A New Critique of Theoretical Thought. Deel 4. Index of Subjects and Authors

P

Pantheism, I, in Bruno, 199.

Panunzio, S., III, Allgemeine Theorie des fascistischen Staates, 431.

Pappenheim, Von, III, De alt-dänischen Schutzgilden, 673.

Pappenheim, Von, III, attacked Wilda's thesis on the craft guilds, 673.

Paraplasmatic Material Particles, III, Woltereck's view, 724.

Parental Authority, III, in civil law, 281.

Parmenides, I, his logicism refuted by the Sophists, 19; the eternal divine form of being has no coming into being nor passing away and is enclosed in the ideal static form of a spatial sphere; this view is antinomous, 31; Parmenides' didactic poem sharply opposes theoria and pistis, knowledge to doxa (uncertain opinion), 35; he thought he could base an entire metaphysical doctrine of being on the logical or analytical unity-and-identity, 79.

Parmenides, II, hypostatizes the analytical relation of identity expressed in the copula ‘to be’; the ‘eternal Being’ is spherical and held together by Anangkè (fate) and Dikè (justice, or order); Ouranic and Olympian thoughts, 56; Dikè and world order, and being, 132; Dikè reacts against every ultra vires, 134.

Parmenides, III, on becoming and change; identifies thinking and being, 5; being has a spherical form, 7.

Party Discipline, III, should not be overstrained, 616.

Party and State, III, there is an enkapsis of party and State, especially at elections and in the formation of a cabinet, 619.

Party System, The U.S.A., III, has contributed to the unification and the homogeneity of the population, 623.

Parva Glandula, I, in Descartes, 219.

Pasch, II, on the convergent infinite series; Zahlstrecke; number is continuous, 91.

Pasjoekanis, III, civil and penal law are bound to commodity exchange and the principle of equivalency; the communist distribution according to needs; the State has to protect the exchange relations; State and law are forms of ‘civil society’; they should be transformed into socialist law; ‘economical law’, 459.

Passions, II, emotions should not be identified with ‘affects’, nor with ‘passions’; affects are psychic types of movement, 116, 117; the control of our sensory passions and affects is a cultural, not an ethical function of the will, 145.

Patria Potestas, II, in ancient Rome; in a domestic undifferentiated community; this power was at the same time an office, and a subjective right of property implying the legal faculty to sell the children under it, 411.

Patriarchy, III, was later than matriarchy, 331.

Patrimonial Theory of the State, III, of v. Haller, 477; Groen's view, 478.

Patristic Thought, I, its various motives, 173.

Paul, St., I, without the law there is no sin; and there is a law of sin, 63; human thought (nous) has become the ‘carnal mind’ (nous tēs sarkos), 100.

Paul, H., II, Prinzipien der Sprachgeschichte, 222.

Pavlov, II, his experiments with animals, viz. with dogs, concerning the secretion of spittle under the direction of psychical associations, 184.

Pearson, Karl, III, defended the right of the ‘Aryan race’ to expel the ‘inferior races’, 496.

Peasant Revolt, III, in Germany, induced Luther to appeal to the secular Government in matters of ecclesiastical organization, 514.

Peras, I, in Plato, is the natural law setting a limit to the apeiron, and the formless stream of becoming receives the character of a becoming to being, 113.

Peras, III, and the material world, in Plato, 11.

Peras and Apeiron, II, Plato's idea of Being synthesized positive and negative Being, the on and the mè on, and the principles of form and matter; all genesis is a becoming to a form of being expressing the Divine Idea of the good and the beautiful (Kalokagathon); the Eleatic determinations of Being by unity and verity were completed by those of beauty and goodness, and the dialectical Idea of Being embraced peras and apeiron, the distinction of form and matter, 57; the Pythagorean idea of peras limiting the apeiron supplies the rational measure of

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the due mean between two bad extremes in the subjective ethos, 146.

Perception I, is wholly passive in Kant, 90; material unconscious perceptions pass into consciousness, but confused representations pass to the distinct and clear apperceptions of the limited spiritual monads, in Leibniz, 234.

Perception, II, perception, representation, remembrance, volition, etc., are concrete human acts which cannot be enclosed in a modal aspect of reality but have only a modal function in the psychical law sphere, 372.

Perception, III, its anticipations, 38; the necessary relation between stimulus and sensation, 44; in empiricist psychology, 104, 105.

Perception of Space, II, the objective sensory space of perception functions in the modus of emotional sensibility, 372; but for our subjective feeling of extension we could not perceive any objective sensory image of space; the space of sight, of touch, of hearing have different structures; they function in structural coherence with each other; and are organically connected; the projective optic space and the tactile image, 373.

Perfectibility, II, the perfectibility of man was an article of faith of the Enlightenment, and also of J.F. Herder's Ideen zur Philosophie der Geschichte, 272.

Perfect Society, The, III, in the sphere of grace it is the Church; in that of nature it is the State, according to Thomas Aquinas, 220.

Peridinidiae, III, 772.

Periods in History, II, the temporal course of history expresses the struggle between the Civitas Dei and the civitas terrena; any division of history into periods should depend on the actual course of historical development, and is bound to the provisional phase of history in which the historian himself lives, 295.

Perrault, Claude, III, his colonnade at the Louvre; disregard of the bound character of architectural style for the sake of monumentality, 142.

Persian Wars, III, of Athens, 210.

Personal God, I, in Descartes, Rousseau and Kant, 191.

Persona Ficta, III, the Canonists conceive of organized communities as fictitious persons, 233; in the Humanistic theory of natural law; Hobbes, 235.

Personality, I, its freedom is guaranteed by the domination of mathematical thought in Locke, 318.

Personality, II, in primitive culture man does not realize that he transcends the things of nature. His sense of being a personality is diffuse, dispersed; he even incorporates personality in animals, plants or lifeless objects, 296; becomes diffuse in restrictive apostatic faith, 316.

Personality, III, Boethius' definition adopted by Thomas Aquinas; the substance concept, 6; its typology in psychology; W. Stern; Hempel and Oppenheim, 81.

Personality-Ideal, I, in the Humanistic transcendental Idea, 198, 294-296, 302, 313; in Kant, is a function of feeling, 334, 341, 351, 384, 463; cf. s.v. Fichte, Mainon, Irrationalism.

Perspective of Experience, Subjective, II, is restored to us in the faithful acceptance of Divine Revelation with all our heart; it enables us to grasp reality again perspectively in the light of Truth, 563.

Perspective of Truth, II, the a priori structure of truth bears on the horizon of human experience; its full richness is only conceivable theoretically in the Christian Idea of Verity; this Idea is directed to the fulness of meaning of Truth and has the same perspective character as the experiential horizon, 571.

Pessimism, I, in Macchiavelli, 217; in Hobbes, 253.

Pessimism, II, 262; Rousseau, 271.

Pessimism, Marxian, III, in F. Tönnies, 186.

Petites Perceptions, I, in Leibniz, 251; this Leibnizian doctrine was introduced into Kantian epistemology by Maimon, 404.

Petraczicky, II, the attributive-imperative function of law, 134.

Pfaff, Christoph Matthaeus, III, founded the theory of the collegial system of Church government, 517.

Pfänder, Alexander, II, Der philosophische Kritizismus, 439; Logik, 438, 439, 440, 441, 442, 443, 448, 488.

