A New Critique of Theoretical Thought. Deel 4. Index of Subjects and Authors

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Jacobi, I, his philosophy of feeling strongly influenced Fichte, 451; he was a typical representative of the German Sturm und Drang; there was true enthusiasm and optimism of the ‘Deed’, 452; their philosophy was irrationalistic; their philosophy of life culminated in the demand for subjective ethical freedom; freedom against every rule, authority, compulsion, dependence, freedom of feeling, 453; Jacobi taught that the ‘unconditioned Being’ could not be demonstrated theoretically, but only felt immediately by emotional faith; he did not restrict the truth value of immediate feeling to sense perceptions, but considered the certainty of supra-sensory belief as the second basic form of immediate feeling; he identified feeling with naïve experience, 458; he opposes ‘emotional faith to the understanding: ‘Heathen with the head, Christian with the heart’; he found true Christianity in the postulates of the Human-

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istic personality ideal: belief in the personality of God, in moral freedom and autonomy, and in the immortality of human personality, 459; he could never recognize the value of Fichte's ‘doctrine of science’, 460.

Jacobsohn, H., II, on Aktionsarten (character and aspect of verbs), 126.

Jaeger, F.M., III, Lectures on the Principles of Symmetry, 705.

Jaeger, Werner, III, Aristoteles, 13, 14.

Jaeger, Werner, III, on Aristotle's ‘Metaphysics’ and its earlier and later conceptions, 13, 14.

James, W., II, on analytical economy, 123.

Jandun, John of, I, Defensor Pacis, 188.

Jandun, John, I, introduced the process of secularization in Nominalism, 188.

Jandun, John, III, an Averroist Nominalist; grounded the authority of the state and legislation in the general will of united individuals, 224; appealed to the idea of an organism to defend the desirability of intermediary corporations between the citizen and the state, mitigating State absolutism, 236.

Janensky, I, Lavater, 454.

Jaspers, Karl, I, Psychologie der Weltanschauungen, 126.

Jaspers, Karl, I, ‘philosophy gave impulses, drew up tables of values, made human life meaningful and purposive,... gave a view of life and the world’; prophetic philosophy, 125; his theory of possible life-and-world-views is a ‘Psychology of the Life and world views’, 126.

Jansenists, I, the Jansenists of Port Royal accepted Cartesianism as an exact method of thinking and supposed they could find an inner affinity between Descartes' founding all knowledge in self-consciousness and the Idea of God, and Augustinus ‘Deum et animam scire volo’, 196, 223.

Jellema, D., II, Dooyeweerd and Hartmann, 51.

Jellinek, Georg, II, System der subj. öffentl. Rechte, 402; cf. 410;

Jellinek, Georg, II, legal power or competence, a self-restriction of political power, 70; a subjective right of a sovereign to the juridical obedience of citizens; he promotes legal duty to an object, 402.

Jellinek, Georg, III, Allgemeine Staatslehre, 400, 432.

Jellinek, Georg, III, considers the unity of an organized community as a category of consciousness, 241; he tried to combine the antithetical conceptions of the State of the juridical and the sociological school, 385; his dualistic theory of the State, 400; he detected the weak spot in the theory of the purposes of the State; opposed the introduction of political postulates in the theory of the State; he conceives of an organized community as a ‘purposive unity’ in a socio-psychological sense; he defines the State according to its aims in a subjectivistic individualistic way; he confounds the ideas about the external extent of the State's task with the structural principle of the State, 432; Kelsen's ‘normological’ theory resulted in the theoretical negation of State and law, 433.

Jelly-Fish, III, their medusas, 649.

Jerusalem, I, sociology of thought, 165.

Jesus, I, In Fichte Jesus is the immediate individual revelation of the Idea of God in the appearance, 492.

Jhering, Rudolph von, II, Geist des römischen Rechtes, 124, 125, 400, 401; cf. 141, 277.

Jhering, Rudolph von, II, the legal order of a body politic is the whole of law; he eradicates the subject-object relation and the boundaries between subjective right and competence, 401; on the difference between subjective right and reflexive permission, 404.

Joint Family, III, or extended family, 305; the patriarchal joint family, 350; the joint family interlaces different individuality structures in an intra-communal sense, and is founded in some power-formation closely bound to biotic conditions, 349; the joint family and the sib, in Grosse, 359.

