A New Critique of Theoretical Thought. Deel 4. Index of Subjects and Authors

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Obedience, II, the legal duty of obedience does not function in a juridical subject-object-relation in which it is the object of a legal duty and of a corresponding right. Obedience as such is only subjective behaviour in conformity to legal norms, 410.

Object, I, a bird's nest is a biotic object, 42; and Gegenstand confused by Litt, 86.

Object, II, Malan calls numbers ‘objects of the third stage whose species are only sets of things’, 85; intentional object in Scholasticism; object in modern thought is that to which our mental activity in thought or volition is directed, 367; since Kant Object and Gegenstand have been identified, 368; cognitive or volitional object, 369; object functions implied in a spatial picture, 373; object as the intentional contents of a concept and a representation; universalia post rem are the essential forms abstracted by logical aphaeresis; they only have esse intentionale or esse objective in moderate Realism, 387; object is identified with ‘substance’ in Scholastic realism; with Gegenstand; the transcendentalia, 388, 389; temporal reality has an object-side; an intentional logical concept is not identical with an object; reflexive concepts; object is latent until subject opens it, 389; the prelogical aspects become logically thinkable objectively only; definition of logical objectivity; the logical systasis; objectification is restricted to the logical retrocipatory spheres; geisteswissenschäftlichen Methoden, 390; unfree nature is an object in Hegel, 397; the object of a right, 408; formal and material object, 439; subjective, intentional, and material object, Pfänder, 440.

Objectification, II, psychical objectification is bound to the retrocipatory structure of the feeling-aspect, 373; that of pre-biotic functions, 374; that of post-psychical object functions in feeling, 376; juridical objectification, 406.

Objectifying Thought, II, according to Romanticism and Hegel the socio-cultural sciences (Geisteswissenschaften) are required to detach themselves completely from the spatial, objectifying way of thought customary in the natural sciences, 390.

Objective, I, the laws of the ‘objective’ in Immanence philosophy, 110.

Objective, II, the Gegenstand is identified with the universally valid and ‘objective’ of experience, in Kant's theory, 467.

Objective Mind, II, in Hegel; history is the temporal mode of development of spiritual reality, 194; in it the Objective Mind immanently unfolds its infinite wealth of meaning; each individual phenomenon in history is a particular figure or shape adopted by that mind in its dialectical course through history, 195; in Hegel's dialectical Idea of development; the ‘Volksgeister’ as the true subjects of world history have become manifestations of the ‘Objective Mind’, 279.

Objective Natural Things, III, formed or produced by animals, 107.

Objective Reality, III, in Immanence philosophy ‘objective’ means: verifiable by natural science, 36; the object functions of a tree, 57, 58.

Objective Spirit, II, in history, according to German historical Idealism; a shaper of history is a leader in a historical group-function; he is forced along the paths of historical continuity by the power of tradition (objective spirit), 245.

Objectum Intentionale, II, the sensory function of imagination produces its phantasms in merely intentional objectivity, entirely apart from the sensory objectivity of real things, 425.

Objectum Intentionale, III, is bound to the plastic horizon, 116.

Obrigkeitsstaat, III, Gierke's discussion, 435.

Occam, William of, I, the inner dialectic of the motive of nature and grace drove Scholasticism in the 14th century from the Thomistic pseudo synthesis (Natura praeambula gratiae) to the Occamist antithesis (no point of contact between nature and grace); Occam was the leader of the Nominalistic Scholasticism of the 14th century, 66; ‘natural reason’ has become entirely tarnished; there is no place for metaphysics or natural theology, although the autonomy of natural reason is maintained to the utmost; the grace motive retains primacy, but not in the Thomistic synthetical hierarchical sense, 67; he turned against the Thomistic compromise between Christian and pa-

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gan thought, 183; his nominalism was based on an extremely nominalistic conception of the ‘potestas Dei absoluta’ and denied that the ‘universal concepts of thought’ have a ‘fundamentum in rē’; Occam opposed logical thought to reality itself and held that the sources of knowledge are only found in sensory perception and logical understanding; universalia are taken to be merely ‘signs’ standing for a plurality of things but having no reality in or before things; universalia are conceptus or intentiones animae formed by the understanding; they are copies of things and have a merely subjective value; Occam depreciates science; faith is bound to the Bible and to the Church tradition; the Bible is a law book, 184; he assigned primacy to the will, 185; Occam changed the Augustinian primacy of the will in a radically irrationalistic manner; the essence of God is pure form; God's potestas absoluta resembled the unpredictable Greek anangkè; he abstracted God's Will from the Fulness of His holy Being and conceived of his Sovereign Power as an orderless tyranny; thus God's Will was placed under the lex; with reference to ethical and religious laws God's Power became ‘arbitrariness’, 187; Leibniz' contemporaries were more radically Nominalistic than Occam, 225; Occam had disrupted the Christian faith from Aristotelian metaphysics, 260 (note).

