A New Critique of Theoretical Thought. Deel 4. Index of Subjects and Authors

W

Wagner, Richard, I, influenced Nietsche's first romantic-aesthetic period, 465.

Waldecker, Ludwig, III, Allgemeine Staatslehre, 386, 406.

Water, I, is experienced as a means of life in the subject-object-relation of the naïve attitude, 42.

Water, III, in water there is an irreversible enkaptic foundational relation: H2O is the minimum form-totality, 699; the H-atoms and the O-atom remain intact; and the structural principle remains unaltered, 701; a water-molecule is a typical spatial ordering of atoms according ta valency; the formula H2O, 703.

Waterloo, Battle of, II, its historical identity, 230, 231.

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Waterloo, Battle of, III, is not to be grasped in an exclusively modal-historical sense; it is a historical phenomenon manifested in social individuality structures, 384.

Wave Mechanics, III, Wellenpakete, 100.

Weber, E., I, Die philosophische Scholastik des deutschen Protestantismus im Zeitalter der Orthodoxie, 513.

Weber, E.H., III, on Müller's theory of the specific energy of the sense organs, 41.

Weber, Marianne, III, Ehefrau und Mutter in der Rechtsentwicklung, 314, 315, 316.

Weber, Marianne, III, Puritanism did not stop at a utilitarian view of marriage; in Puritan circles the Biblical conception of the love union came strongly to the fore, 316.

Weber, Max, I, a follower of Rickert; under their influence historicism began to turn away from naturalistic evolutionism; the latter made room for reflection on the difference between natural science and cultural science, 212.

Weber, Max, II, Stammler's ‘Ueberwindung’ der materialistischen Geschichtsauffassung, 209; Die protestantische Ethik und der Geist des Kapitalismus, 293.

Weber, Max, II, in his Religionssoziologie in Die protestantische Ethik und der Geist des Kapitalismus there is a shift in the positing of the problem, 293 (note).

Weber, Max, III, Die Prot. Ethik und der Geist des Kapitalismus, 247, 248; Parlement und Regierung im neu geordneten Deutschland, 386; Kirchen und Sekten in Nord Amerika, 527.

Weber, Max, III, his ‘ideal types’ of social organizations, 171, 176; his concept of an anormative empirical sociology and the elimination of the concept of community, 183; his observations on the inner loneliness of the individual person in Calvinism, 247; the conflict between the ‘individual’ and ‘ethics’ (in the sense of S. Kierkegaard) did not exist in Calvinism, though in religious matters it placed the individual completely on his own; he classes the term individuality with that of individualism, 248; his ‘ideal types’ are useless in ethnology, 330; the sib chieftain possesses ‘charismatic’ authority, 357; a modern state is a large scale economic business, 386; his idea of ‘Zweckenrationalität’ (rational aims), 408.

Webster, III, Primitive Secret Societies, 365.

Webster, III, secret societies developed from initiation rites and age groups; they were intended to establish an aristocracy via a democracy and a plutocracy, 365.

Weierstrasz, II, on functions in arithmetic; intuition, 484.

Weinmann, III, has pointed out the rareness of the occurrence of really inadequate stimuli of the sense-organs, 41.

Weismann, August, III, his theory concerning he continuity of germplasm, 739; the introduced the term ‘germplasm’; the ‘Keimbahn’ theory; body cells or soma are split off from the germ-cells, 757; his theory of the predisposition of full grown organic forms, 771.

Wells, H.G., II, The Outline of History, 270.

Wells, H.G., II, wrote a history of the world, based on Spengler's evolutionistic ideas, and socialism; ascribed a great rôle to human initiative, 270.

Weltanschauungslehre, I, a theory of life and world views, 120.

Wentscher, I, Geschichte des Kausalproblems, 300.

Werner, Heinz, II, Einführung in die Entwicklungspsychologie, 178.

