, E., II, Lose Blätter aus Kant's Nachlass, 438.

Reicke, II, Published a note given by Kant, 438.

Reines Denken, I, or philosophical thought as ‘mere thought’, has as such no actual selfhood, 7.

Reingkink, Th., III, and Church government; the episcopal system, 516.

Reinhardt, II, Das Persönlichkeitsrecht in der geltende Rechtsordnung, 413.

Reinhold, I, a disciple of Kant, gave the doctrine of the affection of the subjective sensibility by the mysterious ‘Ding an Sich’ such a gross form as to expose its inherent antinomy sharply; this ‘Affizierung’ was, according to Reinhold, a causal process, 413.

Reinke, Joh., III, Ueber Deformation von Pflanzen durch äussere Einflüsse, 647.

Relativism, I, in Litt, 138.

Relativism, III, with respect to the Church institution, in Emil Brunner, 542.

Relativity, II, incongruity between relativity and physical continuous space, 101.

Religion, I, the fundamental dependence of human selfknowledge on the knowledge of God has its inner ground in the essence of religion as the central sphere of our created nature, 55; it is the innate impulse of the human selfhood to direct itself toward the true or a pretended absolute Origin of all temporal diversity of meaning, which it finds focused concentrically in itself; to the formal transcendental character of this description the concrete immediacy of religious experience remains strange; in theoretical thought we can only arrive at a transcendental idea; the function of such an idea; religion transcends all modal aspects, faith included; religion is not at all a temporal phenomenon manifest within the temporal structure of human act-life, 57; it can be approximated only in the concentric direction of our consciousness, not in the divergent one, not as a ‘Gegenstand’; religion cannot be described ‘phenomenologically’ or ‘psychologically’; it is not the experience of the ‘tremendum (Rudolph Otto); it is the ex-sistent condition in which the ego is bound to its true or pretended firm ground; veritable religion is absolute self-surrender, 58; true self knowledge discovers the ex-sistent character of the self also in the fact that the ego is bound with other egos in a religious community; the I-ness lives in the spiritual community of the we, which is directed to the Divine Thou; the central command of love is of a religious and not of a moral character; in this Command the neighbour is a member of the religious community of mankind in its central relationship to God Who created man after His image, 60; a religious community is maintained by a common spirit which as a dynamis is active in the concentration point of human existence; it works through a basic motive, whose forms are historically determined, but whose central meaning transcends historical form-giving; since the Fall and the promise of the coming Redeemer, there are two central main springs operative in the human heart, viz., the Holy Ghost and the spirit of apostasy from the true God, 61; in Western thought the apostate spirit has disclosed itself in two central motives,

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61; pre-Homeric religion of life was a nature religion; the classical-Greek motive (since Aristotle) of form and matter; the Olympians were cultural gods; and the Humanistic motive of nature and freedom, 62; the Humanistic motive took its rise from the religion of the free autonomous human personality and that of modern science evoked by it, and directed to the domination of nature; the Christian motive of creation, fall, and redemption; the Scholastic motive of nature and grace was introduced by Roman-Catholicism and directed to a religious synthesis between the Christian and the other motives; the fall into sin is a privatio, a negation, a nothingness; but the central dynamis of the spirit of apostasy is no ‘nothing’; it springs from the creation and cannot operate beyond the limits in which it is bound to the divine order of meaning; the dynamis of sin can unfold itself only in subjection to the religious concentration law of human existence; without the law there is no sin, and there is a law of sin; but sin has no real power in itself, independent of creation, 63; idolatrous motives conceal themselves in a religious antithesis, for the absolutizing of relative meanings evokes their correlata; these motives are composed of two religious antithetic motives driving human action and thought continually in opposite directions; the resulting religious dialectic is quite different from the antithetical gegenstand-relation of theoretic thought, 64; the Roman-Catholic theological dialectic of nature and grace was taken over by Protestant Scholasticism; it aimed at a synthesis of the Aristotelian view of nature with the central motive of the Word-Revelation; but it lends itself as well to a combination of the motive of the Word Revelation with the Humanistic motive of nature and freedom; then the Christian motive loses its radical and integral character; the Scholastic vision does not assign a central place to the Biblical revelation about the human heart as the radix of temporal existence; Thomism could proclaim the autonomy of natural reason in the ‘natural sphere’ of knowledge; the dialectic tension between nature and grace hides the inner dialectic of the Greek and the Humanistic motives; in Scholastic anthropology this component is expressed in the dichotomy of body and 65 soul; Scholastics was swayed from the Thomistic ‘natura praeambula gratiae to the Occamist denial of any contact between nature and grace (William of Occam); the same polar tension in ‘dialectical theology’ between Karl Barth and Emil Brunner, 66; Rousseau's religion of feeling, 67; cf. sub voce Transcendental Basic Motive; - the central basic motive of the Christian religion is the motive of creation, the fall into sin, and the redemption through Jesus Christ in communion, with the Holy Ghost; God is the absolute and integral Origin, the Creator of the ‘earthly world’ concentrated in man, and of the world of the angels, 173; there is no original power which is opposed to Him; in His creation there is no expression of a dualistic principle of origin; man has been created by God according to His image in man's heart participating in the religious community of mankind; the creation implies a world plan; Divine providence is concerned with the law side and with the factual side of the creation; the providential plan concerning the factual side is hidden from man; sin can only be understood in veritable radical self knowledge, as the fruit of Biblical Revelation, 174; Sin is apostasy from God; it involves the root of existence and the whole temporal cosmos; it does not stand in a dialectical relation to the creation; the redemption in Christ is also radical; sin is propitiated by Him; gratia communis, 175; Kant's religion remains within the boundaries of mere reason, 384.