Jordan, P., III, Quantumphysikalische Bemerkungen zur Biologie und Psychologie, 643, 644; Die Naturwissenschaften, 644;

Jordan, P., III, organisms are essentially microphysical systems; vital processes are peculiar to the atomic order of magnitude and direct the reactions in the macroscopic world which proceed a-causally; the laws of quantum mechanics cannot form a sufficient basis for the theory of intensification, 644.

Josserand, Louis, II, abuse of right; droit social; Bolshevist Russian Civil Law, 396.

Josserand, Louis, III, De L'Esprit des Lois et de leur Relativité, 463.

Josserand, Louis, III, his theory of the abuse of rights; civil subjective rights should be viewed as private rights granted by society only if they are in accordance with the social economic function they ought to serve, 463.

Judgments, I, theoretical and a-theoretical judgments, in Litt, Rickert, Kant, 151, 153; of perception, and those of experience, in Kant, 158, 159; synthetical and analytical, in Kant, 340; particular

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judgments originate from the principle of determinability, in Mainon, 409; empirical judgments are synthetic, but do not hang together systematically according to the principle of determinability, 410.

Judgments, II, Kant on analytical and synthetical judgments, 435; logical and linguistic structure of a judgment multi-vocality of the word ‘is’, 436; empirical judgments; Pfänder on Kant's theory, 440, 441, 442; Sigwart's and Schleiermacher's interpretations, 442-444; Aristotle's categories, 445; the judgment ‘this rose is red’ is pre-theoretical and has universal validity; it has an analytical aspect and is subjected to the logical principles; S = P is its formula, but cannot replace the judgment; the judgment claims to be true; it refers to the temporal horizon of experience and has a logical aspect; the logical objective systasis of this rose here; in the sensory impressions as such there is no logical identity, they cannot be the basis for the application of the fundamental logical norms; rationalistic epistemology recognizes only non-individual concepts; concrete existential judgments then leave it in an impasse, 450; Husserl's formalized judgments and Kant's distinction between analytical and synthetical judgments, 451; symbolic logic, 452; Husserl critized, 453; all theoretical judgments are synthetical and have a logical aspect; S = S; implicit and explicit synthet. judgments, 460, 461; pre-theoretical judgments, 462; theoretical judgments and sphere-sovereignty, 577.

Judgment of Identity, I, only in this judgment can metaphysical being be ascertained by logical thought, in Kant, 335.

Jura in Rē, II, and legal power, 198.

Jura in Personam and Jura in Rē, II, in Von Savigny's thought, 398.

Juridical Analogies, II, explained as having a mathematical meaning, in Kant, Grotius, Rousseau, Fichte, etc.; according to the nominalistic individualistic doctrine of natural law, 167.

Juridical Aspect, I, in a closed primitive jural order the anticipating connection with morality - as expressed in the principles of equity, good faith, good morals, punishment according to guilt, etc. - is absent, 29; embraces all kinds of law in a horizontal functional coherence; the conception of merely technical constructive scientific concepts, 550, 553.

