A New Critique of Theoretical Thought. Deel 4. Index of Subjects and Authors

D

Dalton, III, the law of multiple proportion, 704.

Damascenus, Johannes, I, Dialectica, 202.

Damascenus, Johannes, I, his definition of the concept ‘substance’, 202.

Dancing, III, as an art, 110.

Darmstaedter, Fr., III, Die Grenzen der Wirksamkeit des Rechtsstaates, 408, 409, 410, 428.

Darmstaedter, Fr., III, the power state is an organization; the law state is an organism; their natural reality is related to values: a multitude of people are related to regulated behaviour and tot the power of the magistrate, 409; cf. sub voce State; his view is antinomous, 410.

Darwin, Charles, I, his evolution theory pervaded the historical mode of thought in the second half of the nineteenth century, 465.

Darwin, Charles, II, evolution, 260, 261; his influence on Spencer's view of history, 269.

Darwin, Charles, III, his evolutionism, 95.

Darwin, Charles, I, Association psychology, 264.

Darwinism, I, in historical science, 469.

Darwinism, II, its evolutionism is a genetic life and world view about culture and society, a metaphysics of the Humanistic science ideal, 264; introduced into the conception of history, 269.

Dasein, I, as the ontological manner of being in contradistinction to the ontical way, 53.

Dasein, II, in Heidegger, 22; or existential being, 23; and the transcendental imagination, 524.

Datum, II, the datum in epistemology, according to Driesch and Volkelt, 431.

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Days of Creation, I, transcend cosmic time, 33.

Decalogue, I, a Christian remains subjected to the Decalogue, 518.

Decision of the Moment, III, is superior to any principle, according to Hermann Heller, 393.

Decline, I, in Humanistic philosophy, 214.

Dedekind, II, ‘section’ theory of irrational numbers, 90, 91.

Deed, I, enthousiasm and optimism of the ‘Deed’ in the ‘Sturm und Drang’, 452.

Definitions, I, nominal and real definitions, according to Leibniz, 243; def. are synthetical in mathematics, but analytical in metaphysics, according to Kant, 336.

Delphic Maxim, The, I, Gnoothì séauton, 51, 52.

Dema, II, personal and universal; a fluid distinction, 317.

Demic Individuality, III, the nationality of a State reveals its demic individuality, according to R. Kjellen, 484.

Demiurge, I, the divine agent in Greek thought, 180; in Plato, 248.

Demiurge, II, in Anaxagoras, 56.

Democracy, III, in Athens during the Persian wars, 10; Aristotle calls it the rule of the poor; - modern views, 479; its axiological relatvism, in Kelsen, 610.

Democritus, I, was not a ‘materialist’ in the modern sense, but in that of the Greek form-motive: his ‘atoms’ were ‘ideal forms’ in a mathematical sense, 122.

Democritus, III, his ‘atoms’ are non-sensible, but intelligible ‘ideai’, 8.

Denominator, Basic, I, of the aspects, 47.

Department Store, III, is a free association, 575.

Depth-Psychology, I, dealt a death blow to the personality-ideal, 214.

Depth-Psychology, II, and the manifestations of the animal structure of the human body in certain Grenzsituationen, 114.

Descartes, René, I, Rationes more geometrico dispositae, 203; Principia Philosophiae, 202, 222; Méditations Métaphysiques, 220, 222; Notae, 222.

