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E
| Eastern-Question Association, The, III, of the year 1877, was not a political party, 612. |
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Eberstadt, III,
Der Ursprung des Zunftwesens, 674. |
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| Ecclesiastical Assessment, III, imposed on baptismal members of the Dutch Reformed Church brought before a Civil Court, 689. |
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| Ecclesiastical Authorities, III, are juridically outside the church, because the latter is a fictitious person according to Canonist theory, 235. |
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| Ecclesiastical Legal Orders, III, are derived from the State, according to E. Brunner; this view is due to Neo-Kantian influence, and based on on the dualism between ‘nature and grace’, law and Gospel, 553. |
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| Ecclesiastically Unified Culture, The, I, collapsed in the latter half of the Middle Ages, 189. |
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| Ecclesiastically Unified Society in the Middle Ages, II, is an example of cultural unity, 204, 288. |
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| Ecclesiastical Party, III, this term is objectionable, 620. |
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| Echinoderms and vertebrates, III, 774. |
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| Eckhart, I, had a strong influence on Luther, 512. |
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| Ecology, III, its field of research, 648. |
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| Economic Autarchy, III, cannot be complete; Fichte's closed commercial State, 483; R. Kjellen's view, 484; Koch's explanation of the fascist programme, 484, 485; Nazi-Autarchy; H. Stoll, 485. |
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| Economic Aspect, II, the sparing mode of administering scarce goods, implying an alternative choice of their destination with regard to the satisfaction of different human needs; sparing, frugal, scarce; uneconomical; non-economical; requirements of economy; logical economy; economy of speech; logical and lingual economy, are only found in deepened theoretical thought and language, 66; conventional and ceremonial economy; technical economy; aesthetical and legal economy, 67; economy of thought in Aristotle; its objectivistic formula, 122; the theory of limiting profit; its conception of economic value, 123; economic anticipation in language; economic retrocipation in the aesthetic sphere; juridical retrocipation in the aesthetic sphere, 127; cultural economy; mathesis universalis and economic theory; ‘pure’ economics; theory of prices; price movement theory; market equilibrium, 344; mechanistic views; Eucken's analysis, of the antinomy in economic theory, 345; humanistic natural law and individualism united with economic individualism; mercantilism and State-absolutism, the law-State; Locke's formation of the classical liberal idea of the state of law; the classical school of economics of ‘laissez faire’; medieval guild corporations shattered, 360; economic individualism; physocrats; opening of the inter-individual economic relations at the expense of the communal relationships; supply and demand; freedom of exchange and contractual liberty; a free market; utilitarian morality; disharmony in the opening-process; absolutization of the homo economicus; rationalizing and technicizing of economic life meant misery for the labourers; ‘Christian’ bourgeois money makers, 361; the excess of cultural power formation caused by science; absence of cultural economy, 362; tyranny of the science ideal; Restoration and reaction; Romantic revolution;
liberalism; socialism; communism, 362. |
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| Economy Principle, II, according to Hennipman, 123; the principe of economy is often abused to justify the introduction of theoretical fictions masking antinomies, 124. |
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| Economy of Thought, I, in Aristotle's criticism of the Platonic Ideas; in David Hume, 272. |
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| Ecumenical Co-operation, III, is needed; its requirements, 543. |
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| Education, III, in Aristotle's theories, 267; in the family sphere is irreplaceable, 274; and discipline, 275. |
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| Ego, I, our ego expresses itself as a totality in the coherence of all its functions within the modal aspects of cosmic reality; the ego or selfhood transcends this coherence; the ego as a totality operates in the conceptual determination of philosophical thought, but also in all my temporal functions; it is I who am the central point of reference and the deeper unity above all modal diversity; the ego transcends the philosophical concept; it is the concentration point of all its cosmic functions, a subjective totality lying at the basis of all the functions, 5; the supposed reduction of the selfhood to
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| an immanent, subjective pole of thought; in this attempt the thinker imagines that he is able to set the logical function of thought apart as a self-sufficient activity, 6; but such a reduction of the thinking ego to the would-be ‘transcendental logical subject’, executed in the process of thought, can be performed only by the selfhood, which cannot itself turn into the result of the abstraction formed by thought, 7; the restlessness of the ego is transmitted from the selfhood to all temporal functions in which the ego is actually operative; the ego must participate in the meaning totality if genuine thinking in terms of totality is to be possible; the ego seeks its origin in order to understand its own meaning and thereby the cosmos; the ego is subjected to a central law, which derives its full meaning from the Origin of all things and limits and determines the centre and root of our existence; the Archè transcends all meaning and our ego comes to rest in it, 11; the ego is the inner concentration point of all the aspects, and does not coalesce with the mutual coherence of the aspects, but is transcendent over it; the modal diversity is the expression of a totality of signification; the meaning totality is the transcendent centre where the aspects converge into the unity of direction towards the Origin, the Archè of all meaning; the transcendental logical ego is the subjective pole of thought to which the empirical world is related as Gegenstand, i.e., in immanence philosophy, 16; the conception of the ‘transcendental cogito’ conceals a pitfall in its neglect of the problem of the relation between the ego and the logical function, 17; the original choice of a position is an act of the full self which transcends the modal diversity; it is a religious act for it contains a choice of position in the concentration point of our existence in the face of the Origin of meaning, 20; the self-hood, or ego, as the
religious root of existence is the hidden performer on the instrument of philosophic thought, 21; the central sphere of human existence; the religious sphere; pre-functional; the concentration point of the root of our existence, 31; this central sphere is one of dynamic occurrence out of which the conflict between the civitas Dei and the civitas terrena takes its issue; but occurrence is not identical with the historical aspect of cosmic time, 32; the ego and religion, 57; religion is the ex-sistent condition in which the ego is bound to its true or pretended origin; religion is self-surrender; the idolatrous elevation of the ego to an ‘ideal selfhood’ opposed to our ‘empirical’ I-ness as the objectivation of our self in the past and subjected to causality; if this ‘ideal selfhood’ is related to the present and the future, a dialectical time problem results in the existential conception of the ego, due to the basic motive of nature and freedom; but the ‘authentic’, the ‘fundamental’ I-ness is then dispersed in time and recedes from our view for ever; a purely temporal ex-sistere may never be identified with the ex-sistent character of the religious centre of human nature, 58; the ego is rooted in the spiritual community of mankind, in the ‘We’ directed to the Divine ‘Thou’, 60; the concrete and the thinking ego, in Theodor Litt, 82; Heidegger reproaches Kant for conceiving the Ego as a Subject in an ontological sense, thus considering the being of the ego as the reality of the ‘res cogitans’, 111; the absolute and the thinking ego in Fichte, 142; the ego is mathematical centre of thought in Descartes; in Hume it is a merely collective concept of the series of ideas ordered constantly in accordance with the laws of association, 295; the ego is
an illusion and must be explained in terms of the laws of association, in Hume, 296; in Kant the ego becomes an ego only if it obeys itself, 373; Fichte's absolute ego is the hypostatization of the concept ‘ego’ as the totality of reason, according to Lask, 416; the ‘Ego-Drama’ is the formal expression of the art of the German ‘Sturm und Drang’, 453. |
| Ego, III, Theodor Litt's view: the ego is a monad interweaving past and present experiences, 250. |
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| Egology, I, Husserl's egology, 91, 213. |
| Egology, II, in Husserl, 560. |
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Ehrlich, W, II,
Kant und Husserl, 487. |
| Ehrlich, W, II, proved that the phenomenological ‘intuition of the essence’ cannot adequately grasp the ‘essence’ of ‘immediate experience’, 487. |
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| Eidè, I, in Plato, 31, 100; as eternal forms, 248. |
| Eidè, II, in Plato, 10. |
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| Eidetic Logic, I, in Husserl, 213. |
| Eidetic Logic, II, in Husserl, 558. |
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| Eidetic Juridical Logic, II, in line with Husserl's ‘reine’ Mannigfaltigkeitslehre, developed in F. Schreier's ‘pure theory of law’, 342. |
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| Eidetic Numbers, II, in Plato; he taught the transcendent being of the form world and included in it the numbers themselves, 9. |
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| Eidos, II, as immanent essence in Aristotle, 10; or supertemporal essence, Husserl, 454; logical eidos in the Wesensschau, 544. |
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| Einstein, I, time is a fourth dimension of the physical world space, 27, 85; Kant's followers opposed Einstein's theory of relativity on the ground of
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| Kant's view that three-dimensional space, as an intuitional form, is a transcendental condition of geometry, 547. |
Einstein, II,
Über die spezielle und die allgemeine Relativitätstheorie, 101. |
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Eisler, I,
Wörterbuch der Philos. Begriffe, 150. |
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| The Elders of the Church, III, Thompson asserts that the Presbyterian church order considers them to be the representatives of the Church, 521; but they are Christ's instruments of faith for the exercise of His authority in the Church, 543. |
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| Eleatics, The, I, developed a metaphysical ontology in which the all-inclusive form of being was qualified as the only true, eternal, and unchangeable entity; they were oriented to the ouranic religion of nature, 532. |
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| Election, III, in Christ, the Head of reborn humanity, 247. |
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| Electro-magnetic Fields, I, the reality of these fields, in ‘critical realism’, 559. |
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| Electro Magnetic Theory, III, of Maxwell was in conflict with Rutherford's atom model, 706. |
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| Electrons, III, the determination of their positions and their velocity, 715. |
| Electrons, III, protons, neutrons, electrons, deuterons, mesons, have mass and charge, 100; the typical chemical reactions occurring in chemical combinations are related only to the electrons in the periphery of the atom; in the heavier elements the change is restricted to the outermost shell of electrons; the inside shell and nucleus retain their inner structure unaltered, 699; electrons emit elementary waves, 705. |
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| Elements, III, the structure of chemical elements, 100. |
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| Elite, III, influences all the individuals by means of institutional ideas, according to Hauriou, 189. |
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| Emancipation, III, of individual man, 581. |
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| Embryo, III, embryology and evolutionism; the ‘biogenetic law’ of Haeckel, 95; an embryo's development, 753. |
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Emeléus-Anderson, III,
Ergebnisse und Probleme der modernen anorganischen Chemie, 699, 700. |
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| Emergent Evolutionism, III, of C. Lloyd Morgan; of B. Bavink; his view of the virus, 84; Woltereck's theory, 729; different levels of reality arise according to the rule of structural constants in Woltereck's theory; Whitehead is an adherent of emergent evolutionism, 762; Woltereck's evolutionism is irrationalistic, 763. |
| Emile, I, Rousseau's Emile opposes sensory nature to the feeling of freedom, 316. |
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| Emotions, II, feeling expresses itself in movements of feeling, called emotions, 117. |
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| Empathy, I, as a method in Herder to understand history, 454; and individuality, 455. |
| Empathy, II, the inner life of experience can only exist in a social exchange of experiences; hence the psychological method of empathy, 113 (note), 114; (in Bergson) is an immediate subjective psychic penetration into the durée, 480, 481. |
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| Empirical Judgments, II, are synthetical, according to Kant; this view criticized, 438. |
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| Encouter, III, provides genuine inner knowledge; experience affords ‘objectifying outer knowledge’, according to Martin Buber's Existentialist view, and that of others, 782, 783. |
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| Encyclopedists, I, were condemned by Rousseau, 317. |
