A New Critique of Theoretical Thought. Deel 4. Index of Subjects and Authors

H

Haeckel, III, his ‘biogenetic basic law’, 95.

Haelschner, II, cancelled the power of enjoyment contained in the concept of subjective right, 403.

Haering, Theodor, III, Philosophie der Naturwissenschaft, 37; Ueber Individualität in Natur und Geisteswelt, 635.

Haering, Theodor, III, modern physics omits secondary as well as primary qualities of matter, 37; Haering's use of the term ‘Enkapsis’; kidneys, lungs, etc. have relatively independent individuality, 634; yet the total organism displays internal unity working in all its individual parts; e.g. a muscle; Haering applies this idea in a general way in biology, physics, in the ‘purely psychical realm’ of the psychè; his conception is oriented to a constructive trichotomistic schema of physis, psyche, and spirit, 635; a single organ may be kept alive outside of the whole organism; then it is not the same organ, 636; he considers atom and molecule as real parts of a cell, 641; the fact that a psychically qualified reaction in protozoa also displays a physico-chemical and biotic aspect has been misinterpreted by Th. Haering, 766.

Hahn, Eduard, III, an adherent of the Kulturkreislehre, 333.

Haldane, II, a holistic biologist, 341.

Haldane, III, his modern holism, 647.

Haller, v., III, Restauration der Staatswissenschaft, 477.

Haller v., III, his patrimonal theory of the State; monarchy was the normal and oldest form of government, based on large scale land ownership, 477.

Hallucination, II, lacks the sense of identity on the part of the psychical subject, 375.

Hamann, I, Sokratische Denkwürdigkeiten, 452.

Hamann, I, What replaces in Homer the ignorance of the rules of art that Aristotle invented, and what in Shakespeare the igorance or violation of these critical laws? Genius, is the unanimous answer, 452; true reality is in the irrational depths of subjective individuality and can be grasped only by feeling; Hamann's thought is dominated by the irrational philosophy of feeling, 453.

Hamel, Walter, III, Volkseinheit und Nationalitätenstaat, 414, 415; Das Wesen des Staatsgebietes, 415.

Hamel, Walter, III, the background of the German racial theory was irrationalistic historistic, 414; German national socialism was folk-minded; Italian fascism was State minded; Hamel considers people and State dialectically connected, 415; community of territory is the adversary of community of blood, 416.

Hamilton, I, arithmetic is the science of pure time or order in progression, 32.

Hamilton, II, his so-called quaternion calculus, 171.

Hankel, II, Die Elemente der projektivischen Geometric, 105;

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Theorie der complexen Zahlensysteme, 170, 174.

Hankel, calls magnitude independent of any number concept, 170; his view of the symbol -i-, 174.

Harem, III, is an enkaptic interlacement with the marriage bond, an unnatural enkapsis, 305.

Harmonia praestabilita, I, in Leibniz, 259.

Harmony, II, in feeling; in logical analysis; in sociality; in language; in economy; in matters juridical, 128; logical harmony, 176; cultural harmony, 286, 289.

Harmony and the State, III, the State is a beautiful order in which symmetry and proportion prevail, according to J. Calvin, 480.

Hartley, I, his mechanistic psychology, 264.

Hartmann, Eduard von, II, Das religiöse Bewusztsein der Menschheit, 315, 317.

Hartmann, Nicolai, I, remained involved in a theoretical dogmatism, 35; his critical ontology is unacceptable, 544.

Hartmann, Nicolai, II, Grundzüge einer Metaphysik der Erkenntnis, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 110, 111, 148; Ethik, 148.

Hartmann, Nicolai, II, his ontological ‘spheres of being’, 19; his concept of ‘being’; and of the subject, 21, 22; his ‘Schichtentheorie’ (theory of the spheres of being) came after the publication of Dooyeweerd's ‘Wijsbegeerte der Wetsidee’ (Philosophy of the Cosmonomic Idea); Hartmann's ontological categories; his dichotomy of material versus ideal being is Humanistic; his ethics is a material value philosophy, 51; he holds that ‘matter’ is transformed by ‘life’, a lower ‘layer’ into a higher one, 111; his view on good and evil, 148; he is an adherent of the phenomenological school, but with a cosmonomic Idea of his own, 488.

Hartmann, Nicolai, III, his ‘Schichtentheorie’ influenced Woltereck's ontological view, 762.

Hartree, III, on the elementary waves emitted by the electrons of the same atom, 705.

Hayek, II, The facts of the Social Sciences, 230.

Hayek, II, his question about the battle of Waterloo as an historical event, 230.

Heart, I, the human heart is the concentration, the radix of temporal existence, 65; according to Peter Bayle, religion has a place in the heart and is in open conflict with human reason; he opposed the ‘Vernunftreligion’, 260; Rousseau holds that the principles of true virtue are inscribed in everybody's heart, 314.

Heart, II, the heart and faith, 299.

Hauriou, Maurice, III, follows Durkheim; is a Roman-Catholic sociologist; founder of the institutional school of law; rejects Durkheim's ‘collective consciousness’; the metaphysical Ideas (Neo-Platonic) function as structural principles in society; their influence is explained by psychologically conceived idées d'oeuvre directing the élite of the ‘entrepreneurs’; these Ideas are ‘institutions’ or ‘institutional Ideas’; their influence through the operative Ideas d'oevres expands from the élite to the whole of all the individuals embraced by a corporation, 189; he was first influenced by Comte; then by the philosophy of life; then conceived the State in a semi-Platonic way, 384; he distinguishes between subjective purpose and structural principle, but calls the latter an ‘idée d'oeuvre’, the embodiment of an ‘institutional idea’; this neo-Platonic speculation cannot explain a criminal organization of professional criminals; he assumes the existence of ‘bad’ ideas, 578; bad ideas cannot account for normative principles of behaviour in such a criminal organization; evil cannot build, only deform a community; bad ideas are incompatible with neo-Platonism, 579.

Havestadt, G., III, Der Staat und die nationale Gesamtordnung, 431.

Hefele, III, Conciliengeschichte, 512.

Hegel, I, Werke VI, 457.

Hegel, I, tried to think together the antithetic motives of nature and freedom, 64, 65; his dialectical logification of history as the dialectical unfolding of the Absolute Idea in the objective Spirit, 208, 209; it is impossible to conceive historical development in the a priori dialectical thought forms of the Hegelian system, which reduced man's ‘creative freedom’ to the rôle of a puppet of the World-Reason, 209; the Idea is ‘present’, consequently ‘essentially now’, 328; his absolute Idealism, 329; Hegel elaborated speculative dialectic consistently, 421; it is wrong to suppose that the things which form the contents of our representations were first, and our subjectivity which through the earlier mentioned operation of abstraction and synthesis of the common characteristics of the objects, produces their concepts, would come only afterwards. The concept is rather the true first’, 457; he divides philosophy into logic, natural philosophy, and the philosophy of the Spirit, 529.

Hegel, II, Die Vernunft in der Geschichte, 280, 281, 284, 289; Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts, 396, 397.

Hegel, II, his absolute Idealism, 19; history

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as the unfolding of the Objective Mind, 195; his intensive idea of development, 279; he conceived of the freedom motive in a trans-personalistic sense; List der Vernunft; the world history motive asserts itself in the view of every individual mind, 280; the truth in his intensive idea of historical development, 281; he absolutizes the cultural denominators of Western civilization, 282; demanded ‘Geisteswissenschaften’ to detach themselves the spatial objectifying way of thought, 390; subjective right as an individual volitional power; justice is anchored in the idea of freedom; as the idea of ethical power; in the state it is universal competence; antithesis to morality; there is no element of interest in Hegel's idea of subjective right, 396; he defended the classical theory of civil law; unfree nature is an object, 397; general and particular will are dialectically connected, 399; the infinite logical subject, 589.

Hegel, III, Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts, 318; Philosophie der Geschichte, 456; Rechtsphilosophie, 491; Encyclopädie der phil. Wissenschaften, 584, 585.

Hegel, III, his view of the state as a person; the highest realization of the objective spirit; the reality of the ethical idea; the present divine will; this absolute state breaks through (244) family and civil society; its will is the real ‘communal’ will, proving its objectivity, its universal validity and absoluteness, 245; juridical moral essential nature of marriage; subjective feelings should give way to an ideal restriction, 318; he emphasized the normative determination of married love, but his view remained dialectical-functionalistic, 319; his idealistic universalistic idea of the absolutist power State, 399; he rejects the idea of an essential purpose of the State because the State is an absolute end in itself; it is the highest revelation of the ‘objective Spirit’, the totality of morality, in which freedom attains to its highest rights, 433; his dialectical view of the relation between ‘civil society’ and the State; the latter alone can integrate all private interests into the communal interest of the societal whole as ‘ethical substance’, the highest revelation of the ‘objective Spirit’, 456; public opinion contains the eternal essential principles of justice, the true contents and result of the entire constitution, legislation and general condition in the form of common sense, 491; his dialectical idea of the ‘bürgerliche Gesellschaft’; the ‘strategem of reason’, 583; the Vernunftstaat and the substantial moral freedom of everybody as a part of the whole; the State as the organized administration of justice and police, 584; the three main structures in civil society: the economic, the legal, and the public administrative structure; civil society is subservient to the ideal State as the ‘totality of substantial morality’; its structure is a complex of economic purposes regulated by civil juridical and administrative legal rules; family and civil society are dialectically elevated to a higher unity in the absolute State; increasing differentiation entails an increasing division of labour; social classes; the logical triad of social class-distinctions, 585; Korporationen (i.e. voluntary associations) are of fundamental importance to manual labourers and manufacturers who might fail to see general concerns; an organized group has comparative universality of interest; society and the family, are mere parts within a whole; a corporation is the guarantee of ‘vocational class honour’; a single unorganized person has no ‘social station’; a corporation tries to reconcile individual interests with the demand of universality in the form of civil law, 586; criticism of Hegel's view, 587.

