A New Critique of Theoretical Thought. Deel 4. Index of Subjects and Authors

C

Caesar, Julius, II, as a historical leader, 243.

Caesar, Julius, III, De Bello Gallico, 356.

Caley, II, and Klein, on projective geometry, 105.

Calvin, John, a, I, Epitre à tous amateurs de Jésus Christ, 4; Institutio religionis Christianae, 516, 517, 519, 523; Seneca's De Clementia, 516; De aeterna praedestinationae, 518.

Calvin, John, b, I, Comm. in Mosis libros V, 518.

Calvin, John, I, man wanted to be something in himself, 4; Calvin's judgment: ‘Deus legibus solutus est, sed non exlex’ touches the foundations of all speculative philosophy, 93; he expounded in his Institutio the authentic Christian conception of Augustine that all knowledge of the cosmos depends on self-knowledge, 196; Calvin passed through an early Humanistic period, 515; but when he reached the turning point of his life he abandoned any Nominalistic and Scholastic viewpoint to adopt a Biblical view; he maintained that the true nature of man cannot be opposed to grace, but was in its root corrupted by the fall into sin and is restored, ‘renewed’, by God's grace in Jesus Christ, 516; he called ‘natural theology’ an ‘audacious curiosity’ of human reason, 517; his statement: ‘Deus legibus solutus est’ implies that all creation is subject to the Law; the Christian remains subjected to the Decalogue; his struggle with the Anabaptists who opposed the sermon on the Mount to civil ordinances, 518; his view implies the rejection of the Aristotelian-Thomistic ‘lex naturalis’ with its ‘substantial forms’, 519; Calvin must not be considered as a pater angelicus of Reformed philosophical thought; he had no philosophic system; the development of a Christian philosophy is actually stimulated by the Biblical basic motive of the Reformation and shows a constant

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striving after reformation; this precludes the canonizing of any one system; its basic Idea embraces the religious antithesis between the apostasy of nature and its destiny according to creation, 522; it recognizes in ‘common grace’ a counter force against the destructive work of sin in the cosmos; because the antithesis between sin and creation is really abrogated by the redemption in Jesus Christ; common grace must not be dualistically opposed to particular grace; both are subordinated to the ‘honour and glory of God’; the root of common grace is Christ, 523.

Calvin, John II, Institutio, 561; Comment. in ep. ad Col. 3^14......152; Op. 27,560; - 27,588; - 26,502ff......161. cf. 243.

Calvin, John, II, all the virtues are summarized in love, 152; against the Anabaptists he maintains that justice is in the interest of love, 161; as a leader in a cultural sense, 243.

Calvin, John, III, C.R. 66, 635; - 504; Institutio religionis Chr., 520, 533, 534, 535, 542, 548.

Calvin, John, III, the State is a ‘beautiful order’, in which prevails ‘symmetria, proportia’: its opposite is a ‘confusum et dissipatum chaos’, 480; Christ's kingship; we do not have an earthly king as Christ's image, for Christ gives life to the church Himself, 504; the Church is the Body of Christ, i.e. the una sancta ecclesia, 509, 510; he connects the invisible with the visible church and recognizes only Christ's authority in the latter exercised through Christ's Word and Spirit; he emphasizes the dependence of the communal law of the Church on the exceptional structure of this instituion, 519; and claims sphere sovereignty for the latter, also in a juridical sense; Church authority functions in all aspects of its temporal institution; because it is a real organized community; the disposition of the four offices and the congregation's share in their election was exclusively inferred from the New Testament; there was no question of democracy or people's sovereignty, or a modern system of representation, 520; the authority (to administer the Divine Word) has not been given to these men themselves but to the office of wich they are the bearers; or, to say it more clearly, it has been given to the Word whose ministry has been entrusted to them, 533; Calvin stresses St. Paul's attitude to the Corinthian Church with all its sins, 534; the Church is the mother of our faith in Christ Jesus, 535; his view of the Church Confession, 542.

Calvinism, I, according to Rickert, 149.

Calvinism, III, according to Troeltsch Calvinism is individualistic, the same view in Schmalenbach, Troeltsch and Weber, 247.

