A New Critique of Theoretical Thought. Deel 4. Index of Subjects and Authors

G

Gaius, III, Institutiones, 193.

Galileo Galilei, I, laid the foundations of modern mathematical natural science, together with Newton, 193, 201; the law of motion had been formulated by Nicolaus of Oresma before Galileo, 202; the differential number anticipates the meaning of motion in its original exact pre-physical sense, as it is viewed by Galileo, 236.

Galileo Galilei, II, his kinematics, 99, 100; he was a leader of history, 243.

Galileo Galilei, III, on ‘substance’, 19.

Gall-Wasps, III, and oak, 649.

Ganzheitskausalität, III, in Driesch, 735.

Gassendi, I, his atomism was intrinsically contradictory, 255.

Gaussian Coordinates, II, are physical anticipations in geometry, 101.

Gefühl ist alles, I, in Goethe's Faust, 453.

Gegenstand, I, in the phil. of the Cosmonomic Idea, is what is opposed to the logical function in the theoretical attitude of thought; in current philosophy the ‘Gegenstand’ is usually called ‘object’ (6), in theoretical thought the ‘Gegenstand’ is formed by the non-logical aspects distinguished from the logical aspect and synthesized with the latter, 18; in theoretical thought we oppose the analytical function of our real act of thought to the non-logical aspects of our temporal experience; the latter become ‘Gegenstand’, i.e., the opposite to our analytical function; this antithetic structure of the theoretical attitude can present itself only in the temporal total structure of the act of thinking; this antithetic structure is only intentional; not ontical, 38, 39; the modal structure of the analytical aspect itself is given as a whole, and not in analyzed moments; in-the theoretical attitude we can analyze the logical aspect, for the latter expresses in its modal structure the temporal order into which the different aspects are fitted; the theoretic act is not identical with the aspect; in its theoretical abstraction the modal structure of the logical aspect has only an intentional existence in our act of thought and can be made into the Gegenstand of our actual logical function, 40; dogmatic epistemology identified the subject-object relation with the Gegenstand-relation, 43; we must proceed from the theoretical antithesis to the theoretical synthesis between the logical and the non-logical aspects, if a logical concept of the non-logical ‘Gegenstand’ is to be possible, 44; the antithetical attitude offers no bridge between the logical aspect and its non-logical ‘Gegenstand’, 45; the starting-point of all special synthetic acts of thought must be sought by looking away from the ‘Gegenstände’ of our knowledge and exercising self-reflection, 51; in the phenomenological attitude the ‘absolute cogito’ (i.e. absolute transcendental consciousness) is opposed to the ‘world’ as its intentional ‘Gegenstand’; Scheler considers the ‘Gegenstand-relation’ as the most formal category of the logical aspect of mind; in this relation the human mind can oppose itself not only to ‘the world’ but even make the physiological and psychical aspects of human existence into a ‘Gegenstand’, 52; modern Humanistic existentialism grasps existence only in its theoretical antithesis to the ‘given reality of nature’; it creates a great distance between existential thinking as authentically philosophical and all scientific thought as ‘gegenständlich’, ‘Gegenstand’ in existentialism means ‘given object’ (das Vorhandene), 53; a generic concept cannot bridge the modal diversity in the theoretical ‘Gegenstand-relation’, 77; if Litt's ‘pure thinking ego and its Gegenstand’ (the concrete ego) were one and the same, the Gegenstand-relation would be eliminated, 81; Litt confuses Gegenstand and object, 86; the Gegenstand is identified with ‘temporal reality’ in immanence phil., 87; the Gegenstand relation in Litt, 143; in Kant the G. is a chaotic mass of sense impressions received in the a-priori forms of intuition (space and time), 352.

