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| Face, II, Human face shows logical thought in a concrete act of thinking, 377. |
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| Facts, I, Locke distinguished empirical facts from the necessary relations between concepts, 269. |
| Facts, II, Bayle discovered that historical facts are not given to scientific enquiry, but that science has to analyse them, 353. |
| Facts, III, can only be conceived in their structural meaning, 330. |
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| Facts and Norms, II, this Kantian distinction is advanced by Leendertz against the normative conception of God's guidance in history, 233. |
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| Faculty Psychology, II, modern psychology conceived feeling as one of the chief classes of Erlebnisse and co-ordinated it with volition and knowing as the two other classes. This misconception is due to the faculty psychology of the 18th century since Rousseau, especially to Tetens and Kant, 111. |
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Fairchild, H.P., III,
Dictionary of Sociology, 177. |
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| Faith, I, the modal meaning of faith is related to divine revelation; it is an eschatological aspect of cosmic time; and groups the eschaton and that which is or happens beyond the limits of cosmic time; e.g. the days of creation; the order in which regeneration precedes conversion, etc.; this aspect should not be identified with the historical modus, 33; faith is bound to Holy Scripture and the Church Tradition; the Bible becomes a law book, in Occam, 184; the faith in the validity of mathematics is a product of the imagination and of psychical association, according to Hume, 289; Jacobi opposes emotional faith to the understanding, 458, 459; faith and reason, in Luther, 513. |
| Faith, II, ecclesiastical power, 69; faith power, 71; primitive popular faith and legal life, 183; historical development of faith, 291; of Humanism; Weber's Religions Soziologie; substrata of faith, 292; and Marxism; Weber's Die Protestantische Ethik und der Geist des Kapitalismus, 293; faith and the meaning of history; civitas Dei and civitas terrena; Christ the consommation of historical power, 294; fear of natural powers is the content of primitive faith; deification of natural powers, 297; faith is not identical with religion; we must distinguish the subjective function, the root, the principium, content and direction; Kuyper's view of pistis, 298; the heart and faith; direction of faith; Kuyper's provisional definition, his material circumscription; faith and intuitive evidence, 299; Kuyper discusses sub-functional anticipations of faith; faith and imago Dei; Common Grace; its direction after the fall into sin; Thomas Aquinas' actus intellectus given by supernatural grace; Troeltsch and Otto psychologize faith; Barth's view of Christian faith as a new creation; regeneration and faith; faith is not a new creation, 300; Barth's Scholastic dualism, 301; natural man's impotence to have faith in Christ; sin is not a counter power but derives its power from creation; faith and the heart; Christ's work in the heart, 302; the dynamics of faith; faith and science; church and state; the identification of religion and faith leads to the view that religion is a special department of life; Volkelt's view of faith as cognitive intuition, 303; Husserl's Glaube is noetic sensory perception, doxa, not certainty; this refers to a faith anticipation in sensory experience; the nuclear meaning of faith is transcendental certainty
related to divine revelation; there is no concept of faith possible, 304; its lawside is the faith aspect of Revelation; revelation is expressed in all creation; faith and culture cohere; progressive revelation; its historical aspect; dynamics; development, 305; faith in a closed and in a deepened state; general revelation and particular revelation (in the Scriptures), 306; the Word revelation is universally intended; with Abraham came revelatio particularis; Israel; revelation to a community, not to individuals; Christ as Root and Head of reborn humanity; no theologia naturalis, 307; revelation in nature disclosed by the
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| Word; idolatry; the Roman appeal to Paul's Epistle to the Romans 1:19-23; natural revelation apart from the Word turns into a law of sin, 308; Common Grace and general revelation; Common grace and Special Grace; the closed aspect of faith is the extreme limit of apostasy, 309; apostate faith has -reversed its direction away from God in the absolutization of created things; primitive faiths look like diseased mental states; restrictive faith is the running to waste of faith; Christian faith is deepened by its openness to the Word after the regeneration of the heart, 310; regeneration reverses the direction of faith; semen religionis; paganism; elements of truth in apostate faith and philosophy, falsified on the immanence standpoint, 311; magic; Frazer's opinion, 312; worship of nature and of death; animism; polytheism; montheism, 313; magic and idolatry are interrelated; Beth's and Vierkandt's discoveries of a pre-magical cultural stage, 314; the restrictive revelational principle is not the original phase; the biotic sensory substrata of a closed society are deified; Eduard von Hartmann on faith in nature, 315; the restrictive revelational principle turns into a curse; personality becomes diffuse; mana; personal and impersonal, natural and supernatural are merged; taboo, 316; heno theism; Max Müller; split personality at initiation; totemism, 317; Bergson, Durkheim's views; Cassirer's criticism; moral analogies in faith in primitive cults, 318, 319; the opening process; Greek aesthetic humanizing of polytheism; Hesiod's theogony; the gods of measure, order, and harmony; Homer; personal cultural gods; Cassirer's view, 320; he identifies faith and religion; natural and cultural religions; art and science; national consciousness, gods;
Olympians; the expansion of the normative lawspheres; Orphism; deified nous undermines polytheism; self-reflection, 321; transcendental selfconsciousness; faith anticipates the revelation of the deity in the selfhood; man becomes aware of his freedom to devise idols, 322; the principle of divine revelation in the order of creation; man transcends his own self in the central relation to his Origin; positive and negative opening of faith; Cassirer's view, 323; the self is identified with some normative function; Egypt; the juridical and the moral function; immortality; Osiris the judge; Iranian belief; Veda, rita; the Upanishads, âtman, Brahman, 324; mythical consciousness; mythos and logos; mythos atheos; myth and magic; and fiction, 325; âtman of the Upanishads is not a primitive magical form of faith; Kant's idea of the transcendental logical subject is a Humanistic article of the faith in reason, hence a myth; a logical unity without multiplicity! not every faith is mythical; myth is fictitious; though not like a tale or a legend; its time aspect; myth falisfies Revelation; misinterprets truth; the pistic interpretation of the Deus absconditus experience, 326; Plato's nous was a myth; Descartes' and Leibniz' intellectus archetypus; the self was identified with mathematical thought; the image of their mathematical god; Kant's homo noumenon is the image of his moralistic god; Hume and Kant had a mythical idea of the temporal coherence; the profane and the sacred; Brahman-âtman; faith versus maya: noumenon-phenomenon; Plato's me on and apeiron; Leibniz' peras as the metaphysical evil; the myth of deterministic nature and creative human freedom, 327; naturalistic thought and transcendental thought are mythical; not in a restrictive
