A New Critique of Theoretical Thought. Deel 4. Index of Subjects and Authors

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Nagel, III, says that Müller's theory of the specific energy of the sense organs is based on experiments made on the ‘chorda tympani’, 43.

Nägeli, III, his concept: ‘Miscellen’, 722.

Naïve Attitude, II, in the pre-theoretical (i.e. the naïve) attitude a Christian ought to experience the relation between the Christian religion and temporal reality; he cannot fall back into the nominalistic dualism between faith and thought, and between nature and grace, if in the theoretical attitude he has seen the universality of the lawspheres, 334.

Naïve Experience, I, reality in naïve experience confronted with theoretical analysis, 3; in the naïve, pre-theoretical attitude of experience we have an integral, immediate experience of cosmic time in the uninterrupted coherence of all its modal aspects and in concentric relatedness to the selfhood; an example is: looking at the clock to know the time; the modal aspects are not explicitly experienced as such, but implicitly and conjointly, 34; the naïve attitude lacks an intentional antithetic structure; our logical function remains entirely accommodated to the continuous coherence of cosmic time; we grasp reality in its typical total structures of individual things and concrete events; naïve concept formation is not directed to the modal aspects but towards things and concrete events, 41; it is concerned with individual totalities, not with abstract relations, e.g., of number or space, energy effects as such, but with things countable, spatial and subjected to physico-chemical changes; the logical aspect is conceived as an inherent and implicit component of concrete reality itself; the subject-object relation is the pre-supposition of the integral character of naïve experience; objective functions and qualities are unreflectingly ascribed to things and events in modal aspects in which it is impossible for them to appear as subjects; thus water is experienced as a necessary means for life, etc.; a bird's nest is an object of life; a rose has objective beauty; the subject-object relation is grasped as a structural relation of reality itself; the sensory colour red is ascribed to a rose, not in relation to my or your perception, but to that of anybody, 42; we experience reality in the total and integral coherence of its aspects, leaving the typical total structures intact; naïve exp. is not a theory about reality; not an ‘uncritical realism’, 43; naïve experience is exclusively concerned with the typical total structures of individuality and does not explicitly distinguish aspects, 82; every philosophic view of empirical reality ought to be confronted with the datum of naïve experience; this datum must be converted by philosophy into a fundamental problem; it should analyse the typical structures of individuality which also constitute a philosophic problem; modern science breaks up the naïve concept of a thing in order to gain know-

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ledge of the functional coherence of the phenomena within a special modal aspect, 83; the fundamental deficiency of theoretical thought in comparison with naïve experience; temporal reality does not give itself ‘gegenständlich’; naïve exper. has an integral vision of the whole, and, if rooted in the Christian religion, naïve exp. has the radical, integral view of reality concentrically conceived in its root and in its relation to the Origin, 84; philosophy, special science, and naïve experience, 85; in Hume, 289; it is not a theory, but explainable in terms of a natural impulse of feeling, in Hume, 290; a view of ‘common sense’, ‘the vulgar view’, based on sensory impressions, 291, 292; naïve exp. and natural science were not fundamentally different in Hume and Kant, 297; naïve exp. is identified with feeling, by Jacobi, 458.

Naïve Experience, II, is fundamentally misrepresented for the benefit of the ‘Satz des Bewusztseins’. The Humanistic conception of experiential reality tyrannizes science by means of the Humanistic prejudice, 538.