Religion, II, nature religions, 263 (and note); faith and religion identified; erroneously, 303; religion and magic; Westermarck; Frazer's definition; Freud, 312; Cassirer, 321; Egyptian religion, 324; Husserl's idea of religion, 544.

Religion of Feeling, I, in Rousseau, 67.

Religious Fulness of Meaning, I, love, wisdom, justice, power, beauty, etc., coincide in this fulness, 106.

Religious Horizon, III, the temporal and the religious horizon of experience, 68; the imago Dei, 69; religious love is the fulfilment of all temporal meaning, 71; the I-ness is the spiritual centre, of human existence, 88.

Religious Root of the State, III, faith points to this Root, 500; State and Church, 501.

Religious Sphere, The, I, is pre-functional, the concentration point of the root of our existence, 31.

Rembrandt, II, Nightwatch, 423.

Remembrance, II, is an act, 372.

Renaissance, I, at the time of the Renaissance Humanism was completely aware of its real religious motive, but in the 18th century this notion faded away, 170; Romanticism was as aristocratic in character as the Renaissance had been, 171; the Renaissance began as a spiritual Humanistic movement when the medieval ecclesiastically unified culture had collapsed, 173; in Italy, especially, the Renaissance took the side of the ancient world view; it re-discovered Greek and Roman Culture and gave up synthesis

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philosophy, 189; in the Renaissance the Biblical motives were secularized, 190; the Faustian domination; the personality-ideal was permeated with an unquenchable thirst for temporal life and a Faustian desire to subject the world to itself; the Renaissance secularized the Christian idea of regeneration, 191; this ‘renascimento’ and the ‘uomo universale’; Leo Battista Alberti; Leonardo Da Vinci, 192; its secularized motive of regeneration, 193; the Renaissance did not explicitly develop the model of modern natural scientific thought, although it contained such a tendency; it also inclined towards the infinite in which modern man thinks he can rediscover himself in his boundless impulse of activity, 194; Stoic and Epicurean motives in Renaissance thought; Da Vinci; Valla; the thirst after infinite nature and its mysteries was manifest in Renaissance painting and poetry; the Faustian passion to dominate nature was revealed in a flourishing alchemy; Petrus Ramus' logic, 198; Bruno's pantheism, his dithyrambic glorification of nature's infinity and the human microcosmic monad; natura naturata and natura naturans; the rejection of a ‘Jenseits’, 199; the Renaissance ascribed the mathematical conception of natural phenomena to Plato and Democritus, 200.

Renard, G., III, La théorie de l'institution, Essai d'ontologie juridique, 384.

Renascimento, I, and the ‘uomo universale’ of the Renaissance, 192.

Representations, I, are ‘synthetic concepts’ of empirical ‘Gegenstande’ in Kant, 53.

Representation, II, is an act, 372.