Canonists, III, they were the first to conceive of organized communities in the concept of a person; a persona ficta; the universitas is a juridical name, not a real person, something incorporeal; there are only natural persons, 233; a universitas is not a societas; the hierarchical church institute had its unity from above, through Christ's representative the Pope and his clergy; the laity were not active members; the church is a persona ficta; canonists followed the absolutistic view of Roman law and did not allow any internal structural diversity in the universitates; there was only one Roman universitas personarum, viz. the state, a legal person; other universitates required the State's recognition by a lex specialis; canonists did not recognize free corporations in State or Church; such freedom, 234, evidenced anarchy, and was dangerous; canonist accommodation of the Roman legal concept universitas to the Church and its sub-divisions; the universitas became a foundation; the Church is a persona ficta, an individuum, a unity without plurality; church authorities are outside of the Church in a juridical sense, because the fictitious person lacks legal capacity of acting; internally the Church is fitted into a representational theory, 235.

Canon Law, II, and the study of legal history, 197; justa causa doctrine; the principle of the freedom of contract in Canon Law was taken over by Germanic Law; and ‘natural’ ethical law, 359.

Canon Law, III, 233, 235

Cantor, II, Grundlagen einer allgemeinen Mannigfaltigkeitslehre, 87, 90, 91. cf. 340.

Cantor, II, transfinite numbers; actual or completed infinity of a series in the infinite and the infinitesimal orders; this is antinomic, 87; the convergent infinite series is arithmetical in his view, 91.

Capitalist, III, concept of capitalist is oriented to the absolutized economic aspect in Marxism, 165.

Carlyle, III, A History of Medieval Political Theory in the West, 232.

Carnap, R., II, Der Raum, 78, 96.

Carnap, R., II, on formal space, 63; on topological space as a receptacle, 96.

Carolingians, The, II, answered the challenge of the Arabian invasion and the private power formations of the Frankish seigneurs, 253.

Carolingian Renaissance, II, of science

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and art was founded on the establishment of the Carolingian Empire, 191.

Carolingian State, III, this State existed while the inter-individual relations had not yet been completely emancipated from undifferentiated communities, and the medieval Church, 659.

Carpzovius, III, Diss. de jure decid. theol. controv., 516.

Cartesian Doubt, II, applied by Bayle to historical tradition, 353.

Cassirer, I, Philosophie der symbolischen Formen, 55; Das Erkenntnisproblem, 199, 228, 229, 240, 247, 249, 265, 282, 340, 342, 344, 345, 349, 350; Leibniz' System in seinen wissensch. Grundlagen, 229, 255; Die Philosophie der Aufklärung, 462.

Cassirer, I, on the basis of anthropological and ethnological data he established that in the mythological sphere selfknowledge is dependent on the knowledge of deities, 55; the relation between the new Humanistic concept of the ego and the new concept of nature, 199; he rejects Riehl's interpretation of David Hume, 282; he thinks that Kant conceived of time and space as ‘conceptus singulares’ before he conceived them as forms of intuition, but Cassirer has overlooked the terminology in Kant's inaugural oration, 345.

Cassirer, II, Die Philosophie der Aufklärung, 346, 347, 348, 350, 351, 354; Substanz Begriff und Funktions Begriff, 83, 103; Philosophie der symbolischen Formen, 316, 318, 320, 321, 323, 324, 326, 328, 330.

Cassirer, II, rejects Russell's logification of number, 83; on the change from the geometry of measure to that of positions, 103; mana-idea; personal and impersonal, natural and super-natural are merged in it, 316; criticizes Durkheim's view of totemism; animals and humans; their unity of action proves their unity of essence, 318; totemistic communities absorb individuality entirely; the power of the primitive communal consciousness, 320; pisteutic conception of self in relation to the deity is mythical; the concentrated self is reached in myth by projecting new images of deity; man knows himself only insofar as he can visualize himself in his idols, 323; mythical consciousness, 324; myth and the theoretical -I- of transcendental apperception, 325; on Classicist art, 346; Leibniz' treatise: Von der Weisheit; Boileau's reduction of the individuality of an artefact to law-conformity is not critized bij Cassirer, 347; his view of Condillac's theory, 348; on Voltaire's attempt to save human freedom from deterministic science, 351; praises Bayle excessively, 353; criticism of Voltaire, 354.

Casti-Connubii, III, the Encyclical, 319.

Catalysts, III, in fermentation processes, 716; compared with lubricants, by Ostwald, 731.

Categorical Imperative, II, is the pure form of the respect for the ethical law, in the sense of respect for the Idea of mankind, according to the Humanistic ideal of personality, 149.

Categorical Imperative, III, in Kant, 749.