Naïve Experience, III, maintains the identity of a thing in all its changes within the limits of a thing's plastic structure, 3; but cannot account for such identity; metaphysics turns away from what is strictly given in naïve experience, 4; Aristotle's primary substance is foreign to the naïve exp. of a thing, 10; Russell's identification of thing and substance, 19, 21; and of naïve exp. with an ontological theory of ‘naïve realism’, Russell's ‘refutation’ of naïve exp.; he reduces naïve exp. to sense-impressions like Hume did, and appeals to the laws of perspective, 22; his ‘perspective’-argument, 25; the modern mathematical logical concept of function and the plastic horizon of human experience, 26; Hume acknowledged that naïve exp. cannot be a theory of reality; naïve thinghood and epistemological Gegenstand in Kant, 27; of the identity of a thing misinterpreted by Kant; various attempts to explain away the identical thinghood of naïve exp., 28; naïve exp. is not impervious to mythological aberrations; in the Biblical naïve attitude the transcendent religious dimension of the experiential horizon is opened to the light of Divine Revelation; the I-we, and the We-Thou-relation, 29; a true Christian is not exempt from the solidarity of the fall into sin, and knows the impersonal attitude, the dread of nothingess in a so-called existential isolation; when his heart is open to the Divine Word-Revelation he experiences things as meaning pointing beyond and above itself to the true Origin; the Biblical attitude is not theology, 30; even concepts originating from modern science change their meaning and assume a concrete and practical sense when assimilated by us to common thought, 31; the plastic and the theoretical horizon have their historical aspect; social praxis forms naïve experience which pre-supposes a sufficient development of the act structure of human existence and practical acquaintance with the things of common life, 31; essential to it is the subject-object-relation; is the naïve attitude compatible with animism and magic?, 32; Russell's opinion refuted; infantile and pre-experiental thought is provisionably unable to conceive subj.-obj. relations; and animistic myth or metaphysics; animistic metaphysics has nothing to do with the naïve attitude, 33; the sacral sphere of primitive belief does not affect the typical structure of the naïve attitude; primitive animism and magic may re-appear in the naïve attitude of modern Western cultured people as forms of superstition; causality is not functionally experienced but as a concrete fact in an emotionally striking event; the reason why superstitions do not prevent the opening of our experiential horizon; the representation or copy theory of naïve realism, 34; in the latter perceiving is like taking a photo; Windelband's theory; the internal contradiction in his view is that common exp. is called naïve and at the same time rooted in an epistemological theory to be refuted by the ‘critical’ analysis of knowledge, 35; our consciousness in the naïve attitude is systatic; the refutation of naïve exp. is based on the unreliability of sensory perception as to ‘objective’ reality; objective is here intended as verifiable by natural science; formerly the subjectivity of the secondary qualities was an argument against naïve experience; Bernard Bavink, 36; Theodor Hearing; colours refer to electro-magnetic waves of which they are the symbols; physics has to restrict itself to formulae denoting the physical functions, but such formulae do not exhaust the objective contents of human experience, 37; in the naïve attitude we accept objective sensory qualities in the concrete context of our plastic horizon, we do not identify them with our subjective impressions; sensory perception is not pre-ponderant in our naïve exp.; perception is strongly anticipating in character; espec. symbolical anticipations; the structure of this experience and its degrees of clarity; its practical tendency; the subj.-object relation, 38; naïve exp. does not know about ‘Dinge an sich’, nor of a reality in itself opposed to consciousness, 46; naïve exper. is incompatible with critical realism and with critical idealism, 47; Riehl's view, 48; in Natorp naïve experience is lodged in the vestibule of mathematical logicism, 52; naïve exp. has an implicit awareness of the modal structural coherence of the functions of a tree, e.g., 59; philosophy cannot replace naïve experience, 66; force is a particularly strong manifesta-

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tion of energy in naïve exp., and not the essence of a picture, table, etc., 70; in the macro world of naïve exp. our plastic horizon has three radical types of individuality structure of a prelogical qualification, matter, plants, animals; most border cases belong to the micro world, 83-85; a living cell is not directly accessible to naïve exp., 102; naïve exp. and Divine Revelation, 128; Plato's interest in the ‘trivial’; modern thought is indifferent to chairs, lamps, tables, etc., as such, 129; the routine view of modern daily life is not naïve exp., because it is content with names and with a very superficial knowledge of what these names mean; phenomenology bypasses such verbalism in its ‘intuition of essences’, 145.

Naïve and Theoretical Thought, II, Von Jhering argues that the juristic conception of the res or of personality is merely an artificial expansion of the natural naïve concept of a thing or a person respectively; but the modal legal concepts of object and subject cannot be artificial expansions of the natural idea of a thing since they only refer to modal functions, not to things, 125 (note).

Names, III, evoked by the symbolical anticipations in sensory impressions, 38; and naïve experience, 51, 57, 145.

Napoleon I, II, and the battle of Waterloo, 231.

National, III, national honour, in international intercourse; its transcendental meaning, 485; David and the Ammonites, 486; national solidarity, binds country, government and nation, 493; is revealed in the anticipatory spheres of the psychical sphere; its enkapsis with international relations, 494.

National Church, III, this idea is a deformation; its recognition of infant baptism; it may influence the whole nation according to E.E. Brunner, 540.

National Community, I, is an individual historical totality in Fichte; ‘the true historical reality that has an earthly eternity’, 493, 494.

National Individuality, II, Ranke saw that national individuality does not begin to unfold until the historical development has been opened and includes the nations in a larger dynamic cultural coherence, 276, 277.

Nationality, III, Herder's view, 467; Gurvitch and the Historical School, 468, 469; von Jhering, 470.

National Socialism, German, III, its racial theory and its background, 414; was folk-minded, 415.

Natorp, I, out of the correlation of abstracting and combining, the continuity of the movement of thought gives rise to the continuity-postulate, 204.

Natorp, II Die logischen Grundlagen der exakten Wissenschaften, 91, 92, 95, 171, 172, 173, 386.

Natorp, II, he logifies number and space, 91; his view of matter as a substance of occurrence filling space, 95 (note); of multidimensional or complex numbers; ‘Dimension überhaupt’ is a modal shift of meaning serving to derive imaginary numbers from the relation of isolation and unification, 172; Dimension überhaupt, 173.