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| Energide, III, is a potential unit of nucleus and protoplasm sphere, according to Sachs, 722. |
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Engels, F., III,
Ludwig Feuerbach, 457;
Herrn Eugen Dührings Umwälzung der Wissenschaft, 457. |
| Engels, F., III, in the class struggle it appears that the idea of a common interest is illusory; then the State is necessarily an ideological whole; it only serves the interests of the ruling class; the State will die out, 457. |
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| English Empiricism, II, starts from the dogmatic supposition that the datum in experience is of a purely functional sensory character; the same thing is found in Kant, 431. |
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| Enkapsis and the Relation Whole-Parts, III, enkapsis is the inter-structural coherence between different interwoven types of individual totalities, 92; different kinds of interlacement: natural and unnatural interlacements; both may occur side by side in the structure of a whole (e.g. parasitical forms of symbiosis), 93; the enkapsis in the structure of a marble sculpture, 111; the Abbild-relation in such a sculpture, 113; the physical structure is opened in it and directed in an anticipatory way to the aesthetic expression, 123, 125; an enkapsis of structural principles, 126-128, 131, 132; enkapsis and sphere sovereignty in the inter-structural coherence of interlaced societal individuality structures, 170; animal types of symbiosis differ from normatively qualified societal human relationships which require human formation, 172; civil and ecclesiastical marriage, etc., 174; enkapsis of com- |
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| munal and inter-individual relationships, 181; enkapsis in compulsory organizations (with the State), 190; voluntary and indirectly compulsory organizations may be interwoven with each other in the genetic form of a free association, 191, 192; Theodor Litt's view of the ego who interweaves past & present experiences, 250; Litt's idea of the social interwovenness of the ego in the community of the closed sphere, 251; intertwinements of individuality structures cannot be posited a priori, but must be discovered in continuous confrontation with empirical social reality, 264; undifferentiated organized communities are interlacements of social structures, 347; interlaced in an intra-communal sense, like the sib, 349, 350; the Kirghizian Aul, 350-351; ancestor worship, 352; sibs, 354-362; Männerbunde (secret men's societies) are politically guided; Vehmgerichte, 363-366; the medieval guilds, primitive vicinages (villae, domaines), seignories, 367; the Greek household, 368; phylae; phratries; polis;
Roman curiae, 369; quirites, 370; primitive primary norms are interweavings of various structural norms, 374, 375; the enkaptic interlacement between Church and State as seen in an Established Church; the State may enact ecclesiastical norms, 376; no single individuality structure can be realized but in inter-structural intertwinements with other individuality structures; the idea of a ‘Universe’, 627-632; the structural type of a linden tree is incapable of complete isolation and cannot be conceived in itself as an independent substance; its metabolism appeals to the cosmic coherence between the tree and its environment (‘Umwelt’); outside of the latter the metabolic functions are impossible, 632; the complicated structural interlacements revealed in the natural scientific view of the tree are multiplied when the objective normative functions are considered, including the tree also in the structures of human society; the universal inter-structural cosmic coherence is reflected in the pheno-typical individuality-structure of this thing; according to its transcendental limiting function the tree is an object of faith integrating it into the cosmic interwoven coherence, which only makes its structure possible and a real datum centring in the religious root of human existence; the interwoven coherence of the individuality structures and the teleological order of the Aristotelian ‘essential forms’; (see Anaxagoras; Diogenes of Apolonia; Socrates; Xenophon; Plato; Aristotle; the Demiurge), 633; the interstructural interweaving in the cosmic order does not display a uniform schematism; the different types are so varied that they defy any speculative construction; Theodor Haering borrowed the term ‘enkapsis’ or incapsulation from Heidenhain to denote the relation between the separate organs of a living body and its total organism; kidneys,
lungs, etc. are not mere ‘parts’ of the body but relatively independent individuals, 634; the body, however, displays an independent internal unity working in all the individual component parts; an example is the enkapsis of histo-systems arranged one on top of the other in a muscle, a rather shoved into one another; Haering uses the terms enkapsis, Funktionseinheit and Ganzes mit Gliedern promiscuously and applies these terms a.o. to the psyche as ‘ichhafte Funktionseinheit’, etc.; his conception is oriented to a constructive trichotomistic schema of physis, psyche, and spirit, 635; Haering's own term, viz. ‘unity of individuality’ is better suited to what he intends to express; in a genuine enkapsis the interwoven individuality structures are not related to the whole as its parts; the relative autonomy of the organs within the total organism does not mean that they have a natural leading function of their own, 636; an animal organ does not have the natural destination to live apart from the total organism; the inner nature of an ‘autonomous’ organ is determined by its natural destination as a part of the whole; in its artificial isolation an organ may continue to propagate itself in its process of growth; this proves its relative autonomy, not its sovereignty within its own sphere, 637; the relation between an individual totality and its parts is determined by the internal structural principle of the whole; there are different types of this relation: internal homogeneity, and internal heterogeneity of the parts (cf. Anaxagoras, Aristotle); all biotically and psychically qualified natural beings are non-homogeneous in structure; so are the objective works of art realized in a thing structure; the marble of the ‘Hermes of Praxiteles’ is not a part of the work of art, though it functions in it through an interstructural interlacement; the
physico-chemically qualified molecules are no parts of the living organism of a cell; because they lack the subjective vital function of the cell; the real parts of the cell are the nucleus and the protoplasm with their numerous organic-structural component parts, 638; the parts of a non-homogeneous thing are qualified by the structure of the whole; such parts can only be identified by an inquiry into the internal individuality structure of the whole; the physico-chemical functions of a cell are bound to the molecules of the different kinds of its constitutive matter but these functions are no living parts of a cell; in an enkaptic interlacement one structure is bound in another and exceeds the boundaries of its internal structural principle in this enkapsis, which is
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| regulated by the law of the enclosing thing-structure; the internal sphere-sovereignty of the bound individuality structure is left intact, 639; enkaptic interlacements display different types of ordering; between the marble and the sculpture there is an irreversible foundational relation in their enkaptic interlacement; the marble of the ‘Hermes’ is the foundation of the artistic object in the relation of material and form; the technical form is the foundation of the artefact as an aesthetically qualified thing; the qualifying function is found in the objectified depiction of the aesthetic conception of the god's figure which is not at all identical with the technical form; in this enkapsis the structure of the marble is opened and deepened turning it into an aesthetically expressive material of the object of art; the internal nature of the marble has not been destroyed but rendered subservient, 640; the marble assumes a variability type and, conversely, it gives the artefact a variability type; in a cell's nucleus and plasm with their organic subordinate parts the atoms are enkaptically bound in a molecular union but retain their own inner nature and internal sphere sovereignty, 641; only in the physico-chemical macro-processes the bound structure is opened by that of the cell-organism; assimilatory and dissimilatory processes display an anticipatory direction; the resulting chemical combinations are for the most part extremely complicated and in their phenotype they are determined by the structure of the organism; each type of organism produces its own type of albumen; the enzymes or ferments and their rapid operations, 642; modern biology holds that ‘life’ reveals itself in a solidary activity permeating ‘the living mass’ to its minutest biotically qualified particles; but in the molecular structures of matter the living structural whole of the organism is enkaptically founded; modern scientists say that
the cell is not the real bearer of life, but much rather the living mass; but this assertion is unwarranted; the hypothetical ‘protomeries’; they are often called ‘bio-molecules’. Life will be extinguished when ruthlessly exposed to the light; Bohr, called this fact ‘complementarity’; it found expression in Heisenberg's ‘relations of incertitude’, 643; Jordan's theory; he biologizes the internal atomic structures of matter; his theory premises that atomic and molecular structures of matter, enkaptically bound in a living organism, are biotically qualified; but the enkaptic physico-chemical function of the atoms and molecules in a living cell is determined by the structure of this living whole, 644; enkaptic symbiosis and correlative enkapsis; the field of research of ecology; environment or Umwelt; the environment exhibits and objective biotic and objective psychic qualifying function; pheno-types of individuality; these interlacements bear the character of mutual interdependence in a different respect; symbiosis remains interwoven with the correlative enkapsis between living being and Umwelt; symbiosis of an independently existing individual outside of the collective unit within which it functions as a part of the whole, 648; animal colonies of coelenterates, coral zoophytes, and synphonophora; the medusas of the jellyfish; there is enkaptic symbiosis also in the volvox and the spongiae; parasitic symbiosis between animals and plants; symbiotic enkapsis between structures of a different radical type; gall-wasps and oaks; virus and plants or animals; a collective type of enkaptic symbiosis between forest, heath, meadow, steppe, etc., and plants and animals; a pine forest; a heath, 649; natural collective centres or nodal points of enkaptic symbiosis (landscape and fauna and flora) are not to be confused with structural wholes proper; they are ruled by a
law of biotic balance; enkaptic subject-object relations between animals and plants and their objective formations: calc-shell of molluscs; the shell can be detached and then its object function is in-actualized, 650; planets with their satellites; solar system; spherical groups of stars, galaxy, etc.; astronomy; the universal interwoven coherence of thing-structures and the nodal points of these enkaptic interlacements, 651; enkaptic interlacements of natural things in human societal structures; a mixed farming business; fields, pastures, cattle, buildings function in this societal structure as well as all the usable objects belonging to farming; the live stock in their own internal structure are not economically quaified; they are bound to the pasture (as a vegetative collectivity) in a symbiotic interlacement, and form a correlative enkapsis with their Umwelt; they can be enkaptically interwoven with an industrial relationship, 652; Primitive societal interlacements like the extended family, the patriarchal or matriarchal sib or clan, are undifferentiated, 653; marriage bond and cognate kinship cut across the sib relations and are bound in a foundational enkapsis within the sib; types of enkapsis between communal and inter-communal or inter-individual relationships, 654; the latter are united in a correlative enkapsis in undifferentiated organized communities; the fancied figure of a family living in temporary isolation in an uninhabited island; the story of Robinson Crusoe; the supposed genetic character of the relation between natural communities and the other relationships of human society, 655; the latter cannot have developed from natural communities genetically;
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| there is genetic coherence between a real marriage bond and the family relationship as far as their genetic form is concerned; but the first pair of human beings did not develop from marriage; only the transcendent root community of mankind forms the ultimate basis of temporal human society; the transcendental Idea of the origin refers to the basis of all societal structures laid at the creation and transcending theoretic thought; community structures cannot occur outside a correlative enkapsis with inter-individual structures; Eve was led to Adam as a woman in her full temporal existence (in principle comprising all societal structures at the same time); the first formulation of the married order in Scripture, 656, indicates a correlative enkapsis of marriage and family with the inter-individual societal relations outside of the family; the positive forms of exogamy are of an historical foundation; the intertwinement of natural communities with their intercommunal and inter-individual relations display the type of correlativity; the enkaptic foundational relation between the opened structures of inter-individual relations and those of free associations; contractual genetic forms of free associations and the constitutive rôle of ends and means of an association, 657; prohibition of trade-unions and enterpreneurial associations in liberalism; the French Code pénal; in England the Combination Act; opened individual relationships may occur without the formation of free associations but not the reverse; their interweaving is found in an irreversible foundational relation; this enkapsis implies a transcendental correlativity not to be confounded with a correlative type of enkapsis; the enkapsis of free associations with inter-individual relations displays reciprocity between these two; natural institutional communities and differentiated organized communities are interwoven in an irreversible foundational relation, 658; in their genetic forms