Gegenstand, II, is absolutized into a ‘substance’, 11; Kantian categories and the Gegenstand, 15; in Nicolai Hartmann, 19; transcendental Idea and the concept Gegenstand in Kant, 44; an in Meinong, 33; absolutized G., 220; the historical Gegenstand and individualization, 274, 275; in realistic Scholasticism, 388; G. and intentional object identified in Nominalism, 389; up till Kant the G. was considered to transcend the phenomenon; Kant's view, 430; Kant's conception of the ‘datum’, 431; the G. as a resistant to the logical function, 433; G. and object, 434; Phenomenologists conceive of the Gegenstand as a datum in the intentional relation of the act of consciousnesses, as the intended correlate to the latter; the ‘world’ as intended G., 466; constituted by the ‘transcendental consciousness’ (Husserl); it is the subjective reality of a substance which is independent of human experience in pre-Kantian metaphysics; in Kant it is the universally valid and objective of experience; there

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is no G. of knowledge, neither of the knowing subject or the ‘transcendental consciousness’, or the ego, or the ‘cogito’; the Origin of the Gegenstand is to be sought in the theoretical disjunction of the cosmic meaning-systasis in which our selfhood is not found; the Gegenstand must be in the diversity of the modal aspects owing to a theoretical setting apart, 467; the enstatic and the antithetical attitude of thought, 468; the ‘epoche’ and the continuity of time; varieties of ‘Gegenstände’, 469; we think ‘Gegenstände’ a-priori in Kant, 504; the Gegenstand in Husserl, 544.

Gegenstand, III, metaphysical view of the Gegenstand relation as corresponding to reality, 10; Aristotle's ‘ousia’ as a Gegenstand, 13; difference between the Gegenstand-relation and the subject-object relation, 22; a thing is not a Gegenstand, 27, 28; naïve attitude is not antithetical like the Gegenstand relation, 31; this relation has nothing to do with naïve exp., 33; this relation makes modal sphere-sovereignty seem to contradict the internal unity of a thing, 63; the absolutization of the Gegenst.-rel. gave rise to the pseudo problem of body and soul, 64.

Geist, I, in Max Scheler, 52; its individual disclosure, in Schelling, 471.

Geisteswissenschaften, II, on the dialectical standpoint of philosophy the method of investigation should be ‘geisteswissenschaftlich’ if philosophy is to attain to transcendental self-reflection, 76; Geisteswissenschaften should be detached from spatial objectifying thought, according to Neo-Kantianism, 390.

Gelasius, III, delimited the competence of the state from that of the church, 216.

Gelpcke, Ernst, I, Fichte und die Gedankenwelt des Sturm und Drang, 451, 452, 453.

Gelpcke, Ernst, I, his characterization of the new Humanistic postulate of freedom and its aversion to all universal rational norms, 453.

Gemeinschaft (i.e. community), III, Tönnies' distinction, 177, 178; and Schelling, 184, 185, 186; Simmel, von Wiese and Weber resolve the social Gemeinschaft into a formal system of relations and interactions, an individualistic view; Litt holds that the ego is interwoven in the Gemeinschaft of the closed sphere, 251; its expressive symbolical forms are rendered transpersonal, 252; closed spheres of the second degree and social mediation in a subjective and in an objective symbolical way; this mediation creates unity and continuity in the social whole; the true communal relationship is the closed sphere, a spiritual reality, 253; and phenomenological analysis, 254; Litt's view is a new type of social universalism; authoritative societal organizations have the relation of authority and subordination implied in them; Litt's Gemeinschaft lacks norms, and therefore authority, 255; this is due to his phenomenological prejudice; his argument is that normative and anti-normative are mutually exclusive; the error in this argument; Litt's ‘spiritual reality’ concept, 256; he seeks the root of temporal reality, of the selfhood, in time; ‘closed spheres’ and social mediation are not structural principles guaranteeing the inner unity e.g. of a political community; the spheres overlap; his quantitative criterion of the scope of the ‘closed spheres’ of the second degree, 257; there is one final all-embracing ‘closed sphere’, says Litt, 258; it is constituted in terms of inter-communal cultural relations between component groups, 259; Smend applies Litt's theory of Gemeinschaft to the state, 259; Litt excludes the organizations from his community concept, 260; medieval society completely realized the ‘Gemeinschaft’, 271; Tönnies' category of ‘Gemeinschaft’, 571, 574.

