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K
Kahl, K., III,
Lehrsystem des Kirchenrechts und der Kirchenpolitik, 552. |
| Kahl, K., III, Sohm wrongly represents his thesis concerning the incompatibility of law and Church as the result of historical research, 552. |
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| Kallikles, III, a radicalistic individualist, a Sophist, 199; he started from the Greek matter-motive and defended a naturalistic individualistic idea of the political ruler, a prelude to Nietsche's ‘Herrenmensch’, 398. |
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| Kalokagathon, I, the Greek ideal of the beautiful and good, 122; cannot be identified with Schiller's modern Humanist aestheticism, 123; it was transformed by Shaftesbury, 462. |
| Kalokagathon, II, after the manner of the Socratic Idea of the Kalokagathon the process of becoming in the sensible world is understood as a genesis eis ousian, 10; the Kalokagathon embodied the Greek ideal of personal perfection, 177. |
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Kampschulte, III,
Joh. Calvin, 520, 546. |
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| Kampschulte, III, this Roman-Catholic writer holds that Calvin seeks the sovereignty over the Church in the collective will of the Church members, 520, 521; his quotations from Calvin are to prove that the Reformer started from the principle of the sovereignty of the congregation, but are irrelevant or prove the very opposite, 546. |
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Kant, Immanuel, I,
Kritik der reinen Vernunft, 27, 75, 107, 118, 261, 340, 345, 352, 353, 354, 357, 359, 362, 363, 365, 366, 367, 368, 369, 370, 371, 372, 374, 377, 381, 85, 390, 400;
Entwurf der notwendigen Vernunftwahrheiten, 339;
Letter to Garve, 351;
Reflexionen Kants zur kritischen Philosophie, 341, 344, 345, 349, 350;
Allgemeine Naturgeschichte des Himmels, 332, 547;
Der einzig mögliche Bewreisgrund zu
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einer Demonstration des Daseins Gottes, 336;
Versuch den Begriff der negativen Gröszen in die Weltweisheit einzuführen, 336, 340;
Untersuchung über die Deutlichkeit der Grundsätze der natürlichen Theologie und Moral, 336, 337;
Beobachtungen über das Gefühl des Schönen und Erhabenen, 338;
Vom ersten Grunde des Unterscheides der Gegenden im Raume, 342, 343;
Träume eines Geistersehers erläutert durch Träume der Metaphysik, 333, 334, 340, 346;
Physische Monadologie, 33;
De Principiorum primorum cognitionis metaphysicae nova dilucidatio, 335;
Prolegomena zu einer jeden künftigen metaphysik, 107, 159, 162, 344;
De mundi sensibilis atque intelligibilis forma et principiis, 345, 346, 347, 348, 350;
Versuch einiger Betrachtungen über den Optimismus, 347;
Kritik der Urteilskraft, 354, 385, 386, 387, 389, 390, 391, 392, 393, 394, 395, 396, 397, 398, 399, 401;
Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten, 65, 75;
Vom ewigen Frieden, 469;
Kritik der praktischen Vernunft, 354, 357, 369, 373, 374, 376, 377, 378, 379, 380, 381, 382, 384, 385, 392, 401;
Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Rechtslehre, 529;
Idee zu einer allgemeinen Geschichte in Weltbürgerlicher Absicht, 529;
Gedanken von den wahren Schätzung der lebendigen Kräfte, 547. |
| Kant, Immanuel, I, time is a transcendental form of intuition, coordinated with space, the form of intuition, 27; number originates from a schematizing category of quantity in time, 2; Kantian epistemology is involved in a theoretical dogmatism, because it starts from the dogma of the autonomy of theoretical thought, 35; since Kant the religious background to the Humanistic ideal of science and personality has found expression in the basic motive of nature and freedom, 36; he is the father of critical-transcendental philosophy; he sought a starting-point in theoretical reason as the basis of every possible theoretical synthesis; his ‘Gesinnungsethik’ rationalizes the ‘disposition of the heart’ as the criterion of morality; he absolutized the moral aspect, (note) 49; he identifies the act of thinking with a purely psychical temporal event, the ‘Gegenstand’ to the ‘transcendental-logical cogito’; his dualistic view of reality, 50, 51; his ‘transcendental-logical unity of apperception’ is a subjective pole of thought in the ‘Verstand’ (i.e. the logical function of thinking); representation, i.e. concepts of empirical Gegenstände, must be accompanied by the ‘I think’ if they are to be my representations; the ‘cogito’ can never be a ‘Gegenstand’ of the ‘transcendental-logical subject of thought’, 53; we do not possess real self-knowledge, for knowledge is concerned with the forms of intuition and the logical categories in connection with the sensory world; the transcendental-logical ego remains caught in the logical pole of the theoretical Gegenstand relation, the counter pole is the non-logical aspect of sense perception, 54; theoretic self-reflection in thought pre-supposes self-knowledge, the concentric direction of theoretic thought can only
start from the ego; Kant has overlooked this truth, 55; his motive of nature and freedom, 62; Kant's verdict: the antinomy cannot be solved, 65; Kant deprives nature (in the natural-scientific sense) of all divine character and even denies its divine origin; God is a postulate of practical reason, i.e., 67; of autonomous morality, which is completely dominated by the Humanistic freedom motive, 68; his distinction between synthetic and analytic judgments, 73; the unity of reason was dissolved by Kant in the dualism of theoretical and practical reason, 75; in his epistemology he calls ‘reality’ one of the ‘categories of modality’, 76; Kant's ‘transcendental-logical subject’ and Theodor Litt's, 78; the tri-unity of the transcendental Ideas: the idea of the universe - of the ultimate unity of human selfhood - and of the absolute Origin; they are the hypothesis of every philosophy, which fact Kant does not recognize, nor does he realize that the theoretical ideas have a content depending on supra-theoretic pre-suppositions; he restricts their significance to their purely formal-logical regulative systematic function; the deeper reason for his view was his awareness of the unbridgeable antithesis in the basic motive of nature and freedom, and he refused to attempt a dialectical synthesis; his conception of the autonomy and spontaneity of the transcendental logical function was ruled by the freedom motive; the nature motive found expression (89) in his view of the purely receptive character of sensory perception subjected to the causal determinations of science; he accepted the a priori relatedness of the transcendental categories to sensory experience, but rejected this synthesis in his ethics; his ‘dialectic of pure reason’; the transcendental ideas point to the transcendent realm of
the ‘noumenon’ in which the ideas of free autonomous will and of God have ‘practical reality’; theoretical thought has no other limits than its bond with sensory perception; freedom is dialectically related to causality and is the hypothesis of transcendental logic, 90; the same Idea obtains ‘practical reality’ for ‘reasonable belief’
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| in de Krit. d. pr. Vern., 91; his hypostatization of ‘theoretical reason’ as the self-sufficient Archimedean point of philosophy eliminates the cosmic temporal order; it was the source of subjectivism in the development of philosophic thought; his ‘Copernican revolution’ proves the impossibility of a truly critical critique of theoretic reason apart from the insight into the cosmic time order; he wants the reader to accept nothing as given except reason itself; this amounts to an abdication from the preliminary questions of critical thought, 107; in his ‘theoretical’ philosophy the subject is only epistemological, the Archè of the form of the theoretical laws of nature; the ‘transcendental subject’ is lawgiver of nature; pre-psychical reality is a synthesis of logical and sensory functions of consciousness; their modal and structural laws are replaced by a-priori transcendental forms of theoretical understanding and of sensibility in an a priori synthesis; in his ‘practical’ philosophy the subject is homo noumenon (pure will), the autonomous law-giver for moral life, 109; his epistemology has a theoretical dogmatic character, 118; his ‘critical’ standpoint; the ‘universally valid’ transcendental subject’, stripped of all individuality is the formal origin of the real ‘Gegenstand’ of knowledge; his theoretical Idea (130) of the totality of reality was viewed by Kant as essentially an infinite task for thought, 131; the ideal of personality gained the upperhand over the Humanistic science ideal of the intellectualistic Enlightenment, viz., in Kant's primacy of the practical reason, 137; Kant's ‘homo noumenon’ is a synthetical hypostatization of the ethical function of personality; theoretical thought is ethically determined, 143; ‘universally
valid’ is independent of all ‘empirical subjectivity’, valid for the ‘transcendental consciousness’, the ‘transcendental cogito’, which is the origin of all universal validity; the synthetic a-priori, making objective experience possible, is universally valid; perception has merely ‘subjective validity’; he distinguished judgments of perception from judgments of experience, 158; the former require no pure concept of the understanding but only the logical connection of perceptions in a thinking subject; the latter require special concepts originally produced in the understanding as well as the representations of the sensory intuition; ‘the sun heats the stone’ is merely subjectively valid, but if I say: ‘the sun causes the heat of the stone’, I add the concept of the understanding (viz. causality) to perception, and the judgment becomes universally valid, 159; the datum of experience is chaotic and must be formed by the transcendtal consciousness to an objective coherent reality; the secondary qualities are merely ‘subjective’, 161; he eradicates the difference between theoretical knowledge and pre-theoretical experience, 162; since Kant the transcendental basic Idea of Humanistic thought has to be designated as the motive of nature and freedom, 190; the Idea of a personal God was accepted as a postulate of practical reason by Kant, 191; he criticized the Humanistic metaphysics of nature, 203; the extremely refined antinomies hidden in Leibniz' haughty metaphysics were scrutinized by Kant in his ‘Kritik d.r. Vern.’ in order to uproot the primacy of the ideal of science, 261; Kant did not make any fundamental distinction between naïve experience and natural science, 297; Kant was the first to undertake the actio finium regundorum