Pfänder, Alexander, II, he objected to Kant's distinction between analytical and synthetical judgments, 438; analytical judgments concern the subject, synthetical judgments concern the object of a concept; Pfänder distinguishes between subjective, intentional (or formal) Object and the ‘Gegenstand an sich’ (material object); Attributionsurteil, 440.

Phantasm, II, a phantasm is an original type of individuality in sensory phantasy in its restrictive function, and also in animal psychical life; it is not typically founded in the biotic function, for the sensory imagination produces a phantasm in merely intentional objectivity, 425.

Phantasy, III, the productive phantasy of an artist is founded in the sensory

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function of the imagination; the act-structure; a phantasy object has an intentional character; a phantasm is the product of our imagination; aesthetic phantasms are intentional visionary objects, 115.

Phenomenological Attitude, I, the absolute ‘ego’ is opposed to the world, 52.

Phenomenological Attitude, II, is absolutized by Husserl, and is internally antinomous, 489.

Phenomenological Intuition, II, of the essence; if theoretical insight could fully realize the eidos of a modal aspect, as the result of an adequate intuition of its essence, it should grasp the fulness and the totality of its meaning adequately; it should not merely refer to this meaning intentionally, but possess the latter as an immanent datum of the phenomenological consciousness. But then the modal meaning as such would have been cancelled. For such a condition can only be realized in the transcendent identity of all temporal modal meaning, 486; the phenomenological ‘identity’, however, remains enclosed in the horizon of a particular aspect; it is philosophical, theoretical, and requires the analytical epochè, 487.

Phenomenological Ontology, I, of Nicolai Hartmann, 35.

Phenomenological Schools, II, Husserl, Pfänder, Scheler, N. Hartmann, Heidegger, Hoffmann, each starts from a different cosmological Idea, 488.

Phenomenological Subject, II, in Husserl, is the phenomenological ego, in which the ‘universal Logos of all thinkable being’ is found immanent in the constitutive possibilities of the phenomenological subject or ego and the transcendental inter-subjectivity of the egos, 543.

Phenomenology, I, with Franz Brentano phenomenology posited the intentional relatedness of every act of consciousness to a ‘Gegenstand’; it could not dissociate its theoretical attitude from the Gegenstand relation; Brentano and Husserl ascribe to feeling an intentional relation to a ‘Gegenstand’; (e.g. a melody); the absolute ‘cogito’ (i.e. the absolute transcendental consciousness) is opposed to the ‘world’ as its intentional ‘Gegenstand’; the intentional anti-thetical attitude of theoretical thought is present in the phenomenological attitude itself; Scheler considers the Gegenstand relation as the most formal category of the logical aspect of mind (Geist), 52.

Phenomenology, II, Edmund Husserl; his ‘regions’ defined; and Kant's categories, 17; on Sinn und Bedeutung in Husserl, 27; the phenomenologist's intuitive gaze is directed to the intentional acts of his consciousness; then meaning is identical with the relation of the ego to the Gegenstand, 27; absolute consciousness; epoche; destruction of the world; noema, Gegenstand, meaning, 28; Husserl's objective ‘meaning’, Paul Hoffmann's subjective ‘meaning’; meaning is the opposite of ‘thing’; the pure I; Erleben, 29; Hoffman's Logology, 30; unprejudiced analyses of the states of affairs in a religious sense is impossible; two conceptions of the theoretical epoche; phenomenological epoche, 73; reduction and Wesensschau, 486-488; the phenomenological attitude, 486, is that of P. Hoffmann, 488; rooted in a deeper level of the a priori than the merely immanent transcendental horizon of human consciousness, 489; this attitude is contrary to the truth; Husserl; fundamental thesis: the transcendental ego is absolute, a super-human being, the ultimate origin of all meaning; the adequate intuition of essence; this attitude lacks critical self-reflection; the attempt to investigate human selfhood theoretically; phenomenological reduction, 489; phenomenology has to construe the forms of all thinkable worlds in the cadre of all thinkable forms of being (543) in correlation with the constitutive a priori of the intentional acts creating this world as the Gegenstand; its knowledge is founded in a radical and universal self-reflection of the ego on its acts and their possibilities; this a priori is rational; the Wesensanschauung is an intuition of the logical eidos; the noetical and noematical contents of the intentional acts; its universal concrete ontology or concrete Logic of being, 544; it ascribes infallibility to the intuition of the essence, 597.

Phenomenology, III, Scheler's phenomenology fails to give an insight into the plastic horizon of naïve experience, 53, 70; modern phenomenology demands more than an impersonal merely symbolical knowledge of things, 145; Litt's phenomenological analysis of essences, 251; of social communities, 254, 255, 256, 259, 261.

Phenomenon and Noumenon, II, in Immanence philosophy, 50; phenomena are related to the sensory perceptive function; noumena are accessible only to theoretical thought; Kant's view of noumenon and phenomenon, 430.

Philo, II, the contrast between a microcosm and a macrocosm, handled by Scheler, originated in the pre-Socratic philosophy of nature; Plato, the Stoa, Philo, and Neo-Platonism handed it down to medieval Scholasticism, 592.

Philosophers, I, approach the gods, 35; are commanders and law-givers in Nietsche, 125; in Plato, III, 168.

Philosophia Perennis, I, its definition, 117; is an idea that is required by the religious transcendental basic Idea of philosophy, 118; in Leibniz, 224.

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Philosophia Prima, II, in realistic Scholasticism the transcendental concepts of the ‘philosophia prima’ become objects of the actus intelligendi, 389.

Philosophical judgments, I, are not to be identified with subjective supra-theoretical prejudices, 115.