the State and the Church institution do not show any genetic relation with natural institutional communities; the opening of the nonpolitical inter-communal and inter-individual relations pre-supposes the rise of institutional communities of a differentiated organized character; there may exist a real State or Church, whereas the inter-individual relations have not yet emancipated from their binding to undifferentiated communities, e.g., the Carolingian State and the medieval Church; the opened interindividual relationships and the nonpolitical relationships stand in a one-sided foundational relation with Church or State, 659; the juridical form of a free association pre-supposes common private law; the State in its turn is bound by the opened and differentiated inter-individual societal relations in its inter-individual course; between different States there is a correlative type of enkapsis; the State's structure has always been realized in a plurality of States; the idea of a Civitas maxima is speculative; -, Kelsen derives the validity of the international public legal order from the constitutional law of the separate States, or vice versa, 660; this view is internally contradictory; the sovereignty of the State's legal order is not the ultimate origin of the validity of international inter-communal law; this view would deny international law as an inter-communal legal order; the reverse hypothesis is the denial of the inner communal character of constitutional State-law. There are various types of enkapsis of societal relations; e.g.; correlative and foundational types: fashion in sporting clothes; international trade is one-sidedly founded in traffic; free market and competition form a correlative enkapsis; the territorial enkapsis of the other differentiated social structures in the State, 661; members of the same Church or family may belong to different nationalities; so do international organizations; Bodin's concept
of sovereignty; Althusius' theory of human symbiosis; his Politica, 662; his anti-universalistic view of the interstructural relations between the different types of social relationships; he formulates the principle of internal sphere sovereignty; difference between the territorial and the personal type of interlacement, 663. Nodal points of enkaptic interlacement; they are the positive forms given to them which have a typical historical foundation; genetic and existential forms; genetic forms and the sources of law; marriage, organized communities, contractual inter-communal and inter-individual relationships presuppose positive genetic forms establishing or constituting these relations; these genetic forms are declarations of will, as such they are omni-functional, 664; there are constituent and constituted genetic forms; agreements for cooperation are formal sources of law intra partes, civil law and integrating non-civil social law (general conditions, customary stipulations, etc.). These genetical forms are centres of enkaptic structural interlacements within the juridical lawsphere; examples; in the juridical genetic forms of positive law different material spheres of competence are interwoven with each other, 665; the theory of the sources of law; positivistic, natural law, naturalistic-sociological, historicistic, all ignore the fundamental problem of the individuality structures within the jural order; the ‘naive’ legalistic theory elevates one of the genetic forms of law to the highest source of validity; but in these genetic forms there lurks a
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| problem, viz. that of structural enkapsis; the political dogma of the will of the legislator as the sole source of validity (Kompetenz-Kompetenz) is taken for granted; other theories recognize autonomous law formation in a contractual way and in non-political communities; yet they lack insight into their enkaptic interlacements, 666; modern sociologists eliminate the competence problem because it implies a normative viewpoint; Gurvitch turns the problem into a historical one; Beseler and Gierke; their theory of the juridical autonomy of associations; they keep clinging to the constituted juridical genetic forms of autonomous social law (articles of association, domestic bylaws); in a differentiated human society the genetic forms cannot guarantee the internal independence of law-formation in non-political associations; the genetic forms are bound to the typical structure of the legal sphere of the organs; a Church community cannot promulgate a State Act; etc., 667; but the genetic form of ecclesiastical rules may contain provisions of a civil juridical nature; a private contract of sale may contain economically qualified legal rules, general civil-juridical clauses, and social integrating law; a particular genetical form (juridical) cannot be the original source of validity of all positive law; indirect and implicit, direct and explicit genetic forms; custom and customary law; longaevus usus, 668; juridical genetic forms interlace original and derivative spheres of competence; one and the same genetic form positivizing juridical principles may be an original source of law in one sphere of competence, and a derived source in another sphere; articles of association are an original source of law within the society concerned, a derived source with regard to civil law; the original spheres of competence bind and limit each other, 669; a question of internal communal law may have its counterpart in a
civil juridical question; this civil juridical question can only relate to the external formal-juridical aspect of an internal communal legal point of difference; all law displaying the typical individuality structure of some community or inter-individual or inter-communal relationship falls within the original material juridical sphere of competence of such an orbit and is only formally connected with the spheres of competence of other societal orbits; the legal history of the medieval Germanic unions; the Historical school opposed the absolutization of Roman jus civile et gentium on the part of the Romanistic wing led by Puchta, etc., 670; Gierke's theory was universalistic-metaphysical and gave no insight into the real individuality structures of society; medieval juridical life had very intricate structural interlacements, both in territorial and in personal enkapsis; e.g. the ordinances of a mark alternating with regulations concerning weddings, funerals, poor relief, the Church, etc.; medieval craft guilds; trade unions; coercive legal organizations (guild ban), a part of the political organization of a town on a military basis, an ecclesiastical group; the guild fraternity (including families); communal spirit (like the old sib), 672; Gierke's definition of a medieval guild; he ignores the differentiation of the guilds at the time of their greatest power; the oldest are Frankish and Anglo Saxon, and have an undifferentiated structure; the oldest, espec. the sworn peace guilds formed an artificial sib; also in the late medieval fraternities the sib-idea survived; Sommer's and Sieber's conception, 673; later differentiation in the genuine craft-guilds: economically qualified industrial organizations, interwoven with fraternities; primitive neighbourhoods may have been the basis of the craft guilds; then this would be an example of territorial enkapsis; the natural
family relationships of the guild brethren were interwoven with the fraternitas in a personal enkapsis, 674; the vocational organization of the craft guild was not identical with the organization of the public office; in various towns there were crafts that were not al all connected with the magisterium, and the guilds embracing these crafts had not obtained the guild ban either; if craft and office were connected, this could only be in an enkapsis; Overvoorde and Joosting's edition of the sources of law relating to the guilds at Utrecht up to 1528, 675; the guild fraternity was interwoven with the craft, with an internal ecclesiastical group structure, a political structure; the guild ban is only concerned with the positive existential form of the craft organization in a particular variability type; but this element cannot be based on the internal structure of the industrial organization; the guild society is an autonomous organization and also a part of the town community; both in an enkaptic interlacement; Gierke's error; he seeks the internal bond in the guild as a juridical community, 676; he clings to the real or supposed genetic forms of guild law. The guild regulations show a great structural variety of provisions, which do not form a unity as to their material sphere of competence; they only hang together in having the same genetic juridical form; there is a fundamental difference between the political and the industrial members; between fellow craftsmen and mere members of the protective guild relationship, 677; the guild could possess original spheres of competence only as the free organization of a craft, and as an undifferentiated fraternity without a political
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| structure; the Dutch Judicial Organization Act, art. 167 of the Constitution; the limits to the competence of the State's common courts, 678; provisions concerning the ‘attributive competence of the common courts; the nature of the disputes to be submitted to the civil judicature; the fundamentum petendi, according to Thorbecke, deciding what actions, for debt belong to the cognizance of the civil judge; but this article is invariably interpreted in conformity to art. 2 J.O. Act, and only the object of an action is decisive; ‘the right to be protected is decisive’, 679; judicial decisions show the difference between civil and non-civil law to be fundamental; the civil judge is competent to take cognizance of claims whose fundamentum petendi is found in non-civil legal relations; he has to refrain from judging of material questions of law concerned with the internal structure of the public administration and with that of non-civil communal and contractual law; English judicature adopts the same attitude, 680; so does the Supreme Court of Germany; but makes an exception with respect to Zwanggenossenschaften; in the latter the private member's social status is at stake; then there is an enkaptic structural interlacement with the State, 681; a new criterion of civil wrong was introduced by the Supreme Court of the Netherlands; illegal acts are also those that are ‘contrary to the due care pertaining to another's person or goods’ in inter-individual social intercourse; this appeals to unwritten legal norms lacking the genetic form of statute law; a civil judge employs a formal concept of unlawfulness if the decision of the material legal question should lead to an encroachment upon the internal legal sphere determined by the inner structure of the societal relationship concerned; examples of disputes about Church matters, 682; the positivistic contractual theory is influenced by the Humanistic doctrine
of natural law and its contractual construction of all communities irrespective of their inner nature, 683; this construction is helpless when a civil court has to decide material juridical questions not concerning the internal structure of a private organized community; the decision of the Amsterdam Court given on the 22nd June 1880 is an instructive example, 684; the South African case in which professor Du Plessis was deposed and the judge was induced to a material appreciation of questions of belief and confession; this was an excess of legal power. Within its own sphere an organized community cannot be compelled to accept a civil judge's decision, 685; a civil judge's final decision has to be accepted unconditionally in a civil juridical sense only; the positivistic construction of the ‘formal autonomy of a free association’ or a Church community cannot clarify the judicial view in cases of civil wrong on the part of the public administration; the decision of 1919 and the material criterion of unlawfulness formulated by the Dutch Supreme Court cannot be explained by the contractual theory; the civil judge makes a halt before the internal sphere of communal law, 686; jurisdiction has to form law in concreto; it refuses to judge the internal structure of unlawful governmental actions by means of a material civil law standard; the internal communal relationships have their civil legal counterpart. Gierke criticized, 687. If the internal rights of membership in an organized community are qualified by their inherence in membership qua talis, and a member is merely a part of the whole, he cannot bring an action against the whole, just like an outsider; Gierke's separation between communal law and inter-individual civil law and his lack of insight into their enkaptic structural interlacements render this state of affairs inexplicable; but every internal communal law and civil inter-individual law
are related in an enkapsis, 688; a civil judge applies the formal test of the articles of association and the domestic regulation of a society to the actions performed by the organs within their original sphere of competence, in order to maintain legal security; he examines a domestic jurisdiction and puts it to the test of the principles of audi et alterem partem and of impartiality; he also applies common civil law principles to the so-called inalienable human rights; the juridical regulations of an organized community are necessarily interwoven with civil legal relations to protect the legal status of the human personality as such; an ecclesiastical assessment imposed upon baptismal members of the Dutch Reformed Church brought before a civil court and the juridical sphere sovereignty of the Church, 689; the theoretical view of the Dutch Supreme Court agreed with the doctrine of Thorbecke; De Savornin Lohman opposed this view by absolutizing the juridical internal sphere of the Church; but here is a case of enkaptic structural interlacement between civil law and internal ecclesiastical law; baptism establishes a juridical bond of an internal ecclesiastical nature; the obligation to pay a Church tax imposed on baptismal members - 690 - can never be of an internal ecclesiastical juridical character as it has no relation to the typical structural principle of the institutional Church; it is contrary to this principle; the Church is not a coercive power organization; partiality or abuse of power may arise when the authorities of an organized community or a family exercise their authority contrary to its inner nature and destination so that the