Hegel, Karl, III, Städte und Gilden der Germanischen Völker im Mittelalter, 673, 674.

Heidegger, Martin, I, Sein und Zeit, 111.

Heidegger, Martin, I, his definition: ‘das Sein des Seienden’ and Dooyeweerd's: ‘Meaning is the mode of being of all that is created’, (note), 4; time is historical and has a dialectical existential meaning, 27; the being of the ego is understood as the reality of the res cogitans (thinking substance), 111; he accepts the static conception of reality with respect to the ‘given world of things’ and rejects this conception as to ‘free personality’ or ‘free human existence’; he moves in the paths of immanence philosophy; his Archimedean point is in ‘existential thought’, thus making the ‘transcendental ego’ sovereign, 112.

Heidegger, Martin, II, Sein und Zeit, 22, 23, 24, 524; Holzwege der Philosophie, 22; Was ist Metaphysik?, 25; Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik, 520, 521, 522, 523, 524, 525, 527, 528, 529, 530, 531.

Heidegger, Martin, II, his notion of ‘being’; he opposes the old metaphysical equation of ‘being’ and non-differentiated unity; ‘das Vorhandene’; Dasein; Geworfenheit; Verworfenheit, 22; das Nichts; Angst; ‘ontical being’ has no selfhood; historical existential being; Dasein or existential being, 23; Zeit; Sorge; running forward to death; Entschlossenheit; Heidegger and Oswald Spengler's ‘Der Untergang des Abendlandes’, 24; Heidegger's interpretation of Kant's Kritik der reinen Vernunft, 492; Kant's Krit d.r. V. is not

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concerned with epistemology, according to Heidegger; but it relates to ontology, at least in its first edition, 493; Heidegger holds that Kant did not deduct the categories from the table of judgments, 505 (note); and acknowledges that the operation of the productive imagination on sensibility is ascribed by Kant to logical thought, 515; Kant's chapter on the schematism is the central part of the whole work, 520; the synthesis is called imagination, but it is the understanding, 521; the unity of sensibility and thought cannot be understood or even made a problem; Heidegger distinguishes sharply between epistemology and ontology (Sein des Seienden), 522; his maxim for interpreting a philosophical system; its relative truth; the guiding idea should be that of the system under investigation; Heidegger views Kant from the irrationalistic historicistic idea of existentialism; this is an arbitrary policy; he admits that he has recourse to violence; he identifies Kant's ‘transcendental imagination’ with Dasein; the synthesis is ontological; human life is at the mercy of ‘das Vorhandene’ but rises above it through understanding das Vorhandene; for this purpose Dasein designs an a priori image of what is; the problem of synthesis is: how can a finite being know the ‘being’ of what is ‘beforehand’?, 524; Heidegger's transcendence of the selfhood is only that of Dasein above das Vorhandene; its essence is time as pure intuition; transcendental imagination is the formative medium of the two stems of knowledge, viz., intuition and thought, 525; Heidegger does not recognize the cosmic coherence, and seeks the selfhood in the temporal historical Dasein, 526; the phenomenon is object, ‘Gegenstand’, das Vorhandene in nature, the ‘mè on’; the synthesis of the transcendental imagination gives it ontical being; the possibility of ontological synthesis remains unexplained; Kant still held the selfhood to be supra-temporal; reality is only accessible in the theoretical abstraction of the ‘Gegenständliche’, 527; Kant on intuition, imagination, logical thought, as a threefold unity of time; Heidegger holds time to be the cogito; pure receptivity; self-affection, 528.

Heidegger, Martin, III, Existence and Being, 30.

Heidegger, Martin, III, his existentialism used by August Brunner, 5; seeks an immediate approach to the innermost sphere of man's temporal existence; the Existentials (care, dread, concern), 781.

Heidenhain, M., III, Plasma und Zelle, 642, 643, 722.

Heidenhain, III the so-called albuminoids bear the same relation to the building materials of the living basic substance as the albumens proper do to protoplasm, 642; his concept ‘protomeries’, 722, 755.

H. Heimsoeth, I, Metaphysik der Neuzeit, 473, 476.

Heineccius, III, El. jur. civ. tit. Inst. de Nuptiis, 316.

Heinichen, O., III, Driesch' Philosophy, 738, 746.

Heisenberg, O., III, his concept ‘relations of incertitude’, 643; in the determination of position and velocity of an electron, 715; the micro structure of atoms sets a limit to a causal explanation; it has been formulated in Heisenberg's relations of incertitude, 734.

Heliocentric Picture, I, of the world: introduced by Copernicus, 194.

Helmholtz, III, on qualitative and modal differences between sensations, 43; the ‘quality’ of sensations is not affected by Müller's law, 44.

Hempel, Carl G., (and P. Oppenheim), III, Der Typusbegriff im Lichte der neuen Logik, 81.

Hemsterhuis, I, the philosophy of feeling discloses its absolutization of aesthetic individuality in Hemsterhuis and the German Sturm und Drang, 463.

Hennipman, P., II, Economisch Motief en Economisch Principe, 123.

Hennipman, P., II, denies the economic worthlessness of the analytical principle of economy, 123.

Henotheism, II, in primitive nature-belief according to Max Müller; the fragmentary personification of the divine lacks concentration of personality, but does not cancel the belief in the deeper unity of mana, 317.

Hepp, V., II, Het Testimonium Spiritus Sancti, 300.

Heraclitus, I, tried to bridge the religious antithesis in the starting-point by means of a theoretical logical dialectic, 64; the Ionian philosophers and Heraclitus could never ask for an ‘Unmoved Mover’ as prime cause of empirical movement, because they deified the matter principle of the eternally flowing stream of life, 72.

Heraclitus, II, B. Fragm. 94, 134; cf. 132.

Heraclitus, II, his ‘Dikè, 132; it reacts against every ultra vires, 133, 134.

Herbst, III, mechanistic biologist, 733.

Hering, E., III, ‘mnemism’, 733.

Heller, Hermann, III, Der Begriff des Gesetzes in der Rechtsverfassung, 383;

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Die Souveränität, 387, 393, 395; Allgemeine Staatslehre, 388, 389, 390, 391, 392, 393, 394, 407, 408, 410, 411, 477, 481, 491, 492, 497.

Heller, Hermann, III, on the political degeneration of the idea of the law-State, 383; the State is always in a process of becoming as a ‘plèbiscite de tous les jours’, 387; broke with Smend, relinquished some basic thoughts of Litt's sociology; recognized the State as a subjective ‘Aktzentrum’; broke with the anti-axiological conception of sociology; he wants to bridge the Neo-Kantian dualism of Sein and Sollen; he says that the State is a structural, not a historical notion, 388; the unity of the State maintains itself in all changes; he tries to explain State, Church and Industrial life from the cross-section of the stream of history, 389; this view is historicistic; the State is an historical structure, a function within the totality of the concrete historical-social constellation; the functions and structure of the State are changeable, 390; insofar as this structure has a certain duration political theory has been given its ‘Gegenstand’, but its configuration is open, 391; his normative idea of the State is moderately historicistic; his moral-juridical principles which he considers to be the only justification of the State are not supra historical, 392; the decision of the moment is superior to any principle; he rejects the idea of a supra historical ‘ordre naturel’; he distinguishes between the State and other organized communities according to the method of Aristotle's genus proximum and differentia specifica; genus proximum is here: organization; differ. spec. is sovereign command over a territory, 393; the State is ‘the formal source of the validity of all legal rules’, 394; other organized communities lack the competence to make their internal legal order independent of the agreement of the State; State and law present a historical problem; law has developed from an undifferentiated convention; he agrees with Bodin's theory of absolute sovereignty; juridical norms are indissolubly bound up with human volition; the will of the State is a subjective psychical act; this leads to an antinomic concept of law; this concept is a pseudo concept of function, 396; his idea of organization, 407; unity of action and organs, 408; his ‘dialectical structural idea’ is functionalistic and handles a ‘general concept’ apart from the internal individuality structures of organized communities, 410; his dialectical viewpoint is incapable of discovering the radical difference between, e.g., Church and State, 411; the State can only affect economic life from the outside; State and economy are self-contained, equivalent social functions, each with relative autonomy, 481; on ‘public opinion’, 491; on the demo-liberal ideology with respect to public opinion, 492; criticism of modern racial theories, 495.

Hermes of Praxiteles, III, its sensory image is an intentional visionary object bound to the plastic horizon of experience, 116; the function of its marble, 638; between marble and sculpture there is an irreversible foundational relation, 640.

Herder, J.F., I, Ideen zur Philosophie der Geschichte der Menschheit, 469.

Herder, J.F., I, his irrational philosophy of feeling, 453; his philosophy of history was never able to liberate itself from deterministic rationalism; his naturalistic concept of development was derived from Leibniz; he tries to understand the voice of history by way of empathy, by feeling himself into the spirit of historical individualities; he unhesitantingly accepts the polarity, the inner antinomy between this irrationalistic view and the deterministic conception of development taken over from Leibniz, 454; necessity of nature and creative freedom of the irreducible individuality come together in history; yet historical development remains subject to natural laws; the lex continui is conceived of as in increasingly complicated and more highly ordered series from inorganic matter to organic life and human history; his cultural optimism; it is refined by the new ‘humanity’ ideal of the Sturm und Drang; the impulse toward sympathetic understanding of cultural individuality protects Herder from Voltaire's rationalistic construction of world history, 455.

Herder, J.F., II, Ideen zur Philosophie der Geschichte, 272, 276, 277; cf. 593.

Herder, J.F., II, man's perfectibility & Leibniz' idea of development; Herder's irrationalistic personality ideal; his insight into individual totalities, 272; his idea of cultural development as the idea of humanity; and Shaftesbury's aestheticism; the dignity of man; Von Humboldt, Herder's standard of national perfection, 276; tension between national individuality and humanity; organological notions, 277; his extensive idea of history, 280; his humanistic cosmonomic idea, 593.