Philosophy, I, Philosophy is theoretical thought directed to the totality of meaning, 4; philosophical thinking is an actual activity and only at the expense of this actuality can it be abstracted from the thinking self; this abstraction is necessary for formulating the concept of philosophical thought, but even in this act of conceptual determination it is the self that is actually doing the work, 5; the supposed reduction of the selfhood (in philosophy) to an immanent, subjective pole of thought, 6; philosophical thought has no selfhood as mere thought, i.e., ‘reines Denken’, 7; its genetic tendency towards the Archè, 9; so-called ‘critical’ philosophy regards one or more of our cognitive functions as independent, i.e., apart from all further possible determinedness and elevates these functions to the a-priori Origin of our knowable cosmos, 10; phil. thought cannot withdraw itself from its tendency toward the origin; philosophic thought is restless; because our ego is restless; the unrest is transmitted from the selfhood to all temporal functions in which the ego is actually operative; the twofold pre-supposition of philosophic thought: an Archimedean point, and a choice of position in the face of the Archè, 11; philosophy intends to give us a theoretical insight into the coherence of our temporal world as an intermodal coherence of meaning. Philosophic thought is bound to this coherence, 24; the theoretical attitude of thought arises only in a theoretical abstraction, so that theoretical reason cannot be considered as an uproblematic datum, 40; dogmatic theory of knowledge identified the subject-object relation with the antithetic Gegenstand relation and misinterpreted naïve experience as a ‘copy theory’ which had to be refuted, 43; the various ‘-isms’ in the theoretical vision of reality are due to absolutizations, 46; the problem of the basic denominator for the theoretical comparison and distinction of the modal aspects, 47; starting-point of theoretical synthesis in the Kantian Critique of knowledge, 49; and critical self-reflection, 51; religion cannot be a theoretical ‘Gegenstand’, 58; the transcendental basic Idea of philosophy, cf. subvoce, 68-70; theoretical and supra- theoretical judgments, 70; analogia entis, cf. sub-voce, 71; the philosophical Idea of totality, 73; the Origin and the continuity principle in Cohen's philosophy, 74, 75; the masking of the transcendental basic Idea in Theodor Litt, 77, 78, 79; Litt's dialectical Idea of unity and identity, 80, 81; the theoretical character of the transcendental basic Idea and its relation to naïve experience, 82; philosophy, special science, and naïve experience, 83, 84; philosophy has to grasp in the view of totality the different modal aspects set asunder by theoretic thought and thus to account for both naïve experience and special science; the analysis of the modal aspects must precede that of the typical structures of individual totality; special science can neither have an autonomous conception of the modal structures of the different aspects, nor of the typical structures of individual totality; with the structure of a special aspect there is expressed the inter-modal coherence of cosmic time order; the aspect requires a transcendental idea of its coherence with other aspects and of the radical unity of all aspects; special sciences are pointed to the examination of the functional coherence and typical character of transitory phenomena within a special aspect; special scientific concepts must be made a philosophic problem; Einstein's concepts of time and space; in them their special synthetic meanings in connection with other sciences remain hidden; philosophy can elucidate them, 85; ‘reflexive’ versus ‘objective’ thought in recent philosophy; reflexive thought is introverted to the transcendental logical subject of pure thinking’, it is opposed to ‘objective’ thought, (‘gegenständliches Denken’), in modern Immanence philosophy; ‘objective thought’ is that of special science, it is ‘naïve’, lost in its ‘objets’; the ego of ‘reflexive thought’ can never be a ‘Gegenstand’; cf. s.v. Theodor Litt; object and Gegenstand are confused in these statements; in philosophy, however, we assume the antithetic attitude as well as in science, but we focus phil. towards the totality and unity in the root of temporal meaning; the transcendental basic Idea is the hypothesis of philosophic thought, 86; the problem of the possibility of inter-modal synthesis occurs in phil. as well as in science; phil. is confronted with the fundamental problems concerning the relation of origin, totality, modal diversity and inter-modal coherence; it encounters its own limits within cosmic time; these limits can only be accounted for in the concentric direction of theoretic thought to its supra-theoretic pre-suppositions; truly reflexive thought is characterized by critical selfreflection as to the transcendental basic Idea of philosophy in which it points beyond and above itself to its own a priori conditions; reflexive thought does not transcend all structural limits because of their belonging to the ‘gegenständliche’ world; this notion leads to the illusory sovereignty and autonomy of

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philos. reflection; it is based on the identification of ‘Gegenstand’ and ‘temporal reality’; the limits of phil. thought transcend the Gegenstand relation; phil. thought is determined and limited by its being bound to its intentional and to its ontical structure in cosmic time, 87; we can reflect critically on the limits of phil. thought only because in our selfhood we transcend them; the pre-supposita of philosophy are infinitely more than Idea; the religious pre-supposition of philosophy is of a transcendent nature; the choice of the Archimedean point crosses the boundary line of the temporal coherence of our world; but philosophy itself remains within this boundary line because it is possible only by virtue of the temporal order; transcendent and transcendental are no alternatives, but the latter pre-supposes the former; this is the original critical meaning of transcendental thought, 88; Kant's opinion concerning the transcendental Ideas; he does not accept them in their tri-unity as the real hypothesis of his ‘critical’ philosophy; and restricts their significance to a purely formal one: they have a mere regulative systematic function; here he has become aware of the unbridgeable antithesis in the basic motive of nature and freedom, 89; he accepted the synthesis between natural necessity and freedom in his epistemology, but rejected it in his ethics; he could not account for the possibility of the synthesis between the logical and the sensory function of consciousness; this was due to his fundamental dualism in his religious basic motive; Fichte's first edition of the ‘Wissenschaftslehre’ made ‘practical freedom’ the hypothesis of his theoretical epistemology and introduced a dialectical logic to bridge the Kantian gulf between epistemology and ethics; in Fichte's conception of the basic Idea of Humanism the postulate of continuity broke through the Kantian boundaries set to the theoretical use of the transcendental Idea of freedom; in Kant's ‘dialectic of pure reason’ the transcendental Ideas point to a transcendent realm of the ‘noumenon’; thought sets limits to theoretical thought, except for the bond with sensory perception; the transcendental Idea of freedom is dialectically related to the category of causality and is the hypothesis of Kant's transcendental logic, 90; this same Idea obtains ‘practical reality’ for ‘reasonable belief’ in the Krit. d. pr. Vern.; the essential function of the transcendental Idea is that of the hypothesis pointing beyond the limits of theoretical thought; it reveals Kant's transcendental motive; in Neo-Kantian logicistic idealism this motive fades away in the postulate of logical purity and continuity in the system of knowledge; to Cohen the transcendental idea is the ‘selfconsciousness of the (logical) concept’, but it does not point towards a transcendent sphere; Litt's conception of the pure self-reflection of theoretical thought and Edmund Husserl's ‘egology’ exclude limits set to the ‘transcendental cogito’ and deny the ego's transcendence in respect to transcendental thought and consciousness; the basic Idea of phil. is only a subjective hypothesis and must not dominate truth in a relativistic way, for it is accountable to an ultimate judge, 91; philosophy in its transcendental direction to the totality and the Origin remains bound to cosmic time and the cosmic order; failure to appreciate this limit leads to speculative metaphysics which seeks the absolute and supra-temporal within the temporal order; absolutizations and speculative metaphysics; the position that modal laws have absolute universal validity even for God is speculative; Plato's Ideas; modern absolute ‘values’; ‘truths in themselves; ‘absolute consciousness’ in Husserl; the ‘immortal soul’ doctrine; the hypostatization of the non-sensory psychical, logical and post logical functions of mental acts (Geist), in a rationalistic or an irrationalistic sense, 92; the absolutized realm of meaning becomes Archè, conceived of as ‘being’, non-substantial actuality, ‘validity’, in its subject- or its cosmonomic side; Calvin's verdict: ‘God is not subject to the laws, but not arbitrary’; strikes at the root of metaphysical speculations; the origin of the term ‘cosmonomic idea’, 93; Dr. H.G. Stoker's objection to it; and Dr. Philip Kohnstamm's; reasons for maintaining the term, 94; comparison with the term: the Idea of creation; objections to this term; the cosmonomic Idea gives expression to the limiting character of the basic transcendental Idea; Socrates on the nomos as limitation, 95; the cosmic nomos has meaning only in correlation with the subject-side of the cosmos; the Idea of the subject points toward the factual side of reality (totality, diversity, coherence); the philosophy of the cosmonomic Idea is not an ‘idealism of meaning’, (Stoker), 96; Rickert's meaning-Idealism distinguishes between meaning (Sinn) and reality; the latter has meaning ascribed to it by means of reference to values (Wertbeziehung); Rickert's reality is psycho-physical only; meaning cannot live, act, move, but living, action, motion are meaning not coming to rest in themselves; God's Being is not meaning; the meaning-totality transcends philosophic thought and has its correlate in the Being of the Archè; the modal concepts of laws and of subject and object in the sciences depend on the cosmonomic Idea, 97; in the logicistic trend in pure mathematics; the ‘continuous’ series of real numbers is based