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| civil juridical interests of its members are injured, 691; then there should be an appeal to the civil judge possible. The agreements with a transportation company may violate the deepened civil-juridical principles de facto; then the civil juridical counterpart of the non-civil law-formation must not be lost sight of; the enkaptic inter-structural interlacements between civil law and non-civil law form a delicate tissue; the original spheres of competence cannot be isolated from one another hermetically; sphere-sovereignty only functions in the cosmic meaning coherence; the legislator's competence is limited as regards the enkapsis between non-civil inter-individual commercial or industrial law and the civil legal order; the Dutch Code of Commerce in its earlier form restricted commercial transactions to movables; brokers in real estates were not merchants, 692; this was encroachment on the part of the civil legislator upon the internal sphere of competence of commerce and industry; it was abolished in the Limited Liability Company Act of 1928; and the Acts of May 1922 and July 1934, - 693. |
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| Enkaptic Whole - and - Substance Concept, III, naïve experience knows individual wholes; the idea of the enkaptic structural whole is opposed to the a priori substance concept of metaphysics, 694; preliminary definition of an enkaptic structural whole; its interwoven structures are not parts of the whole; the leading structure has the qualifying rôle; but this highest structure does not coalesce with the enkaptic total structure; the enkaptic structural whole is not identical with a primitive undifferentiated individuality structure, e.g., a primitive organized community, 695; in a genuine enkaptic structural whole the different interwoven structures maintain their sphere-sovereignty and belong to the totality so long as they are united in the mutual enkaptic bond; the incapsulated structure has its own internal operational sphere and an external enkaptic sphere ordered by the higher structure's operational sphere; the relation of enkapsis should not be confused with the whole-part relation, 696; the enkaptic structural whole and the different types of enkaptic interlacement; the irreversible foundational relation does not always function in an enkaptic structural totality: in a differentiated human society there is no ‘highest component structure’; in physico-chemically qualified things and matter, and in the vegetable and animal kingdoms there is always found an enkaptic totality cohering with the irreversible foundational relations in their interlacements; it is also found in man's temporal individual existence, 697; enkaptic symbiosis displaying a real collective structure; in the type of correlative enkapsis the figure of an enkaptic whole is lacking (e.g., plants and their ‘Umwelt’), 698; the apparent paradox in the basic thesis of chemistry. An atom's nucleus determines the place of an element in the periodical system as well as its physico-chemically qualified geno-type; typical chemical
reactions in chemical combinations are only related to the electrons in the periphery of the atom; probably only the outermost shell of electrons in the heavier elements; the inside shell and the nucleus retain their inner structure unaltered; in the chemical combination ‘water’ we are confronted with an irreversible enkaptic foundational relation; H2O is the minimum form-totality, 699; the H-atoms and the O-atom remain hydrogen and oxygen; their nuclei remain unaltered as to their structural principle; they are not ruled by the structural principle of the matter ‘water’; they function in enkaptic binding within the new individuality structure; but without their internal connection with the nuclei the electrons could not display chemical functions; the theory of valency; three types of binding; the combination is always concerned with the electrons of the outermost atomic sphere, whereas the nucleus, (and in the heavier elements the inside shell of electrons) remains unaltered; the H-atoms and the O-atom cannot be called parts of water; they only function enkaptically in the combination; the atoms are embraced by the molecule as the minimal form-totality, viz. a typically ordered physico-spatial figure or configuration (701) as the foundation of the qualifying physico-chemical function of the whole (i.e. water). Enkaptic natural totalities of the macro world, a mountain, a poly-cellular plant or animal, etc., cannot exist without a typical foundational spatial form; unordered aggregates lack the typical total form of an inner structural whole; inorganic crystals are enkaptic structural totalities; mountains displaying typical totality figures; shell-lime, lithographic slate, chalk; an enkaptic total structure must possess a typical embracing form-totality doing justice to the enkaptic interlacement, 702, and to the whole-part relation; the form is the nodal point of enkaptic interlacements; a mere correlative
enkapsis is not an enkaptic structural whole; but a water-molecule is; it is a physico-chemically qualified form totality with a typical spatial ordering of atoms according to their valency; the formula H2O; the atomic nuclei are immune to the combination; an atom is not essentially changed; only in its periphery, 703; the existential duration of an individual whole is determined by the typical temporal order of its individuality structure; experimental proofs of the conclusion that atoms do not change es- |
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| sentially; H-rays; radio activity; stoechiometrical laws; crystal-lattices; the Laue diagram, 704; crystals have a net-like structural form whose nodal points are occupied by the centra of atoms; the intensity of the rays reflected by the crystal lattice also depends on the inner structural forms of the atoms; separate atoms of a crystal lattice may operate as independent sources of radiation; the classical atomistic conception of a molecule as a mechanical aggregate does not explain the fact of the absorption-spectrum, 705; a chemical combination is a new totality; the mechanistic view of classical science culminated in the atom model projected by Rutherford: an atom is a kind of solar system; quantum physics exploded this conception; Bohr tried to accommodate Rutherford's pattern to Max Planck's quantum theory; Maxwell's electro magnetic theory conflicted with Rutherford's model; Bohr's improvement entailed new anomalies, 706; Hoenen's neo-Thomistic theory concerning the ontological structure of atoms and molecules and crystals; the continued actual existence of atoms in molecules must lead to the atomistic conception of molecules as aggregates, according to Hoenen; he offers only one alternative, viz., the neo-Thomistic conception of a mixtum (or composite) as
a new substance in which the elements are not present actually but only virtually or potentially; the ‘mixtum’ is then a substance, a new totality, consisting of one ‘primary matter’ and one ‘substantial form’ giving the matter unity of being; there is a gradation of potencies according to this view; the unity of an extended substance does not exclude a diversity of properties in its different parts; there are ‘heterogeneous continua’; this theory is applied to atom and molecule; Hoenen's criticism of the classical atomistic conception is convincing, 708; but the immunity of the atom-nuclei in a combination is not due to some virtual preservation of heterogeneous properties, for the nuclear structure of an atom is not an accidental property; the nuclear structure determines the particular type of element; giving the atom its indispensible ‘unity of being’; in Thomism this structure should be called its substantial form; it cannot be destroyed in the combination of atoms; Hoenen's theory has landed in an impasse; the immunity of the existential duration of a radio active element as to its bound condition in a molecule is concerned with the element's actuality as an internal structural whole; Hoenen's theory of a crystal lattice as a heterogeneous continuum; he does not mention the ‘atomic formfactor’ 's influence on the intensity of the reflected Röntgen rays, 709; nor does he mention Kossel's experiments; the neo-Scholastic concept of a heterogeneous continuum is incompatible with the foundations of modern wave-mechanics; de Broglie's pronouncement; the unacceptable dilemma in the Aristotelian-Thomistic concept of substance; temporal reality is in principle built up in enkaptical structural interlacements which leave no room for absolute metaphysical points of reference; the
substance concept precludes the insight into the relation of enkapsis; the molecule, or the crystal lattice, is a typically qualified enkaptic form-totality bearing the genuine chemical combination; there are three different structures enkaptically interlaced, 710; a molecule or crystal as an enkaptic form totality can embrace the interlaced structures of its bound atoms leaving the atomstructures' sphere sovereignty intact; the Thomistic substance concept is bound to the form-matter motive; Hoenen posits a wrong dilemma, 711; it is impermissible to argue from neo-Thomism that an enkaptic structural whole cannot satisfy the ontological requirement of a ‘unity of being’, for such a structure requires the binding of plural structural wholes in an embracing totality preserving the inner proper nature of each of these wholes; Hoenen cannot solve the structural problem concerning the dissolution of a combination; how can the atoms regain their substantial form in the process of dissolution after losing it in the chemical combination?, 712; there is no genetic affinity of nature between the mixtum and its elements; ‘the preservation of the properties of the elements is to be explained by a material cause as ratio sufficient; new properties of the mixtum are explained from the efficient cause,’ says Hoenen; this reasoning should hold in the reverse direction as well, but a ‘material cause’ is no ‘ratio sufficiens’ and Hoenen fails to point out its efficient and ‘formal cause’. The conception of material composites in pre-Thomistic medieval Scholasticism; the Arabian Aristotelians and the older Christian Scholastics, 713; their view was contradictory; atoms and chemical combinations are not parts of the living organism; the structural enkapsis embraces both the matter structures and the living organism of a cell, 714;
cell-organism must be distinguished from the real cell-body; the small number of elements in a cell: H., O., C., N. and usually nine others; the higher organic combinations in plasm and nucleus are complicated and labile; Bohr's biological relation of incertitude, 715, shows the limits of mathematical causal explanation of the chemical constellation in a living organism; the individuality structure of such a living organism posits these limits; only for extremely complicated organic combinations there are no fixed structural formulas as yet (e.g., globulin, nuclein, albu- |
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| men, etc.); chemistry has succeeded in the synthesis of a great number of organic combinations; the rôle of catalysts in fermentation processes; ‘living organism’ (716) is a typically biotically qualified individuality structure functioning within an enkaptic whole; a living body does not coalesce with its ‘living organism’; Hoenen's view, 717; neo-Thomism reasons a priori from the Aristotelian substance concept rendering empirical research superfluous; the cell with its nucleus and plasm sphere is the smallest unity capable of independent life discovered up to now; there exist non-cellular tissues; the extra cellular bifurcation of the genuine cellular plasm in protozoa (exoplasm); exoplasm has autonomous division, increasement, capability for stimulation, etc.; but they lack viability, 718; bacteria, blue-green algae have no cell--nucleus; their more diffuse central cell-sphere plays the part of a nucleus; most living cells have the material substructure of a colloid system; the enormous development of surface of solved matter in the cell's colloid mixture; their enormous surface charges of electricity render them sensitive to changes of electric condition and temperature; being colloid, protoplasm may pass from a solinto a gel-condition and vice versa; most cells have an alveolar form of plasm, 719; the
hylocentric, kinocentric and morphocentric structure of a living cell; the living cell has a centred structure; metabolism, and its organizing, determinating and regulating effects are directed from a central sphere in the cell-body; the rôle of the nucleus; that of chromatin; in animal plasm there is an internal motive centre, viz. centro-soma; the cell's centred structure and the production of typical somatic part-forms; difference between a living cell and physico-chemically qualified micro-wholes, like molecules and crystals; its physico chemical aspect expresses the cell's individuality structure qualified by the biotic function, 720; an artifical model of a polypeptid molecule is not centred; Kolzoff's materialistic conception of the ‘molecular components of living albumen substance’; assimilatory processes are supposed to be crystallization processes; but this theory cannot explain the typical centred structure of living plasm; in protozoa every nucleus is the potential centre of a new cell-body; finally the polynuclear protozoa split up into as many new individuals as there are nuclei; cell-division in metazoa; polynuclear protozoa may retain their plurality of nuclei: an actino-sphaerium has over a hundred of them; arbitrary cut pieces of cytoplasm can become complete individuals, 721; Sach's designation of ‘energide’; infusioria have dissimilar nuclei; a nucleus bears the heredity factors and is the vital centre; genital cells in poly-cellular beings have an unlimited capability of propagation; protozoa nuclei bear heredity factors and are vital centres; infusioria have two different nuclei: for propagation and for vital processes; generative and somatical nucleus; the smallest living units within the cell-structure: bio-molecules; Miscellen; vitules; protomeries; but they have not been proved to maintain life apart from a living cell, 722; endo- and exoplasms; the cell-organism is