Herrenmensch, III, Kallikles' idea of the political ruler is a prelude to Nietsche's Herrenmensch, 398.

Heteronomy, III, Kant opposes heteronomy in an ethical sense to morality, 273; heteronomy and autonomy in Darmstaedter, 408.

Hertwig, O., III, Allgemeine Biologie, 758.

Hesiod, II, his mythology, 320, 321.

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Heterogenesis, II, of historical aims, 244.

Heterological, I, versus heterological-monological thought, in Rickert, 22, 23.

Heteronomy, II, versus autonomy, in Kant, 141.

Heymans, G., I, Einführung in die Metaphysik, 103.

Heymans, I, his psycho-monism with its elaboration on all realms of meaning, 103.

Heymans II, Einführung in die Ethik, 147.

Heymans, II, his definition of ‘character’, 147.

Hierarchy, III, in the church derives from above through the Pope and the clergy, 234.

Hilbert, II, Husserl deduces mathematics in a purely mathematical way, and shows affinity with Hilbert's conception of mathematics, 452.

Hildebrand, Dietrich von, III, Die Ehe, 319.

Hildebrand, Dietrich von, III, Love is the primary meaning of marriage according to the creation; its primary purpose is to produce new human beings; this latter function is entirely subordinate to the primary meaning; the conjugal relation is an I-thou-relation, 319; this statement is due to irrationalistic influences; Hildebrand hypostatizes the masculine and the feminine principle in creation to a metaphysical difference of essence; the feminine principle is concentrated in the Virgin Mary; Buber's influence; the conjugal I-Thou relation is a central contact in human existence; thus the marriage bond is absolutized; his view of a community's ‘rank’; he distinguishes between marriage as a natural union and as a sacrament of grace, 320; he emphasizes the tendency to be indissoluble as long as life lasts is implied in the conjugal love union; then only is marriage possible, if there is conjugal fidelity, 321.

Hildebrandt, Kurt, I, Leibniz und das Reich der Gnade, 308.

Hildebrandt, Kurt, III, Geschichte und System der Rechts- und Staatsphilosophie, 205, 206.

Hirzel, III, Ἄγϱαφος νόμος, Abh. der philolog. hist. Klasse der Kgl. Sächs. Ges. der Wissensch. xx., 231.

Hispanus, Petrus, I, Summulae, the 7th Treatise, entitled: ‘de terminorum proprietatibus’, expanded to Parva Logicalia, 184 (note).

Hispanus, Petrus, I, universalia are only ‘sings’ standing for a plurality of individual things in the human mind, but do not possess reality in or before these things; ‘stand for’, ‘supponent’, hence the name ‘suppositional logic’; they are based on arbitrary convention like the ‘voces’, or they are ‘conceptus’ or ‘intentiones animae’ formed by the understanding, 184.

Histology, III, histological discoveries, 102.

Historical Aspect, I, the historical aspect is absolutized in historicism; O. Spengler, 103, 118; the historicist view of reality, 207; historical development is considered as a necessary causal process in Comte; Hegel's view of histor. development, 209; this development is the non-recurrent individual and lawless realization of value in Fichte, 491; historicism began to turn away from evolutionism under the influence of Weber and Rickert, 212; in Fichte freedom in history possesses a hidden law-conformity, the Providence of the moral deity; his five periods of history, 484, 488; historical time is distinguished from empty time; historical existence is the final mode of being of finite existence and the basic denominator, in Fichte's third period, 476, 485; his concept of historical truth, 486.

Historical Aspect, II, historical aspect and technical economy; primitive technique, 67; command or power is a modus, not a thing, 68; cultural authority, 69; naïve and theoretical conceptions of history; Groen's adage, 192; history as a Gegenstand; historical time; genesis; evolution, 193; in chemistry, geology, biology, psychology, language, jurisprudence, etc.; positivism; Comte; Neo-Kantianism; empirical reality related to values; individuality; natural science is blind to values; Hegel's idea of history, 194; the dialectical course; Oswald Spengler's biologistic view; the existentialistic conception; the humanistic idea; the meaning-nucleus of the cultural aspect; the term ‘culture’, 195; the term history; geology, palaeontology and history, 196; history of language, societal forms, economy, art, legal affairs, morality, faith; Roman and Canon law; mastery or control transcends what is given in nature, 197; free project of form-giving; historical continuity; a spider's web; beavers; termites; Personskultur; Sachkultur; societal formation; things cultural; formers of history; positive cultural principles; legal power, over persons essential to the jura in rē, 198; culture and civilization; barbaros, 199; the I-ness participates in the central spiritual community of mankind; the ‘Historical School of jurisprudence’ and the word ‘culture’; Volksgeist; positivistic absolutization of history; culture and nature, 200; Neo-Kantian individualizing way of relating nature to value in culture on the influence of Fichte and Kant, 201; tradition; K. Kuypers' view, 202; culture is formative control; the indirect method of establishing the existence of a modal law-sphere; typical individuality structures; the material extent of the historical field; cultural

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realms; cultural phenomena, 203; modern society is not a ‘social whole’; primitive society; medieval ecclesiastically unified society; current views: Rickert; Münch; their humanistic origin, 204; culture conceived as the collective concept of all the normative law-spheres; the philosophy of life uprooted the faith in the super-temporal ideas; historism; Troeltsch; Leibniz' monads, 205; ethics and communal life derive their standards from historical development; values clinging to historical processes; there is no criterion to distinguish culture from other meaning modes, 208; Stammler wants to conquer historical materialism; Rickert's ‘transcendental-logical’ historical form of knowledge is useless; the antinomy in the epistemology of cultural sciences, 209; Binder historicizes law, 215; the cultural is never right or wrong socially, juridically, morally, or in faith; it is not a supra modal concentration point of experience, 216; historicism with its generalizing undefined concept of culture is antinomic, 217; science and history, 218; Spengler's historism, 218-220; this is self-refuting, 221; logical retrocipations in culture, the Romantic term: natural history, 229; the concept of development is multivocal; natural events may change history, but only in the subject-object relation; cultural development is not a natural process; requires a subject's analytical sense of meaning; logical retrocipation of identity and diversity in history; the battle of Waterloo; Hayek's question, 230; historical imputation of actions to subjects of formative power is implied in the cultural nucleus; historical contradiction; and continuity, 231; vital and dead historical development: a biotic retrocipation; Herder's view; Von Savigny: historical development is continuous; state and society are considered as a natural growth; Fichte; Schelling; a hidden law of Providence; dialectical synthesis of freedom and natural elements, 232; Fr. von Stahl on God's guidance; the conservative mind of the Restoration; its quietism; Christian-Historical theory opposed to the French Revolution; objections raised by A.C. Leenderts; he contrasts facts to norms, 233; every fact has a normative qualification; norms cannot be derived from subjectivity, 234; a national mind is not a norm, nor Providence, nor destiny; historical norms 235; historical reaction is anti-normative; progress and reaction; signorial rights in the Netherlands in 1814 and 1815; formula of the development of political powerformation, 236; reaction is a retrocipation; post-logical laws are regulative principles requiring positivization; variable formations accommodated to cultural development; genuine norms offer a rule of conduct to human judgment; logical norms are principia, 237; temporal normative freedom; free scope in the pre-logical modi; free formative control; positivization is historically founded; appeal to the human will; humanism speaks of eternal principia separated from positive norms, 238; natural law; positivistic legal theory; the anticipatory spheres of the pre-logical spheres require human intermediary for their opening, 239; absolute and empirical norms; this distinction is untenable; Windelband; logical, aesthetical, ethical norms are called supra temporal; F. Somlo; norms vary with time and place; antique and modern drama, 240; also ethical norms; modern economic ethics; medieval prohibition of interest; theoretic thought must be ruled by the theoretical formations of principles of logic; juridical positivization of norms of juridical competence; might is not right, 241; law formation and history; tradition and progress; reaction; continuity; conservatism; the cultural task, 242; shapers of history; the struggle for power; the formative will and analysis in historical activity; leaders: Caesar, Galilei, etc., 243; the psychical function of the will; and cultural formation; Clovis and cultural integration; heterogenesis of aims in history; leaders in an historical group function, 244; the objective spirit in history; the supra individual group tradition; the question about the individual and the group; primitive culture and group tradition; the historical genius, 245; normative historical mission; power over men, is not brute natural force, nor social psychical influence; leader and masses; dialectical theology has a horror of power formation; the Divine cultural commandment in Genesis; all power is in the hands of Christ, 246; church founded in His power over men; the risk of power is a proof of its normative meaning; positivistic view; the speculative concept of the collective soul; Emil Durkheim; normative mission of formative control, 247; principles of cultural development; consummation in Christ; power inherent in the imago Dei; absolutization is idolatry and apostasy; the powers of darkness; the Romantic quietist conception of God's guidance in history, 248; Schelling and the Historical School of jurisprudence; Fr. von Stahl; irrationalistic organological view of history; an unconscious formative process; this conception contradicts man's Divine mission to lay the foundation of the Kingdom of Christ, 249; biotic retrocipation in historical development; organological view; living and dead elements in tradition; a closed historical law-sphere lacks a regulative principle of development, 250; historical causality; imputation; historical meaning of natural events in the subject-object relation only; historical causal nexus and physical psychical an-

