A New Critique of Theoretical Thought. Deel 4. Index of Subjects and Authors

M

Macchiavelli, I, displayed a tension between pessimism and optimism in combining virtue and necessity, 217.

Macchiavelli, III, influenced by Polybius, 231; his theory of the ‘raison d'état’ appealed to by the adherents of the theory of the power State, 399.

Mach, Ernst, I, founder of Neo-Positivism, whose centre was the Vienna School, expected a more adequate approach to reality from modern natural science; formulas and concepts of physics are mere symbols, 213; his purely technical conception of the Humanistic Science-ideal, 556; his own and Ostwald's opposition to the acceptance of real atoms and light waves, and their attempt to resolve physical causality into a purely mathematical concept of function, depends on their positivist sensualistic standpoint in philosophy, 557; a mathematically formulated theory is correct if it explains in the simplest way possible the phenomena known up till the present time by bringing them in a functional coherence; this is the principle of logical economy, 558.

Mach, Ernst, II, the term ‘principle of economy’, 66, 123; biologistic interpretation of logical economy, 175.

Macro- and Microcosm, III, in Plato, 207.

Magic, II, Frazer denies that magic belongs to ‘religion’, i.e., to a cult in the modal meaning of faith, 312; he holds that every cult is preceded by a period of magic; magic is directed to the impersonal forces of nature, and does not strive after the propitiation of the deity, but aims at dominating nature; the discovery of the inefficacy of magic leads to the feeling of the power of the invisible, and from this feeling arises the worship of the personified forces of nature, and death; later on to polytheism, and then to monotheism, 313.

Extensive Magnitude, II, as a complex anticipation of space in the irrational function of number within the series of the ‘real numbers’, 170.

Maier, Heinrich, I, Philipp. Melanchton als Philosoph, 515.

Maimon, Salomon, I, Versuch über die Transzendentalphilosophie, 405, 407; Über die Progressen der Philosophie, 406.

Maimon, Salomon, he introduced into Kant's episte-

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mology Leibniz' doctrine of the ‘petites perceptions’, eliminated the concept ‘Ding an sich’; his method to have the ‘matter’ of experience originate from the transcendental consciousness is an apostasy from Kant's transcendental motive; Kant's philosophy had started critical self-reflection on the personality ideal, Maimon dropped it, 404; Maimon wants to overcome the antinomy of the Cricital form-matter schema; he reduced ‘sensory experience’ to the creative consciousness as purely theoretical; the matter of knowledge is produced unconsciously in the consciousness; it is to be understood as the ‘transcendental differential’ of clear transcendental-logical thought; ‘Ding an sich’ becomes a theoretical limiting concept; oriented to the continuity postulate of the science ideal; M.'s basic problem is that of the universal a priori forms of the ‘transcendental consciousness’ and the particular matter, 405; Maimon tried to reconcile mathematical idealism with Critical transcendentalism; to the Idea of the Divine Understanding any Critique of pure Reason must be reduced; this was a regression to dogmatism; Maimon tries to give Kant's matter of consciousness a mathematical basis; the understanding asks after the origin of the sensory impressions of the Gegenstand, 406; Kant's Idea or noumenon becomes a mathematical differential concept as the foundation of Kant's sensory matter of consciousness; the Idea knows no other archè but creative mathematical thought, 407; he tries to clarify the relation of the particular to the universal by means of his new conception of the Idea as ‘differential of consciousness’; the modal particularity of meaning must be reduced to its origin, according to a logical principle of creation; the problem of specification is set in the frame of a cosmonomic Idea; he starts with the specification of the formal logical concepts into the special concepts of mathematics; he refers space as ‘apriori form of intuition’ to its logical origin; then the problem broadens to that of the origin of all ‘real’ thought in universally valid synthetic judgments with a special sense; his principle of determinability, 408; this expresses the Idea of logical domination of the manifold in the special Gegenstände of thought, not to be derived from merely analytical principles; the principle of determinability becomes the origin principle of all particular judgments of knowledge, in which thought becomes ‘thinking of being’, and all being becomes ‘being of thought’; three ways to combine a plurality of objects of consciousness into a logical unity; the elements are inter-independent; then thought remains formal; the elements are inter-dependent; cause and effect in a judgment of causality, 409; in the mathematical style of thinking, e.g., thought becomes thought of reality; the predicate cannot be thought without the subject; empirical judgments are synthetic but do not hang together systematically according to the principle of determinability; gold is a complex sense perception; the reason of its qualities occurring together is hidden; here is Maimon's critical scepticism, 410; he ends in scepticism with respect to Kant's a priori principles of experience; he only acknowledges as valid the logicized mathematics and the transcendental philosophy as science of the synthetic origin of the pure forms of consciousness; his continuity postulate of the science ideal halts before the boundary of sensory phenomena, 411; M.'s dilemma with respect to the ‘Ideas’: they are either to be taken in Leibniz' sense, or as mere fictions of phantasy in Hume's sense; later on Leibniz' speculative Idea of God lost its significance to Maimon, the Ideas tend to be fictitious; he sharply separated reason and sensibility; his transcendental basic Idea lacks unity in its Archimedean point, 412; Maimon influenced Fichte, 427.

Maimon, Salomon, II, denied that Kant's synthetical judgments could be a priori applied to the sensory matter of experience, 449.

Maimonides, I, sought to synthesize the Old Testament and Aristotelianism, 173.

Maine, Summer, III, on the evolution from status to contract, 178.

Majority Principle, III, rejected by Aristotle, 211.

Malan, G.H.T., II, De Eerste (Getals-)kring van Dooyeweerd, 84, 85, 89.

Malan, G.H.T., II, starts from the ‘Gegenstandstheorie’ of A. Meinong; he holds that number pre-supposes sensory perceptible pre-numeral sets of discrete objects, 84; he interprets Bertrand Russell; accuses Dooyeweerd of hypostatizing a quantative mode of being ‘number’; Malan's original objects with number, 84; numbers are his ‘objects’ of the third stage; ‘prenumeral sets’, 85.

Malberg, Carré de, III, Contribution à la théorie générale de l'Etat, 407.

Malebranche, I, his idea concerning a ‘visio omnium rerum in Deo’, 525.

Malebranche, II, strongly influenced Scheler's phenomenology, 589.

Malinowsky, II, contradicts Cassirer's assertion that in a primitive community the individuality of its members is totally absorbed, 320.

Malinowsky, III, Crime and Custom in Savage Society, 371.

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Malinowsky, III, legal, moral, social and faith rules are not interwoven into an undifferentiated unity in primitive societies; they have differentiated categories of norms; he also criticizes the current view that primitive societies do not possess an idea of ‘propriety’ (Sitte), 371.

Man, I, he whose ego expresses itself in the coherence of all its temporal modal functions, was created as the expression of God's image, 4; man transcends the temporal coherence in his selfhood, but within this coherence he exists in a status of being universally bound to time, together with all creatures that are fitted with him in the same temporal order, 24; as an individual totality of functions in Rickert's thought, 129; according to Nietsche, man is a ‘phantastic animal, not yet fixed’, 211; may be an end in himself only in the subject-object relation, 377; was created as a ‘homo noumenon’, not as a ‘phenomenon’, according to Kant, 380.

Man, III, is a microcosm in Plato, 207; his hierarchical structure of the three parts of the soul; individual man is a kind of state ruled by reason, 230; the body of man is the vehicle of the soul; this is an objectivistic conception in Plato, 778.

Mana, II, the divine mana is also named orenda, wakonda, manitu, dema; the mana-idea possesses a peculiar fluidity; in it the natural and the super-natural, the personal and the impersonal are merged; its counterpart is taboo; the disintegration of the sense of personal identity in mana and totemism, 316; is elevated above the familiar every-day sphere of life which can be conceived by common sense; it is personified in mythical figures embodied in visible things: plants, animals, men, and also in unfamiliar or huge objects, regarded as the masks of the mysterious mana, 317.

Mana-Belief, III, in totemistic clans, 356.

Mangold, H., III, he gave rise to an entirely new embryo by transplanting a piece of the blastopore of a gastrula into the tissue of another embryo, 752.

Mankind, Idea of, II, the categorical imperative of Kant's philosophy demands respect for the Idea of mankind, 149.