the real normal minimal centre of life; non-living components of the cell-body and their enkaptic binding in the living organism; enzymes or ferments are not living components of a cell; but are organic catalysts; Buchner's experiments of 1896; fermentation is an intricate process; enzymes are complicated protein combinations; ‘organizers’ are inductive, non-living material components influencing living cells, 723; vacuoles, nucleoles, and other para plasmatic material particles; typical mineral formations of protozoa and protophytes; SiO2 formations of radiolaria; they are typical form-totalities, enkaptically interwoven in a cell, but not parts of the living organism; the term ‘bio-molecules’, 724; a molecule or quasi crystal of an organic chemical combination lacks the centred structure of living units, it is physico-chemically qualified; in bio-physico-chemical constellations there are biotically directed physico-chemical functions of material components; such constellations are opened by the subjective vital function; such constellations are directed by bio-impulses qualified by the central subjective vital function of the organism as a whole, 725; they have a physico chemical aspect; these impulses use a minimum of energy and possess a spontaneous character; Bohr's relation of incertitude is structurally localized and determined as an enkaptic relation; the bio-chemical constellation starts exactly at the point where the molecular or quasi crystalline structures of organic matter end; the living organism avails itself of variability types of these structures; irradiation of nervous tissues; tendons are built up of genuine crystals with large molecules and ordered after the pattern of fibres; muscular contraction and myosin-molecules, 726; the problem of so-called’ ‘living protein’ is wrongly posited; protein combinations found in a living body are
intricate, labile material combinations physically determined in structure; Bohr's bio-chemical relation of incertitude can only pertain to the enkaptic functions of these molecules in the living organism; a possible bio-synthesis, 727; the search for a ‘proteid molecule’; Woltereck's summary of the modern programme of bio-synthesis; but he holds that the combination of continual active change
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| with the maintenance of the total system is a completely new biotic phenomenon that cannot be produced artificially, 728; Woltereck adds that an artificial combination will never ‘experience’; the most simple living beings have a kind of a-psychical experience (Innen-Erregungen) says Woltereck; this a postulate of his ‘emergent evolutionism’; a cell's centred structure guarantees the preservation of its identity and has its necessary counter-part in the variability of all material combinations in their enkaptic functions within the living organism; the limits to physico-chemical penetration into the bio-chemical constellation, 729; metabolism happens with the aid of ferments; bio-chemistry is not identical with organic chemistry; the process of mineral formation in radiolaria and other protozoa, 730; typical field reactions and the catalytic processes in assimilation and dissimilation are started and directed by bio-impulses, which impulses are accessible to physics and chemistry only in their physico-chemical aspect, not in their qualifying biotic modality, 731; the question about a specific ‘vital matter’; the materialistic view of Koltzoff denies its existence, because it would lead to a vitalistic standpoint; but Driesch denies the existence of a specific material bio-substance; he assumes that matter can only be ‘living’ so long as some ‘entelechy’ controls a physico-chemical constellation; ‘bio-substance’ in a recent conception; Woltereck defends the ‘bio-substance’ concept; he criticizes Driesch's ‘entelechy’, 732; vitalism should not be identified with the view of the biotic aspect having its proper laws and of the characterization of a living organism by its total structure of individuality; vitalism absolutizes the
biotic aspect; the ‘Stufentheorie’; or ‘emergent evolutionism’; ‘mnemism’ (Hering and Semon): Gurvitch, Ungerer, Bertallanffy, Alverdes evade the problem; the mechanistic view is inspired by the classical science-ideal and starts from an a priori absolutization of the physico-chemical energy aspect, denying the irreducible nature of the biotic modus, 733; this view is involved in antinomies; it handles a deterministic concept of causality; its first limit is the micro-structure of atoms; the acceptance of a second limit in the internal biophysico-chemical constellation of a living organism cannot contradict the results of modern physics and chemistry; it is in conflict with the a priori mechanistic startingpoint of classical natural science; modal aspects do not have a rigid structure; the physico-chemical constellation is not closed; neo-vitalism holds to the mechanistic view of the physico-chemical constellation in a living organism but wants to withdraw ‘life’ from the rule of its causality; Driesch's experimental proofs of self-regulation, regeneration, and heredity; Older vitalism proclaimed the a priori thesis: [734] ‘chemistry will never succeed in composing organic matter’; this conception could also be meant in a mechanistic sense; difference between neo- and old-vitalism; Driesch's proofs of entelechy; his ‘Ganzheitskausalität’ is contrasted with ‘Einzelkausalität’; experiments with eggs of sea-hedgehogs, 735; regenerative processes in full-grown organisms; quantitative causality versus totality causality; the restricted force of Driesch's argument; his lack of insight into the modal structures; his recourse to the substance concept; ‘life’ lacks genesis, because it is an invisible immaterial ‘organic
form’ in a pseudo Aristotelian sense; i.e., an entelechy; - psyche and psychoid - 736; the proper substance of organic form is entelechy, the form, the eidos; that which is formed in a visible way is only the transitory product of its operation in matter; Driesch's entelechy is a second natural factor; he wants to base his metaphysics on empirical research; he rejects an a priori and primordial basic science (philosophia prima); his startingpoint is the Cartesian cogito - he is influenced by Kant's epistemology, notwithstanding the intentional character he ascribes to his ordering concepts or ‘categories’, 737; Driesch's Ordnungslehre is nominalistic, 738; his dualism of a material and an immaterial substance, 739; phylogenetically speaking there is only one entelechy, viz. ‘super-personal life’, 740; his scheme: ‘potence-act’ compared with that of Aristotle; he denies the existence of a typical bio-chemical constellation, 741; entelechy constitutes the difference between ‘living’ and ‘dead matter’; this is exemplified in the human brain; sufficient and partial genetic grounds of events in an organism, 742; four possibilities of entelechy influencing matter, 743; Gurvitch speaks of a vital form (morphe) regulating, but not determining the physico-chemical system; Bernard Bavink's criticism of Driesch's second and third hypotheses; Driesch should have shown how entelechy can alter the direction of a physico-chemical process that is already completely determined by its initional condition and the classical laws of nature, 744; the suspension theory supposes the production of some energy on the part of entelechy; a force that does not do any work is nevertheless a physical force; whereas entelechy is supposed to be an immaterial cause; the
building plan theory; the realization of such a plan can never occur in a purely immaterial way, but requires physico-chemical energy not belonging to the physico-chemical constellation of the building materials; so long as ‘life’ is
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| viewed as ‘an immaterial substance’ working upon a ‘material substance’, the possibility of such operation will remain a problem; the dualistic substance concept involves theoretical thought in insoluble problems, 745; Aristotelian entelechy is in different ways in a better position than neo vitalism; Driesch could not adopt this conception because he started from the basic motive of nature and freedom in a Humanistic sense; his use of the scheme of matter and form, act and potence, anangkè and tuchè, 746; his dualism of ‘totality’ and ‘chance’ (Baer's definition of ‘chance’), - but his idea of tuchè is: what is not related to a totality; in ‘matter’ chance rules without restriction, 747; Driesch and Kant on freedom; freedom is a question of belief; Driesch's philosophy of nature remains within the frame of determinism; his totality concept remains a category pertaining to natural phenomena; it is influenced by Schelling's freedom-idealism; Schelling's and Driesch's idea of totality was derived from Kant's Kritik der teleologischen Urteilskraft, 748; Driesch denies the genuine freedom character of Kant's practical Idea of liberty; Driesch holds genuine metaphysical freedom to be incompatible with any general law imposing itself on human action; genuine freedom is only compatible with a consistent pantheism in the sense of a ‘becoming deity’ lacking any determination by a constant divine nature, 749; Woltereck's bio-substance concept; this substance is connected with ‘immaterial and conditional structural constants’ as potencies which pass away with their material bearer; physico
chemical bio phenomena are the temporal spatial outside of a living organism, their genuine essence is their immaterial inside; a vital process is the ‘inner experience’ of a living being; an artificial bio-synthesis is impossible; causal physico-chemical analysis of bio-phenomena has reached a limit, 750; by ‘bio-substance’ he means ‘living mass’; this mass is a complex of molecules different from inanimate matter or dead plasm; owing to a ‘primary bio-chemical moment’ this bio-substance is autonomously capable for stimulation, and has genetic continuity; it is comparable with radio-active elements and aromatic combinations; in a living cell some components produce other kinds of matter without passing away themselves; others are produced without being able to produce; enzymes are intermediate; only the producing ‘Chief substance’ is ‘living substance’; a bio-system has units effecting assimilation and dissimilation; the organizing regulators, i.e. the inductive material units (genes, hormones, enzymes); the ‘matrix’ (germ-plasm, idio-plasm, reserve-plasm), 751; the ‘matrix’ produces itself and, if need be, the inductive material components; the catalytic operation of enzymes in metabolism; the specificity of protein combinations; the significance of hormones; ‘developmental mechanics’ has pointed out the existence of ‘organizers’ and their influence on the embryo; Spemann's experiments with the transplantation of cells from the blastophore, i.e. the invagination of the gastrula; inner-, outer-, mesoblastoderm, 752; during its development the living cell of an embryo has more genetic potencies than that which is realized; neighbouring cells exercise a determining influence on the direction of the development; the two part-cells of the egg of a sea-hedgehog and the direction of their development; H.
Mangold's experiment; ‘chimera formations’; Spemann's hypothesis: the blastopore must contain the organizing centre, 753; mechanists called these ‘organizers’ material substances; neo-vitalists viewed them as effects of the immaterial entelechy; Driesch mentioned the building plan theory and assumed sub-entelechies; experiments have shown them to be inductive material factors; Holtfreter's experiments; the discovery of the genes in the chromosomes; the bearers of the hereditary dispositions, 754; Morgan's genetical analysis; chromosome maps; chromatin; Woltereck's hypothesis, 755; the genes have their seat in the nuclear loops of the germ-cells; we do not know where the matrix has its seat; presumable location of the matrix, 756; Woltereck later on speaks of the existence of the ‘matrix’ as an experimentally established fact; a cell's material components are non-living combinations; genes are not pure living units; the existence of bio-molecules causing assimilatory and dissimilatory processes has not been proved; by ‘matrix’ Woltereck means germ-plasm, idio-plasm or hereditary material; August Weismann's theory of germ-cells, 757; recent discoveries have almost invalidated this theory; Driesch's criticism of Weismann's view, 758; the question about material combinations is a philosophical problem of structure; the influence of the metaphysical substance concept on Woltereck's theory of ‘matrix’; he holds that the bio-substance may display the intricate structure of a polypeptid molecule; there are living and non-living cell components; his theory is influenced by the metaphysical substance concept; his hypothetical ‘bio-substance’ seems to display the
intricate structure of a polypeptid molecule, although he has asserted that such a model can never account for the typical centred structure of a living cell; the theory of a molecular ‘living matter’ eliminates the typical totality structure of a living organism, 759; the classical concept of matter; its transfor- |
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| mation into the concept of function; in chemistry ‘matter’ only means a system of equilibrium between protons, neutrons and electrons; neither in modern natural scientific thought, nor in Greek and Scholastic metaphysics can it make sense to speak of a specific material bio-substance in contrast to an in-organic substance of ‘dead matter’; Woltereck's standpoint is far from clear, 760; his concept ‘bio-substance’ implies an inner contradiction; Roux's criticism of a ‘matter’ which assimilates itself; Woltereck is involved in antinomies, 761; his ‘Ontologie des Lebendigen’, containing a dynamical ‘Stufentheorie’; this is a genetic monism accepting irreducible levels of becoming; life is a new level of reality, and at the same time an ‘emergence’ of physico-chemical constellations; emergent evolutionism; different chemical elements are explained by Woltereck from increased possibilities of a material basic substance; psychical life as an ‘emergence’ of biotic, and ‘mind’ as an ‘emergence’ of psychical life; the rise of different autonomous ‘levels of reality’ is ruled by ‘structural constants’ called ‘autonomous powers’, ‘determinants’, ‘imagoids’ or ‘ideas’, 762; the constancy of these ‘determinants’ is in conflict with the continuity and unity of the process of becoming in an antinomic way;
Woltereck acknowledges this antinomous character of his theory and observes that determinants of becoming and those of value are mutually incompatible, like validity and the genesis of validity; this antinomy is due to an overstraining of the modal aspect of biotic development; W.'s evolutionism is irrationalistic; he views structural laws as products of the creative freedom of a ‘Welt-Subjekt’ in the process of development; here the Humanistic motive of nature and freedom is the ultimate, religious power of his theoretic thought; ‘freedom’ is called the ‘completion of nature’, 763; W. asserts that the ‘spiritual-psychic phenomena, the productive activities and their results belong just as much to life as, e.g., the shell formation or movement of protozoa’; a temple, a book, a sonata, or a strategic plan are bio-phenomena, 764; the cell-body is a biotically qualified enkaptic form-totality embracing three different kinds of individuality structures: the physico-chemical material combinations (themselves enkaptic structural wholes), the cell's living organism, in which these building materials are enkaptically bound, and finally the cell-body as a biotically qualified enkaptic whole; in animal cells the structure of the living organism is the foundation of the psychically qualified sensorium structure; the enkaptic structural whole is, therefore, also psychically qualified, 765; the bio-chemical constellation in a cell is built up by means of those physico-chemical functions of the material components that are enkaptically bound in the living cell-organism; these functions fall outside of the internal structure of the material components; they are subject to the continual direction of the leading biotic function of the organism whose internal physico-chemical functions they are, and they are not functions of the material molecules; the organism can only realize itself in the enkaptic whole