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tecedents, 251; J. Huizinga; G. Simmel; arbitrary selection of facts; the rise of the feudal system; Frankish vassalage; Toynbee's challenge theory; political power integration of the Frankish kingdom, 252; challenge and mission; historical cause is factual, not normative the Carolingians, 253; Rickert's individual causality; causal equation, not historical; individual causes occur in all the super strata of the kinematical aspect; individuality is an apeiron except for its leading function; historical individuality is determined by history, not vice versa; individual totality opened in the anticipatory direction; history and natural causality, 254; Dilthey and causality; development rests in movement; biotic potentiality; vital and dead tradition; historical cause; its basis is movement, 255; spatial retrocipation; numerical analogy; power and quantity viewed historically, 256; cultural area; historical magnitude; subject-object relation; the call to win control over nature; technical industry, 257; tools, agriculture; techne is not purely objective; technical norms; communal; progress and reaction; technical authorities, 258; deepend technical principia; inventions; primitive closed societies without a leading function; the leading function of the church; authorities in primitive societies are often deified guardians of the group tradition; cultural contact necessary for development, 259; war; conquest; Christian missionaries; cultural integration and differentiation; Western intrusion into underdeveloped cultures, 260; Durkheim; H. Spencer; Darwin, 260; development in science and art, 261; multi modal development; the tower of Babel; unity of mankind; control over the earth; sin; optimism and pessimism; the Kingdom of Christ, 262; the original stage of mankind; Protagoras; Plato's golden age, the Prometheus myth; according to Protagoras, the ‘natural state’ had religion, language, limited technique; no justice nor morality; general conviction and general will; natural law; civilization; the Humanistic mathematical natural science ideal and the Idea of Progress; the Enlightenment, 263; an axiological standard; the transcendental idea of historical development; Darwinism; Fichte's original culture of a highly gifted people; the origin of culture is a meta-historical question; pre-history, 264; primitive and deepened culture; ethnology; sociology; historical science; cave cultures, 265; closed primitive cultures are rigidly bound to biotic organic development; rise, maturity, decline; opened cultures: Egypt, Babylon, Persia, etc.; fecundated Germanic and Arabian cultures, 266; historical idea; ‘Kultursynthese’; Christian Germanic cultural development and Greek and Roman culture; Egyptian factors, 267; Troeltsch's synthesis of Western culture; Universal or World history; the breach with the Christian conception of history in the Enlightenment; Eusebius; Augustinus; Bossuet; Voltaire's formulation of the humanistic idea of culture and Newton's natural-science principles, 268; Voltaire collected materials; his idea of of World history; belief in the perfectibility of man by science; St. Simon; Comte; and positivism; Darwin's influence; Spencer's idea of development, 269; Comte's three stages, 270; Rousseau's pessimism and his later optimism; Spencer; Kant's conception, 271; league of nations as final aim of history in Kant; civil legal relation between nations; chiliasm of the philosophy of history; the irrationalized personality-ideal; Herder's ‘Ideen’; perfectibility of man; Leibniz' developmental idea; the period of Storm and Stress; Herder's insight into the unfolding of individual historical totalities in historical development, 272; individuality in primitive societies; in disclosed communties; shapers of history, 273; the rise of nationalities; National Socialism; the national character; this view is reactionary; Old Germanic ‘trustis’; the norms of individualization, 274; individual talent in a cultural community; the historical Gegenstand; historical method of concept formation; Rickert's discovery, and his error, 275; apart from the anticipatory meaning-coherence individuality is an apeiron; Herder's idea of humanity; Shaftesbury; Von Humboldt; national cultural communities in Herder, 276; his view is naturalistic organological; the universally human is not a standard of historical development; the Historical School of jurisprudence; their crux of legal history; Von Jhering and Beseler's criticism, 277; Schelling's romantic idealism and Kant's transcendentalism; nature is the spirit coming into existence; history as two developmental series of the absolute (as indifference); synthesis of nature and freedom: free action rooted in hidden necessity; Providence or fate; Schelling's aesthetical culture and Kant and Schiller's doctrine; Kant's moralism; Von Savigny and Puchta took it over, 278; the Historical School; nationalistic conservatism and irrationalism; pedantry of their epigones; Hegel's dialectical idea of historical development; the objective mind, 279; the selfdeveloping humanistic freedom motive asserts itself in every individual mind; List der Vernunft; individuality is a precipitation of the objective mind, 280; every individual moment contains the whole course of world history in nuce; Ranke's idea of development; history starts when there are written documents; criticism of Hegel's idea of development; his intensive conception contains an important truth, 281; Dil-

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they and Troeltsch; their autonomous idea of culture; their historism; Spengler's concept of history in which evolution shows merely biotic retrocipations; he parallels cultural totalities without any coherence; Spengler's view of time; he eliminates causality; his fatalism, 283; the internal unrest of meaning; symbolical anticipation; Hegel and Ranke; narrative and deeds are simultaneous according to Hegel, 284; mnemosyne is idle in primitive culture; but disclosed history is signified meaning; cultural symbolism; historical signification is not identical with lingual; cultural international intercourse and historical development; primitive cultures are isolated and secluded, 285; cultural factors should not expand their power to excess; economic anticipation; shapers of history cannot disturb this economy without dislocating and ruining the entire cultural complex; cultural harmony, 286; between power formations there should also be harmony; expansion between the cultural boundaries of the respective cultural spheres: State, Church, family, industry, etc.; no totalitarianism, 287; medieval ecclesiastically unified culture was a necessity; church and ‘secular’ culture; disadvantages of ecclesiastical supremacy, 288; the motive of nature and grace; of form and matter; biblical motive; juridical anticipation; Hegel's Weltgericht; but historical justice is not juridical; sin in history; the course of history is often marked by blood and tears, 289; God maintains his world order; this is historical jurisdiction; God's hidden counsel can never become the normative standard for the judgment of the course of history; God's guidance refers to the juridical anticipations; historical retribution, 290; moral anticipations; cultural Eros; cultural economy and harmony; anticipation of faith; shapers of history are guided by faith in their task, 291; domination of nature and the faith of humanism; Weber's sociology of religion is a retrocipation, 292; error of Marxism with respect to faith, 293; civitas Dei et civitas terrena; Augustinus; the Greek idea of the eternal return of things in cyclic time; the possibility of culture lies in the victory of the Kingdom of God over the powers of Darkness, 294; Adam's fall and Christ's incarnation are turning points; periods in history, 295; objections raised to the view that cultural development is the meaning of history; primitive man does not realize his transcendence over nature; his diffuse personality awareness, 296; his faith rests on the fear of the powers of nature, 297; the stress in the humanistic science ideal shifted to the science of history during the Enlightenment; its secular idea of development opposed the Christian Augustinian view, 349; progress of mankind; Voltaire; uniform reason passes through a historical process to get rid of prejudice and tradition; Montesquieu's political idea of development; the Enlightenment and Voltaire's history of culture; the ultimate aim of history is to attain to reason's self-consciousness; the unalterable empirical causes and psychological analysis, 350; the ideal of the Enlightenment; Bossuet's error; he exceeded the boundaries between theology and historical science; knowledge of faith guides us but is not a stop-gap; Voltaire tried to reconcile freedom with deterministic science, 351; Newton had taught experimental method and empirical science, and history was now subjected to the same rules in the application of psychology to history; the pragmatic method; causal explanation and miracles and Providence; a small number of basic principles in history; craftiness of priests, etc.; the victory of critical understanding, 352; Bayle's historical criticism, 353; Dilthey's method; empathy, 391.

Historical Development, II, according to Kant, 270, 271.

Historical Economy, II, the different cultural factors ought to be prevented from expanding their power in an excessive way, 286.

Historical School of Jurisprudence, II, Puchta and Von Savigny, 138, 234, 249; its idea of development, 277; nationalistic conservatism, and irrationalism, 279.

Historical School, III, and Tönnies' Idea of Gemeinschaft, 186; the State is only the historical form of the political national community; the transpersonalistic conception of organized communities is elaborated pluralistically; they recognize the autonomy of non-political and of lower political associations; the general will is their substance; the concept ‘spiritual organism’ is derived from Schelling; Gierke's theory, 245; the State is the historical form of political organization of a national community, 400.

Historicism, II, Oswald Spengler's biologistic view, 195; positivistic absolutization of history, 200; Troeltsch and Dilthey's struggle with historicism; historicism in Binder's conception of law, 215; historicism is antinomous, 217; Spengler, 218-220; is self-refuting, 221; Dilthey, Troeltsch, etc., Spengler, 283; historicism tries to explain everything historically, 354; Troeltsch's historicistic bias leads to mythological mystifications, 355; his interpretation of the contract theory moves in a vicious circle; individualistic ideals of natural law of the Enlightenment, 356.

Historicism, III, starts from the absolutized historical viewpoint, 82.

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Historical Identity, II, of the battle of Waterloo, 230.

Historical Space, II, cannot be perceived, and must be signified, 65.

History, II, science of becoming, according to Fruin, 193; as a stream of life, 195.

Hobbes, Thomas, I, Leviathan, 150; De Corpore, 197.

Hobbes, Thomas, I, his materialistic metaphysics, 122; he was a Nominalist and considered truth and falsehood to be attributes of language, not of facts and things; the exact truth consists in the immanent agreement of concepts with each other on the basis of conventional definitions, 150; he describes (in the terms of the story of creation in Genesis) the methodological demolition of all given reality by human reason in order to reconstruct the cosmos out of the simplest elements of thought; the logical activity creates; the motive of logical creation is entirely modern and Humanistic, 197; behind it lies the postulate of continuity of the mathematical science-ideal, 200; he did not recognize any limits to the continuity postulate founded in his monistic metaphysical ontology; the post-biotic functions, 216, were brought under the basic denominator of ‘moving body’; an idealistic materialism; ‘moving body’ was not conceived in a physical sense only; it was a metaphysical-mathematical denominator; ‘body’ is everything that can be analysed mathematically; the State is an artificial body construed Nominalistically by means of a social contract out of the simplest ‘elements’, i.e. the individuals and their emotions of fear; the State is Leviathan; here the domination motive of science has absorbed freedom; the human soul is mechanistically conceived; his view of human nature is pessimistic; still he retained his enthusiastic faith in the personality ideal; his Faustian consciousness found an optimistic expression in Leviathan, where the light of reason is said to destroy the kingdom of darkness; his mechanistic epistemology and ethics undermined the normative foundations of truth and ethics, the science ideal as well as the personality ideal fell a prey to logical self-dissolution; his epistemology was sensationalistic, reduced to movement, in terms of causality; this theory served to satisfy the continuity postulate of the science ideal; Galileo's mechanics became the basic denominator of the aspects, 221; movement is a subjective ‘phantasma rei existentis; time is a ‘phantasma motus’; mathematically determined movement is the basic denominator, 223; Leibniz avoided Hobbes's crass materialism, 227; the optimism of the Enlightenment and of Hobbes with regard to the science ideal was in overt contradiction to his ‘pessimist scientific’ view of human nature, 253; he sought to free himself of the Cartesian dualism, 264; the picture of Leviathan on Rousseau's ‘Contrat Social’ had its head cut off, 316; Hobbes' idea of the state of nature as a ‘bellum omnium contra omnes’; his optimism and pessimism compared with Rousseau's, 317; Locke opposed the absolutist doctrine of Hobbes (318) who conceived of the Social contact in a formal sense, 319; his encyclopaedical systematizing of the sciences in a successive continuous process from simple to complex spheres of knowledge, 529.