Natorp, III, Die logischen Grundlagen der exakten Wissenschaften, 35, 51, 52.

Natorp, III, held Aristotle's Xth book of Metaphysics to be non-authentic, 13; our imagination gives a kind of reflection of things (the copy theory), 35; his caricature of naïve experience; he holds that the things given beforehand are syntheses of primitive understanding, far from pure or correct, 51; the naïve exp. of a thing is lodged in the vestibule of mathematical logicism by Natorp and inexact, 52.

Natural Aspect, III, of the State, can only be understood in a normative juridically qualified individuality structure, and not merely functionally, 493.

Natural Beauty, III, and the observer's task of deepening his own natural aesthetic vision, 114.

Natural Family, III, the cognatic ‘extended family’, 180; the typical foundation of the family in the biotic aspect of reality; the communal tie between parents and children is genetic, grounded in a blood relation of an extremely immediate kind; human procreation is not entirely biotic or functional; but has a biotic substratum; human blood-relationship is not qualified biotically; Aristotle's and Thomas' views, 267; the universality view of the marriage and family bond; in what sense there is universality; the differentiating process leaves the inner structure intact and concerns only the positive forms of actual transitory societal relationships, 268; the undifferentiated household was never identical with the actual natural family-relationship; the natural family is not a rudiment of a former historical phase; it is a normative bond of love based on the natural ties of blood between parents and children; the reflection of the bond of love between the Heavenly Father and His human children; this love is not the meaningfulness of love in the corpus Christi, but is temporal modal; founded in the biotical aspect, qualified by the

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typical moral love between parents and children, 269; its biotic foundation is not detrimental to the purity of its moral love but gives it intensity; this love cannot be matched by any other moral relation except the conjugal bond; the moral aspect coheres with all other modal aspects; family love cannot be reduced to an instinctive feeling of sympathy, 270; such feeling must be opened in the anticipatory direction by the moral bond; the love principle has not been affected by sin; sin affects subjective positivizations; family unity is normative; its realization is defective; Litt's error, 271; the moral qualification of parental authority; the latter has the intimacy of the bond of love by its natural biotic foundation; the divine fifth commandment is not at all in conflict with the intimacy of family love, education in the family sphere is irreplaceable, 274; the internal legal relations of the family; the parental competence has an internal function, and an external function in civil law; parental discipline compared with that of magistrates; difference between penal and disciplinary law; the competence to punish; parental discipline has a penal character in accordance with the structure of the family, 275; its pedagogical nature; it is accommodated to the stage of the child's development; children have a right to receive their livelihood from their parents as a proof of their love, 276; juridical relations within a family, 277; aesthetical aspect of family relations; aesthetical anticipation in juridical relations, 283; disharmony is a subjective anti-normative realization of family relations; beauty of family life is not artistic; it implies authority and subordination, 284; social and lingual functions; economic function; feeling tone within the family; the social tone; respect for parents; politeness and helpfulness; formality nor disrespect towards parents; tenderness; social respect is not identical with moral respect; they are interwoven, 285; cultural aspect of family life; education; the parents' formative power and the cultural stage of development of society; undifferentiated cultural spheres; modern society; home education in the early years; support of psychology and pedagogy, 286; school and family; the moral bonds among teachers and pupils are typically determined by the instructional community, 287; different schools, 287; communal sense in the home and in later life; communal notions in the family are pre-theoretical and directly founded in the life of feeling; such communal thought is guided by family love; it implies parental authority; later on in puberty parental thought should be justified by arguments, 288; the internal communal sphere of thought must be accommodated to the development of the adolescents; social prejudices; historical position of the family's milieu; pre-logical functions of family life; they are directed by family love; i.e. their anticipatory spheres are opened; the naturalistic conception: a reflex of biotic relations; reciprocity within the group is viewed as a biological necessity; but in this conception the opened anticipatory spheres of pre-psychical functions are unawares taken for the closed functions; Alfred Vierkandt on reciprocity, 290; what is taken for granted in his theory, 291; the biotic bonds of blood between parents and children cannot be separated from their moral qualification; motherly love of foster children; they do not belong to the family proper, 292; absence or weakness of communal family feeling is contrary to the inner vital law of the family; such feeling is opened by the moral function into tenderness, 293; souvenirs in the subject-object relation; pretium affectionis; psychical interlacements; authority and respect, 294; the internal affective relations between parents and children are actually interwoven with a great many other feelings: national feeling, that of social standing, ecclesiastical cummunal feeling, etc., 295; a family relationship does not have a mystical biotic corporeal organism apart from that of its members; but in the biotic aspect of their individual existences there are structural communal relations interweaving the members of a family, 299; these relations function in a moral anticipating way, 300; the family has typical chemical-physical and spatial aspects; its origin lies in the female ovarian cell fecundated by the male sperm; the care of the biophysical aspects is guided by love; left to instinctive natural impulses a human being would die; the spatial centre of the home, 301; the feeling for home; souvenirs suggest spatial nearness of the other members of the family; the family unity implies a typical unity in multiplicity in the numeral aspect: bi-unity is expanded into multi-unity in normative freedom of action, 302; the family relationship functions in faith; the father is the priest; but the family is not qualified as a typical faith communion; but it is the temporal expression of the religious meaningfulness of human communion in Christ in His relation to the Divine Father as the Son; its moral function does not terminate a family's opening process; its anticipatory spheres are opened by faith in the transcendental direction; faith does not obliterate a family's moral destination, but refers it to the Heavenly Father; a family implies a certain simultaneity in the internal interweavings of its members; when both parents have died the family-bond as such is broken, 304; the typical conjugal relations remain separate from the family commun-