Mankind, III, the fall of mankind, 69; and love, 71; mankind is not enclosed in a temporal kingdom of individual beings, 87, 89; racial differences, 89; is not a temporal community, 163; the Biblical revelation, 168; the Stoic conception and that of Hugo Grotius, 169; mankind is a central religious community, 170; the religious solidarity of mankind, 196.

Mannheim, Karl, I, sociology of thought, 165.

Mannheim, Karl, III, on the sociology of thought, 289.

Manorial Communities, III, villae, domaines; they are undifferentiated organized communities, 367.

Man's position in the World, III, this is a question of anthropology; it can only be dealt with after we have gained insight into the transcendental conditions of philosophic thought and into the different dimensions of the temporal horizon with its modal and individuality structures; existentialism seeks an immediate approach to the innermost sphere of man's temporal existence to interpret the I-ness in its situation in the world from the supposedly most fundamental strata of human existence of concern, care, dread, i.e., its ‘Existentialen’; Binswanger replaces Heidegger's ‘dread’ by ‘love’ (the meeting between I and thou); this seems to assume a trustworthy Christian meaning; this existentialistic trend is not interested in structural investigations like ours, 781; it pretends it can penetrate into its subject matter by an immediate ‘encounter’; ‘encounter’ as the genuine inner knowledge method is opposed to ‘experience’ as affording ‘objectifying outer knowledge’; Christian neo-scholasticists think this existentialist anthropology more ‘Biblical’ than rationalism and idealism; this is another attempt at accommodation; Sören Kierkegaard considered existentialism to be separated from the Divine Revelation in Jesus Christ by an unbridgeable gulf; the ultimate and central questions cannot be answered by philosophy in an autonomous way; they are religious; they are answered in the Divine Word Revelation; Christian theologians and philosophers join existentialism and thereby reject the radical transcendental critique of philosophic thought; it is wrong to expect so much from philosophic anthropology; the question about man's temporal existential form implies a series of primordial problems; man as such has no qualifying function, but transcends all temporal structures; man is not a ‘rational-moral being’; he is the creaturely centre of the whole earthly cosmos; he has an eternal destination in the fulness of his individual personality, 783; in temporal human existence we are confronted with an extremely intricate system of enkaptic structural interlacements which pre-suppose a comprehensive series of individuality structures bound within an enkaptic structural whole; the question about ‘who is man?’ is unaswerable from the immanence standpoint, 784.

Mansion, S., III, La première doctrine de la substance, 16.

Manus mariti in jus civile, III, the old Roman conception, 325.

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Marble, III, its structure; its function in a sculpture; a phenotype of an original genotype of inorganic matter, 119; its structure, 124, 125, 126.

Marble Sculpture, III, its enkapsis, 111.

Marchal, II, Gegenstand und Wesen der Wirtschaftswissenschaft, 123.

Marck, Siegfried, III, Substanzbegriff und Funktionsbegriff in der Rechtsphilosophie, 255, 259, 401, 408.

Marck, Siegfried, III, he holds that Theodor Litt has produced ‘a new type of social universalism in contrast to the old dogmatic and ontological version’, 255; he rejects Gierke's distinction between inner corporative and inter-individual law (Sozialrecht and Individualrecht), 259; he is oriented to Litt's dialectical sociology; he capitulates to the dualism of sein and sollen; but rejects the dialectical solution of Hegelianism; he remains dialectical phenomenological, 401; he opposes organization to social organism, 408.

Marcks, Erich, III, Gaspard von Coligny, 521.

Marcks, Erich, III, interprets Calvin's idea of Church government as the expression of the sovereignty of the congregation, 521.

Maritain, I, a French Neo-Thomist thinker, 524.

Marett, III, an adherent of Boas, 333.

Market, Free, III, and competition, 661.

Market Equilibrium, II, and the mechanical analogies of price-movement gave the mechanistic conceptions of pure economics a firm basis in the opinion of economists influenced by the classical Idea of mathesis universalis, 344.

Marlet, Michael Fr. J., S.J., III, Grundlinien der Kalvinistischen Philosophie der Gesetzidee als Christicher Transcendentalphilosophie, 6, 15, 73.

Marlet, Michael Fr. J., S.J., III, interprets the substance concept as a structure of being; its relation to the accidentalia, 16; he objects to the rejection of the substance concept; and says that in the struggle against Michael Servet Calvin exaggerated God's transcendence at the expense of man's being, accentuating God's immanence at the expense of man's creaturely activity, 72; on the philosophy of the Cosmonomic Idea, 73.

Marriage, III, conjugal relations remain separate from family relations; bi-unity in marriage; polygamy means a plurality of marriages; the harem is an enkapsis; the joint or extended family, polygamous or not; patriarchial agnatic kinship; the Roman family, 305; the Roman family excluded polygamy; the termination of the marriage bond, 306; marriage and family; radical and geno types; sexual union for the propagation of the race; marriage as a legal institution; love has primacy, 307; Scholastic view considered love as a changeable feeling instrumental to propagation; civil and canon law regulations have a formal and external character, 308; the structure of the conjugal community subjects its partners to its institutional law, not to their arbitrary discretion, 309; this law requires constant vital realization of the conjugal structure; permanent anti-normative behaviour destroys the internal union, but does not dissolve marriage as a civil (tribal, or ecclesiastical) institution, 310; canon law and civil law may be in conflict with each other; the social form of marriage is maintained; divorce; Christ and the Pharisees, 311; misuse of the New Testament; the Thomistic theory of the bona matrimonii; marriage as a natural law institution; this view favoured the idea of the primacy of the legal institution; canon law jurists and Roman Catholic philosophers elevate marriage as a divine and a natural law institution to a ‘sacrament’, 312; marriage is meant for the propagation of the human race according to Thomists like Cathrein, von Scherer, Hoegen, 313; agapê, eros, in Luther; Scholastic Protestant ethics; Luther's great Catechism gives love the primacy in marriage; Augustinus considered sexual pleasure as due to sin; Luther ascribed the sexual eros to the corruption of human nature, 314; the pre-Thomistic view of marriage as a sacrament served to sanctify the supposed sinful sexual erotic basis through ‘the means of grace of the Church’; marriage was a ‘less perfect state’; later Lutheranism considered it as the juridical order of sexual intercourse with the positive duty of procreation; Reformed ethics was tainted with Scholasticism, 315; the rationalistic Enlightenment; its view of married love as a ‘blind passion’ was individualistic; the methodist Whitefield boasted that in his proposal of marriage there had been no question of love ‘that foolish passion’; this was rationalistic utilitarian puritanism; the genetic juridical form of the marriage bond was absolutized in the Humanistic doctrine of natural law; marriage became the right to use each other's body; but until the Enlightenment marriage was held to be a permanent union which could not be dissolved by mutual agreement; a contract giving rise to jura in rē was already found in Canon Law, 316; but it concerned marriage in the state of becoming, the matrimonium in fieri (not in esse); its causa was procreation; its essence was found in the traditio corporum; Kant's view; he relates marriage exclusively to subjective sexual enjoyment; his crude definition; Romantic view of free love versus marriage as an institution, 317; in this con-