General concepts, II, are equivocal and unqualified, 77.

Generic Concepts, I, in special science, cannot bridge the modal diversity, 77, 193, 194.

Generic Concepts, II, e.g. triangle, 459.

Genes, II, are organizing regulators, 751; the bearers of hereditory dispositions, 754; genes and chromosomes, 755.

Genesis, III, or becoming, is an analogical concept requiring modal qualification in scientific thought, 193; active and passive genesis (in Husserl), 558.

Genesis eis ousian, II, in Plato, 10, 57.

Genetic Tendency, I, of philosophy towards the Archè; and the Critical Method, according to Neo-Kantians, 9.

Genetic Coherence, III, between marriage and family; but the first pair of human beings did not develop from marriage, 656.

Genetic and Existential Forms, III, and pheno-types of organized communities, 174; genetic forms of compulsory organizations, 191; the Genetic Juridical Form of the church institution; it functions as the nodal point of enkaptic structural interlacements in the juridical law-sphere, 554; the genetic forms of Church and State do not show any genetic relation with natural institutional communities; the opening of non-political inter-communal and inter-individual relations pre-supposes the rise of organized institutional communities, 659; genetic and existential forms of enkaptic interlace-

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ments, 663, 664; genetic forms may be constituent or constitued, 665-668.

Genital Cells, III, in poly-cellular beings can propagate endlessly, 722.

Genius, I, Kant's doctrine of creative genius recognizes subjective individuality, 387; in Hamann's thought, and in that of the Sturm und Drang generally, 452; Geniale Volk (highly gifted people) in Fichte, 491.

Genius, II, historical genius, 246; the bearers of the original civilization were a nation of geniuses, according to Fichte, 264; their theoretical intuition can grasp certain modal law conformities synthetically in the free direction of its attention without previous exhaustive analysis, 483; individual genius; its insight; and the process of disclosure, 595.

Geno- an Variability Types, III, and radical types, 93.

Gentes, III, the Roman gentes were patri-lineal sibs, 353.

Genus proximum, II, in Aristotle, 14; and the differentia specifica, 15, 132.

Geny, François, II, rejects fictions in juridical science, but not in juridical technique, 125.

Geological History, II, the natural genesis of geological formations, 196.

Geology, II, in often called ‘natural history’, when it refers to the natural genesis of geological formations and of species of plants and animals, 196.

Geometrico, More, II, the Humanistic doctrine of natural law started with the postulate of dealing with the jural sphere more geometrico, 342.

Geometric figures, II, are transcendent, in Plato, 9.

Geometry, I, discovered by Descartes, and considered as the model of any scientific method, 197; it was invented by Nicolaus of Oresme, i.e., analytical geometry, 202; the geometrical conception of the root of reality, 250; Spinoza's ‘eternal and unchangeable geometrical truths’, 250, 251; Hume on ‘pure geometry’; comparison with Riehl's view, 285; Kant thought a non-Euclidean geometry possible in his pre-critical period, 547 (note).

Geometry, II, non Euclidean geometries; the arithmeticizing of geometry; Brouwer, Max Black; Carnap; Russell, 78; of measure and of position, 103; Poncelet's projective geometry approximates the meaning of motion, 104.

Geo Politics, III, is Ratzel's name for political geography, 500.

Gerber, III, an adherent of the formalistic positivistic constitutional legal theory, 399; juridical formalism leading to a dualistic internally contradictory constitutional theory (right versus might), 400.

Germ-Cells, III, of human beings; they refer to the mystery of the spiritual centre of human existence transcending all temporal structures, 645; germ-plasm, or idio-plasm, in Plate, 732; continuity of germ-plasm, according to Weismann, 739, 757.

Gesamterlebnis, III, in a social whole, according to Litt, 253.

Gesinnungsethik, I, of Kant; he absolutizes the moral aspect, 49.

Gesinnungsethik, II, Kant's Gesinnungsethik was meant to replace the central religious commandment of Love; Categorial Imperative is the ‘pure form’ of the ethical law, 149.