Categories, II, in Kant, 13; Kelsen, 17, 42; Kant's cosmological Ideas; the Idea is a ‘Ding an sich’ to which the categories of the understanding are applied as logical determinations without the aid of any sensory experience; thus reason gets involved in antinomies, 43; of quantity in Kant are merely analogical concepts, 58; Aristotle's system of categories was influenced by metaphysical and linguistic considerations; they are basic forms of predication about the existent, 445; refer to sensibility in Kant, 495; in Kant, are the foundations of the synthesis; Kant derives them from the table of logical judgments, 506 ff.; independent of sensibility, 507; there is one synthesis of categories and time, 508; Aristotle's categories of possibility and actuality were based on the form-matter scheme, 512; ‘of knowledge’ in critical epistemology, 517.

Cathrein, Victor, II, Recht, Naturrecht, und positives Recht, 162.

Cathrein, Victor, III, Moralphilosophie: Die Ehe als naturrechtliche Institution, 313, 321.

Cathrein, Victor, III, the principal aim of marriage is not the personal welfare of the marriage partners but that of the human species, the honourable maintenance and propagation of the human race, 313.

Causality, I, is dialectically related to freedom in Kant, 90; it is psychologized by David Hume, 280; the law of physical causality is an innate idea in Descartes; it is an eternal truth to the mathematical science ideal; factual verity to Leibniz, 298; a habitual junction of successive events in Hume, 299; Wolff derived causality from the logical principle of contradiction; Kant opposed this view, 335; it is a natural-scientific category exclusively related to sensory experience never to ‘Dinge an sich’, in Kant, 381; causality in Fichte's thought, 443; the classical concept of causality has been abandoned in twentieth century physics; and resolved into a purely mathematical concept of function, 557.

Causality, II, the ‘sole causality of God’; free causes, 38; causality in the Thomistic

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proofs of the existence of God, 39; causality is a modal meaning-moment; the human ego is the super-modal cause of his actions, 40; a purely modal cause is a theoretical abstraction; causality cannot be defined in the super-temporal; the speculative concept of God as ‘prima causa’, 41; cause and effect are analogical moments in the structure of the energy aspect, 110; causality, according to J.S. Mill, 119; in Kant it is a transcendental-logical category, 120; juridical causality, 182; historical causality, 251; Rickert's views; ‘individual causality’, 254; Dilthey excludes causality as unhistorical, 255; so does Spengler, 283; historical development and natural causality, 283; causality is implied in the concept ‘happening’, 438; Kant ascribes physical meaning to the category of causality, 512.

Causality, III, a substance is a first cause making a thing into an individual whole, 12; Driesch's entelechy, 23, 24; Russell's opposition of the causal theory of perception to the ‘common sense’ view, 23; causality in Kant is a category of relation, 27; causality in naive experience, 34; external causes; modal aspects of causality, 40; there is no causal relation between the aspects, 62; the intermodal unity of a thing and the internal thing-causality, 63; such causality is not substantial, 66; there is no mutual causal encroachment of one modal sphere upon the modal spheres of the others; structural causality pre-supposes a total view and can only be handled as a transcendental idea, 159; totality causality and quantitative causality in Driesch, 735.

Cave Cultures, II, the investigation of cave cultures is not a genuinely historical theme, 265.

Cell, I, a living cell is a typical individuality structure, 554.

Cell, II, in biology we are confronted with the typical numerical relations between the particles of a cell, the typical number of chromosomes, 425.

Cell, III, a cell of the body of an animal, 85, 86; is undoubtedly real, but not directly accessible to naïve experience, 102; structure of a living cell; the last independent viable unity of a living mass, 102; the word ‘cell’ denotes an undefined general concept and says nothing about the individuality structure of the living unit in question; germ cells of plants and animals; germ cell of a human being refers to the mystery of the spiritual centre of human existence transcending all temporal structures; the germ cell of a plant is biotically qualified; the ‘psychology of plants’ cannot demonstrate the existence of subjective modal feeling in plants; the biotic reaction to stimuli and their utilization should not be confused with genuine feeling; the leaves of the mimosa pudica; insectivorous plants like the drosera rotundifolia; these reactions have sensory analogies in feeling; in protozoa the cell possesses ‘nervous-like spheres’; the background to the ‘psychology of plants’ is the Leibnizian principle of continuity, 645; the borderline cases between the vegetable and the animal kingdoms pre-suppose the radical typical boundaries; the germ cell implies the architecture of the differentiated body as a pre-disposition, not as a ‘pre-formation’; it is as if every individual cell has been given the plan of the whole; this integrating tendency is manifest, e.g., in regenerative phenomena; Driesch's experiments with the eggs of sea-urchins (echinoidea); the structural plan of the total animal realizes itself in its parts, 646; the experiments made in connection with the transplantation and implantation of groups of cells and with the cultivation of free cell-cultures outside the living organism; they do not prove that separate cells possess an independent natural inner destination different from that of the total organism; organic disease like sarcoma, and goiter; the modal causal functional coherence of the vital phenomena within the physico-chemical sphere is not annihilated by the internal structural law of the individuality structures functioning in this aspect; there is a harmonious coherence between the functional and the structural typical view of life phenomena, 647; the real parts of a cell are its nucleus and the protoplasm, 638; the cell is the smallest unity capable of independent life discovered up to now, 718; development of surface of solved matter in a cell; enormous surface charges of electrity render a cell sensitive to changes of electric condition and temperature, 719; most cells have an alveolar form of plasm, 719; hylocentric, kinocentric, morphocentric structures; a living cell has a centred structure; metabolism and its effects are directed from this centre; the nucleus; chromatin, 720; endo- and exoplasm; non-living components; the organic catalysts: enzymes and ferments, 723; a cell cannot live in the molecular or crystalline matter structures, 769; a living cell-organism is enkaptically founded in a mixture of matter which it binds within its own individuality structure, 770.