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ception nature was said to be dialectically united with freedom without any normative commitment; the aestheticist morality of men of genius; Schlegel's ‘Lucinde’ embodied the Romantic ideal of free love; Fichte's actualistic view of sexual love was incompatible with the institutional character of the marriage community, ignored its external civil juridical aspect as well as its internal juridical side; Hegel held the essence of marriage to be a juridical moral kind of love, 318; Roman Catholic recognition of the primacy of love; the new tendency: the Encyclical Casti Connubii; Hildebrand's view, 319, 320; Hilnebrand; older Roman Catholic conceptions: Cathrein; Thomas Aquinas, 321; the Encyclical ‘Casti Cunibii’; it compares very favourably with E. Brunner's conception of love as a ‘sandy ground’; marriage is intentionally adapted to the family relationship; and deepend by it; the selfhoods of the marriage partners are for all eternity interwoven with the new root of life, Christ Jesus; this is the religious fulness of meaning of marriage; they belong to each other as children of one Father in Christ; in a temporal sense they belong to each other as if they did not; temporal ties are perishable, 322; the religious union should find expression in the temporal; in a family the conjugal bi-unity has been expanded in a unity in plurality; the personality of the marriage partners in its temporal existence finds fuller expression in their union, and acquires a wider and deeper perspective in the multi-unitary bond of the family; Thomas says that posterity is essential to the marital bond; this is an error; childless marriages are genuine marriages; Thomas' view is contradictory, 323; married love sanctified in Christ justifies the sexual consummation of marriage; temperance and chastity; marital authority; its external juridical function, 324; the old Roman manus mariti in ius civile; the Roman legal concept of the agnatic patrician familia as concerned with an undifferentiated societal relationship, viz. the domestic community of the pater familias with its enkaptically interwoven structures; manus marriage; its disappearance; a husband's jus vitae ac necis with respect to his wife in Roman law; a husband's authority leads but does not dominate; male and female are equivalent, though not equal; marital authority and normal emotional life; female emotional life wants to find support and guidance in the husband, 325; the question of normal male and female feeling; cultural influences; the normative structural principle, 326; effeminacy in men; authority in the juridical aesthetical and social function of marriage; no autocracy; marriage is not a state in miniature; the co-responsibility of the wife; and civil law; the civil judge should not be the supreme power of decision here, 327; the female lead in marriage is a disharmony; the aesthetic function in marriage; social and lingual forms of intercourse in marriage, 328; marital authority is biotically founded; active and passive rôles in sexual intercourse; Aristotle's notions about the genesis of woman; the wife was held to be essentially imperfect; Thomas Aquinas calls her: ‘mas occasionatus’; ‘aliquid viri’; not ‘civis simpliciter’; marital authority, however, is a divine ordinance, 329; ethnological research should start from the structural principle of marriage when investigating marriage relations in primitive tribes; facts can only be conceived in their structural meaning; ‘empirical’ norms; ‘ideal types’, are useless; Max Weber; matriarchy in evolutionism; the socialist theories of Engels and Bebel; were based on L.H. Morgan's hypotheses; matriarchy discussed by J.J. Bachoven; he derived marriage from promiscuous sexual intercourse; matriarchy among the Lycians of Antiquity; Bachoven's explanation; women invented agriculture; then came patriarchy; L. Morgan elaborated this theme; the refutation of this theory, 331; about matriarchy and the Kulturkreislehre, 332-339; other abnormal external forms of marriage and family: levirate, sororate, brother-polyandry, the pirra-urra-relation; Frazer's theory of ‘group-marriage’, 339; his explanation of levirate; levirate and sororate are forms of ‘preferential marriages’; rare occurrence of polyandry; and then only brother polyandry; only the first born marries one woman; polyandry is usually found among peoples that lived, or still live, in matriarchy; matriarchy and patriarchy were mixed; the right of primo-geniture; Thurston pointed to the aim of polyandry; polyandry among the ancient Babylonians: Urucagina of Lagasch boasted of having abolished the practice, 340; polyandry is a sanctioned juridical proprietary share in the wife; pirra-ura is an external enkapsis of the marriage bond with abnormal sexual relations, 341.

Marsilius of Padua, I, he was an Averroistic Nominalist, 188; the general will, in which every citizen encounters his own will, cannot do any injustice to any one: volenti non fit injuria, 323.

Marsilius of Padua, III, the Averroist nominalistic individualist view of the state as grounded in the general will of united individuals, 224; his theory of the social contract, 232; state absolutism, mitigated by intermediary autonomous corporations between citizen and state, 236.

Marx, Karl, I, transformed Hegel's dialectic into historical materialism; the ideological super structure of society was

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explained in terms of a reflection of the economic mode of production; Marxism was united with Darwinism, but they still believed in a final developmental goal outside historical relativity, 210.

Marx, Karl, III, Der Historische Materialismus, 456.

Marx, Karl, III, mechanized the idea of ‘organization’, 406; his Hegelianism; private and public law will vanish after the socialist revolution, 455; the united world-proletariat; historical materialism; the future State, 456.

Marxism, I, originated from Hegel's dialectic, 210.

Marxism, II, rightly assumes that there is a historical-economic sub-structure of aesthetic life, justice, morals, and faith; but it separates this conception from the cosmic order of aspects and assumes it can explain the aesthetic, juridical, moral and faith phenomena in terms of economics, 293.

Mass-man, III, the totalitarian state sacrifices individual man, and appeals to the spiritually uprooted mass-man, 397; mass-man and fashion, 592.

Mass-Production, III, and bad taste, 139.

Masur, Gerhard, II, Ranke's Begriff der Weltgeschichte, 269, 282.

Masur, Gerhard, II, on Ranke and the disintegration of the realm of values at the end of the nineteenth century, 282.

Materia, II, signata vel individualis, and the immortal soul, 419.

Materia Prima, I, is the force of the Leibnizian monads, 231.

Material Criterion of Unlawfulness, III, was formulated by the Dutch Supreme Court; it cannot be explained by the contractual theory, 686.

Materialism, I, in Hobbes, 122.

Mathematical Concepts, I, are natural and usual, but useless and incomprehensible fictions to Hume, 285.

Mathematical Science Ideal, I, was undermined by Peter Bayle, 260.

Mathematics, I, criticized by David Hume, 280, 281, 283, 284, 285; creates its own Gegenstand; and metaphysics follow different methods; mathematical thought remains bound to sensory experience; Kant, 336, 337.

Mathematics, II, formalized geometry, 63; geometry of measure and geometry of position; analytic and projective geometry; Descartes' analytic geometry, 103; Poncelet's projective geometry; correlation between two spatial figures; the imaginary figure; imaginary points of intersection; transformation; comparison with imaginary number; principle of progression, 104; radical axis; anticipation of movement; theory of Cayley and Klein is antinomous, 105; mathesis universalis, 337 ff.; Diderot on mathematics; its modal sphere-sovereignty; ‘pure mathematics’; logical and symbolical disclosure; economy of mathematical thought; later anticipatory spheres opened, 339; Cantor's ‘set’-theory; transfinite numbers criticized by H. Weyl, etc.; biotic anticipatory sphere in number and space; Meyer's view, 340; ‘pure mathematics’, 341; its prejudices; social and juridical anticipations in the mathematical aspect, 342; natural law; the jural sphere treated ‘more geometrico’; atomistic mechanistic view of the State; other communities; contractual constructions, 342; mathesis universalis in ‘pure’ economics; prices, Schreier's theory of law, 343, 344; Eucken's analysis; the cause of the trouble in economic theory; mathesis universalis and aesthetics, 345; Husserl's and Hilbert's views, 452.

Mathematics, Pure, I, and philosophy; is not a priori in the sense that it can proceed from arbitrary maxims, 549; is not confronted with reality in its typical individuality structures, 554.

Mathesis, I, Mathesis pura et mathesis applicata in Kant, 344.

Mathesis Universalis, I, Husserl tried to rejuvinate this idea, 213; in Leibniz, 229; in Descartes, 529.

Mathesis Universalis, II, the Humanistic Idea of mathesis universalis and the social and juridical anticipatory spheres of the mathematical aspect, 342; its seeming success in pure economics, especially in the theory of prices; the one-sided mechanistic and logical orientation of this Idea has prevented pure economics from analyzing the complicated structure of the mechanical analogies in economics, 344; and music, in Descartes, 346.

Mating, III, in animal life, compared with human marriage, 324.

Matriarchy, III, among the ancient Lycians; socialist theories based on Morgan's hypothesis, 331-339; matriarchy is connected with the rise of agriculture, 338; is alien to the internal domain of marriage and family, 339.

Matrix of Living Matter, III, is substantial, in Woltereck's conception, 23, 24; his term ‘bio-molecule’, 725 (note); germ-plasm, idio plasm, reserve plasm, 751; the ‘matrix’ produces itself if need be; inductive components; enzymes, hormones, ‘protein combinations’; ‘organizers’, genes, 752.

Matter, I, is only potentiality in Aristotle, 26; is the metaphysical principle of imperfection and potentiality, 67; does

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not owe its origin to the deity, in Aristotle, 182.

Matter, II, viewed as a filling up of mathematical space; in classical physics; Natorp on energy as a substance of occurrence, 95; moving matter as a filling up of space is exclusively oriented to the sensory aspect of experience; this latter appeals to our pure intuition of movement; matter determines physical space, 101; the idea of matter as a filling up of space is antinomous, 102; Nicolai Hartmann's layers of being and his opinion that ‘matter’ as a lower layer would be completely ‘transformed’ by life, 111.