Wesenschau, I, or ‘theoretic intuition of the essence’ is the ultimate ground of philosophical certainty in some trends of modern philosophy, 12; Husserl's eidetic logic was to be based on the direct intuition of the essences on the part of an ‘uninterested observer’; in the theoretical epochè he can give an adequate essential description of the entire act-life of man in its intentional relation to the world, 213.

Westermarck, Edward, II, Early Beliefs and their Social Influence, 312.

Westermarck, Edward, II, on Religion and magic, 312.

Westermarck, Edward, III, criticized the constructive evolutionist theory of the natural family's development, 331.

Western Society, III, is threatened by totalitarian ideologies which render the English dual party system inadequate and too superficial, 623.

Weyl, H., II, Ueber die neue Grundlagenkrise in der Mathematik, 88; Die Stufen des Unendlichen, 340.

Weyl, H., II, Maths depends on natural numbers, 88; criticizes Cantor's ‘set-theory’, 340.

Whitehead, A.N., II, Whitehead and Russell; Principia Mathematica, 78, 82, 83, 436, 452.

Whitehead, A.N., II, number and the class concept, 83; in Whitehead and Russell: Principia Mathematica; Leibniz; idea of the logical calculus seems to have been realized, 452.

Whitehead, A.N., III, Principia Mathematica, 21, 24;

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Process and Reality, 21.

Whitehead, A.N., III, distinguishes between ‘events’ and ‘objects’; these events are not logically self-subsistent, but aspects, 21; he is an adherent of ‘emergent evolutionism’, 762.

Wiegand, Heinrich, III, Die Staatslehre des Thomas von Aquin, 227.

Wiese, Leopold von, II, his formal sociology, 212.

Wiese, Leopold von III, Allgemeine Soziologie, 242, 243.

Wiese, Leopold von, III, his concept ‘social form’, 172; the unity of an organized community is explained as a formal category of consciousness, 241; social interhuman formations exist only in the minds of men; but they presuppose a plurality of men; his misinterpretation of naïve experience of communal formations, 243.

Wijk, N. van, II, on Aktionsarten, 126.

Wilda, III, thesis on the medieval craft guilds, 673.

Will, I, primacy of the will, in Occam, 187; in Descartes, 220; is a modus of thought; there is no freedom of the will in Leibniz', 238; the concept of the will as a mode of mathematical thought, was rejected by Locke, 271; in Hume, the will is an impression felt in a corporeal motion or in the production of new Idea in our mind; Locke's theory of the will, 305; general will in Rousseau's view, 315; in his first metaphysical treatise Kant rejects the freedom of the will, 337; later on our pure autonomous will is called an example of an idea of freedom, an intelligible substance by Kant, 349; pure will is the moral law, 373; the will is directed by the knowledge of the natural laws and not by its own moral inclinations, if happiness is the result of the moral action; this is the antinomy of the practical reason, 383; the pure ethical will, in Fichte, 441.

Will, II, in modern psychology, 111; is the concrete direction of human act life, 145; Kant views will as the essence of man, 150; formative will, 243; psychical function of the will, 244; juridical will, 537.

Will of the State, The, III, is an organized unity of volitional direction in the organized actions of a societal whole, 436.

Will to Power, The, I, of Nietsche, 211.

Windelband, I, Einleitung in die Philosophie, 121; Geschichte der neueren Philosophie, 194, 281, 349, 437, 449, 450, 464, 465; Einleitung in die Philosophie, 531; Geschichte der alten Philosophie, 539.