Descartes, René, I, his ‘cogito’ was intended as the only fixed point in his universal methodical scepticism with respect to all reality present in experience, 12; his ‘theism’, 122; his mathematical concept of truth, 150; the idea of a personal God is accepted as a metaphysical foundation for the truth of mathematical thought, 191; the ‘cogito’ is a ‘res cogitans’ checking methodical scepticism; the given world is broken up and then reconstructued by autonomous mathematical thought, 195; from his ‘cogito, ergo sum’ Descartes proceeds to God, but as absolutized mathematical thought; he founds all knowledge in selfconsciousness, 196; his discovery of analytical geometry; its propositions could be proven without any other pre-suppositions than arithmethical ones; the laws of arithmetic originated from sovereign thought; the motive of logical creation is modern Humanistic, 197; at the back of this is the continuity postulate of the mathematical science-ideal, 200; his definition of a ‘substance’, 202; and Aristotle's, 203; his ‘semi-idealism’ came into violent conflict with the mechanistic naturalism of Thomas Hobbes; this conflict was the first expression of the basic antinomy in the Humanistic Cosmonomic Idea, 216; he hypostatized ‘the thinking soul’ and ‘the extended body’ as ‘finite substances’; they are mutually irreducible; a dualistic view; he rejoiced at Harvey's discovery of the circulation of the blood as a victory over the Scholastic ‘substantial forms’; in Hobbes, mathematical thought is causally determined on the part of the movements of the material body; there is no room for the freedom of human personality; no standard of theoretical truth, or even for mathematical science; Descartes elevated the ideal of personality to the rank of referee, but it was infected with rationalism and identified with mathematical thought, 218; but Descartes coordinated the ‘res extensiva’ and the ‘res cogitans’; the relation between body and soul in Descartes; his concept ‘influxus physicus’; this influx entered human consciousness from the parva glandula in the human brain; stimulating consciousness to sensory perceptions and affects which disturb logical thought; he extended mathematical and natural scientific methods to psychology; the ‘influxus’ could not enter mathematical thought and the pure will directed by such thought; his epistemology and ethics exalted the mathematical method to the norm of truth and morality, 219; the perfect free personality should conquer the confusion wrought by sensory perception with the aid of the pure concept formed ‘more geometrico’; the emotions can be ruled only by the moral will according to clear and distinct Ideas; his partial ‘indeterminism’; absolute freedom of the will with respect to inadequate sensorily obscured Ideas; he does not want to undermine the foundations of the science-ideal; the ‘will’ is a modus of thought, just like fantasy and sensory perception; the will has no freedom in

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the face of clear and distinct concepts; theoretical error is apostasy from the mathematical attitude; immorality is also due to this apostasy, involving us in the causal processes of affects and passions; the mathematical ‘cogito’ does not err; his dichotomy of thought and mechanistically determined space was to save the science ideal, 221; his ‘ideae innatae’ are inborn capacities to think them; universals are modes of thought, and general names; his metaphysics is Nominalistic; mathematical thought is not subjected to a cosmic order; the personality ideal is resolved into the science ideal; the personality ideal has primacy within the science ideal in Descartes; he has to struggle with solipsism; the idea of God has to be the bridge to absolute mathematical thought creating the res extensiva, 222; movement is a modus of filled space, 223; his crass dualism, 227; the ‘res extensiva’ as a natural substance is a part of absolutized space of which motion is the only modus, 231; his explanation of error and sin; the influxus physicus; freedom of indifference, 236; doctrine of innate ideas in Leibniz, 237; his ‘liberum arbitrium indifferentiae’ was retained with regard to sensory representations, 238; Locke's division of human experience into ‘sensation’ and ‘reflection’ is the counterpart of Descartes' division between ‘extensio’ and ‘cogitatio’; the material and the spiritual substance are independent of each other, 263; mathematical thought is purely logical, 264; such thought, with its strict deductive coherence, is the mainstay of the ideal of science, 265; in Descartes Ideas are potentially innate, 268; he permitted mathematical thought to become a static ‘res cogitans’, 269; the ego, the personality, is identified with mathematical thought and hypostatized as a thinking substance, 295; he called the law of physical causality an ‘innate idea’, 298; in his work ‘Le Monde’ the passion to dominate nature found its classical expression in Descartes' proud motto: ‘Give me matter, I will build a world from it’, 332; Descartes conceived of the science-ideal in an abstract deductive mathematical sense, 337.

Descartes, René, II, Regulae ad directionem ingenii, 346; Meditationes, 367; Principia philosophiae, 367.

Descartes, René, II, analytic geometry, 103, 104, 337; Cartesianism could not form an idea of historical development, 351; his scholastic view of subject and object, 367.

Descartes, René, III, the metaphysical concept of material substance is the hypostatization of the general functional coherence between physical phenomena, 27; Driesch rejects Descartes' metaphysical conclusions from ‘cogito’, although this cogito remains his starting-point, 737, 743.

Development, I, a naturalistic concept in J.F. Herder, 454.