structure of faith but of deepened pistis; mana faith separates the profane from the sacred, 328; the mysterious is magical; Lévy-Brühl thinks that primitive thought is pre-logical; he influenced Cassirer, 329; mythical thought is pistological and so is the faith in reason, 330; the dualism of faith and scientific thought, 334; the faith in science and the personality-ideal, 357; the faith in ‘reason’ determines Kant's doctrine of Ideas, 492; in Nominalism, 564. |
| Faith, III, of totemistic clans arose from economic causes, according to W. Koppers, 360. |
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| Fall into Sin, II, has obfuscated our experiential horizon, 549. |
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| Family, the Human, III, its six stages of development, according to L.H. Morgan, 331; extended family as a societal interlacement, 653; the internal psychical interlacements between the members of a family: authority and respect, 294; interlacement with national feeling, feelings of social standing, etc., 295; in the biotic aspect of the temporal existence of the members of a family there are structural communal interweavings, 299; they function in an anticipatory way under the guidance of the moral family bond, 300; the same holds for the members' physico-chemical and spatial relations, their origin in the female ovarian cell and the male sperm; the care of their bio-physical existence is guided by love; the spatial centre of the home, 301; a harem is only enkaptically interwoven with the marriage bond, an unnatural enkapsis, 305; in primitive societies in India the pirraura relations are abnormal sexual relations interwoven in an external enkapsis with marriage, 341. |
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| Farming Business, A Mixed, III, is an enkaptic interlacement, 652. |
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| Fascism, III, its conception of the cosmos; it is a mental attitude in reaction to the superficial materialism of the nine- |
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| teenth century, according to Mussolini, 414; the Fascist State is a will to power; the myth; Fascism was State-minded, 415; its economic autarchy concept, 484. |
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| Fashion, III, and the leading houses, 591; is an integrating factor in inter-individual social relations, 592; fashion in sporting-clothes, etc., 661. |
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| Fate, II, in Spengler, replaces the concept of causality, 283. |
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| Fechner, G.Th., III on the macrocosm; the somatic-spiritual individual Super-being; his pantheism, 630, 631. |
Fechner, G.Th., III,
Zend-Avesta oder über die Dinge des Himmels und des Jenseits, 631. |
| Fechner, G.Th., III, our bodies belong to the larger, or higher, individual body of the earth, just as our spirits belong to the larger and higher spirit of the earth; the spirit of the earth is not the sum total of the earthly individual spirits, but their unified higher, conscious coherence embracing them all; our individuality, independence and freedom are only relative; the earth and all other stars are individual animate beings, 631. |
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| Feeling, I, F. Brentano ascribes an intentional relation to feeling as a Gegenstand, 52; according to Fichte naïve man's emotional belief grasps reality, 458. |
| Feeling, II, is the nuclear moment in the psychical lawsphere, 111; is universal, and implied in every Erlebnis as a quality of the totality of our inner experience, 111, 112; is characterized by its polarity; sensations are elementary subjective feeling phenomena referring to objective sensory qualities of things or events. Indifference is also a feeling attitude, 116, 117; feeling in animals has a closed structure, 184; is absolutized in Hume, 332; of bloodrelationship, 424. |
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| Feeling of Justice, II, the feeling aspect must first be deepened in its anticipatory spheres, before there can be any differentiation in the feeling of justice, 177. |
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| Ferment, III, its effect is chemical, 730. |
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| Feudalism, II, the rise of feudalism in the Frankish kingdom, 252. |
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Fichte, J.J., I,
Wissenschaftslehre, 78, 90, 417-425, 428-432, 437, 440-448, 455, 479;
Zweite Einleitung in die Wissenschaftslehre, 301;
Die Bestimmung des Menschen, 449, 450; Grundrisz des Eigentümlichen der W.L. in Rücksicht auf das theoretische Vermögen, 433;
Transzendentale Logik, 449;
Die Tatsachen des Bewusstseyns, 449,461; Grundlage der gesammten Wissenschaftslehre, 401, 414, 415, 416, 434-437;
Ueber den Begriff der Wissenschaftslehre, 415;
Appellation an das Publikum gegen die Anklage des Atheismus, 438;
Ueber die Würde des Menschen, 447;
Aus einem Privatschreiben, 438;
Grundlage des Naturrechts, 436;
Ueber den Grund unseres Glaubens an eine göttliche Weltregierung, 438;
Rückerinnrungen, Antworten, Fragen, 455, 456, 458;
Werke II, 458, 461, 473, 474;
Werke IV, 459, 461, 475, 487, 488, 489, 490, 491, 492;
Werke VII, 459, 477, 478, 480, 481, 482, 483, 484, 485, 486, 494;
Grundzüge des gegenwärtigen Zeitalters, 459;
Sonnenklarer Bericht an das grössere Publikum über das eigentliche Wesen der neuesten Philosophie, 455, 460;
Reden an die deutsche Nation, 479, 494;
Letter to Schelling, 477;
Werke V, 492. |
| Fichte, I, the ‘thinking ego’ has a reflexive-logical sense in the ‘Wissenschaftslehre’, 78; Litt identifies ‘pure’ reflexive thought and being (like Fichte and Hegel), 79; ‘practical freedom’ is the hypothesis of his epistemology in the first edition of his ‘Wissenschaftslehre’; he introduced a dialectical logic in order to bridge the Kantian gulf between epistemology and ethics; the postulate of continuity implied in the freedom motive broke through the boundaries accepted by Kant with respect to the theoretical use of the transcendental Idea of freedom, 90; he is the father of the dialectical way of thinking; he spoke of the tension between ‘absolute ego’ and ‘thinking ego’, 142; he refused to hypostatize theoretical thought, in his Kantian period; to him the root of the selfhood was in the ‘practical’, not in ‘theoretical’ reason, 143; the concept of substance is antinomous; so is that of the ‘Ding an sich’, 301 (note); the development of the conception of the Idea displays a dialectical tension, 329; the Idea of autonomous freedom is elevated to the all-inclusive root and origin of the cosmos, 358; he eliminated the natural ‘Ding an sich’ and proclaimed the ethical ideal of personality to be the deepest root of the cosmos, 362; F. accepted the domination of the personality ideal over nature at the expense of the science ideal, 390; in his first ‘Wissenschaftslehre’ the dialectical development of transcendental freedom idealism (413) took its start from the transcendental reflection upon the Idea of freedom as the hypothesis of the science Ideal; he abandoned the concept ‘Naturding an sich’; all functions of consciousness are referred to their absolute, transcendent root, viz., the
selfconsciousness as absolutely free ego; this ego creates itself by means of a free prac- |