Representational Relation, III, the naïve experience of a thing is not that of a copy or representation of such a thing (Abbild-relation), 34-38, 44-47; Rickert's view of the copy theorie 49-51; Scheler, 53; Husserl, 54.

Representative System, III, Calvin did not introduce this system into the Church, nor the idea of the sovereignty of the Congregation, 545-549.

Rēs, II, the Roman conception of the rēs in a juridical sense, 393.

Rēs Publica, III, the State is a res publica, 412.

Restlessness, I, of phil. thought, and of our ego, is transmitted to all temporal functions in which the ego is operative, 11.

Restoration, II, of the 19th century was conservative, 233; and reaction, 362.

Restrictive State of Feeling, II, is found in animals, 117.

Retribution, II, is to be taken in bonam partem as well as in malam partem, 130: and economic life, 131, 132; and love; retribution acts against excessive manifestations of altruism; is not a feeling-drive, 134; Aristotle's arithmetical and geometrical proportions in retribution, 135; economic, aesthetic, social retrocipations in the juridical aspect, 135, 136: the expression of the modal meaning of retribution in a primitive legal order, 182; in primitive society the legal subjectivity of man and the validity area of the norms are still rigidly bound up with the unopened aspect of social intercourse restricted to the members of the tribe, in psychical life, 168, 183, 184; logical substratum of juridical aspect, 182, 183; biotic retrocipations in primitive culture, 270; juridical retrocipations, 405.

Reuchlin, I, a friend of Melanchton's, 513; R. was disappointed when Melanchton broke with the ideals of Humanism, 515.

Reuter and Hart, III, Introduction to Sociology, 177.

Revelation, I, is the synthesis of irrationality and originality - Fichte -, 492.

Revelation, II, appeals to ourselves in the root of our existence, 52; general and particular, 306; are universally intended, 307; natural revelation, 308; and common grace, 309; the principle of Divine R. in the order of creation, 323.

Révész, G., II, Het psychologisch ruimteprobleem, 373.

Revolution, III, Christian revolution and Stoicism, 169; revolution can only succeed when its leaders collar the military power, 421.

Rhizopoda, III, mineral formations in their protoplasm, 108, 774.

Rhumbler, III, Das Lebensproblem, 733; Das Protoplasma als physikalisches System, 733.

Richter, Otto, III, Gust. Theod. Fechner, Eine Auswahl aus seinen Schriften, 629-631.

Rickert, Heinrich, I, System der Philosophie, 22, 23, 120, 121, 129, 151; Wissenschaftliche Philosophie und Weltanschauung, 23, 129; Grundprobleme der Philosophie, 129, 130, 133, 134;

Rickert, Heinrich, I, theoretical philos. thought first demolishes everything a-theoretical, leaving a chaotic material of consciousness, which is to be ordered in the creative forms of philos. thought, 14; he defends the neutrality postulate with respect to philosophy, 14, 15; his statement: ‘if we are

