A New Critique of Theoretical Thought. Deel 4. Index of Subjects and Authors

L

Laband, I, and his school; their ‘material concept of statute law’, 322.

Laband, III, a formalistic positivist in constitutional legal theory, 399; his formalistic juridical method in the science of constitutional law, with its internally contradictory dualism of ‘right and might’ led to a dualistic theory of the State, (empirical versus normative juridical theory), 400.

Lachelier, I, an anti-rationalistic Neo-Scholasticist, 525.

Lactantius, II, Div. Instit., 411.

Lagrange, II, a mathematician referred to by Diderot, 339.

Laing, B.M., I, David Hume, 275, 287, 308.

Laing, B.M., I, Hume's conception of unity is found in Sextus Empiricus, 287; in Hume's distinction between what is and what ought to be, 308.

Lambert, I, developed Crusius' distinctions further, 340.

Land, III, Inleiding tot de Wijsbegeerte, 28.

Landscape, II, the Beauty of landscape, 381.

Landscape, III, and its fauna and flora are not structural wholes proper, and are ruled by a law of biotic balance, 650.

Langer, Susanne K., III, Feeling and Form, 138.

Language, II, logical unity of scientific language aimed at by the Unified Science Movement, 59, 60.

Lanson, Gustave, II, Boileau, 348.

Laprune, Ollé, I, a neo-scholastic thinker, and teacher of Maurice Blondel, 525.

Larenz, Karl, III, Staatsphilosophie, 433.

Lask, Emil, I, Gesammelte Schriften, 416, 451, 459, 460, 486, 491, 492.

Lask, Emil, I, Fichte's ‘absolute ego’ is only an hypostasis of the universal concept ‘ego’ as the totality of reason, 416; he sharply analysed the various phases of development in Fichte's thought since 1797, 451; the change in the valuation of individuality brought Fichte to a metaphysics that was completely different from his former identity-philosophy, 470; Fichte's initial dualism between empirical individuality and value is removed in fact by the ascription of value character to that which is irrational; this ascription is not made a problem until Fichte's last phase (Staatslehre); then he discovers the logic of historical truth; here he tries to synthesize nature and freedom in the historical field, 486; Fichte developed a transcendental logic of history in contrast with the metaphysics of Hegel, 492; his logic of philosophy, 544.

Lask, Emil, II, Die Lehre vom Urteil, 436.

Lask, Emil, II, culture and nature, 201; warns against confounding the linguistic and the logical significations of the copula ‘to be’, 436.

Lask, Emil, III, a Neo-Kantian, 409.

Laski, Harold, III, A Grammar of Politics, 387, 465.

Laski, Harold, III, he characterizes the guild socialist view of the State as the opinion that the State is ‘a body on the same footing as the Miners' Federation’, 387; calls political pluralism ‘guild-socialism’; he himself overstrains the economic function of the State; ‘the State is the body which seeks so to organize the interests of consumers that they obtain the commodities of which they are need’; the State has coercive membership and a territory, these two features are its distinctives, 465 (note).

Lasco, Joh. à, III, Forma ac ratio tota ecclesiastici ministerii, 520.

Laue Diagram, III, and the atom; the diagram shows the deviation of Röntgen rays through crystal lattices, 704.

Laughing, II, and weeping, 378.

Lavater, I, a representative of the German ‘Sturm und Drang’, 452.

Laves, F., III, Fünf und zwanzig Jahre Laue Diagramme, 705.

Lavoisier, III, he law about the mass of a combination, 704.

Law (lex), I, the concentric law, 11; without the law the subject would drop away into nothingness, 12; Calvin's judgment: God is not subject to the laws, but not arbitrary, 93; the cosmonomic Idea;

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implies a transcendental Idea of subjectivity; objections against the term ‘cosmonomic Idea’, 94; Plato's Philebus argues that the nomos (= lex) is, ex origine, limitation of a subject, 95; the lex is the boundary between the Being of God and the ‘meaning’ of the creation; Christ Jesus, with respect to His human nature, was under the law, but not with respect to His Divine nature, 99; every modal aspect of temporal reality has its proper sphere of laws, irreducible to those of other modal aspects; this is the principle of sphere sovereingty, 102, 103; this principle is indissolubly connected with the transcendental Ideas of the Origin and the totality and unity of meaning and with the Idea of cosmic time, 104; the modal structures of the modal aspects are structures of cosmic time; as structural laws they are founded in the cosmic time order and are principles of temporal potentiality; realized in individual things, they have time duration and actuality as transitory factual structures, 105; sphere sovereignty of modal aspects makes no sense in the fulness and radical unity of meaning; cosmic time refracts this unity and totality into coherent modal aspects, 106; the lex originates from God's holy creative sovereignty; everything created is subjected to a law, 108; the concept of the lex in positivism, 110; in ancient Greek thought it depended on the form-matter motive; first the lex has the juridical sense of justice (dikè), (cf. Anaximander, p. 67); this Dikè is inescapable fate, Anangkè; in the form motive of the later, culture religion the lex is order, in a teleological sense with respect to all ‘natural subjects’, 112; Socrates introduced this conception; Plato; Aristotle elaborated it metaphysically; it was opposed to the Sophists' nomos as pure convention in society and the absence of ‘laws’ in nature; in Aristotle, the subject is composed of matter and form, ruled by natural law in the striving of matter to its proper form; Plato's peras or natural law setting a limit to the apeiron and the formless stream of becoming receives the character of a genesis eis ousian (becoming to being); criticism of these conceptions; the Christian Scholastic concept of the law and the subject is dominated by the motive of nature and grace, 113; a real law can never acquire the function of a mere register of the subjective facts in their complete individuality; individual subjectivity cannot exist unless it is bound to a supra individual order, 493.

Law (lex), II, and subject are mutually irreducible and indissolubly correlated, 8; Stammler's view, 16; cosmic laws cannot be antinomous, 37; law and sin, 134; law-making, 138; law regulates external behaviour, according to Thomasius, 151 (note); natural law, 167, (342); Canon Law, 197; Binder's concept of law, 215; Bolshevist law, 396 (note); according to von Jhering, the whole of law is the legal order of a body politic, 401; lex aeterna, 559.

Law (lex), III, H. Grotius' four main principles of natural law, 212; law is contrasted with morality by E. Brunner, 281 (note) law is a coercive regulation according to Thomasius, and to Kant, 427; Common Private Law is bound to the State, 451; law according to Duguit, 461-465; law and Gospel in Sohm, 551.

Law of Contract, II, in primitive society, 183.

Law State, II, of Locke is the classical liberal idea of the State, conceived in terms of the social contract, 360.

Law State, III, the political decline of the idea of the law-state, 383; various conceptions, 399, 400; law-state and welfare state; culture state; the old liberal view, 426; Locke, Kant, Thomasius, 427; Montesquieu's trias politica; Kant's view, 428; definition formulated by Stahl, 429; O. Bähr; R. Gneist; Kelsen, 430, 431.

Leading Function, III, of an association is not identical with the purpose that the founders had in view, 574.

Leading Personalities, I, in history realize the absolute metaphysical Idea, in Fichte, 477.

Leading Personalities, II, in a historical group function, 244.

Lee, A. Mc Clung, III, New Outline of the Principles of Sociology, 177.

Leendertz, A.C., II, De Grond van het Overheidsgezag in de anti-revolutionnaire Staatsleer, 233.

Leendertz, A.C., II, facts and norms, 233.

Legal Economy, II, the prevention of excessive reactions against tort or crime, 67.

Legal Fact, II, the juridical causality of a legal fact, 181.

Legalism, III, tries to derive legal norms from the New Testament, 312.

Legal Marriage Regulations, III, are held in Roman Catholic practice to be the exclusive competence of the Church, 555.

Legal Order, II, acc. to Kant, it is an order of place, 150.

Legal Order, III, and the Church are considered to be mutually exclusive by Sohm, and by Emil Brunner, 551; legal order is, however, necessary in the cult community, (to be distingushed from the Glaubens-Kirche), in E. Brunner, 552.

Legal Power, II, or competence, 69; Jellinek's view; it is based on historical power even in primitive society, 70.

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Legal Representation, III, Binder supposes that legal representation destroys the juridical personality of the represented in favour of that of the representative, 279.

Legal Space, II, cannot be perceived, must be signified, 65.

Legal Subjectivity, A Child's, III, is closely bound up with that of its parents, 278.

Legal Technique, II, in Von Jhering, 124.

Legal Validity, II, 165.

League of Nations, II, is the aim of history, according to Kant, 272.

League of Nations, III, Kant's individualistic project, 474; The Acte Générale of 1928; the San-Francisco Charter; the United Nations, 475.

League, Anti-Corn-Law, III, was not a political party, but an organization ad hoc, for a definite aim, 612.

Lehmann, Fr. Rud., II, Mana, 316.

Lehnartz, E., III, Die chemischen Vorauszetzungen des Lebens, 727.

Lehnartz, E., III, the composition of extremely complicated proteins containing amino-acids and other ‘prosthetical’ groups which can be split off from albumenoids without any alteration of the latter, 727.

