A New Critique of Theoretical Thought. Deel 4. Index of Subjects and Authors

I

-I-, Pure Actual, II, in Husserl, 584.

Idea, I, is a limiting concept referring to a totality not to be comprehended in the concept itself, 8 (note); the immanent Ideas of the inter-modal coherence of meaning, and of the meaning totality are transcendental limiting concepts, 21; ideas are symbols of reality in Leibniz, 240; ideas are complex representations, distinct from sensible and spiritual impressions, in Locke, 264; simple and complex ideas, 265; the Idea is the embodiment of the Humanistic personality ideal, Hönigswald, 328, 329; Idea as ‘differential of consciousness’ is to clarify the relation of the particular to the universal, in Mainon, 408; Hegel's metaphysical idea, 500.

Idea, II, and concept; basic transcendental Idea; the presupposition of phil., 4; in Kant the Idea is the origin of the being of what is, 19; the transcendental Idea of Christian phil., 25; the Idea in post-Kantian freedom Idealism, 26; Fichte's Idea as noumenon, 27; in Neo-Kantianism, 27; Christian Cosmonomic Idea, 30, 31; the Idea of meaning as the mode of being of creation, 32; transcendental Idea and concept of Gegenstand; the Idea of the homo noumenon in Kant, 44; in the metaphysics of the mathematical science ideal the transcendental Idea is a ‘Ding an sich’, 44; concept and modal Idea, 45; the number of theoretical ideas, 45; Ideas depend on concepts in the foundational direction; concepts depend on Ideas in the transcendental direction, 186, 187, 188; the Idea of development oriented to the personality-ideal in Kant, 271; Id. of political development in Montesquieu, 350.

Idea Legis, I, is the cosmonomic Idea of Christian philosophy, 93.

Idealism, I, versus naturalism, 121; Leibniz' idealism is mathematical; of Greek thought, 122; Hegel's absolute idealism, 329; mathematical idealism and critical transcendentalism in Maimon, 406; organological idealism of Schelling, 469.

Idealism, II, Hegel's absolute Idealism, German Idealism yields to irrational historicism, 19, 20; idealistic metaphysics, 20; Kant's transcendentalism and his idea of the noumenon, 187.

Idealism, Critical, I, and the concept of the ‘transcendental subject of thought’, 120.

Idealism, Organological, I, in Schelling, 469.

Idea of Creation, I, objections to this term, 95.

Idea of Humanity, The, I, in the Sturm and Drang, 454.

Idea of Humanity, II, in the Enlightenment, 358.

Ideal Subject, I, in Immanence philosophy, 110.

Ideal Types, III, of Max Weber, 171; they are no structural principles; and antique and medieval forms of ‘political life’, 175; these ideas are useless in sociology, 330.

Identity, Principle of, I, in Fichte, 418.

Identity, II, the relation of identity must not be absolutized, 461; our experience of identity, 500.

Identity, III, and change as a metaphysical problem, 3, 4.

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Illegal Act, II, in its primary meaning modus there is an analogy of energy-effect in the factual juridical causality, 181.

Illusion, I, the dialectical illusion, in Kant, arises when theoretical thought tries to attain the knowledge of the supra-empirical, 365.

Image, II, an image of movement is objective sensory, and requires a perceptible reference, appealing to our intuition of movement, 100; psychical image, 375.

Imaginary (number), II, function of number, 171.

Imagination, I, the creative power of psychological thoughts is imputed to the faculty of the imagination, by Hume, 294; productive imagination in Fichte, 427, 428, 429, 430, 431; produces the non-ego in Fichte's view, 434.

Imagination, II, and the intentional structures, 115, 118, 121; and sensory experience of motion, 168; and feeling in Classicism, 347; phantasms of sensory imagination are intentional objects apart from the sensory objectivity of real things, 425; Kant: imagination and logical synthesis, 497; the transcendental imagination in Kant, 513; productive, reproductive, synthetic-imagination, 514; Cusanus' view; Hume; Kant, 515; productive imagination in Kant, the root of practical reason, a faculty of the soul ascribed to logical thought, 520, 521; Heidegger identifies imagination with Dasein; the pure finite selfhood is rooted in time, 524; the formative medium between the two stems of knowledge in Kant's view, 525-529; Kant's ‘pure imagination’ links the two stems of knowledge, but is not their root, 532; imagination and sensibility, 534; definition of Kant's ‘pure imagination’, 535.