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able to determine the boundaries of thought through thinking, we must be able, too, to exceed these limits’, is contradictory on the immanence standpoint; he distinguishes ‘heterological’ from ‘hetereological-monological thought’; but it leads to antinomy, 22, 23; he observes, correctly, ‘as soon as we are beyond thought, we do not know anything’, but fails to appreciate the transcendence of our selfhood; the non-scientific attitude towards the world must not claim universal validity for all; then it can hold its own by the side of scientific philosophy; the latter makes the entire man also its object and transcends man himself, 23; as a Neo-Kantian Rickert opposes being to validity, reality to value; these concepts are not modally defined; he reserves ‘meaning’ for ‘culture’ as a subjective relating of ‘reality’ to ‘values’, 76; his meaning-idealism distinguishes meaning (Sinn) from reality; the latter is only viewed in its abstract sense of the psycho-physical aspects, 97; his classification of the ‘life-and-world-views’ is oriented to the Neo-Kantian philosophy of values; he distinguishes intellectualism, aestheticism, mysticism, moralism, eudemonism, eroticism, theism, polytheism, 121; his classification is a confusing schematism, 122; it is construed apart from the religious basic motives of Western thought and interprets ancient and medieval thinkers after the pattern of the modern Humanistic motive of nature and freedom, 123; his view of the difference between philosophy and a life view, 124; his ‘Wissenschaftliche Philosophie und Weltanschauung is aimed at modern existence-philosophy (Heidegger, Jaspers, etc.), which opposes existential thinking to Rickert's purely theoretical; he tries to demonstrate that the cosmic totality must remain hidden from the total man, who is an individual complex of functions, 129; philosophy must separate the cosmos into two spheres: temporal-spatial (sensorily perceptible) nature reality and timeless values having absolute validity; imperatives and norms are not the business of philosophy; the concept of a normative science is internally contradictory; special science studies what is ‘mere reality’ and immanent as ‘given reality’, the ‘psycho-physical’; reality is also a theoretical form, a category of thought, which itself is not real, but has ‘validity’, 130; the theoretical Idea of the totality of reality, viewed by Kant as an infinite task for thought, has value-character; ‘totality of reality’ is a problem of epistemology; philosophy must be a theory of values directed to the ‘Voll-endung’ (fulfilment) toward the totality and includes the universe of values in its horizon; it must strive after a system of values; and also investigate the a-theoretical values, such as morality, beauty, holiness; it orients itself to the historical life of culture to track down the multiplicity of the values; philosophy must reunite the worlds of ‘natural reality’ and of ‘values’; this unity can be immediately experienced when we are not thinking, 131; there is a third realm serving as a connecting link between reality and values; viz. that of meaning; meaning is constituted in the valuating act of the subject, but is not itself value, but relates reality to values; it joins these two in a higher synthetic unity; value is meaning of a transcendent, timeless, and absolute character; meaning is ‘immanent meaning’; reality is the object of the transcendental epistemological subject; in the realm of values there is no subjectivity at all; culture is reality to -which values cling; philosophy must work with an ‘open’ system, 132; such a system is only a formal order of ‘the stages of value’; philosophy must not be ‘prophetism’; nor a view of life and the world; the latter must be included in theoretical inquiry; the object of philosophy is the totality of the cosmos inclusive of the subject (the whole man and his relation to the cosmos); philosophy necessarily becomes a theory of the total meaning of life, 133; the pitfall in Rickert's neutrality view lies concealed in his a-priori identification of ‘truth’ with theoretical correctness, and in his a-priori supposition that such truth is an ‘absolute’ ‘value’, ‘timelessly valid’, ‘resting in itself’, 134; this view is antinomous on Rickert's own standpoint, 135; the test of the transcendental basic Idea applied to Rickert's philosophy, 136, 137; Rickert's view of Calvinism, 149; the judgment ‘Truth is the highest value’ is not theoretical but proceeds from a life and world view; theoretical judgments are oriented to a (theoretical) value; in the judgment ‘this rose is beautiful’ the aesthetic attitude is abandoned for the theoretical judgment about ‘the aesthetic value’, 151; he distinguishes theoretical from practical philosophy, 530.

Rickert, Heinrich, II, Kulturwissenschaft und Naturwissenschaft, 207; Die Grenzen der naturwissenschaftlichen Begriffsbildung, 207, 421; Die Probleme der Geschichtsphilosophie, 207, 208;

Rickert, Heinrich, II, on culture, nature, value, 201; culture is ‘natural reality to which values cling’, 204; qualifies historical science as individualizing; cultural life filled with meaning, 207; reality bears meaning; all normativity is reduced to the cultural denominator, 208; his concept of transcendental logical historical forms of knowledge, 209; his distinction between systematical and individualizing sciences, is antinomic, 213, 217; at first he used the term ‘natural history’ but he gave it up

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later on because he believed that the historical viewpoint cannot include an individualizing view of nature, 230; and Kuypers, 243; individual causality; causal equation or inequivalence; individuality as such is an apeiron, not a norm as Rickert thinks, 254; his error, 275; individuality originates from the matter of experience; the genuine individual science is related to values by cultural science, 421; individuality is empirical uniqueness related to values; natural science method is blind to values and works in a generalizing way; individuality forced into the form-matter scheme, 421; individuality is a sensory mè on in Neo-Kantianism; meaning-indiv. in the general notion of culture only, 422.

Rickert, Heinrich, III, Der Gegenstand der Erkenntnis, 49, 50; System der Philosophie, 51; Kant als Philosoph der modernen Kultur, 428.