of which (in vegetable cells) it is the qualifying component; in animal cells the sensorium binds the lower individuality structures; there is a bio-chemical as well as a physico-chemical constellation; a psychical qualified reaction in protozoa also displays a physico-chemical and biotic aspect; Theodor Haering distinguishes ‘material body’, ‘psyche’ and ‘mind’ (or ‘spirit’); the living organism of a cell-body can as such not contain lifeless parts, but this organism is not identical with the cell-body of which it is a part-structure, 766; this total cell-body is an enkaptic form-totality also containing lifeless material combinations bound by its living organism; in an animal cell the organism is enkaptically bound by the sensorium; this theory of enkapsis harmonizes two series of experiential data which in the substance view seemed to contradict each other; the contest between mechanistic and vitalistic views cannot be settled on the basis of the substance concept; the Aristotelian-Thomistic substance concept is unable to resist the mechanistic view; so is neo-Scholasticism with its theory of the virtual preservation of properties of the material components in a living whole, 767; the internal molecular and crystalline structures of the material components are not as such part structures of the living whole; our theory of a plurality of structures interwoven within an enkaptic structural whole does not contradict this structural unity, 768; the living body is not an aggregate; a cell cannot live in the molecular or (quasi-) crystalline matter structures, though the latter are actually present in the living cell, because its organism can no more live without than within them and the material sub-structure functions within its form-totality, 769; a living cell-organism is enkaptically founded in a very particular mixture of matter and binds the latter within its own individuality
structure; its nodal point is the alveolar-colloidal and centred form of the plasm maintained in the continual processes of dissolution and building up of the matter structures; in this form the material components disclose their particular variability types that function in the bio-chemical constellation; the cell-body as a whole gives the plasmatic matter its par- |
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| ticular form qualified by the subjective biotic (or in animals by the psychical) function; the form is plastic, enabling the body to adaptations; the total form is an expression of the total system (e.g. of the cell); also the cilia, fibres, vacuoles, etc., are produced by the total substratum of the system; the living ‘cell-body’ is the bearer and producer of all its part-forms and of the specific total figure of the radiolarium, infusorium, bacterium’, 770; Driesch and others have refuted the aggregate theory; the visible figure of poly-cellular plants, animals, the human body, obeys the specific form-laws of a totality; Weismann's theory was refuted; also the separate cell-form is an elementary total form expressing a typical structural whole, 771; Woltereck's investigations into the ‘biotic elementary forms’ such as bacteria, algae, amoebae; no particular forms have developed in them besides membrane and nucleus; flagellated cells; sperm-cells; monads; peridinidiae; all these part-forms are produced by the living cell as a whole and are a differentiated morphological expression of its structural totality; tissue cells; epithelial cells, muscle cells, gland cells, etc.; the total cell form with all its particular articulations of inner and outer architecture is a function of the total cell-body, 772; the typical totality character of the form products of protozoa and protophytes; silico lattices and flagellates; they differ from the physico-chemically determined crystal forms of the mineral
silicon dioxyde although they remain typical SiO2 figures; their production starts with alterations of the colloidal plasm which zonally passes from the sol- into the gelcondition; the fixed formations arising in the plasm of calc-algae and foraminifera; plasmatic, allo-plasmatic, and xeno plasmatic forms, 773; they are typically qualified by a biotic (or post-biotic) object function; they arise from solidified plasm (having passed into the gel-condition; silico skeletons, and calc-shells of sponges, coral polyps, echino derms, vertebrates; cellulose coverings of uni- or poly-cellular plants, the chitin of articulate animals, and horny formations (scales, hairs, feathers, etc.); rhizopoda; foraminifera and their coverings; lobsters cover their hind parts with seaweed, sponges, or snailhouses; insect larvae build tubes and ‘houses’ from shell pieces, etc.; especially with protozoa the xeno- and allo-plasmatic forms may be similar: the different nature of the materials is not essential to the form production of the living bodies; the essential thing is the formative principle that selects the material and works them into moulded products; the xeno- and allo-plasmatic forms are qualified by an object-function, 774; of biotic or post biotic modality; they can only function enkaptically in the living organism; but this subject-object relation does not detract from the enkaptic form-totality, 775; the foundational form-totality of a living body is always an objective sensory-spatial figure; its non-living form product obeys form laws of the cell body as a whole and not the laws of crystallization of the materials used; the non living form product is taken up in the body's objective sensory form totality; the form of a living cell body as a whole, and that of its organic parts is a morphological expression of an enkaptic structural whole of a higher than physico-chemical qualification; the material components are no parts of this
totality, but they are realized in the morphological interlacements of the structures concerned; there is no suitable single morphological criterion to distinguish the different ‘structural layers’ of a living body; this body is a morphological whole qualified by the highest structure enkaptically bound by it, 776; vegetable or animal bodies are therefore real thing-structures, accessible to naïve experience which immediately grasps the morphological whole; the form totality does not coalesce with the form functions of the interlaced structures; the sensory total form of the body overlaps the interlaced structures, giving the body its material sensory figure, which is still lacking in the dynamic biotic space; it is the objective sensory image of the materialized living organism; in an animal it objectively expresses the higher structure of the sensorium; in the human body, in an anticipatory direction, it expresses the act-structure of the enkaptic whole, 776; the enkaptic totality constitutes itself by means of inter-structural interlacements without being reducible to the latter; the whole is thus accessible to naïve experience which grasps the continuous whole only, and is implicitly aware of the qualifying rôle of the highest structure as to the sensory form-totality; the enkapsis with the ‘Umwelt’; the bodily form is produced by the living being itself and is not mechanically impressed on the latter by its vital milieu; the number of organ forms far surpasses that of the life conditions; Woltereck's three groups of morphological types: suspensoid, motoroid, and basoid types, 777; the organic forms are never a mechanical result of adaptation to the milieu, but always co-determined by the structural genotypes; in the same milieu are developed a thousandfold abundance of forms of the motoroid type, e.g., the freely swimming peridinidiae; the diatoms, radiolaria; the form-totality is a nodal
point of enkaptic interlacements, both as to its internal constitution and as to its outer milieu, and remains the morphological expression of an internal structural whole; each of its struc- |
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| tural strata has its proper internal structural criterion; the body intertwines them in its typically qualified form-totality; Plato viewed the body as a vehicle (ochèma) of the soul, an objectivistic conception, 778; Aristotle ascribed all the ‘formal’ qualities of the body to the soul as its substantial form (a subjectivistic view); Augustinianism preferred the Platonic conception; the objective sensory form of the body is the foundational function of its structure as an enkaptic whole; it is related to a possible subjective sensory perception; Plato related this form to the ‘immaterial substance’ (the soul) so that the material substance can only be a vehicle or organ of the soul; this is a hypostatization of the objective morphological aspect of the body; M. Hauriou on the relation between body and soul; Modern Existentialism returns to the subjective view (Sartre, Merleau Ponty), but emancipates it from the Greek metaphysical substance concept; Ponty's ‘experienced corporality’ belongs to the supposed ‘pre-objective experiential field’, 779; human corporality is then considered as a ‘blind adherence’ to the ‘pre-objective’ world, 780. |
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| Enlightenment, I, the primacy of the Humanistic science ideal of the intellectualistic ‘Aufklärung’ (Enlightenment) had to yield to the personality ideal in Kant's ‘primacy of the practical reason’, 137; at the time of the Enlightenment and of the natural scientific positivism of the 19th century, Humanistic philosophy invades its own life and world view in a popular form and imprinted upon it its quasi-scientific mask, 170; Humanism began to influence the masses during the Enlightenment, 171; to the Enlightenment the term ‘natural’ meant ‘conceived in terms of natural laws’, 453; the German ‘Sturm und Drang’ was never able to liberate itself completely from the deterministic rationalism of the Enlightenment, but its conception of individuality no longer had the atomistic individualistic character of the Enlightenment, 454; In Herder's phil. of history the science-ideal of the Enlightenment is still clearly evident, 455. |
| Enlightenment, II, its idea of progress, 263; its idea of development. Newton and Locke dominated its science ideal, Dilthey, 349; Pope's praise of Newton, 350; the Enlightenment opposed the Christian-Augustinian conception of history, 351; rejected miracles and Divine providence; applied psychology to history, 352; Bayle's method of historical criticism is overpraised by Cassirer, 353; natural law; individual ideas of natural law, faith in the science and the personality-ideal; innate human rights; Locke; Rousseau's rights of man and citizen; Western culture becomes rationalistic-individualistic, - individualization and faith; anticipations rationalized individualistically, 357. |
| Enlightenment, III, in the Humanistic doctrine of natural law; in Chr. Wolff, 282. |
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| Ens Realissimum, II, in Scholaticism is God, 20. |
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| Enstatic Attitude, II, and the antithetical attitude of thought, 468, 470; and intuition, 474. |
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| Enstatic Erleben, II, in pre-theoretical intuition, 474. |
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| Entelechy, I, organic life as an entelechy, 556 (note). |
| Entelechy, II, in Aristotle, 11; in Driesch's view of ‘organic life’, 110. |
| Entelechy, III, in Driesch, 23, 24; in Aristotle, 634, 739, 746, 751; Driesch's entelechy concept is criticized by Woltereck, 732; Driesch's supposed proofs of the existence of entelechies, 735; his recourse to the substance concept, 736; he rejects a prima philosophia, 737; but he finally ascribes a metaphysical sense to his entelechy idea as a ‘substance’, 738; he holds to the Cartesian substance concept although rejecting Descartes' metaphysical interpretation; his view is dualistic, viz., the dualism of body as matter, and the immaterial entelechy, 739; the difference between this view and that of Aristotle; from a phylogenetic viewpoint there is only one entelechy, viz., the super-personal life of which all individual entelechies are ramifications, 74; but in the end Driesch takes his entelechy concept in a metaphysical sense, 741; he assumes four possibilities as to a causal method of operation of entelechy, 742; at first he only rejected the first, later on the third possibility, 743; Bernard Bavink criticized the second and the third possibility, 744; criticism of the fourth, 745. |
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| Entschlossenheit, II, in Heidegger: the selfhood is exclusively free in its running forward [in hermeneutical reflection] to death; it is the authentic self only in its fundamental isolation by the silent dreadful resolve (Entschlossenheit) to accept the fate of its existence, 24. |
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| Environment, III, the naturalist environment theory has entangled Ratzel's view of the spread of culture, 333. |
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| Enzymes, III, and their rapid operations, 642, are protein combinations, 723; differ from hormones, 731. |
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Epictetus, III,
Diss., II, 20, 6-232. |
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| Epicurean Motives, I, in Renaissance thought, 198. |
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| Epicureanism, III, is nominalistic individualistic; developed the theory of the social contract; they were atomists and held a mechanistic view of the cosmos; denied the appetitus socialis; a community of men arises out of a voluntary association
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| of individuals; the State is due to a contract made against common dangers, 232. |
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| Epicurus, I, divided philosophy into a canonic (logical), a physical, and an ethical section, 538. |