Occam, William of, II, Summa totius logicae ad Adamum, 388.

Occam, William of, II, economy of thought, 123; universalia have an intentional existence, are symbols; concept and actus intelligendi; his copy theory; supponere pro; terminism; Gegenstand, 388.

Occam, William of, III, distinguishes arbitrary from natural signs; misinterprets the objective logical aspect of a thing, 45.

Occasionalists, I, attempted a synthesis between Cartesianism and other systems of thought, 223.

Occupational Organizations, III, are very important; they show a spirit of community and solidarity, 603.

Oedipus Complex, II, and religion in Freud, 312, 313.

Ogburn, W.F. and Meyer F. Mimkoff, III, A Handbook of Sociology, 305.

Ogden, C.K. and I.A. Richards, II, The Meaning of Meaning, 227.

Olympian Gods, I, were personified cultural powers, 62.

Olympians, II, are the personal gods of Homer; the first national gods of the Greeks; they are the universal, celestial gods, bound neither to a specific logality, nor to a particular place of worship, 321.

Opening-Process, I, discloses the temporal character of the cosmic order; anticipatory moments are developed cohering with later aspects; the opening-process has temporal duration, 29, 30.

Opening-Process, II, other names; closed structures; juridical, 181; primitive legal sphere is closed, 182; its retrocipations in the closed state; feeling as a closed aspect, 183; closed physical aspect; and juridical aspect; how opened, 184; limiting functions of number, of logical feeling; of juridical guilt, etc.; unlawfulness, jurid. causality and imputation, 185; ‘higher feelings’ deepen the retrocipations in feeling; sensory perception refined to human sensibility, 186; in the Idea phil. thought is directed to the root and to the origin of all meaning, 188; anticipatory spheres can open only after retrocipatory spheres have been disclosed, 188; prelogical spheres and normative anticipations; a guiding function must first open its own anticip. spheres; opening-process starts in the cultural sphere, but is guided by faith; but faith has no anticipations, 189; a provisional resting point in history, 190; historical sphere is nodal point in opening-process in the transcendental direction, 191; in the historical aspect and its superstrata the opening-process may have started whereas logical thought is still unopened; Carolingian Renaissance; a real state requires an opened cultural function; science starts after the opening of culture; why the historical aspect is the nodal point of meaning disclosure, 191; the expression of the foundational direction of time in the transcendental direction, 192; opening-process and sphere universality, 335; sin and the opening-process; positivization of structural principles, 335; sin affects the law-side of the opening-process; paper decrees in the French Revolution, 336; logic of facts; the eschatological perspective in the Christian Idea of cultural development, 337; the guidance of faith in the opening-process of mathematics; mathesis universalis; Descartes, 337; Leibniz; physics; the deepening of mathematical thought; in how far the idea of mathesis universalis was useful; absolutization of mathematics by Leibniz; lex continui, 338; rigidity of mathem. Idea expressed by Diderot; pure mathematics, 339; various attempts to mathematicize other sciences: biology, physics, 341; sociology, juridical theory; Husserl; Schreier, 342; the so-called socio-cultural sciences, 343; biology and society, 344; when can the opening-process start; the contribution of the Enlightenment to the disclosure of Western civilization, 356; positivization of individualizing norm in the Enlightenment; normative principles of sociality, economy, justice, morals and faith in an anticipatory individualistic way; Locke's theory of in-