Imagination, III, the copy theory of ‘naïve realism’, 35; empiricist atomistic view of sense impressions and perceptual images; the qualifying function of a thing dominates its objective perceptual image, 104, 105; an artist's productive fantasy is founded in sensory imagination; a visual phantasm; an intentional visionary object; reproductive fantasy; in art; the fancied objective structure of a thing is a potentional structure capable of being represented in a real thing, 113-116; the sensory function of the imagination, 115.

Imago Dei, I, man was created by God as the expression of His image, 4; the image of God was wiped out when man intended to be something in himself, 4 (note).

Imago Dei, II, the supertemporal focus of all the aspects of creation, the fulness of meaning given in Christ, 30; the power inherent in it, 248; and faith, 300.

Imago Dei, III, cannot be understood if the human person in its kernel is conceived as a substance, 6; in a religious sense love is the fulfilment and radical unity of all temporal meaning, only found in the imago Dei revealed in Christ, 71.

Immanence Philosophy, I, accepts the self-sufficiency of philosophical thought in accomplishing its task, i.e., the autonomy of reason, 12; it does not reject the metaphysical way to what transcends human thought; classical imm. phil. was based on a metaphysical ‘prima philosophia’; rationalistic Imm. Phil. involves the attempt to overstep the boundaries of phil. thought in the idea of an absolute deified thought, viz., the ‘intellectus archetypus’; Imm. Phil. does not necessarily imply the belief in the self-sufficiency of only logical thought; it varies from rationalism to modern logical positivism and the irrationalistic phil. of life; modern existentialism, 13; Imm. Phil., taken in a narrow sense, views all reality as immanent in consciousness, breaking the bridge between an extra-mental ‘Ding an sich’ and the functions of human consciousness, 14; immanence phil. in a wide sense is all philosophy that seeks its Archimedean point in philosophic thought itself; on this standpoint there is a current which stresses the purely theoretical character of philosophy; the theoretical is only one of the many aspects from which we may view the cosmos, although it is the only one from which we can really grasp the cosmos in the view of totality; but this school of phil. also brings to the fore the self-sufficiency of ‘transcendental thought’ as its Archimedean point; the theoretical cosmos is the creation of philos. thought, 14; religious and ‘weltanschauliche’ convictions cannot claim recognition in the domain of philosophy; this is the neutrality postulate; it is defended by Rickert and Theodor Litt, a.o.; the inner problematic situation of immanence philosophy; the choice of this standpoint requires philosophy to transcend the limits of phil. thought, 15; the necessary religious transcending in the choice of the immanence standpoint; this choice is not an act of a ‘transcendental subject of thought’, because this ‘subject’ is merely an abstract concept; it is a religious act of the full self which transcends the diversity of the modal aspects; this choice of the immanence standpoint is a choice of position in an idolatrous sense, 20; Rickert's assertion ‘if we are able to determine the boundaries of thought through thinking, we must also be able to exceed these limits’ contains an overt contradiction on the immanence standpoint, 22 (note); on this standpoint Rickert lacks an appreciation of the transcendence of our selfhood, 23; immanence phil. stands and falls with the dogma of the autonomy of theoretical thought, 35; imm. phil. seeks the starting point for the theoretical synthesis in

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theoretical reason, 45; such synthesis can be performed with each of the aspects; the process invariably amounts to the absolutization of a special synthetically grasped modal aspect; this is the source of many ‘-isms’, 46; in Greek and scholastic metaphysics the concept of ‘being’ as an ‘analogical unity’ lies at the basis of the diversity of aspects, 47; ‘-isms’ in ‘*pure’ mathematics, and in ethics, aesthetics and theology, 48.