Development, II, a biotic retrocipation in history, 232; historical dev. requires cultural contact, 259; in the different spheres of human society, in science and art, in the whole of creation, 261; multimodal dev., 262; individuality in Vico, 276; according to the Historical School; the idea of cultural development in J.F. Herder threatens to stiffen into biological analogies, 277; intensive idea of histor. development in Hegel, 279; Ranke's idea of histor. dev., 281; historical development as a steady progress of mankind, in Voltaire, 350; the Christian Idea of hist. dev., 363.

Diaconate, III, is the organized office of charity towards the poor members of the church, 549; is a requirement of a living church; a church without a diaconate must be mortally ill, 550.

Dialectic, I, religious and theoretical dialectic, 65; Agricola's dialectic was an art of reasoning in the Nominalist sense, 514.

Dialectical Connection, II, between general and particular will, in Hegel, 399.

Dialectical Logic, I, Fichte's dial. log. has to bridge the Kantian gulf between epistemology and ethics, 90.

Dialectical-Phenomenological Sociology, III; and the dilemma between individualism and universalism, 248.

Dialectical Synthesis, II, of natural necessity and freedom according to Schelling, 232.

Dialectical Tension, III, among the moments of a social whole according to Litt, 249.

Dialectical Theology, I, its negative attitude with respect to the idea of an inner reformation of philosophical thought is the expression of the religious dialectic born out of the collision between the hidden basic motive of Humanistic thought and the central motive of the Christian religion, 521.

Dialectical Theology, II, and its horror of power formation, 246.

Dialectical Thought, I, was introduced by Fichte, 142; in immanence philosophy, 146; in Hegel, 208 ff.; in Fichte it is only concerned with the finite ego, 421, 422; it is the restless dialectical movement of theoretical reason depending on sensation, 436; dial. thought in the early Romantics, e.g., Hamann, 466.

Dialectical Unity, I, of natural necessity and creative freedom, in Schelling, 208.

Dialectical Unity, II, between sensibility and understanding is not intended by Kant, 529.

Dialectical View, II, of creation and sin in Barth, 34.

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Diatoms, III, 107, 108.

Dibelius, III, Das Jahrhundert der Kirche, 539.

Dicey, III, praises the British rule of ‘common law’, 439, 440; [cf. s.v. Juridical Aspect, p. 277].

Dichotomy, I, of body and soul, its origin, 44; in Thomism, 65.

Dichotomy, II, of psycho-physical body and mind in Scheler, 112.

Diderot, II, De l'interprétation de la Nature, 339.

Diderot, II, on the rigidity of his Idea of mathematics, 339.

Diemer, N., III, Het Scheppingsverbond met Adam, 247.

Diemer, J.H., III, Over biotypen van Anopheles Maculipennis, 96; Het Soortbegrip en de idee van het Structuurprincipe in de biologie, 96; De totaliteitsidee in de biologie en de psychologie, 96; De nieuwe holistische biologie, 96.

Differential Number, I, anticipates motion, 235, 236.

Differential Number, II, a function of number, 87.

Dignity of Man, II, according to W. von Humboldt, 276.

Dikè, I, the divine order in Anaxagoras, 26; in Anaximander, 67, 112.

Dikè, II, in Parmenides, 56; in Heraclitus, Pythagoras, Parmenides; and world-order, 132, 133.

Dilthey, Wilhelm, I, Die Typen der Weltanschauung, 120.

Dilthey, Wilhelm, I, he and Heidegger conceive of time in an irrationalistic historical sense, 27; his irrationalistic hermeneutical historicism, 53; his and Spengler's historical relativism with respect to life and world views, 118; he sets up three types of philosophic world views: materialistic positivism, objective idealism, and freedom idealism, 120; his confusing abstract schematism of philosophic systems, 122; it interprets ancient and medieval philosophic trends after the pattern of the modern Humanistic motive of nature and freedom, 123; his view of the modern Humanistic ‘cogito’ as Archimedean point, 203.

Dilthey, Wilhelm, II, Das achtzehnte Jahrhundert und die geschichtliche Welt, 349; Ges. Werke, VII, 290/1: - 206; cf. 112, 205, 206, 226, 256, 282, 391.

Dilthey, Wilhelm, II, historicism; vivo replaces cogito, 19; the consciousness of finiteness and relativity of every human condition and belief, 206; he saw the impasse in which Historicism involves theoretical thought, 207; from historical science causality is excluded as unhistorical and explanatory, spatial thinking; because historical thought is interpretative understanding, 255; historical development according to Dilthey and Troeltsch, 282; Dilthey and the Enlightenment and the science of history, 349; in Dilthey empathy replaces reflexive thought in socio-cultural science, 391.