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on a logicist-rationalist cosmonomic Idea; mechanist biology depends on the classical deterministic Humanist science ideal; the Neo-Kantian ‘reine Rechtslehre’ of Hans Kelsen depends on a dualistic cosmonomic Idea (nature and freedom); the rationalists reduce the subject side of reality to the nomos-side; functionalistic biology and juridical science do not know of typical structural-individuality laws, 98; the Archimedean point of philosophy is chosen in the new root of mankind in Christ, in which by regeneration we have part in our re-born selfhood; the totality of meaning of our temporal cosmos is in Christ, with respect to His human nature as the root of the re-born human race; in Christ the heart bows under the lex as the universal boundary between the Being of God and the meaning of His creation; theological objections to this theme answered, 99; the transcendent totality of meaning of the cosmos is no eidos in the speculative Platonic sense, no being set by itself, but remains in the ex-sistential mode of meaning; sin is the revolt against the Sovereign of our cosmos; it is apostasy, the absolutizing of meaning to the level of God's Being; the fall permeated all temporal meaning aspects, also the logical one; the logical function in apostasy; St. Paul's word about the carnal mind; the laws of thought are not affected by sin, 100; only the subjective activity subjected to these laws; the contents of the cosmonomic Idea concern the Archè, subjection to God's sovereignty requiring love and service of God on the part of man, through Christ, in the observance of the sphere-sovereignty of the various divine laws regulating the temporal world; the symbol of the sunlight refracted by a prism into the seven colours of the spectrum, 101; the sphere sovereignty of the modal laws, 102; the disregard of this state of affairs on the immanence standpoint owing to absolutizations: psychologism, historism; dualistic starting-points; is the Christian starting-point an absolutized religious meaning?, 103; Christian religion is the connection between the meaning of creation and the Being of the Archè; religion is not identical with the function of faith; Rickert acknowledges this fact; sphere-sovereignty as a philosophical basic problem, 104; and the intermodal coherence; the aspects have a cosmonomic structure; all temporal structures of reality are laws founded in the cosmic order and are principles of temporal potentiality; as realizations of laws they have duration and actuality as transitory factual structures; potentiality resides in the factual subject-side, its principle in the cosmonomic side of reality; cosmic time and the refraction of meaning; Stoker and Kohnstamm, 105; the fulness of meaning is not actually given and cannot be actually given in time; the meaning of cosmic time (in its correlation of order and duration) is to be successive refraction of meaning into coherent modal aspects; in the religious fulness of meaning love, wisdom, justice, power, beauty, etc. coincide in a radical unity; cosmic time can only be approached in a limiting concept; such a concept is necessarily discontinuous; the relativity of the logical function is not of a logical, but of a cosmonomic temporal character, 106; the elimination of cosmic time order in Kant's Kritik der reinen Vernunft; Kant's hypostatization of ‘theoretical reason’ as self-sufficient Archimedean point; the question about the possibility of philosophy pushed into the background; Kant's ‘Copernican revolution’ concerned epistemology; it proves the impossibility of a truly critical Critique of theor. reason apart from a transcendental insight into the cosmic time-order; Kant's ‘Prolegomena zu einer jeden künftigen Metaphysik’: (this system) sets at its foundation nothing as ‘given’ except ‘reason’; but this reason is a product of theoretical abstraction!, 107; the lex of the cosmos originates from God's holy creative sovereignty and is the boundary between the Being of the Archè and the meaning of everything created as ‘subject’, i.e., subjected to a law; the subject-side implies the object-side; in immanence philosophy the subject becomes sovereign, 108; as a ‘substance’ (noumenon) or in a transcendental logical or phenomenological sense; Kant: the subject is only epistemological, and as such Archè or form of the theoretical laws of nature; the ‘transcendental subject’ is lawgiver of nature; the pre-psychical aspects dissolved into a synthesis of logical and sensory functions of consciousness; their structural laws became a-priori transcendental forms of (theoretical) understanding and of subjective sensibility; numbers, spatial figures, energy effects; in his ‘practical’ philosophy Kant makes the metaphysical subject (homo noumenon) the autonomous lawgiver for moral life; his polar opposition between laws of nature and norms; the subject on the Immanence standpoint is epistemological and ethical; things and events are considered only as objects; the proclamation of the ‘critical’ ‘Satz des Bewustseins’, 109; the subject as ‘transcendental’ or as ‘ideal’ subject is the autonomous lawgiver; classical rationalism reduces the subject to a complex of causal relations; the laws are ‘the objective’; the empirical subject is ‘object’, identified with ‘Gegenstand’ of the ‘transcendental subject of thought’; in modern ‘realistic’ positivism the lex is a scientific judgment of probability, an ‘autonomous’ product of science by which to order the ‘facts’

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by way of a ‘logical economy’ rationalists dissolve individual subjectivity into a universally valid order of laws originating from sovereign reason; irrationalistics consider the ‘theoretical order’ as a pragmatical falsification of true reality; the latter in its creative subjective individuality is not bound to universally valid laws and mocks at all ‘concepts of thought’, 110; prophetic philosophy, according to Jaspers, 125; phil. has to clarify a life and world view, 156.

Philosophy of Feeling, I, of Jacobi, 451.

Philosophy of Nature, I, is given theological preference by Seneca, 539.

Phonemes, II, in modern phonology the expressive articulated speech sounds (phonemes) are understood from the meaning-structure of language itself, 224.

Phratria, III, in the Greek polis, 369, 371.

Phylae, III, in ancient Greece, cf. s.v. Ancient Greece, 369.

Phylon, III, in biology, 80.

Physico-Chemical Processes, II, are undirected in a closed state, 184.

Physical Aspect, II, Classical physics; its view of matter, 95; in mechanics there is movement, but physics is always concerned with functions of energy, which implies cause and effect; acceleration is a physical concept; inertia is a kinematical concept, not a physical one, 99; ‘moving matter’ is a physical concept; so are: fields of gravitation, protons, etc.; physical events have an objective sensory aspect, 100; theory of relativity; physical space is determined by matter; quantum theory, 101; electromagnetic fields, quanta, photons, electrons, neutrons, protons, eetc., become mainfest in real events that have an objective sensory aspect, 108; physico-chemical energy in biotic phenomena anticipates life; organic unity directs physical anticipatory potencies, 110; Nicolai Hartmann holds that matter is completely transformed by life; this is an error, 110, 111; in physical-chemical processes there is a closed state, and an opened condition; these processes are deepened in living organisms and animals; also in human beings; Pavlov's experiments with animals, 184.