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| tical act (Tathandlung); it is the dynamic totality of activity; from it originates the entire cosmos; even necessity is a product of the activity of the absolute -I-, 414; his highest principle is: the ego posits itself; the ego is the origin of the analytical principles and elevated above all logical determination; but the first principle of the doctrine of science proclaims the absolute sovereignty of ‘practical reason’ in the sense of the Humanist ideal of moral freedom, 415; the absolute ego's first ‘Tathandlung’ is thinking of itself; the laws of this reflection are tacitly pre-supposed as known and established; this absolute ego must be qualified as a mere hypostatizing of the universal concept ‘ego’ as the totality of reason; it is the absolute free activity of the moral function hypostatized in the personality ideal, 416; the Humanistic continuity postulate required mathematical thought to produce a cosmos of its own according to the mathematical science ideal, and similarly the same continuity postulate drove the Humanistic personality ideal to exceed the modal boundaries of the aspects and to elevate the moral function to their basic denominator; natural necessity became a product of the hypostatized moral freedom; ‘theoretical’ reason, practical reason, and faculty of judgment are no longer mutually isolated, but are related to the root of selfconsciousness viewed by Fichte as freely creative moral activity; the ego is the absolute subject; every category is derived from it; everything to which it may be applied has its reality transferred from the ego to itself, 417; the logical principle of identity is merely the form of the conclusion from ‘being posited’ to ‘being’, abstracted from the proposition ‘I am’ by the elimination of the
content implied in the ego; A is A is an A created and activated in the ego; the ego is not static but infinite activity, therefore identity is not an immobile logical form but an infinite task in the determination of the cosmos; the mode of activity of the human mind, disclosed in the logical form of the jugdment of identity, is the category of reality; this category is reduced by Fichte to the absolute ego as actual origin of all reality; its relation to sense experience is not based on the ‘natural thing in itself’, but on the absolute ego; the logical judgment of contradiction is also referred to the first principle of the doctrine of science, 418; the principles of identity and contradiction are found among the ‘facts of empirical consciousness’; logic cannot justify them ultimately; in the judgment: non-A is not A we can ask: has indeed non-A been posited, and under what condition of the form of the mere act has it then been posited? logical antithesis is an absolute act of the ego; it is possible only on the condition of the unity of consciousness in its thesis and antithesis; originally nothing is posited but the ego; all opposition must be made with reference to this ego; but the antithesis of the ego is the non-ego; ‘to the ego a non-ego is opposed’, from this material judgment Fichte derives the principle of contradiction; further abstraction leads to Kant's second category, viz., that of negation; like all other categories it is a dialectical point of transition to the ego's consciousness of itself as infinite free activity; in the second principle of the doctrine of science there is an overt antinomy; the non-ego (i.e. nature) is to be posited only in the ego as absolute totality, 419; but as antithesis it cancels the ego; ‘thus the second principle is opposed to itself and cancels itself’; but the third principle requires the synthesis of
ego and non-ego: ‘The ego posits the non-ego in the ego by limitation of itself; further abstraction leads to the category of determination; in Fichte's thought dialectical thought usurps the task of the cosmic order; thus the boundaries of the modal spheres are relativized; the absolutized moral aspect is conceived as an unlimited totality from which by division the limited, finite functions must originate, 420; Fichte's basic denominator is formulated in his statement: “Our world is the material of our duty, rendered sensible; this is the authentically real in things, the true basic matter of all appearance”; the moral function is thus torn out of the cosmic temporal coherence and becomes a meaningless form and no totality of meaning; Fichte's “Wissenschaftslehre” raises “ethics to the position of metaphysics” (Kroner); speculative dialect demands that the thesis of the “absolute ego” should not fall outside the dialectical system; F.'s absolute ego of the thesis is separated by him from the limited ego of the antithesis, 421; F.'s dialectical system in the “Wissenschaftslehre” is only concerned with the finite ego; the absolute synthesis remains an infinite task; here the Idea of the absolute ego as ethical task makes its entry; the predicate of freedom can hold for man insofar as he is an absolute Subject who has nothing in common with the natural being and is not even opposed to it; freedom and natural necessity should be united in the Idea of the ego as undetermined by anything outside of itself; this Idea is contradictory, but nevertheless set up as our highest practical goal; the final antinomy in the dialectical system cannot be reconciled logically, only ethically, 422; F.'s Wissenschaftslehre attempts to clear up the problem of the epistemological synthesis by relating the latter to the root of the
self-consciousness, 423; the root of self-consciousness is the “homo noumenon”; the synthesis is
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| then rooted in antinomy; the antithetical relation in theoretical thought becomes a logical contradiction in a dialectical sense; he derives Kant's categories of quantity and quality by abstraction from the absolute ego; later on he does the same thing to the categories “substance”, “inherence”’ ‘causality’, ‘interaction’ starting from the synthesis between reasonable freedom and sensory nature, 424; he tries to derive the science ideal from the personality ideal by the way of the continuity implied in the freedom motive; ‘everything reproduces itself and there is no hiatus possible; from any single term one is driven to all the rest’, 425; Fichte searches for the radical unity of philosophical reflection in a selfhood beyond the theoretical diversity of syntheses; he shows insight into the continuous coherence of the cosmos; but his insight is misdirected by his Humanistic cosmonomic Idea; the limits that reason sets to itself rest on free self-limitations of reason itself; ultimately the absolute synthesis should be effected by the hypostatized ethical thought of ‘practical reason’; there is one function which achieves this absolute synthesis creating form and content alike, 426; to Fichte it is ‘the power of productive imagination’ proclaimed the free creating origin of sensory matter; it is theoretical and practical; determining theoretical thought posits rigid conceptual boundaries and cannot bring about the highest synthesis; it remains confined in the final antinomy between the free infinite ego and the finite ego limited by the non-ego; they can be synthesized only in the concept of mere determinability, not in that of determination, 427; the boundaries between the finite ego and the finite non-ego in the infinite ego are relativized to attain to the final theoretical synthesis, which