against the primacy of the science-ideal over the personality ideal, 310; perhaps Kant was influenced by the fourth book of Rousseau's Emile where sensory nature was opposed to the feeling of freedom, 316 (note); the general will in which every citizen encounters his own will, cannot do any injustice to any one: volenti non fit injuria, 323; Kant's philosophy inaugurated the phase of ‘transcendental freedom-idealism’; the ideal of science is limited to the world of sense-phenomena; the root of human personality is sought in the normative ethical function of its free will; there is a growing self-reflection of Humanism on the religious foundations of its philosophic attitude, 325; Richard Kroner holds that Kant was the first to have expressed the intrinsic spirit of the Christian faith within a so-called philosophical life- and world view; he conceived of God no longer as an objective Idea, Pure Form, First Cause and Substance, but rather out of the depth of the ethical-religious life’; Roman Catholic thinkers consider German Idealism since Kant as the philosophical expression of the Reformed view of the relation between God and His creation, 326; Kant has been historically influenced by Puritanism and Pietism; his transcendental basic Idea is ruled by the Humanistic motive of nature and freedom; criticistic idealism has deeply influenced the philosophical thought of Protestantism; this fact reveals the invasion of the Scholastic spirit of accommodation originating from the basic motive of nature and grace in its nominalistic conception; this motive impeded the inner reformation of philosophical thought; in Kant's phil. the Humanistic ideal of personality awakens from its lethargy, 327; the freedom-Idea in Kant is religious totality and Origin of meaning; Richard
Hönigwald on the conception of the Idea as the embodiment of the Humanistic personality-Ideal; this development starts with Kant's Kritik d.r. Vern.,
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| 329; Kant struggled with various motives, viz. in Newton's natural science, and the Enlightenment, Leibniz-Wolff metaphysics of the mathematical science-ideal, in Hume's psychologism, in Rousseau's free personality; Puritanism and Pietism ruled his rigorous attitude towards sensory human nature, 330; he tried to find a scientific foundation for his moral and religious conviction, and began to realize that the speculative metaphysical mathematical science-ideal was no use in this attempt; but he still held the spirit of the Englihtenment in high esteem, 331; he repeated Descartes' motto: ‘Give me matter and I will build a world from it’; he never repudiated the spirit of Newton; his doubt only concerned the metaphysics of the mathematical science-ideal; he was deeply moved by Rousseau's proclamation of the freedom of human personality from the subjection to science; this influence was decisive, 332; in his ‘Dreams of a visionary’ he confesses that his disdain for ‘the mob who do not know anything’ has vanished and that Rousseau has set him right; he has learned to honour men; ‘true wisdom is the companion of simplicity and with it the heart lays down the law to the understanding, it generally renders the elaborate equipment of learning superfluous’; with Socrates he says: (333), ‘How many things there are that I do not need at all!’ This means the end of the domination of the science-ideal in Kant's thought; his humorous criticism of Swedenborg was turned against rationalistic metaphysics (Leibniz, Wolff); like Rousseau and Hume, Kant conceived of the personality ideal as the function
of feeling; theoretical metaphysics was intended to criticize the foundations and limits of mathematical knowledge of nature; he did not reduce causality to the succession of psychical Ideas like Hume, nor did he follow Rousseau's complete degradation of the mathematical science-ideal, 334; he tried to limit mathematical and causal thinking to sensory experience; in his Physische Monadologie he differentiated between Leibnizian metaphysics and the mathematical conception of space; he opposed Wolff's attempt to derive causality from the logical principle of contradiction; with Crusius he distinguished between ‘logical ground’ and ‘ground of being’; he rejected the ontological proofs of the existence of God; but he still held to Wolff's metaphysics which would furniish a priori knowledge from mere concepts; the ‘metaphysical’ root and origin cannot be derived from the logical unthinkableness of the opposite; Kant held that metaphysical being can be ascertained by logical thought only in the judgment of identity, 335; the different methods of mathematics and of metaphysics; mathematical definitions are synthetical, metaphysical definitions are analytical; mathematics creates its own Gegenstand, its definitions come first; in metaphysics the concepts of things are given, definitions come at the end; the true method of metaphysics is like Newton's method of mathematical physics, 336; ‘hypotheses non fingo’ was Newton's adage: natural laws formulated with the aid of mathematical thought must in the last analysis be subjected to the test of experience; the causes of phenomena cannot be devised by thinking; even mathematical thought remains bound to the confines of sense experience; Kant accepted this view, thereby implying that the line of
demarcation between the methods of mathematics and philosophy in his writings of 1763 was not definitive; with him the science-ideal, at least partially, still has the primacy in the sense formulated by Newton, 337; he rejects the freedom of the will; under the influence of English psychologism Kant distinguishes the knowing faculty representing what is true and the power to distinguish what is good; the latter is the moral sentiment (cf. Shaftesbury, Hutcheson, Hume); ‘the judgment: “this is good”, is wholly incapable of demonstration, and an immediate effect of the consciousness of the feeling of the pleasure we take in the Idea of the object’; the first principles of ‘natural theology’; they are capable of moral certainty only insofar as they are concerned with God's freedom in action, His justice, and goodness; K. took the path of psychologism; cf. his ‘Considerations on the feeling of the beautiful and the sublime’; ethics is based on the feeling of beauty (Shaftesbury); Kant made Crusius' distinction between the logical ground of knowledge and the ground of being the foundation of his critical investigations, 339; he affirmed that in physics the terms negative and positive have an entirely different significance from that ascribed to them in logic and mathematics; in his third period Kant was close to Hume's scepticism, and Rousseau's thought led Kant to emancipate the science-ideal from the grasp of theoretical metaphysics; K. introduced the distinction between analytical and synthetical judgments, 340; he considered all synthetical propositions to be concerned with sensory experience, i.e., to be ‘empirical’ judgments; thus he was sceptical with respect to the universally valid foundations of
mathematical physics; physical ‘causality’; its principle is not universally valid or necessary; then he saw that such scepticism would destroy the very foundations of mathematics, 341; he was now interested in the relation of space and time to real things; he defended Newton's and Euler's mathematical doctrine of ‘ab- |
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| solute pure space’ against Leibniz' conception that space is nothing but an ‘a priori order of possible coexistences’; space is not the product of the relations of material parts, but the pre-requisite for the relations of spatial things to each other; but he did not take over Newton's absolute space as ‘sensorium Dei’, 342; he discovered the mathematical antinomies; he rejected Newton's and Euler's view and accepted that of Leibniz: ‘space and time’ are a priori forms of pure thought, 343; K. did not ascribe any value to the metaphysical application of Leibniz' creative a priori concepts of the mind; in a new schema he coordinated space and time with actuality, possibility, necessity, etc.; he reckoned all of them to ontology, related to the rest of philosophy as mathesis pura to mathesis applicata, 344; in his inaugural address at Königsberg University Kant called space and time ‘conceptus singulares’ and also ‘intuitus singulares puri’; he opposed them to ‘conceptus universales’ acquired by abstraction; there is only one space and one time, including all limited spaces and all finite periods of time as their parts; this new conception marks a reaction against theoretical metaphysics on the part of Kant's gradually maturing new conception of the personality ideal, 345; his inaugural address makes the important distinction between
the sphere of sensory phenomena and the intelligible world; the value of personality is not dependent on scientific thought; K. still adhered to the sentimental religion and ethics of Rousseau and the English psychologists; but pietistic motives made Kant increasingly more suspicious of sensory human nature, 346; it became impossible to harmonize the sensory nature of man with the Idea of normative autonomous freedom; his pessimism of the ‘radical evil’; nature as the sole experienceable reality is degraded to ‘mundus sensibilis’; space is a synthetical form of the ‘outer sense’, time of the ‘inner sense’; both are necessary conditions for sensory experience, 347; the ‘Dinge an sich’ are fundamentally excluded from the sphere of experience; mathematics and natural science are therefore, limited to the phenomenon; corporeal things fill mathematical space; space is an a priori form of intuition; the usus logicus of logical understanding; the usus realis, 348; the intelligible world is that of the ‘Dinge an sich’ as the new conception of the personality ideal; our pure autonomous will, only determined by the form of moral legislation, is itself an ‘example of an Idea of freedom, of an intelligible substance’; two tasks performed by metaphysics: an elenctic and a dogmatic one; knowledge from concepts of the mind is only ‘cognitio symbolica’; he denied to theoretical metaphysics every mode of intuitive adequate knowledge; he rejects Leibniz and Wolff's view that sensory knowledge is a ‘cognitio confusa’; Kant holds that sensory intuitions of space and time furnish us with the most distinct cognitions of all, namely the mathematical ones’; the ‘mundus intelligibilis’ is Civitas Dei; he identifies it with the mundus moralis; God is
the ‘practical original Being’, this is the moralistic ideal of personality, 350; the idea of the autonomous self-determination of personality became Kant's hypothesis of theoretical knowledge; the discovery of the antinomies of theoretical metaphysics was the occasion of his transition to critical Idealism; the real motive was religious; the intellect is law-giver to ‘nature’; in the spontaneity of the intellect is expressed the sovereign value of the personality; his letter to Markus Herz in 1772; the intellect possesses an ‘usus realis’ in the a priori foundation of the ‘mundus visibilis’; the problem of the a priori synthesis, 351; universally valid experience is identical with ‘Gegenstand’, and the latter with ‘objectivity’ in Kant; on what is the relation between our representation and the Gegenstand (object) based? This Gegenstand is a chaotic mass of experience, of intermingled sense impressions; but they are received in the a priori forms of intuition, space and time; our representations of things in the external world are syntheses of our consciousness; the universal validity of such syntheses originates from the a priori function of pure logical understanding with its categories; Kant developed the programme of the Transcendental Analytic, 352; the central problem of his critical work is that of the possibility of synthetical judgments a priori; he soon found the metaphysical deduction of the categories; his system of the Critique of Pure Reason took nine years to elaborate; the difficulty was the ‘transcendental deduction’, which was to explain why the categories are necessarily related to the ‘Gegenstand’; in the ‘transcendental deduction the foundations of the mathematical and natural scientific pattern of knowledge were at stake; the core of his Critique is