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| Episcopal System, III, of church government; Reingkink; J.F. Stahl, 516. |
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| Epistemology, I, the epistemological problem about the limits of our knowledge presupposes some insight into the meaning of knowledge as necessarily related to the ego; the genetic tendency of philosophic thought makes its appearance at the heart of all epistemological questions: a priori conditions of human knowing, the possibility of universally valid knowledge of our cosmos; its non-a-priori moments; the distinction between the critical and the genetic method is terminologically confusing, 9; in so-called critical philosophy the knowable cosmos derives all its meaning from the supposedly self-sufficient a-priori structure of the cognitive functions; the question as to the meaning of our knowledge is thereby precluded; questions concerning the foundation of philosophy are not asked: philosophic thought has come to rest in the pretended origin of meaning; Neo-Kantians suppose they can understand the whole of cosmic reality in the transcendental logical meaning, 10; Kant's epistemology is dogmatic, 35; dogmatic epistemol. identified the subject-object relation with the Gegenstand-relation, 43; Kant calls reality a category of modality, 76; his epistem. is dogmatic, 118; that of Hobbes is mechanistic, 221; Locke's is psychological, 262; substance, Ding an sich, became the epistemological x, 263; Hume reduces abstract concepts to sensory impressions, 272-277; Kant opposes sensibility to logical understanding, 360; Maimon adopted Leibniz' doctrine of the ‘petites perceptions’, 404; Fichte's Wissenschaftslehre and epistemology, 423; his conception of the productive imagination, 427-428-429-430; this imagination is a pre-logical function of the ego as a link between understanding and sensibility, 431. |
| Epistemology, II, is not an isolated problem, 4, 5; epistem. of cultural sciences, 209; in Simmel, epistem. of history, 211; immanence standpoint; its fundamental error; the prejudice of selfsufficient theoretical thought since the Eleatics; phenomenon and noumenon; substance; knowledge derived from sensory perception; or from logical thought and perception; or logical thought alone; the substance is cognizable or not; the ‘thing in itself’; positivistic Nominalism; intuition as inner certainty of feeling - or as a superior rational organ; up till Kant and Hume the Gegenstand was considered to transcend the phenomenon; Kant's Copernican revolution: the Gegenstand as a given chaos of sensory impressions; Kant's view of theoretical synthesis, 430; Kant excludes intuition from logical thought; English ‘empirism’; Kant's datum in experience is of a purely functional sensory character; the objective synthesis provides every empirical thing in the world that is beyond the un-arranged sensory impressions; the chief problem is the abstraction of the sensory material from the meaning systasis; Driesch and Volkelt on the ‘datum’, 431; abstraction is theoretical disjunction and opposition; the epistemological capital sin; critique of knowledge; its cosmological petitio principii; Kant was led by a truly transcendental motive; his dogmatism, 432; ancient, scholastic, and pre-Kantian epistemology were based on the theory of being; in phenomenology the need of ontology is felt again; its description of the acts of cognition; but theoretical synthesis has not become a problem to it; absolutizations the source of uncritical dogmatism; how can the analytical function be opposed to the non-logical functions? the Gegenstand as a
resistant, 433; how is synthesis possible? analytical or logical synthesis and intermodal theoretical synthesis; also in naïve experience; the objective systasis of logical characteristics in the logical object; Aristotle did not see this difference, 434; Kant's analytical and synthetical judgments, 435; Kant makes a logical problem dependent on the linguistic structure of a judgment; the copula ‘is’, 436; the concept ‘body’; and ‘extended’; a concept is not purely and exclusively analytical; ‘heaviness’, 437; empirical judgments are also analytical; the concept of causality is implied in that of ‘happening’; it is not synthetical a priori; Kant's note on his own distinctions, 438; Riehl's paraphrase; Pfänder's elaboration; formal and material object, 439; the concept ‘triangle is supposed not to imply ‘three angles’; the material object of the concept does have three angles; Pfänder's exegesis, 441; that of Sigwart and Schleiermacher, 442; Kant says that synthesis precedes analysis, 443; his dualism; Sigwart confuses the linguistic and the logical structure of a judgment, 444; Aristotle's categories and Kant's distinction, 445-448; and the subject-object relation; the truth of judgments of experience; S = P, is not a purely logical judgment, 449; Husserl on analytical and synthetical judgments, 450; on the concepts of the whole and its parts; symbolic logic, 451; Whitehead and Russell's logistic, 452; Husserl's complete formalization, 453; Kant on ‘the whole and its parts’; Husserl's
‘regions’, 454; logical space and movement and subject and object functions, 455; Husserl on ‘the whole and its parts’;
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| formalization implies synthesis; H.'s modal shiftings; Russell, 456; Russell's ‘purely’ analytical deduction and the ‘whole and its parts’; Husserl's ‘extensive whole’; his other ‘totalities’, 457; ‘unifying connective forms’; relations of foundation; formalization is the abstraction in a concept from all meaning individuality in the law-sphere concerned; the concept triangle, 458; its limits; the limits of formalization; false formalisms in Husserl; also in Kant, 459; analytical and synthetical judgments; only logical relations are formalized; linguistic formula and analytical relation do not have an absolute objective character; theoretical-logical subject-object relation and gnoseological Gegenstand relation, 460; the signification of: S = S; logical identity and diversity; Plato's Parmenides shows that the relation of identity must not be absolutized, 461; pre-theoretic judgments are systatic; there is no Gegenstand relation in them; the possibility of logic as a science, 462; Kant's view of the Gegenstand; that of Husserl; a definition of Gegenstand, 467; the enstatic and the antithetical attitudes of thought; there is not antithesis in the psychical aspect; analysis in naïve experience has no Gegenstand; definition of naïve experience: a concrete experience of things and their relations in the fulness of individual temporal reality; the enstatic subject-object relation; the theoretical Gegenstand relation; meaning-synthesis and time; the ‘epoche’, 468; in theoretical Gegenstand relation the continuity of time is abstracted; various Gegenstände; limits to abstraction; the ‘epoche’ is unavoidable, 469; the dynamics of sphere-universality urges the analytical function on to the
deepened meaning of analysis; antithetical thought distinguished from enstatic analysis; the naïve concept; and the temporal systasis; naïve distinctions are oriented to practical life, and verifiable in the sensory sphere, 470 (and III, 779); the anticipatory sphere in the pre-logical Gegenstand is opened; its pre-disposition to the systematic tendency of theoretical thought; the logical object side is deepened; logical systasis becomes distasis; the modal concept of function, 471; this distasis is made manifest, not created; it is a possibility, not a datum; intermodal synthesis is a subjective cognitive act presupposing the transcendent super-temporal I-ness, 472; cosmic intuition and our continuous contact with all the functions, our selfhood becomes cosmologically conscious of itself in the temporal coherence and diversity of all its modal functions; actual analysis exceeds the limits of the analytical law-sphere, 473; self-reflection on the modalities as being our own; enstatic Erleben, 474; synthetical thought is based on intuitive insight; Volkelt's theory, 475, 476; Kant's view, 477; ‘pure sensation’ is an abstraction; theoretical intuition of time and inter-modal synthesis, 478; cosmic and cosmological self-consciousness, 479; animals are ex-statically absorbed by their temporal existence; man enters into the coherence of cosmic time enstatically; analysis and intuition; Schelling's view; Bergson's psychologistic theory of intuition, 480; he has to revert to concepts connected with intuition, 481; Bergson on ‘pure duration’, 482; theoretic intuition cannot operate apart from the analytical function; intuition and instinct, men of genius, 483; Weierstrasz' discovery and intuition; Riemann's, 484; limits set to concept formation and definition; the phenomenological attitude, 485; its
internal antinomy, 486; its character dangerous to Christian thought, 487; a great variety of phenomenological schools of thought, 488; its lack of real transcendental selfreflection, 489; the dogmatic character of the crypto religious attitude in ‘critical’ epistemology, 491; the postulate of self sufficiency is a religious a priori forced on us as a ‘pure’ theory; Kant's critical method is a failure as to the central problem of epistemology, 492; Heidegger on Kant's Kritik der reinen Vernunft; his view does not concern the second edition, 493; Kant's synthesis and the unity of self-consciousness; his ‘datum’; Hume, 494; Kant's ‘pure sensibility’; he was influenced by the metaphysical concept of substance, 495; his categories refer a priori to the objects of sensory intuition, 496; he does not distinguish between logical and intermodal synthesis; his concept of the power of the imagination, 497; he logicizes the cosmic and cosmological self-consciousness, 498; identifies the transcendental unity of self-consciousness with the ‘cogito’, 499, 500; his critique is functionalistic, 501; the I-ness has become a formal concept, 502, 503; his transcendental logic, 503; he calls the categories conceptus dati a priori, 504; they are of a logical character, 505; the logos becomes Archimedian point, also in Neo-Kantianism; substance in Kant, 506; categories and sensibility, 507; Kant's epistemology lacks cosmological foundation; unity, plurality, totality, 508; reality, negation, limitation; Kant's conception of time, 509; the categories of quality, 510; of relation; and Aristotle's logic, 511; Kant's concept of causality is physical; his categories of modality and Aristotle;
Leibniz; the intellectus archetypus, 512; Kant on the transcendental imagination, 513, 514; Hume; Kant's transcendental logic; the ‘inner sense’, 515; he stuck to the dogma of the autonomy of theoretical thought, 516; he avoids the problem of the possibility of synthesis; his ‘transcendental schema’, 517, 518, 519; Heidegger's view of Kant's productive imagination; Kant's three sources, 520; the change in the se- |
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| cond edition of the Kritik d.r. Vern., 521; Heidegger distinguishes epistemol. and ontology, 522; Kant's noumenon and phenomenon, 523; homo noumenon; Heidegger's interpretation of Kant, 524; Kant never meant a dialectical unity between sensibility and understanding, 529; he does not identify transcendental self-consciousness and time, 530; but the I of the intuition and the logical I, 530 (note), 531; the link between two stems of knowledge, 532; two ways of deduction, 533; he argues in two directions, 534; the transcendental unity of selfconsciousness is not sensible, 535; his conception of experience, 536; the ‘Satz des Bewusztseins’, 537; his ethics and his epistemology form a whole, 538; the real datum of experience; in Kant, positivism, phenomenology; there is nothing given without the psychical function, but a great deal more has been given, 539; experiential data are not merely functional but of a cosmic systatic character, 540; (cf. sub voce ‘Apriori’); there is an apriori complex in the cosmological sense of the structural horizon of human experience; this horizon has the character of a law; the merely subjective apriori complex in the epistemological sense is the subjective apriori insight into the structural horizon, 548; the sense in which the
experiential horizon is identical with the horizon of our earthly cosmos; the obfuscation of our experiential horizon by sin, 549; categories of modality, 550; necessity and possibility, 551; the transcendent dimension of the cosmological horizon is formed by the religious root of human existence; the transcendental dimension cosmic time, 552; the modal horizon, 557; the perspective structure of the horizon of human experience; the religious or transcendent horizon is that of the selfhood and encompasses the cosmic temporal horizon; the latter encompasses and determines the modal horizon; the temporal horizon also encompasses and determines the plastic horizon of the structures of individuality in which the modal horizon is implied; the religious foundation of all knowledge, 560; objection raised to spiritualism in epistemology; the transcendent light of eternity must force its way through time into the perspective horizon of experience; our experience is not limited to time, 561; in the transcendent religious subjective a priori of the cosmic self-consciousness human cognition must be directed to the absolute truth; ‘the stumbling-block of the cross of Christ’ as the corner-stone of epistemology and the cross of scandal, 562; the law-conformity of the structure of our experiential horizon is originally a law of freedom, 563; standing in the Truth; reason and faith, 564; the perspective structure of truth, 565 ff.; [cf. sub voce Truth]; the individuality of human experience in Scheler's phenomology, 583; his theory of the individuality of absolute truth as truth of personal validity; his ‘pure actual -I-’ is a residue of the methodical destruction of the world, but no true individuality; his solipsistic self-reflection; he adopts Leibniz' view of the ego and alter egos; the monadic ego is broken through by the universally valid innate ideas in Descartes and in
Husserl, 584; Scheler, 585; individual cognition and human society; societal structure of human knowledge, 594; human theoretical insight objectified in records of a symbolical structure; according to Scheler the ‘Wesensschau’ gives us the ‘essence’ in a non-symbolical way; individual insight of genius and the theoretical opening-process; leading personalities in the scientific world, 595; criticism of the concept of a ‘formal transcendental consciousness’; our a priori knowledge remains subjective and fallible, 596; criterion of the truth of the cosmonomic idea; modern phenomenology ascribes infallibility to the intuition of the essence, 597; the task of epistemology, 598. |