Leibniz, I, Letter to Jacob Thomasius, 223; Letter to Remond de Montfort, 223, 231; Letter to Clarke, 231; Letter to Johann Bernouilli, 256; De Rerum originatione radicale, 224; Disputatio metaphysica de principio individui, 224; Dissertatio de stilo philosophico Nizolii, 224, 244; Principes de la nature et de la grace, 226, 227, 233, 238, 251; Nova methodus pro maximis et minimis, 227; De geometrica recondita et analyse indivisibilium atque infinitorum, 227; Cum prodiisset atque increbusset analysis mea infinitesimalis, 228; Meditationes de cognitione, veritate, et ideis, 229, 273; La Monadologie, 230, 232, 235, 248, 257; Système nouveau de la Nature, 231, 235; Nouveaux essais sur l'entendement, 237, 241, 242, 243, 244, 249; De libertate, 238; Causa Dei asserta per justitiam eius, 239; Theodicée, 239, 252, 257, 258, 261; Quid sit idea, 240; Réflections sur l'essai de Locke, 243, 256; De arte combinatoria, 245, 246; Opuscula, 246; Generales inquisitiones de analyse notionum et veritatum, 246; Dialogus de connexione inter rēs et verba et veritates realitate, 247; Essais sur la bonté de Dieu, la liberté de l'homme, et l'origine du mal, 253 ff.; Discours de la conformité de la foi avec la raison, 261; Méditation sur la notion commune de la justice, 308.

Leibniz, I, his ‘theism’; his idealism is mathematical and ruled by the motive of nature and freedom, 122; the form-matter motive and that of nature and grace assume a new sense in the philosophy of Leibniz, 190; he considered the limited as ‘metaphysical evil’, 194; the motive of logical creation was carried through continually, especially by Leibniz, 197; in his Monadology the concept of ‘substance’ has nothing to do with the Aristotelian-Thomistic ‘substantial forms’; it is the hypostatized modern functional concept of law, ‘the abiding law for a series of changes’; the functional coherence becomes the ‘invariant’, 202; he founded the metaphysical law-idea of the ‘lex continui’ in the differential calculus, 204; the question of a reconciliation in Leibniz between the new mathematical-mechanical view of nature and the teleological Aristotelian-Thomistic doctrine of the ‘substantial forms’; his letters to Jacob Thomasius and to Remont de Montfort, 223; his emphasis on the ‘philosophia perennis’; his doctrine of ‘eternal verities’ existing in God; his letter concerning Platonic philosophy; but his own real Archè is deified mathematical thought; the origin of the cosmos is in ‘divine mathematics’ functioning in God as creative thought; his Nominalistic doctor's thesis; his praise of the ‘sect of the Nominalists’, 224; his moderate Nominalism maintained the necessity of logical relations in opposition to Hobbes' radical Nominalism; eternal verities are eternal possibilities in God's creative mathematical thought, 225; he uses Scholastic Aristotelian terms in a modern Humanistic sense: grace becomes the sphere of creatures with freedom of clear and distinct thought and ruled by ethical laws; nature that of creatures lacking freedom and ruled by mechanical laws, 226; his idea of a pre-established harmony; God's creative will is bound to the eternal metaphysical verities; his Idea of a City of God; of sin as privatio in a Cartesian sense; he introduced the mathematical concept of function in the differential and integral calculus and used it to carry through the continuity principle; the concept of function had to level the modal aspects according to the continuity of thought and thus became a metaphysical concept, 228; his idea of mathesis universalis; his arithmeticism is Humanistic, not Calvinistic; his logicism in mathematics;

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the monadology was opposed to metaphysical space universalism and materialistic atomism; monads are differential numbers, 229; they fill the noumenal cosmos as animate beings in gapless density reflecting (each of them) the entire universe; they are absolutely closed, self-sufficient, windowless, spaceless, points of force; compared with Bruno's aesthetical monadology; Leibniz considered qualitatively different individuality as a function of progression and accessible to rational calculation; both personality and science ideal were thus reconciled, 230; he hypostatized the concept of force introduced by Newtonian physics; it assumed the Aristotelian form of ‘entelechy’ and ‘causa finalis’ but intended in a modern Humanistic sense; space is an arrangement of co-existence, time is one of succession; mechanical matter is the mode of appearance of metaphysical force belonging to the essence of the monad; the force of the monads is materia prima, 231; the self-sufficiency and autarchy of the monad is in conflict with Aristotelian metaphysics, especially with the Aristotelian doctrine of the relation between body and soul; he tried to express the basic tendency of the personality ideal in a metaphysics of the science-ideal, which caused polar tensions; the science ideal remained supreme, espec. in its Faustian domination motive; mathematical science must construe the relation between totality and diversity in the meaning coherence; his common denominator of the aspects is the ‘perception’ of the composite or what is outward in the simple substance, 232; all monads are perceiving points of force reflecting the cosmic coherence in their representations; to these he applies the lex continui, arranging them in mathematical progression; their qualitative difference is quantified according to their degree of clarity and their tendency to pass from one perception to another, 233; the material, unconscious perceptions pass into conscious but confused representations (of the sensory soul monads), to the clear and distinct apperceptions of the limited spiritual monads; and then to the infinite creative mathematical thought of the Deity; man is placed between matter and Deity; his limitation; here Theism becomes pantheism; ‘universal harmony is God’; because of its limitations human thought cannot get an insight into the absolute (mathematical) necessity of a seemingly contingent event in the world of phenomena; the logification of the dynamic personality ideal, 234; the activity of all the monads has ‘Vorstellung’ (representation) for its basic denominator; their autarchical activity was interpreted as a tendency (appetition) to pass from one into another, a ‘causa finalis’, 235; he interprets original motion as movement of thought; he also logicized ‘force’; force as a tendency is the expression of Leibniz' individualistic personality ideal, 236; sensory perceptions are produced in absolute autarchy, entirely from the inside of the human soul monad; error of thought and ‘sin’ are due to metphysical imperfection of the finite rational monads; sin and error are gradual conditions; innate ideas are dormant, virtual representations of which we are not yet aware; they gradually develop into clear, distinct concepts, 237; all monads experience the same things, so that their representations exactly correspond with one another through pre-established harmony; this is a stringent determinism; the slightest deviation in any one moment would disturb the whole cosmos; ‘the present is pregnant with the future’; there is no freedom of the will; nothing happens without cause; the freedom of indifference is impossible, 238; the spiritual monad is an automaton spirituale; determining causes are ‘inclinantes, non necessitantes’; freedom is in proportion to our agreement with reason; the lex continui and ‘harmonia praestabilita’ owe their origin to the deity; the latter is the hypostasis of creative mathematical thought untroubled by sensory representations; volition is a modus of thought, 239; the deity is world-harmony; Spinoza's ‘Deus sive natura’ becomes ‘harmonia universalis, id est Deus’ in Leibniz; the kernel of this harmony is the mathematical lex continui; ideas are symbols of reality in L's nominalistic philosophy; he quotes Occam's distinction between conventional voces and universal symbols; natural symbols require a certain similitude (240) like that between a geographical map and the region represented by it; or a connection like circle and its perspective ellipse; the human mind can produce results from its own activity completely agreeing with the actual results in things; ‘in nature everything occurs in a mechanical manner’ is a thought laid by reason at the foundation of our experience of reality; his apparent fight against Nominalism; he clothes his Humanistic conception in traditional realistic scholastic terminology; he is concerned with the maintenance of his ‘eternal truths’ against the view that universal Ideas are mere creations of language (Hobbes); an Idea is an object of thought which is immanent to thought, the expression of the qualities of things; realists and nominalists both were right; simple Ideas and those of substance are grounded only in the possibility of thought; universalia do not have a model in natural reality; the essentiae are the ‘eternal truths’, i.e., logical possibilities in creative mathematical thought, 242; the eternal truths are by no means arbitrary

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symbols; their reality is that of thought itself; nominal definitions are arbitrary unions of symbols functioning in thought as ‘counters’; real definitions reveal the logical possibility of a thing by discovering the logical principle of its origin; but to L. Ideas do not possess any real existence outside of thought; they belong to the representations of the monads, 243; he took the side of the moderate Nominalism of the school of Occam, and fought against the conception of Nizolius, 244; according to L. the real significance of the universal is in the universal validity of the judgment founded exclusively in the universal Idea or definition of terms, which indicates the a priori possibility of the genetic construction, i.e., the method of ‘logical creation’; it is the rationalistic Humanistic concept of the law implied in the mathematical science ideal; he blames Hobbes for doubting the theorem of Pythagoras ‘that has been deemed worthy of the sacrifice of a hecatomb’; L.'s idea of a logical alphabet, a universal symbolical characteristic; he gave it a primitive form in his youth, 245; elaborated it in his analysis of the infinite; his ‘Ars Combinatoria’; concepts can be subjected to an infinitesimal analysis; the truth of a judgment depends on a general rule for the movement of thought allowing us to conclude with certainty that the distinction in the judgment between subject and predicate must approach zero in the prolonged analysis; the lex continui, 246; factual contingency must approach infinitesimally close to ‘eternal truths’ of mathematical thought; the central significance of the Leibnizian universal Ideas as symbols of relations; his transcendental basic Idea bears a subjective Idealistic stamp and seeks its Archimedean point in the ‘cogito’; the hypostatization of individuals; monads are subjective mirrors of the universe, 247; essentiae, possibilitates, or eternal truths have not a realistic sense; Divine thought is only creative thought in which mathematical possibility and reality coïncide; this creation motive is foreign to Plato's divine nous as demiurge; L.'s conception secularizes the Christian (248) view of God's sovereignty as the Creator; the modal aspects are modi of a mathematical order; the lex continui maintains the coherence; the universe in the representation of the monads is sensory phenomenon; the monads are the root of reality, the noumenon, 249; the spiritual ones are the autarchical individuals of the ideal of personality; vérités de raison versus vérités de fait’; the former are eternal, necessary truths; purely noumenal; products of pure thought; analytical truths; the latter are contingent truths, empirical, established by thought in confrontation with sensory experience; the principium rationis sufficientis has a natural scientific causal meaning; in the deity the difference between vérités de raison and vérités de fait disappears, 250; he consciously rejects Spinoza's view ‘eternal’ and ‘metaphysical truths’ are only vaguely present in the ‘petites perceptions’ of material monads and hidden in the human soul as ‘unconscious representations’; these representations are contained in experience as a logical a priori of which we gradually become conscious; ‘contingent truths’ thus become preliminary to eternal mathematical truths; this view reveals a mathematicistic Idea of the Origin; the sensory aspect is merely a phenomenal expression of mathematical relations; the same thing applies to the other modal aspects of reality; even the aesthetic aspect is subsumed under mathematical thought; his view of music, 251; even (ethical) perfection is such a freedom of the will that the latter obeys reason; the moral goal is rational self-determination in which man acts according to clear and distinct concepts; rational freedom is obtained by the logical understanding of adequate representations of the other monads and by the insight into the harmonia praestabilita; his theodicy was to reconcile evil reality and the ethical ideal, 252; he tries to resolve the antinomy between the mathematical science-ideal and the ideal of personality; his formal reconciliation of ‘causae efficientes’ and ‘causae finales’ in the divine world-plan; his radical optimism is typical of the faith of the Enlightenment in the final unity of the antagonistic factors in the Humanistic basic Idea; scientific thought was believed to make humanity free; the antinomy between science and personality ideal assumed the form of that between nature and grace in Leibniz; their deeper unity was creative mathematical thought; the deceptive formulation of the polar tension in the Humanistic transcendental basic Idea in terms of Christian doctrine, 253; his view of predestination; his Idea of God; the existing cosmos is only the realized choice out of an infinite possibility of worlds, 254; the basic antinomy in the Humanistic cosmonomic Idea assumed the form of a mathematical problem in Leibniz: the reduction of the discreteness of the monads to mathematical continuity; here is the mathematical antinomy of actual infinity in the monad; for the infinitesimal can never possess actual existence; L. points out the merely methodological origin of his ‘infinitesimal’; it is not a smallest part of spatial matter; but an ideal hypothesis for the mathematical process, 255; in the face of reality the differential is a mathematical fiction, also according to L. himself; nevertheless he elevates it to actual reality in the concept of the monad; his purpose was to reconcile the science ideal