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ity; the bi-unity of husband and wife depends on their personal individuality; polygamy means as many marriages as the husband has wives; the harem is only enkaptically interwoven with the marriage bond; it is unnatural; marriage is impaired by it; polygamy gives rise to the relationship of a ‘joint, or extended family’, a strongly patriarchal-agnatic kinship, 305; but such an extended family is not necessarily polygamic, the Roman family excluded polygamy in its extended patriarchal character; this type of family is not a natural community; death of a marriage partner and re-marriage of the surviving partner, and parental authority; the original marriage has then ceased to exist; marriage and family are intertwined enkaptically, 306; they are of the same radical type, but of different genotypes; the institutional sexual union of husband and wife is serviceable for the propagation of the human race; marriage is the ‘germ-cell’ of the family relationship; marriage is also a legal institution; but it is qualified as a love union; love is not subordinate, 307; but has primacy; Scholastic view of marriage as a legal institution for the propagation of the human race; conjugal love was considered as variable feeling, a mere instrument for propagation; civil and canon law contain regulations which have only a formal and external character; the Scholastic view is unbiblical and untenable, 308; the institutional conjugal community is not dependent for its structure on the subjective arbitrary discretion of the partners; they are subjected to its institutional law; its continuous identity is not exclusively found on its lawside, 309; their unity in duality should be realized in a constant subjective vital union; a constant anti-normative attitude destroys the possibility of realizing the internal bond of marriage; but in its external relations in society the marriage is not dissolved; it is a civil institution still; civil or tribal law alone can dissolve it, 310; or in Roman Catholic countries canon law can; canon and civil law may be in conflict in this respect; the social form of marriage is maintained; divorce problems; the Pharisees and Christ, 311; deriving legal norms from the New Testament is a relapse into legalism; the Thomistic view; the theory of the bona matrimonii; marriage as a natural law institution, 312; agapê, eros and original sin in Luther; influence of Thomistic natural law conception on Protestant ethics, 314, 315; the contractual view in canon law and in Humanistic natural law, 316, 317; marriage as a love union in post-Kantian German Idealism; ‘free love’, 317, 318; Roman Catholic reaction; the primacy of love: the encyclical Casti connubii, 319, 320; see further under ‘marriage’ 306-342; Kulturkreislehre, 333-41; natural conjugal family; kinship community and marriage are biotically founded and morally qualified, 342; a joint family is not biotically founded; kinship is unorganized; leges barbarum of Germanic tribes, 343 (cf. Cognate family).

Natural Forces, II, are deified in apostate faith, 132.

Natural History, II, this term explained, 196, 229; Rickert first adopted it, but gave it up later on, 230 (note).

Natural Law, I, in early Christian philosophy, 182; and the body politic, in Thomism; criticized by Hume, 311; rejected by Calvin, 519.

Natural Law, II, Felix Somló, 142; from Grotius to Rousseau, Kant and the young Fichte explained the indirect arithmetical retrocipations in the jural sphere by imputing an original mathematical meaning to them in the nominalistic doctrine of ‘natural law’, the ‘mos geometricus’; they tried to construe the State, the juridical person and the legal order out of their ‘mathematical elements’, 167; the Humanistic doctrine of natural law was tied down to an atomistic-mechanistic way of thought; the state became a totality of individuals instituted by means of contracts, 342; the ideals of natural law of the Enlightenment were meta-historical, guided by the faith in the science ideal and that of personality in its rationalistic individualistic form, 356, 357; the theme of innate human rights was conceived by John Locke, then expanded in the theory of the rights of men and citizens by Rousseau, and the French Revolution; the conception of absolute rights of the individual is in conflict with the fundamental structure of any positive legal order because every right is by nature relative, 357; in Hobbes, 403; the theory of personality rights tries to make the personality as such into an object of subjective rights; and is inherited from Locke is and Chr. Wolff's views of innate human rights, 413.