Gestures, II, deictic, mimic gestures, 126.

Geworfenheit, II, in Heidegger, 22.

Gibbon, Edw., II, followed Voltaire, 350.

Gierke, Otto, II, Genossenschaftsrecht, 394, 395; Deutsches Privatrecht, 413; cf. 344.

Gierke, Otto, II, on the Roman conceptions of a rēs, 393; the construction of ‘rights to rights’, 394, 395; he holds that the real object of a right can only be the specific object-sphere of the rēs affected by this right, 408; personality rights and copyright, 412, 413.

Gierke, Otto, III, Deutsches Genossenschaftsrecht, 205, 206, 233, 234, 235, 673, 676, 677, 678, 685, 688; Joh. Althusius, 232; Die Grundbegriffe des Staatsrechts, 394, 399, 400, 406; Deutsches Privatrecht, 662, 670, 687, 688.

Gierke, Otto, III, holds that the corpora ex distantibus (of Stoic philosophy) are limited to human communities and animal herds, only developed and held together by the psychical social impulse, 226; on the canonist view of organized communities as personae fictae, 233; types of societal wholes are viewed as persons with a ‘spiritual’ organic articulation with a separate soul (the will of the corporation) and their body is the organization; this is metaphysics; the internal law of the ‘Verbände’ had formal juridical autonomy, 245; G. was aware of the difference between communal and inter-individual, and inter-communal relations; he distinguished ‘Individualrecht’ from ‘Sozialrecht’, 247; the differentia specifica of the State institution, 394; State and law are two different and independent aspects of communal life, 399; State and law are interdependent although entirely different aspects of communal life; the State is the historical form of the political organization of a national community, 400; organized communities are

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‘spiritual personal organisms’, 406; distinguishes between ‘Obrigkeitsstaat’ and ‘Volksstaat’, 435; he is an adherent of the Germanist wing of the Historical School of Jurisprudence, 462; his view of the craft guilds, 676; and of the internal unity of the Craft guilds, 677; the guilds possessed an independent public law of their own, 678; he splits up legal human subjectivity into that of an individual and that of a member of a communal whole, 689.

Gilson, I, a Neo-Thomist; he speaks of ‘Christian Philosophy’, 524.

Gland Cells, III, 772.

Gneist, Rudolph, III, Der Rechtsstaat, 430.

Gneist, Rudolph, III, his civil juridical view of the State, 430.

Gnosticism, I, a danger to early Christianity; it separated creation and redemption, 177.

God, I, in Kant God is the postulate of practical Reason, 67; Rousseau's belief about a personal God, 191; God is absolutized mathematical thought in Descartes, 196; He is ‘universal harmony’ in Leibniz, 234; in Kant He is the practical original Being, 350; in Fichte He is the moral order, 459.

God, II, is the idea of the good and the beautiful in Plato, 10; the actual nous in Aristotle, 11; ens realissimus in Scholasticism, 20; God is the pure actual form in Aristotle; the Archè, 26; the sovereign Creator and Lawgiver of reality in the Christian religion, 30; meaning is religious dependence on God, 31; God as the unmoved mover in Thomism, 39; God is only the Cause of everything in the sense of the transcendental Idea of origin, 40; God as prima causa, 41; God's act of creation is revealed in the Scriptures; this revelation appeals to ourselves in the religious root of our existence, 52; God's guidance in history, 233, 290; intellectus archetypus in Kant, 501; the Idea of God in Scheler's thought, 589, 590, 592.

God, III, His transcendence and immanence according to Marlet, 72.

God's Guidance in History, I, according to Von Stahl, 488, 489.

Goebel, K. v., III, Organographie der Planzen, 777.

Goethe, W., I, quotation from ‘Faust’ adapted to Anaximander's philosophy, 67; the activistic ideal of personality permeates all the expressions of the Sturm und Drang period and concentrates itself, as it were, in Goethe's Faust with its typical utterance: ‘Im Anfang war die Tat’, 452; Faust formulates the irrational philosophy of feeling of the Sturm und Drang in the utterance: ‘Gefühl ist alles’, 453.