Juridical Aspect, II, Stammler, 16, 17; legal economy; juridical proportion; primitive talion, 67; political mastery; competence; legal power, 69; Jellinek's view; legal power is realized on the basis of historical power, even in primitive society, 70; J. Stuart Mill on the conditio sine qua non, 119; misuse of the principle of economy; legal will; juridical fictions; legal technique; R. von Jhering, 124; François Geny; modern jurists call juristic basic concepts fictions, reduce them to the ‘only real psycho-physical’ states of affairs, 125; juridical retrocipations in the aesthetical aspect, 127; retrocipations to feeling, analysis, sociality, language, economy, 128; the meaning-kernel of the jural aspect is retribution; the kernel is intuitively apprehended; only describable in analogical terms, 129; retribution ‘in malam et in bonam partem’; Leo Polak's enquiry, 130; retribution and economic life, 131; justice as suum cuique tribuere, Dikè, anangkè, rita, tao; in Heraclitus; the Ionian philosophers; Pythagoreans; justica as cosmic order; a rigid and merciless justice, 132; the deification of natural forces; necessity; the Erinues; Parmenides' being, bound to the spherical form by anangkè or Dikè, 133; retribution and love, the legal order and sin; reaction against ultra ires; attribution in a social and in a juridical sense; and egotism; retribution is not a feeling drive; and altruism, 134; equality is a mathematical retrocipation; Aristotle's arithmetical and geometrical proportions in retribution, 135; social retrocipations: communal and inter-individual interests; economic and aesthetical retrocipations; economical retr. in primitive retribution, a tariff of compositions, 136; symbolism to denote juridical relations; implied undertakings; juridical and linguistic interpretation, 137; such interpretation is law-making; competent legal organ is required; judge and jurist; the Historical School on the sources of law, 138; E. Brunner on ‘perfect justice and love’, 157; the legal validity sphere, 166; mos geometricus in ‘natural law’; Social Contract; Neo-Kantian quantitative categories in law; Cohen, Hobbes, Fichte, Grotius, Rousseau, Kant; the absolutized legal order of the State, 167; a legal fact and energy; causality, 181; primitive criminal law; Erfolgshaftung; juridical causality; its logical substratum; normative imputation; risk; guilt; etc.; the physical nexus; causation by omission; primitive retribution, 182; and social intercourse; hostes; ex-lex; do ut des; formalism in contracts; primitive inertia of thought and sensory symbolism; wer; Gewehre; faith directs primitive legal life, 183; feeling of guilt; good faith, good morals, are limiting functions guided by the ethical aspect, 185; legal history, 197; legal power over persons is essential to jura in rē, 198; Stammler's view of positive law, 208; positivization of juridical norms, 241; the Historical School of Jurisprudence, 234, 249; juridical anticipation in the historical aspect; Weltgericht; God's guidance in history, 290; moderation and

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justice developed under the guidance of popular faith in ancient Greece; Plato and Aristotle, 321 (note); juridical aspect was deified in ancient Egypt: Osiris, 324; mathesis universalis, natural law, social contract, etc., Husserl, Fr. Schreier, 342; Cohen, 343; Gierke's organological theory, 344; freedom of contract; doctrine of justa causa; H. de Groot's pacta sunt servanda; Hobbes' soc. contract; justum pretium; Hobbes' constitutional and civil law, 359; subject-object relations; subjective rights; the Classical Roman jurists conceived subjective right as individual subjective power; the jural subject was an ‘individuum’; the corporation (= universitas) a jural unity; the Stoic construction; its bond; Germanic conceptions of an objective jural sphere, 392; the Roman ‘thing’-concept (rēs); jus pars pro indiviso; the rēs was considered as a juridical singularity; there was essentially only one direct ius in rē, viz the right of property; the origin of this conception ius in rē aliena; the subject-object-relation in personal rights of Roman law; mortgage on an object of usufruct, 393; a dilemma; incorporeal and corporeal ‘things’; the construction of rights to rights; Gierke's criticism, 394; rights to rights, e.g., to sleeping, walking, breathing, living, etc., 395; Hegel's view of subjective right; he excluded the idea of purpose; this attitude influenced later conceptions, e.g., of the abuse of right, 396; subjective right as will-power came to eliminate the jural object, 397; jura in personam et jura in rē, 398; various theories, 398; the will power theory was antinomic, 399; Hegel's dialectical view, 399; positivistic will power theories of subjective rights; got involved in antinomies which were masked by means of fictions; subjective right and juridical norm are both a psychological imperative, 400; competency and subjective right; and objects; content and object; Jellinek's error; the disposal of a right in an act of law-making, 402; Von Jhering; Thon; Wandscheid; Kierleeff; Haelschirer; Hobbes, 403; subj. right and reflex-permission; Von Jhering's criterion; the Roman actio popularis; Dutch Civil Servants Act, 1929; on abuse of power; the interdicts of the Roman Law of possession; possession and property, 404; the subject-object relation in subjective right; dependent objective juridical facts; a juridical object is related to the subjective power of disposal and enjoyment; such an object is never the full reality of a thing, or an object of sensory perception (rēs corporalis); it is a modal function; retrocipations in the juridical aspect, 405; definition of the concept of the juridical aspect; possibility of juridical objectification, 406; only things functioning economically can be juridical objects; and things under cultural control; Mare Liberum by Hugo Grotius; possibility of objectification of post-juridical functions and relations in the retributive sphere; Dutch High Court of Justice on obligation of morality and decent behaviour in civil law, 407; here are anticipations to morality in the subj.-obj. relation; natural juridical obligations between husband and wife and parents and children exceed civil law, 408; rights to rights; Gierke's opinion; ius in rē in an immovable is independent of the subject in the German ‘Reallasten’, 408; an objectified right in an immovable may become the object of another right, e.g., mortgage; Reallast; a parallel with the objectified image of a subject-object-relation in the sensory sphere; can competence over persons be the object of a subjective right? compare public rights, 409; medieval regalia considered as rēs in commercio, 410; in a modern state no single juridical authority over persons can be the object of a private right; the subject of public right is the State; definition of obedience, 410; patria potestas in Rome was an office and a right; a juridical object can only be the juridical objectification of cultural and economic interests, 411.