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with that of the personality; but his logicistic continuity is in conflict with the discreteness of the monads; in his theodicy he contrasts the actual infinity of the cosmic monads as finite with the infinity of divine creative mathematical thought; finitude is the metaphysical evil; the monads must be finite substances, 256; they must be confined within their own borders if the cosmos is not to flow together into a formless whole; the spiritual monads participate in mathematical thought together with the deity, and form the Civitas Dei; metaphysical evil is necessary if there is at all to exist a cosmos; the origin of evil lies in the eternal truths of mathematical thought; evil is not from matter; the ancients thought it was because they considered matter as uncreated and independent of God; L.'s creation motive is a secularized biblical thought, 257; the human spiritual monad is limited in its thought, not omniscient, liable to error and to moral faults; three kinds of evil: physical, moral, metaphysical; physical and moral evil is possible, not necessary; metaphysical evil is necessary; the latter evil is privatio, lack of perfection; its cause is a causa deficiens; physical and moral evil are a negative condicio sine qua non for the realization of the good; physical good is pleasure; ethical good is free personality, a member of the Kingdom of grace; without evil the cosmos would not leave any room for the free rational personality of man, moral freedom is a requirement of the continuity principle of the science ideal; since there must be room for an organic union of soul- and material monads, and the continuity in the species of substances must be actualized, 258; in the actual infinity of the intuitive analysis of divine creative mathematical thought the individual evil of the monads disappears in the relative perfection of the cosmos conceived in the spaceless continuity of creative mathematical thought; nature is identical in its root with grace; grace is the intelligible world of the clear and distinct concept; causae efficientes, causae finales and harmonia praestabilita are brought into complete harmony with the appetitions in the monad's representations; the inner contradictions of this theodicy, 259; Leibniz' theodicy was pointed against Peter Bayle, 260, 261; he sought to free himself of the Cartesian dualism, 264; praised the principle of the economy of thought as one of the treasure troves of Nominalism, 272; he combated Hume's radical sensationalism from the very beginning, 284; the ego, the personality is identified with mathematical thought and hypostatized as a thinking substance, 295; he conceived ‘causality’ as a ‘factual verity’ but held to its logical foundation in our judgment, 297; causality is the foundational principle of all judgments of experience, bound to ‘factual verities’, 298; he distinguishes what is from what ought to be; but ethical action remains dependent on clear and distinct thought; he agrees in principle with Descartes' ethics; Leibniz' rationalism is mitigated by a mystical motive: that of a ‘supra-natural’ participation of human reason in the creative thought of God, which produces love and piety, 308; his monadology was attacked by Chr. Aug. Crusius with a famous argument, 339; space is an a priori order of possible coexistences, 342; space and time are a priori forms of pure thought, ‘notions’, or ‘conceptus intellectus puri’; we become aware of them on the occasion of our sensory perceptions of corporeal things, 343; the apriori concepts enable us to know the ‘eternal truths’; the metaphysical order of the cosmos; the laws of the ‘noumenon’, the ‘Dinge an sich’, but sense experience is a lower function of knowledge concerned with contingent truths only, 344; Kant derived the expression ‘symbolical knowledge’ from Leibniz, 349; Kant rejected Leibniz' and Wolff's theory of sensory knowledge being only ‘cognitio confusa’; Leibniz' God was deified mathematical thought, 350; L.'s logistic cosmonomic Idea of pre-established harmony included the free personality in a continuous mathematically construed cosmic order and relativized the distinction between sensibility and rational freedom, 356; the Idea of the intellectus archetypus in Kant is derived from Leibniz, 361; Kant's characterization of the Leibnizian conception of free personality as an automaton spirituale, 380; his doctrine concerning the ‘petites perceptions’ was introduced into Kantian epistemology by Maimon who wanted to transform Kant's antithesis between sensibility and logical understanding from a fundamental into a gradual one, 404; to bridge the gap between the universal and the particular Kant used Leibniz' theological Idea of the ‘Intellectus archetypus’, 405; Leibniz gave to phenomena in their sensory form a foundation in creative mathematical thought, 406; the Neo-Kantians began to apply Leibniz' principle of continuity as a transcendental logical principle of creation to Kant's categories, 407; Leibniz' conception of the relation between phenomenon and noumenon, 411; L.'s speculative Idea of God lost positive significance in Maimon's later works, 412; Leibniz, the genius of the German Aufklärung, grew up in the School philosophy started by Melanchton, and transformed its motives in a rationalistic Humanistic sense, 513.

Leibniz, II, cf. 86, 103, 118, 171, 272, 327, 345; Von der Weisheit, 347 (note).

Leibniz, II, his law of continuous movement of thought, 90; analysis situs, 103, 104;

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apperception and perception, 118, 119; idea of historical development, 232, 272; and mathematics, 338; intellectus archetypus chooses from the possible to create the actual, 512; lex aeterna, 559; vérités éternelles and Scheler's philosophy, 592.

Leibniz, III, his monads are metaphysical concentration points of ‘force’; this ‘force’ is an undefined physical concept; its metaphysical application was inspired by the autarchy motive of the Humanistic personality ideal; and Leibniz' view was influenced by Newton's concept ‘force’; Stoker's use of this notion, 70; Leibniz' monadology, 182.

Lemercier, III, his chapel at the Sorbonne, 142.

Lenel, II, will power as a subjective right, 397.

Lenin, III, realized that a communistic community is incompatible with the State institution; its realization in the Marxian sense is Utopia, 464.

Lennep, Mr. L.H. van, III, De Rechtskracht van de Verordeningen der Christelijke Kerkgenootschappen, 690.

Lentze, H., III, Der Kaiser und die Zunftverfassung in den Reichsstädten, 479.

Leon, Xavier, I, Fichte et son temps, 451.

Lever, J. and H. Dooyeweerd, III, Rondom het biologisch soortbegrip, 81.

Leviathan, I, in Hobbes, and in Rousseau, 317.

Levirate, III, an abnormal external form of marriage, 339, 340.

Lévy-Brühl, II, Les fonctions mentales dans les sociétés inferieures, 329.

Lévy-Brühl, III, attributes characteristics to the primitive mind that have nothing in common with our civilized mind, 33.

Lex Aeterna, I, in Patristic Thought, 173; expressed in the lex naturalis, 178; and substantial forms, 202.

Lex Continui, I, in Neo-Kantianism; founded in the differential calculus by Leibniz, 204; applied to the representations in the monads, 233; and harmonia praestabilita, 239; in Leibniz, 246; the lex continui maintains the meaning coherence, 249; as a developmental series from inorganic matter to organic life and human history in Herder, 455.

Liberal Idea, II, of the law state, 360.

Liberalism, II, resisted the reactionary policy of the Restoration in the 19th century, but evoked the reaction of socialism and communism, 362.

Liberum Arbitrium indifferentiae, I, in Descartes, 238.

Liermann, H., III, Das deutsche Volk, 497; Deutsches Evangelisches Kirchenrecht, 545, 548.

Liermann, H., III, In the Lutheran Church, also with the sovereigns, office became right, service turned into dominion, 545; modern parliamentary ideas gave rise to the German Synodal-Konsistorial system of the 19 century, 548.

Life, II, as a ‘substance’ in Driesch, 110.