Physical Aspect, III, Aristotle was confronted with the question about the metaphysical primary substance and not merely the physical sensible Gegenstand, 13, 14; Russell thinks that modern physics has destroyed the naïve conception of things; Galilei and Newton and the classical physics view of substance filling up space; time as the fourth dimension of world space, 19; energy has replaced matter; the curious facts of interval and quantum; Russell's ‘events’; his ‘rhythms’; physical and mental, 20; Whitehead's events and permanent objects, 21; the constants of modern physics and Newton's ‘material units’, 23; Russell's concept of structure; he identifies psychological time with physical, 24; his theory of light waves, 25; he identifies the physico-psychical world with the whole of empirical reality, 26; the metaphysical ‘substance’ since Descartes is the modal coherence between physical phenomena, 27; Kant on our naïve experience of the identity of a thing: the physical concept of quantitatively constant matter, the Gegenstand of natural scientific thought, 28; the doctrine of secondary qualities; B. Bavink, 36; sensory colour and physics, 37; the physical system in a linden tree, 56; force, essence, energy, 70, 71; atoms, molecules; radio activity; the visibility of a body depends on light waves, 99; wave mechanics; corpuscles; Wellen pakete; classical mechanics; Kant on matter; substance; primary typical operational quanta are not ‘substantial’; the temporal unity of an individual whole is not modal in character; radio activity cannot be influenced by external functional factors; chemical ‘elements’; electrons, protons, neutrons, deuterons, mesons, viewed physically have mass and charge, 100; an atom possesses a veritable individuality structure in the radical type of physically qualified totalities; the structure of molecules and that of crystals are more complicated; enkaptic structural wholes; the functional schema x, y, z, t; the metaphysical reconstructions of the exploded substance concept in neo-Thomism; in Eddington's ‘world-substance’ in his psycho-monism after the manner of Heymans; mathematical forms are supposed to be ‘spiritual’; Planck's ‘Wirkungsquantum’ -h- has no modal mathematical meaning, however, 101; structure of atoms, 105, 106.

Physico-psychical World, II, in Immanence phil. we find the form-matter scheme; the disruption of the integral empirical reality into a noumenon and a phenomenon; the reduction of this reality to a merely physico-psychical world, 50.

Physics, I, is the science of constant and recurrent features of existence in Fichte, 482; has eliminated the naïve view of reality, 559; is held to be philosophically neutral by B. Bavink; modern physics and its epistemological pre-suppositions, 562.

Physiocrats, II, Economic individualism took the leadership of the ideas of the Enlightenment and attained to theoretical reflection in the economic theories of the physiocrats and the school of classical economists, 361.

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Pirkheimer, Willibald, I, a friend of Melanchton's, 513.

Pirra-Ura Relation, III, an external form of marriage, 339; a kind of concubinage; an external enkapsis with abnormal sexual relations; in primitive Indian societies, 341.

Planck, Max, III, his quantum theory, 706.

Planets, III, with their satellites; solar system; spherical groups of stars, galaxy, 651.

Planks, III, are semi-manufactured material used as the material foundation of furniture, 131, 132.

Plants, III, are typically biotic subjects, 267; the continuity of the life of a plant extends beyond the span of the always changing individual cells, 296; and can only be actualized in the coherence of these cells; the plant possesses no more life of its own than a human community does outside of the structural relation between its members, 297; plants have not been proved to possess feeling, 645; they do not form an enkaptic whole with their environment, but may form a correlative enkapsis, 698.

Plastic Horizon, III, Scheler's phenomenology cannot give an insight into this horizon, 53, 70.

Plate, III, his concept ‘germ-plasm’ or ‘idioplasm’, 732.

Plato, I, Phaedo, 31; Parmenides, 31; Politeia, 248; Timaeus, 510.

Plato, I, eidè and immortal soul are supra temporal and immobile; Parmenides' absolutization of space is antinomous, 31; only philosophers approach the race of gods, 35; the law is a limitation of subjectivity, 95; Plato's transcendental basic Idea is conceived in an objective idealistic sense, 247; in the Politeia the eidè seem to originate from the Idea of the good, and the deity as demiurge is the origin of the eidos (e.g. of a couch: ϰλίνη), but this is not a divine creation of the phenomenal world; the nous [divine mind], is only the origin of the eternal forms, never that of matter; in the later dialogues the conception of the divine nous as the origin of the eternal forms [eidè] is abandoned, 248 (note); theoretical reason is distinguished from practical reason, 535.

Plato, II, Phaedo 9; Parmenides, 9, 13, 56, 103; Sophistes, 9, 56; Politikos, 9, 263; Timaeus, 10, 263; Philebus, 10, 57, 146; Politeia, 10; Critias, 263; Symposion, 153.

Plato, II, his form-matter scheme, 9, 10, 13; methexis principle (participation); his doctrine of genesis eis ousian, 26; spatial simultaneity is a modus of time, 103; analytical economy, 122; concept formation by means of genus proximum and differentia specifica, 132; Pythagorean ‘peras’ and ‘apeiron’, 146; Eros in Plato's Symposion, 153; the ‘Golden Age of mankind’, 263; his ethics started from popular morality, 321.

Plato, III, Timaeus, 8; Philebus, 11; Politeia, 200, 207, 223, 230, 232; Crito, 206; The Laws, 207; Phaedo, 168.

Plato, III, introduced the dialectical Idea of being to synthesize ‘form and matter’; dialectical logic; the ideal sphere of transcendent eidè; peras and the material world, 11; cf. ‘atoms’; the philosopher has a higher value than the good citizen, 168; the polis is all-inclusive; Plato's inconsistent universalism; the State structure is determined by a normative principle; its deformation is due to Anangkè, the matter principle; opposed by Reason; three ranks in Greek society and Plato's psychology; justice related to the central Idea of the good; dialectical tension between the polis as a public order, and conjugal and family communities, 200; the State is a mesokosm, individual man a mikrokosm; the universe a makrokosm; three ranks in the State: wise rulers, military, and labour rank; an order of justice for harmonious cooperation; his scheme of government in The Laws; law combines the monarchical and democratic principles to a unity in a well-balanced constitution; government ensures the unity of the polis as an all-inclusive whole, 207; Glaucon's nominalistic individualism in the dialogue Politeia, 223; the legend of the aureum saeculum, 229; Plato called the hierarchical structure of the three parts of the soul ‘the state in man’; he founded the relation of authority and subordination in the metaphysical order; and on the principle of the inequality of men; he justified slavery; authority and subordination were essential to every composite organism; individual man is a kind of State ruled by reason, 230; he blames the Sophists for their contract theory of the State, 232; the State is the whole of human society; a supra temporal metaphysical idea is its essence, 380; the idea of justice and the power of the sword, 381; Kallikles' super-man opposed by Plato's justice ruled State; Plato's totalitarianism; the polis had unlimited competence; the religious origin of this view,

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and the dialectical tension with justice, 398; he defends State education, abolished marriage, in the public interest, 442; the universe as a macrocosm is a living being, an autozooion; man is a microcosm; the State as a mesocosm connects these two and embraces all societal relations as its component parts, arranging them according to the idea of justice in its concentric relation to the idea of goodness; the world soul has a world reason, just as the human soul has human reason, 628; the temporal world is a totality; Plato is universalistic, 629; Plato's Philebus hands down Socrates' idea of a teleological world order, 633; it served as the foundation of the physico teleological proof of the existence of God; it generally implied a technical-cultural view of nature, which suited the Greek conception of God as the Demiurge, the Divine Architect, who moulds matter after a free project or technical plan, 634; P. viewed the body as a vehicle an ochèma, of the soul; an objectivistic conception, 778.

Play-Drive, I, the aesthetic play-drive reveals the fulness of human personality in Schiller, 463.

Pleasure, I, is a general term for very different feelings, in Hume, 309.

Plenge, III, Drie Vorlesungen über Organisations-lehre, 405.

Plessis, Professor Du, III, his deposition, 685.

Plethon (Georgius Gemisthos), I, and the Florentine Academy, 189.

Pluriformity, III, of churches cannot justify fundamental deviations from the Divine Word Revelation, 542; pluriformity may be the result of external variability types of organization of the Church, 559.

Plutarchus, II, uses the term antinomy, 37.