found in the Dialectic of Pure Reason, 353; he wished to open the way for the a priori rational faith in the reality of the autonomous freedom of the personality by denying the claims of theoretical metaphysics; his three ‘Critiques’ are one whole; his ‘Copernican Deed’ is the reversal of the relation between the knowing subject and empirical reality, 354; this reversal is only significant in the basic structure of Kant's transcendental ground-Idea; since Descartes' Humanistic philosophy had sought the foundations of reality in the knowing subject
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| only; but Kant did more than repeat this thought; he withdrew the ‘Ding an sich’ from the domination of the mathematical science ideal and limited theoretical knowledge to sense phenomena in order to safeguard the Humanistic religious freedom motive of the personality ideal, 355; he sought the transcendent root of human existence in the rational-moral function of sovereign personality; with regard to knowledge of nature K. held to the sovereignty of mathematical thought; but the science ideal cedes its primacy to the ideal of personality; Kant bound mathematical and natural scientific categories to the sensory function of experience, 356; Kant proclaimed the ‘primacy of practical reason’; the Critique of Pure Reason and the Critique of Practical Reason break the cosmos into the sphere of sensory appearance and that of super-sensory freedom; the ideal of science makes the mind the law-giver of nature, since it constitutes empirical reality as ‘Gegenstand’; but this ideal is not permitted to apply its categories outside of sensory experience; in the realm of freedom the homo noumenon is the sovereign (i.e. the hypostatized rational-moral function); the noumenon is a self-sufficient metaphysical reality, but it avenges itself by logical formalism in ethical questions, 357; Kant's ‘transcendental unity of apperception’; its relation to the absolutely autonomous moral freedom is unclarified; his ‘transcendental cogito’ has no metaphysical meaning; but it does not belong to the phenomenon since he considers it as the formal origin of natural phenomena; the ‘transcendental cogito’ is merely a logical function, 358; it is a pure spontaneity of the uniting act synthesizing the plurality of a possible sensory intuition; a final logical unity in consciousness above all logical multiplicity in concepts;
but there cannot be a real unity of selfconsciousness in the Kantian conception because of the gulf between ‘theoretical’ and ‘practical reason’; the cogito is lawgiver of ‘nature’; the transcendent subject of autonomous moral freedom is law-giver of human action; the antinomies of natural necessity causal law and norm; natural necessity remains a counterforce against the moral Idea of freedom, 359; Kant's epistemology opposes sensibility to logical understanding; sensibility is purely receptive and an insurmountable limit to the sovereignty of theoretical thought; logical understanding (the ‘Verstand’) is lawgiver in a formal sense only; the material of knowledge remains deeply alogical: the ‘Ding an sich’ behind it can affect sensibility; Ding an sich then is a substance, incompatible with the ‘homo noumenon’ Idea; the ‘Ding an sich’ destroys the sovereignty of thought, 360; Kant tried to avoid the antinomy in his delimitation of the science-ideal by a natural ‘Ding an sich’, in his construction of an ‘intellectus archetypus’, an intuitive Divine Mind creating its Gegenstand in direct non-sensory intellectual intuition, 361; Kant introduced the transcendental Ideas of theoretical reason; the limitation of the categories to the sensory phenomenon makes it impossible for the intellect to conceive of the ‘Ding an sich’ in a positive sense as the absolute; the concept of a noumenon is merely a ‘limiting concept’, 362; he criticized the Leibnizian-Wolffian school in the statement: concepts without sensory intuitions are empty, intuitions without concepts are blind; ‘Verstand’ (the understanding) brings unity to the phenomena by means of rules; Reason (‘Vernunft’) creates the unity of the rules of understanding under principles; the
reality of ‘things in themselves’ is only secured by ‘practical Reason’ in a-priori faith; the concept of a ‘noumenon’ as the ‘Gegenstand’ of an infinite intuitive intellect; the intellect recognizing the infinity of its task in the determination of the ‘Gegenstand’ submits to ‘theoretical Reason’ with its transcendental Ideas; the latter point the understanding the way to bring unity to its rules; the Transcendental Idea is the absolutized logical category, 363; ‘Pure reason’ is never related to ‘Gegenstande’ but only to the a-priori concepts of ‘Gegenstände’; Kant's table of transcendental Ideas of pure Reason; the Idea of a Supreme Being; the Idea of the Soul; that of the universe; that of the Deity; not any transcendental Idea is related to experience; they do not give us scientific knowledge, 364; the ‘dialectical illusion’ arises when theoretical thought supposes it can attain to knowledge of the ‘supra-empirical’; the task of Kant's Critique; he rejects metaphysical psychology, cosmology and natural theology, in his ‘Paralogisms of Pure Reason’ he reduced the rationalist psychology, as theoretical metaphysics, to absurdity and struck at the root of the Cartesian conclusion from the cogito to the esse, 365; the basic theses of metaphysical psychology: the substantiality, immateriality, simplicity, immortality and personality of the ‘thinking ego’; by means of the logical categories these conceptions are based on relating the empty logical form of transcendental self-consciousness to the ‘external world’, to a supra-empirical ‘Gegenstand’; the basic problem of Humanistic metaphysics is the relation of the material substance to the soul substance and became null and void to Kant; this
problem he reduces to the relation between subjective psychical phenomena of the ‘inner sense’ (366) and the objective psychical phenomena of the ‘outer sense’; the theoretical function of the
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| transcendental Idea of the soul; it directs theoretical thought to the homo noumenon; Kant reduced to absurdity rationalist cosmology, 367; if reason draws conclusions from the cosmological ideas of the universe with respect to the ‘Dinge an sich’, it is involved in antinomies; if it is possible to prove both the thesis and its antithesis of a speculative proposition, the logical principle of contradiction is violated, and it is evident that the supposed object of such a proposition cannot be a real ‘object of experience’; Kant posited four theoretical antinomies: two mathematical and two dynamical antinomies; a limited or an infinite world in space and time; its divisibility into absolutely single parts, or the opposite; causality through freedom - or mechanical necessity; the existence of an absolutely necessary Supreme Being can be proved and disproved, 368; Kant's Ideal of Personality is founded in causality through freedom, the ‘homo noumenon’ and God as the final hypostasis of the moral Idea of freedom; he chooses the side of the theses with respect to ‘Dinge an sich’; and the antitheses with regard to sensory appearance; in this dialectic of ‘theoretical Reason’ the root and origin of the cosmos is concerned; but then the insoluble antinomy in his dualistic transcendental basic Idea is in evidence; this Idea implies ‘purity’, i.e., unconditionedness; thus there arises an uneradicable cleft between the science and the personality ideal, 369; in the solution of the dynamic antinomies he appeals to the supra-sensory sphere of human personality in favour of the thesis; in that of the mathematical antinomies he excludes such an appeal, 370; the reason for this difference; but his argument is not convincing; Leibniz' monad is spaceless; Kant's second antinomy: every
composite substance in the world consists of simple parts and there exists nowhere anything but the simple and what is composed of it; Leibniz taught that the series of spatial analysis originates in a noumenon which is dissimilar to the parts of space; the thesis is: cosmic time originates in eternity (as timelessness); Kant depreciates the theoretical Idea of God; his own Idea of God has to pave the way for the practical Idea of the deity as a ‘postulate of practical reason’; his Krit. d.r. Vern, destroys the entire theologia naturalis, 372; the kernel of Kant's transcendental basic Idea is the freedom and autonomy of the ethical function of personality in its hypostatization as ‘homo noumenon’; the latter is identified with the moral law, as ‘pure will’; the ego only becomes an ego when it obeys itself (Kroner); the self-legitimating law elevates Reason above all finite connections; self-consciousness has a vague existence in the ‘transcendental unity of apperception’, but in the Critique of Practical Reason it discloses its ‘metaphysical root’, 373; his dualistic conception of the selfhood is antinomous; his logical formalization of ethics and theology; theoretical logic dominates the ideal of personality as formulated in the categorical imperative, contrary to Kant's own intention; the either or between sensory experience and reason induced him to apply the form-matter schema to the moral principles; his categorical imperative is a logicistic judgement, 374; the transcendental concept of freedom is merely negative and is to become positive through the principle of autonomy; but the latter lacks meaningful content which is only a formal principle; he teaches the self-sufficiency of the homo noumenon; this makes any moral autonomy of man meaningless; his logistic hypostatization of the
‘categorical imperative’ only offers ‘stones for bread’; Kant's Eulogy of Duty, 375; free personality is an end in itself; man is unholy, but ‘humanity’ in his person ought to be sacred to him; this ‘human value’ is the sacred ‘homo noumenon’, the empty formula of the categorical imperative; morality versus legality, 376; man can be an end in himself only in the subject-object relation; but not in the religious sphere, because there it would contradict the ex-sistent character of the religious centre of human personality; the religious root of our existence is nothing in itself, because it is the imago Dei; in Kant's practical philosophy the absolute freedom of the homo noumenon exists by the grace of the same logical understanding that in his epistemology he had bound to the chain of sensory phenomena; this understanding subjects the personality ideal to logical formulization, 377; that which is said generally in the ethical rule (in abstracto) must be applied to an action in concreto by the practical faculty of judgment; a concrete action is always ‘empirically determined’, i.e., belongs to the sensory experience of nature; thus the hypostatization of the moral function is destroyed; Kant's ‘solution’ of the difficulty, 378; if a subjective maxim of action cannot be thought of in the form of a natural law as a universal law of human action, it is morally impossible; the dualism between ‘nature’ and ‘freedom’ becomes an antinomy, 379; he called psychological freedom - which he subsumed under the mechanism of nature - the freedom of a turnspit, which also executes its movements of its own accord after it is wound up; he rejects the Leibnizian automaton spirituale; God has created man as a homo noumenon, not as phenomenon; according to Kant God cannot be said to be