Life and World View, I, Genuine Christian philosophy requires a radical rejection of the supra-theoretical pre-suppositions and ‘axioms’ of immanence philosophy, 114; because of the Christian radical critical standpoint Christian phil. is able to enter into the most inward contact with immanence phil.; it distinguishes sharply between philosophical judgments and supra-theoretic prejudices; a popular argument against the possibility of Christian science and philosophy; 2 × 2 = 4; this arithmetical truth holds for Christians and heathens; it draws the attention to undeniable states of affairs which form the basis for the cooperation of different schools, 115; the proposition 2 × 2 = 4 is not ‘true in itself’, but only in the context of numerical and logical laws; this proposition refers to a ‘state of affairs’ independent of the subjective theoretical view and its supra-theoretical pre-suppositions; and is dependent on the cosmic order; the latter is the same for every thinker; and every thinker has to throw light on the state of affairs from the standpoint of his transcendental basic Idea, 116; in the philosophical effort to account for the states of affairs the various schools of thought can learn from each other and compete; Christian philosophy cannot claim any privileged position, it is not infallible; Christian phil. does not place itself outside the historical development of philosophic thought; it aims at reformation, 117; the idea of the Philosophia Perennis; this Idea is required by the religious transcendental basic Idea; Dilthey's philosophy of life and world views is historical relativism with respect to truth; Oswald Spengler; Christian phil. turns against the Humanistic view of science with the philosophic idea of the sphere-sovereignty; in spite of its inner historical connection with Kant's Kritik d.r. Vernunft, Chr. phil. turns against the Kantian theoretical dogmatism of his epistemology, 118; the religious starting point of Christian phil. and consequently the whole direction of its thought remains consistent; any Scholastic accommodation is rejected; historical development implies

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the biblical-Augustinian idea of the struggle in the religious root of history between the civitas Dei and the civitas terrena, 119; in immanence philosophy the antithesis of standpoints takes the modern form of a theory of life- and world-views (Weltanschauungslehre); the most ancient is that between idealism and naturalism; ‘critical’ idealism insists on it that the effort to reduce theoretical thought to a natural object pre-supposes a ‘transcendental subject of thought’ or a ‘transcendental consciousness; others make philosophy itself into a neutral ‘theory of the life and world views’; Dilthey's three types; Rickert's seven types, 120; such classifications obliterate the only really radical antithesis and proclaim relative oppositions as absolute; all oppositions on the immanence standpoint are relative; and become irreconcilable on account of absolutization; idealism is opposed to naturalism in consequence of the inner antinomy in the humanistic central religious motive between the ideal of science and that of personality; aestheticism and moralism are not polar oppositions; ‘theistic philosophy’ was built on a metaphysical idea of God, viz. the hypostatized nous, 121; the divine nous as actus purus and pure Form, etc., is hypostatized theoretical thought; the theistic philosophy of Descartes or Leibniz; was ruled by the Humanistic motive of nature and freedom; the philosophical meaning of terms like idealism, materialism, intellectualism, etc., depends on the transcendental basic Idea ruling their contents; Leibniz was ruled by the science ideal; Greek ‘idealism’ by the Form motive; Anaximander and Anaximenes were ‘materialists’ in the sense of the Greek matter-motive; Hobbes' materialism was mechanistic scientialistic; Democritus' atoms were ‘ideal forms’ in the sense of the Greek Form-motive; the Greek ideal of the Kalokagathon (122) differs from Schiller's Humanist aestheticism; Kant's moralism is not affiliated with Socrates' ethical thought; Dilthey and Rickert have interpreted ancient and medieval thinkers after the pattern of modern Humanism; the only ultimate and radical antithesis is that between deified meaning and thought turning to God in Christ and realizing the relativity and self-insufficiency of all created meaning; the antitheses within the dialectical basic motive have the character of polar tensions, 123; Rickert's criterion for the difference between philosophy and a life and world view; Litt's criticism of Rickert, 124; Litt's criterion; Nietsche's view; modern existentialistic opinion; Karl Jaspers and ‘prophetic philosophy’, 125; his ‘Psychology of Life-and-World Views’; Litt's view; he refers to the atmosphere of the common convictions in a community, to myths & dogmas and popular wisdom; Georg Simmel characterizes philosophy as a ‘temperament seen through a picture of the world’; and ‘the revelation of what is deepest and final in a personal attitude toward the world in the language of a picture of the world’, 127; a life and world view is a view of totality; it implies an Archimedean point, and has a religious basic motive; it requires the religious commitment of our selfhood; its attitude is pre-theoretical; it conceives reality in its typical individuality structures; it applies to everybody, the simplest included; the Divine Word-Revelation does not give a detailed life and world view but it gives both to philosophy and to the outlook on life and the world their starting point and direction in a radical and integral sense determining everything; in the root philosophy and life and world view are united, but not identified; each has a task of its own; philosophy has to give a theoretical account of a life and world view, 128; Rickert's defence of the neutrality postulate, 129; reality versus values; to philosophy ‘reality’ has validity as a category of thought in Rickert; philosophic problems are theoretical problems of meaning and value; values are to be traced down to the life of culture; philosophy re-unites reality and value, 131, the connecting link is ‘meaning’; meaning belongs to all ‘acts’ in so far as the subject chooses a position in them with respect to values; in the ‘immanent meaning of the act’ value and reality are synthetically together; the immanent meaning is not itself value, but reality is here related to values. Historical science has to do with reality to which values cling. Value is transcendent, timeless, absolute meaning; reality is the object of the transcendental epistemological subject, and in the realm of values there is no subjectivity at all, 132; such a system of a-theoretical values (beauty, holiness, morality, happiness) is an open system; ‘a formal order of the stages of value’; phil. must not be ‘prophetism’, nor a life and world view; the object of philosophy is the totality of the cosmos inclusive of the subject, 133; the ‘neutrality-postulate’ defended by Rickert, although he recognizes the necessity for religion to penetrate the whole of life and never to put up with its coordination with other ‘values’; he also recognizes that the axiological viewpoint cannot exhaust the essence of religion, 134; his opinion that the absolute validity of the theoretical ‘truth-value’ can be proved theoretically is untenable: every theoretical proof pre-supposes a norm for its correctness; ‘absolute truth-value’ is an absolutization of theoretical truth and leads to antinomy in Rickert's own system, 135; if a special value is torn out

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of the meaning-coherence and set by itself, it becomes meaningless; if it should not become meaningless, the postulate of the self-sufficiency of theoretical thought is reduced to absurdity, and it is proved that in theoretical thought we cannot find the Archimedean point; the test of the transcendental basic Idea reveals the concept ‘value’ in Rickert to be ruled by a supra-philosophical position with respect to the Archè and meaning totality; an Idea of reason has been hypostatized as a self-sufficient value; August Messer's defence of the philosophy of values, 136; the root of the axiological metaphysical theory is the Humanistic personality ideal that gained the ascendency over the science ideal after a long struggle; the proclamation of the self-sufficiency of philosophic thought signifies the withdrawal of that thought from Christ as the new Root of our cosmos, 137; Litt reckons the value idea as such to belong to the domain of a life and world view; yet he defends the neutrality postulate by an appeal to the pretended self-guarantee of ‘theoretical truth’; this self-guarantee he considers to be not demonstrable theoretically; truth cannot be referred to something that is not truth; any one attempting to demonstrate this self-guarantee theoretically is a relativist, according to Litt; relativism in any form is internally contradictory, 138; Litt also identifies truth with correctness; self-sufficient truth, he says, exclusively holds good in correlation to the ‘cogito’; he does not hypostatize theoretical verity as an Idea or value apart from subjectivity; absolute truth only holds in and for theoretical thought; this is self-contradiction incarnate, 139; the ‘cogito’ is absolute, ‘pure’ thought which cannot be a Gegenstand of thought; the full concrete ego and all temporal-spatial reality is the objective antipole of the transcendental ‘I think’, 140; the correlation between truth and the transcendental cogito saves this philosophy from relativism, according to Litt at least; criticism of Litt's view: he relativizes the fulness of meaning of truth to mere theoretical truth and starts from the tacit acseptance of the self-sufficiency of theoretical thought, 141; his ‘unconditioned’ transcendental cogito, 142; Fichte, Kant and Litt; in the antithetic relation of theoretical thought he conceives of the ‘I-think’ as the antipode to ‘Gegenständlichkeit’, 143; he determines the selfhood by ‘pure thought’, i.e. by dialectical logic, the ‘self-refutation’ of scepticism; the question as to whether the logical principia are set aside by God and the angels implies that God and the angels have to think in a cosmic temporal fashion, 144; Greek irrationalistic sophistic scepticism; the self-refutation of scepticism; Litt's relativism is sceptical and antinomic; his view of the ‘transcendental cogito’; reality is only in the absolutized individuality; his ‘Erkenntniskorrelation’ and ‘Gegebenheitskorrelation’; the ‘pure thinking subject’ is itself the ‘universally valid’ and the origin of all universal validity, 145; Litt's ‘theoretical universal validity’ replaces the cosmic order; there arises a dialectical tension between universal validity and individuality; between philosophy and a life and world view; individuality is lawless; dialectical thought has to recognize its other in the irrationality of life; it has to understand its dialectical unity-in-the-opposition with the life and word view as a normless ‘impression of life’, both are dialectical emanations from the same ego which lives in the relativistically undermined Humanistic ideal of personality, 146; the self-refutation of scepticism is that of the neutrality postulate as well; but this self-refutation cannot of itself lead us to the positive knowledge of truth; Litt inclines to the irrationalist philosophy of life, 147; we do not recognize a dialectical unity of philosophy and a life and world view; their deeper unity is found in the religious basic motive; philosophy has to give a theoretical account of a life and world-view; it should attain to critical selfreflection on its transcendental basic Idea; it can never be religiously neutral, neither can a life and world view; Litt interprets philosophy and a view of life as personal confessions of the individual struggle between person and cosmos; philosophy must surmount the contents of such confessions, 148; his life and world view is a secularized one; he cannot claim for it ‘universal validity’ and ‘absolute truth’, nor ‘theoretical neutrality’; his hypostatization of ‘pure’ dialectical truth serves to release human personality from any norm of truth; hence the conflict against the ‘universally valid norms and values’ of rationalism and semi-rationalism; Rickert's theory of life and world views is not neutral; he stops half-way on the road to irrationalism; by his schematism he falsifies the meaning of every life and world view that rejects his own religious starting point; a Calvinistic life and world view cannot be classed as ‘theistic’, based on the choice of the ‘value of holiness’ to which as subjective commitment ‘piety’ answers, 149; the theoretical concept of truth depends on the transcendental basic Idea: Hobbes' nominalist view of truth; Aristotle's realistic conception; Hobbes calls truth and falsehood only attributes of language; truth consists in the immanent agreement of concepts with each other on the basis of conventional definitions; Hobbes' opinion; Aristotle's; Kant's; Hume's; Descartes'; Hegel's; Litt's; the consequence of the neutrality postulate