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nate human rights, 357; the Enlightenment had to create new forms of culture; its natural law view; rights of man; world-citizenship borrowed from the Stoa; a world organization of the church rejected for a humanistic humanity; use of Reformation ideas; process of disclosure becomes secular in direction; rationalistic-individualistic-utilitarian codifications; Chr. Wolff and John Locke, 358; juridical principles positivized in the Humanistic rationalistic sense, freedom of contract principle positivized at an early period, the doctrine of justa causa in Canon Law; Hugo de Groot: pacta sunt servanda; Hobbes' theory of natural law; rejects Thomistic justum pretium; justitia commutativa et distributiva, laughed to scorn; constitutional and civil law reduced to a formalistic contractual principle; private law too, 359; opening of economic relations; Law-State in Locke; liberalism; classical economics; guilds abolished, 360; one-sided opening of economic relations; atropy of communal relations, 361; homo economicus; bourgeous ‘Christian’ callousnous; excessive power of science and technique; no cultural economy; revolution, 362; reaction Romanticism; Restoration; Socialism; Communism; disharmony in opening-process becomes antinomy in Humanistic thought; science and personality; but such disharmony is a defect in the process of disclosure through sin, 362; process of disclosure is bound to history and guided by faith; the Christian idea of historical development is not guided by the optimistic faith in progress - nor by the pessimism of Historism, but by the struggle between the civitas Dei and the civitas terrena, 363; our univocal criterion to distinguish between primitive and disclosed cultural spheres; apostate guidance by apostate faith leads to disharmony on the law-side side and misery on the subject-side; apostatic movements have an historical task; Historism rejected, philosophical or theological speculations rejected in the periodizing of history, 364; Christians have to struggle for the power of cultural formation, 364; the struggle is not against our fellowmen but against the spirit of darkness, 365.

Opening-Process, III, the possibility of the internal opening-process in a tree is an insoluble problem, 66; disharmonious opening, 142; this process does not abolish the original foundation of the State, 419; the opening and individualizing process is a rationalizing progress, 594.

Opening-relation, III, in the individuality structure of a linden-tree, 58; the rôle of the qualifying function in this process; internal and external structural coherence of modal functions, 59, 60; external teleology and internal destination; entelechy in Aristotle, 60; opening process and sphere-sovereignty, 61, 62; the genetic process of human life and the opening-relation, 78; the opening of the lingual function of a book by any reader who can understand it; this opening is preceded by the actualization when we pick it up, turn the pages, and read, 152.

Oppenheimer, Fr., III, System der Soziologie, 159, 166.

Oppenheimer, Fr., III, society; life, 166; a secondary immortal substance, 167.

Oppenheim, P. (and Carl G. Hempel), III, Der Typusbegriff im Lichte der neuen Logik, 81.

Optimism, I, of the Enlightenment; in Leibniz, 253.

Optimism, II, cultural optimism is unacceptable, 262; Rousseau's later optimism, 270.

Order of Succession of the Aspects, II, is not recognized in Humanistic philosophy, 49; architectonic differentiation, 75 ff.

Ordered Physico-Spatial Figure, III, Woltereck's concept, 701, 702.

Ordnung, III, an undefined concept in Emil Brunner, 538, 540.

Ordnungslehre, III, Driesch's ‘Ordnungslehre’ is influenced by Kant's epistemology, 737.

Organism, I, a natural organism must be related to itself as cause and effect, in Kant's view, 394.

Organization, III, renders a community independent of the lease of life of its members, 180; of an economic business and of the State, in Kelsen, 386; in Heller, 407; organization versus organism; Schelling; Fichte; Marx; Gierke; Positivism, 406, 407; Tönnies; Marck; Darmstaedter, 408; the lawstate is then an organism, the power State is an organization, 409; Marx mechanized the idea of organization, 455, 456; the organization of voluntary associations to counteract 19th century destructive individualism, 596.

Organized Communities, III, industrial authoritarian organization; associatory and authoritarian organizations; their enkapsis; an industrial organized community is most often authoritarian and indirectly compulsory, 191, 192; the canonist conception of organized communties as personae fictae; Roman jurists considered collectivities of persons or of things as universitas; person to them was the individual subject of private law; the ‘universitas’ is merely a juridical construction according to Innocentius IV; Petruccius Senensius, Johannes Andreae, on the universitas as not real; this is not yet nominalism, 233; the unity of the hierarchical Roman Church in the view of the Canonists, s.v.; the fiction theory, s.v., 234, 235; natural law and state absolu-