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| menon’; but the ‘causa noumenon’ of sensory actions is merely the absolutized form of the law ‘überhaupt’; here is antinomy; the categorical imperative is the moral law and also the subjective ‘causa noumenon’; the subjective moral volitional function cannot be comprehended as ‘free cause’ because it is dependent on sensory nature; Kroner's attempt to solve this antinomy, 380; the origin of this antinomy is the impossibility of thinking the moral logical form of reason together with its sensorily determined material; in K.'s Dialectic of pure reason the natural scientific category of causality is exclusively related to sensory experience, never to ‘Dinge an sich’; in practical reason K. tried to re-establish the coherence between nature and freedom by means of the concept of the highest good; he observes that the old ethics sought after an ‘object of the will’, 381; in heteronomous ethics the concept of the highest good becomes the ‘unconditioned totality’ of the object of pure practical reason; it pre-supposes the final determinative ground of the moral law; in the concept of the highest good virtue and happiness are necessarily united; this union of virtue and beatitude cannot be conceived analytically, for freedom and nature do not logically follow from each other but rather exclude each other; it can only be thought of synthetically; if happiness is the moving cause of moral action, there is no autonomy; if happiness is the result of moral action (382), the will is directed by the knowledge of natural laws and not by its own moral inclination; this is the ‘antinomy of practical reason’; happiness as the result of moral action is a false thesis only in so far as it considers virtue a cause
in the sense world thus ascribing only a phenomenal existence to rational beings; an intelligible Creator may have set moral inclination in a necessary causal coherence with beatitude as its effect in the sense world; Kant had hypostatized the moral personality, and the ‘intelligible Creator’ is a postulate to escape his antinomies; this postulate rests on a universally valid and necessary reasonable faith (like two other postulates of practical reason: positive freedom and immortality); nature and freedom are to be brought into a deeper coherence, 383; but then he must abandon the Idea of the ‘homo noumenon’ as ‘Ding an sich’; the intrinsic character of the pure practical reason is autonomy, but this is undermined by Kant's inclusion of happiness as a material determination in the pure moral law; in the concept of the highest good all the antinomies between the personality- and the science-ideal are crowded together; Kant's ‘deity’ as postulate of ‘pure practical reason’ is the final hypostatization of the ideal of personality; this reasonable God is the categorical imperative itself; the principle of morality extends to all beings that have reason and will, even to the infinite Being as Supreme Intelligence; K.'s religion is one within the boundaries of mere Reason, 384; his lack of insight into the essence and starting point of Christian doctrine; the faith of pure reason he supposes to be the kernel of all religious dogmas; the fall into sin is the antagonism between sensory and moral nature; the ‘radical evil’ is the tendency to subject the will to sensory inclinations; regeneration is a free deed of our moral nature through which the good conquers the evil; the God-man is the ‘moral ideal man’, the pre-requisite for regeneration; in the two Critiques (of pure reason, and of practical reason) the antinomy
between the science and the personality ideal had remained unsolved; a new attempt was mode in the ‘Critique of Judgment’, 385; he acknowledged that the super-sensory ought to influence the sensory world; there must be a ground of unity of the super-sensory lying at the foundation of nature, with the practical content of the freedom-Idea; the concept of this unity has no proper realm, but it must enable us to pass from the principles of nature to those of freedom; nature must be subsumed under the freedom of reason, 386; only in his aesthetic philosophy Kant recognizes subjective individuality in his doctrine of the creative genius; as a rule he called individuality ‘specificity in nature’, and identified law and subject; in the ‘class of the higher cognitive faculties’ there is a link between understanding and reason, viz. the power of judgment (Urteilskraft); it subsumes the particular under the universal laws; it is a ‘determining transcendental faculty of judgment’ and constitutive for experience, 387; as a ‘reflecting faculty it judges the particular in its accommodation to the universal laws given to nature by the understanding in the a priori synthesis; reflecting judgment judges of the particular multiplicity of nature as if a higher than human understanding had given the laws of nature for the benefit of our cognitive faculty in order to make possible a system of experience according to particular laws of nature; the soul has three original faculties: the cognitive, the feeling of pleasure and pain, the desiring faculty; he relates the reflecting judgment to feeling; in every feeling we order an imagined object to an end, 388; the a priori universally valid principle of the reflecting judgment is that of the ‘formal teleology of nature’; this transcendental concept of teleology dictates a law to itself in order to judge nature; viz. the law of specification; a
mere regulative principle for our view of nature, 389; but the teleological mode of contemplation must not
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| encroach upon the domain of the science ideal; the connecting link between understanding and reason is a third immanent function of consciousness; the faculty of judgment compares sensory intuition and logical understanding, 390; the Urteilskraft can establish that a given sensory representation has an appropriate accommodation to our understanding; or it can judge that a concept has an appropriate accommodation to the visible reality of an object; in the first case the representation is joined with a feeling of pleasure, it is a teleological representation of an aesthetic character; in the second case the teleology is laid in the thing of nature; hence Kant's Critique of the aesthetic and that of the teleological judgment, 391; he formulates the dualism between the science- and the personality ideal with great acumen; the Kr. d. Pr. Vern. furnished the idea of causality through freedom; it ought to exist; the Urteilskraft is to furnish the mediating concept in that of a teleology in nature, 392; but the homo noumenon as Ding an sich and its moral freedom are to have unconditional validity; in this way the freedom motive is almost completely reduced to the logical principle of contradiction; human personality as an end in itself enables this motive to escape dissolution into a formal tautology, 393; in nature the living organisms set a limit to causal explanation and thus justify the critique of teleological judgment; a natural organism must be related to itself as cause and effect; it gives ‘objective reality’ to the concept of a goal; the causal coherence in an organism can never be a nexus effectivus; the organism cannot result from an external cause; its causal relation is that of a nexus finalis, in which the effect is a causa finalis; the parts of an organism can only exist through their relation to the whole, and are connected to the unity of the whole through their being the mutual cause and effect of each
other's form, 394; such a teleological union is only known to us from our own human action; we may judge the living organism only as if a teleological activity lay at its foundation; this principle leads to the idea of nature as a ‘universal organism’; everything in the world is good for something whatsoever; nothing in it is aimless; this transcendental Idea only has heuristic value; it results in an ethical teleology, 395; Kant formulates his antinomy as follows: ‘All production of material things is possible according to merely mechanical laws’; and: ‘Some production of the same is not possible according to merely mechanical laws’; the postulate of continuity of the science ideal and that of the personality ideal are irreconcilably antagonistic; Kant ascribes this antinomy to the fact that the autonomy of the reflective faculty of judgment is taken for the heteronomy of the determinative faculty, 396; but this antinomy cannot be solved by referring either of these functions to its own a priori principles; the principle of their compatibility must lie outside both and yet contain the ground of them; this is the supersensory; but we cannot acquire any theoretical knowledge of the supra-sensory substratum of nature, 397; here is evidence of Newton's view of the compatibility of mechanism and divine teleology in nature; Kant says: ‘we may not pretend, however, that there actually exists a particular cause having its determinative ground in the idea of a goal’, 398; ‘there is a certain casuality in the constitution of our understanding’ necessitating a teleological judgment of nature; he contrasts the intuitive Divine understanding which is creative in a material sense, with human understanding which is only creative in a formal sense; sensory material is the ground of all contingency of the particular in nature; our
understanding must distinguish between possibility and reality, for it has to rely on logical understanding and sensory intuition; an absolutely intuitive understanding could only know reality; the Idea of the absolute necessity (uniting possibility and reality) is itself only something possible, as an Idea it is distinct from reality; there is a similar situation with respect to the relation between mechanism and teleology in nature, 399; the principle of teleology remains a fiction, an as-if consideration of human reason; the basic antinomy between the science and the personality ideal remains unsolved; it has everywhere crystallized in the dialectical form-matter schema, 400; but in Kant's system a teleology can never be a teleology of nature, since the sensory and the supra sensory are divided by an unbridgeable cleft; the merely subjective principle of teleology is related to the sensory material which in this way is subjected to two principles that are mutually exclusive, 401; his dualistic transcendental basic Idea lacks an unequivocal Archimedean point and Idea of totality; the ‘Ding an sich’ of nature continued to be a counter-instance against his moralistic Idea of totality, 402; by the dialectic of theoretical reason with its transcendental Ideas reason is elevated by Kant above the limits of sense experience, 403; a theoretical dialectic with insoluble antinomies is a proof of a speculative misuse of the transcendental Ideas; Kant's dualism between reason and sensibility, universally valid a priori form and sensory empirical matter; transcendental, selfreflection on the personality ideal as the root of science, 404; Kant had tried to solve the problem of the relation between the universal