Matter, III, according to August Brunner, in the material sphere the cultural object is the prototype of a ‘substance’, 6; matter is opposed to form in Greek metaphysics, and is the principle of becoming and decay; matter is never ‘ousia’; it becomes actual by assuming a form in an individual thing, in Aristotle's metaphysics; the matter motive is given the primacy by Anaxagoras, 7; matter is void of being, in Plato, the mè on, 8; Aristotle conceives of geometrical forms as of ‘intelligible matter’, 8; eidos is used in two senses, 9; ousia synthetos, in Aristotle, 10; matter is the principle of individuality in Thomas Aquinas, 16, 17; matter and mind are logical structures of relations between events, in B. Russell, 21; Newton's ‘material units’, 23; material substance, in Descartes, 27; secondary and primary qualities of matter, 37; Husserl's ‘regions’ of the ‘material sphere’, 54; ‘living’ and ‘dead’ matter, in Driesch, 742; in chemistry matter is a system of equilibrium between protons, neutrons, and electrons, 760.

Matter-motive, I, had the primacy in Ionian philosophy, 66; in Anaximander; this motive qualifies Anaximenes' materialism, 122.

Mausz, Hubert et, II, Esquisse d'une théorie générale de la magie, 317.

Maxwell, III, his electro-magnetic theory, 706.

Mead, Margarite, III, An Investigation of the Thought of Primitive Children, with Special Preference to Animism, 34.

Meaning, I, the universal character of referring and expressing proper to our entire created cosmos; meaning is the being of all that is created and the nature even of our selfhood, 4; it constantly points without and beyond itself toward an Origin which is itself no longer meaning, 10; meaning and being; in Stoker; and in Rickert, 97; meaning connects reality and value, according to Rickert, 132.

Meaning, II, modal diversity of meaning; meaning coherence, 3, 4; analysis and synthesis of meaning; logical and cosmic diversity, 5; the law of refraction of cosmic time, 6; the criterion of an aspect is its general meaning; a functional modality of the religious fulness of meaning, 7; meaning and reality, 25, 26; ‘nature’ is meaningless in Fichte; neo-Kantianism; meaning and signification in Husserl; Husserl identifies them; he also identifies meaning with the pure Act in its noetic and its noematic aspect, 27; meaning is ‘the intentional content of an Act of consciousness in Husserl's phenomenology; noema and Gegenstand, and meaning, 28; Paul Hofmann's subjectivism, 29; his logology; Dooyeweerd's view: meaning as such is the convergence of all temporal aspects into the religious root, 30; distinction between reality and meaning is rejected; can a burning house be meaning? everything that exists does so in some structure of meaning; meaning is the creaturely mode of being under the law, 31; is sinful reality ‘meaning’? the relation of dependence on God is not annihilated by depraved creation; sin is not mere privation, it reveals apostate power derived from the creation; Gratia communis and meaning, 33; the religious value of the modal criterion; specific sphere-sovereignty, 36; meaning-components of a word, 226.

Meaning-Idealism, I, of Rickert, 97.

Meaning-Totality, I, philosophic self-reflection requires being directed toward the Archè of our seflhood as well as of the meaning-totality, 11; the ego is the inner concentration point where all the aspects meet, converging into the unity of direction towards the Archè; the meaning totality or fulness of meaning is the necessary transcendent centre of the mutually cohering aspects, 16.

Mechanics, Developmental, III, in W. Roux, 752, 761.

Medieval German State, III, von Below's studies, 439 (note).

Medieval Juridical Interlacements, III, mark ordinances; those for weddings, funerals, poor relief, the Church; craft guilds; guild ban, 672.

Medieval Objects, III, castles, 146; attire, 147.

Meinong, II, his ‘Gegenstandstheorie’ and Malan's critique of the first modal law-sphere, 83.

Menzel, Adolf, II, on Protagoras' theory of cultural development, 263.

Mekkes, J.P.A., III, Proeve eener critische Beschouwing der Humanistische Rechtsstaatstheorieën, 426.

Melanchton, Ph., I, Leibniz was educated in the Scholastic philosophy of Me-

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lanchton, 226; he undertook the task of establishing a relation between the Reformation and modern science but relapsed into Scholasticism; his influence was detrimental to the development of a truly Reformed philosophy; he dominated Protestant universities up to the Enlightenment; he grew up in a circle of German Humanists, admired Agricola, enjoyed the friendship of Erasmus and Willibald Pirkheimer, 513; his inaugural address was only expressive of his philological Humanism; his academic reformation remained within the Scholastic encyclopaedia, inspired as he was by Erasmus and Agricola; the latter aimed at an accommodation of the Humanistic personality ideal to a supposedly ‘simple, Biblical Christianity’; but they really humanized the radical Christian doctrine moralistically, 514; Melanchton opposed only speculative realistic metaphysics with its ‘universalia’, ‘formalitates’, its theory of the infinite, etc.; he retained the Nominalistic dialectic; Reuchlin and Erasmus broke with Melanchton; in 1536 he brought about a definitive synthesis between Lutheran faith and a nominalistically interpreted Aristotelian philosophy.

Melanchton, Ph., III, Loci (Corpus doctrinae Lips., 1561), 515; Unterricht der Visitatoren, 545.

Mendelssohn, I, developed Crusius' distinctions further, 340.

Men's Societies, III, in primitive tribes; arise from a reaction to matriarchy, 357, 363-365; and the dichotomy of the sexes, 365.

Menzel, A., III, Griechische Staatssoziologie, 205, 219, 380; Beiträge zur Geschichte der Staatslehre, 206; Der Staatsgedanke des Faschismus, 415, 421, 431.

Menzel, A., III, he denies that Aristotle's view of the State has no internal structural limitation, 380 (note); Mussolini appealed to the tradition of ancient Rome, 415; moral power of the State in an international sense; military power and war are the supreme court of justice of the nations, 421.

Mercantilism, II, the Humanistic view of natural law was united with economic individualism and was expanded in a mercantilistic spirit as long as it turned into state-absolutism, 360.

Mercier de la Rivière, III, his demo-liberal ideology suggests that public opinion rules, 492.

Messer, August, I, Deutsche Wertphilosophie der Gegenwart, 136.

Messer, August, I, only a ‘realism of values’ such as Plato's doctrine of Ideas rests on hypostatization, 136.

Messer, August, II, Psychologie, 483, 484.

Messer, August, II, pre-theoretical attention is rigidly bound to psychical factors, 483; his psycological explanation of attention, 484 (note).

Metabolism, III, in a living organism, 61, 62; it happens through ferments, 730.

Metaphors, III, should evoke a visionary picture of nature, in poetry, 68 ff.

Metaphysics, I, rationalistic metaphysics deifies thought, 13; (rationalistic) archè and Archimedean point remain distinct; the archè is the Intellectus Archetypus, 20; metaphysics and natural theology are impossible on Occam's standpoint, 67; speculative metaphysics results from the failure to recognize the limits of philosophic thought, 93; metaphysics of nature criticized by Berkeley, 203.

Metaphysics, II, ancient and medieval, 9-14, 15; of knowledge; N. Hartmann, 19; idealistic metaphysics absolutizes the rational function; N. Hartmann has no sense of the transcendence of the selfhood, 20; Greek and Scholastic metaphysics, 21; Heidegger attacks ancient and modern metaphysics, 22; being as the ultimate idea of reason in immanence metaphysics; in post-Kantian freedom Idealism; the deity is actual pure form in Aristotle; divine creative mathematical thought was the true ground of being in pre-kantian Humanistic metaphysics; Plato's genesis eis ousian, 26; antinomies in speculative metaphysics, 35; Thomistic proofs of the existence of God, 39; the speculative concept ‘cause’ is an absolutization, 41; the four cosmological ideas of reason, 43; Kant's controversy with speculative metaphysics, 44; the metaphysical conception is unbiblical; in Thomism it is related to God, 52; Thomistic ‘objective qualities’, 53; Greek and Scholastic metaphysics and analogical concepts, 55; Parmenides identified ‘true being’ with logical thought, 56; the metaph. doctrine of the analogia entis, 57; transcendental determinations and distinctions of ‘being’ are analogical; a vicious circle; its cause, 58; the Scholastic principium individuationis, 417; individuality in Greek metaph. as an apeiron, a guilt, 418; individuality in Nominalism; Realism; Aristotle's form-matter scheme; Thomas Aquinas; formae separatae and the human soul, 419; in pre-Kantian metaph. the Gegenstand of theoretic thought is the subjective reality of a substance independent of human experience, 467; speculative metaph. separates phenomenon from noumenon; also in phenomenology; in positivism; in Kant, 539; the meaning of the word a-priori, 542; the doctrine of the substantial essential forms was to

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account for the plastic horizon of experience, 558; rational metaphysics of Descartes and Leibniz, 584.