Natural Law, III, and the view of Hugo Grotius, 169; and the State, in Aristotle, 223; in Stoicism; the legal order with its external tonos was grounded in the lex naturalis, 228, 229; but did not permit essential subordination in Stoicism, 231; the Humanistic view of natural law, 232; here the State is the centre of a corporative unity; fiction theory; contract theory; Hobbes, 235; the mathematical science ideal and natural law; the state is an all-embracing societal relationship in Hobbes and Rousseau: State-absolutism; sometimes non-political organizations were granted freedom on the basis of natural law, 236.

Natura Naturans, I, is God, in G. Bruno, 199.

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Natura naturata, I, in G. Bruno is the self-development of God, 199.

Natura praeambula Gratiae, I, in Thomism, 66.

Natural Powers, II, the fear of the powers of nature is at the basis of primitive faith, 297.

Natural Reason, I, in Thomism, 36; depreciated by Occam, 67; is autonomous in Thomas Aquinas, 179.

Natural Science, I, modern mathematical natural science founded by Galileo, etc., 193, 201.

Natural Scientific Methods, I, expanded over the total act of thinking in modern Humanistic Philosophy, 206.

Natural Theology, I, rejected by Occam, 67; in Kant, 338; destroyed by Kant's Kritik d.r. Vernunft, 372; an audacious curiosity of human reason according to Calvin, 517.

Nature, I, has nothing divine, in Kant, 67; is immeasurable to modern man, 192; is a teleological, living whole, in Leonardo Da Vinci; deified by Lorenzo Valla, 198; is the ‘mundus sensibilis’ in Kant, 347; must be subsumed by Kant under the freedom of reason, 386; in Fichte, is the reasonable ethical appearance of God, 475; is considered to be ‘rational’ in its deepest foundation by B. Bavink, 560 (note).

Nature, II, the true ground of being is no longer mathematic thought in Kant; in Fichte nature is phenomenon, meaningless in itself, the material for doing our duty, 27; nature assumes meaning through value, in Neo-Kantian thought, 27; no synthesis of reality and value by the Akt-Sinn, 27; nature and value, 201; N. as the spirit that is coming into existence, in Schelling's philosophy, 278; Nature and freedom, their synthesis and unity according to von Savigny, 278; Christian thought should reject the dyalism of Nature and Grace, 334.

Nature, III, there is no style in nature, 121; Protagoras depreciated nature, 199.

Nature And Freedom, I, this motive is the religious background to the Humanistic ideal of science and personality, 36; in Kant, 62; in the Modern Humanistic life and world view, 63, 187, 190; Fichte attempted their synthesis in the historical field; the indeterminate concept is ‘free force’; ‘dead nature’ is governed by mathematical-mechanical laws; freedom is alive and ruled by the autonomous moral law, 487; this motive evoked apparently diametrically opposed systems of thought, 499.

Nature and Grace, I, the Thomistic conception of the autonomy of the naturalis ratio has its background in the Scholastic basic motive of nature and grace; in the proper use of natural reason philosophy can never contradict the supernatural truths of grace in the Church-doctrine; the Aristotelian metaphysics and view of nature are accommodated to the ecclesiastical dogma, 36; in Roman-Catholicism, 63, 65; Thomism, 72, 180, 181, 183; these motives got separated in Humanism, 187; in Leibniz, 190; Grace is the sphere of clear and distinct thought in Leibniz; nature is the sphere that lacks freedom, 226; this motive operated in Lutheranism which Brunner tried to accommodate to Calvin's view of the law, 520.

Nature and Grace, III, according to Robbers, 73; in Emil Brunner, 403.

Nature Philosophy, I, of Schelling, 208.

Nayar Caste, III, in India; they are matriarchal, 341.

Nazional Sozialismus, II, old Germanic traits in it, 274.

Nazi-Ideology, III, was irrational and historicistic, 414.

Neanderthal-Man, II, his culture is a subject of so-called pre-history, not a historical subject proper, 265.

Néant, Le, I, in Sartre, 53.

Nemesius, III, De natura hom., 227.

Neo-Hegelianism, I, in Germany, 212.

Neo-Hegelianism, II, history is the creation of the ‘objective Mind’; transpersonal reason (Vernunft) infolding itself in time, 213; Julius Binder's view on systematic juridical science and the science of legal history; both have the same Gegenstand, 213.