Cell-Body, III, is to be distinguished from the cell-organism; organic combinations in plasm and nucleus are complicated and labile, 715; in animals is an enkaptic form-totality, with a psychical leading structure, 765; its living organism cannot contain lifeless parts, 766.

Central Command, I, is the command of love, 60.

Certainty, II, feeling of certainty in

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faith, 115; two types in Volkelt: intuitive certainty originating from the logical necessity of thought, and the certainty derived from the moral law, 477.

Chair, A, III, is a kind of seat; it has a biotic characteristic; the cultural need of man, 134.

Challenge, I, the world is an infinite active chain of challenges, according to Fichte, 476.

Challenge, II, in Toynbee's sense, is at the same time an appeal to the normative task of the real formers of history, a historical lest of their qualification as leaders in the process of cultural development, 252, 253.

Chamberlain, III, Grundlagen des Neunzehnten Jahrhunderts, 496.

Chamberlain, III, his mystic pan-Germanism and vehement anti-semitism, 496.

Chance, III, according to v. Baer, 747.

Character, II, Heymans' definition; character in its relation to the standards of good and evil as the veritable object of ethical judgment, 147, 148.

Chardon, C., II, Themis, 133.

Charity, III, within and outside of the Church institution, 549, 550.

Chemistry, I, cannot operate exclusively with a general concept of function, 554.

Chiliasm, II, in the philosophy of history, 272.

Chitin of Articulate Animals, III, 774.

Christ, I, as the New Root of mankind is subject to the law, 101.

Christ, II, embodies the religious fulness of meaning as the meaning-ground of created existence, 25; the new root of creation, 30; of reborn creation, 32; a Christian is given everything in Christ, 34; the Kingdom of Christ, 262; in Him is the consummation of historical power, 294; He is the Root and Head of reborn Humanity, 307; and the transcendent Root of individuality, 418.

Christ, III, His kingship, - in Calvin - 504; His authority in the Church, exercised through His Word and His Spirit, 519.

Christian, I, science, art, politics, philosophy, are rejected by E. Brunner, 519.

Christian Aesthetics, II, does not absolutize the artist's aesthetic subjectivity, 128.

Christian-Historical Political Theory, II, was influenced by the conception of God's guidance in History, 233.

Christian-Historical Thought, III, and the organological view of the 19th century Restauration, 597.

Christianity, I, in the Roman Empire was persecuted, and its attitude with regard to politics and culture was negative, 157; in the very first centuries of the Christian Church the Biblical basic motive was in danger of being strangled by that of the Greeks; then the dogma of the Divine essential unity (homo-ousia) of the Father and the Son (soon this was to include the Holy Spirit) was formulated and the dangerous influence of gnosticism in Christian thought was broken; before this period a speculative logos-theory was derived from the Jewish Hellenistic philosophy of Philo; the Church maintained the unbreakable unity of the Old and the New Testament, thus overcoming the gnostic dualism that separated creation and redemption, 177; the Reformation was quickly captured by the Scholastic motive of nature and grace and did not develop an essentially Christian philosophy based on the basic motive of Holy Scripture, 188.

Christian Idea of Truth, II, this idea is directed to the fulness of meaning; truth has a perspective character, 571.