Plutarchus, III, De Stoic. rep. 2, 228; Alex. M. fort. I, 6, 229.

Plutarchus, III, Plutarchus says that Zeno's Politeia was favourable to a world kingdom under a common law, 229.

Cosmic Pneuma, III, in Stoic theory; cohesion in inorganic nature; physis in plants; psychè in living beings; logos in man; this logos is the product of the evolution from perceptions and representations, 226.

Poem, III, is an imaginative totality, aesthetically qualified, 111.

Poetry, III, as an art, 110.

Poincaré, Henri, II, La Valeur de la Science, 483; Science et Hypothèse, 483.

Poincaré, Henri, II, criticizes Cantor's ‘set’-theory, 340; his views of analysis and insight; he refutes the idea of ‘pure analysis’, 483.

Point, I, a mathematical point without any extension must be an absurdity to Hume, 285.

Point, II, a spatial point pre-supposes the modus of continuous extension; the notion of a ‘continuum of points’ is antinomous; points have only a dependent objective existence in the spatial subject-object relation, 385.

Point of Contact between nature and grace, I, denied by Karl Barth; in Emil Brunner; in Thomism; its denial in Occamism, 66.

Polak, Leo, II, De zin der Vergelding, 130.

Polak, Leo, II, on retribution; recompense or punishment are deserved, 130; wage is price, not the indebted recompense of labour; equivalence and proportion; Vergelding en Vergoeding; Dikè, 131.

Polarity of Feelings, II, feelings have polarity, they are distinguished from sensations and representations; also from Erlebnisse, 116.

Polis, III, in Protagoras, is a communal whole whose laws express the general opinion, 199; Polis in Aristotle, 201-206; in Plato, it is an all-inclusive community; Plato's inconsistent universalism; anangkè and the deformation of the State; three ranks in society; dialectical tension between the polis and the family, 200, 207; the Greek polis gave rise to a dialectical tension with the idea of justice, 398.

Political Party, III, the meanings of the word ‘political’, 611; the party bond is not theoretical; a party requires a total view of the State and its policy; its inner divergences in practical politics; conservative versus progressive, 612; its leading function is not some political faith, 613; but the party is qualified by the moral function, 614, 615; parties and a dictatorial élite, 617; its genetic form, 619; is enkaptically interwoven with the State institutions; its genetic and its existential form, 605; a party is not a faction, 606; parties are indispensible in a free country, awakening the public spirit; Kelsen's view, 607, 608; separate Christian parties are not always necessary; the party's foundation; its unity, 609; variability types of party, 611.

Political Pluralism, III, Duguit is an adherent of this trend; it means ‘economic monism’, 465.

Polos, III, a sophist; radical individualist, 199.

Polyandry, III, an external form of mar-

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riage, 339; according to the ‘Kulturkreislehre’; it was intended to prevent the splitting up of the family property, according to Thurston; it existed among the ancient Babylonians, 340; and among the Indian Nayar caste; original polyandry was strictly monogamous, and not a matrimonial form, only sanctioned among the Todas; juridical proprietary share in the wife, 340, 341.

Polybius, III, authority rests on the right of the strongest; a sophistic view, influenced Macchiavelli, 231.

Polytheism, I, in the restriction of philosophical autonomy to theoretical thought, 21.

Polytheism, II, considered by Frazer as an earlier stage of a cult leading to monotheism, 313; the aesthetic humanizing of Greek polytheism since Homer and Hesiod; Hesiod's theogony, 320; in Greece was undetermined by the transcendental direction of faith to deified theoretical thought, 321.

Pomponius, II, and the Stoic construction of the universitas, 392.

Pomponius, III, 4, 30 D. 41, 3.

Poncelet, S., II, Traité des propriétés de figures, 104.

Poncelet, S., II, carried out Leibniz' programme of analysis situs, 104.

Ponty, Merleau, III, ‘experienced corporality’ belongs to a supposed ‘pre-objective’ experiential field, 779; he characterizes human corporality as a blind adherence to the pre-objectve world, 780.

Pope, Alexander, II, on Newton, 350.

Pope and Emperor, III, their struggle in the Middle Ages, 217.

Posidonius, I, has theological preference for theoretical philosophy of nature, 539.

Posidonius, III, Seneca says that he has borrowed the idea of an uncorrupted natural state from Posidonius, 229 (note).

Positive Law, II, was conceived by Stammler as a historical-economic material in the ‘legal form of thought’, 208, 209.

Positive Law, III, as the ‘general will’; volenti non fit inuria, in Kant, 232.

Positivism, I, in positivistic historicism, Comte, 210.

Positivism, II, on culture, 200; its struggle with the rationalistic theory of natural law, 239.

Positivism, III, Comte, 164.

Positivistic Views of the State, III, St. Simon, Aug. Comte, 452-455.

Positivization, II, of post-logical laws, 237, 238, 240, 241.

Positivization, III, social forms are positivizations of structural principles; their historical foundation and relative constancy; they must be distinguished from factual relationships, 172, 173; social forms are the nodal points of the complicated interlacements between positivized structural types, genetic positivized structural types, genetic and existential social forms, 174, 175.

Possession, II, its difference from property, 404.

Possibility, II, in Kant 512, 513, 530.

Potentia, III, the constant substance of the form, in Driesch, 741.

Potentiality, I, and actuality in Aristotle, 26; is found in matter, in Thomism, 72; temporal potentiality resides in the subject-side, and has the cosmonomic side for its principle, 105.

Potentiality, II, the dynamei on, in Aristotle, 9.

Potestas Dei, I, in Occam's view, resembles the Greek Anangkè, 186.

Power, I, Nietsche's religion of power, 211.

Power, II, is a modus, not a thing, 68; different kinds of power: political, ecclesiastical, logical command, 69; faith power is an analogical concept, 71.

Power, III, the power of the State is half demonic, according to Emil Brunner, 402; power is an irrational product of history with its hidden god, 404; the power State is an organization; the law State is an organism, according to Darmstaedter, 409; political power and its components, 416.

Power of Enjoyment, II, this theory was carried to absurdity by Thon, 403.

Power of Judgment, I, (Urteilskraft) is the link between Understanding and Reason, 387; its ‘as-if’ attitude, 388.

Praag, Léon van, III, Rechtspraak en voornaamste literatuur betr. de Wet op de Recht. Org., 682.

Practical Ideas, II, are transcendent above the temporal world, in Kant, 523.

Practical Reason, I, was separated from the Humanistic science ideal by Peter Bayle, 260; is the basis of theoretical reason, in Fichte, 437, 438, 439; cf. s.v. Kant.

Practical Reason, II, Heidegger holds that the productive imagination also functions as the root of practical reason in Kant's system, 520.

Praetor, III, his task in private common law, 450.

Pragmatic Method, II, of historical science, was psychological analysis, supposed to be free of theological or metaphysical speculation, 352.

Prantl, III, Geschichte der Logik, 7.

Praxiteles, III, his Hermes and Dionysus, 110-127; an intentional visionary

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object represented in a real thing, 115, 116.

Precocity, II, disapproved of in classicist aesthetics, 347.

Predisposition, III, of full grown organic forms, in Weismann's theory, 771.

Pre-History, II, is not history, 265, 270.

Pre-Historic Humanity, III, according to the school of the doctrine of cultural circles (Kulturkreislehre), 333.