Metaphysics, III, on substance, noumenon and phenomenon, 4; its substance concept is rooted in an absolutization of the theoretical antithesis, 7; noumenal thing opposed to sensible things which are capable of generation and liable to destruction, 9; substance (ousia) is the primary category of being, the foundation of all accidental categories, of an exclusively intelligible character, a thing in itself, not sensorily perceptible; its sensibility is vested in human sensibility; its qualities are accidents, qualitates occultae; the real meaning of the Aristotelian ‘ousia’; it is thought of as a synolon, i.e. a whole, ousia synthetos, 10.

Methexis, II, in Plato; the phenomenon shares in the true Being (ousia); the doctrine of temporal, changeable reality as a genesis eis ousian, 26.

Metzger, A., I, Phänomenologie und Metaphysik, 203.

Metzger, W., I, Gesellschaft, Recht und Staat in der Ethik des Deutschen Idealismus, 465.

Meyer, Ad., II, Die organische Wirklichkeit und ihre Ideologien, 340.

Meyer, Ad., II, a holistic biologist, 340, 341.

Meyer, Ad., III, Logik der Morphologie, 80.

Meyer, Ad., III, his holism; his concept ‘vitules’, 647, 722.

Meyerhof, O., III, Die Naturwissenschaften, 644.

Michels, R., III, Zur Soziologie des Parteiwesens in der modernen Demokratie, 605.

Micro- and Macrocosm, I, in the Renaissance, 199.

Micro- and Macrocosm, II, in Scheler, 588, 589; pre-Socratics; Plato; the Stoa; Philo; Neo-Platonists; medieval Scholasticism, 592; the Renaissance; man is not a micro-cosm, 593; naïve experience does not know of a cosmos as a ‘personal world’, 594.

Micro-cosm, I, is human personality, reflecting infinite nature, according to G. Bruno, 199, 200.

Micro-Physics, I, destroyed scientific determinism, 212.

Military Power, III, organized military power has an anticipatory structure, 422.

Mill, J. Stuart, II, System of Logic, 119.

Mill, J. Stuart, II, logical causality identified with physical, 119; conditio sine qua non, 119.

Mimosa Pudica, III, its leaves; the mim. pud. is an insectivorous plant, 645 (note).

Mind, I, according to Hume ‘mind’ is not the theatre for ‘impressions’ but consists of nothing but ‘perceptions’, 295, 296.

Mineral Formations, III, of protozoa and protophytes, Si. O2-formations (radiolaria), 724.

Mining Industry, III, a free association, 574.

Miracles, II, and Divine Providence were rejected by the Enlightenment, 352.

Missionaris, II, the isolating walls of partition (between primitive people and the world of a higher culture) must be broken, if there is to be any normative dynamics; very often it is the power of the sword that sets the opening-process going; but also peaceful powers like that of Christian missionaries, 260.

Mitteis, H., III, Lehnrecht und Staatsgewalt, 440.

Mixtum, III, a mixtum is a new ‘substance’ according to P. Hoenen, 707; his neo-Thomistic conception: the virtual and the potential presence of the elements; the unity of an- extended ‘substance’ does not exclude a diversity of properties, 708.

Mnemism, III, of E. Hering, 733 (note).

Mnemosyne, II, is idle in primitive cultures, 285.

Modal Diversity, I, is the expression of a totality of signification, 16.

Modal Nucleus, II, if nucleus, retrocipations and anticipations of a meaning modus have been found, there is no sense in a further analysis, 485.

Modal and Structural Difference, III, in the case of undifferentiated and differentiated communities, 348.

Modal Universality, II, counterpart of sphere sovereignty; the apparent success of absolutizations and the various ‘-isms’; David Hume's universe of the imagination, 331; truth in this conception, his view is self-refuting; so is Kant's, 332; divine irony in all kinds of ‘-isms’ in the history of philosophy, 333; sphere universality and world order; and the Christian religion; the naïve attitude; dualism of belief and thought; nature and grace, 334; the openingprocess and modal sphere universality; the influence of sin; the harmony of a perfect work of art; the ‘spiritualization’ of the material sides in such an artifact; sin as a disconcerting resistance, 335;

Moderation, II, and justice developed under the guidance of popular faith in Greece, 320, 321 (note).

Modern Humanistic Philosophy, I, the boundaries between the theoretic and the

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pre-theoretic attitude have been wiped out gradually, so that the Humanist is unable to account for his cosmonomic idea in philosophy, 169; the Humanist life and world view from the outset proclaimed the autonomy of human reason; there was a dogmatic reliance on theoretical thought until the modern crisis; out of the crisis was born modern existentialism; in ancient and medieval philosophy there was a balance between philosophy and a life and world view; modern Humanistic phil. has no such counter poise; the Humanistic view of life and the world was invaded by philosophy, the naïve and the theoretical attitude were equalized and the sense of religious commitment was undermined; modern existentialism sharply criticizes this impersonal attitude of philosophic reflection; to the Enlightenment science was the crown-witness of reason; the Humanism of Renaissance times was still conscious of real religious motives; in the 18th century Humanistic philosophy was popularized and the religious awareness faded away; there was no impulse towards religious selfconsciousness in the pre-theoretical attitude, but belief in the impartiality and infallibility of theoretical thought, 170; the notion of the irreplaceable significance of the naïve attitude toward reality was lost; the Humanistic life and world view had become a theory; the Sturm and Drang in German Romanticism were reactions in the part of the personality-ideal; but the reaction left the lower classes unaffected; the influence of popular scientific writings, of ‘belles lettres’, and propaganda during the Enlightenment; the French Revolution; socialism; as mass movements, 171; the simple Christian calmly retained his pious certainty against all errors of theoretical thought; Dr. Kuyper's work in the Netherlands; his struggle with the enlightened liberalism of the 19th century; the Kant-renaissance of the XX century; the undermining influence of historicism and relativism; historicistic philosophy of life; a new view of life and the world manifest in syndicalism and fascism, 172; the ‘Moderni’ based themselves on Petrus Hispanus' Parva Logicalia; Duns Scotus and William of Occam contributed to the dethronement of Thomism, 184-188; the process of secularization of late medieval Nominalism was introduced by John of Jandun and Marsilius of Padua, 188; the collapse of the medieval ecclesiastically unified culture; the rise of national States; large-scale industry and business; early capitalism; expanded credit; new sea-routes; India and America; the Crusades and the process of individualization and differentiation; neo-Platonic and mystic-theosophy tinged ‘universal theism’; Georgius Gemisthos Plethon, father of the Platonic Academy at Florence; the Erfurt Humanist Mutianus Rufus, 189; the ambiguity of the Humanistic freedom motive; this motive calls forth the motive of dominating nature, leading to the religious self surrender to autonomous science, 190; they are the results of the Humanistic secularization of the Christian motives of creation and Christian freedom; modern man rejects ‘supernatural powers’; religion must concentrate on man; Descartes', Kant's, and Rousseau's ideas of a personal deity, 191; the ambiguity of the nature motive, 192; it leads to a deterministic theoretical view of reality; the mathematical physical method of science becomes the model of scientific investigation; all phenomena are ordered in a causal series; a structureless view of reality, 193; modern man thinks he can rediscover himself in the endless (Cusanus, Bruno); the limited is the metaphysical evil in Leibniz, 194; the principles of Humanistic philosophical thought received their first clear formulation in the system of Descartes, 195; he founded all knowledge in self-consciousness; this ‘cogito’ implicitly proclaimed the sovereignty of mathematical thought, which he deified in his Idea of God, 196; analytical geometry became Descartes' methodological model of all systematic philosophy; thought produces its own foundation in a supposed logical process of creation; this motive of logical creation is modern and Humanistic, 197; the cosmic temporal coherence of the aspects is replaced by the mathematical-logical continuity in the movement of thought, 200; modern natural science turned away from the Aristotelian-Thomistic substance-concept and wished to grasp the functional coherence of physical phenomena with the concept of function in mathematically formulated natural laws; it discarded the Ptolemaic-Aristotelian view of the universe, the Aristotelian ‘qualitates occultae’, 201; the new ‘substance’-concept is the hypostatized concept of function; Leibniz' definition; it had a Nominalistic background; Nicolaus of Oresme formulated the new concept of the law of motion in full mathematical precision; he anticipated Copernicus, and invented analytical geometry before Descartes; the functionalistic conception of reality is rooted in a Nominalistic tradition; up to Kant the ‘substance’ of nature was conceived as a ‘Ding an sich’; Descartes' definition (and that of Johannes Damascenus) of ‘substance’, 202; Suarez on the substance, compared with Descartes; the criterion of truth is supposed to be in thought itself with the ‘more geometrico’ attained clearness and distinctness of concepts; this thought has logically creating sovereignty; the Humanistic metaphysics of nature collapsed under the critique of Berkeley,