Neo-Kantians, I, some Neo-Kantians distinguish between a critical and a genetic method of thought, which terminology is confusing, 9; Rickert, 14, 15; on the self-sufficiency of philosophic thought ‘within its own field’, 20, 22 (note), 23; they oppose ‘Being’ tot ‘Validity’, ‘reality’ to ‘value’; Rickert reserves the term ‘meaning’ exclusively for ‘culture’ as a subjective relating of reality to values, 76; they were anti-metaphysical; but elevated the lex continui to the basic law of philosophical thought; Natorp's concept of the continuity postulate, 204; Neo-Kantians supposed they could correct Kant by abolishing his limitation of the sovereignty of theoretical thought to sensory phenomena; they extended the logicized ideal of knowledge to the normative world; thus they violated the typical structure of Kant's transcendental basic idea, 356; the Neo-Kantians take up Maimon's Idea as the logical origin principle that knows no other archè but creative mathematical thought; Kant's categories must be derived from their logical origin

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in a dynamic process of creation, they applied Leibniz' continuity postulate to Kantian categories, 407; in the principle of determinability thought becomes ‘thinking of being’ and all being becomes ‘being of thought’; reality can hold as reality only insofar as it is derived from a logical origin, 409.

Neo-Kantians, II, their theory of law and Kant's form-matter schema; provinces of knowledge: logical, social, moral; they have recourse to Aristotle's logic with its ‘genus proximum et differentia specifica’, 14; they deviate from Kant; Stammler's views, 16; Kelsen's ‘Reine Rechtslehre’; his conception of Kant's categories, 17; the logically continuous order of the various sciences created by logical processes, 49; J.P. van Mullem; Görland; Nicolai Hartmann, 51; physical phenomena and space, 95; the facts of history are related to values; their view of individuality and history, 194; Rickert on individual causality, 254; Fichte's philosophy of history combined with Kant's critical formalism; individuality subsumed under the subjective teleological viewpoint leads to formalism; teleology of cultural sciences, 421; individuality is the mè on; meaning-individuality is only cultural: the form of thought is conceived apart from the meaning coherence, the subject-side of the juridical law-sphere is reduced to the law-side, which is mis-interpreted in a formalistic way, 422.

Neo-Platonism, I, its descending progression of degrees of reality, 178.

Neo-Platonism, III, and metaphysical ideas, 189.

Neo-Positivism, I, proceeding from Ernst Mach, 213.

Neo-Scholasticism, I, of Boutroux, 525.

Neo-Scholasticism, II, Scheler's Idea of God and that of person are neo-Scholastic speculative metaphysics, 590, 591.

Neo-Scholasticism, III, August Brunner; substance is human personality in its concrete unity and identity; in the material levels of being the selfhood in its concerning (Sorge) struggle for possession seeks permanent things to rely on; a substance is a fixed thing with a certain permanency, 5; Mansion and Marlet on the concept ‘substance’, 16; Neo-Scholasticism is influenced by some ideas of Leibniz' monadology; it is spiritualistic; irrationalistic; conceives of the essence of things as volitional energy, the impulse of action; a modern irrationalistic reaction against the scientialist view of the world; natural science is said to be a controlling attitude furnishing only external knowledge; the ‘living’ attitude penetrates to the internal essence which is love and a longing for completion, 71; the difference between neo-Scholasticism and the phil. of the Cosmonomic Idea is the latter's rejection of any accommodation of Greek or Humanistic motives to the Christian faith, 74.

Neo-Vitalism, III, of Driesch, 647.

Neurath, O., II, on unified science, 59.

Neurosis, Compulsive, II, Freud ‘explains faith’ as a universally human compulsive neurosis-originating from the infantile ‘Oedipus-complex’. The father, admired and feared, is the primitive image of every form of deity, 313.

Neutrality-Postulate, I, in immanence philosophy it is often maintained that the ‘objectivity’ and ‘universal validity’ of philosophy and its scientific character will be endangered if philosophy were to bind itself to religious or ‘weltanschauliche’ convictions, 14; this is the so-called ‘neutrality-postulate’, defended by Rickert, 15; under the influence of the personality-ideal the neutrality-postulate is a means to avoid self-reflection as to the transcendental basic Idea of a philosophic system; it originates from Kant's distinction between theoretical and practical reason and his attempt to emancipate the free and autonomous personality from the tyranny of the science-ideal; this postulate is of a religious origin; Rickert's defence of this postulate, 129, 134.

Neutrality-Postulate, II, Kant suggests that his critique of knowledge has been composed apart from any religious attitude and is quite unprejudiced as the product of ‘pure theoretical reflection’, 493.

Neutral State, III, the State is never neutral; its modal revelational principle assumes a political type of individuality; outside the Word-Revelation this principle turns into a law of sin, 503.

Newton, I, laid the foundations of modern mathematical natural science, 193, 201; his ‘absolute mathematical time’ refuted by D. Hume, 286; tempus quod aequabiliter fluit, 328; Kant struggled with the proud structure of Newton's system of natural science, 330; Kant pointed metaphysics to the method of mathematical physics formulated by Newton, 336; his pronouncement: ‘hypotheses non fingo’, 337; Kant defended Newton's and Euler's doctrine of ‘absolute pure space’ - which was termed ‘sensorium Dei’ -, in a writing of the year 1768, 342; Kant accepted Newton's view of corporeal things filling space, 348; N.'s view of the compatibility of mechanism and Divine teleology in nature, 398.