Preiser, II, Das Rationalprinzip in der Wirtschaft und Wirtschaftspolitik, 123.

Preussiches Landrecht, II, projected by the Wolffian jurists Suarez and Klein, displayed an individualistic and utilitarian tendency, 358.

Priestly, I, association psychology, 264.

Prima Causa, II, God as ‘prima causa’ is an antinomous concept of speculative philosophy, 41.

Primacy of the Will, I, in Augustinus, 185.

Primary and Secondary Qualities, I, this distinction is rejected by Hume, 291.

Primary Cultures, III, their existence, posited by the Kulturkreislehre is denied by Lowie, 354.

Primary Races, III, their existence is denied by Franz Boas, 495.

Primitive Communal Consciousness, II, in a totemistic community the individuality of the members is not effaced; Cassirer's view is only acceptable with respect to the pistic aspect of primitive social life, 320.

Primitive Cultures, III, may show historical coherences, 333; their order of succession, 337.

Primitive Faith, II, looks like a diseased mental state, 310.

Primitive Jural Order, I, in a closed primitive jural order the anticipatory connection with morality is absent, 29.

Primitive Juridical Symbols, II, on the inert substratum of primitive thought all juridical acts are still tied down to the sensory symbol. Only then can they be understood by the primitive mind, 183.

Primitive Languages, II, they often have an extremely rich vocabulary, but they lack the capacity to express abstract and general relations and states of affairs, 126.

Primitive Man, III, Lévy-Bruhl on prim. man; the sacral sphere, 33, 34.

Primitive Retribution, II, there is a scarce indication that in primitive society accident and intention are distinguished from each other; but as a rule criminal law is based on the principle of responsibility for the factual consequences of a deed, 182.

Primitive Social Forms, III, shut people off in a kind of exclusive symbiosis, 581.

Primitive Society, II, retribution; juridical causality, 182; intercourse; hostis, exlex; do ut des; formalism in contract making; sensory symbolism; the wer, 183; primitive expressions of modal meaning are formalistic; primitive customary law is called êwa; only in the Idea can philosophy be directed to the religious root and the Divine Origin, 188; primitive society is closed; its authorities; how such a society may be opened, 259; differentiation and integration processes, 260; primitive culture, 266; individuality in primitive society, 273; primitive man's diffuse personality, 296; closed fath function, 297.

Primitive Society, III, the primitive mind, according to Lévy-Brühl, 33; the primitive norm in an undifferentiated societal relationship; nd the interwoven norms; the sense of propriety, 371; primitive soc. is considered to be outside of history by Fr. Münch, 372, 373; the primitive legal order is of a penal type; that of differentiated societies is of the contractual type, 460.

Primitive Technique, II, it lacks technical economy, 67.

Primitive Thought, II, this thought is held to be pre-logical by Lévy-Brühl; the collective representations are regulated by the law of participation, indifferent to contradiction, 329.

Primo Geniture, III, in an undifferentiated organized community, 340, 351.

Principia, II, as modal norms require human formation for their further specification, 237, 238.

Principium Individuationis, I, in Fichte, 461; in Fichte's final phase it is history, 490.

Principium Individuationis, II, the substantial form in Aristotle is a theoretical abstraction and a universal, but is individualized, 12; this problem of realistic Scholasticism is insoluble and internally contradictory; it is occasioned by the form-matter scheme which prevents the insight into the radical individual concentration of temporal reality in the human I-ness, 417; the substantial form of a natural being, as such, lacks individuality and must be combined with matter into a ‘synolon’ (τοδε τι ), in Aristotle; Thomas Aquinas seeks the principium individuationis in a materia signata vel individualis, 419.

Principium Rationis Sufficients, II, logical causality has undoubted correspondence with a genuine form of analytical

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relation, 511; causality has an analogical character, it is necessarily qualified by the analytical nucleus of the logical aspect; as an analytical law of every logical conclusion it is the principium rationis sufficientis, 512.

Private Property, III, will come to an end, 457; is theft, according to Proudhon, 458.

Progress, II, the Idea of progress in Protagoras in his Prometheus myth; Plato's idea in Timaeus, Criterias and Politikos. The modern Idea of progress is naturalistic, 263; Voltaire's and Montesquie's idea of progress, 350.

Progression, II, the principle of progression and Leibniz' programme of an ‘analysis situs’, 104; in the Euclidean view of the infinitely distant point in which two parallel lines intersect, 105.

Prohibition, III, of a political party may give rise to underground activity, 619.

Proletariat, III, the united world proletariat in Marx, 456.

Prometheus-Motive,- I, in Klopstock, 454.

Prometheus, II, Protagoras' Prometheus myth and the idea of progress, 263.

Promiscuity Theory, III, and matriarchy, 332.

Prophyta, III, 108, 773.

Proofs of the Existence of God, I, rejected by Kant, 335.

Proofs of the Existence of God, II, in Aristotelian Thomism, starting from the concept of causality, 39.

Prophetic Philosophy, I, of Karl Jaspers, 125.

Prophetism, I, rejected by Rickert in philosophy, 133.

Protagoras, II, defended the idea of the ascending line of cultural development, 263; his Prometheus myth, 263.

Protagoras, III, depreciated nature and the ancient gentilitial and tribal organizations, as unstable social products of nature lacking law and morality; legal and ethical norms can only originate from the nomos of the polis, not from nature; the polis is a communal whole whose laws express the general opinion of the democratic community and impose themselves on the citizens irrespective of their individual opinion, 199.

Proteins, III, containing amino-acids and other prosthetical groups that can be split off from albumenoids, can be composed synthetically, 727.

Protomeries, III, hypothetical ‘bio-molecules’ in Woltereck's theory, 643; Heidenhain's concept, 722.

Protons, etc., II, fields of gravitation, electro magnetic fields, quanta, photons, electrons, neutrons, protons, etc. are not sensory, although the real events in which they manifest themselves, have an objective sensory aspect, 100.

Protozoa, III, are psychically qualified, 85-87, 107, 108; their nuclei are the potential centres of new cell-bodies; poly-nucleur-protozoa; cell-division in metazoa, 721; their psychically qualified reaction displays a physico-chemical and a biotic aspect, 766; their total form is an expression of the total system of the cell, 770; the separate cell-form is an elementary total expression of a typical structural whole, 771, 773.

Proudhon, I, ‘L'antinomie ne se résout pas’, 65.

Proudhon, III, property is theft, 458.

Proust, III, the law of constant proportions, 704.

Providence, II, the Historical School and the normative conception of historical development. Fr. J. Stahl on the secondarily normative character of God's guidance in history; providence is a hidden law in history, 232.

Providential Plan, I, is hidden from man, 174.

Przywara, Erich, I, Thomas oder Hegel, 327.

Psyche, I, is the form of the material body, in Aristotle, 26.

Psyche and Psychoid, III, in Driesch, 23, 24, 736.

Psychical Analysis, II, must explain historical phenomena, according to the phil. of the Enlightenment, 350, 351; this analysis must be carried out acc. to the methods of natural science, 352.

Psychical Aspect, I, absolutized by Hume, 302.