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would have to be the allocation of the concept of truth to a personal choice of a life-and-world-view; Immanence philosophy recognizes no norm of truth above its transcendental basic Idea; the dogma of the autonomy of theoretical reason hands truth over to the subjective commitment of the apostate personality, 150; the distinction between theoretical and a-theoretical judgments; only the former are accorded the universal validity of truth by Litt and Rickert; this distinction goes back to Kant's dualism between theoretical knowledge and a priori rational faith; the distinction is untenable; in the judgments: ‘this rose is beautiful’, and ‘this action is immoral’ there is an appeal to a universally valid standard of aesthetic and moral valuation respectively, 151; the denial of this fact affects the meaning of aesthetic and moral judgments as such and cuts through the coherence among the logical, aesthetic, and moral law-spheres, inclusive of the logical principles; Rembrandt's ‘Night-Watch’ and aesthetic valuation; such valuation is subjected to a norm defining its meaning; the Night-Watch is the objective realization of an individual subjective aesthetic conception, 152; non-theoretical judgments are non-‘gegenständlich’; theoretical judgments are formed in the Gegenstand relation and subject to the norm of theoretical truth; non-theoretical judgments, i.e., the so-called ‘practical’ judgments, are not a-logical, but only non-‘gegenständlich’ and subjected to the norm of pre-theoretical truth which possesses universal validity as well as the norm of theoretical truth; all temporal truth points to the fulness of meaning of verity given in the religious meaning totality of the cosmos in relation to the Origin; verity does not admit of any limitation as to its fulness of meaning, 153; Litt's distinction between theoretical and ‘weltanschauliche’ truth and his self-refuting interpretation of this distinction: truth is merely the integral consistency of a thinker's personal views and its agreement with his actual behaviour in life, 154; but if there is no universally valid truth about the meaning of the cosmos, I can give no subjective ‘interpretation of life’, for I can interpret only what I can judge of truly; Litt makes ‘universally valid theoretical truth’ the judge as to essence, meaning, and limits of ‘weltanschauliche’ truth; he holds that judgments of the life and world-views are situated ‘beyond truth and falsity’; theoretical thought must not dominate the life and world view of the sovereign personality, 155; but Litt's view, if consistently thought out, annihilates the foundations of theoretical thought, and reaches the pole of complete self refutation; the concept of an ‘absolute merely theoretical truth’ is internally contradictory; philosophic thought is dependent on the religious basic motive of the thinker's ego; philosophy has to clarify a life and world view, 156; the latter is not a system; but in every such view there is left a residue of living immediacy which escapes theoretical concepts; it is focused in the full concrete reality, though it is not lost in faith and feeling; theoretical, systematic thought cannot be so focused; a system speaks out of a distance preserved by scientific abstraction in opposition to life; a life and world view bears a continuously open character to each concrete situation; the radical Christian view of science was born in the midst of a concrete situation; Dr. A. Kuyper; the attitude of the early Christians, 157; the ideal of personality reacted to the rationalism of the Enlightenment; science was now required to be neutral with respect to a life and world view; the development of such a view is constantly found in immediate contact with concrete situations in the fulness of life; Christian philosophy is not an elaboration of a Christian life and world view; the meaning of the concept ‘universal validity’; in the dogmatic cadre of a pretended ‘unconditioned pure thought’ his ‘universal validity’ concept was a ‘standard of truth’; Kant defined it as: independence of ‘empirical subjectivity’, and ‘valid for the transcendental consciousness, 158; the judgment ‘the sun heats the stone’ is one of perception, but if I say: ‘the sun causes the heat of the stone’ I pronounce a judgment of experience which is universally valid; judgments of perception are only subjectively valid, 159; in the phil. of the cosmonomic Idea universal validity is the agreement of a judgment with the divine law for the cosmos in its modal diversity, inter-modal coherence, and fulness of meaning; such validity rests on the universal validity of the structural laws of human experience (universal, because elevated above all individual subjectivity); the judging subject is subjected to laws not originating in a so-called ‘transcendental-logical subject’; the judging subject can come into conflict with the laws; the laws of theoretical thought do not hold ‘an sich’ but only in the cosmic coherence and in dependence on the religious radical unity of the divine law; universal validity inheres in every judgment to which assent ought to be given by any one; ‘I do not believe in God’ cannot be universally valid; it is subjective, restricted to the individual ego, 160; judgments of naïve experience like ‘this rose which stands on my table is red’ claims concrete truth and universal validity; the latter depends on the structural laws of pre-theoretical experience; there are structural differences between judgments as regards their

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universal validity; a judgment of perception is not merely valid in the concrete here and now of the sensory perception; if it were, it would be merely subjective; the structural laws of temporal reality, and therefore of naïve experience, regulate the subject-object-relations in the latter and guarantee the plastic structure of the experience of things also with respect to its subjective-objective sensory and logical aspects; Kant's view falsifies naïve experience, 161; the criterion of universal validity of judgments concerning supra-theoretical states of affairs and the unconditional validity of the religious law of concentration of human experience; the universal validity of religious judgments, 162; the ‘transcendental consciousness’ is hypostatized theoretical thought; in it truth is made dependent on the really general apostasy of thought in immanence philosophy; the concept ‘normal consciousness’ is not identical with the ‘norm of consciousness’; Litt explains the great diversity of life and world views by calling them ‘individual impressions of life’, 163; but philosophic and special scientific theories are no less divided among themselves; in theoretical thought it is impossible to eliminate the individuality of a thinker; the attempt to do so is a remnant of the rationalistic view of science prevalent in the Enlightenment; focused in the full temporal reality we direct our religious vision of totality towards the reality of life in its concrete structure, in our life and world view; neither life and world view, nor philosophy can be understood individualistically; they have a social origin; a life view is ex-origine the common conviction of a human community bound together by a central religious motive; philosophy, too, issues from such a common religious basic motive, 164; in philosophy as well as in a life and world view there may occur social prejudices due to the limitation of the views prevailing in a social environment (class- and racial prejudices, those of a church group, etc.); philosophic thought may be stimulated by a life and world view, and the latter may be clarified by philosophy, 165.

Light Waves, I, are not real, according to E. Mach, 213; reality of light waves, 558.

Light Waves, III, Russell's theory, 25.

Limits to Concept formation & definition, II, law sphere cannot be grasped in a purely logical way; nucleus of a modality cannot be further analysed; we can form an Idea of the nucleus; phenomenology; its rigid ‘eidos’; an ‘absolute essential structure’; Sache an sich, 485; transcendental Idea of a modal function approaches the limit of the aspect only; a concept is anterior to an Idea and only foundational; it depends on the Idea; Idea is limiting concept, 486; the aspects are incapable of seclusion; error of phenomenology; its danger to Christianity; it penetrates to an a-priori level of phil. thought; it does not ‘leave religion alone’, 487; phenomenological reduction defined; different schools; Scheler's assertion of the adequacy of ‘Wesensschau’, 488.

Limiting Profit Theory, II, gave a psychological circumscription of the economical principle, 122 (note), 123.

Linden Tree, III, in naïve experience, 54; its structural type; its environment, 632; its objective function of faith, 633.

Lingual Aspect, I, when I let a person go first who is ranked higher in the social scale, I am intuitively aware of the temporal aspect of symbolic significance, 33.

Lingual Aspect, II, and historical, legal, etc. space, 65; lingual economy, 66; linguistic denotations of fundamental analogical concepts, 55-71; number, space, economy, command, 55-71; objective sensory phenomena are symbols of physical states of affairs; linguistic economy is an anticipation; deictic and mimic gestures show some lingual economy; primitive and civilized languages; Aktionsarten and Aspects; flexion, 126; internal and chronological time indications; artifical languages and economy of speech; scientific language; juridical anticipations in language; univocality, 127; juridical sense of linguistic expression is a juridical anticipation, so is univocality; a deepening of language; there is no juridical anticipation in primitive languages and no aesthetical or economic anticipation, 140; the historical aspect of language, 194, 197; the nuclear meaning of this aspect is that of symbolic signification; Von Humboldt's ‘Innere Sprachform’; Paul's Prinzipien; the latter are psycho-physical in character; his positivism; language formation is a historical process, 222; historical memorial symbols; the historical element is retrocipatory; modern phonology, phonemes; phonetics; Husserl's ‘pure grammar’, and ‘pure’ significations are logical, not lingually qualified, 224; Husserl has broken the subject-object-relation in language; sign and signification; interindividual understanding; the Diltheyans protested; the ‘vivo’ and the historical stream of experience, 225; expression; the meaning intended; the signifying act has a lingual modus; Husserl identifies act and modus; the formative moment in the lingual sign adapts the meaning to cultural development; lingual reference through subjective intention and signifying; conceptual and emotional components of meaning; Husserl's logical meaning kernel; the ‘feeling tone’ and its intentional re-

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ference, 226; they must be interpreted from the semasiological subject-object-relation and retain their lingual character; Ogden and Richards and their psychologism, 227; cultural and lingual symbols, 285; symbolic expression as a criterion of art in Condillac; Cassirer's criticism, 348; the objectification of the symbolic aspect; of post-lingual anticipations; conventional, unconventional, explicit, implicit, abstract symbols; aesthetical anticipations, 381; the structure of a symbolical subject-object-relation; the beauty of a landscape symbolized; social symbols; cult and prayer, 382.