Immanence Philosophy, II, immanence philosophy subjectively eliminates the cosmic time-order and absolutizes theoretical thought, 8; Meaning is distinguished from reality in Immanence Phil., 25, 26; the metaphysical idea of being in Imm. Phil., 26; Imm. Phil. never posited the problem of the cosmic order of succession of modal spheres, 49; its unmethodical treatment of the coherence between the normative aspects, 49; Imm. Phil. was incapable of positing the problem of concept formation correctly, 50; its form-matter scheme, its theory of phenomenon and noumenon; its concept of a psycho-physical world, 50; its hypostasis of theoretical thought, 435; and of the intellect in Kant, 501 (note); the hypostasis of the so-called transcendental consciousness, 583.

Immortality, I, of the rational soul, in Thomas, 44.

Impersonal Attitude, I, of philosophic reflection criticized by Existentialism, 170.

In-Actualization, III, if the objective qualification of a thing is no longer operative owing to changed historical circumstances, we speak of in-actualization of the qualifying function; a medieval castle may become a museum; there is a distinction to be made between the objective reality of a thing and the subjective actualization of its qualifying function in the subj.-object-relation, 143, 146, 147; the shift in a thing's destination is exclusively concerned with the actualization relation, 148; the biotic function is necessarily included in the subject-object relation of a thing both in the opening and in the actualization relation, 149; things function in the biotic aspect in their own typical structure; only then can their qualifying normative object function be actualized; such things belong to the objective human environment; by actualizing their objective destination man enriches his own existence, 150; the actualization of a book structure, 152; books broaden our horizon, 153.

Incapsulated Structure, III, its internal operational sphere, and its external enkaptic sphere, ordered by the operational sphere of the higher structure, 696.

Incertitude, III, Heisenberg's concept of incert., 643 (note); Bohr's relation of incertitude, 715, 726, 727.

Incarnation, II, in the perspective horizon of experience we become aware of the fulness of meaning only in the light of the Divine Revelation. For this reason, as the fulness of God's Revelation, Christ came into the flesh, 561.

Indifference, II, is an attitude of feeling, as is also interest, 117.

Individual and Group, II, in the question about the great personalities of history, 245.

Individualism, III, sociological individualism absolutizes the inter-individual relationships, cf. Hobbes, 182, 183; Polos, Thrasymachos, Kallikles, were individualists, 199.

Individuality, I, is ‘specificity in nature’, in Kant, 387; true reality is in the irrational depths of individuality, according to Hamann, 453; the conception of individuality in the Sturm and Drang period, 454; is the result of a metaphysical actus individuationis in which time acquires individual points of concentration, according to Fichte, 474; natural individuality must be annihilated by the individual spirit in the historical process, in Fichte, 478; can only be understood from the individual communities, 479; subjective individuality cannot exist unless it is bound to a supra-individual order, 493.

Individuality, II, historical individuality, 194; individual causality in Rickert, 254; individual historical totality in J.F. Herder's Ideen, 272; in primitive societies, 273; the task of individual talent, 275; apart from the anticipatory meaning coherence historical individuality is an apeiron, 276; the individuality of the members of a primitive community, 320; indiv. as an apeiron when primacy is ascribed to the form-motive in Greek metaphysics, 418, 419; in Kant individuality belongs to the sensory matter of experience, 420; it is empirically determined, 421; individuality in Neo-Kantianism originates from the ‘matter’ of experience; it occurs only once in this definite place in (sensory) space and time; it is empirical uniqueness related to values, 421; if, with Kant, individuality belongs to the sensory matter of experience, it can have no functions in the modal law spheres, and remains an apeiron, 422; in Scheler individuality is the absolute requisite in the concrete essential structure of experience, and is elevated above the law, 591.

Individuality, III, an inconstant individuality structure is found in works of art belonging to music, poetry, drama, 110-116; the individuality of a sculpture has an objective historical nuclear type; the inner

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articulation of its geno-type; its pheno-type, 121; individual man in primitive societies, 194; individualism accordiing to Spann, 239; there exist no ‘individuals’ but only members of the body of the human race, according to Kuyper, 247 (note), 248.

Individuality Structures, I, eliminated in the classical Humanistic science ideal, 84, and the continuity postulate, 555.

Individuality Structures, II, this structure is not at all that of the metaphysical ‘substance’ founded on an absolutized Gegenstand relation, 11, 419.