Psychical Aspect, II, sensory multiplicity is a numerical retrocipation; also perceived by animals; the objective sensory image of movement requires a perceptible reference and appeals to our pure intuition of movement, it is founded in the intermodal cosmic order; the objective psychical aspects of physical events, 100; the soul is not the Gegenstand of psychology; psyche; the Biblical word soul in the sense of religious centre; feeling is the meaning kernel of psychical phenomena; feeling, volition, knowing in modern psychology; faculty psychol.; Tetens; Kant, 111; feeling is implied in every Erlebnis; universality of feeling; feeling erroneously taken for the origin of the other classes of Erlebnisse; Erlebnis is intentionality; Drever's definition; acts are not aspects, but function in all aspects; dogmatic dichotomy of body and soul; its modern

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version in Max Scheler; Geist and Gegenstand; genetic development in a child, 112; empathy, 113; animal psychology; psychology examines concrete phenomena within individuality structures, in so far as they (114) express themselves in feeling, and its anticipations e.g.; certainty in faith; universality within the psychical sphere; acts have social and individual manifestations and a psychological aspect; psychologism; there is no psycho-physical ego; nor a psychical centre of Erlebnisse; self-feeling, self-respect etc. are emotional and concentrated to the self, 115; feelings have polarity, etc.; a feeling is not an Erlebnis; sensations refer to objective qualities of things; pleasure and pain; indifference; interest; retrocipations in feeling; the restrictive state of feeling in animals; higher feelings; sensibility; life of feeling; association, polarity, etc.; emotions; affects, 116; passions; sensory space; sensory multiplicity of impressions, 118; psychological description of economy, 123; spatial analogies in psychical sphere; sensory perceptible space is an objective retrocipation in the feeling aspect; the feeling of extension is subjective; subject-object relation; tactile, optic space is three dimensional, 168; sensory dimensionality; its indirect reference to original spatial dimensions; how are sensory images of motion in space possible?, 168; modal retrocipations in feeling interpenetrate intensively in the meaning-coherence of feeling; biotic space and motion interpenetrate; sensibility and organic structure; organic development and space and number, 169; anticipation can only be complex; directly and indirectly anticipating meanings, 170; feeling of justice; as indirect juridical anticipation in the psychical aspect, 176; not a feeling of revenge, implies logical feeling; social feeling; moral feeling; moral insanity; feeling of justice only in disclosed state; Greek kalokagathon; primitive tribal feeling of what is permissable and what is not, 177; feeling of justice is bound up with cultural feeling; primitive feelings very insufficiently differentiated; as in a child; a child's emotional life: little differentiation; Werner and Kroh; axiological differentiation of feeling depends on culture, 178; feeling of justice pre-supposes that of symbolism, sociality, economy, things asethetical; historical anticipation starts from the opened historical sphere; but refers forward to the ultimate sphere of faith, 179; there is no zero point in the dynamis of a sphere, 180; the closed structure of feeling in animals; psychological differentiation depends on organic difference; animal ‘intellect’ rests on deliberate presentiment of causal and teleological relations, 184; human feeling is deepened into logical feeling by the analytical function; logical feeling is a limiting function of feeling, 185; will, striving, desiring, 244; the submissive instinct and psychial influence, 247; psychology as a means to interpret history, 350, 352; perception; representation, remembrance, are acts; coherence between perception of extension and an image of space, 372; emotional sensibility, visual, tactile, auditory space; their association is based on organic coherence; objective picture of space, its implied retrocipations, 373; no psychological empiricism; the sensory image refers to actual pre-psychical subject functions; but not so in hallucinations, in the imagination, or in dreams; in memory images the actual reference is reproductive; no awareness of identity on the part of the subject, 375.

Psychical Aspect, III, classificatory method compared with typological method in psychology and psychiatry, 81; animal psychology has shown that animal behaviour differs radically from vegetative reactions to physiological stimuli; the psychical aspect, 85; embraces animal and human emotional sensations; an animal's behaviour is psychically qualified; its psychomotor structure and the absence of a cellulose membrane in the cells of the animal's body, 86; the sensory aspect of a tree presents itself in an objective macroscopic image in which its numerical, spatial, kinematic, physico-chemical and biotic functions are objectified in relation to our sensory perceptive function, 98; empiricist psychology erroneously resolved the sensory total image of a tree into functionally distinct impressions only subjectively associated by our function of perception; the subject functions of a tree are objectified in our perceptual image, 104, 105; the living model an artist uses evokes the ideal harmonious sensory shape in his productive fantasy, 113; the productive aesthetic fantasy is founded in the sensory function of our imagination exhibiting a productive objectifying function; a visual fantasm; this fantasm is not related to pre-psychical subj. or obj. functions of actually existing things but it is the objective sensory aspect of a product of our imagination, and as such a merely intentional visionary object, 115; the representational objectivity of the sensory image of a marble statue, 120; Plato's view of the structure of the soul as the ‘state in man’; Aristotle's view; the passions ought to be ruled by reason, 230; the Stoics called reason ‘hegemonikon’, 231; Roman Catholic theories of conjugal love and sexual appetite; on ‘spiritual knowledge’ and ‘spiritual love’, 321.

Psychical Interlacements, III, between the members of a family, of a nation, of a social class, 294, 295.

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Psychological Empiricism, II, reduces the biotic subject-object-relation to sensory impressions, 374, 375.

Psychology, I, mechanistic ps. in Hartley, 264; in Locke is atomistic, 266; it has to explain the origin and the limits of human knowledge, 269; idealist ps. of Berkeley resolved nature into sensory impressions: esse est percipi, 274; Hume's psychology, 303, 304; metaphysical psychology holds as basic theses: the substantiality, immateriality, simplicity, immortality and personality of the thinking ego, 366.

Psychology, II, Bayle applied psychology to the science of history, 353.

Psychology of Plants, III, and Bavink's pan-psychical principle of continuity, 641.

Psycho-Monism, I, of Heymans, 103.

Public Law, III, identified with civil law, by Kant, 427; is correlated with private common law, 446: in the Carolingian State; the Roman Republic; Clovis' lex Salica; jus gentium; jus naturale, 447; public and private law in Rome, 449.

Public Legal Industrial Organization, III, and natural community, 180; of industrial life, is not a ‘natural community’; the error of the Protestant League of Trade Unions in the Netherlands, 598.

Public Opinion, III, according to H. Heller; contains the eternal essential principles of justice, in Hegel; influences the political will of the nation: it transcends different parties, 490, 491; it may be misled; in Mercier de la Rivière's demo-liberal ideology; Ratzenhofer's naturalistic psychological explanation, 492.

Puchta, II, Cursus der Institutionen, 397.

Puchta, II, the historical school of jurisprudence, 138, 277; historical development from nature to freedom, and their deeper identity, 278; theory of Subjective Right, 397.

Puchta, III, of the Historical School, 670.

Pufendorff, I, with Hobbes and Grotius conceived of the social contract in a formal sense, 319.

Pufendorff, II, on subjective rights, 395.

Pufendorff, III, the social contract state comprises an agreement concerning the form of government, 236.

Puritanism, III, and marriage, 316.

Purposeful Unity, III, an organized community is a purposeful unity in a socio-psychical sense, according to Jellinek, 432.

Pygmean Culture, III, Pygmies have monogamy, 332; W. Schmidt's conception criticized, 333.

Pyrrhonism, I, in Crouza's version, and in Hume, 275.

Pythagoras, II, dikè binds the world, 132.

Pythagoreans, II, and others have stressed the fact that retribution is the meaning of justice, 132.

Pythagoreanism, II, in Plato, 9.

Pythagoreanism, III, the void is the flowing air, 8.