Goethe, II, his humanistic cosmonomic idea, 593.

Gogarten, F., II, dialectical theologian; wrote ethical works, 143.

Goiter, III, an organic disease, 647.

Golden Age, II, of mankind, in Plato; in Protagoras, 263.

Golden Age, III, the legend of the golden age in Plato; golden age of innocence, in Stoic theory, 229.

Goldenweiser, III, an adherent of Boas, 333.

Goltz, II, eye and ear, 373.

Good and Evil, II, in Nic. Hartmann, 148.

Good Life, The, III, in Aristotle's view of the polis, 203.

Good Samaritan, The, III, Jesus' Parable, 583.

Göppert, III, Über einheitliche, zusammengesetzte, und Gesammtsachen nach römischem Recht, 226.

Görland, II, Prologik, 51.

Görland, II, on the order of classes of knowledge, 51.

Gottschick, III, Zeitschr. f. Kirchengeschichte, Bd. VIII, pp. 590 ff., 518.

Grace, III, Christ is the King of Common Grace; the State has a general soteriological vocation, 506; gratia particularis changes the root of life and has a conserving effect and a regenerating operation, 524; common and particular grace, 525; regenerative grace is the root of temporal conserving grace, 527.

Grace, The Sphere of, III, is the church, the perfect society in Roman Catholic belief; the infallible interpreter of ‘natural law’, 220, 221.

Graebner, F., III, Methode der Ethnologie, 145, 332, 334, 335.

Graebner, F., III, We can only experience the objective reality of things connected with the sacred character of the community to which they belong if we sympathize with such a community; this fact is important for the ethnological ascertainment of the objective destination of primitive utensils, 144, 145; he is an adherent of the theory of the cultural orbits, 333; ‘mixed and contact cultures’ are of a secondary character, 334.

Grammar, II, pure (Husserl), 224; pure signification, 224, 225.

Grand, G. Guy, III, La démocratic de l'après-guerre, 479.

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Graszmann, II, Ausdehnungslehre, 171.

Gratia Communis, I, God maintains the fallen cosmos in His common grace by His creating Word; the redeemed creation shall finally (175) be freed from its participation in the sinful root of human nature, and shall shine forth in higher perfection, 176; Christian philosophy recognizes in common grace a counter force against the destructive work of sin in the cosmos; this grace is not to be dualistically opposed to particular grace; Calvin subordinated ‘gratia communis’ to ‘gratia particularis’ and to ‘the honour and glory of God’; Common grace is meaningless without Christ as the root and head of regenerated mankind; it is grace shown to mankind as a whole, which is regenerate in its new root Jesus Christ, but has not been loosened from its old apostate root, 523.

Greece, Ancient, III, Attic and Dorian phylae; phulobasileis; patrician sibs; phraties (ōbai); genē; Solon's reforms; Kleisthenes' reform; the Pisistratidae; phraties become cult-communities, 369.

Green, I, Introduction (to the Ist part of Hume's works), 282, 288, 305.

Green, I, rejects Riehl's interpretation of David Hume, 282; Green thinks that Hume saw the impossibility of reducing arithmetic to sensory relations, 288; Locke's theory of the freedom of the will again evokes an intrinsic antinomy with his science-ideal, 305.

Gregorius VII, III, viewed the church as the hierarchy of a sacramental institution of grace transcending all the secular relationships as the absolute, perfect society, 511.

Gregorius of Rimini, I, was more Nominalistic than Occam, 225.

Grenz Situation, II, the animal structure of the human body can freely manifest itself in limiting situations, 114.

Groen van Prinsterer, Guillaume, II, his adage: it is written and it has happened, 192.

Groen van Prinsterer, Guillaume, III, Ongeloof en Revolutie, 478.

Groen van Prinsterer, Guillaume, III, Dutch Christian historian; opposed v. Haller's patrimonial conception as the ‘Christian Germanic State-Idea’ to the classical republican idea defended by the a-priori natural law doctrine; he abandoned this reactionary view for that of F.J. Von Stahl, 478.