Individuality Structures, III, specific structures of time; duration of things, events, etc.; in genetic processes; opening-process; inorganic, organic, feeling, logical analysis, formative activity (culture); actualization of potentialities in the human body, 78; structures of individuality belong to the lawside; have no real duration; theoretically knowable; factual duration of a thing depends on its individuality structure, 79; the internal structural principle determines the subjective or objective individuality of the whole as the typical law of individuality; a unity of order in the modal diversity of its aspects; the confusion in modern biological systematism; taxon, phylon, isogenon, ‘reine Linie’, 80; classificatory and typological methods in psychology and psychiatry, 81; Weber's ideal-typical method; typological concepts in jurisprudence, 82; genera or radical types; kingdoms, 83, 84; animal behaviour and vegetative reaction; protozoa, infusiora; animal psychology and behaviourism, 85, 86, 87; the denominator of comparison of radical types, 87; the human body, 87, 88, 89; secondary radical types, 89, 90; leading and foundational function of a structural whole, 90; the anticipatory structure, 91; interlacements of different individuality structures may be combined into a typically qualified form-totality or they may be not thus combined, 92; structural interlacements find expression in special individuality-types distinct from those belonging to the irreducible inner structure of the whole; interlacements are necessary for the realization of the inner nature of a thing; natural and unnatural interlacements; parasitical forms of symbiosis are natural to one of the interlaced individuals, unnatural to the internal structure of the other, 93; geno-types within the radical type ‘animal’; sub-types; every genetic viewpoint pre-supposes these individuality structures; structures are not subject to genesis and evolution, their realization in changing individuals; ideo variations (mutations) give rise to hitherto unrealized genotypes; every phylon pre-supposes radical and genotypes, 94; the cosmic plastic horizon determines the inner nature of all individual totalities which are subject to genesis and decay; the older Darwinistic evolutionism construed a gapless continuity in its mechanistic system of phylogenetic series; Darwin's and Haeckel's conception has been rejected; but modern evolutionism still believes that the biotic, the psychical and the so-called ‘mental’ aspects of temporal reality have originated from physico-chemical constellations in a process of continuous evolution; the philosophical implications of evolutionism; the discoveries of palaeontology; the facts of embryology; Haeckel's ‘biogenetic basic law’; the interpretation of the so-called ‘blood reaction’, 95; classifications in biology based on the distinction between radical, geno-, and pheno-types, geno-type has two meanings (note), 96; structural type und subjective (or objective) individuality; the identity of the whole is retained throughout all transformation of a thing within its ‘accidental’ properties; this identity must be both a-typically individual and in conformity with its internal structural principle; this linden tree is interlaced with my garden (variability type), 97; the individual identity of this tree is based on the structurally determined individual whole, not vice versa, 98; there are individuality structures in the micro-world that are not objectified in the macroscopic perceptional world of naïve experience, 98; there are no original types of individuality in the pre-physical spheres, 99; the structure of atoms and molecules contradicts the positivist thesis that they are fictitious; because they can be made visible, 99; Ding an sich; modern wave-mechanics and the old rigid corpuscles; and ‘Wellenpakete’, 100; the thing structure expresses itself especially in its leading function, 105; structural principles do not depend on the genesis of individuals in which they are realized; these principles are a-priori; but our knowledge of them is not a-priori, 106; there are natural things qualified by a structural object-function: e.g., ant hills, birds' nests, honey combs, spiders' webs, beaver dams etc.; they are objectively qualified by a typical animal-psychical function dependent on the animal's subjectivity for its actualization; they have no independent radical type, only a secondary type; they are not merely pre-biotic structures, 107; their typical nature cannot be ascribed to an independent ‘substance’; their nature is meaning; mineral formations produced by the protoplasm of rhizopods; the Si O2 formations of radiolaria, 108; the reality of a thing is a continuous process of realization, 109; Praxiteles' Hermes is an objective thing structure; relatively constant; but music, etc., have an inconstant individuality structure; books, etc., signify the lingual or the aesthetic structure; there is an art of performance