Windelband, I, philosophy is the science of the life-and-world-view, 121; comparison of Leibnizian metaphysics with Plato, Aristotle and Neo-Platonism, 194; speaks of Platonic idealism in Leibniz' doctrine of the ‘eternal verities’, 224; W. holds that Hume, like all his predecessors since Descartes, had unwavering faith in mathematics as prototype and foundation of scientific thought; W. overlooks Hume's distinction between natural and philosophical relations, 280; W. misunderstands Hume's conception of the certainty of mathematical knowledge, 281; he considered the influence Rousseau had on Im. Kant to be the decisive turning-point in Kant's philosophic thought, 332; W. thinks that Kant's idea of ‘mundus intelligibilis is a relapse into Leibnizian metaphysics, 349; his interpretation of the second German Renaissance in its attempts at a solution of all antinomies between the ideals of science and personality, 464; but his error is that he does not recognize the moralistic conceptions of this Humanism as an apostasy from the Christian Idea of freedom, a secularization, 465; his division of philosophy, 531.

Windelband, II, Präludien, 239; Geschichte der neueren Phil., 503.

Windelband, II, on culture, 201; logical, aesthetical, and ethical norms are supra temporal; they claim their realization with immediate evidence, 239; W.'s short-sighted praise of Kant's epistemology, 503.

Windelband, III, Einleitung in die Philosophie, 35; Geschichte der neueren Philosophie, 35.

Windelband, III, naïve empirical thought pre-supposes a relation between representations and reality similar to that between a thing and its copy; reality is the Gegenstand of the copy in the naïve picture of the world, 35.

Windscheid, II, Pandekten, 403.

Windscheid, II, on subjective rights, 397; he did not cancel the power of enjoyment contained in the concept of subjective right, 403.

Wirtz, P., II, Die Marind-anim von Holländisch-Süd-Neu-Guinea, 316.

Witgenstein, Ludwig, II, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, 60.

Witgenstein, Ludwig, II, on the method of philosophy, 60.

Witte, J.L., S.J., III, Het probleem individu-gemeenschap in Calvijn's geloofsnorm, 73.

Wöhler, III, his synthesis of urine matter, 716.

Wolff, Christian, I, he did not understand the inventive or ‘creative’ character of Cartesian and Leibnizian mathematical logic; and reduced the principle of sufficient reason to the logical principle of contradiction, thereby abolishing the

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distinction between ‘necessary’ and ‘contingent’ truths; but this consequence lay hidden in Leibniz' theology, 251; his basic law for the State, 320; ‘salus publica suprema lex esto’; he openly acknowledged the insoluble antinomy between this law and Locke's doctrine of the inalienable human rights, 321; Kant dealt a blow to Leibniz and Wolff's metaphysics, 334; he attacked the Wolffian conception which derived causality from the logical principle of contradiction, 335; his logicistic mathematical method; by mere conceptual analysis he thought he could obtain a priori knowledge of reality and its causal relations, 339; his division of philosophy, 530.

Wolff, Christian, II, philosopher of the Enlightenment, influenced codifications, 358; his humanistic theory of innate rights and natural law, 413.

Wolff, Christian, III, Jus naturae, 282, 444.

Wolff, Christian, III, his theory of the police- and welfare state was based on the Lockian ‘innate rights’ and devoted much attention to non-political associations; but individual freedom was sacrificed to the salus publica, 237; his theory of natural law, 282; of salus publica, 442, 443; his Aristotelian view, 444.

Wolff, III, Angewandte Rassenkunde, 496.

Wollf, J., II, Complexe Getallenstelsels, 173.

Wolff, H.J., III, Organschaft und Juristische Person, 407.

Whole and its Parts, The, I, in metaphysics, is a pseudo-concept, 72; in Husserl, 73, 74.

Woltereck, R., I, Grundzüge einer allgemeinen Biologie, 565.

Woltereck, I, he conceives of organic life as a material living ‘substance’ (matrix) with an outer material constellation and an inner side of life-experience, 556; discussion of the philosophical conflict concerning the foundations of biology, 565.

Woltereck, III, Grundzüge einer allgemeinen Biologie, 102, 108, 643, 698, 701, 702, 719, 720, 823, 724; 725, 728, 729, 731, 770, 771, 777, 778; Philosophie des Lebendigen, 733, 749, 750, 751, 755, 756, 757, 759, 760, 761; Ontologie des Lebendigen, 762, 763, 764, 765.