is grasped as ‘determinability’; the ego posits itself as finite and as infinite at the same time; this change of the ego in and with itself is the faculty of imagination, 428; it is thetic, antithetic and synthetic activity; making consciousness possible through reflection; it is a free act not determined by any grounds; it operates prior to all reflection as pre-conscious activity; it hovers between determination and non-determination; its product is called into existence during and by means of this hovering; by ‘pre-conscious’ Fichte apparently means ‘pre-theoretical productive imagination’, 429; the productive imagination has ‘no fixed standpoint’ and keeps the mean between definiteness and indefiniteness, finitude and infinitude; thus the opposites ‘ego and non-ego’ are united; the ‘productive imagination’ is a ‘Factum’, a synthesis, and a function of feeling; a comparison with Kant's transcendental ‘productive imagination’, 430; F. sought a ‘pre-logical’ function of the ego as a link between understanding and sensibility, a link that exceeded the theoretical antithesis; only our cosmic self-consciousness can grasp the deeper unity of all the aspects of reality; but a ‘function of feeling’ (Fichte's idea) cannot accomplish an interfunctional synthesis, 431; Fichte holds that an explanation of the occurrences in our mind is impossible without absolute opposites; these occurrences rest on the productive power of imagination which can only exist if absolute opposites appear as fully unsuited to the power of apprehension, 432; Fichte supposes he has cancelled dogmatic idealism and dogmatic realism in a higher critical idealism; in his ‘Grundrisz’ of 1795 he follows the reverse method in comparison with his earlier
work; he starts from the ‘fact’ of consciousness; the ego sets itself in opposition to itself; in producing itself it also produces the non-ego by imagination, creates sensory impressions, as parts of the ego itself and finds itself in them; so it transcends the sensory function and makes the sensory perceptions its own; this activity cannot cease before the selfhood has become conscious of the ego having produced the non-ego in itself; in the long run sensation changes into the object of intuition and experience, and the latter into the transcendentally conceived ‘Gegenstand’ of epistemology, until finally ‘theoretical reason’ becomes conscious of itself as creating the ‘Gegenstand’; empirical reality is phenomenality of nature constituted in a synthesis of sensory and logical functions, but without a ‘natural thing in itself’; the non-ego gives the ego the impulse necessary for mental representation, 434; the guiding thesis of the ‘doctrine of science’ was: ‘the ego posits itself as determined by the non-ego’; it also implies the guiding thesis of the practical ‘doctrine of science’: ‘the ego posits itself as determining the non-ego’,, 435; in this ‘practical part’ an account is given of the reduction of the theoretical to the practical reason; the restless dialectical movement of the theoretical reason depends on sensation, the first limit the ego sets to itself; the first impulse for the development of the entire dialectical series, i.e., sensory impression, makes ‘theoretical reason’ possible and is not to be derived from it; in its innermost nature the ego is ‘practical’, the root of personality and nature is in the moral function; the ego operates causally upon the non-ego; the antinomy between the ego as absolute being and its dependence and limitation as intelligence should be overcome; the
non-ego must remain opposed to the ego if the I-ness is not to become an empty form, 436; the free infinite ego ought continually to set limits to itself as ‘in- |
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| telligence’ by an objective non-ego, in order to provide its infinite striving activity with a resistance to be overcome giving content to this striving; without striving there is no object; therefore the practical reason is the basis of the theoretical; (‘Kant's categorical imperative’); the root of selfconsciousness is the hypostatized moral function, 437; the finite, moral, practical ego can have no other goal for its infinite striving than to become absolute; the tension between form and matter, consciousness and being, freedom and nature, personality-and science-ideal, should be eliminated in the absolute Ego (the Divinity). Kroner says: ‘even the absolute Ego needs the “impulse” if it is to be an ego’, 438; the theoretical ego is necessarily coherent with the practical; it must reflect on its being limited; practical and theoretical ego are the same, striving being their common root, 439; he supposes that he has destroyed fatalism by referring to the absolute freedom of reflection and abstraction and to the possibility of man's focusing attention to something according to moral duty, 440; the sensory ego is driven forward by itself to become a self-knowing intelligence, and the ego dominated by sensual impulses becomes the ego determining itself as ‘pure ethical’ will; in the ego there is an original striving to ‘fill out infinity’; a Trieb (i.e. impulse) is a self-producing striving; the impulse to reflection (Reflexionstrieb) is also an ‘impulse toward the object’; feeling is the expression of a suffering, a passivity, an inability; it is united most intimately with activity: I feel - I am the feeling subject - and this activity is reflection - a
limitation - I feel, I am passive, 441; this limitation supposes an impulse to go beyond it; that which wills, needs, embraces nothing more, is - naturally with respect to itself - unlimited, and thus satisfied and not satisfied; the course of Fichte's deductions, 442; a longing drives the ego in itself beyond itself and discloses an outer-world in the ego; causality is fulfilment of desire; compulsion arises through the limitation of longing by the non-ego, its object is something real; the object of the longing has no reality (the ego in itself has no causality, which would cancel it as ‘pure activity’) but ought to have it in consequence of the longing which seeks reality; both objects stand in antinomic relation to each other (nature and freedom); the reality felt determines (limits) the ego which as such determines itself (in the reflection about the feeling); its longing becomes the impulse to determine itself, and this reality, 443; in the longing arises the Empfindungstrieb, the drive toward knowledge, striving to regain for the ego the natural object created by it, not yet experienced by the ego as its own; it strives to represent the object in the I-ness; the limit is felt as felt, i.e., as created in the ego by the ego; by a new reflection the sensory feeling changes into an intuition; intuition sees, but is empty; feeling is related to reality, but is blind; the feeling ego must keep pace with the intuition which views what is felt as something contingent in the object, 444; the impulse toward a change of feelings is the disclosure of the longing; the changed feeling must be intuited as changed if the ego is to be able to reflect about the impulse to change its feelings; approbation; its opposite is displeasure, 445; the synthesis in the approbation may not be performed by the spectator, i.e., theoretically, but the ego itself must perform it; intuition and impulse alike must be understood as determined and