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in connection with music, drama, etc.; gramophones; there is a secondary radical type: works of art, 110; a sculpture is an interlacement between a subjective material structure (marble) and an aesthetically qualified objective structure; the biotic function in a sculpture, 111; implied in its objective sensory perceptibility; there are abstract sculptural artefacts, 112; the Abbild-relation; the artist's aesthetic conception; Rickert's view rejected, 113; the latent objective aesthetical function of a natural thing and the subject-object relation; the observer's task of deepening his own natural aesthetic vision, 114; the thing structure has no meaning, apart from its aesthetical totality; the merely intentional character of an object of fantasy; Praxiteles has projected his Hermes as a merely intentional visionary object, 115; the sensory image of the Hermes is an intentional visionary object bound to the plastic hohizon; the sculpture's reality is the representation of the fancied thing structure; it is not the aesthetic objectification of the aesthetic subject function of the artist; it can only function in an intentional aesthetic subj.-object relation, 116; the organic vital function is implicitly intended in the artist's productive fantasy, and this intention is realized in the thing, viz. the statue, 117; the typical foundational function of this sculpture; this is not the marble, 118; marble is a phenotype of an original genotype of inorganic matter; the sensory objectified fantasy form is not the typical substratum of the sculpture; the marble is a: dynamei on, 119; the marble is a bare material for the aesthetic expression; the sculpture's objective sensory image is not original but representational; the artist's plastic activity is an original free formation pointing beyond the sensory aspect; the sensory figure is anticipatory; the sculpture has a typical historical foundational function, 120; the nuclear type of individuality of the statue is its objective historical structural function; the inner articulation of its genotype: plastic work of art; pictorial, mimic, sculptural types; sculptured figures and deities; phenotypes: marble, bronze, etc.; style is a typical historical analogy in aesthetic structures; there is no style in nature; free art is not enclosed in an enkaptic structural whole lacking aesthetic qualification, 121; the term ‘radical type’ used in a modified sense with respect to products of human formation; music, literature, 122; classification of fine arts; interlacement of natural and aesthetic structures, 123; marble is an aggregate, the work of art is an unbreakable non-homogeneous whole determined by its inner structural law; marble is a variability type of calcium carbonate forming a homogeneous aggregate; its cultural form in a statue is not homogeneous, 124; the marble's physico-chemical processes are directed by the artist's technique in an anticipatory way to the aesthetic expression without being destroyed; this figure is enkapsis; there should be no dualism, 125; the artist has to open the natural structure of his material through the aesthetic structure of his work, 126; the terms ‘form’ and ‘matter’; a variability type points to an enkapsis of structural principles, 127; there is an irreversable foundational relationship between the natural and the aesthetically qualified thing structures, 128; the wood of a piece of furniture in a tree; when sawn to planks the wood displays a secondary natural structure, 129; its ontic status is not on a level with that of, e.g., the shell of a molusc., 130; the physico chemical properties have been put under the guidance of the vital function in a living tree; resulting in a variability type of wood; planks are semi-manufactured material as the foundation of the structure of furniture; semi-products have no leading function, 131, 132; different materials may be utilized in the same chair, etc.; their inner structure remains distinct from the internal structure of the chair; its pre-technical modi have only an anticipating type of individuality; e.g. numerical and spatial relations; physico-chemical properties; the technical project; subjective and objective functions, 133; weight, bearing power suit its typical objective destination; a chair is a seat: a biotic characteristic; a cultural need of man, 134; subject-object relations are typical anticipations; logic modus; implicit pre-theoretical analysis; explicit theoretical analysis; its sensory perceptible traits are implicitly conceived in an anticipatory sense; the general idea of the word chair does not exceed the naïve concept, 135; the individual identity of the parts of a chair cannot be essential to that of the whole; a dog's use of a chair is without awareness of its structural meaning; at least if man is civilized he realizes this meaning, 137; the genotype furniture; their leading function is social; free and applied (or bound) art; handwork served as the historical occasion for the rise of independent plastic art, 138; mass production, bad taste and the pursuit of gain and architecture a work of architecture is bound to the structure of the building, as a social cultural object; the aesthetic aspect is subordinate to the social function, 140; furniture style has a bound character; Louis XIV style, 141, 142; useful objects belong to the radical type of the kingdom of historically founded, objectively and socially qualified utensils; the difference between a thing's structural destination and our subjective end in using it; an