Gronovius, III, Ad Grotiam de jure Belli ac Pacis, 316.

Grosche, R., Der hl. Thomas von Aquin, 12.

Grosse, Ernst, III, Die Formen der Familie und die Formen der Wirtschaft, 359.

Grosse, Ernst, III, criticized the evolutionist theory of the rise of the natural family, 331; the influence of economic factors on the formation of patriarchal joint families and sib relationships, 359.

Grotius, Hugo, I, he externally follows the Aristotelian Thomistic doctrine of the appetitus socialis, but in his theory authority and obedience have no natural foundation; they must be described ‘more geometrico’ out of the simplest elements, i.e. the free and autonomous individuals; the construction of the social contract, 311; he conceived of the social contract in a formal sense like Hobbes and Pufendorff, 319.

Grotius, Hugo II, De jure belli ac pacis, 359; De jure praedae, 407; Mare liberum, 407; cf. 167, 395.

Grotius, Hugo, II, the doctrine of natural law, 167; my own rights are all that others are forced to respect on account of the legal order, 395; he denied England's and Portugal's claims to the property of the open sea, 407.

Grotius, Hugo, III, De Jure Belli ac Pacis, 212; Inl. H. Rechtsgel., 316.

Grotius, Hugo, III, his natural law doctrine used the Stoic idea of mankind as an all-inclusive temporal community for his foundation of international law, 169; he denied that ‘distributive justice’ has a juridical sense; he ascribed a moral sense to it; he summarizes natural law in four main principles pertaining to inter-individual relationships, 212; his theory of the contractual state and the Stoic ‘social instinct’, 232; marriage is a contractual relationship giving rise to mutual iura in rē, viz., the right of using each other's body, 316.

Group, II, theory of number, 173.

Group Marriage, III, according to Frazer, 340.

Groups, III, particular and all-inclusive groups according to Gurvitch, 164; the term ‘group’, 176.

Group-Tradition, II, at a primitive stage of culture civilization seems to be immersed in a lethargic group-tradition, 245; guarded by the historical authorities in primitive societies, 259.

Grünbaum, III, Herrschen und Lieben, 71.

Guardian and Ward, III, their legal relation, 279.

Guidance, II, God's guidance in history, in the thought of v. Stahl, 249.

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Guilds, III, are fraternities, primitive associations, generally embrace the children under age of the guild brothers; this is an institutional trait; they may include different trade unions, cult communities, political organizations, etc., but the principle of the kinship community has the lead; medieval towns and rural viciniages were organized as guilds; guilds also exist in primitive peoples; villae, domaines, indicated as ‘familiae’ also included an agricultural business; feudal vassalage and Germanic trustis were connected with the domestic community of the seigneur, 367; they might be under the lead of a political structure with military power, but did not constitute a real state, 368; Binder's definition; the oldest are Frankish and Anglo-Saxon, 673; later forms, 674; and the sources of law, 675; the guild ban is only concerned with the positive existential form of the craft organization, 676.

Guild Socialism, III, according to Harold Laski, 387.

Guilt, I, the concept of guilt in Greek and Humanistic philosophy has a dialectical character, and consists in a depreciation of an abstract complex of functions of the created cosmos in opposition to another, and deified, complex; Kant's ‘radical evil’ is opposed to the Bible, 175.

Guilt II, good faith, good morals, etc. are limiting functions of the juridical aspect, 185.

Gunn, J. Alexander, I, The Problem of Time, 32.

Günther, III, Rassenkunde des deutschen Volkes, 496.

Gurvitch, Georges, I, Sociology of Law, 495.

Gurvitch, Georges, I, elaborated Fichte's view of the relation between a nation and a State, 495.

Gurvitch, Georges, III, Sociology of Law, 164, 667.

Gurvitch, Georges, III, all-inclusive and particular societies, 164, 165; competence in partic. groups, 667; he avoids the dilemma between mechanistic and vitalistic biology, 733.