Newton, II, movement in space, 95; ‘absolute’ space, 95; space is a metaphysical entity: sensorium Dei, 96, 97; Newton's mathematical time is kinematical, 100; his principles of natural science and Voltaire's view of historical development, 268, 269; dominated the Enlightenment together

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with Locke, 350; Newton's empirical method applied to history, 352.

Newton, III, the constants of modern physics have nothing to do with Newton's rigid ‘material units’, or substances, 23; his concept of force and that of Leibniz' monadology; Stoker's use of this concept; its influence on Scheler, on French spiritualistic neo-Scholasticism, 70.

Niebuhr, Reinhold, I, The Principle of Ethics, 521; Nature and Destiny of Man, 521 (note)

Niebuhr, Reinhold, III, Römische Geschichte, 369.

Nicolaus of Oresme, I, formulated the new concept of the law of motion; and anticipated Copernicus' discovery; and invented the method of analytical geometry before Descartes, 202.

Nietsche, I, Genealogie der Sitten, 125.

Nietsche, I, on life and world views; his philosophy of life sets philosophy the task of determining the practical ‘ordering of values according to rank’; philosophers are called ‘commanders and law-givers’; philosophy is the ‘art of living’, 125; his gospel of the super-man, 210; first a Romantic Idealist, later a Darwinian evolutionist; developed the religion of power; man an animal not yet fixed, overestimating his own importance; a ‘phantastic animal’ with ideologies; he killed his gods; history a struggle for power; the ‘Will to Power’; super-man; blond beast; transvaluation of all values; science has only pragmatic value; no faith in scientific truth or in the Idea of humanity, 211; since a new development of the natural-science-ideal under Darwin's influence pervaded the ‘historical mode of thought’, the irrationalistic turn in Humanistic freedom-idealism led to a dialectical struggle between the two basic factors of the Humanistic transcendental basic Idea; Nietsche's final phase marks the beginning of the religious uprooting of modern thought; this was the result of the dialectical self-destruction of Humanism in radical Historicism; Nietsche's first period was romantic-aesthetic, influenced by Schopenhauer and Richard Wagner; his second phase was positivistic, 465; the biological ideal gets the upperhand; in his last period, that of the culture-philosophy of the ‘Superman’, the science-ideal has been entirely depreciated; science is a biological means in the struggle for life, without any truth-value, 466.

Nietsche, II, on good and evil in an ethical sense, 148.

Nizolius, Marius, I, his extreme nominalistic sensualism conceived the universalia as mere collectives comprehending all the individual things implied in them; a concept is an abbreviated summation of many sensorily perceived individuals which are signified by a common name; this conception does not do justice to the Humanistic science ideal with its creation motive, 244.

Noah, III, the Divine covenant with Noah, and the State, 423.

Nodal Points, III, of enkaptic interlacement are the positive forms given to these interlacements, 664.

Noema, II, in Husserl; every noema has a content, viz. its meaning, i.e. the intended as such, 28.

Noematical Contents, II, of the intentional acts of consciousness in the intuition of the essence (Wesensanschauung), 544.

Noetic And Noematic, II, in Husserl ‘meaning’ becomes identical with the ‘Reine Aktwesen’ both as regards its subjective noetic and its objective noematic aspect, 27.

Nominalism, I, of Occam, 66; of Thomas Hobbes, 150; of the 14th century turned against realistic Scholasticism, 183-185; was related to Augustinian thought through the Franciscans, 186; disrupted the Christian and the pagan motives of Scholasticism, 187; was secularized in the later Middle Ages by John of Jandun and Marsilius of Padua, 188; of Descartes, 222; of Leibniz was moderate; in Locke, 224, 225; of Hobbes was radical, 225; its theory of natural law cannot ascribe ontological reality to the State, 311; Occamist nominalism of Luther, 512.

Nominalism, II, universalia post rem; noumenon and phenomenon; concept is symbol of a set of individual things, 387; Occam: universalia are exclusively intentional; they are symbolic terms (termini) signifying things; an intentional concept is almost identical with the actus intelligendi; in nominalism and in realism the subject-object relation is detached from the meaning coherence; as the merely intended content of thought; Aristotle's theory leads to the copy doctrine; both in Thomas and Occam; Occam: supponere pro; universalia are no mere fictions, but images (imago), symbolical copies of things, but no substantial essential forms; Scholastic error about the Gegenstand of theor. thought, 388; intentional object and Gegenstand are identified, 389; the nominalistic separation between faith and reason, 564; is impossible and rests on the hypostatization of synthetical thought, 565.