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antique shawl may be used as a wall decoration; inactualization, 143; historically founded social things are not always usable for any subject; a wedding ring, a throne, etc., have a subjective individualization of their objective destination; this individualization may be symbolically indicated by initials, etc.; an altar, chapel, temple, crucifix, rosary have an objective destination for worship (a pistic qualifying function); in a museum they more or less continue to express their societal pistic destination, 144; but their objective reality is strange to us unless we sympathise with the group that used them, 145; in the subject-object relation we must distinguish between the objective empirical reality of things and the subjective actualization of their objective qualifying function; the preference for antique furniture; old shawls, armours, weapons preserved for decoration or for their historical interest; patrician Amsterdam houses; medieval castles, 146; a shift in their objective destination; i.e. this destination has been inactualized, it is no longer in operation; the disappearance of knighthood; the preservation of knightly attire; their objective qualification remains; but their social destination can no longer be actualized, 147; the three figures in the subject-object relation: intentional representation; unfolding; actualization; the shift in the objective destination is only a shift in the subject-object relation but does not affect the original structure, is only concerned with the actualization relation; the shift occurs from the qualifying to the historical or aesthetical function; pageants, plays, with medieval attire; this kind of use is bound to their original structure, 148; a thing's structure expresses itself in the order of modalities; the biotic function is necessarily included in the subject-object-relation, in the unfolding and in the actualization process, 149; our sense perception of things pre-supposes the biotic stimulation of our visual nerves; things function in their own typical structure; the unfolding relation; human environment; by actualizing things with an objective normative function man enlarges his environment and frees it from its static dependence on the physical-chemical functions given in nature; nothing can affect our sense organs (in the subject-object-relation) which does not itself function subjectively or objectively in the biotic modality; things function here in their own typical structure, 150; a reading book contains the intentional conception of its author signified in an objective thing-structure; differentiation of this type depends on the nature of the ideas and conceptions signified (literary, scientific, musical content); variability-types of books; the structure of a book has a cultural foundation and a symbolical leading function, 151; Aristotle's failure to explain the structure of a book, 152, 153; genetic and existential structures, 174; cf. Sociology.

Individualization, Subjective, III, of historically founded social things: a throne; a wedding-ring; an altar, etc., 144.

Industrial Life, Modern, III, was individualistic and mercilessly capitalistic, 595.

Inertia, II, is a kinematical concept, 99; principle of Galilei, 100.

Infallible Church, III, of Rome, in Thomas' view, as the interpreter of natural law and the limits of the State's competence, 221.

Infant Baptism, III, is based on the Covenant, 541.

Initation Rites, III, of a primitive cult community which is guided by the natural family structure, 362.

Initiative, II, human initiative in history, according to Wells, 270 (note).

Innate Ideas, I, in Descartes; are present at birth, according to Regius, 222; are dormant virtual representations in Leibniz, 237; rejected by Locke, 264.

Innate Ideas, II, according to Descartes, and to Husserl, 584.

Innate Human Rights, II, this theme was conceived by Locke, and expanded by Rousseau; it gave Western culture a rationalistic-individualistic form, 357; the theory of personality rights was derived from that of innate human rights, 413.

Innere Sprachform, II in the theory of W. von Humboldt; it is the formative law of the structure of linguistic signifying, 222.

I-ness, I, shares in the Archimedean point, 59; is rooted in a spiritual community directed to the Divine Thou, 60.

I-ness, II, the I-ness is a formal concept, in Kant, 502, 503.

I-ness, III, Aug. Brunner's view, 6; the meeting of I and Thou, 781.

Infinite, I, the doctrine of the infinite in Cusanus, 200.

Infinitude, I, and the Renaissance; in Leibniz; in Bruno; and man, in Cusanus, 194; of nature glorified by Bruno, 199; actual infinitude of the monads, in Leibniz, 255.

Influxus Physicus, I, in Descartes, 219.