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| a priori forms of the ‘transcendental consciousness’ and the particular matter; he used Leibniz ‘intellectus archetypus’ with its mathematical analysis completed in a single intuition of the whole individual reality to bridge the gap; this idea remains merely a regulative principle for the use of the understanding; his teleology, 405; Kant halted before the eradication of the limits between theoretical reason, practical reason and faculty of judgment in the interest of the science-ideal, for he did not want to reduce the latter to the freely creative moral activity of the ‘homo noumenon’ like Fichte, 417; reality is a category of quality, 418; Kant had not really solved the problem of the epistemological synthesis, 423; the transcendental productive imagination achieves the synthesis of sensory matter and pure forms of thought by means of the schematizing of the categories in time as a form of intuition, by the creation of a ‘transcendental pattern’ for all empirical ‘Gegenstände’, 427; but the a priori synthesis issues from the transcendental logical function, 430; his ‘Kritik der Urteilskraft’ oriented the aesthetic judgment to free feeling and recognized the absolute individual value of genius; it offered a point of contact to Schiller's Aesthetic Idealism, 462; in his critical period he proclaimed three-dimensional space to be a transcendental condition of geometry; several Kantians opposed Einstein's theory of relativity on the ground of Kant's thesis; but others, the Neo-Kantians Gausz, Lobatschewsky, Riemann, Bolay, etc., hastened to accommodate Kantian epistemology to the non-Euclidean geometries; the same applies to Kant's conception of causal natural law oriented to the classic
physics of Newton, which could not be maintained against modern quantum physics; in his pre-critical period Kant had admitted that a non-Euclidean space is conceivable, 547 (note); the Kantian conception of the a-priori and the empirical moments in human knowledge identifies the ‘empirical’ with the sensory impressions, 549. |
Kant, Immanuel, II,
Kritik d. reinen Vernunft, 12, 13, 14, 15, 17, 18, 19, 27, 43-47, 58, 77, 79, 82, 86, 95, 96, 120, 123, 141, 142, 149, 150, 151, 167, 176, 186, 187, 396, 420, 421, 422, 430, 431, 432, 434, 435, 436-449, 455, 459, 466, 467, 477, 492-518, 520, 521, 522-528, 532-534, 550, 575;
Kritik d. teleol. Urteilskraft, 201, 271, 421, 422, 506, 507;
Idee zur einer allgemeinen Geschichte in weltburglicher Absicht, 271, 272;
Kritik d. Prakt. Vernunft, 506, 538, 543;
Ueber die Fortschritte der Metaphysik seit Leibniz und Wolff, 507, 508, 530-536;
Logik, 450;
Further references to Kant: 219, 270, 326, 327, 333, 358, 396, 569, 573-575, 585-587. |
| Kant, Immanuel, II, uses the form-matter-scheme, 12; categories are concepts of pure synthesis a-priori, 13; they have no genus proximum; transcendental and formal logic; generic and specific concepts in the teleological judgment, 15; the Idea is the origin of the being of what is, 19; theoretic antinomies; idea of reason, 42; cosmological ideas and categories; dialectical illusion; mathematical and dynamic antinomies; nature and freedom; and the antinomies; understanding and reason; noumenon is absolute normative Idea, 43; homo noumenon; dialectic of pure reason; speculative metaphysics and theology; reality is identified with sensory and logical experience; the moral aspect absolutized into the transcendent noumenon, 44; phenomenal and noumenal world; nature and freedom; the number of antinomies, 45; their nature and origin, 46; Kant reduces antinomy to logical contradiction; theoretic thought separated from the cosmic coherence, 47; only three transcendental determinations; an artifical result; his categories of quantity are analogical, 58; he saw that it was impossible to derive number from logical synthesis; he conceived of movement as happening within space, 95; called space a transcendental form of intuition; this antinomic notion had already been refuted by Hume, 96; his faculty psychology, 111; causality as a transcendental logical category, 120; analytical economy, 123; Gesinnungsethik; Categorical Imperative; respect for ‘humanity’, 149; dialectical motive of nature and freedom; love is sensory inclination; the essence of man is his will; legal order is an order of peace; external; the radical evil; this is a secularized Christian conception, 150; he explained juridical analogies of number in a mathematical way, 167; theoretical reason interrogates nature as a judge, 176; theoretical and practical ideas; his abuse of the theoretical idea of the homo noumenon; he restricts
science to sensory impressions of nature, 187 (note); teleological judgment; he influenced neo-Kantians, 201; absolutized formal ethics in his categorical Imperative, 206; his positive humanistic view of history, 270; his Idea of development was oriented to the personality ideal; his judgment ‘als ob’ (=as if); he shared Rousseau's criticism of the Enlightenment; he opposed civilization to morality, 271; the League of nations as the aim of history, 272; he blamed Herder for the lack of direction in Herder's Ideen zur Philosophie der Geschichte, 277; Kant's transcendentalism and moralism, 278; influenced the Austrian Civil-Code, 358; he excluded the idea of purpose from the concept of subjective right, 396; he seeks the principle of individuality in the sensory matter of
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| experience; the intellectus archetypus idea; the view of nature as the work of a divine architect is teleological; the regulative use of theoretical ideas; the law of specification, 420; the extension and the content of a concept; generic and specific; the rule of variety in the similar among the lower kinds; homogeneity and continuity, 420; all individuality is empirically determined, 421; this view is criticized; Kant's law of specification is an a-priori logical rule; there are degrees from the general to the particular, 422; his epistemology: ‘Ding an sich’ is: ‘substance’; the Gegenstand, 430; synthesis of logical categories and forms of intuitions; the datum; his implied pre-suppositions, 431; his startingpoint is dogmatic; ancient, Scholastic and pre-Kantian metaphysics gave an account of their cosmonomic Idea, Kant did not, 432; analytical and synthetical judgments; ‘all bodies are extended’ is an analytical judgment; ‘all bodies are heavy’ is a synthetical judgment, 435; body and extension cannot be identified logically, 436; ‘body’ in Kant's ‘Transcendentale Aesthetik’; and extension; he states: ‘extension’ is implied in the concept ‘body’; therefore this concept embraces more than mere extensiveness; viz. its substratum of sense impressions; it is not an exclusively and ‘purely’ analytical concept; he means ‘body in the sense of material body’; then it necessarily implies ‘heaviness’, 437; he calls ‘empirical’ judgments synthetical; if empirical predicates are excluded from the concept of the subject of a judgment, these predicates are not subject to the logical principles; then they cease to be ‘predicates’; if they are genuine judgments, they must be analytical; 2 + 2 = 4; causality, 438;
Riehl, Pfänder explain Kant's ‘notes’ on the distinction between analytical and synthetic judgments, 439-441; criticism of Kant's theory, 442; Schleiermacher and Sigwart's attempts to clear things up, 442, 443; Kant's dualistic cosmonomic Idea; Sigwart confounds linguistic and logical structures, 444; Kant adopted Aristotle's substance and accidentia in a modified form; his substance is only related to the senses; accidentia are modes of existence; his remark on empirical judgments, 445; his theory of synthetic judgments is confused, 446-449; he calls the expression ‘general concept’ tautological, 450; a discursive specific concept and its specima; space and the whole and its parts, 455; Kant's Categories and forms of intuition are false formalisms, 459; his view of the Gegenstand of theoretic thought, 467; Kritik der reinen Vernunft interpreted by Heidegger, 492; Kant's epistemology is based on his Idea of human personality; his doctrine of Ideas is determined by his faith in reason; although he suggests that his ‘Kritik’ is religiously neutral, 493; his Transcendental Aesthetic and Logic are not to be isolated; such isolation is due to a misconception of epistemology; the sensory material is not really the datum; his debt to Hume, 494; his isolation of the sensory material of experience is a problem; it creates an antinomy; he assumes an a-priori reference of the categories to sensibility, but no reference of sensibility to the categories, 495; metaphysical ‘Ding an sich’ is unknowable though it affects sensibility; which latter is purely receptive; the understanding is free, active, spontaneous, 496; synthesis is the combination of a plurality and
transcendental logical unity; it is the result of the imagination; and conceived by the understanding in a conceptual form; even the unconscious imagination executes this synthesis by means of the logical function; theoretical synthesis is the prerequisite of analysis, 497; Kant does not distinguish logical from intermodal synthesis; logification of cosmic and cosmological self-consciousness; his categories pre-suppose the basic unity of selfconsciousness, 498; but selfconsciousness transcends the logical function; Kant's ‘law of the unity of apperception’ is the well-known logical: Cogito; he merges the self into the logical unity of thought, 499; definition of selfconsciousness; Kant's Kritik is self-destructive; his unity of apperception is synthetical, i.e., a law conformity determining all experience; an a-priori relatedness of a plurality (in intuition) to the cogito; Richard Kroner realized Kant's self-refutation, 500; self-consciousness as the logical unity excludes sensibility; intuitive and creative thought are only in God as the intellectus archetypus; human knowledge is always conceptual. Kant denies the theoretical intuition, 501; his transcendental logical I-ness is a formal logical unity above multiplicity, a transposition of ‘soul’ as ‘substance’ into the logical modus; transcendental logic concerns synthetical cognitive thought, 502, 503; his doctrine of the pure understanding; we think ‘Gegenstände’ a-priori; general or formal logic; transcendental logic operates in the categories, which are conceptus dati a-priori applying to objects, 504; Kant's table of judgments, 505; the synthesis of the categories is purely logical; neo-Kantians; a substance is a subject without the capacity to become a predicate to anything else, 506; categories are independent of
sensibility, 507; they do not imply any inter-modal synthesis; there is only a synthesis of the categories and time; but Kant cannot recognize this as a synthesis because it is not a logical function of the understanding; quantity categories, 508; those of quality; reality, negation, limitation, are analogies in a logical respect; movement
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| is misrepresented as an a-priori synthesis of sensation with the representation of time; Newton's time concept, 509; in kinematic time the impressions of the ‘inner sense’ are received; Kant's view is confused; the categories of quantity and quality are related to ‘Gegenstände überhaupt’; in time as a sensory intuitional form the categories cannot become numerical or kinematical; qualitative categories determine mathematical kinematical meaning, 510; but Kant's categories are mathematical themselves; logical synthesis replaces intermodal, 511; his logical relation is analogical: the principium rationis sufficientis; logical imputation of an effect to a cause is not something physical; Kant ascribes physical meaning to the category of causality; Aristotle's categories; Leibniz identified possibility and logical possibility; the actual is the Divine selection from the possible, 512; Kant relates logical categories of modality to sensory phenomena; the sensory only is actual; actuality as such is a category of thought; in Kant's ‘transcendental logic’ the notion of the ‘transcendental imagination’ is introduced, which is central in the chapter on the ‘transcendental schema’; this schema originates in ‘the productive faculty of the imagination’; the pure concepts of the understanding are mere ‘forms of thought’; sensibility is ‘the receptive representative faculty; based on this sensibility is a certain form of a priori sensory intuition in the mind; so that the understanding can determine the inner sense by means of the plurality of given representations in accordance with the synthetic unity of apperception; thus the categories obtain objective reality, 513; the a priori synthesis of