Rickert, Heinrich, III, his criticism of Riehl's ‘Critical realism’; epistemology should not include a problem in its pre-suppositions; Rickert starts from the ‘Satz der Immanenz’; his objection made against Riehl is also valid for Rickert's own transcendental idealistic epistemology; he qualifies naïve exper. as ‘a complex of vague and rash opinions’, 49; he identifies the abstract sensory aspect with the integral whole of empirical reality; he rejects the copy theory; speaks of a pre-theoretical Erleben of the unity of value and reality; his Sinn-Begriff; his ‘naïve realism’ is Kantian phenomenal nature, 50; his notion of Erleben is: concept-less, irrational, nameless, a unity of two theoretically construed worlds, corresponding to the dualism of nature and freedom, 51; his copy theory of naïve experience, 49-51; of a work of art as a sensory perceptual thing related to aesthetic value, 113; Sorokin tries to solve the totality problem of sociology from the standpoint of H. Rickert's philosophy, 162; and Darmstaedter's sociology, 409; Kant held the State to be ‘power’; this statement of Rickert's must be restricted to international relations, 428.

Riehl, Alois, I, Der philosophischen Kritizismus, 268, 281, 340.

Riehl, Alois, I, holds that there is no antinomy in Locke's system, 268 (note); R. holds that Hume had unwavering faith in mathematics as the foundation of all science; he misunderstands Hume's conception of mathematical certainty; Riehl says that Hume never meant to dispute the universal validity of ‘pure geometry’, and that Hume only attacked the possibility, presumed by geometry, of dividing space to infinity, some further arguments of Riehl's on this subject, 281; his interpretation confronted with Hume's statements about ‘pure geometry’, 285; in the third period of his development Kant was very close to Hume's scepticism, 340.

Riehl, Alois, II, Der philosophische Kritizismus, 80, 373, 439, 519.

Riehl, Alois, II, his involuntary admission of the numerical analogy in logical unity, multiplicity, etc., 80; association based on the connection between the organs of sight and touch, 373; his paraphrase of Kant's observation on judgments, 439; thought and intuition are originally united in their common subject of consciousness (= the cogito); he denies any essential difference between cognitive (experiential) and logical concepts; but he does not realize Kant's aporia, 519.

Riehl, Alois, III, Der Philosophische Kritizismus, 39, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49.

Riehl, Alois, III, points out that the ‘bond between the objective and the subjective world’ would be broken if Müller's theory of the specific energy of the sense organs were true, 42; he holds that it is impossible to found a law on one single unexplained exception, 43; there is a necessary relation between stimulus and sensation; Riehl ignores the subject-object-relation, 44; he gives a Nominalistic interpretation of the relation between sensory percepts and things perceived; he distinguishes arbitrary from natural signs, like Occam, 45; his Kantianism, 47; his critical realism; his rehabilitation of the sensory aspect of human experience, 47; things and our consciousness form one totality of reality; this thesis is an improvement on Kantianism, but not wholly satisfactory, 48.

Rieker, K., III, Grundsätze reformierter Kirchenverfassung, 520, 521, 544, 545, 546, 547.

Rieker, K., III, refutes the political interpretation of Calvin's system of Church government, as if the elders were representatives of the congregation in the modern sense of representation, 521; he says that the conception of ‘governmental power’ as service is of Reformed origin, 544; Rieker says that Church government was conceived by Luther as dominion in a juridical sense; this is an error, 545; the elders are representatives of the congregation insofar as they are its ministering organs according to their office; they are no mandatories of a popular will above them, 546, 547; an individual Church-member has a right to examine if the orders and arrangements of the ecclesiastical office bearers are in accordance with the Word of God and has to obey insofar as such is the case, 547.

Riemann, II, the second founder of the theory of mathematical functions; and intuition, 484.

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Right, Subjective, II, in Thomasius, Hobbes, Putendorff, my own right is all that has not been forbidden me; in Grotius it is all that other juridical subjects in relation to me are forced to respect on account of the legal order, 395; Kant excludes purpose from the concept of subjective right, 396; according to Von Savigny and Puchta a subjective right is essentially the particular will-power of the individual, 397; confusion between subjective right and juridical competence on account of the elimination of the subject-object-relation, 398; in Thon's conception, 397, 400; in Duguit's view, 399; and competence; and object, 402; and reflex permission; Von Jhering sought the difference in the legal protection (the action in a material sense); this is wrong, 404; a juridical object is nothing but a modal function and is determined by the modal function of the juridical subject-object-relation, 405; the person of the King cannot have a private right to the king's office, 410.