Hobbes, Thomas, II, Leviathan, 360.

Hobbes, Thomas, II, his absolutism of the State, 167; his view of justice, 360; theory of subjective right: my own right is all that has not been forbidden me, 395; his theory of natural law considered the power of enjoyment of a subjective right as the natural freedom to enjoy anything not forbidden by positive law, 403.

Hobbes, Thomas, III, his sociological individualism; the state as a fictitious person; the social contract, 183; denies the juridical sense of distributive justice, 212; his Stoical theory of the state contract, 232; Humanistic natural law led to state absolutism according to the mathematical science ideal; the state embraces all other societal relationships; social contract; the individuals relinquished their original freedom; there is not a single organization independent of the state; the Church is merged into the state; the state is Leviathan, 236; his view of the State, 442.

Hoegen, A.W., III, Over den zin van het huwelijk, 312, 313, 319, 329.

Hoegen, A.W., III, the essence of marriage is determined by its purpose, 312; and the new tendency in Roman Catholic circles in the views of marriage, 319.

Hoenen, P., S.J., I, Philosophie der organische natuur, 26.

Hoenen, P., S.J., I, shares Augustinus' conception of movement with Albert the Great, 26.

Hoenen, P., S.J., III, Philosophie der Anorganische Natuur, 706, 707, 708, 709, 710, 711, 712, 713, 725.

Hoenen, P., S.J., III, his neo-Thomistic conception of molecules, atoms and crystal lattices; a mixtum is a new substance in which the elements are no longer present actually but merely potentially; their properties that are preserved have become accidents of the new substance; this substance can only have one single substantial form; the preserved properties are due to the affinity of the nature of the elements with that of the mixtum; the mixtum is a new totality consisting of one ‘primary matter’ and one ‘substantial form’; the substantial form gives unity of being to the

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‘matter’; there are gradations of potentiality in ‘matter’; the ‘matter’ first has a disposition to the elements and via these to the ‘mixtum’, 707; its substantial unity does not mean that the new substance is always a homogeneous whole, it may have a diversity of properties; there is a possibility of a ‘heterogeneous continuum’; the atom is a mixtum of protons, neutrons and electrons; it is a natural minimum, not further divisible; after splitting it up there arise ‘elementary substances’ of a different physical nature; if molecule or crystal lattice consist of atoms of a different chemical kind they are ‘specific heterogeneous totalities’; i.e. the specific heterogeneous properties of the atoms are preserved to a certain degree in the combination; as a result of the affinity in ‘nature’ between combination and atom, 708; criticism of this view, 708; 709, 710, 711, 712, 713, 716, 717; his a priori method of reasoning, 725.

Hoffmann, Paul, II, Metaphysik oder verstehende Sinnwissenschaft, 29, 30; Das Verstehen von Sinn und seine Allgemeingültigkeit, 29.

Hoffmann, Paul, II, Verstehen und Schauen (understanding and intuiting), 29; logology; meaning as such, 30; he is a phenomenologist, 488.

Hölder, III, Natürliche und Juristische Personen, 279.

Hölder, III, his individualistic conception of legal subjectivity misinterprets the partial two-unity of representative and represented, 278.

Holism, I, is functionalistic, 564, 565.

Holism, II, Meyer and Haldane are representatives of Holism and have tried to project a biological mathematics, 341.

Holism, III, is a totality view of a living organism reducing its physico-chemical aspect to a modality of its central bio-psychical sphere, 77; Haldane's holism, 647.

Holl, Karl, III, Ges. Aufsätze, 514.

Holl, Karl, III, his investigations in the domain of Church history, 513, 514.

Holtfreter, III, his experiments in producing the induction of an embryo in the indifferent abdominal tissue of the host-animal by means of dead cellular material from the blastopore, 754.

Holtker, G., III, Männerbünde, 364, 365.

Holy Roman Empire, The, II, the Church and the Christianized idea of the Holy Roman Empire integrated medieval society into a community embracing all Christianity, 288.

Homer, II, his mythology, 321.

Homo Economicus, II, an abstract individualistic idea resulting from the faith in the sovereignty of mathematical and natural scientific thought which rationalized the formative process, 361.

Homo Noumenon, I, in Kant, 109; he considers the homo noumenon as self-sufficient; which renders any moral autonomy of man meaningless, 375; homo noumenon in Fichte, 424.

Homo Noumenon, II, this idea is the root of reality according to Kant, 44; Kant's practical ethical metaphysics maintains the selfhood as the super-temporal, super-sensory noumenon, 527.

Homo Universale, I, of Leo Battiste Alberti, 192.

Honeycombs, III, as psychical objects, 109.

Hönigheim, Paul, I, Zur Soziologie der mittelalterlichen Scholastik, 188.

Hönigswald, Richard, I, Vom Problem der Idea, 329.

Hönigswald, Richard, I, his summary of the development of the conception of the ‘Idea’ as the embodiment of the Humanistic personality-ideal, 328, 329.

Hopman, III, Weltalkunde, 651.

Horizon of Experience, II, the structural and the subjective horizon of human experience; and our earthly cosmos, 547, 548; there is not an earthly world in itself; Husserl's view rejected; the fall into sin and the horizon of experience, 549; implicit and explicit experience; why it is called a priori; Kant's categories; necessity and possibility in contrast with actuality, 550; the metaphysical absolute horizon of human experience; possibility and necessity belong to creaturely meaning, not to the Divine Being, 551; the transcendent dimension of the experiential horizon; and our selfhood; and the religious attitude; the word religious can be meant in two senses; the transcendental dimensions of the experiential horizon: cosmic time; the functional structure, 552; the a priori modal structures; they determine the possibility of our experience; in the theoretical and in the pre-theoretical attitude; structural stability of the modal aspects, 553; the horizon of theoretical knowledge is formed by the structure of intermodal synthesis; the subjective insight into the theoretical horizon is a subjective a priori, and fallible, 554; examples of physics, juridical facts; mathematics and formal logic are a priori as far as their modal aspect is concerned; their subjective a priori is not intended in the sense of creative logic, 555; the structural horizon of individuality; in concrete things and events; in relations

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among men; structural types of law are unchangeable; the plastic horizon, 557; ancient and medieval views, 558; individuality structures manifest themselves only in the analysis of variable things, events, and relationships; the plastic horizon is a priori because it determines experience and makes it possible; the a priori horizon of exp. is the Divine order of the ‘earthly creation’ itself; this order was present in God's plan before the foundation of the world, 559; the perspective structure of the horizon of experience; its religious root; the transcendent horizon encompasses the cosmic temporal one, which encompasses the modal one and the plastic horizon, 560; Calvin's view of self-knowledge; exp. is limited by, but not to, temporal reality, 561; the apostatic selfhood abused its religious freedom, 563; and fell away into the temporal horizon; it tried to hypostatize an abstract part of the temporal horizon, 564; the process of theoretical cognition is experience according to Kant, 568; the temporal horizon, 594.

Horizon, III, of human experience; the plastic and the theoretic horizon have their historical aspect, 31.

Hormones, III, and enzymes, 731; are inductive material units, 751.

Hornborstel, von, II, the space of perception, 373.

Hose and Mc. Dougall, III, The Pagan Tribes of Borneo, 356.

Hostis, II, a foreigner is hostis, exlex, in unopened primitive society, 183.

Household, III, as the germ of the State, in Thomas Aquinas, 202, 203, 218.

Howitt, S., II, The native tribes of South-East Australia, 317.

Howitt, S., III, The native tribes of South-East Australia, 362.

Howitt, S., III, primary norms promulgated at initiation among the Kurnai in South East Australia, listening to their parents, sharing their goods with fellow tribesmen, etc., 362.

Hubert et Mausz, II, Esquisse d'une théorie générale de la magie, 317.

Huizinga, J., II, he holds that a historian is compelled to select an arbitrary series of facts, 252.

Human Action, II, originates from the religious root, cannot be enclosed in certain aspects of reality, 40; if it is enclosed, theoretically, in its physical aspect, there arises antinomy, 46; the act-structure; Erlebnisse and action, 112; can acts be studied? language and social contact give access to another personality; behaviourism, 112, 113; empathy; the act-structure is founded in a psychical lower structure; animal structure is a sub-conscious under layer; Grenzsituationen; depth psychology; acts are related to the human ego, 114.

Human Body, The, III, there is no radical type, 87-89; is the individual whole of man's temporal existence; it shows a very complicated interlacement of different typical structures (87) combined in a form-totality qualified by the act-structure; this act structure is founded in animal, vegetative and material structures, functions in all modalities, lacks a typical qualifying structure; is the immediate expression of the I-ness, which transcends the cosmic temporal order; man's erect gait, his spiritual countenance, his hand formed for working after a free project; human acts have a threefold direction: cognition, imagination, volition; the human body is the field of free expression for the human spirit, i.e., for the religious centre of human existence, 88; the human body is man in the structural whole of his temporal appearance; the human soul is man himself in the radical unity of his spiritual existence transcending all temporal structures; racial differences, 89; the human body is not qualified aesthetically, 113; the body as ‘experienced corporality’ belongs to a supposed ‘pre-objective’ experiential field, according to Merleau-Ponty, 779; it is a blind adherence to the ‘pre-objective world’, 780.