Lingual Aspect, III, objective sensory phenomena are symbols referring to the pre-sensory aspect of energy (i.e. the physical), 37; the important rôle of symbolical anticipations in sensory impressions: they evoke a name, 38; Riehl calls sensations signs; Occam's distinction between arbitrary and natural signs, 45, 46; sensory phenomena as symbols, 46; naïve experience and names, 51, 57; cultural function precedes lingual function in human development, 78; symbolically qualified things, 110, 111; literature, 123; intuitive and symbolic knowledge, 144, 145; on books, scores, etc., 150-153; symbolical social mediation, 243, 250-253, 272; why in language there is a difference between motherly and maternal, fatherly and paternal, 292.

Lingual Sign, II, (Husserl) a word signifies via its signification, 225, and the human act, 226.

Linguistic Economy, II, 66.

List der Vernunft, II, in Hegel, 280.

Literature, III, in Poetry the aesthetical imagination may seek expression in pregnant metaphors which have no other rôle than evoking a visionary picture of nature, 68; a work of literary art, a drama, etc., have an inconstant individuality structure relying on the art of performance; in books, etc., they are symbolically signified for preservation and later actualization, 110-116; a work of literary art has a cultural foundation and an aesthetic qualification, 123.

Litt, Theodor, I, Einleitung in die Philosophie, 78, 80, 81, 82, 125, 139, 141, 154.

Litt, Theodor, I, defends the neutrality-postulate with respect to philosophy, 14, 15; seeks his Archimedean point in the ‘pure reflection’ of theoretical thought on its own activity; he introduces a dialectical identity of the ‘thinking ego’ (‘pure thought in its self-reflection’) and the ‘concrete ego’ (as a real individual ‘totality’ of all its physical-psychical functions’ in space and time’), 77; ‘in the unity of the thinking I and the concrete I, the former gains the mastery’; the ‘dialectical identity’ is intended in a transcendental-logical sense; only in ‘pure thought’ does the ‘concrete ego’ come to itself; the ‘concrete ego’ does not transcend ‘pure thought’; the theoretic relating of the modal diversity to its integral root has become impossible to Litt; therefore he introduces a dialectical unity to relate the diversity to the two antithetic motives of his religious ground motive of nature and freedom, 78; his dialectical unity and identity of the ‘concrete’ and the ‘transcendental-logical’ ego is in keeping with Fichte and Hegel, but disagrees fundamentally from Kant, 79; it is a masked transcendental basic Idea, 80; he cannot and does not explain how the ‘pure thinking ego’ and the ‘concrete ego’ (as the Gegenstand) can be one and the same; but he intends not merely a logical but a real identity; he holds that by elevating itself to the abstract function of pure thought the ego has reached the ultimate limit of its inner possibilities, 81; his dialectical-metaphysical logicism, 82; the difference between philosophical and ‘objective’ scientific thought and Litt's view of the ‘thinking’ and the ‘concrete ego’; his ‘pure thinking ego’ could not be detached from the Gegenstand-relation; there is a fatal confusion in his view of ‘object’ and ‘Gegenstand’ and of the really ‘naïve’ and the theoretical attitude of thought, 86; the concept of the pure self-reflection of theoretical thought lacks the tendency towards the Origin, 91; Litt criticizes Rickert, 124; he considers ‘value’ to be a-theoretical, and the foundation of theoretical truth in a value is to be rejected; in philosophy not a single valuation may be either one of the determining factors or even the decisive factor’; his view of life-and-world-views; but ‘if valuations are incorporated in philosophy’, the subject has not sacrificed its concretely personal relation to the totality of reality to the striving after pure knowledge’, 125; if ‘universal validity’ is required for a life and world view, there appears to be ‘a lack of logical integrity’, 126; a life and world view is nothing but an ‘individual impression of life’ arising in contact with the conception of experienced reality formed by the community in which a man lives; common convictions; community conceptions: the image world of myths and dogmas of religion and the popular outlook on life; this view of Litt's agrees with Georg Simmel's, 127; his criticism of Rickert, 138; he identifies theoretical truth with theoretical correctness; theoretical truth is absolute and selfsufficient exclusively in and for theoretical thought; this is self-contradictory; and relativistic, 139; in all biological, psychological and anthropological thought the actual ‘I think’ remains hidden; it can never be made into a Gegenstand of thought; philosophical thought

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is directed to self-reflection; it should set in the light the subjective antipole of all objective reality; it demonstrates how the validity of truth (in objectivizing special scientific judgments) depends on the validity of the pronouncements of reflective thought; the absolute validity of truth is bound to the thought relation, but this is not saying that truth is limited to real thinking beings; this validity is restricted to the ‘cogito’, the ‘pure thought’ that ‘springs back’ again and again into the counter position to the ‘Gegenstand thought of’; this ‘thought’ is no longer an aspect of concrete temporal reality, it is the transcendental subject of thought, universally valid itself, and inherent in mere thought as such (Denken schlechthin); all spatial and temporal reality and the full concrete ego is (in the epistemological relation) the ‘objective antipole’ of this transcendental ‘I think’, 140; truth is here not deduced from something else; there is a strict correlation between transcendental truth and cogito; critique of Litt's conception: the fulness of meaning of verity is relativized to mere theoretical truth; and if the transcendental cogito was as self sufficient and absolute as theoretical truth is said to be, they would be identical; Litt's view stands and falls with the supposed absoluteness and selfsufficiency of philosophical thought, 141; his ‘absolute truth requires theoretical logical determination by philosophic thought to be ‘purely theoretical’; philosophic thought receives its determination from absolute truth; this determination is logically undetermined to the highest degree; the first pitfall in Litt's demonstration is the unconditional ‘transcendental cogito’; but this cogito is not the selfhood, only its logical function; Fichte's absolute and thinking egos, 142; Litt has not noticed the antinomy of ‘unconditioned thought’; ‘theoretical truth’ is dissolved into a speculative hypostatization of thought; the actual I-ness has vanished; conceptualization and knowledge become impossible; the second pitfall is the opposition of transcendental thought and full reality; in the Gegenstand relation Litt supposes that ‘full reality’ springs back into the ‘Gegenständlichkeit’, 143; thus he ignores the temporal meaning coherence; the self-refutation of scepticism; logical thought in its subjectivity is necessarily subjected to the logical laws, in casu - the ‘principium contradictionis’; the principle is not absolute and unconditioned, but of a cosmic-temporal character, 144; Litt's concept of a self sufficient theoretical truth is ultimately relativistic and antinomic, it recognizes no norm dominating the absolutized ‘transcendental-logical subject’, in the datum correlation he only sees reality in the absolutized individuality of the ‘concrete ego’, the absolute irrational that can be objectivized only in the correlation of knowledge and conceived by the ‘transcendental-logical ego’ in universally valid thought forms; the ‘pure thinking subject’ is not subject to a law, but is itself the ‘universally valid’ and the origin of all universal validity, 145; there is a dialectical tension between philosophy and a life and world view; philosophy has to understand the latter as its other, in a dialectical unity-in-the-opposition with such a view as a normless individual ‘impression of life’, 146; he inclines towards the irrationalist philosophy of life, 147; his view is akin to Hegel's ‘pan-logism’, oriented to the irrationalistic turn in Humanistic ideal of personality in Romanticism; Litt's view is an irrationalist logicism, oriented historically; he considers life and world views as bound ‘in a dialectical unity’ with philosophy, 148; he cannot claim ‘universal validity’ and ‘absolute truth’ for his outlook on every life and world view, nor ‘theoretical neutrality’, 149; he distinguishes theoretical from a-theoretical judgments and denies universal validity to the latter; this goes back to Kant's dualism, 151; his distinction might make sense if he did not deny all ‘weltanschauliche’ truth; the truth of a view of life and the world can only be the integral consistency of a thinker's personal confession with his actual behaviour, 154; universally valid truth (theoretical truth) is the judge as to essence, meaning, and limits of the truth of a life and world view, whose judgments are situated ‘beyond truth and falsity’; theoretical thought must not dominate the life and world view of the sovereign personality, 155; as life and world views are so various, they must be mere ‘personal impressions of life’; judgments of theoretical thought are only universally true; Litt ignores the dividedness among scientific and philosophic theories, 163.

Litt, Theodor, II, on meaning, 31; historical stream of experience and language 225; logical integrity; his crypto religious attitude of thought, 492.

Litt, Theodor, III, Individuum und Gemeinschaft, 248, 295.