Right, Subjective, III, Thomas Aquinas recognizes subjective natural rights of individual man; a subj. right is a social function according to Duguit, 460.

Rights, I, of man; of the citizen, 321.

Rights, II, might is not right, 241; innate human rights in Locke, 350, 357, 95; Wolff, 413; personality- and property-rights, 392, 413; Roman ius in rē, 392; rights to rights, 394; Hugo Grotius, 395.

Rights, III, inalienable rights of man were opposed to the absolute sovereignity of the State without denying such sovereignty, 399; they are denied by Léon Duguit, 460.

Rights, Inalienable, I, and the public interest, in Wolff, 321.

Rights, Innate Natural, I, in Rousseau, 318.

Right, Personal, II, (jura in personam), was held to be the volitive control over a person in consequence of a particular personal legal relation, in the opinion of the will-theorists, 398.

Rights, Personality, II, the idea of a subjective right to personality is absurd, 413.

Rights, Public, II, modal subject-object-relations may be objectified in the lawsphere in which they function; in the juridical lawsphere rights may become objects of other rights; can a competence implying juridical authority over persons be made into the object of a subjective right, 409, 410.

Rights, Subjective, II, considered apart from interest, by the Historical School of jurisprudence; in Schlossmann; in the will-power theory, 397; its definition in Kierulff; the concept subjective right was abandoned by H. Kelsen, 399; the element of interest was eliminated, 403.

Rita, II, the astronomical world order was identified with retributive justice in the old-Indian conception of Rita explained in the Veda, 133; a moral motive is found in the Vedic conception of the gods Varouna and Mitza, as the guardians of the Rita, the astronomical world-order which is at the same time the moral and the juridical order, 324.

Ritter, P.H., III, Schets eener Critische Geschiedenis van het Substantiebegrip in de Nieuwere Wijsbegeerte, 28.

Ritter, P.H., III, we experience the qualities of a thing but the thing itself is not given in experience; it is put there by us; his view of substance, 28.

Rivers, W.H.R., III, The Todas, 341.

Rivers, W.H.R., III, polyandry among the Todas; its origin, 341.

Robbers, III, De Wijsbegeerte der Wetsidee in gesprek met het Thomisme, 73.

Robbers, III, maintains that the Idea of analogical being is the neo-scholastic basic motive; and that the motive of nature and grace is secondary; this is an error, 73.

Robertson, II, followed Voltaire's view of history, 350.

Robinson Crusoe, III, is a fancied case, and has no force as an argument, 655.

Robson, W.A., III, Justice and Administrative Law, 681.

Roman Empire, Holy, III, was supposed to embrace all spiritual and secular relationships, 217; its foundation was laid by Augustinus' De Civitate Dei, 510.

Roman Family, The, III, excluded polygamy, 306.

Roman Jurists (Classical), II, on subjective right, 392.

Roman Law, II, actio popularis; the interdicts of Roman law of possession, 404.

Roman ‘Thing’ concept, The, II, in a juridical sense, 392; the rēs; the jus in rē, 393.

Romanticism, I, was aristocratic; a reaction to the science ideal, 171; in Nietsche's first period, 465.

Romanticism, II, the term: natural history, 229; in Von Stahl's view of history, 233; its quietism and its conception of God's guidance, 248; under the guidance of the ideas of Romanticism the Restoration followed a seemingly historical, but in reali-

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ty a reactionary policy, evoking the resistance of 19th century Liberalism, 362.

Rome, Ancient, III, the undifferentiated structure of the gentes; the curiae; curiae are ‘gentilitial societies’ and agrarian land property communities; Roman citizenship, 369; quirites, 370.

Rose, A., I, a rose does not feel or think or engage in aesthetic valuation as a subject; but in the naïve attitude we ascribe to it objective qualities of colour and odour, logical characteristics, cultural qualities and objective beauty, 42.

Rose, A., II, a rose is a logical objective systasis, 450.

Rosenberg, Alfred, III, Der Mythus des XX. Jahrhunderts, 496.