self-determining; the drive towards change, that towards mutual determination of the ego through itself, that towards absolute unity and perfection in the ego; the absolute drive; the categorical imperative is merely formal without any object, 446; ‘Thou shalt’ is an eternal task never to be fully accomplished; in Fichte's identity philosophy the personality ideal has absorbed the science-ideal along the line of the continuity postulate of freedom, but at the cost of sanctioning the antinomy; his hymn on the dignity of man, 447; the Faustian passion for power turned into the power ideal of the personality, 448; in the science-ideal ‘nature’ is hypostatized in its mathematical and mechanical functions for the sake of the continuity postulate; in Fichte ‘nature’ only has meaning as material for the performance of our duty; he could not project a natural philosophy, 449; in Kant's dualistic world-picture the antinomy between the science- and the personality ideal implied the recognition of both factors; Fichte converted this antinomy into a contradiction within the personality ideal itself between free activity (spontaneity) and bondage to the resistance of the ‘lower’ nature, or between ‘Idea’ and sense; to Fichte the world is the posited contradiction, and dialetic is the method to know it, 450; in his second period, since 1797, there are no new viewpoints with respect to the dialectical development of Humanistic thought; but under the influence of Jacobi's philosophy of feeling Fichte's third period showed a new trend, an irrationalistic conception of the Humanistic personality ideal, 451; his connections with the ‘Sturm und Drang’; his titanic activity motive and strong voluntarism is congenial with this ‘Storm and Stress’ glorifying
the ‘activity of the genius’; Sturm und Drang artistically expressed in its ego-drama; activity and selfhood are the two poles in this world ouf thought; Goethe's Faust; Schiller's ‘Rauber’: ‘the law did not yet form a
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| single great man, but freedom hatches colossuses and extremities’; Hamann's ‘Sokratische Dekwürdigkeiten’, 452; Fichte separates theoretical knowledge from real life; real life is feeling, desire and action; speculation is only a means to form life, 455; his answer to the charge of atheism; ‘our philosophy makes life, the system of feelings and appetitions, the highest, and allows to knowledge everywhere only the looking on’, 456; F.'s view of the relation of the dialectical concept and the reality of life, and that of Hegel, who posits that the concept is first and the contents of our representations are not; in Fichte Kant's irrational ‘sensory matter of experience’ is the ‘true reality’; it is accessible to immediate feeling, not yet logically synthesized and deeply irrational; ‘all theoretical knowledge is only image... you seek after all something real residing outside the mere image’..., 457; this ‘something’ can only be embraced by belief, not by science; like Jacobi Fichte considers belief to be the diametrical opposite of cognitive thought, 458; the true reality is discovered only by belief rooted in the immediate feeling of the drive to absolute, independent discovery of true reality to vital feeling alone in his third period; however, he concludes with the eulogy of the ‘Wissenschaftslehre’; it will free the whole of mankind from blind chance and destroy fate, 459; he now recognizes both the value of ‘empirical individuality’, and feeling as an immediate source of knowledge of reality; such individuality has an inner value as being rooted in the individuality of the moral ego itself, 460; Kant's categorical imperative now has to read: ‘Act in conformity with your individual destination and your
individual situation; in the individuality of the empirical world is disclosed the material of our individual duty; in each act of perceiving and knowing is concealed a ‘practical’ kernel of feeling; the principium individuationis is sought in feeling as the concentration point of knowledge; the transcendental critical line of thought never vanishes from Fichte's Wissenschaftslehre, the irrationalist philosophy of feeling never gained a complete victory in it; Fichte tries to individualize the contents of his activistic and moralistic personality ideal in the cadre of its universally valid form, 461; the change in his valuation of individuality brought Fichte to a speculative metaphysics that was completely different from his earlier identity philosophy; there was a general and growing opposition to Kantian criticism; ‘Criticism’ had vested all value in the universally valid forms of reason and depreciated the individual, as the transcendental irrational; Kant had raised the problem of individuality only within the frame of his form-matter schema, except in his Aesthetics; the freedom motive began its contest against the old rationalist science-ideal under the inspiration of problems of the philosophy of culture, 470; Fichte's ‘metaphysics of the spirit’; he formulates the question of the individual ego, 472; and that of the metaphysical foundations in being for the spiritual life; the consciousness of the other ego is essential in one's own self-consciousness; the other ego is the Thou; the plurality of spiritual beings outside myself have an altogether other mode of being with respect to me than the material external ‘world’ of ‘nature’; the reality of the world of spirits arises from the moral foundation of the ego itself; the duty to recognize every free individual as an independent moral
‘end in himself’; a metaphysical ‘synthesis of the real world of spirits’ is needed; this synthesis is that of the Absolute Being with infinite freedom; the individual ego is one of the many concentration points of the ‘Absolute Spirit’; the ego has the form of existence (‘Dasein’) from the Absolute Being, but definite, concrete, individual being from the interaction with the spiritual world; all finite selves owe their being to a transpersonal life of reason, 473; the bond of union among the spirits is their communion as individual egos, as appearances of the infinite Origin; they originate from a metaphysical actus individuationis in which time itself acquires individual points of concentration; the Spirit's Being is transpersonal being of freedom; the moral order is the transpersonal bond of union for all finite spirits, 474; the Absolute Being, because actually infinite Divinity, is eternally transcendent to reflection and knowledge, the inner real ground of the possibility of rational freedom, and as such, the absolutely irrational; all life is only image or schema of God; ‘nature’ is the reasonable ethical appearance of God, who only reveals himself in this appearance in ethical activity; God is thus the absolute hypostasis of the creative, subjective ethical stream of life, which is the transpersonal bond and totality of the individual free subjects, 475; his moral basic denominator has changed into a historical one; historical existence is the final mode of being of finite existence; the world is an infinite chain of ‘challenges’ of ‘freedom-evoking and spirit-cultivating inter-action of self-acting life-centres in creative freedom producing ever new faces from nothing’; the theme of history is that of striving upwards to freedom, 476; the higher ethos of spiritual life is in the creative historical process; through the concentration points of the great
leading personalities the absolute metaphysical Idea is realized in the Ideas of art, state, science, religion; history is