Human Brain, The, III, exemplifies the difference between living and dead matter, according to Driesch, 742.

Humanistic Thought, I, (cf. Modern Humanistic Philosophy, I), its ground motive of nature and freedom; its conception of time is orientated rationalistically toward mechanical motion in the sense of classical physics; or it is irrationalistically considered in a vitalistic, psychological, or historical way; objectivistic and subjectivistic views, 27; As long as Nominalistic Scholasticism subjected itself to the dogma of the Church it rested in a dualism between faith and natural knowledge; its secularization was introduced by John of Jandun and Marsilius of Padua, 188; the collapse of the ecclesiastically unified culture of the Middle Ages; the discovery of the pure Greek and Roman sources of culture, resentment against Medieval barbarian linguistic forms of Scholasticism, and against the synthesis between Christianity and the ancient life and world view, 189; Biblical Humanism and the Reformation; the Bible was moralistically interpreted by Erasmus, etc., 190; the religious basic motive of Humanism is that of nature

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and freedom; this motive is founded on the secularized Biblical motive of creation, and Christian freedom and assimilated the Greek motive of form and matter and the Roman Catholic motive of nature and grace; its inner dialectic is due to the ambiguous freedom-motive; which is the driving force of the modern religion of human personality; the latter wants to dominate nature by means of science to which it ultimately surrenders, 190; the radical unity of the human personality gets lost; any faith in the ‘supernatural’ is rejected; its religion concentrates on man and his needs; it rejected any ‘heteronomous’ Divine Revelation; a personal God is used as the foundation for mathematical truth in Descartes; as the requirement of religious feeling in Rousseau, as a postulate of the ‘practical Reason’ in Kant; the Renaissance secularized the Christian Idea of regeneration, i.e., in the Italian ‘Renascimento’, with its thirst for temporal life and its Faustian desire to control the world; Occam's depreciation of ‘natural reason’ was replaced by religious confidence in reason's liberating power, 191; the Humanistic life and world view was originally aristocratic; the ‘uomo universale’ of Leo Battista Alberti's autobiography; Leonardo Da Vinci; Faustian desire for the progress of culture; the Greek ‘physis’ view was dominated by the motive of form and matter; modern autonomous man considers ‘immeasurable nature’ (192) as a macrocosmic reflection of the autonomous freedom of human personality; or as such a reflection of the Faustian domination-motive; this leads to a deterministic theoretical view of reality; Galileo and Newton; this scientific method was proclaimed the universal model for thought; this creates a structureless view of reality as a continuous causal series, which is a threat to free human personality, 193; early Humanism turned away from the ‘formalistic hairsplitting’ of scholastic conceptual distinctions; Copernicus' heliocentric world picture, 194; for modern man the Platonic mè on, the endless, the apeiron, is the highest principle: Cusanus, Bruno; Leibniz considered the limited as ‘metaphysical evil’, 194; Nominalistic subjectivism and individualism were considered as phenomena of decadence and a mortal danger to the Greek polis, in ancient Greek culture, 195; Humanism borrowed heavily from the Stoic ideal of the self-sufficient Sage, from Epicurean ethics (Valla), etc.; but it had an inner predisposition to a deterministic view of the world; the mathematical ideal of knowledge became the transcendental ideal of cosmic order; but originally nature was not conceived as a mechanical system, but as filled with beauty, force and life; Da Vinci considered nature as a teleological whole animated with life; Valla deified nature as the expansion sphere of the personality ideal, 198; since Copernicus' astronomical revolution modern man discovered in nature a macrocosm that had its reflected image in man's own personality as microcosm; Bruno's and Cusanus' worship of the infinite; and of the coincidentia oppositorum; their rejection of the opposition between ‘Jenseits’ and ‘Diesseits’; the religious freedom motive is still in accordance with the nature motive; Bruno's only difficulty intimates the future tension between these two motives, 199; the decisive turn came with the introduction of the functional concept of mechanic causality, 200; Humanist thought had built a new metaphysics, and in its cadre the dialectical tension between nature and freedom became manifest; under the science ideal Hobbes' epistemological empiricism was extremely rationalistic, since it conceived of the process of knowledge in terms of the laws of mechanical movement; since Locke, empiricism gave the science-ideal a psychological turn, seeking the common denominator of the modal aspects within the functional apparatus of human knowledge, 262; especially in feeling and sensation alone; substance, ‘Ding an sich’ became the epistemological x, the unknown and unknowable background of the ‘empirical world’ given only in psychical impressions and perceptions, 263.

Humanistic Thought, II, in the crisis, 18; has given up reflecting on the supra-temporal root of experience owing to the pressure of positivism and historism; the historical consciousness; its irrational existential attitude; the decay of religious self-reflection, 19, 20; the Humanistic cosmonomic Idea, 26; assumes a logical continuous order of the sciences, 49; the science ideal and its creation motive in Pasch, Veronese, Cantor, etc. on ‘continuous numbers’, 91; tends to logicize number and space; the subject-side of number is merged into its law-side, 92; natural law concept, 167; the a priori is taken in an epistemological sense; in recent times in a phenomenological sense, 543.

Humanistic Thought, III, Newton's ‘material units’ and the concept of substance are based on the classical Humanistic science-ideal, 23; this ideal is deterministic; was intended to destroy the world of naïve experience and reconstrue reality by means of mathematical mechanical thought, 26.

Humanity, I, Herder's ideal, 455.

Humanity, II, modern Idea of humanity in Ranke, 281.

Humanity, III, Comte's idea of humanity as an all-embracing community, 167.

Human Nature, I, is a composition of a material body and a rational soul, in Thomism, 180.

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Human Society, III, its ultimate basis is the transcendent root community of mankind, 656.

Humboldt, W. von, II, Werke I, 276; cf. 222.

Humboldt, W. von, II, the general dignity of man, 276.

Hume, David, I, Treatise upon Human nature, 272, 274, 276, 277, 278, 280, 281, 282, 284, 285, 286, 287, 290, 291, 292, 294, 295, 296, 297, 298, 299, 300, 302, 303, 304, 305, 306, 307, 308, 309, 310, 313; Enquiry concerning human understanding, 276, 281, 288, 300; Dialogues concerning natural religion, 275; Dissertation on the Passions, 302; The Original Contract, 312; An Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals, 312.

Hume, David, I, He criticized the Humanistic metaphysics of nature, 203; desired to reduce all phenomena to the smallest possible number of simple principles (economy of thought); and in this way to achieve a Copernican revolution in the field of the phenomena of human nature; all abstract concepts must be reduced to individual sensory ‘impressions’ as the simplest elements, 272; this shows a strong vein of Nominalism in Hume's psychologicism; his ‘empiricism’ and that of Leibniz; moderate and radical nominalism; his reduction of universal ‘representations’ into ‘impressions’ is the exact psychological counterpart of (e.g. Leibniz') the resolution of ‘complex concepts’ into the simplest conceptual elements by mathematicism, 273; Hume's ‘data’ do not belong to the real data of our experience; Locke's ‘simple psychical element of consciousness’ is as abstract as the concept ‘triangle in general’; he eradicated the boundaries between Locke's ‘sensation’ and ‘reflexion’; all reality was ‘sensation’; 274; he was strongly influenced by the method of Sextus Empiricus; but he did not want to end in Pyrrhonistic scepticism, 275; Hume's scepticism was only a method in the interest of the psychological ideal of science; he repudiated the dualistic division between ‘sensation’ and reflexion; reflexion became an image of ‘sensation’; truth has its criterion in the demonstration of the ‘original impressions’ from which an Idea is derived; his notion of ‘impressions’; he does not conceive them in their subjective actuality, but according to their objective content as the elements of phenomena; ideas, or thought and reasoning are derived from sensory ‘impressions’; they are copies of impressions and less sensorily intense; his explanation of ‘false Ideas’, 276; the difference between the Ideas of memory and those of fantasy; the phantasm possesses a concept of order excluding arbitrariness; the law of this order is that of necessary connection or association; Ideas are simple or complex; the complex Ideas are partly based on sensorily perceived relations between impressions; impressions are either simple or complex; all associations obey the law of resemblance, spatial and temporal coherence (contiguity), the law of cause and effect, 277; they are purely mechanical laws and concern only the so-called ‘natural relations between the Ideas; their products are the complex Ideas of relations, substances and modi, i.e., the ordinary objects of our thoughts and judgments; the imagination produces associations on the basis of sensory relations and exceed that which is given; they may go astray; there are “natural” and “philosophical” relations; the latter compare Ideas or impressions not connected by association; there are six classes of philosophical relations (278) in this classification; the basic mathematical principles have become psychological ones, and so have the laws of logic, philosophical relations are either variable or invariable; the latter are the ground of certain knowledge; certain, because unchangeable and directly perceivable together with their terms without reasoning; reasoning always consists in a succession of Ideas; they fall under the province of intuition rather than under that of demonstration; the same thing is true for the variable relations of identity, time, and place, 279; natural relations rest on a veritable association in the sequence of Ideas; on the ground of the causal relation those of time, place, and identity can exceed the directly given sensory datum and play a part in the associational process of thought; Hume's criticism of mathematics; contradictory interpretations of Hume's critique of mathematics: Riehl, Windelband, 280; he doubted the claims of mathematics to exact knowledge; mathematics belongs to the knowledge of relations, not of facts; in his Enquiry he says: though there were never a circle or a triangle in nature, the truths demonstrated by Euclid, would for ever retain their certainty and evidence, 281; his Treatise contains very contradictory statements; the method to solve this riddle; Hume's contrast between “matters of fact” and “relations of Ideas” is not Lockian; Hume's “reflection” is an “image” of sensation’; many complex Ideas are not due to corresponding ‘impressions’, many ‘complex impressions’ are never reflected exactly in ‘Ideas’, 282; ‘I can imagine a city like the ‘New Jerusalem’, although I have never seen such a city; I have seen Paris but I cannot form such an Idea of it that is adequate to reality; all judgments that are