Rosenberg, Alfred, III, his ‘cultural philosophy’ based on the distinction between inferior and superior races; he glorifies the ‘Nordic or Aryan’ race; it became the accepted ‘philosophical’ justification of Hitler's inhuman anti-semitic policy, 496.

Rousseau, J.J., I, Discours sur les sciences el les arts, 313, 314; Discours sur l'origine de l'inégalité parmi les hommes, 314; Oeuvres II, 314, 315; Du Contract Social, Ou Principes du Droit Politique, 315, 319, 320, 321, 322; Emile, 316.

Rousseau, J.J., I, he depreciated the ideal of science and ascribed primacy to the freedom motive which is the main spring of his religion of feeling, 67; the Idea of a personal God was a requirement of religious feeling to Rousseau, 191; in R.'s work he tension between the science and the personality ideal reached a crisis; he openly disavowed the science-ideal in favour of the recognition of human personality as a moral aim in itself; freed from the burden of science we may learn true virtue from the principles inscribed in the heart of everybody; O, virtue, sublime knowledge of simple souls!; he called Humanistic thought to self-reflection; not thought but the consciousness of freedom and the feeling of moral power prove the spiritual character of the human soul, 314; human thought is a higher level of the animal associations of sensory Ideas; all value of human personality is concentrated in the feeling of freedom; the mathematical pattern of thought served to defend the natural rights of human personality in the face of Hobbes's Leviathan; the ‘general will’ only is directed to the common good; in it each of us brings into the community his person and all his power that we may receive every member as an indivisible part of the whole; personal freedom is absorbed by the principle of majority, 315; Hobbes' and Rousseau's State-Leviathan, mathematically construed, respects no limits, devours free personality in all its spheres of life; the ‘volonté générale’ had a normative sense; Leviathan with its head cut off on the frontispiece of R.'s ‘Contrat Social’! the accent was shifted to the personality ideal in Rousseau in contradistinction to the senice-ideal of the Enlightenment; feeling became the true seat of the Humanistic personality-ideal; R. attacked the rationalistic view of religion of the Enlightenment; his religion of sentiment condemned the French Encyclopedists and Newton; religion is seated in the ‘heart’; abstract science must not encroach upon the holy contents of human feeling, 317; he combated the rationalistic associational psychology ‘without a soul’; he got estranged from the materialistic Encyclopedists as well as from his earlier friend and protector David Hume, whose associational psychology was still dominated by the ideal of science; Western culture had all its spheres dominated by sovereign science; Rousseau turned to the dream of a natural state of innocence and happiness; this state revived the Stoic ‘Golden Age’; his optimism; with respect to the original goodness of human nature; his pessimism with regard to culture, 317; the free personality will build a new culture, founded in the divine value of personality; the natural state of freedom and equality is not his ideal; a higher destiny calls humanity to the civil state; natural freedom must be elevated to normative freedom; innate natural rights must become the inalienable rights of the citizens; the social contract, 318; to give up one's liberty is to give up one's quality of man, the rights of humanity, even one's duties; the words slavery and right are mutually exclusive; the fundamental problem is the guaranteeing of the sovereign freedom of the personality; for this purpose a form of association must be sought, 319; the inalienable right of freedom is maintained in the inalienable sovereignty of the people; the sovereign will of the people is the ‘general will’, not the ‘will of all’; the general will must be directed to the general interest; it is incompatible with the existence of private associations; he appeals to Plato's ‘Ideal State’; public law does not recognize any counter poise in private spheres of association; the ‘Social Contract’ is the only juridical basis for all the rights of the citizens; this means unbridled absolutism of the legislator; R. saw there was inner tension between the ‘general will’ and individual freedom, 320; the mutual relationship between the natural rights of man and the rights of the citizen; every individual transfers only as much of his natural power, his possessions, and freedom, as is required for the ‘common good’; natural rights are private rights; the absolute equality of all the citizens