Woltereck, III, substantial ‘matrix’ of ‘living matter’, 24; exoplasmic and endoplasmic constituents of an organism, 102; he opposes the older view of an organism as a cellular system; he calls the hypothetical ‘protomeries’ bio-molecules, 643; plants and their ‘Umwelt’ form an internal structural unity and totality, 698; the concept ‘ordered spatial figure’, 701, 702 (note); on exoplasms, 718, 719, 720; paraplasmatic material particles, 724; his term ‘biomolecule’ has played him a bad trick in his conception of the ‘matrix’ of ‘living matter’, 725; his programme of bio synthesis, 728; active change with maintenance of the total system is a new biotic phenomenon, 728; the difference between enzymes and hormones operating as bio-impulses in a living organism and the catalysts of non-biotically qualified chemical processes, 731; matrix; his criticism of Driesch's entelechy, 732; his bio-substance concept is connected with ‘immaterial and conditional structural constants’; physico-chemical bio-phenomena are the temporal-spatial outside, the immaterial essence is the inside of a living being; a vital process is the ‘inner experience’ of such a being; it will be impossible to synthesize ‘living matter’, i.e. the ‘bio-substance’, 750; its ‘primary bio-chemical moment’; and is capable of stimulation and has genetic continuity; it is to be compared with radio active elements and aromatic combinations; there are producing and produced components of a living cell; the ‘producing’ component only is ‘living-substance’; assimilation and dissimilation; inductive material units (genes, hormones, enzymes, organizers); ‘matrix’ (germplasm, idioplasm, reserveplasm), 751; the matrix produces itself and sometimes the inductive material components; enzymes and metabolism; protein combinations; hormones; the influence of ‘organizers on the embryo’, 752; his hypothesis, 755; the ‘seat’ of the organizers and regulators, 756; he speaks of the ‘matrix’ as something whose existence has been established; he identifies it with germplasm, idioplasm or hereditary material, 757; and emphatically distinguishes between living and non-living components of a cell; his view was influenced by the metaphysical substance concept; a molecular theory of matter eliminates the typical totality structure of a living being, 759; it does not make sense to speak of a specific material ‘bio-substance’, 760: Woltereck is involved in antinomies; Roux's criticism of a matter ‘that assimilates itself’, 761; his ‘emergent evolutionism’; different levels of reality arise according to the rule of structural constants, 762; antinomy between their constancy and the continuity and unity of the genetic process; value and the genesis of value are mutually exclusive; W.'s evolutionism is irrationalistic; it proceeds from the Humanistic motive of nature and freedom; freedom is called the completion of nature, 763; W.'s all-embracing ‘life’ concept is an absolutization and shows his lack of insight into the different modal and individuality structures, 764; in the protozoa and protophytes the total form is an ex-

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pression of the total system of the cell, 770; he demonstrated that also the separate cell-form is an elementary total form expressing a typical structural whole, 771; his investigations into the biotic elementary forms, 772, 773; his three main groups of morphological types and their milieu, 777.

Wood-Cells, III, of a tree, 129, 131.

Work of Art, I, reconciles the tension between necessity and freedom (Schelling), 208.

Work of Art, III, a secondary radical type, 110; it is a sensory perceptual thing related to aesthetic value, according to Rickert, 113.

World Citizenship, II, in the Enlightenment and in the Stoa, 358.

World-Kingdom, III, Zeno's politeia; the Stoic cosmopolitan ideal, 228, 229.

World Plan, I, and creation, 174; according to Fichte, 480, 481.

World Plan, III, Anaxagoras' idea, 633.

World Substance, III, in Eddington's psycho-monism; mathematical forms are called ‘spiritual’; but the ‘Wirkungsquantum’ -h- has no modal mathematical meaning, 101.

Wundt, II, heterogenesis of aims in history, 244.

Wysjinsky III, The Law of the Soviet State, 459.