sensory intuitions as a ‘synthesis speciosa’ or ‘figurative synthesis’ is distinct from the ‘synthesis intellectualis’; intellectual synthesis is called ‘Verstandesverbindung’; the figurative synthesis is called the ‘transcendental synthesis of the imagination’, 514; Hume considers the imagination to be the faculty enabling us to picture something not actually given in sensory impressions; Kant says that this imagination can function only through the transcendental ‘figurative synthesis of imagination’; it belongs to receptive sensibility; as and act of spontaneity of the understanding operating on sensibility, it is the first application of the understanding to the objects of possible intuition and the basis of all other applications; it is, therefore, the synthetical activity of the productive phantasy which is ascribed to the logical function of thought; this figurative synthesis is a synthetical influence of the understanding on the ‘inner sense’; the problem is exactly the possibility of this influence, 515; the synthetical unity of ‘transcendental apperception’ is distinguished by Kant from sensory intuition; the understanding does not find a conjunction of the manifold in the inner sense by affecting the latter but creates it; the interfunctional synthesis is only ascribed to logical thought; Kant sticks to the dogma concerning the formative autonomy of theoretical thought, 516; the doctrine of the categories does not belong to general epistemology but to the cosmological analysis of the modal meaning structures; Kant constantly avoids the genuine epistemological problem; his solution is not a really critical one; he posits a third something between a category and a phenomenon; this something must be intellectual as well as sensible; it is a mediating
representation, viz., the transcendental schema, 517; he explains the possibility of the interfunctional synthesis between logical category and sensory phenomenon by an appeal to the interfunctional synthesis in the a priori schematized category, 518; a transcendental determination of time being of the same kind as a category in that it is universal, is based on a rule a priori; it is also homogeneous with a phenomenon; thus its application to phenomena is made possible; this argument begs the question of the inter-functional synthesis, 519; Kant's view of the transcendental unity of self-consciousness involves him in an impasse (an aporia); his critical conscience has been roused in the chapter on the schematism; Heidegger holds that the productive imagination also functions as the root of practical reason in Kant; Kant speaks of three subjective sources or faculties of the soul: sense, imagination, apperception, 520; each with its own synthesis; he assumed the possibility of a common root; but in the second edition of the Krit. der r. Vern. he retracts this view, 521; then there is no possibility to find the unity between sensibility and pure thought, nor to posit such unity as a problem; Kant wrote his Kritik d.r. Vern. for the sake of his metaphysics of practical reason; his critique of theoretical reason is oriented to his idealistic conception of the super-temporal noumenon, a fundamental theme of the traditional metaphysica generalis, 522; Kant sharply distinguishes between phenomena and noumena; the practical Ideas are absolutely transcendent above the temporal world; he clings to his rational faith in the homo noumenon; Heidegger interprets Kant from a historistic, irrationalistic point of view, 523; he calls the transcendental imagination the root of knowledge and holds it to be identical with ‘pure reason’
(theoretical and practical), and with the ‘pure finite self’ rooted in time; the pure reason is pure receptive spontaneity, or sensory reason; human reason does not create but receives its ‘objects’; for human life (Da- |
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| sein) is at the mercy of ‘das Vorhandene’ but capable of understanding that which is; if Dasein designs an a priori image of the being of what is; the question is: how can a finite being know the ‘Vorhandene’ before any reception of what is?, 524; the transcendental imagination must be understood as the ‘formative medium of the two stems of knowledge’; Heidegger approaches Kant from the modern state of decline of the Humanistic cosmonomic Idea; in Kant the ideals of personality and science are still unshakable pillars of the cosmonomic Idea, 525; Heidegger has seen that we can only isolate understanding from sensibility on the basis of a primary intermodal synthesis; but he does not see that such isolation is made possible by starting from the fulness of the temporal meaning systasis; Heidegger seeks the selfhood in the temporal (historically conceived) Dasein, 526; and he supposes that reality is only accessible to the self in theoretical abstraction of the ‘gegenständliche’; this is the phenomenon; human knowledge is delivered to what is given (das Vorhandene) in nature, the Platonic mè on, the relative nothing; he eliminates the cosmic order of time, merging the self into time, 527; pure thought and pure sensibility are modi of the ‘transcendental imagination’, which in essence is time and selfhood; Kant's three modi of the cognitive synthesis are merely the present, the past and the future; time and the cogito are identified; time is pure self affection, the basis of the finite ego, and the finite ego is
‘pure understanding’; this explanation does not solve the problem of the intermodal synthesis, 528; Heidegger makes the two cognitive functions flow together, thereby cancelling the possibility of a real synthesis; designating Kant's ‘pure understanding’ as ‘pure sensory understanding’ results in a dialectic that Kant would have rejected; to Kant ‘representation in general’ is the genus proximum of thought and sensory intuition; the genus concept is of a logical origin, 529; in his treatise: Ueber die Fortschritte der Metaphysik seit Leibniz und Wolff, Kant emphatically rejects the identification of the transcendental self-consciousness with time as ‘pure sensibility’, 530; Heidegger makes one of the ‘stems of knowledge’ into the origin of the other; his ‘existential time’ is not cosmic time; he seeks the transcendence of the self in the inner experience of the ‘ex-sistere’, the historical mode of time anticipating the future, 531; Kant's ‘transcendental imagination’ is the connecting link between the two stems of knowledge, not its ‘hidden root’, 532; the subjective viewpoint considers the pure understanding and its possibility; this is not an essential element in Kant's aim; his principal concern is to ascertain how much and what can understanding and reason know a priori?, 533; Kant ascribes the transcendental imagination to ‘pure sensibility’ relating to the transcendental unity of the apperception; first he follows a line of reasoning that descends from the transcendental unity of apperception; then he follows a course of argument in the opposite direction; apperception renders pure imagination intellectual, 534; all knowledge is based on
the faculty of pure imagination; Kant starts from a necessary systasis, viz. that of sensibility and that of pure thought; he misrepresents it as a systatic datum, 535; in the supposedly ‘given’ unity of pure thought and pure intuition the logical function remains the law-giver and determining factor in Kant's view; the Kantian conception of experience has become the shibboleth between the ‘critical and the dogmatic trends of thought; this conception was precipitated in the ‘Satz des Bewusztseins’ or the ‘Satz der Immanenz’, 536; the influence of the Kantian conception of ‘empirical reality’ in the normative special sciences, 537; for the benefit of the ‘Satz des Bewusstseins’ naïve experience is fundamentally misinterpreted, in ‘empiricistic-positivistic’ thought; in Husserl's phenomenology; Kant is entirely dominated by his dualistic cosmonomic Idea: the normative aspects of reality fall outside of experience; experience is only allotted to the mechanistic science-ideal; it is not possible for Christian thought to accept Kant's view of experience in his Krit. d.r. Vern, and to reject his Krit. d. pr. Vern., 538; Kant's conception of matter is a theoretical abstraction, not a datum of experience; the sensory aspect of reality is experienced only in its subject-object relations in the cosmic meaning coherence; animals merely undergo sense-impressions; if nothing outside of the psychic function has been given, we should not have been given anything at all, not even the sensible, 539; the data of experience have not been given to the sensory function but to our self-consciousness, 540; epistemology has long accepted the restriction of experience to the sensory and logical aspects because it was dominated by the dualistic Humanistic cosmonomic Idea, 541; his
idea of the a priori as the universally valid transcendental forms; all synthetical judgments of universal validity which cannot be founded on sensory experience, 543; his categories of modality are supposed only to express the relation of the object (intended in the concept) to our cognitive faculty; but possibility and necessity can be conceived in every abstracted meaning modus, whereas ‘reality’ can never be enclosed in an abstract modal meaning, 550; Kant's ‘Grundsätze des reinen Verstandes’ were inspired by
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| the science ideal, and could not stand the test of the progress of natural science, 556; Kant understood the traditional Idea of truth as a mere ‘explanation of a name’; he asks how the adequacy of thought and reality is possible, 567; he seeks the criterion of truth in the activity of the transcendental logical ego and restricts truth to the Sensory phenomena; a priori synthetical judgments constitute the guarantee of truth; they are the source of all truth before all experience; empirical truth is relative; experience is identified with theoretical cognition; its direction to the absolute ideal; the correspondence between representation and ‘object’; his criterion of truth leads to the denial of the possibility of non-mathematical-natural-scientific-theoretical knowledge, 568; his concept ‘transcendental truth’ undermines every trans-subjective validity of theoretical verity; the transcendental subject is the seat of transcendental truth; his view of the empirical world was determined by the classical Humanistic science ideal; it landed him in an inner autonomy with regard to his conception of truth, 569; his principles of pure understanding (Grundsätze des reinen Verstandes), cannot hit off the transcendental structure of theoretical truth, because they are not oriented to the transcendental direction of time; functionalistically they isolate and absolutize two aspects of the theoretical horizon of experience, 575; on the immanence standpoint the subjectivistic a priorism of the rationalist Kantian epistemology had to be outbid by an irrationalist a priori view, 583; Kant could only assign a place to individual genius in the field of artistic creation, 595. |
Kant, Immanuel, III,
Kritik der reinen Vernunft. 27;
Metaphysik der Sitten, Rechtslehre, 317, 427, 428;
Met. Anfangsgründe der Rechtslehre, 444; Krit. d. prakt. Vernunft, 748, 749.