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not pure copies of the original impressions must relinquish their claim to certainty and exactitude; if mathematics goes beyond the sensory limits it has no claim to universally valid truth; all universal ideas are merely particular ones under a universal name evoking other individual ideas in the imagination resembling the first, 283; everything in nature is individual; this inclines to radical sensationalism; the conception of space is the copy of sensory impressions of ‘coloured points’; Hume's basic denominator is ‘visual and tactual meaning’; coloured points are minima sensibilia, their sensory relation is reflected in the concept of space as a mere copy of them; these points must possess a sensory extension which is no longer divisible, 285; a mathematical point without any extension must be an absurdity to Hume, even in the ‘order of thought’; the concept of mathematical equality; of straight lines; curves; planes, etc.; they are useful fictions; the first principles (of maths) are founded on the imagination and the senses; the conclusion, therefore, can never go beyond, much less contradict these faculties, 285; Hume's concept of time; this ‘Idea’ is formed out of the sequence of changing sensory ‘impressions’ and ‘Ideas’; five notes played on a flute give us the impression and the concept of time; all false concepts in mathematics arise through the natural associations of resemblance, contiguity and causality, 286; arithmetical unity is the copy of a single ‘impression’; number as unity in the quantitative relations is a fiction; a real unity must be indivisible and incapable of being resolved into any lesser unity; a sum of units can only be grounded on a sensory relation between individual impressions, 287; the ‘coloured points of space’, the minima sensibilia; he reduces original numerical meaning to ‘sensory impression’; but sensory multiplicity pre-supposes the original modus of number; in Hume arithmetical laws are psychical laws; if this were true, arithmetic would have to relinquish any claim to being an exact science; Hume shrank back from such a conclusion; his ‘Enquiry concerning human understanding’ relapses into the Lockian position, 288; mathematical exactitude and independence of sensory impressions only has a pragmatic validity; faith in mathematics is to be explained from imagination and the laws of psychological association; these laws are to arrest radical Pyrrhonist scepticism; psychological thought is Hume's Archimedean point; his criticism of the substance concept and his interpretation of naïve experience, 289; he insisted that naïve experience is not a theory of reality, but must be explained in terms of a natural impulse of human feeling; nothing is given in experience but the multiplicity of sensory impressions, 290; Hume rejected Locke's distinction beween primary and secondary qualities; his positivistic psychologism had no recourse to a metaphysical theology to explain our belief in an external world; ‘Ding an sich’ is a product of imagination; ‘natural associations’, resting on the temporal succession of Ideas lead fantasy beyond what has been given and metaphysics to its false substance concept; common sense (i.e. naïve experience) or ‘the vulgar view’ derives its belief in the external world from sensory impressions and true philosophy has to indicate these impressions; metaphysics merely relates ‘natural associations’ to a false concept (substance), 291; the constancy and coherence of our sense impressions are the foundation of our naïve faith in a world independent of our consciousness, 292; we speak of an identical thing, but the only data we have are similar impressions, separated in time but united by associational relations; Hume absolutizes the sensory aspect of experience; he desired to explain the claim to logical exactitude of so-called ‘creative mathematical thought’ in terms of psychology, 293; he places sovereign psychological thought as such above the ‘creative’ fantasy; the creative power of this thought is imputed to the faculty of the imagination; this thought is Arché, origin and law-giver of the cosmos of experience; but Hume fails to account for this transcendental Idea of Origin, because he had not yet arrived at transcendental critical self-reflection; his laws of association serve as lex continui, as the foundation of reality; he also destroyed the concept of the spiritual substance, 294; the conflict between materialism and idealism is one between ‘brothers of the same house’; Spinoza was an atheist to the idealists because he did not believe in a soul-substance; then the idealistic metaphysics of the immortal soul is also atheistic; Hume asserted that the universe of our experience is resolved into impressions and Ideas derived from them; the ego is merely a collective concept of the series of Ideas ordered constantly in accordance with the laws of association, 295; the mind itself is not really a theatre for ‘impressions’, but consists in nothing else but ‘perceptions’; the ‘ego’ is an illusion; identity is merely a quality we attribute to different perceptions when we reflect upon them; in Hume the psychological science-ideal has destroyed the personality ideal in its foundation, 296; causality had been an ‘eternal logical truth’ to the mathematical science ideal; Leibniz called it a ‘factual verity’; Hume did not distinguish between naïve experience and natural science in a fundamental sense; experience goes beyond the given sen-

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sory impressions; then epistemological judgments of supposed universal validity and necessity are given with reference to the sensory impressions; we conclude from a sensorily given fact to another fact that is not given, with the aid of the principle of the connection of cause and effect; its foundation can only be sought in the relations of impressions; two relations: contiguity and priority in time of one event before another, 297; but the Idea of causality very decidedly goes beyond these sensory relations; a judgment of causality does not state a mere post hoc, but is intended to indicate a propter hoc; there is no object which as a ‘cause’ would logically imply the existence of any other object; the denial of a necessary connection between cause and effect does not lead to a single logical contradiction; we remember that after the sensory perception of fire we have regularly experienced the sensation of warmth; thereby is discovered the constant connection of two sorts of impressions that follow each other in time; in this relation there is nothing in itself implying an objectively valid necessity; from the mere repetition of any past impression, even to infinity, there will never arise any new original Idea such as that of a necessary connection, 298; but the constant resemblance in the different instances does raise a new subjective impression in the mind, namely a tendency to pass over from an instantly given impression to the Idea of another impression which in the past repeatedly occurred after the former; this is the impression corresponding to the Idea of causality; in his ‘Inquiry’ he immediately introduces habit in connecting Ideas as a natural law; this habit compels us to join the Idea of an event B repeatedly following the same event A, with the Idea of the latter, 299; the ‘propter hoc’ can never be demonstrated or understood rationally, it can only be believed; this faith is some feeling accompanying our Idea; Hume's acknowledgment destroys the foundation of the psychical laws of association as laws of human nature; but Hume appeals to these laws in a purely dogmatic fashion; he shook the pillars of the personality ideal and of the science-ideal as well; he levelled the modal boundaries between the different law-spheres, and was involved in antinomies, 300; he did not understand that only theoretical thought is in a position to isolate the psychical aspect of reality; a concept is to him a mere copy of a psychical impression, thus he reduced the logical aspect to the psychical aspect; his basic denominator for all given reality was not psychical, but psychological, 301; Hume undermined the claim to truth made by his own theory; he recognized a relative meaning-diversity in the cosmos within his absolutized psychical sphere; ‘pleasure and pain constitute the very essence of beauty and deformity’; his mechanistic theory of the emotions; this theory was the foundation of his ethics and his theoretical view of faith; the laws of association are his explanatory principles; these laws are founded in the principle of the uniformity of human nature at all times, 302; primary impressions (of sensory perceptions) and pain and pleasure); secondary or reflective impressions (the emotions); calm and vehement emotions; direct and indirect passions; the selfhood cannot be the cause but only the object of a passion, 303; in pride and humility the selfhood is the object; in hate and love others are the objects; on the validity of the laws of association, 304; in his psychological mechanism there is no room for freedom of the will; ‘res cogitans’ the selfhood concentrated in its mathematical thought as a substance was destroyed by Hume's psychological criticism; he conceives of the will as a mere impression felt in corporeal motion or in the production of a new Idea in our mind, 305; he thought his doctrine of the psychological necessity of human actions to be essential both for morality and religion; his philosophy was the prelude to the shift of primacy from the nature motive to the freedom motive; he taught that reason alone can never be a motive to any action of the will, 306; nor can it oppose passion in the direction of the will; reason is and ought to be the slave of passion; even causal natural scientific thought cannot influence nor activate the will; where the objects themselves do not affect us, their connexions, discovered by reason, can never give them any influence; action only arises from an emotion; nothing can oppose or retard the impulse of passion but a contrary impulse; the rationalist prejudice is rejected that the decisions of the will are determined by theoretical Ideas, 307; he sharply distinguished that which ‘is’ from that which ‘ought to be’; this implies the contrast between scientific thought and ethical action; ethics cannot be proven logico-mathematically; if mathematical thought could prove ethics, the character of virtue and vice must lie in certain relations between the objects, or they are ‘matters of fact’ discoverable by scientific reasoning, 308; if virtue were discoverable through thought, it would be either an object of mathematical science, or of natural science; rationalists think that ethical norms can be proven a priori and ‘more geometrico’; Hume derives vice and virtue from feelings of pain and pleasure; this is antinomous; he explains that pleasure is a general term for very different ‘feelings’; e.g. aesthetic feeling and that of taste are mutually irreducible;

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but Hume's mechanistic theory of human nature destroys the foundation for all normative imputation, 309; the basis of normative ethical distinctions is the moral sense; a particular moral feeling is due to moral impressions; the sense of virtue is a feeling of satisfaction from the contemplation of a character; the fact that such a character pleases in a particular way makes us feel that it is virtuous; the motives of acts, even of moral acts, remain a-normative in Hume; acts are hedonistically determined; here is a tendency to withdraw the personality ideal from the grasp of the science ideal, 310; he criticized the doctrine of natural law and the contractual view of the State; he appealed to the psychical condition of primitive people; his criticism of the contractual view aimed a blow at the mathematical ideal of science; his connection with the Tory party; primitive people cannot comprehend obedience to political authority in terms of an abstract contract of individuals; he pointed out that the obligation arising out of agreement is not of a natural but of a conventional character, 311; a contract cannot precede the establishment of an ordered community and the institutions of the state; he replaced the contract theory - generally justifying the state along the mathematical logical path - by a psychological conception; in his ‘The Original Contract’ he assumed an original equality of men, hence an original consent of individuals to subject to authority; such equality is not conceived in mathematical exactitude; the original agreement was psychological and intermittent, in terms of the impressions of necessity and utility in a given situation, for the sake of submitting to somebody of eminent qualities; frequent recurrence of such situations gave rise to a custom of obedience, 312; the right of authority is due to the influence of time on the human soul; utility breeds the impulse to obey; Hume made the doctrine of natural law cave in under his critique, 313; Hume's influence on Kant was only restricted in scope, 334; Hume sought the moral faculty in the moral sentiment, 338; in the third period of Kant's development he followed Hume in reducing all synthetical propositions to the sensory aspect, qualifying them as ‘empirical judgments’, 341; Hume's critique of the principle of causality stimulated Kant to demonstrate the transcendental-logical character of the synthetical categories, 353.