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Hume and Kant; the mathematical concept of function became the common denominator of all the aspects of reality; reason employs the method of continuity as the sceptre of its absolute sovereignty, 203; the lex continui in Leibniz and in NeoKantians, 204; the continuity postulate opposes the subjection of philosophical thought to the cosmic temporal order originating in the Divine plan of creation; the postulate has led philosophy into a maze of antinomies, 204; the naturalistic science-ideal must reveal a fundamental antinomy in the basic structure of the Humanistic transcendental basic Idea, 204; there will be a time when the Humanistic personality-ideal falls a prey to this science-ideal; the Idea of unconditional and sovereign freedom of the personality will prove to be an illusion; transcendental-idealism supposes that since Kant and Fichte the fundamental antinomy between the science and the personality ideal has been solved; the ‘cogito’ opened the way to self-reflection; all scientific syntheses depend on the transcendental logical function of the ego who is never a Gegenstand; but this ‘transcendental cogito’ is also antinomous, 205; the Humanistic classical science-ideal was a primitive kind of naturalism insofar as they wanted to comprehend actual thought in a natural scientific manner; the natural scientific method was expanded over the total act of thinking; Kantian idealism accepts only a cosmic determinateness of the empirical act of thought in a natural scientific causal sense; Humanistic philosophy is placed before an inexorable dilemma between science and personality; the freedom of the personality possesses the same tendency of continuity as the science ideal, 206; the philosophy of the Enlightenment had conceived the freedom and the personality ideal in a rationalistic individualistic sense, and even Kant had done so; after them it was attempted to synthesize nature and freedom dialectically, and freedom and personality received an irrationalistic and universalistic form; there arose a new mode of thought, viz., the historical one, elevated to a new science-ideal; a historicistic vision of reality also permeated the view of nature, 207; historicism undermined both the classical Humanistic science ideal and its personality ideal; the dialectical basic motive led to a spiritual uprooting; ‘natural history’ became the basis of human cultural history; Schelling's nature philosophy, the developmental process from inert matter to the living organism (from mechanical necessity to creative freedom); the dialectical union of necessity and freedom; Volksgeist, and the awakening of the historical consciousness; Hegel's dialectical logicizing of the historical process, 208; as a dialectical unfolding of the Absolute Idea in the objective spirit, 208; it was impossible to conceive history in Hegelian a priori thought forms; man's creative freedom was thus lost; positivistic sociology and Comte's law of the three stages, 209; the third stage embodies the classical science ideal and its domination motive in a positivistic form and is elevated to the standard and goal of the historical process; it is the old faith in the freeing power of science; it proclaimed itself to be a new religion, ‘un nouveau christianisme’; in the middle of last century the dogma of evolution spread from biology to all other sciences; the classical deterministic science ideal was revived; it accepted the primacy of the nature motive; Hegel's idealistic dialectic was transformed into Marxist sociology and its historical materialism, united with Darwinism; there was still belief in a final goal of development outside historical relativity; the spiritual uprooting became manifest in Nietsche's gospel of the super-man, 210; he was influenced by Romanticism and Idealism, later by Darwinian evolutionism; finally he developed a religion of power based on Darwin and historicism; man is an animal not yet ‘fixed’, but not bound to static instincts and his ‘Umwelt’; his anthropology; man overestimates his own importance; man is a ‘phantastic animal’ positing ideologies; science enables man to kill his gods; history is merely a struggle for power’ ‘Wille zur Macht’ is the only escape from nihilism; super-man; blond beast; the transvaluation of all values established on the ruins of Christian and Humanistic ideologies; the ideals of science and of personality are both rejected; science has mere pragmatic value; no faith in scientific truth or in the Idea of humanity, 211; he introduced the process of religious decay into Humanistic philosophy; Neo-Kantianism tried to check naturalistic positivism; historicism turned away from evolutionism; the difference between natural science and cultural science claimed attention; but the rôle of Neo-Kantianism was at an end with the rise of national socialism; German neo-Hegelianism interpreted Hegel in a relativistic sense and soon became a docile instrument of the Hitler regime, 212; the twentieth century development of microphysics, destroyed natural scientific determinism; quantum mechanics, 212; neo-positivism of the Vienna school (Mach) viewed the formulas and concepts of physics as conventional symbols, but not as truth; Edmund Husserl tried to rejuvinate the Idea of mathesis universalis; his ‘eidetic method’; tried to found logic on the direct intuition of essences (Wesensschau); his phenomenology and Descartes' cogito and Kant's practical reality

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of the Idea of freedom; the ‘epoche’; transcendental Ego-logy; the transcendental phenomenological consciousness becomes an ‘uninterested observer’; his science of the ‘essences’, 213; the abyss of nothingness behind the absolutized transcendental theoretical consciousness; the second phenomenological trend was irrationalistic in origin, and established by Dilthey; assimilated by Heidegger's philosophy of existenie; Sören Kierkegaard's existential thought opposed Hegelianism; since Nietsche there arose a strongly variegated philosophy of life, depreciating the science ideal as well as the Humanistic freedom idealism; ‘cogito’ replaced by ‘vivo’, the absolute Idea by the ‘stream of life’; depth psychology dealt the death blow to the personality ideal; Freud's mechanistic view of the unconscious, dethroning Humanistic ethics and religion; Spengler's Untergang des Abendlandes; Heidegger's Sein und Zeit; Sartre's ‘l'Être et le Néant’ are representative of the attitude of decline in Humanistic philosophy; historicism allows modern man only the insight into the meaninglessness of his existential freedom in the face of nature in which he is ‘thrown’, a ‘freedom to death’, a ‘nothingness’, 214; Humanism in decay lost its monopolistic position; there is a chaotic struggle for leadership in the future of Western culture, requiring a transcendental critique of theoretical thought, 215; the critical separation between understanding and sensibility, universal form and individuality, form and matter of experience, understanding and reason, had to be overcome after Kant; the freedom motive was increasingly recognized as the root of the Humanistic life and world-view; it called into play its inner postulate of continuity; Kant's theoretical reason elevated above the limits of sense experience, became a new dialectical logic, as a true ‘organ’ of freedom idealism; nature and reason should be thought together dialectically; the classical science ideal was pushed back and subjected to the personality ideal, 403; antinomy was now sanctioned as a transition to a higher synthesis, 404; in Kant's dualistic world picture the science and the personality ideal remain the recognized antinomic factors; Fichte changes this antinomy into a contradiction within the personality ideal itself, viz., that between free activity (spontaneity) and bondage to the lower nature, or between Idea and sense; this bondage to sensory nature cannot be cancelled without dissolving the personality ideal into an empty abstraction; with the hypostatization of the moral norm this antinomy must be retained, 450; the titanic activity motive of the ‘Sturm und Drang’, its voluntaristic tendency, its glorification of the ‘activity of Genius’; its artistic expression in the ‘ego-drama’; enthusiasm and optimism of the ‘Deed’; its bond with Rousseau's ‘natural forming of life’, but its absolutization of the subjective individuality; it culminates in its demand for subjective ethical freedom; an irrationalistic type of the Humanistic personality-ideal, 453; but the Sturm und Drang could never free itself from the deterministic rationalism of the science-ideal; its irrationalist Idea of Humanity, Herder, Klopstock, 454; the method of empathy to understand every individuality, 455; Fichte's philosophy of life and feeling, 413-455; especially pp. 456, 457, 458-462; Schiller's Aesthetic Idealism; the ‘Beautiful Soul’; the ‘morality of genius’ in early Romanticism; Nietsche's development, 465; the irrationalist philosophy of life; Bergson; the rationalist types of Humanistic philosophy make the concept of the subject a function of the concept of the law in a special modal sense; thus the subject is dissolved into the law; on the other hand the irrationalist types reduce the ‘true’ order to a function of individual subjectivity, 466; Kant's formulation: ‘the true autos discovers itself only in the nomos’, concerns the Humanistic personality ideal; the Irrationalistic version would be: ‘the nomos is a reflex of the absolutely individual autos’; rationalism and irrationalism are polar contrasts; absolutized individuality and law display an antinomic inner tension, so that the Early Romantics, e.g., Hamann, developed a dialectical conception of reality; logical contradiction has an absolute reality here; Dilthey's irrationalistic historical philosophy of life led to modern dialectical phenomenology; Husserl's phenomenology is rationalistic, however; not irrationalistic, 466; the dialectical trait of irrationalism shows that irrationalistic philosophy is rooted in the absolutized theoretical attitude of thought; the sanctioning of a theoretical antinomy manifests the subjective attitude of thought to be directed against the cosmic order and the basic logical laws functioning in this order; this attitude is a component part of sinful reality insofar as its anti-normative meaning is determined by the cosmic order and its logical norms; it implies the negation of the law side of reality; but subjectivity without an order can have no existence and no meaning; there are as many types of Irrationalism possible as there are non-logical aspects of temporal reality, 467; irrationalistic types of Humanistic philosophy concentrate their attention upon the science of history; Kant's Transcendental critique of teleological judgment had cleared the way for a philosophy of history oriented to the personality-ideal, to a certain extent at least, 468; Kant's teleological view of historical development in his ‘Vom ewigen Frieden’; Her-