Christian Interpretation of History, II, related the Idea of development to the Kingdom of Christ in the consummation of times and was engaged in a fierce struggle with the spirit of the Enlightenment, 351.

Christian Philosophy, I, is aware of its being bound to the cosmic order of time and only points beyond and above this boundary line to its pre-supposita; it does not elevate human reason to the throne of God; its transcendental basic Idea is the cosmonomic Idea (idea legis), 93; its idea of the Archè, meaning totality, modal laws, subject, object, (97;) depends on the cosmonomic Idea; typical laws corresponding to individuality structures, 98; the lex as the boundary between the Being of God and the meaning of the creation, 99; the apostasy from God and the fall into sin; its effect on ‘meaning’; the logical function and sin, 100; the re-formation of the cosmonomic Idea by the central motive of the Christian religion; Archè, totality, diversity; the subject side is the correlate to the cosmonomic side; the supra temporal unity of the modalities; Christ as the new root of mankind subject to the divine law; the relation between the aspects is expressed by the term: sphere sovereignty, 101; the principle of sphere sovereignty is indissolubly connected with the transcendental ideas of the Origin and the totality and radical unity of meaning and with that of cosmic time, 104; cosmic time and the refraction of meaning into mutually coherent modal aspects, 106; everything created is subjected to a law, and in this sense a ‘sub-

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ject’, 108; Christian philosophy does not break off philosophical contact with Greek, Scholastic and modern Humanistic philosophy; it enters into the most inner contact with immanence philosophy, but distinguishes sharply between philosophical judgments and supra-theoretic prejudices; undeniable states of affairs form the basis for a cooperation of the different philosophical schools in the accomplishment of a common task, 115; partial truths are not self-sufficient, 116; even the Christian basic motive and the content of our transcendental basic Idea determined by it do not give security against fundamental errors in our thought on account of the effects of the fall into sin; the Idea of the ‘philosophia perennis’, 117; not any thinker can begin with a clean slate and dissociate himself from the age-old process of philosophical reflection; the historical development of philosophic thought is implied in the Christian transcendental basic Idea, 118; but the religious starting-point and the whole direction of Christian philosophy remain consistent and require the rejection of any accommodation to non-Christian basic motives; apostate currents of thought also contribute to the fulfilment of the Divine plan in the struggle between the civitas Dei and the civitas terrena, 119; the central basic motive of Religion, cf. sub voce Religion, 173-175; this motive requires the inner reformation of the theoretical vision of temporal reality, destroying any dualism; no dichotomy of pre-logical opposed to post psychical aspects, between ‘sensory nature’ and ‘super-sensory freedom’, between ‘natural laws’ and ‘norms’; no ‘theodicy’; the conflicts because of sin are not due to the cosmic order; Christian philosophy does not believe itself to be in possession of the monopoly of theoretical truth, 176; in the Alexandrian school of Clemens and Origen there arose a speculative Logos-theory denaturalizing the Biblical motive of creation: the Divine creating Word was conceived of as a lower, mediating being between the divine unity and impure matter; the Christian religion was made into a moralistically tinged theological and philosophical system, a higher gnosis placed above the faith of the Church; in the Orthodox period Christian philosophy culminated in Aurelius Augustinus, 177; but the inner point of contact between religion and philosophy was not accounted for; the Christian character of philosophy was the ‘ancilla theologiae’; a notion already found in Aristotle's Metaphysics; philosophy had no independent rights in Augustinus' statement: ‘Deum et animan scire volo. Nihilne plus? Nihil omnino.’ Augustinus started on the path of scholastic accommodation of Greek thought to the doctrine of the Christian Church; his cosmonomic Idea (the lex aeterna expressed in the lex naturalis); we find the neo-Platonic descending progression of degrees of reality accommodated to the Idea of the Divine sovereignty of the Creator; this Idea was combined with the Logos theory accommodated to the dogma of the Trinity; Genesis 1:1 was interpreted in the cadre of the Greek form-matter motive, 178; but the central religious motive remained foremost in Augustinus' theological conceptions; he emphasized the absolute creative Sovereignty of God and rejected any original power of evil; the radical character of the fall, the rejection of the autonomy of theoretical thought; but in spite of his growing insight into the radical character of the Christian religion he, at the least, regarded Greek philosophy as a natural foundation for a ‘super-natural revealed knowledge’; the central theme of his De Civitate Dei; he broke with the Greek Idea of time and paved the way for an Idea of development; Roman Catholicism strove after a religious synthesis of Christian faith with the Aristotelian view of nature; Thomas Aquinas' posited the autonomy of natural reason in natural knowledge; nature is the understructure of super natural grace; philosophy was the ancilla theologiae, 179; philosophy belonged to the sphere of natural reason where it is independent of revealed theology; the basic motive of the Christian religion was replaced by that of the Aristotelian form-matter scheme accommodated to the Church doctrine of Creation; the Roman Catholic motive of nature and grace; creation became a ‘natural truth’ in Thomas' theologica naturalis; the Greek form-matter motive excludes the Biblical creation motive by its thesis: ‘ex nihilo nihil fit’; the Greek concept of the divine Demiurge; Aristotle's ‘Unmoved Mover’ is the radical opposite of the living God; the principle of matter is that of metaphysical and religious imperfection and cannot find its origin in pure Form, i.e. in God; human nature is a composition of a material body and a rational soul as a substantial form, 180; the theory of the donum superadditum; sin is the cause of the loss of the supernatural gift of grace, but did not lead to the radical corruption of human nature; Thomas developed the metaphysical theory of the analogical concept of Being (analogia entis), 181; under the sharp critique of Nominalism the Christian and pagan motives, synthesized in Thomism, were radically disrupted; ‘nature’ and ‘grace’ separated; then Humanism was able to develop the line of ‘autonomous natural thought’ the manner of which is based on the motive of nature and freedom, 187; the Reformation took over the Scholastic motive of nature and grace, 188; Patristic and Medieval Compromises;