Krit. d. teleol. Urteilskr., 748. |
| Kant, Immanuel, III, his ‘critical’ concept of substance as a synthetical a priori concept of function, 27; he misinterpreted our naïve experience of a thing's identity as the classical physical function concept of the quantitatively constant matter; things became ‘Gegenstände’ of natural scientific thought; critical epistemology, 28; he dominated Riehl's epistemology, 47; his theory of positive law as the general will, volenti non fit iniuria, 232; the destructive character of Kantian autonomy; authority and subordination in the family; Kant considers this heteronomy in an ethical sense to be opposed to morality; Kant has no room for moral community; Kant's absolutization of morality; this aspect has become meaningless, 273; Kant replaced the bond of love by a legalistic motive of respect for autonomous ethical law, 274; the law of nature is a law of reason giving priority to the personality ideal; his crude definition of marriage as the union for life long possession of each other's sexual qualities, 317; Kant's distinction between autonomy and heteronomy in the sociology of Fr. Darmstaedter, 408; Kant identifies public and civil law; to him law is an a-priory idea of civil law; the principle of civil co-existence; his view of public law, 427; the state is a union of a multitude of people under legal rules; Kant ignores the historical foundational function of the monopolistic military power almost on purpose, 428; he derived his definition from Cicero, 429; Kant's idea of the salus publica, 442, 444; his concept of iustitia distributiva, 445; Driesch's ‘Ordnungslehre’ is influenced by Kant's epistemology, 737; the metaphysical question of
freedom in his Critique of Practical Reason, 748; totality idea in the Krit. der Urteilskraft, 748, 749; categorical imperative, 749. |
|
Kattenbusch, III,
Doppelschichtigkeit in Luthers Kirchenbegriff, 509, 514. |
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| Katz-Engelman, II, on space perception, 373. |
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Kaufmann, Fritz, II,
Geschichtsphilosophie der Gegenwart, 230. |
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Kawerau, Wald., III,
Die Reformation und die Ehe, 314. |
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Keil, Joh. Chr., III,
Ueber die Lebenskraft, 735. |
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Kelsen, Hans, I,
Reine Rechtslehre, 98, 555, 556.
Hauptprobleme der Staatslehre, 210. |
Kelsen, Hans, I, his ‘reine Rechtslehre’ identifies the legal rule with a logical judgment, and dissolves the juridical aspect and its subjective right into a logical complex of legal rules, 98; he reduces all other typical juridical spheres to State-law; or to law of a supposed international super-State (civitas maxima) and completed the confusion between modal functional and typical-structural viewpoints by the pseudo-logical identification of law an State, or law and Super-State; but if State and law are identical, it makes no sense to speak of State law; if all positive juridical norms are of the same formal nature, and typical material differences are meta-juridical, then it is contradictory, 555 (note), to introduce into this modal functional conception of law the typical characteristics of State law or of Super-State law, 556.
Reine Rechtslehre, 17, 46, 209, 212, 343, 399, 422. |
| Kelsen, Hans, II, pure theory of law, 17; he logifies the jural aspect; this is antinomous, 46;
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| he deemed formal sociology to be impossible, and considered sociology as a causal science like natural science, 212; a positive legal norm is a logical proposition, 343; he abandons the concept of subjective right, 399; and calls the juridical modus an empty form of thought; his theory of degrees of law making; and of positive law, 422. |
Kelsen Hans, III,
Der Staat als Integration, 260, 661;
Vom Wesen und Wert der Demokratie, 386, 607;
Allgemeine Staatslehre, 407, 607, 608. |
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| Kelsen Hans, III, criticizes Smend's integration theory, 260; he holds that the organizational problem of an economic business and that of the State are the same, 386; his ‘normological’ theory; the State is a logical system of legal norms, 387; he caricaturized the naturalistic sociologistic view of the State, 401; he identifies State and law and conceives of every State as ‘law’, 431, 432-434; his formalistic view of public law, 439; sovereignty of law from a normological viewpoint, 461; Kelsen ascribes axiological relativism to democracy; autocracy is supposed to be founded in the belief in an absolute verity, 608; he appeals to the principle of proportionality to attribute prevalence to the opinion of a parliamentary majority; this appeal is unwarranted on a relativistic standpoint, 608. |
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Kenzie, R.T. Mc, III,
British Political Parties, 605. |
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| Keppler, I, founded modern natural science, with Galileo and Newton, 201. |
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Keugen, F., III,
Aemter und Zünfte, Zur Entstehung des Zunftwesens, 674. |
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| Kidneys, III, lungs, etc., have relative independent individuality, 634. |
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| Kierkegaard, S., I, the antinomy cannot be solved, 65; he strongly influenced modern ‘existential philosophy’, 125; and Hegelianism, 214. |
| Kierkegaard, S., III, existentialistic philosophy and the Divine Revelation in Jesus Christ he considered to be separated by an unbridgeable gulf, 782. |
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Kierluff, II,
Theorie des gemeinen Civilrechts, 399. |
| Kierluff, II, defines subjective right as the concrete unity of the will of the state and the individual subjective will, 399; eliminated the element of interest from subjective right; cancelled the power of enjoyment, contained in the concept of subjective right, 403. |
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| Kinematics, II, in its original sense movement cannot have the meaning of an effect of energy. Kinematics or phoronomy can define a uniform movement without any reference to a causing force; the concept of acceleration is physical, not kinematical, 99; of Galileo; his definition of inertia is purely mathematical-kinematical, 99, 100. |
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| Kinship, III, the structural principle of the kinship community; and its different functions, 344, 345. |
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| Kirche des Glaubens, III, and ‘Kultgemeinde’, in Emil Brunner, 509. |
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| Kirghizian Aul. III, is an interlacement, 351. |
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Kjellen, Rudolf, III,
Der Staat als Lebensform, 197, 484. |
| Kjellen, Rudolf, III, applies the substance concept to the State, 197; his vitalistic-organic idea of the power State; he defends autarchy is the principle of ‘the individuality of the State in the economic sphere’, like geographic individuality of the State's territory and like nationality (= demic individuality), 484. |
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Klein, E.F., II,
Preussisches Landrecht, 358, 559. |
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Klein, F., II,
Einleitung in die höhere Geometrie, 106. |
| Klein, F., II, his projective geometry (with Caley) 105; geometrical transformations in space form a group of ‘Operationen’; the logical origin of mathematical concepts; a dilemma, 106. |
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Kliefoth, III,
Acht Bücher von der Kirche, 545. |
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| Klopstock, I, his Prometheus' motive: ‘Forces of the other world are contained in the Idea of God, but man feels like a second Creator, able to reflect the Idea of the Universe’, 454. |
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Kluckhohn, III,
Die Auffassung der Liebe in der Literatur der 18. Jahrh. und der deutschen Romantik, 316. |
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| Knowing, II, is classed with feeling and volition as one of the three classes of Erlebnisse, in modern psychology, 111. |
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| Knowledge, I, depends on self-knowledge, 196; the grounds of certain knowledge in Hume, 279; cf. s.v. Epistemology; and also: Truth. |
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| Knowledge, Impersonal, III, of a merely symbolical nature is not naïve experience, 145. |
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Koch, Woldemar, III,
Die Staatswirtschaft des Faschismus, 484. |
| Koch, Woldemar, III, Fascist autarchy in economic respects; The programme of economic integration of the Italian Fascist State, 484; he adds that the one-sided dependence on foreign countries is founded in the natural basic conditions of the Italian national economy, 485. |
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Koellreuter, III,
Deutsches Verfassungsrecht, 431. |
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| Kohler, II, on subjective rights, copyright, and the right to a patent, 412. |
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Kohnstamm, Dr Ph., I,
Pedagogy, Personalism and Philosophy of the Cosmonomic Idea, 105. |
| Kohnstamm, Dr Ph., I, joined Stoker's opinion after his transition to the philosophy of the cosmonomic Idea, 94; he raises the question why it should be in cosmic time that the totality of meaning is refracted into coherent modal aspects, 106. |
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| Kolzoff, III, his materialistic biology, 721; a mechanistic biologist, 733. |
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Koppers, W., III,
Ehe und Familie (Handwörterbuch der Soziologie), 305, 332, 333;
Völker und Kulturen, 334, 360. |
| Koppers, W., III, tried to explain the rise of the totemistic clans in terms of economic causes, 359; he even included the faith aspect of these clans, 360. |
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| Körperschaften, III, Tonnies' view, 579, 580. |
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| Kossel, III, experiments with crystals, 705. |
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Köstlin, J., III,