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der's ‘Ideen zur Philosophie der Geschichte der Menschheit’, introduced the method of empathy and sympathy into the study of historical contexts in their incomparable individuality; Schelling's Organological Idealism equipped the Historical School with its philosophy of the originally unconscious growth of culture from the ‘Volksgeist’; the post-Napoleonic spirit of the Restoration favoured the rise of the historical mode of thought; as also did the rise of sociology in the early part of the 19th century; this sociology led to the invasion of Darwinistic evolutionism in historical science, 469; Fichte's contribution to the methodology of historical thought; Neo-Kantian epistemology of historical thought; Neo-Kantian epistemology of historical thought; Rickert and Max Weber, 470; the development of Humanistic philosophic thought into apparently diametrically opposed systems is due to the internal dialectic of the same religious basic motive, viz., that of nature and freedom; its root is the motive of freedom, which evokes the opposite motive of the domination of nature; this root remained hidden under the primacy of the science ideal up till the rise of transcendental philosophy; the latter was the first trend that penetrated to the foundation of the science-ideal, viz., the ideal of sovereign personality; Fichte was the first to recognize it openly; Kant was still dualistic, 499; Humanistic self-reflection remained at no higher level than its Idea of the sovereign free personality, which it identified with the religious root of the cosmos; its search for the transcendent root in particular normative aspects leads to absolutizations; in Hegel free personality became a dialectical self-unfolding of the all-embracing metaphysical ‘Idea’; Hegel identified philosophic thought with divine thought; he tries to solve the religious antinomy in his basic motive by theoretical dialectic, like Schelling did in ‘absolute thought’; Hegel abandoned the critical transcendental attitude of Humanistic thought; if this critical attitude is preserved, it implies the absolutizing of theoretical thought; Fichte's critical moralism; Humanistic philosophy lacks insight into the final transcendental determination of philosophic thought; if it concentrates on the Archimedian point, it focuses on some hypostatized function of personal existence, not on the religious root, 500; Confrontation of Humanistic Philosophy with Christian philosophical thought, 501-508.

Moderni, I, based themselves on Petrus Hispanus' Parva Logica, 184-188.

Modern Mechanist Biology, III, identified with a machine theory by Driesch, 734.

Modern Society, II, is not a ‘social whole’, 204 (note).

Moelia, T.S.G., II, Het primitieve denken in de moderne wetenschap, 330.

Moelia, T.S.G., III, Het primitieve denken in de moderne wetenschap, 33.

Molecules, I, reality of molecules, 559 (note).

Molecules, III, have a more complicated structure than atoms; the functional schema x, y, z, t, 101; atoms are embraced by the molecule as the minimum form-totality, viz., a typically ordered physico-spatial figure or configuration which is the foundation of the physico-chemical function of the whole, e.g., water, 701, 702; a molecule is not an aggregate, 705; molecules, atoms, crystal lattices, in P. Hoenen, 707; a molecule is a typically qualified enkaptic form-totality embracing three different structures, 710, 711.

Mollusc, III, the ontic structure of the shell of a mollusc compared with that of sawn wood, 130.

Mommsen, Theodor, III, Abriss des römischen Staatsrechts, 369, 370.

Mommsen, Theodor, III, on the possibility of forming corporations during the Roman Republic, 234; on Roman curiae, 369, 370.

Monads, I, in G. Bruno, 199, 200; in Leibniz are differential numbers (229) filling the noumenal cosmos as animate beings in gapless density, each reflecting the entire universe, 230; the roots of reality, 249.

Monads, II, Troeltsch appeals to the Leibnizian idea of the monad and retains an unprovable faith in the coherence of historical development with the ‘absolute’ in the concurrence of the factual and the ideal, 205; Husserl identifies metaphysical problems with ‘religious questions’; he treats these questions on the basis of an intuitive eidetical insight into their transcendental constitution by the transcendental inter-subjectivity of the egos or the phenomenological ‘monads’, 545.

Monads, III, Leibniz' metaphysical ‘concentration points of force’, 70; biological monads, 772.

Monogamy, III, the numerical relations in a human family, 302.

Monotheism, II, as the last stage of development from magic via nature worship and polytheism, to monotheism, according to Frazer, 313.

Montesquieu, Ch. de Secondat, II, his political idea of development; history is an account of the history of various States, 350.

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Montesquieu, Ch. de Secondat, III, his ‘trias politica’, 428; to him the State is the whole of society, 452.

Moral Aspect, I, its position in the series, 3, 5; the aspect of the temporal relationships of love as differentiated more precisely by the typical structures of temporal society as conjugal love, love of parents and children, love of country, social love of one's fellow-man, etc.; Kant mentions the ‘disposition of the heart’ as the criterion of his ‘Gesinnungsethik’, but this disposition is actually of a central-religious character; Kant absolutizes morality, 49; the moral goal in Leibniz is rational self-determination, 252; Hutcheson's conception, 310, 338; in the Sturm und Drang philosophy they demanded moral freedom, 453.