Nominalism, III, in Riehl, 45; and sociological individualism, 183; Othmar Spann's view of universalism and individualism errs in two respects; not all nominalism is individualistic; modern irrationalistic nominalism is universalistic in sociology; so is the nominalistic Stoa in an under cur-

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rent; sociology is based on ontology; the realistic metaphysical theories of Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas are universalistic; rationalist individualist nominalism denies the metaphysical foundation of social relationships, 222; Plato's Glaucon in his Politeia considered only the individual sensory thing is real and enclosed within itself, the individual person precedes every societal relationship; the state as an aggregate of individuals; Sophists and Cynics denied social life, 223; nominalistic theories are functionalistic; e.g. a community is based on psychical interaction between individuals; or on a legal contract; Aristotle's ‘social impulse’ was transformed into naturalistic or idealistic functionalism; the Stoic appetitus socialis; Averroist nominalism of John of Jandun and Marsilius of Padua, 224.

Nomos, I, only has meaning in correlation with the subject-side of the cosmos, 96.

Norms, II, a norm is a rational standard founded in the logical manner of distinction; the central commandment of love is not a norm, 156 (note); according to Windelband, the logical, aesthetic, and ethical norms have an absolute character, elevated above time and not subject to temporal change, 239; but the truth is that logical, aesthetical and ethical norms, etc., are neither absolute, nor invariable, 240, 241.

Normological Theory, III, of Kelsen; the State as a logical system of legal norms, 387; of Jellinek; his view resulted in the theoretical negation of the State and of law, 432, 433.

Nothingness, I, idolatrous absolutization is necessarily directed to the speciality of meaning, which is thereby dissociated from its temporal coherence, and consequently becomes meaningless and void; the fall into sin is a privatio, a negation, a nothingness, 63.

Nothingness (das Nights), II, in Heidegger in its awareness of the nothingness of its Being; Dasein turns in upon itself and reflects on its freedom in order to project its finite existence, revealing it in its inner essence in the movement of historical time, 22, 23.

Noumenon, I, is the transcendent realm in which the ideas of free autonomous will and God have ‘practical reality’, in Kant's thought, 90; in Kant, is a self-sufficient metaphysical reality, but it avenges itself by logical formalism in ethics, 357.

Noumenon, II, in Kant's dualistic cosmonomic Idea the realm of experience (of nature) is separated from that of super-sensory freedom; the realm of the understanding is restricted to the phenomenon; the practical realm of reason bears on the super sensory sphere of the absolute normative noumenon, 43; in Kant the theoretical Idea refers to the transcendent root of reality in a theoretically transcendental sense; this root is the Idea of the Homo noumenon, 44; Kant's idea of the homo noumenon is a theoretical idea, based on synthetical abstraction, 187 (note); Plato split up reality into an independent noumenon and a material phenomenon, 387; Kant sharply opposes phenomena to noumena, showing that he holds to the absolute transcendence of the practical Ideas above the temporal world, 523.

Nous, I, the human nous has become the carnal mind, through sin, 100; the Divine nous is actus purus and pure Form, first transcendent cause, unmoved mover and final end of the cosmos in Aristotle, 122; or the divine mind, in Plato, 248.

Nous, II, the actual nous, i.e., the actual reason, cannot become matter because it is the Archè of all delimitation of meaning, in Aristotle, 11.

Novalis, I, laws are absolutely opposite to morality; they are the complement of defective natures and entities, (note) 465.

Nucleus, III, of an atom; determines the place of an element in the periodical system, and its physico-chemically qualified geno-type, 699; of a living cell; bears the heredity factors, and is the vital centre of the cell, 722.

Numerical Aspect, I, the + and - order of numbers is a modal aspect of time, and in temporal reality it is continually related to factual duration; the + and - directions express a numerial order of time determining the place and value of each of the numbers; Kant made number originate from a schematizing of the logical category of quantity in time; Hamilton defined arithmetic as the science of pure time or order in progression; intuitionalistic mathematics makes numbers originate from a synthesis of the original intuition of time and the original ideas of one and addition, 32 (notes); Leibniz held that number as a sum of static units is the metaphysical basic Idea of the cosmos; later he gave this up and held that a discrete element is only a function of the mathematical principle of progression, and number itself is the simplest instance of the general relation of thought; his mathematics is logicistic, 229; the differential number anticipates the modal meaning of phoronomic movement, 236; according to Hume, number is a fiction, 287.

Number, II, rational, irrational, and complex numbers pre-suppose the ‘natural’ numbers; the nuclear meaning of number is discrete quantity disclosed in the se-

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ries principle of numerical time-order in the plus and minus directions, 79; Russell introduces the class concept to deduce number from the extension of the concept of class, 83; irrational and differential functions of number are not actual numbers. They are only complicated relations between natural integers; mathematics is dependent on the character of the natural numbers, 88; Neo-Kantians logicize space and number exhaustively, 91.

Number, Irrational and Differential Functions of, II, anticipate original space and movement, 87.

Numerus formalis, I, in Augustinus; in Albertus Magnus, 26.