Luthers Theologie, 314. |
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| Krabbe, III, proclaims the sovereignty of law from an ethical-psychological point of view, 461. |
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| Krause, I, elevated the knowledge of the arch-essential (das Ur-wesentliche), the intuition of essence, above the relative knowledge from concepts, 471. |
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Kroh, II,
Psychologie des Grundschulkindes, 178. |
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Kroll, Michael, II,
Das Rätzel ‘Volkswirtschaft’, 123. |
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| Kronecker, II, whole numbers have been made by God, all the others are the work of man, 88. |
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Kroner, Richard, I,
Von Kant bis Hegel, 326, 360, 361, 373, 381, 384, 421, 423, 434, 438. |
| Kroner, Richard, I, a Hegelian philosopher; his view of Kant and the Christian religion, 326; Kant's ‘things in themselves’ confront the subject with a predominant principle that is not mediated in thought; ‘affection’ is a mysterious word taking the place of a concept that is lacking, 361 (note); his view that the Idea of the understanding producing its own Gegenstand leads beyond logic as epistemology: it is a limiting concept, 361; Kant's ego becomes an ego only when it obeys itself; a double sense is included in Kant's ‘Idea of moral autonomy’, 373; Kroner tries to solve the Kantian antinomy of the ‘causa noumenon’ of sensory action as the absolutized form of the law ‘überhaupt’, 380; but a ‘pure’ will cannot be ‘empirically conditoned without losing its purity’, 381; the autonomy of pure practical reason is undermined by the inclusion of happiness as material determination in the pure moral law, 384; in his ‘Wissenschaftslehre’ of the year 1794 Fichte raised ethics to the position of metaphysics, 421; Fichte's proposition of the selfcreative absolute ego is ‘the basic law of pure practical reason in its speculative use’, 423. |
Kroner, Richard, II,
Von Kant bis Hegel, 500. |
| Kroner, Richard, II, realized Kant's self-refutation, 500. |
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Kruisinga, E., II,
A Handbook of Present Day English, 126, 127. |
| Kruisinga, E., II, on Aspect and Character, 126, 127. |
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| Krueger, Felix, II, on the universality of feeling, 111, 112. |
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Kruyt, J.P., III,
Gemeenschap als Sociologisch Begrip, 177, 183. |
| Kruyt, J.P., III, on Max Weber's conception of ‘community’, 183. |
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Kühn, H., II,
Kunst und Kultur der Vorzeit Europas, 314. |
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| Kulturkreislehre, III, (i.e. the doctrine of cultural circles), the doctrine of cultural circles was adhered to by Ankermann, Graebner, Hahn, Foy, W. Schmidt, W. Koppers and others; the founder of this school was Leo Frobenius; they want to trace the genealogical coherence between ‘cultural orbits’ and give a picture of pre-historic humanity; some adherents of this theory of historical coherences reject the method of complex formation on geographical grounds, viz., Boas, Lowie, Marett, Swanton, Goldenweiser, etc. Criticism of W. Schmidt's conceptions of pygmean culture; the one-sided causal explanations of this school; Koppers' rationalistic view of matriarchy and totem belief as due to economic factors, 333; this school ignores the difference between open and closed cultures; it pre-supposes that the cultural circles first developed in complete isolation before getting into contact; this is not true for deepened cultures; Schmidt's and Koppers' cultural orbits are irrelevant to the historian; ethnological time becomes deepened in historical time, 334; historical science requires written documents, etc., 335; the doctrine of cultural orbits ignores the differences between ethnology and history; the Roman Catholic scholars Schmidt, Koppers, and others had an eye for the structural principles of marriage, family, and kinship as given in the order of the creation; they distinguish between the external and the internal functions of these communities; however, their conception of the state is vague, 336; Schmidt and Koppers point to the fatal influence
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| some external forms have on the internal solidarity, purity and intimacy of these communal bonds; this axiological viewpoint is indispensable to social science, 336; only from a nominalistic a-priori can we try to understand subjective human social relations apart from their individuality structures, but then we shall fail to grasp them; marriage and family are fully alive among the very old extant primitive peoples; the order of succession of the primitive cultures, 337; monogamy, matrimonial fidelity, parental love, married love are normal among them; Lowie says that the simplest cultures lack the sib and possess the family; matriarchy appears with the rise of agriculture; the nature of this connection; bina marriage; the avuncular relationship, 338; matriarchal phenomena do not belong to the internal domain of marriage and family, 339; Kulturkreislehre and its theory about polyandry, 340; tarwad house, and tarwad property; original polyandry was strictly monogamous; polyandry is not a matrimonial form; only a sanctioned juridical proprietary share in the wife; polyandry outside of the brothers is found, e.g., among the matriarchal Nayar caste in India; Schmidt thinks this practice originated from an irregular concubinage; the facts of pirra-ura-relations; here the abnormal sex relations are interwoven in an external enkapsis with marriage, 341; [cf. sub voce Undifferentiated organized communities;]; the patriarchal ‘joint family’ is called a ‘family form’ of pastoral nomads, by the Kulturkreislehre, 350; the Kirghiz ‘aul’, 351; [cf. sub voce Radloff]; ancestor worship of the Greek and Roman ‘gens’, [s.v. Fustel de Coulange;] Lowie refuted the theory of the ‘primary cultures’ in the Kulturkreislehre; the least developed primitive cultures do not know the sib but they do know the conjugal
family and the kinship, 354; W. Schmidt's theory of secret men's unions must seem the most satisfactory attempt to explain these political organizations, 366. |
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| Kultursynthese, II, the historical Idea is considered to be restricted to an immanent Kultursynthese, according to modern Historicism, 267. |
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Kung Chuan Hsiao, Prof., III,
Political Pluralism. A Study in Contemporary Political Theory, 465. |
| Kung Chuan Hsiao, Prof., III, political pluralism results in ‘economic monism’, 465. |
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Kurz, P.E., III,
Individuum and Gemeinschaft beim Hl. Thomas Aquinas, 218, 219. |
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Küster, E., III,
Die Zelle und die Gewebe des pflanzlichen Organismus, 720. |
Kuyper Sr., Dr. A., I,
developed the Calvinistic life and world view in the Netherlands in the last decades of the 19th century; the pressure of the scholastic notion of science, the necessity of defence against the ruling Humanistic view of science, stimulated young neo-Calvinism to consider its religious calling in the realm of science, 157; the phil. of the Cosmonomic Idea is to be understood only if the Calvinistic revival of the 19th century is taken into account, which revival was stimulated and led by Kuyper, 523; his Idea of the religious antithesis, 524. |
Kuyper Sr., Dr. A., II,
Gemeene Gratie, 33;
Encyclopaedie der Heilige Godgeleerdheid, 299, 309, 310. |
| Kuyper Sr., Dr. A., II, Common Grace, 33; on the function of faith, 299; Christianity and paganism are related in the same way as the plus- and minusdirections of the same series, 309; the deterioration of faith in which man has been abandoned to the inclination of his heart, 310 (note). |
Kuyper Sr., Dr. A., III,
Encyclopaedie der Heilige Godgeleerdheid, 247, 248, 506, 521, 524, 526, 531, 535, 540, 541;
De Gemeene Gratie, 506;
Tractaat van de Reformatie der Kerken, 532, 535, 539, 540, 541, 559. |
| Kuyper Sr., Dr. A., III, election in Christ the Head of reborn humanity; the operation of the spiritual factor is also individual, 247; but individual in connection with and as a result of the operation on the whole. Individuals do not exist in themselves; there only exist membra corporis generis humani, 248; the State belongs to the general temporal life of the world, and owes its existence to common grace as an ‘institution ordained on account of sin’, 506; we cannot subsume the Church institution under some higher general concept, 521; the church as an organism, 524; the institutional Church as a temporal organization has been instituted by Christ within the modal and radical structural types of individuality structures given already at the creation, 526; it is impermissible to isolate ‘the doctrine of Jesus’ from the context of the whole of the Divine Word-revelation, 531; sects nearly always arise through the fault of the Church, 532; the institutional Church is the mother of our faith in Christ Jesus, 535; in the days of the Old Testament there was a visible church manifesting the invisible ecclesia invisibilis electorum, but there was no institutional Church, 539; the institutional Church is confessional, not national in character, 540; ‘you cannot prevent your Church from deteriorating even if you could equip your Church government with a strictly Orthodox personnel, if your Church government is bad, 541; the
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| apostles never mention a Church that is a more comprehensive body embracing a number of local churches, 559. |
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Kuypers, K., II,
Theorie der Geschiedenis, 202, 207, 243. |
| Kuypers, K., II, tradition is the nucleus of history; Rickert's distinction between individualizing and systematic sciences criticized, 207; historical subject must have an analytical sense of meaning, 230; tradition and historical continuity, 243. |
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Kuijpers, G., III,
De Russische Problematiek in het Sowjet-Staatsbeleid, 459. |
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