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| essentially made by great personalities, 477; natural individuality must be annihilated by the individual spirit in the historical process, 478; individuality can only be understood from the individual communities, in which alone it has temporal existence; a nation is a historical totality; he denies both the reality of abstract general concepts (universalia) like the Nominalists, and the possibility of deriving subjectivity from a law; his absolute transcendental Idea is not a universal but a totality; he rejects any hypostatization of general concepts in the sense of Platonic ideas; his system is not monistic Eleaticism, for being in the latter sense is static, in Fichte it has an essential relation to the historical process; it is the divine origin of all activity and cultural individuality; he has broken through the Critical form-matter schema, 479; but his conception of the Idea as a metaphysical totality of all individuality easily leads to a priori construction in the philosophy of history; he requires a philosopher to be able ‘to describe a-priori the whole of time and all possible periods of it’; thus his idea of a historical world-plan, which is construed a-priori and defined in a teleological sense: ‘the aim of the earthly’, 480; life of mankind is ‘the arrangement of all its relations within it with liberty according to reason; this World-plan is the Idea of the unity of the whole of human earthly life’, his five chief periods of world-history whose subject is the ‘human race’; he offers no point of contact for the science of history; the latter is handed over to the annalist; philosophy should also make a logical analysis of the general conditions of ‘empirical existence’ as the material of historical construction; his ‘logic of the historical mode of enquiry’ emphasizes the irrational character of historical experience;
Fichte's ‘transcendental-logical’ delimitation of the historical field of investigation, 481; the philosopher has to guarantee to the historian his basis and foundation; physics is the science of constant and recurrent features of existence; the science of history investigates the contents of the flowing time-series; the philosopher of history has to comprehend the facts in their incomprehensibility, clarifying their ‘contingency’, therefore, to differentiate between speculation and experience; he opposes any attempt to deduce historical facts from the infinite understanding of the Absolute Being, 482; neither the historian nor the philosopher can say anything about the origin of the world or of mankind, for there is no origin at all, 483; the relationships between the components of historical development to be known a-priori and those to be known a-posteriori; his Idea of a Normalvolk, which was dispersed over the seats of rudeness and barbarism, and had been in a perfect ‘Vernunftkultur’ through its mere existence, without any science or art; the a-priori component of history is the world-plan leading man through five periods of world-history; history in its proper form is the a-posteriori component, 484; he distinguishes true historical time from empty time; he anticipates modern phil. of life in his conception of historical time; but at this stage (485) his historical logic exhibits a fundamental hiatus; true science of history is restricted to the collection of mere facts with the exclusive criterion of the external sequence of years and centuries without any regard to their content; in the Staatslehre he discovers the logic of historical truth; he attempts the synthesis of nature and freedom in the historical field, 486; the intermediate concept is: free force; ‘dead nature’ is governed by mathematical-mechanical laws; ‘living actual freedom’ is ruled by the autonomous
moral law; the problem is: what rules ‘free force’, the realm of freedom products, i.e., that of visible, cultural freedom; then history is lawless, 487; but freedom disclosed in history possesses a hidden law-conformity, viz., the providence of the moral Deity; this law conformity is not knowable from rational concepts; it is a hidden telos, 488; in this way the law is made a simple reflection of individual free subjectivity disclosed in the ‘irrational process’, 488; it is the precipitation of the irrationalist personality ideal, and the negation of veritable historical norms; in it the nomos is merely the reflection of the autos; the individual person's membership of a particular community is a constitutive historical factor owing to the historical tradition and the ‘common spirit’ that all the members share; this leads to a universalist conception of society, viewing the latter as a ‘whole’ in relation to its ‘parts’; Fichte irrationalizes the Divine world-plan; this is now sought in the individuality of the historical matter, 489; what he posited as absolutely factual (and therefore incomprehensible), might be posited by an Understanding; history thus becomes the principium individuationis, as the synthesis of value and temporal reality; the gradual conquest of faith by the understanding is a merely formal one; it is only the qualitatively individual moral nature which, as given freedom, produces the material of history, since it becomes an individual paradigm for the producing by freedom; the concept of a moral procreation or nature of man has replaced Providence (as a Miracle); Providence is the ‘transcendental-logical condition’ for the possibility of historical experience, 490; the miraculous is further transferred from the individual to com- |
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| munities viewed as ‘individual totalities’; we must conceive the appearance of freedom
as a totality absolutely closed in time, and therefore we must assume some society possessing by its mere existence the morality to which it leads subsequent societies; this is Fichte's conception of a original ‘highly gifted people’ (das geniale Volk); historical development is the non-recurrent individual and ‘lawless’ realization of value; it is of higher value than what recurs periodically according to uniform laws of nature; the historical is the totality of what is new and creative individual, 491; nature is static being; the infinite content of ‘freedom’, the moral task, remains incomprehensible, the image of God, to be experienced only in the revelations of history; revelation is the synthesis of irrationality and originality; religious life in the historical empirical form of Jesus is the immediate individual revelation of the Idea of God in the appearance; Fichte brings all normative subject functions under a historical basic denominator; yet he denies all knowable historical determination of facts, because de-termination can only issue from a law regulating and limiting the subject functions in their infinite individual diversity, 492; his discovery of the national community of a people as an individual historical totality; under the influence of Romanticism he broke radically with the atomistic cosmopolitan view of the Enligtenment, 493; he opposes the nationality to the State; the latter is to him a mere conceptual abstraction; the former is ‘true historical reality’, which has an ‘earthly eternity’, far above the State, 494; he absolutizes nationality to the true historical revelation of the eternal spiritual community of humanity; Fichte and the Historical School; in recent times this view of the relation between nation and State has been elaborated in detail in the irrationalistic ‘pluralistic’ sociology of
Georges Gurvitch, 495; he classified philosophy into a ‘Doctrine of Science’ with a theoretical and a practical section, 529. |