Hume David, II, A Treatise of Human Nature, 331; cf. 12, 86, 96, 332, 333, 350, 430, 494.

Hume David, II, psychologizes mathematics; this leads to antinomy, 46; he refuted the view of space as an a priori receptacle, 96; he provided Kant with psychologistic epistemology, 494; his definition of the imagination, and that of Kant, 515.

Hume David, III, his psychologistic notion of substance, 27.

Hundeshagen, III, emphasizes the fact that Calvin recognizes the functions that the Church has in all the spheres of human societal life, 520.

Husserl, Edmund, I, Ideen zu einer Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie, 52; Logische Untersuchungen, 73; Die Pariser Vorträge, 213; Cartesianische Meditationen, 213.

Husserl, Edmund, I, in the phenomenological attitude the absolute ‘cogito’ is opposed to the ‘world’ as the intentional ‘Gegenstand’ which is dependent on the cogito, 52; the modal diversity of meaning can be transcended by means of a formalized logical totality-concept; thus he arrived at the ‘formal logical’ relation ‘whole and its parts’ which is to be purified from any non-logical speciality of meaning; then he can formulate different purely logical propositions and definitions by means of the concept ‘logical foundation’; but the proposition: ‘the whole is more than its parts’ is not purely analytic; Husserl's concept of the whole is taken in the special sense of mathematics, which he considers to be reducible to pure logic, 73, 74 (note); the concept ‘whole’ remains enclosed in the analytical aspect which pre-supposes the inter-modal coherence; it cannot be a transcendental Idea of totality; his formalized concept of the whole is conceived in the special sense of pure mathematics which he reduces to pure logic, 74; his ‘egology’ excludes the existence of limits for the ‘transcendental cogito’, 91; his ‘absolute consciousness’ is a speculative metaphysical concept, 92; his ‘eidetic logic’; direct intuition of the essence by an ‘uninterested observer’ in the ‘epoche’ can give an adequate essential description of the act-life of man in the intentional relation to the world, 213; considers his phenomenology to be the foundation of philosophy, 543, 544.

Husserl, Edmund, II, Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie, 17, 18, 27, 29, 452, 453, 454, 543; Logische Untersuchungen, 27, 28, 224, 450, 452, 453, 454, 457, 459; Cartesianische Meditationen, 489, 538, 543, 544, 549, 584; cf. 462, 468, 487, 488, 558, 560, 569.

Husserl, Edmund, II, his theory of ‘regions’, 17; the 12th and 13th sections of his ‘Ideen’, and scholastic logic, obscuring the boundaries of the modal aspects, 18; Sinn (= meaning) and Bedeutung (= signification) -are identified; meaning is the pure act in its noetic and noematical aspects, 27; noetic consciousness is absolute, the residue of the destruction of the

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world performed by the epochè (= suspending the naïve attitude), 28, 29; meaning cannot be reality itself for it cannot be burnt down like a house, 31; on Erlebnis, 112; his idea of pure grammar, 224; pure significations, 224, 225; his structural conception of the lingual sign: expression, meaning intentions, reference to ‘thing’, i.e. signification, 225; a word signifies via its signification, 225; he abstracted the subject's intention from the subjective signifying function; the signifying he called a psychical act; but intending and signifying are not the act; they are modalities in which the act is realized, 226; his ‘reine Mannigfaltigkeitslehre’ and juridical theory, 342; conception of analytical judgment, 450; its truth is independent of the Gegenstand and may be completely formalized; the sentence; the existence of this particular house includes that of all its parts;, formula: G (α, β, γ,...) implies (α, β, γ...), 451; Husserl's affinity with Hilbert's conception of maths, 452; the whole and its parts; independence, etc., are essentialia; pure concepts conceived eidetically are empty basic forms, 453; his material regions of being are delimited by the numerical (454) analogy in the whole and its parts in the spatial modus; continuous analytical extent; analytical juxtaposition and numerical juxtaposition accomplished in the movement of thought; prius et posterius; kinematic analogy, 455; his regions of being, 454-456; formalization of judgments requires meaning-synthesis; ‘essential’ forms; material synthetical categories; the regions ‘thing’, ‘soul’; he contrasts supertemporal essence (= eidos) with the purely accidental empirical fact; the whole and its parts is a relation pre-supposing subjective analytical synthesis and objective analytical systasis, because it is a logical unity in a logical multiplicity founded on number, 456; extensive whole; extensive parts, 457; all totalities (except the extensive ones) lack unifying connective forms; the relations of foundation, 458; criticism of Husserl, 458; the transcendental consciousness constitutes the Gegenstand, 467; Wesensschau moves in acts of reflexion: modifications of experience through reflexion, 487 (note); he absolutizes the phenomenological attitude, 489; his view of the a priori, 543; of the Gegenstand; the task of phenomenology; the transcendental constitution of the world; his universal concrete ontology; concrete logic of being; his idea of what is religious, 544; the phenomenological monads, the absolute, primary being, 545; his eidetic logic and the plastic horizon of experience, 558; he relativized his conception of the world of pure essences by the motif of active and passive genesis, 558; his transcendental phenomenological egology makes the knowledge of God dependent on the phenomenological self-interpretation of the transcendental ego 560 (note), 561; his attack on Kant, 569; he calls the a priori forms of sensibility ‘mythical constructions’; Kant thought transcendental truth accessible to the cognitive selfhood and unproblematical; this became Husserl's basic problem; the ego's transcendental synthesis is a hidden ‘anonymous’ a priori act and is made visible by phenomenological analysis, and also constitutes pre-theoretical experience; the theoretical horizon encompasses all dimensions of experience, and the religious dimension; the latter becomes the immanent horizon of intentional phenomena constituted by a synthesis of the transcendental ego; truth is the adaequatio (i.e. coalescence) of the intended with the given; Husserl hypostatizes the horizon of theoretical truth, 570.

Husserl, Edmund, III, he functionalistically misinterprets the thing structure of reality as one of ‘regions’ of the material sphere next to the sphere of functional-sensory qualities, spatial figures, etc.; on the so-called copy-theory, 54.

Hutcheson, I, on the moral sense, 310; the power to distinguish what is good lies in the moral sentiment, 338; he replaced the absolutism of individuality in Shaftesbury by the absolutism of law, characteristic of the rationalistic types of the Humanistic cosmonomic Idea, 463.

Hylè, II, and morphè in Aristotle, 10.

Hypostatization, I, Plato and Aristotle's hypostatization of the theoretical activity of thought in its logical aspect as an immortal Ousia or substance; Thomas Aquinas accommodated this view to the doctrine of the church; the entire soul, characterized by the theoretical activity of thought, must be an immortal and purely spiritual substance, 44; of the non-sensory psychical, logical, and post-logical functions of mental acts, 92; of ‘theoretical reason’, in Kant, as Archimedean point, 107; of theoretical thought in the divine ‘Nous’, 122; in the concept ‘realism of values’, 136 (note); of the ethical function into the ‘homo noumenon’, in Kant, 143; of the modern functional concept of law, in Leibniz, 202; of the concept ‘force’ introduced into physics by Newton, 231; of the ego as a thinking substance, in Leibniz, 297; of the personality-ideal in Kant's ‘god’ as the postulate of the pure practical reason, 384; of the universal concept ‘ego’ in Fichte, 416; of practical reason in Fichte, 426; of ‘nature’ in the science-ideal, 449; of the moral norm, 450; of the absolute and subjective ethical stream of life as ‘god’, in Fichte, 475.

Hypostatization, II, of reason in the metaphysical idea of being, 26; Parmenides hypostatized the relation of identity expressed by the co-

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pula to be, 56; Malan accuses Dooyewerd of hypostatizing a quantitative mode of being, 84; Realism and Christian Scholasticism hypostatized the universalia; universalia have intentional abstract existence in Scholasticism; Nominalism denied them any existence except ‘in mente’, 386; universalia post rem, as symbols of reality; Realism; Thomistic realism is moderate; universalia ante rem in God's mind, and in rē in the world, 387; hypostatization of theoretical thought in immanence philosophy, 435; God as the hypostasis of the intellect, in Kant, 501; of theoretical thought in Heidegger, 526; of the normative aspects into super-temporal ideas, 538; of the structure of human knowledge, 560; of theoretical truth, 561; of the theoretical synthesis, 562; of an abstract part of the temporal horizon to a transcendence, 564; the separation between faith and reason on the immanent standpoint reveals the hypostatization of synthetical thought, 565; Kant's hypostatization of ‘transcendental truth’, 569; of the horizon of transcendental-theoretical truth in Kant, and Husserl, 570; of the relative, 572; of the idea of truth to the absolute super-temporal Truth, 578; of the meaning-synthesis, 579; of the so-called transcendental consciousness in immanence philosophical epistemology, 583.

Hypostatization, III, of deified theoretical thought as archè of substance, 4; of substance as the coherence between physical phenomena since Descartes, 27; in critical realism, 45, 46; in Oppenheimer's concept of the ‘immortal individuum’ ‘life’, 167; of the rational-moral nature of man in Thomism, of the Church and faith, 218; in post-Kantian transpersonalistic idealism, 244, 246, 249; Litt rejects the hypostatis of an Ueberperson, a super personality, 295; hypostatization of faith in Luther, 513.

Hypotheses non fingo, I, Newton's adage, 337.