Infusioria, III, their psychical qualification, 85, 86, 87; they have dissimilar nuclei; each of them has two nuclei, a generative and a somatical nucleus, 722.

Insect Larvae, III, 774.

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Institutional Church, III, is a real organized community, with four offices, 520; qualified by faith, and with a typical historical foundation, 521; a temporal institution according to Dr. A. Kuyper, 526; the mother of our faith, 535; temporal church and Kingdom of Heaven are identified by Sohm, 552.

Institutional Ideas, III, function as structural principles in society, according to M. Hauriou; they influence all individuals through the élite, 189.

Institutional School of Law, III, was founded by Hauriou, 189.

Institutions, III, definition, 187; secondary institutions, 188; there are institutional and non-institutional communities; Church and State, 189; the institutional church is confessional, not national, according to Dr. A. Kuyper, 540; natural institutions and differentiated organized communities are interwoven, 658.

Integration, II, cultural integration, 244; and differentiation in History; Durkheim, 260, 396, 397.

Integration, III, integration theory of Smend criticized by Kelsen, 260 (note); horizontal integration brought about by organized industrial groups, 594.

Integrationslehre, III, and the dialectical cultural scientific method, 387.

Intellectus Archetypus, I, is absolute deified thought, comprising the fulness of being in a purely logical sense, 13; the rationalistic metaphysics that distinguished archè and Archimedean point, absolutized the logical aspect of actual thought only in the Archè as the Intellectus Archetypus, 20; in Kant it is derived from Leibniz, 361.

Intellectus Archetypus, II, in Kant, 420; in Leibniz the intellectus archetypus chooses from the possible to create the actual, 512.

Interests, II, a general concept in Von Jhering, 401.

Interests, Theory of, II, this theory was introduced by R. von Jhering, 400.

Interlacements, III, natural and unnatural interlacements; interlacements are necessary for the realization of the inner nature of a thing, 93; interlacement of affections in the family: national feeling, feeling of social standing, feeling for the church, etc., 295.

International, III, international relations and the ‘sacred egotism’ of the separate states, 596; international trade is founded in traffic, 661; international law is an inter-communal legal order, 661.

Interpenetration (psychical), II, of modal retrocipations of feeling, 169.

Interpretation (legal), II, of legal states of affairs is law-making, if done by a competent organ, 138.

Intrusion (cultural), II, Western intrusion in underdeveloped cultures, 260.

Intuition, I, of the essence, Wesensschau, in Husserl, 213; was a faculty of the cogito, the basis of all mathematical proof, in Locke, 270; and feeling in Fichte, 444; intellectual intuition, in Schelling's view, 471.

Intuition, II, according to Kant space and time are forms of intuition, 12, 96; of original movement, 99; movement intuition needs no sensory perceptible system of reference, but requires its coherencec with static space intuition, 100; intuitive insight into retribution replaced by analogical concepts, 132; in Immanence Phil. intuition is either inner certainty of feeling, or a superior rational organ, or the immediate evidence of truth, 430; intuition is the bottom layer of the logical function which is in continuous contact with all the aspects of our own reality; it exceeds the logic. function; it cannot be theoretically isolated; it is a cosmic intuition of time, 473; cosmic intuition and selfhood, and cosmological consciousness of self; theoretical intuition, 473; intuitive self-reflexion on the modalities and theoretical synthesis; the I-ness is the central point of reference in our cosmic experience; intuition does not transcend time; it remains at rest (in the naïve attitude) in the systasis of the datum; Erleben and Hineinleben, 474; conscious Erleben is the temporal basic layer of all cognition; non-intuitive knowledge cannot exist; Volkelt contrasts logical necessity with intuitive certainty, 475; he thinks he can analyse intuition psychologically; he has no insight in the subject-object relation; he seems to hold logical intuition something radically different from moral, aesthetical and faith intuition, 476; he distinguishes two types of certainty; his definition of intuition; of experience; his sensualism; difference between experience and animal awareness of sensations; his Kantian prejudices, 477; Volkelt restricts experience to sensory impressions; intuition enters into the cosmic stream of time; objectivity; the sensory subj.-obj. relation; a sensory impression is intentional and objective; a ‘pure sensation’ is an idle phantasm; intuition moves to and fro between theoretical analysis and Gegenstand to unite them in an inter-modal synthesis, 478; trough intuition deepened thought is able to analyse the Gegenstand; its reference to the religious root, in transcendental reflection; intuition is a transcendental condition of the cognitive meaning synthesis; we can have an Idea, not a concept of it; in theoretical thought our theoretic intuition is actualized in the synthesis of meaning as insight; a deep-