Juridical Aspect, III, Aristotle's view of the two forms of justice: commutative and distributive, 212; equality and inequality, 213; juridical relations in the natural family: penal and disciplinary competence; rights and duties, 276; natural obligations and their civil legal consequences; a realization of the moral anticipations in the jural sphere; there is no question of general positive legal norms in a family; law making through case law; also in Anglo Saxon countries, 277; inner structural legal subjectivity; a child's legal subjectivity is closely bound up with that of its parents and his connection has external civil legal consequences; the individualistic view of a child as an incompetent individual whose father is its natural legal representative; this view ignores the child's legal subjectivity displaying communal juridical relations; its external inter-individual relations do not pertain as such to internal family law; there is a partial legal intertwinement of representative and represented legal subjectivity; an organic juridical retrocipations, 278; juridical imputation joins the legal actions of the one with the rights and duties of the other; Hölder and Binder assert that legal representation destroys he juridical personality of the represented in favour of that of the representative; this theory is contrary to positive civil law and is also incompatible with the modal meaning of law as such, for it denies the partial intertwinement and unity in the civil legal subjectivity of father and child; there is an identical

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partial two-unity in the legal relation between curator and curandus, and between a guardian and his ward, 279; the interlacement of the juridical functions of the members of a family, or of those of representative and represented is constitutive in the legal subjectivity of the individual persons; the recognition of the legal subjectivity of every man as such apart from his specific communal bonds has been achieved in a long process of emancipation, 280; in civil law parental authority has only inter-individual functions; they require a warrant of attorney for civil actions of minors; e.g. a civil marriage; civil legal administration of the children's property; civil law recognises educational disciplinary competence of parents and the children's right to sustenance of life by their parents; but they are not sufficient to realize the internal family law; the contract made between law and morality is of Humanistic origin, 281; the insufficiency of the juridical concept of function; ‘natural law’ and individualism; the Enlightenment and the social contract; Chr. Wolff on the patria potestas; jura ex contractu; jura acquisita; jura connata; sphere sovereignty limits the competence of lawmakers, 282; absolute power of legislators is incompatible with the meaning of retribution; sphere sovereignty within natural organized communities, intercommunal and interindividual relationships; the expression of the structural moral and juridical functions in the aesthetic aspect of the internal family-relations, 283.

Juridical Causality, II, if in the functionalistic way ‘empirical reality’ is conceived of as the synthetically arranged sensory phenomena, the idea of juridical causality is taken to be a construction of thought, 537.

Juridical Interpretation, II, is theoretical, according to Von Savigny, 138.

Juridical Person, II, is considered as a construction of thought in the functionalistic view of ‘empirical reality’, 537.

Juridical Formalism, II, in the primitive law of contract, as yet little developed, is very strict, and frequently exhibits magic traits; all juridical acts are tied down to the sensory symbol, 183.

Jurisdiction, III, has to form law in concreto; it refuses to judge the internal structure of unlawful governmental actions by means of a civil standard, 687.

Justice, I, the idea of justice in Em. Brunner as a ‘purely formal value’ is Neo-Kantian, 520.

Justice, II, perfect justice is a contradiction in terms, according to Emil Brunner, 157.

Justice, III, in Plato, an order of justice in the polis for the harmonious cooperation of rulers, soldiers, and labourers, 207; the idea of justice and the power of the sword, 381; the unlimited competence of the polis and its dialectical tension with justice, 398.

Justinian (the Roman Emperor), III, abolished the last remmants of the ancient cvil law; jus gentum et jus civile, 449.

Justum Pretium, II, in Hobbes's theory of natural law the Aristotelian Thomistic doctrine of justum pretium was given up, 359.