Dilthey, Wilhelm, III, Die Glaubenslehren der Reformatoren, 521.

Dilthey, Wilhelm, III, he thinks that Calvin advocates the sovereignty of the congregation in matters of Church government, 521.

Dimension, II, belongs to the law-side of the spatial aspect; it is an order; it does not imply a determinate magnitude of lines which, as the coordinates of a point, are constructed in different dimensions, 86.

Dimension Überhaupt, II, a logicistic concept; and the modal shift of meaning, 172; it is a pseudo-concept used to eradicate the modal boundaries between the logical, the numeral and the spatial aspects; Natorp, 173, 459.

Ding an Sich, I, this concept became the epistemological -x-, 263; the apriori concepts of the mind reveal to us the laws of the noumenon, the Dinge an sich, in Leibniz, 344; in Kant, 348, 349, 351, 355; it is excluded from experience, 348; the Ding an sich is a substance, incompatible with the Idea of the ‘homo noumenon’, 360, 361; Maimon eliminated the Ding an sich, 404, 405; Ding an sich in Reinhold's thought, 413.

Ding an Sich, II, in speculative metaphysics of the mathematical science-ideal it is the theoretical idea, 44; in Kant, 496.

Ding an Sich, III, in Ritter's view, 28; and physics, 100.

Diogenes of Apolonia, III, he applies Anaxagoras' basic idea of a teleological world-plan to the interpretation of particular natural phenomena, 633.

Diogenes Laertius, VII-III, 433.

Dionysus, I, the worship of D. is the most pregnant expression of the Greek matter-motive, 62; Dionysian movements, 67.

Directions, II, of movement are retrocipations to space and number, 98.

Direct Spiritual Contact, III, is limited by Th. Litt to a ‘closed sphere’ of the first degree, 253.

Disjunction, II, theoretical disjunction of the cosmic meaning-systasis, 467.

Distributive Justice, III, its juridical sense is denied by Hobbes; Grotius ascribes a moral sense to it, 212; distrib. just. in Kant; according to Duez, 445.

Divine Irony, II, there is divine irony in

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the many ‘-isms’ that have arisen in the history of philosophy, 333.

Divine Revelation, II, does not mention the modal order of the law spheres, 53; has entered history, 305; development of revelatio particularis, 307; self-consciousness and revelation, 323.