| Fichte, J.J., II, 27; on juridical numerical analogies in validity, 167; Fichte and Schelling influenced the Historical School; and Neo-Kantians, 201, 232, 248; his idea of a highly gifted original people as bearers of the original civilization, 264; his theory of absolute innate human rights, 395, 421, 505. |
| Fichte, J.J., III, in his actualism the marriage bond depends on the actual subjective continuance of love between the partners; a modern irrationalistic conception, 307; his actualistic view of sexual love; he derived the essence of marriage from the bare moral notion of love, ignoring the civil juridical aspect and the internal juridical side of marriage, 318; objected to the term ‘organism’, replaced it by ‘organization’, 406; defended State education like Plato, 442. |
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| Fiction theory (of the unity of a community), III, devised by the Canonists, (sub voce Canonists), 233-234; taken over by the Humanists in their doctrine of natural law (cf. s.v. natural law), 235; the fiction theory denied the real unity of an organization and conceived of it as a mere juridical construction, 236. |
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| Fideism, III, in Emil Brunner's view of the Church, 509. |
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| Fisher, E., III, the complicated model of a polypeptid molecule projected by organic chemistry, 720. |
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Fisher, Ludwig, II,
Die Grundlagen der Philosophie und der Mathematik, 385. |
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| Flagellates, III, 772, 773. |
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| Flourens, II, on the connection between eye and ear, 373. |
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| Fluid Concept, II, in Bergson; he connects intuition with concepts in an internally contradictory way; he deprives the intuitively founded concept of every analytical delimitation and considers it as the fluid expression of ‘psychical empathy’, 481. |
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| Foraminifera, III, 107, 108, 773, 774. |
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| Force, III, in naïve experience; and energy, in Stoker's philosophy; in Leibniz' monadology; and the ‘essence’ of things; and Scheler's thought, 70. |
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| Form, II, is a dynamic principle of development in Aristotle, 558. |
| Form, III, is the nodal point of enkaptic interlacement, 703. |
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| Formative Control, II, is the original meaning nucleus, qualifying the historical sphere, 203. |
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| Formers of History, II, give cultural form to the social existence of persons (Personkultur), 198. |
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| Form-Matter Motive, I, in Greek thought, esp. in Aristotle's view of time and motion, 25; the Greek philosophical theoria was dominated by the form-matter motive. this term derives from Aristotle, 36; from the purely intentional anti-thetic structure of the theoretical attitude of thought it is inferred that the logical function is really separated from all pre-logical aspects of the body; this conclusion was directed by the dualistic form-matter motive; Thomas Aquinas held that the entire rational soul must be an immortal and purely spiritual substance because he considered it to be characterized by the theoretical activity of thought, 44; the form-matter motive dominated the classical Greek world of culture and
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| thought, 61; it originated from the encounter of pre-Homeric religion of life (a nature-religion) with the cultural religion of the Olympic gods; the former deified the eternally flowing Stream of life which was unable to fix itself in any single individual form; periodically emerging transitory beings are subjected to the horrible fate of death, anangkè or heimarmenè tychè; this matter motive was expressed, a.o., in the worship of Dionysus imported from Thrace; the Olympian religion was that of form; essentially a deification of the cultural aspect of Greek society; the form-matter motive was independent of the mythological forms it received in the old nature religions and the new Olympian culture-religion, 62; pure form in Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, is the Deity, 67; Augustinus introduced the form-matter motive into the interpretation of Genesis 1:1, 178; this motive in Leibniz, 190; this motive is applied by Kant to the moral principles; his categorical imperative is a logicistic judgment, 374; Maimon attempts to overcome the antinomy of the Critical form-matter schema, 405. |
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| Form-Matter Motive, II, in metaphysics and epistemology; Plato; Aristotle; Pythagoreans; medieval philosophy; Augustinian Scholasticism; - hylè; mè on; dynamei on; ousia delimits hylè - Plato's eidetic numbers; and geometric figures as transcendent being; the choorismos; the phenomenal world; the antinomy in this conception; dialectical logic; the ‘ideal matter of Augustinian Scholasticism; goneness and plurality in Plato; Socratian kalokagathon; rational soul; Plato's anangkè; evil; Aristotle's eidos as immanent essence, 10; Aristotle's hylè, morphè, entelechy; the universal and the individual; the soul is the form of the body; the world order is intelligible; the actual nous is the Archè of all delimitation of meaning, 11; matter is the principium individuationis; form is a constructive a priori conditon of sensory experience in Kant; Kant's epistemological use of the form-matter scheme; he calls time and space intuitional forms, and posits the transcendental consciousness, 12; the form-matter scheme is at the back of the distinction between reality and meaning, 31; form and matter in Parmenides, Anaxagoras, Socrates; Plato's synthesis of Eleatic and Heraclitean principles; being and not-being, 56; Plato's Philebus, genesis eis ousian; the Idea of the good and the beautiful; unity and verity; peras and apeiron, 57; the form-matter schema applied to law by Stammler, 209; by Simmel, 210; Aristotle's use of the form-matter schema with respect to individuality, 419. |
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| Form-Matter Motive, III, in Aristotle, 7; intelligible matter, 8; form is the cause of matter; the form of a natural composite is an ousia; deity; spirits; soul, 15; form and matter of a work of art, 127. |
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| Formal Autonomy of a Free Association, III, is a positivistic construction and cannot clarify cases of civil wrong on the part of the public administration, 686. |
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| Formalism, II, in juridical theory, 422. |
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| Formalistic School of Sociology, III, founded by Simmel, 242. |
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| Formalization, II, of the concept triangle, i.e., all meaning individuality in the spatial aspect is abstracted from such a concept, 458; triangle is a generic concept, geometrical, 459; formalizing cannot exceed the boundaries of the logical modus; false formalisms (e.g. dimension in general); Kant's transcendental logical categories and forms of sensory intuition, 459; the limits of formalization, 495. |
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| Formal Logic, II, cannot be purely analytical; it is a formalized logic, examining the analytical aspect; it eliminates analytical individuality and all total individuality structures, 464. |