| Epistemology, III, critical Ep. considered the transcendental-logical category of substance as the origin of the experience of things; Ritter says that we create a ‘thing’, which he identifies with a ‘substance’, 28; Riehl's critical realism; Satz des Bewusztseins or Satz der Phänomenalität; his Kantianisms, 46. |
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| Epithelial Cells, III, display part-forms within the frame of their specific total form, 772. |
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| Epochè, I, in Husserl's ‘Intuition of the Essence’; the theoretical epochè enables the ‘disinterested observer’ to give an adequate essential description of the entire act-life of man, 213. |
| Epochè, II, in Husserl's philosophy, is the replacing of the naïve attitude by the theoretical-phenomenological one without losng any content of the intentional act of consciousness, 28, 29; the inquiry into the states of affairs implied in fundamental analogical concepts and the epochè of philosophical prejudices; this epochè is the reverse of Husserl's notion of epochè, 73, 74, 75; the epochè from the cosmic meaning-coherence, 469; the contiuity of this coherence is cancelled theoretically by Bergson, 482; Husserl's self-constitution of the ego; his theory of the phenomenological reduction (epochè) and eidetical intuition, 549. |
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| Equality, I, of men, in Hume, 312. |
| Equality, II, is a mathematical retrocipation in the juridical sphere, 135. |
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| Equality and Inequality, III, in Aristotle, 213. |
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| Erasmus, Desiderius, I, as a Biblical Humanist interpreted the Scriptures moral- |
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| istically; this showed the secularizing tendency in the development of late Medieval thought, 190; Luther opposed Erasmus' Biblical Humanism which tried to effect a new synthesis between the Christian faith and the spirit of Greco-Roman antiquity, 512; Melanchton enjoyed his friendship, 513; and underwent his influence, 514; Erasmus broke with Melanchton, 515. |
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Erdmann, K.O., II,
Die Bedeutung des Wortes, 226. |
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| Erinyes, II, the daughters of Anangkè, in Heraclitus, 132, 133. |
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| Erleben, II, in Hoffmann's thought is a mode of pure experience, 29; or hineinleben, 474, is an entering into reality lacking theoretical insight into the modal aspects, 475. |
| Erleben, III, in Rickert, 50, 51. |
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| Erlebnis, II, is intentional; Felix Krueger's definition of Erlebnis; implies feeling; Franz Brentano; Edmund Husserl's definition, 112; Erlebnisse are subjective, multi-modal, and not the Gegenstand of psychology; Erlebnisse and external behaviour; lingual expression and social contact; behaviourism, 113; Erleben or Hineinleben in systatic thought, 474. |
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| Erlebnisstrom, I, as true time, in phenomenology, 27. |
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| Eros, II, the cultural Eros, an element in formative power, 291. |
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| Eros and Agapè, II, Eros described in Plato's Symposion, is an aesthetical love drive to the beautiful; Agapè is religious love; they form no contrast, 153. |
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| (Innen-)Erregungen, III, of the simplest living beings, in Woltereck, 729. |
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| Eschatology, I, the eschatological aspect of cosmic time; eschaton is what is or happens beyond the cosmic temporal limits, 33. |
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| Eschatological Perspective, II, in cultural development, 337. |
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| Essentia Dei, I, is pure form, rejected in Occam, who conceived of God's power in the Greek way, of the unpredictable anangkè, 187. |
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| Established Church, III, an interlacement with the State, 376. |
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| Estates, The Three, III, secular government in Church matters, according to the Lutheran views, 516; they originated from the late medieval nationalist view of the Church, 517. |
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| Eternal Return of Things, II, the eternal return of things in cyclic time, in Greek thought, 294. |
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| Eternal Truths, I, in Leibniz, 224; they are eternal possibilities in God's creative mathematical thought, 225, 242. |
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| Eternity, I, is set in the heart of man, 31. |
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| Ethics, I, of Socrates, 123; in heteronomous ethics the concept of the highest good becomes the ‘unconditioned totality of the object of pure practial reason’, in Kant, 382. |
| Ethics, II, Nic. Hartmann's ethics is a material value philosophy, 51; Brunner's dialectical ethics, 143; Aristotle's ethics is determined by the Idea of the highest good, 144; his idea of virtue, as the permanent control of the will over the sensory functions according to the rules of the practical reason, 145; Barth denies the science of ethics, in Aalders and E. Brunner, 148; a definition of Christian Ethics, 156; modern economic ethics; medieval economic ethics, 241; in Plato; popular morality in ancient Greece [note] 321; in Hegel the body politic is the incorporation of true morality, into which the antithesis with subjective right is dissolved; justice is identical with the Idea of ethical power, 396. |
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| Ethnological Time, III, and historical time, 334, 335. |
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| Ethnology, II, evolutionistic ethnology; Morgan; Tyler; Frazer, 265, 267, 270. |
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| Eucken, II, pointed out the antinomies in the pseudo-natural scientific conception of economics, 345. |
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| Euler, II, Diderot on him, 339. |
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| Eusebius, II, his Christian conception of history, 268. |
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| Evil, II, and good, in Nietsche, 148; the radical evil (Kant), 150. |
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| Evolutionism, I, in the 19th century, 210; and Charles Darwin, 465. |
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| Evolution, II, is an analogical concept; progressive evolution of mankind, in Comte, 194; in Darwin, 260, 261. |
| Evolution, II, found adherents especially in prehistory and ethnology; but even in ethnology evolutionism has been refuted; the evolutionism of Spenser; that of James Frazer; in Wells' History of the World, 270. |
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| Evolutionism, Darwinistic, III, B. Bavink's; Lloyd Morgan's, 84; Charles Darwin; Haeckel, 95. |
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| Excess of Legal Power, I, in Hobbes' view of the State as a perfect instrument of domination (Leviathan), 217; in Rousseau's conception of the ‘general will’ as expressed in legislation, 320. |
| Excess of Legal Power, II, retributive justice reacts against every ‘ultra vires’; it binds every legal power to its limits, 134; the principle of talion in primitive tribal laws, 136; excessive striving after power dashes itself
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| to pieces against the power of the other differentiated cultural spheres, 290; disregard of the normative principles of law can in the end only create social chaos, 336; Locke's conception of absolute innate human rights is incompatible with the relative nature of right as such, 357 (395); in the idea of the Roman Catholic Church as the guardian and interpreter of the ‘lex naturalis’ there is question of an excess of legal power, 359; also in the ancient Roman figure of the ‘patria potestas’, 411. |
| Excess of Legal Power, III, Plato's and Aristotle's conceptions of the polis embracing all human societal relationships, regulating even human procreation; in Aristotle even common meals for all citizens; Plato denied to the governors any private household and property, 205, 206; Aristotle knew of no limits to the competence of the legilator, nor did Plato, 209; in Thomas Aquinas the Church has to judge of any excess of legal power on the part of the State, thereby exceeding the ecclesiastical competence, 221, 311; the general juridical concept of competence includes a mutual balance and delimitation in juridical harmony of conflicting interests and excludes any excess of legal power, 283; excess of legal power on the part of a despotic government undermines the fundamentals of authority itself, 442; Rousseau's ‘general will’ did not imply any material legal criterion of the competence of the legislator, 443; Pope Boniface VIII's Bull ‘Unam Sanctam’ and the excess of legal power on the part of the Church, 511, 512; Luther invoked the secular government to organize the temporal church, and thus occasioned excess of legal power on the part of the State, 514; compare the episcopal, the territorial and the collegial systems of Church government, 515-518; a civil judge will avoid any excess of legal power in civil law-suits when a juridical decision of an internal nature taken by a competent organ in a community has to be considered; he then employs a formal concept of unlawfulness, 682, 683; a material excess of legal power on the part of the State cannot violate the internal sphere-sovereignty of an organized community so long as the latter puts up a united resistance in defence of its original sphere of competence, 685. |
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| Excommunication, I, as a means to check the polar tensions in the dialectical motive of nature and grace, 183. |
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| Existentialism, I, has broken with the Cartesian (rationalistic) Cogito, and replaced it by existential thought conceived of in an immanent subjectivistic historical sense, 13; modern existentialism is unable to dissociate its theoretical attitude of thought from the ‘Gegenstand-relation’, 52; existentialism, the Humanistic kind, can grasp the free historical ex-sistere only in its theoretical antithesis to the ‘given reality of nature’ (for Heidegger ‘Dasein’ as the ‘ontological’ manner of being against the ‘given world’ as the ‘ontical’; for Sartre ‘le néant’ as against ‘l'être’); Heidegger's phenomenologism is irrationalistic, in Dilthey's hermeneutical historicist way; existentialistic thought assumes an antithetical attitude, notwithstanding the fact that it wishes to create a great distance between existential thinking as authentically philosophical and all scientific thought which is directed to a ‘Gegenstand’; in existentialism ‘Gegenstand’ is ‘das Vorhandene’, i.e., the given object, 53; in so far as it considers time to be an existential of the ‘authentic ego’ it remains entangled in the diversity of meaning of the terms ‘ego’ and ‘selfhood’ (note 3); the ‘empirical selfhood’ as an objectivation of the self in the past and subject to causality; the ‘ideal selfhood’ related to the ‘present’ and the ‘future’ freedom, 58; even in the religious absolutizing of the historical aspect of our existence we transcend time, 59; opposes existential thinking to theoretical, 129 (note); Heidegger's existentialism, 214. |
| Existentialism, III, and the Divine Revelation in Jesus Christ, according to S. Kierkegaard, 782. |
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| Existential Isolation, III, and the impersonal attitude; the dread of nothingness, 30. |
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| Existentials, III, care, dread, concern; Heidegger, 781. |
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| Exlex, II, in primitive societies a foreigner is hostis, ex-lex, 183. |
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| Exo- and Endo-Plasm, III, endo- and exo-plasmatic constituents, in a living cell; endoplasmatic corpuscules in a cell, 102; exo-plasm has autonomous division, increasement, capability of stimulation, but it lacks viability, 718, 719. |
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| Exogamy, III, a law of the clan (= sib), 355. |
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| Experience, II, is rooted in self-consciousness, 560; cf. s.v. Naive Experience. |
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| Experimental Method, I, is one of isolation and abstraction, 561. |
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| Ex-sistere, I, a temporal ex-sistere cannot be identified with the ex-sistent character of the selfhood, 58. |
| Ex-sistere, II, If Heidegger had had real insight into cosmic time, he would not have sought the selfhood's transcendence in the inner-experience of the ex-sistere, in the historical time-aspect with its anticipatory future, 531. |
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| Ex-sistent, I, modern Humanistic existentialism can grasp existence as the free historical ex-sistere only in its theoretical antithesis to the given reality of na- |
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| ture (Heidegger: Dasein as the ‘ontological’ manner of being against the ‘given world’ as the ‘ontical’; Sartre: ‘le néant’ against ‘l'être’, 53; religion is the ex-sistent condition of the ego; a purely temporal ex-sistere may never be identified with the ex-sistent character of the religious centre of human nature, 58; the autonomous ex-sistere of the ego lost in the surrender to idols must be broken down by the Divine ex-trahere from the state of apostasy if man is to regain his true ex-sistent position, 59. |
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| Extatic, II, extatic absorption in sub human creatures by their temporal existence, 480. |
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| Extension (spatial), II, not identical with ‘body’, 436, 437. |
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| Extensive Idea of History, II, Herder's Idea of History, 280. |
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| Evil, I, radical evil, in Kant, 175; evil has not any original power, according to Augustinus, 179; the metaphysical evil in Leibniz is the limited, 194; this metaph. evil is necessary if there is at all to be a cosmos, according to Leibniz, 257; he distinguishes three kinds of evil, 258, 259, 260. |
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