Divisions of Philosophy, I, the classification and formulation of problems in immanence philosophy are intrinsically connected with its transcendental basic Idea, 527; Kant treated the epistemological foundation and limitation of the classic ideal of science (directed to the ‘domination of nature’) in his Kritik der reinen Vernunft; ethics was examined in his Kritik der praktischen Vernunft; his third Kritik, viz, that of Teleological Judgment investigates the philosophical problems of biology, history and aesthetics; in connection with his Krit. d. prakt. Vern. Kant treats the philosophical problems of jurisprudence (Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Rechtslehre) and theology; his Krit. der teleologischen Urteilskraft is thought of as a merely subjective between the two other ‘Kritiken’; Fichte classified philosophy as a Wissenschaftslehre with a theoretical and a practical section; Hegel distinguished logic, natural philosophy, and the philosophy of the Spirit; Descartes' program of a mathesis universalis; Hobbes used mathematical logic and ‘prima philosophia’ to arrive at an encyclopaedical system of the sciences in a successive continuous procession from the simple to the complex spheres of knowledge, 529; Comte's positivism, like Hobbes, maintains the natural scientific method in every field of philosophical investigation, in accordance with the continuity postulate of the science-ideal; Chr. Wolff divides philosophy into metaphysics (including natural theology, psychology, and physics) and practical philosophy; John Locke mentions three main divisions: physica (or natural philosophy), practica (whose principal part is ethics), and semiotica (chiefly nominalistic logic); Cohen has: logic of pure knowledge, ethics of pure will, aesthetics of pure feeling; Rickert differentiates between the sphere of real nature and that of ideal values; culture is to synthesize these two; values are theoretical or practical; theoretical philosophy is a transcendental critique of natural science, practical philosophy is a ‘Weltanschauungslehre’, 530; Windelband discusses theoretical problems apart from axiological questions, 531; the distinction between theoretical and practical philosophy existed as early as the Greeks; their form-matter motive; Ionic natural philosophy; Anaxagoras; Anaximander; the Eleatics posited the opposite principle, viz., that of form; metaphysical ontology in which ‘being’ is the only true, eternal, unchangeable entity, 532; in Parmenides the Form-motive is related to the Ouranic religion of nature; Protagoras' sceptical criticism of natural philosophy and metaphysical ontology involved the whole of theoretical knowledge; he drew the most extreme conclusions from the matter-motive of the older nature-philosophy; theoretical truth is in a constant state of flux and change; individual man in his constantly changing subjectivity is the measure of all things; theoretical thought had to give way to practical philosophy concerned with what is useful to man, especially in politics; the paideia gives form to human nature; theoretical and practical philosophy were opposed to each other, 533; Socrates ascribed primacy to the form-motive of the culture religion; he wanted to elevate practical philosophy to an epistèmè, a science; every concept of an arètè must be concentrically directed to the Divine Idea of the good and the beautiful; a concept has value in Socrates' practical philosophy only if it informs us of the use of a thing (arètè); Socrates' practical phil. was in fact theoretical, 534; he rejected the Sophistic opposition of theoria and praxis; Plato and Aristotle sought the characteristic of man in his nous (theoretical thought); Plato's phronèsis, Aristotle's nous praktikos; this division was based on the Gegenstand of the logical function of thought, 535; Protagoras' criterion of utility; in his view theoria is valueless in itself, only in the practical aims it may serve, espec. in politics; the nomos is a higher phase of development of the lawless physis; Plato and Aristotle ascribed a higher value to theoretical philosophy; Sextus Empiricus mentions three parts: ethica, physica, and logica distinguished by Plato's pupil Xenocrates, 536; Aristotle's Topica took this over: problems about the universal are treated under logikai; this part also includes metaphysics; later on Aristotle distinguished practical and theoretical philosophy and Poiètikè; metaphysics became theoretical and of higher value than other parts; practical phil. is directed to ethical and political human activity; poetical phil. is directed to technique and art; theology is the part of metaphysics that investigates the absolute ‘formal’ ground of being’, pure matter is the principle of becoming and change, 537; in ethics he differentiates between the ‘dianoetic’ and the ethical virtues; the former are the highest, being directed to theoretical life; in theory the nous poètikos reveals itself in its purest form; pure theoria is the only way to a real contact with the Divine ‘forma pura’; the transcendental Idea of Origin has two poles: pure Form versus pure matter; Thomas Aquinas adopted Aristotle's division; Epicurus distinguished

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a canonic, (i.e. logical), a physical, and an ethical section, 538; The Stoics had logic, physics, and ethics; in their ethics is revealed the primacy of practical philosophy; all virtues are practical and moral, none is ‘dianoetic’; Chrysyppus opposed the philosophers who viewed theoretical life as an end in itself, 539; the basic division into a theoretical and a practical section points to an inner dissension in the Archimedean point, 540; it is incompatible with the Biblical basic motive of our philosophy; philosophy is necessarily theoretical; the following are fundamental and inseparably cohering themata of philosophy: transcendental criticism, the modal aspects, transcendental selfreflection, 541; individuality structures; philosophical anthropology, 542; the theoretical foundation of philosophy is the transcendental Critique of philosophical thought, 543; no phenomenology like Husserl's or Scheler's; nor a prima philosophia as in speculative metaphysics; nor a ‘logic of philosophy’, as in Lask; nor Nicolai Hartmann's critical ontology, etc.; our transcendental Critique is not a self-sufficient basic science; philosophia specialis, 544.

Divorce, III, the Pharisees and Christ, 311.

Dixon, R.R., III, The Racial History of Man, 497.

Dnimitsch, V.N., III, La courtoisie internationale et le droit des gens, 486.

Dnimitsch, V.N., III, on the ‘incidents Tisza of 26 May 1888’; and ‘Philip Snowden’, 486.

Dnistryanski, Stanislaus, III, Zur Grundlegung des modernen Privatrechts, 408, 409.

Dogmatism, II, in Kant's starting-point of the Kritik der reinen Vernunft, because he does not realize the problems involved in the pre-suppositions, 432.