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| Forms of Thought, II, empirical reality is the synthetically arranged sensorily perceptible in the Kantian conception; everything not belonging to ‘empirical reality’ is called a construction, a form, of thought, 537. |
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| Foster Children, III, and motherly love, 292. |
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| Fouillée, Alfred, III, ‘idées forces’ are operative ideas in a psychological sense; he rejects a collective consciousness distinct from that of the individuals, 189. |
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| Foundational Enkapsis, III, of opened structures of inter-individual relations and those of free associations, 657. |
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| Foy, W., III, an adherent of the Kulturkreislehre, 333. |
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Fraenkel, A., II,
Einleitung in die Mengenlehre, 88. |
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Francé, III,
Der Organismus, 641. |
| Francé, III, he gives an instructive picture of the infinitely complex organic articulation of a ‘simple’ cell, 641. |
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| Franciscans, I, their Augustinianism influenced Luther, 512. |
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Frazer, James, II,
The Magic Art, 312;
The Worship of Nature, 313. |
| Frazer, James, II, an evolutionistic ethnologist, 270; considered magic as not to belong to religion; his definition of religion, 312; he holds magic to be a preliminary to religion, 313. |
Frazer, James, III,
Totemism and Exogamy, 339. |
| Frazer, James, III, his evolutionist hypothesis of
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| ‘group-marriage’, 339; explained levirate as a weakening of polyandry, 340. |
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| Freedom, III, the metaphysical question of freedom in Kant's Kritik der praktischen Vernunft, 748. |
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| Freedom to Death, I, in Existentialism, 214. |
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| Friendship, III, is not a natural community; Dietrich Bonhoeffer's poem ‘Der Freund’, 179. |
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Freud, S., II,
Die Zukunft einer Illusion, 313. |
| Freud, S., II, his view of faith, which he identifies with religion: a universally human compulsive neurosis originating from the infantile Oedipus-complex; the father is feared and admired and as such the primitive image of god; all religion is illusion, 312, 313. |
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| Freyer, II, on the historical stream of consciousness, 225. |
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Frobenius, Leo, III,
Ursprung der Afrikanischen Kultur, 333, 336. |
| Frobenius, Leo, III, applied Ratzel's idea of cultural derivation to entire cultures and used the historical method, 333. |
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Fueter, E., III,
Geschichte der neueren Historiographie, 335. |
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| Fruin, Robert, II, history is the science of becoming, 193. |
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| Function, II, the mathematical theory of function of Riemann; in arithmetic, in Weierstrasz, 484. |
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| Functional Individuality, II, modality is individualized by the structures of individuality, 414; subjective and objective juridical facts; lawful deeds and delicts; law making volitional declarations, 415; sources of law; the individuality of a juridical casus; the individualizing of the modal sphere in its gradations towards complete subjective individuality, 416; modal individualization cannot be inferred from the modal meaning-structures; the rationalistic Scholastic principium individuationis is internally contradictory; form as a universal yields individuality through matter; if matter is universal, form constitutes individuality but loses its ideality, 417; individuality in Greek metaphysics, an apeiron as a guilt; in Christian thought there is no tension between the universal and the individual, (law-side and subject-side), but correlation; in Christ is the transcendent root of individuality; Corpus Christianum is a religious organism; St. Paul; the fulness of individuality is refracted in the modal aspects; the cosmic coherence of meaning, 418; Nominalism and Realism; the modal all-sidedness of individuality; the Greek form-matter scheme; the Humanistic nature and freedom scheme; they show dialectical tension between the universal and the individual; Aristotle's substantial form with matter, a synolon; principium individuationis; Thomas Aquinas materia signata vel individualis and the immortal soul, 419; if an aspect becomes a form of thought, it cannot be individualized; Rembrandt's Nightwatch; intercourse in marriage and in a club; in the form matter scheme there can be no question of individuality, 423; a modal aspect individualizes itself within its own structure but is not exhausted thereby; complete individuality is a-typical; nuclear or original types; sexual propagation; its retrocipations are unoriginal types, only constituted in functional
anticipation of the sexual biotic types (which are anticipatory modal types); juridical types of individuality; psychical feelings of blood-relationship are biotically founded, 424; numeral, spatial, physical anticipatory modal types of individuality; the typical constant h in quantum mechanics; the Loschmidt number -n-; numeral relations between the particles of a cell (chromosomes, e.g.), are anticipatory types; typical albumen formations; mathematical types are anticipatory only; sensory phantasy, also in animals; not typically founded in the biotic sphere; phantasms of sensory imagination are intentional objects; entirely apart from the sensory objectivity of real things, 425; in the opened structure of this type all subjective types of aesthetical projects are founded; these projects are realized in objective works of art; the objective type of a picture differs from that of a painting or a sculpture; that of juridical types of movables and immovables; of servitutes praediorum rusticorum or urbanorum, etc., 426; individuality belongs to the apeiron in Kant's philosophy, 450; the plastic horizon comprises structural individualities, our insight is subjective and fallible, 583; individual knowledge and society, Husserl, Scheler, Spengler: Scheler's ‘essential community’, 584-594; the insight of genius, 595. |
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| Fundamentum Petendi, III, according to Thorbecke, 679. |
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| Furniture, III, tables, 137; chairs, etc., style Louis XIV; - 141; preference for antique furniture, in certain social circles, 146. |
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Fustel de Coulanges, III,
Histoire des institutions politiques de l'ancienne France, 335;
La cité antique, 352. |
| Fustel de Coulanges, III, restricted the historian's task to written records, 335; his description of the ‘eternal’ whole of generations of the same ‘gens’, an undifferentiated organized community, with the cult of ancestor
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| worship, 352; [cf. s.v. Undiff. Org. Comm.]. |
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