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as such; no special privileges can be granted, 321; with respect to the public interest every citizen has equal rights; Rousseau's concept of statute law; it differs from that of the so-called ‘material concept of statute law’ of the German school of Laband; R. holds that a genuine public statute (loi) can never regulate a particular interest, 322; but in the civil state human rights have changed their ground of validity, viz. the social contract; the juridical source of private and public rights is one and the same; so that private rights can only exist by the grace of the general will; the sovereign people alone judges of the demands of the public interest; the general will in which every citizen encounters his own will, cannot do any injustice to anyone: volenti non fit injuria; to Rousseau it is the mathematical science ideal that is to guarantee the value of personality; ‘they must be forced to be free’, 323; R. was impatient of every revolution, 324; his proclamation of the freedom of human personality from its subjection to science had a deep influence on Kant, 332; especially R.'s ‘Discours sur les sciences et les arts’, 333; Rousseau's influence led Kant to emancipate the science-ideal from metaphysics, 340; about the year 1770 Kant adhered to the sentimental ethics and religion defended by Rousseau and English psychologism, 346.

Rousseau, J.J., II, mathematical explanation of legal numerical analogies in validity sphere, 167; his pessimistic view of culture; his natural law theory; culture leads mankind to a higher condition of freedom; the normative goal of culture, 270.

Rousseau, J.J., III, Discours de l'inégalité, 458.

Rousseau, J.J., III, an adherent of the social contract theory and of State absolutism, 236; his natural law-construction of the Leviathan State; he wants to destroy all private associations, 442; the salus publica; the general will; absolute State power, 443; in his early period Rousseau held that the State was only founded for the protection of property; property arises from sanctioning the crime of forceful seizure; the State is the source of class struggle, 458.

Routine View, III, the routine view of daily life in modern times is not naïve experience, 144, 145.

Roux, Wilhelm, III, Ueber die bei der Vererbung von Variationen anzunehmenden Vorgänge, 761.

Roux, Wilhelm, III, mechanistic biology, 733; he is the founder of ‘developmental mechanics’ and showed the existence of ‘organizers’ in the living cell-body; they exercise a determining influence on the development of an embryo, 752; his criticism of Woltereck's ‘bio substance’, 761.

Russell, Bertrand, II, Russell and Whitehead, Principia Mathematica, 78, 82, 83, 436, 452.

Russell, Bertrand, II, tried to deduce number from the class-concept, 82, 83; the antinomy in his theory, 83; is interpreted by G.T. Malan, 84; Criticizes Cantor's Set-Theory, 340; on the meaning of the copula to be, 436; his purely analytical deduction of the concept-‘whole’; pieces and moments, 457.

Russell, Bertrand, III, The Analysis of Matter, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23; Principia Mathematica, 21, 24, 32, 33.

Russell, Bertrand, III, the words ‘substance’ and ‘thing’ express the emotion of recognition; the motor habit in speech; general names are different from proper names; identity of name is taken to indicate identity of substance, 18; the conception of substantial identity in language, common sense, and in metaphysics; on the concept ‘thing’; a substance is a series of physical occurrences; this view is based on the general theory of relativity; his error is the identification of the Greek metaphysical substance with that of classical mechanistic physics (Galilei, Newton), 19; interval and quantum; rhythms; the discontinuous process of nature; a percept; events; the difference between physical and mental is unreal, 20; matter and mind are logical structures of relations between events; a thing is a group of events; criticizes Whitehead's view saying that the events of a group cannot be considered as aspects of the group, 21; Russell's error is the identification of naïve experience and the theoretical Gegenstand relation; he tries to refute the ‘common sense’ view, a.o., with an appeal to the laws of perspective, 22; later he refers to common sense arguments to make his ‘causal theory plausable’, 23; misinterprets naïve experience; his concepts of structure as ‘what we can express by mathematical logic’; it is the foundation of arithmetic; identified with the notion: relation - number; logical properties include all those which can be expressed in mathematical terms; psychological time of perception is the same as physical time; the similarity of structure between percepts and groups of events, 24; semi-similar systems; different percepts need not have exactly similar stimuli; (the act of perception has different modal aspects says D.); Russell's argument rests on a petitio principii; his theory illustrated by considering a light-wave, 25; he replaces the real data of experience by abstract elements of a psycho-physical world, 26; animism and magic and common sense according to Russell, 32; he thinks primitive animism due to defective observation; but primitives are generally excellent observers in a practical sense,

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33; his explanation of substance and thing, 35.

Russian State, The, III, has not become a Communist society, nor a syndicalistic organization in Duguit's sense; Lenin, Stalin, 464.

Rutherford, III, his classical mechanistic atom model, 706.