Dog's Use of a Chair, A, III, is without the awareness of a chair's structural meaning, 136, 137.

Domestic Jurisdiction, III, examined by a civil judge, testing it to the principle of ‘audi et alterem partem’, and that of impartiality; he protects the legal status of the human personality as such, 689.

Domination Motive, I, in Humanistic philosophy, 63; during the Renaissance, 198; in Leibniz, 232; in Descartes, 332; in the Faustian passion of power in Fichte, 448.

Donum Superadditum, I, in Roman-Catholic doctrine, 181.

Dooyeweerd, H., I, Het tijdsprobleem in de Wijsbegeerte der Wetsidee, 25; Reformatie en Scholastiek in de Wijsbegeerte, 36, 64, 66, 248, 479, 538, 566; De transcendentale critiek van the theoretisch denken en de Thomistische theologia naturalis, 73; De Idee der Individualiteitsstructuur en het Thomistisch Substantiebegrip, 26, 27, 181; In de Strijd om een Christelijke Staatkunde, 172, 188, 190, 201, 203, 216, 311, 312; De Strijd om het Souvereiniteitsbegrip in de Moderne Rechts- en Staatsleer, 312; De Crisis in de Humanistische Staatsleer, 466; La Problème de la Philosophie Chrétienne, 526; Norm en feit. Een critische beschouwing naar aanleiding van het geschrift van Mr. Rozemond over Kant en de Volkenbond, 529; Het Substantiebegrip in de Moderne Natuurphilosophie en de Theorie van het Enkaptisch Structuurgeheel, 556; Encyclopaedie van de Rechtsgeleerdheid, 566;

Dooyeweerd, H., II, Reformatie en Scholastiek in de Wijsbegeerte, 10, 114, 319; Het Substantiebegrip in de Thomistische Zijnsleer, 11, 420; De Modale Structuur van het juridisch Causaliteitsverband, 39, 119; De Transcendentale Critiek van het Theoretisch Denken en de Thomistische Theologia Naturalis, 39; De betekenis der wetsidee voor rechtswetenschap en rechtsphilosophie, 46, 213, 215, 343, 422; Het substantiebegrip in de moderne natuurphilosophie en de theorie van het enkaptisch structuurgeheel, 109; Het juridisch causaliteitsprobleem in het licht der wetsidee, 182; Beroepsmisdaad en strafvergelding in het licht der wetsidee, 186; De Crisis in de Humanistische Staatsleer, 212; In de Strijd om een Christelijke Staatkunde, 357, 358, 359; De bronnen van het Stellig Recht in het licht der wetsidee, 422; De analogische grondbegrippen der vakwetenschappen en hun betrekking tot de menselijke ervaringshorizon, 459; Kuyper's wetenschapsleer, 300.

Dooyeweerd, H., III, Reformatie en Scholastiek in de Wijsbegeerte, 8, 87, 200; De idee der Individualiteitsstructuur en het Thomistisch substantiebegrip, 17; Het Substantiebegrip in de moderne natuurphilosophie en de theorie van het enkaptisch Structuurgeheel, 24, 694; De Crisis in de Humanistische Staatsleer, 66, 242, 246, 248, 259, 383, 386-388, 394, 431, 465, 466;

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Rondom het biologisch soortbegrip, - (met J. Lever), 80, 81; In de Strijd om een Christelijke Staatkunde, 232, 398; Encyclopaedie van de Rechtsgeleerdheid, 374, 666; De Vooronderstellingen van ons denken over recht en Samenleving in de Crisis van het moderne Historisme, 383; De Wetsbeschouwing in Brunner's boek ‘Das Gebot und die Ordnungen’, 403, 404; Het Vraagstuk van het organisch Kiesrecht in een nieuw Stadium, 465; Norm en Feit. Een critische beschouwing naar aanleiding van het geschrift van Mr. Rozemond over Kant en de Volkenbond, 474; De Structuur der Rechtsbeginselen en de Methode der Rechtswetenschap in het Licht der Wetsidee, 556; De Bronnen v.h. Stellig Recht i.h. licht der Wetsidee, 666; De Theorie van de Bronnen van het Stellig Recht i.h. licht der Wetsidee, 666; De Strijd om het Souvereiniteitsbegrip in de moderne Rechts- en Staatsleer, 667; Het Tijdsprobleem in de Wijsbegeerte der Wetsidee, 704.