Litt, Theodor, III, dialectical-phenomenological sociologist; tries to overcome the dilemma between individualism and universalism; sociology is a philosophy of culture, furnishes the methodical and metaphysical foundations of the Geisteswissenschaften (socio-cultural sciences), 248; the individual experiencing ego is a spiritual centre; in the communal bond this vital centre lives with other egos; Litt combines dialectical reflexive thought with the phenomenological analysis of essences; science is the self-transillumination of the human mind; the moments of a

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social whole are interlaced in dialectical tensions social meaning is timeless; the egos' psychical experience is united with it in symbols which possess a trans-personal character; the ego monad; its interweaving of past and present perspectives; its intertwinement of corresponding experiences of other I-monads, 250; reciprocity of perspectives is realized in symbols; social interwovenness, 251; of the closed sphere; its coherence with the system of symbolical expressive forms necessary for mutual comprehension; the conjugal bond disqualifies the partners to separate the meaning content of this contact from this one momentary vital relation; in the closed sphere the symbol becomes objective, transpersonal, constant; the closed sphere can thus expand, 252; and embrace an unlimited number of persons, becoming a closed sphere of the second degree; Direct spiritual contact is limited to very narrow spheres; (of the first degree); the means of social mediation; it lends unity and continuity to the social whole; the Gesamterlebnis, 253; the experience and actions of all the members are incorporated in the indivisible unity of a social totality; a Gemeinschaft has a structural unity of interwoveness guaranteed by social mediation and centred in individual physico-psychical personality; a totality without an I-hood, without a personality of its own, 254; the individual personality is only constituted in the social totality of a temporal Gemeinschaft; and there is a final and highest community encompassing all other relationships as its parts; this view is universalistic; there is no authority in Litt's closed sphere, because he ignores normative aspects explicitly, 255; to sociology, he says, only the meaningful and the meaningless count; (natural aspects are meaningless here); his phenomenological prejudice; he confuses the lawside with the subject-side of social reality, 256; criticism of his ‘closed sphere’ (cf. sub voce Gemeinschaft, p. 257), 257; his universalistic conception of the ‘final or highest social unity’ even embraces enmity or conflict; the relation between such a ‘final unity’ and its constituent parts is identical with the relation between the individual ego and the ‘closed sphere of the first degree’; this must lead to the concept of a supra individual ego of some ‘Gesamtperson’, which Litt rejects, 258; he ends in a functionalistic universalism of a historicist type, 259; criticism of Litt's ‘soziale Vermittlung’ concept; he excludes the organization from his concept of Gemeinschaft (community), 260; his dialectical phenomenological method; his charge of ‘spatial mode of thought’; his universalist levelling of differences, 262; his ‘closed sphere’, 271; he intentionally eliminated the normative viewpoint; his idea of ‘social restriction’ is crypto-normative, 272; - psychic interlacements between family members are not a separate department; he rejects the hypostatization of a community to a ‘spiritual organism or super personality’; social acts are inferred from the interlacements among individual egos, 295; his monadological universalism, denies the religious transcendence of human personality, 296; his refutation of the organological view of human communities is only partly adequate; he holds that a community interweaves the individual I-nesses of its members (‘monadological universalism’), 297.

Living Cell, III, a living cell is the last independent viable unity of a living mass, whose reality is not directly accessible to naïve experience, 102; a living organism is a typically biotically qualified individuality structure functioning within an enkaptic whole; a living body does not coalesce with its ‘living organism’, 717; living albumen in Kolzoff's conceptions, 721; ‘living protein’, protein combinations are physically determined in structure, 727; ‘living matter’ according to Driesch, 742.

Livius, Titus, III, Rerum Rom. ab urbe condita, 486.

Lobsters, III, 774.

Locke, John, I, Essay concerning Human Understanding, 224, 263, 305, 530.

Locke, John, I, criticized the Humanistic metaphysics of nature, 203; an undoubted Nominalist, he still speaks of ‘eternal relations between the Ideas’; the ethical and mathematical Ideas are creations of thought, 224; ‘outer world’ of objective sensations, ‘inner world’ of subjective operations of the mind; reflection or ‘internal sense’; the understanding borrows all ‘ideas’ from them; parallel with Descartes' dualism of ‘extensio’ and ‘cogitatio’; behind experience there is supposed to be a material substance and a spiritual one; they are held to be unknowable, 263; Locke undermines Hobbes' monistic materialism; sensation and reflection are not of equal rank; the operations of the mind are perceived only when the mind is stimulated by sensations of the ‘outer’ world; Cartesian ‘innate ideas’ are rejected; the understanding owes all of its content to the simple or elementary representations (Ideas) given in sensation and reflection; mathematical thought, even, is not purely logical; simple sensible and spiritual impressions are passively received by the mind; Ideas, however, are complex, 264; ideas are freely formed by the understanding out of the combinations of simple ones; their number is infinite; simple ideas, e.g., pain, pleasure, joy, grief, etc., force,

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causality, unity, reality; - complex ideas comprise member, space, infinity, identity, power, substance; L. did not complete the psychologizing of scientific thought; he held science (mathematical) to be the mainstay of the science-ideal; his view is antinomic, 265; his psychological dualism is gradually transformed into radical dualism between psychic experience and creative thought; then he came into conflict with his absolutized psychological starting point; he dissolves the world of experience into atomistic psychical elements; they do not cohere, but relate to the unknown bearer, ‘substance’; they are like the letters of the alphabet and capable of being joined together arbitrarily in ‘reflexion’; from this it follows that no scientific knowledge of empirical reality is possible; but the necessary coherence between concepts required in science does not originate in the psychical impressions; between the ‘Ideas’ there are necessary relations elevated above the sensory impressions and having an eternal constancy, 266; true science is only concerned with this necessary connection of concepts; the understanding creates the necessary relations between Ideas and forms ‘archetypes’; in the experience of reality a triangle has the same sum of its angles as does the universal triangle in the mathematical concept; the same thing holds for ‘moral Ideas’; exact proofs are as possible in ethics as in mathematics; both furnish us with a-priori; knowledge, infallible, true, and certain, 267; thus the science ideal is given primacy; human personality can only maintain its freedom of action by obeying mathematical thought; but ‘sovereign reason’ refused to accept the Cartesian ‘innate ideas’, 268; Locke granted to psychology the central task of explaining the origin and limits of human knowledge and of critically examining the validity of its foundations; the dogmatic acceptance of innate ideas endangered the sovereignty of thought; the psychological Archè of mathematical thought must be traced; he refused to ‘swallow’ principles with a blind implicit faith; he limited scientific knowledge to the sphere of the non-real; he distinguished empirical facts from necessary relations between concepts (like Hobbes), 269; Hume was to adopt this distinction, too; Locke maintained that mathematical and moral judgments are synthetical; he then introduced a new faculty of cognition, the intuition of the ‘cogito’; this intuition was the basis of all mathematical proof (demonstratio); thought must always remain joined to psychical sensations if it is to lead to knowledge; the continuity and infinity of space and time are beyond sensory perception; he capitulates to the science ideal; physics and biology are entirely dependent on sensible perception and cannot be mathematically demonstrated, 270; here was the beginning of critical self-reflection on the root of the science-ideal; and of a reaction against the rationalism of the ‘Enlightenment’; L. rejected the Cartesian deduction of ‘Sum res cogitans’ from ‘Cogito ergo sum’; he denied to mathematical thought the right to identify itself with the ‘sovereign personality’ as the root of the science-ideal; the rejected the theory that the will was a mode of mathematical thought; the mathematical science ideal was emancipated from a rationalistic metaphysics of nature; the insight was possible that the root of reality is not to be discovered by science; the science ideal must have its fundamentals in the personality ideal, 271; Hume had outgrown the Enlightenment; he reduced the metaphysical conceptions of nature and human personality to absurdity, 272; he found room for moral freedom and responsibility in the power of man ‘to suspend his desires’; the care of ourselves that we do not mistake imaginary for real happiness is the necessary foundation of our liberty; Locke is indeterministic, 305; he opposed Hobbes' absolutist doctrine, but remained a genuine figure of the Enlightenment in his optimistic faith that the domination of mathematical thought was the best guarantee of the freedom of personality; the free individual remained the central point of the civil State; he construed the transition from the natural state to the civil state by means of the Social Contract; the citizens guaranteed their inalienable rights of freedom and private property by an organized power according to a contract; the civil state is no more than a company with limited liability; this is the constitutional state of the old liberalism, 318.

Locke John, II, together with Newton he dominated the thought of the times of the Enligtenment, 350; his conception of innate human rights pertaining to natural law became a guiding motive, but was a subjective theory that could not be positivized in the legal order, 357; Wolff's and Locke's rationalism penetrated into the codifications of the times, 358; L. formulated the classical-liberal idea of the law state, 360; innate rights; this theory is destructive to the recognition of positive law, 395; theory of personality rights stems from innate human rights, 413.

Locke John, III, his doctrine of secondary qualities, 39; his idea of the body politic construed the state as a political association whose sovereign authority is bound to the aim of protecting the innate natural rights of man to life, freedom and property; he thought the salus publica the highest law of the state, 237; his idea of the law state, 426, 427; of public interest, 442; he distinguishes between State and

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Society, the latter being the system of free market relations, 452; the State is for the protection of the innate human rights, esp. that of property, 457; freedom and life were subsumed under the right of property, 458.

Loeb, III, Tribal Initiation and Secret Societies, 365.

Loeb, III, secret societies have one common root, viz., the initiation rites of boys, 366.

Logic, I, a semi-Platonic mathematical method of logic in Petrus Ramus, 198.

Logic, II, transcendental and formal logic in Kant, 15; logic historically explained, 195; logic as a science, 462; pure logic and pure axiology distinguished by Scheler, 545; cf. s.v. Logical Aspect, II.

Logical Alphabet, I, of Raymundus Lullus, 245.

Logical Aspect, I, in a closed state this aspect lacks anticipatory moments; viz. in the pre-theoretical attitude of thought; but in the theoretical attitude anticipatory moments find expression in the inner connection with the historical, linguistic, economic and later aspects, 29; time discloses a logical modal sense in the logical aspect; logical simultaneity and the order of prius and posterius is as much a modal aspect of time as the physical; the theoretical concept joins in logical simultaneity the analysed characteristics of that which it defines in subjection to the principles of identity and contradiction expressing the analytical temporal order of simultaneity in the sense of logical implication and exclusion; logical movement of thought follows the order of prius and posterius; this movement has duration in the real act of thought when we draw a syllogistic inference in theoretical logical form; in the logical order of succession the former stages do not disappear because the inference implies its premises; in mathematical movement the former stages disappear in the order of succession of its moments, 30; logical order is normative, physical order is not; cosmic time does not offer a concentration point serving as a point of departure for philosophy, not even in the logical aspect, 31; the logical aspect of our act of thought is that of analytical distinction in the sense of setting apart what is given together; logical analysis would have nothing to distinguish apart from a previously given cosmic diversity of meaning, 39; this concept enables Husserl to formulate different purely logical propositions and definitions, 73, 74.