Moral Aspect, II, moral control, 71; juridical guilt; good faith; good morals; equity; are moral anticipations in the juridical aspect, not found in primitive society; difference between law and morality; Kant's view: heteronomy versus autonomy, 141; Kant's pure ‘moral will’; Austin and Felix Somló; morality versus compulsion; the prevailing view of the moral and the juridical aspect; is there a moral sphere?, 142; Buber's ‘I - thou’ versus impersonal relations; this theory deforms the structure of human experience; the world in the Humanistic Science-ideal is ‘nature’, an absolutized abstraction; the meeting of I - thou is religious, not simply ethical, 143; modal and religious love; Scholasticism distinguished natural and supra-natural ethics; the Aristotelian virtues: love, faith, and hope are supra natural; natural reason versus supernatural revelation, 144; entelechy; eudaemonia; golden mean; training; form-matter in Aristotle; virtue; the good; dianoetical virtues; theoretical and practical thought; ethical meaning of virtue; control of passion is cultural, not ethical, 145; such control may serve crime; Aristotle's view of ethics, the due mean was derived from the Pythagoraen peras; limiting the apeiron, 146; human character is the disposition of the inner act-life; the human body; Heymans' view; and moral feeling, 147; good and evil in an ethical sense are indefinable; guilt, good faith, good morals, equity, are anticipatory; not retrocipatory, 148; religious love and moral love; Kant's ‘Gesinnungsethik’; autos and nomos; categorical imperative; the Idea of mankind, 149; an order of peace; the radical evil; duty; moral feeling-drives and pathology, 150; Kant separates law and morality; Thomasius' distinction, 151; moral love and its retrocipations; Eros; Calvin's view of morality; love and social conventions, moral anticipations in social conventions, 152; frugality directed by love towards our neighbour is anticipation of economy to morality; the aesthetic Eros is an aesthetic anticipation to love; Plato's Symposion; Eros and Agapè, according to Existentialism, 153; aesthetic love of the creation; W.J. Aalders distinguishes ethical from religious love; he splits up the Decalogue; religious love is unilateral; ethical love is bilateral, 154; we love God in our neighbour, i.e. in God's image, 155; Aalders was influenced by Martin Buber; Aalders distinguished religion from the sphere of creation; this is unbiblical, 155; the central commandment is not a norm; Brunner confuses ethical and religious love; his definition of Christian ethics, 156; he opposes love to justice; Luther's scheme of nature and grace, 157; Brunner absolutizes temporal love; love implies communal and inter-individual relations, 158; Brunner opposes love to legality, i.e., he condemns rationalistic metaphysics in the Scholasticism of the 19th century, and Kant; the I-thou relation; Luther on the Divine ordinances; his dialectical thought; perfect justice in the religious fulness of love, 159; moral love and Agapè; rational foundation of love; its feeling substratum; love as a duty; its direction through faith to the love of Christ; juridical analogy of temporal love; proportion; the ‘I-thou’-relation to God implies I-we to our neighbour; moral love and self denial, 160; differentiation in moral love according to the social structures of individuality; equality of proportion in moral love is a retrocipation to economy and to the juridical aspect; harmony in love's duties is an aesthetic retrocipation; Calvin on justice and love, 161 (note); thou shalt not kill, does not express retribution; Victor Cathrein's error; the sentence of death; the shooting soldier; intolerable tensions because of moral love and legal duty, 162; ethics is a historical growth, 207, 208; variable ethical norms, 241; moral anticipations in the cultural aspect; the Cultural Eros, 291; and in the juridical aspect, 407.

Moral Control, II, this is an analogical modal term, 71.

Moral Faculty, I, sought in the moral sentiment by Hume, Shaftesbury, etc., 338.

Moralism, I, of Kant, 123.

Morality, I, is opposed to legality by Kant, 376.

Morality, II, and decent behaviour in civil law, are ethical anticipations, 407, 408.

Morality in Communities, III, is lower in more extensive communities than in those of a more intensive character, 195.

Morality of Genius, I, in Romanticism, 465.

Morgan, De, II, Formal Logic, 436.

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Morgan, De, II, evolutionistic ethnologist; pre-history, 270; on the copula to be, 436.

Morgan, C. Lloyd, III, Emergent Evolution, 84 (note).

Morgan, C. Lloyd, III, his genetical analysis of the germ cells of Drosophila; chromosome maps; genes are fitted in a linear ordering of the chromatin particles of a chromosome, 755; he adheres to ‘emergent evolutionism’, 762.

Morgan, Lewis H., III, on matriarchy; the six stages of the development of the human family, 331; the consanguineous family; group marriage, 339.

Morphè, II, or the essential form of material substances, is the teleological cause of the development of matter, 10.

Morphè, III, or vital form, in Gurvitch, 744.

Mortgage, II, an objectified right may become the object of an other right, e.g., the right of mortgage, 409.

Morphological Types, III, according to Woltereck; suspensoid, motoroid, basoid types, 777.

Motoroid Types, III, peridinidiae, diatoms, radiolaria, 778.

Mountain, A., III, is an enkaptic natural totality; so is a poly-cellular plant, or animal, 702.

Movement, I, in Aristotle motion is a striving of matter after form, and from potentiality to actuality; it is a flowing plurality of earlier and later without unity and without actual being; the psychè can give it unity, 25; Albert the Great ascribed to the movement of things, independent of the human soul, a form and structure of its own, in the numerus formalis; Thomas Aquinas and P. Hoenen follow Augustinus, 26; the theoretical logical movement of thought follows the analytical order of prius and posterius as being subjected to the principle of sufficient ground; this movement of thought is compared with mathematical movement, (note) 30; Nicolaus of Oresme formulated the law of motion, 202; Hobbes called space a subjective ‘phantasma rei existentis’, movement a phantasma motus; movement is a modus of filled space in Descartes, 223; Leibniz logified movement, 236.

Movement, II, in Aristotle, 39; movement is continuous flowing; the differential is an anticipation, 93; movement of theoretical thought is a retrocipation; phoronomy in logistic thought, 94; logical movement is retrocipatory; Kant and Newton on movement as occurring in space, 95; Aristotle clearly realized the analogical character of the concept movement; ancient Ionian view an Divine Movement; kinematic movement; absolute time, 97, 98; movement is not a change of place; but a flowing space in the temporal succession of its moments; founded in static space; flowing extension is a spatial analogy implying direction; it cannot be the nucleus of physics, 98; physical movement is restricted to mechanics; Galilei's principle of inertia; movement is pre-sensory; sensory perception is founded in the original intuition of movement, 99; Galilei's kinematics, 100; actual continuity in the aspect of movement, 105; biotic movement, 109; biotic movement is intensive and qualitative development; original movement approaches the modal meaning of life in its biotic anticipations through the intermediary of energy; energy movement, cause and effect (operation), 110; the movement of thought in the process of concluding, 120, 384.

Mullem, J.P. van, II, Analogon des Levens, 51.

Mullem, J.P. van, II, he thought the order of the aspects to be a gratuitious assertion; his ‘arrangement of classes of knowledge’; he is a neo-Kantian; later on he acknowledged his misunderstanding, 51.

Müller, Johannes, III, changed Locke's ‘secondary qualities’ into physiological events, 39.

Müller, K., III, Ueber die Anfänge der Konsistorialverfassung, 515.

Müller, Max, II, mana belief; the henotheistic feature in primitive nature belief, 317.

Multiple Proportion, III, the law of multiple proportions according to Dalton, 704.

Multiplicity, II, the numeral analogy in the logical modus is the analytical unity and multiplicity, inherent in every analytical relation and in every concept; a concept is a synthesis noèmatoon, 80.

Münch, Fritz, II, the formation of nature and society related to ideas is culture, 204.

Münch, Fritz, III, Kultur und Recht, 372.

Münch, Fritz, III, he considers primitive people to be outside of history, 372; they have social, but not historical life; the maintenance of the species started the development of the ‘social moment’, the formation of a community; there arises tribal solidarity; a popular consciousness; embracing a unity of all possible norms; one day the unity is broken because of the fall of the tribal authority; then societal differentiation is started and history begins, 373.

Mundus Intelligibilis, I, in Kant, 349.

Music, II, Descartes' ‘Regulae ad directionem ingenii’ extends the Idea of mathesis universalis to music, 346.

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Music, III, musical tone sensations, 43; music as an art, 110.

Muscle, III, enkapsis of histo systems in a muscle; it displays internal unity working in all its individual parts, 635; muscle cells, 772.

Mussolini, III, Dottrina fascista, 414, 421; My Thought on Militarism, 421.

Mussolini, III, ‘To fascism the cosmos is not the material world in which man is led by a law of nature;... Fascism is a mental attitude born out of the general reaction of our century to the superficial and materialistic positivism of the 19th century’, 414; the fascist State is a will to power and dominion; the nation is created by the State; he rejected the German notion of ‘community of blood’; a myth is a noble enthusiasm and need not be a reality; our myth is the great nation, 415; absolutizes military power; his march on Rome; war is the supreme court of justice of the nations, 421.

Mussolini's March on Rome, III, 421.

Mutations, III, in animals, 94.

Mutianus Rufus, I, the Erfurt Humanist, 189.

Mysticism, I, in Aristotle's metaphysics, 72; mitigates Leibniz' rationalism, 308 (note).

Myth, II, of Hesiod, 320, 321; fiction, magic, faith, 325, 326; Plato's, Descartes', Leibniz', Kant's, Hume's myth of deterministic nature and creative human freedom, 327.

Myth, III, naïve experience is not impervious to mythological aberrations, 29.

Mythical Consciousness, II, in the Egyptian texts of the pyramids we presumably find the oldest historical documents of a gradual rise of mythical self-consciousness to the normative juridical and moral functions of the personality, 324, the hybrid character of the mythical consciousness, 326.

Mythological Mystifications, II, in Troeltsch, as the result of his historistic prejudice, 355 ff.

Mythology, II, the personal gods of Homer are the first national gods of the Greeks and as such the creators of the Helenic consciousness, 321.