Dougall, Mac, Vierkandt, etc., III, on the submissive instinct, 294.

Do ut des, II, this principle rigorously governs the whole of the primitive law of contract, even the mutual exchange of gifts, 183.

Drama, III, an aesthetical imaginative totality reproduced in a series of mental acts and acts of performance with the help of its symbolical objectification in books, etc., 110, 111.

Dread, III, of nothingness, 30.

Drever, James, II, Dictionary of Psychology, 112.

Driesch, Hans, I, Metaphysik (Zwei Vorträge zur Naturphilosophie), 546.

Driesch, Hans, I, philosophy of nature is a guide to natural science, a centre for all possible ways of thought about the data; from it there are roads to the theory of reality, 546.

Driesch, Hans, II, considers phenomena of life as a substance; his concept entelechy, 110; he ignores the meaning-systasis, 431.

Driesch, Hans, III, Philosophie des Organischen, 730, 733, 734, 736, 738, 739, 740, 742, 753, 754; Der Begriff der organischen Form, 736, 737, 739, 740, 741, 771; Geschichte des Vitalismus, 733; Philosophischen Gegenwartsfragen, 737; Ordnungslehre, 736, 737, 738, 746, 747; Wirklichkeitslehre, 737, 748, 749; Logische Studien über Entwicklung, 740, 742, 743, 744; Wahrscheinlichkeit und Freiheit, 747.

Driesch, Hans, III, entelechy-psychoid, 24; his neo-vitalism, 647; the effect of a ferment when it is once present, is chemical... This does not mean that all metabolism is of a chemical nature, 730; denies the existence of a specific material bio-substance, 732; he identifies ‘vitalism’ with the view that the biotic aspect has its proper laws and that a living organism is characterized by its individuality structure, 733; he identifies all modern mechanistic biology with a machine theory of life, 734; totality causality and quantitative causality; his experiments with eggs of sea-hedgehogs, 735, 751, 753; the restricted validity of his argument; his recourse to the ‘substance’ concept; life as an invisible immaterial ‘organic form’; entelechy; psyche and psychoid, 736; his entelechy is a second natural factor; his metaphysics is based on empirical research, it is not a philosophia prima; he starts from the Cartesian Cogito - and is influenced by Kant's epistemology, but his ‘categories’ are intentional, 737; why we do not have a representation of entelechy; his concept ‘substance’ is first an ordering notion, a constant point of reference not implying any relation itself, the constant bearer of the properties, indicating its essence; this ‘substance’ is not a ‘thing in itself’; his Ordnungslehre is nominalistic, though he accepts universalia in rebus; Driesch starts from the Cogito, not from the realistic concept of being, 738; his ‘substance’ concept impedes the insight into the individuality structures; his ‘entelechy’ is not Aristotelian; he adheres to a dualism between an immaterial and a material substance; a material substance is an independent extended corporeal entity, 739; Aristotle's ‘natural primary substance’ is a composite of form and matter; Aristotle's entelechy of a living body is never a substance; its form is never an independent being; in Driesch's entelechy are realized all the potences of a functional, adaptive restitutive character; from a phylogenetic standpoint there is only one entelechy, viz. super-personal life; his scheme of act-potence compared with Aristotle's, 740; potentia is the constant substance of the form in Driesch; actus is manifest in matter as a non-mechanical evolution; hence the ‘constant substance’ is an immaterial ‘thing in itself’; in Aristotle the potency is inherent in matter; in Driesch the immaterial constant substance is pure potence operating only as actus in matter; Dr. denies the existence of a typical bio-chemical constellation; a living body is nothing but ‘dead matter’ when considered from its physico-chemical side; although a ‘living body’ is a material system whose behaviour does