Logical Aspect, II, transcendental and formal logic in Kant, 15; logical contradiction and antinomy, 46, 47; Greek and Scholastic logic and analogical concepts, 55; symbolic logic; logistic; its dangers; logical unity of scientific language, 59; logical space, 63; logical economy, 66; logical command, 69; logical command is not primitive; the way it is acquired, 69; logical distinction and distinctiveness; the nucleus of the logical aspect; numerical analogy, is analytical unity in plurality in a concept; logical unification; the unifying process; the logical norms of identity and contradiction; unity, multiplicity and totality are founded in number, 80; counting is not the origin of number but implies logical distinction; logical plurality is analogical, a retrocipation to number, 81; theoretical movement of thought, 94, 95; meaning-kernel is analytical distinction; retrocipations: logical apperception and perception; Leibniz on this; identity and diversity; the life of thought; principle of sufficient ground is a physical retrocipation; J. Stuart Mill's theory of conditio sine qua non, 118, 119; ground and conclusion; this is a logical and not a physical relation; the logical process of concluding is a retrocipation to movement; analytical space, 120; logical anticipations are only found in the deepened meaning of theoretical thought: logical control (historical anticipation); logical symbolism; symbolic logic; logical economy; in Aritotle, Plato and William of Occam, 122; Mach; Avenarius; W. James; and pragmatic absolutization of logical economy; logical economy is not an application of the general economic principle embracing the ideal of science, 123; analytical economy pre-supposes the norms of identity, contradiction, and sufficient ground; and it deepens their meaning; misuse of this logical economy in jurisprudence and legal technique, 124; logical economy and the principle of sufficient ground, 125; the method of defining things by their genus proximum and differentia specifica was introduced by Socrates, Plato and Aristotle, 132; economy of thought is an economic anticipation; indirect; and in deepened theoretical thought; it is systematic and shows logical control (historical anticipation); biologistic views of Mach and Avenarius; Oswald Spengler's misinterpretation, 175; logical symbolism; logical harmony; justification of theoretical judgment anticipates the legal aspect; Kant's verdict, 176; the relation of the ‘whole and its parts’ is not purely logical, 454; its numerical analogy; the ideas of continuous analytical extension and juxtaposition, are retrocipatory; movement of thought; prius and posterius; are kinematic analogies, 455; the science of logic; this notion is a seeming paradox, 462; the analytical aspect cannot be its own Gegenstand, but it is the I-ness who is operating theoretically, 463; ‘formal logic’ is an antinomy if it is conceived as ‘pure

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analysis’; it is formalized logic; and in it logical individuality and all total structures of individuality have been eliminated; in the theoretical attitude the non-logical is analytically encompassed by the logical categories; logical sphere sovereignty and sphere universality; Christian logic, 464; what it means, 465; intuition is the bottom layer of the logical function, 473.

Logical Calculus, II, in Kant, Whitehead, 452.

Logical Creation Motive, I, in Heinrich Rickert's thought, 14; in modern Humanistic thought; in Descartes; Leibniz; Hobbes, 197, 203; a particular method in Leibniz, 245; in Plato, 247, 248 (note); the logical origin principle of creative mathematical thought, 407.

Logical Economy, I, in positivism, 110; in Ernst Mach's view, 558.

Logical Economy, II, is analytical; in Aristotle's criticism of the Platonic Ideas, 122, 123; its analytical qualification is ignored by Mach and Avenarius; it presupposes the transcendental conditions of knowledge, according to Kant, 123, 124, 125, 176.

Logical Exactitude, I, of mathematics explained by Hume in terms of psychology, 293.

Logical Formalizing, I, of the totality concept, 73.

Logical Function, I, cannot be Gegenstand, only its modal structure, 40; in apostasy, 100.

Logical Ground, I, is distinguished from ground of being, in Crusius, and in Kant, 335; cf. s.v. Logical Aspect, II, 118 ff.

Logical Laws, I, have been psychologized in Hume, 278, 279; cf. s.v. Logical Aspect, II, 118-120.

Logical Necessity, II, is contrasted with intuitive certainly by Volkelt, 475, 476.

Logical Principles, I, in Litt, 144; cf. s.v. Logical Aspect, II, 46, 47, 80, 118, 124.

Logical Space, II, 120.

Logical Thought, I, does not transcend the meaning diversity, 17.

Logical Unity, I, in Maimon, 409.

Logicism, I, of Parmenides was refuted by the Sophists, 19.

Logistic, II, and modern mathematics; symbolic logic; and its basic concepts; logical calculus, 452.

Logology, II, of Paul Hoffmann, 29, 30.

Logos-Theory, I, in the Alexandrian School denatured the Biblical motive of creation; was speculative, 177.

Lohman, A.F. de Savornin, III, De Rechtsbevoegdheid der Kerken, 690.

Lohman, A.F. de Savornin, III, the ‘visible’ church is not a society, but an institution; it possesses an internal spiritual legal sphere of its own entirely apart from civil law; civil juridical rules relating to associations can never be applied here; if a baptismal member refuses to pay the ecclesiastic tax the Church cannot at all call in the aid of a civil judge, 690.

Loneliness, Inner, III, Weber's idea of a Calvinist's ‘inner loneliness’, 247.

Loschmidt, II, and the number ‘n’, 425.

Lotze, Hermann, II,

Lotze, Hermann, II, his cosmonomic Idea, 593. Leben und Lebenskraft, 735.

Lotze, Hermann, III, on Müller's theory of specific energy of the sense organs, 41.

Louvre, The, III, its colonnade, 142.

Love, II, modal; and religious love, 144, 149; as sensory inclination, in Kant, 150; in Calvin's view; love and social convention, 152; according to Aalders, 154; and justice, 161.

Love, III, religious love is the fulfilment of all temporal meaning, 71; love in the human family between parents and children reflects the bond of love between the heavenly father and his human children, 269; its biotic foundation in the family bond gives it an added intensity, 270; love and sin, 271; parental love, according to Vierkandt, 293; love guides the care of the bio-physical existence of the members of a family, 301; Kant's crude definition of married love; free love, in Schlegel, 317, 318; love is called a sandy ground as a basis for marriage, 332; love of country depends on the political structure, 471; love is subjective in the State's people, 472; love is counterbalanced by international love of one's neighbour among the nations, 476.

Love and Justice, II, are antithetically opposed in E. Brunner, 157-159.

Love Union, III, marriage is essentially a love union, 307.

Lowie, R.H., III, Primitive Society, 332, 338, 341, 342, 353, 354, 355, 357, 359.

Lowie, R.H., III, refuted the constructive evolutionist theory of the rise and development of the human family, 331; sexual communism (cf. ‘group marriage’), instead of individual marriage, is nowhere to be found at present and the evidence of its early occurrence must be rejected as insufficient; the bilateral family of husband and wife and children is a universal unit of human social life, 332; Lowie follows Boas, 333; his criticism of economic explanations, 336; marriage and family are the centre of society among even the simplest cultures, whereas the latter lack the sib and the clan, 338; pirra-ura is a question of concubinage, 341; he warns

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against overestimating popular juridical conceptions of marriage, 342; on the sib or clan; his error of seeking the basis of the sib or clan in the biotic aspect, 353; but Lowie proved that the claim of common descent on the part of the sibmates rests on a fiction; there is often a mythical conception of common descent, i.e., a totem, 354; siblings belong to the same generation; the law of exogamy, 355; sibs are extremely changeable units, 357; adoption is a very important feature of a sib; the adopted child is incorporated in the husband's or in the wife's sib, 359.

Lucinde, III, by Schlegel, embodied the Romantic ideal of free love, 318.

Lullus, Raymundus, I, conceived the idea of a logical alphabet, 245.

Luschau, III, Völker, Sprachen, Rassen, 495.

Luther, Martin, I, Luther's spiritualistic distinction between Law and Gospel, 511; his Occamist Nominalism; he opposes temporal ordinances to Evangelical freedom, separates faith from science; although he opposed Aristotelism as well as Erasmus, he was influenced by Eckhart and the Augustinian Franciscan spirit; his nominalistic dualistic view of the Church; in this dualism was implied his subsequently abandoned distinction between official and, 512, personal morality; his dualistic attitude towards scientific thought rested on a prejudice concerning the relation between faith and natural reason, 513; Luther did not escape falling into a spiritualistic antinomianism, 519.

Luther, Martin, II, his dualistic scheme of nature and grace, 157, 159; he was a leader, 243.

Luther, Martin, III, Luthers Werke (Braunschweig, 1892), 514, 545; Vom Papstum zu Rom wider den hoggerühmten Romanisten zu Leipzig, 514.

Luther, Martin, III, agapê, eros, and original sin; he gave love primacy in marriage, but ascribed sexual pleasure to original sin, 314; he rejected celibacy and the monastic vow of chastity; but remained dependent on the Roman views of marriage as a ‘less perfect state’, 315; the relation between the ecclesia visibilis and ecclesia invisibilis according to Luther, 512; his dualism favoured the formation of sectarian conventicles because of his hypostatization of the faith aspect of the temporal institution to the super-natural order; congregatio fidelium, 513; the peasant revolt induced him to turn to the Elector of Saxony to give the Church an external organization and to institute visitation, 514; Luther's idea of giving the congregation the right to elect Church officers and to maintain doctrinal discipline is not of fundamental importance, 515; the Evangelical princes are to render a service of love in the Church and not to have dominion; he did not properly understand the juridical aspect of their service, 545.

Lycians, III, the ancient Lycians had matriarchy, 331.