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tism; Hobbes, Rousseau, 236; the contract was considered as the only foundation of the internal authoritative structure of every organized community; external division of communities according to their various goals; the state is a societas inaequalis; non-political organizations are societates aequales; the liberalist view; Locke; Chr. Wolff, 237; questions raised by considering the unity of an organized community; universalism contra individualism, 238; Othmar Spann's misconceptions; modern individualistic trends do not construe organized communities out of autarchical individuals; they recognize social interactions as constituents of individual life; this is functionalistic individualism; the formal school of sociology; Simmel, v. Wiese; Georg Jellinek; Julius Binder; Aristotle viewed individual man as a metaphysical substance but his sociology is universalistic, 239; in a general sense individualism construes organized communities out of its ‘elementary constituents’; universalism tries to derive the ‘parts’ from the coherence of the whole, 240; does a communal whole as such have its own life of feeling and thought, distinct from that of its members? the ‘popular mind’, ‘the communal soul’, ‘collective conscience’; are they the result of the social interactions between individuals?, 295; a community has a subjective continuity and identity regulated by its structural principle; it is a typical structure of man's own temporal social existence; its continuity can only be realized in the communal structure of the relevant functions of its members; the internal structure of the whole continues to actualize itself in the feelings and thoughts of the existing members in an individual way; in an organized community this continuous identity extends beyond the individual temporal existences of the members; and depends on their inner act-life; a community in time has no I-ness; comparison with the life of a plant, 296; the tertium comparationis was the starting point for the organological theories of human communities; Litt's argument against it is not quite adequate; a temporal human community is not an organic natural being, nor an organically articulated super-person; it does not interweave the central I-nesses of its members, for each of them transcends all temporal relationships, 297; communal structures are secondary and temporal; depending on human actualization; in a temporal community the I-ness expresses itself in its supra temporal religious communion with other egos; community feeling, thought, etc. is feeling, etc., of humans in the unity of societal relationships; this unity is guaranteed by the internal structural principle, i.e. a law, 298; temporal communities have no ‘substance’ and no I-ness; but in comparison with one another they have an inner subjective unity, 299; a community is said to rank higher in proportion to the good determining its scope and to the depth of its point of union in human personality, according to D. von Hildebrand, 320.

Organizers, III, are inductive, non-living material components influencing living cells, 723.

Organological Theory, III, of communities; their starting point; Th. Litt's reasoning against them is not quite adequate, 297; in Hegel, 433.

Organological View, II, of history under the influence of Schelling and the Historical School, led to quietism - intensified by the Lutheran view of the Law - the organol. view of history penetrated to the conception of history propounded Fr. Julius Stahl, 249-250.

Origin, I, neither the historian, nor the philosopher can say anything about the origin of the world, for there is no origin, Fichte, 483.

Orphism, I, and religious revivals, 67.

Orphism, II, in Greek philosophy which continued to be in contact with mythology, 321.

Osiris, II, was the god of the dead and became the judge of good and evil, 324.

Ostrogorski, M., III, La démocratie et l'organisation des parties politiques, 605, 606.

Ostwald, III, compares ordinary catalysts with a mechanical lubricant, 731.

Otto, Rudolph, I, characterizes religion as experience of the ‘tremendum’, 58.

Otto, Rudolph, II, his modern irrationalistic-idealistic and transcendental-psychologistic view of faith as a religious a priori, 300.

Ouranic Elements, II, in Parmenides, 56.

Ouranic Thought, I, of the ouranic religion of nature, 533.

Ousia, I, or substance, is the hypostatized theoretical activity of thought in its logical aspect, 44.

Ousia, II, ousia and hylè in Aristotle, 9.

Ousia, III, the metaphysical supra temporal ousia or substance in Aristotle, 4, 8, 9; its accidents; a noumenon, 10; an antinomic concept; the whole and its parts, 12; this concept is Scholastic, 65, 67; the immortal spiritual substance, 89; the physical concept substance in Kant, 100; artefacts are not substances in Aristotle, 126, 127; life as an immortal substance, 167.

Other-Worldliness, I, rejected in the Renaissance, 199.

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Outer and Inner Experience, I, distinguished by Locke, 263.

Overvoorde, J.C. and J.G.Ch. Joosting, III, De Gilden van Utrecht tot 1528, 478, 479.

Overvoorde, J.C. and J.G.Ch. Joosting, III, on the sources of law relating to the Utrecht guilds up to 1528, 675.