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not conform to mechanical, but to vitalistic laws, 741; only the controlling influence of entelechy constitutes the difference between ‘living’ and ‘dead’ matter; the brain, e.g., is a ‘physico-chemical’ system and the ‘psyche’ operates by means of it; the brain's physico-chemical condition is not the completely sufficient genetic ground, but only the partial ground of what happens in it, 742; entelechy may originate physical movement (energy); entelechy removes energy by ‘turning’ material systems; entelechy may suspend movement or set free energy, in a teleological relation to the needs of a living whole; entelechy imposes a building plan on the material system; these are the four possibilities with respect to a causal operation of entelechy; the first possibility is incompatible with the law of the preservation of energy; in 1908 he chose the third possibility; but later on he preferred the ‘building plan’ idea; Gurvitch meant something similar, 743; Bavink's criticism of Driesch, 744; the suspension theory implies the production of some energy in entelechy, hence a physical force; but entelechy is supposed to be an immaterial cause; the realization of a building plan also requires physical energy, 745; Driesch's entelechy and that of Aristotle, 746; his dualism of totality and chance, 747; Driesch's philosophy of nature is influenced by Schelling's freedom-idealism, and by Kant's ‘Krit. d. teleol. Urteilskraft’. 748; he thinks that genuine freedom is incompatible with any general law. 749; Woltereck criticizes Driesch, 750; for lack of insight into the typical individuality structures of our experiential horizon, Driesch elevated ‘life’ to an ‘immaterial substance’ and called it ‘entelechy’, 762; Driesch gets entangled in the wrongly posited question as to how a psyche can influence a material body, 766; he refuted the aggregate theory, and also the pure physico-chemical theory of biotically qualified shape formation, 771.

Drosera Rotundifolia, III, an insectivorous plant, 645.

Drosophila, III, its germ-cells, 755.

Dualism, I, of a material and a spiritual substance, in Locke, 263; Locke's psychological dualism becomes a radical one, for he opposes psychological experience to creative thought, 266.

Duez, Paul, III, La Responsabilité de la Puissance Publique endehors du Contrat, 445, 687.

Duez, Paul, III, on the iustitia distributiva in the State, 445.

Duguit, Léon, II, his sociological legal theory, 396; he gave up the concept of ‘subjective right’, 399.

Duguit, Léon, III, Traité de droit constitutionel, 462; Le droit social, le droit individuel, et la transformation de l'Etat, 465.

Duguit, Léon, III, denies the human rights of the natural law doctrine; subjective right should be replaced by ‘social function’; there is only ‘objective law’, 460; the State is the factual relation of force between stronger and weaker individuals; ‘objective law’ is social law; social-economic rules and customs of propriety compose law, i.e. legal norms; the sovereignty of law, 461; he later on recognizes the formative factor in law, distinguishing between normative and constructive legal rules; his description of the development of law since the latter half of the 19th century, 462; his ‘social’ law is merely the typical industrial sphere, 463; he is an adherent of ‘political pluralism’, 465.

Dumèry, Henry, 1, Blondel et la philosophie contemporaine, 526.

Dunamei on, II, or potentiality in Aristotle's metaphysics, 9.

Dunamei on, III, the marble of a statue, 119.

Dupuis, II, followed Voltaire's view of history, 350.

Duration, I, is disclosed in a subject-object relation on which the measurement of time depends, 28.

Duration, II, is the subject-side of cosmic time, 3.

Duration, III, of things, events, etc., 78, 79; that of plant-life extends beyond the span of the always changing individual cells, 296; and can only be actualized in the coherence of these cells, 297.

Durée, I, Bergson's conception of the ‘durée’, 27.

Durée, II, and empathy, 480, 481; in Bergson, it is the creative qualitative vital stream of time, 481; pure duration in Bergson, 482.

Durkheim, E., II, Les formes élémentaires de la vie religieuse, 318; cf. 247, 260.

Durkheim, E., II, his speculative concept of a collective soul, 247; his socio-historical integration and differentiation is based on biology, 260, 396, 397.

Durkheim, E., III, De la Division du Travail Social, 460.

Durkheim, E., III, segmentary and organic social forms, 175, 178; on ‘Social Dynamics’, 187; his broad interpretation of the word ‘institution’, 187; he calls it the whole of the ‘social facts’ originating from a collective consciousness; corporative institutions and durable collective manners of behaviour: law, morals, language, etc.; and collective modes of existence: styles of building, 188; traffic, etc.; Durkheim and Hauriou, 189; in primitive societies there is only mechanical psychical soli-

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darity by the pressure of the ‘collective conscience’; ‘solidarity by similitude’; in differentiated societies there is solidarity by the division of labour; primitive legal order is of a penal law type; that of a differentiated society is of the contractual type, 460.

Duty, I, Kant's Eulogy of Duty, 375.

Duverger, M., III, Les parties politiques, 605.