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ening of pre-theoretical intuition; the pre-theoretical and the theoretical consciousness of self, 479; sub-human creatures are extatically absorbed by their temporal existence; man's selfhood enters enstatically into the temporal cosmic coherence; intuition is not a mysterious non-logical faculty; Schelling's view of the intuition of men of genius; ‘intellectual intuition’; Bergson on intuition; analytic thought is adaptation to biological matter; science is merely technically useful to man; intuition he calls an immediate subjective psychical empathy, 480; penetrating with intellectual sympathy into the durée; Bergson psychologizes intuition; his ‘fluid concepts’, 481; his metaphysical absolutization, 482; analysis cannot do without intuitive insight; H. Poincaré; men of genius and intuition; can they intuitively grasp a state of affairs without the aid of the analytical function? intuition and the instinct; intuition of genuises is not infallible; it also has to distinguish and to identity logically; the free direction of our attention to abstract modal states of affairs is typical for theoretical intuition, 483; Weierstrasz' discovery of the general theory of functions and intuition; Riemann's contribution to this theory; theoretical intuition, 484; pre-theoretical intuition and analysis, 485; Intuition in Riehl; and thought in the cogito, 519.

Intuitive Knowledge, I, is not found in theoretical metaphysics, according to Kant, 350.

Intuitive Knowledge, III, and symbolical knowledge, 145.

Invention, I, in the logic of Petrus Ramus, 198.

Inventions and Discoveries, II, are without historical consequences if they are not generally accepted, 259.

Invisible Church, III, and sacramental hierarchy in Roman Catholicism, 217; invisible church as the corpus mysticum whose Head is Christ, 234; and the visible church, 509; its temporal manifestation in the Church Institution, 522.

Ionian Thinkers, I, deified the matter motive of the ever flowing stream of life; they did not distinguish the physical from the mental sphere, and held matter to be animated, 26.

Ionian Thinkers, II, their reflection on justice found retribution as its essence; Heraclitus; Pythagoras; Parmenides, 132.

Ipsen, Guenther, II, Sprachphilosophie der Gegenwart, 222, 224.

Ipsen, Guenther, II, opposes Husserl's ‘pure grammar’ which cancels language itself, 224.

Irrational Historicism, II, came after German Idealism, 19, 20.

Irrationalism, I, absolutizes the factual side of time, 28; considers the ‘theoretical order’ as a falsification of ‘true reality’, 110; in Litt's view, 148; in the second phenomenological trend (W. Dilthey), 214; in Fichte's third period, 451; of Hamann; in J.F. Herder's philosophy of feeling; in the philosophy of the Sturm and Drang, 453; aesthetical; the morality of genius; Schiller's view of the beautiful soul; in Schelling, 465; irrationalism reduces the true order to a function of an individual subject; the philosophy of life, 466; philosophical irrationalism is rooted in the Gegenstand relation, and sanctions antinomy, 467.

Irrationalism, II, of Herder's personality ideal, 272; of the Historical School, 279.

Irrationalistic Phenomenology, I, phenomenology in Heidegger, 53; personality ideal in Fichte, 489; ethics of E. Brunner, 519.

Insight, II, and analysis, in Poincaré, 483.

Isogenon, III, in biology, 81.

I-Thou-We, I, in a spiritual community, and the Divine Thou, 60.

I-Thou, II, I-Thou-relation versus impersonal relations, in Gogarten and Buber, 143; I-Thou-relation and impersonal I-it-relation are dialectically opposed by Aalders and Brunner, 159; in Scheler, 590.

Iver, R.M. Mac, III, Community, 177.

I-We-Relation, II, is religious, and implied in the I-Thou-relation to God, 160.