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Scholasticism proclaimed the ‘autonomy of the ‘naturalis ratio’ in the sphere of natural thought, 508; ‘theologia naturalis’; Neo-Platonism, Aristotelism, Stoicism penetrated Christian thought; the Biblical conceptions of soul, heart, spirit, flesh, were replaced by abstract concepts of dualistic Greek metaphysics; Christian philosophy began to seek the concentration point of human existence in ‘reason’ and there arose a cleft between speculative philosophy and genuine Christian faith; pseudo problems arose: the primacy of will or intellect in the ‘essentia Dei’; individual immortality of the soul and the Aristotelian ‘principium individuationis’, 509; psycho creationism; misuse of Holy Scripture and the conflict with Copernicus; theology as ‘regina scientiarum’, and philosophy as ‘ancilla theologiae’; controversy with Descartes, 510; the dilemma forced on the Reformers; Protestantism relapsed into Scholasticism; Luther and Melanchton, 511; Luther and Erasmus; and Occamism, Augustinian Franciscans; Eckhart, 512; Melanchton landed in Scholasticism; Melanchton, Reuchlin, Agricola, Erasmus, Willibald Pirkheimer, 513; Melanchton's school-reforms, 514; he did not break radically with immanence philosophy; Calvin's early Humanism, 515; his Biblical thought and the rejection of accommodations and compromises, 516; his rejection of speculative metaphysics; and of the dualism of nature and grace, 517; his view of the Law, 518; Calvin and Luther; Brunner versus Calvin; his denial of a Christian science, philosophy, politics, etc., 519; Brunner's dependence on Lutheran thought; he absolutizes temporal love at the expense of justice; his Neo-Kantian and modern Existential motives, 520; Dialectical theology, 521; Christian philosophic thought needs the vivifying spirit of God's Word; God has maintained the cosmic structural order, in spite of sin, the Christian transcendental basic Idea embraces the religious antithesis between the apostasy of nature and its destiny according to creation; it does not seek a dialectical synthesis, 522; it recognizes Common Grace; and particular grace; common grace is grace shown to mankind as a whole, which is regenerate in its new root Jesus Christ, but has not yet been loosened from its old apostate root; the parable of the tares; the philosophy of the Cosmonomic Idea is the fruit of the Calvinistic Awakening in Holland in the 19th cent.; led by Dr. Abraham Kuyper; it includes within its range all of Christian thought as such, 523; the Kingship of Christ must be taken seriously, and the central confession of God's sovereignty over the whole cosmos as the Creator; Christian freedom cannot imply a freedom in thought stimulated by an anti-Christian basic motive; this is the universal sense of Kuyper's Idea of the religious antithesis in life and thought; this antithesis does not draw a line of personal classification, but one of division according to fundamental principles in the world, which passes transversely through the existence of every Christian personality; this antithesis is not a human invention but a great blessing from God; by it He keeps His fallen creation from perishing; the author rejects the name ‘Calvinistic Philosophy’ and insists on denoting his thought as ‘Christian Philosophy’; Thomistic philosophy has constantly rejected this name; neo-Thomists like Gilson and Maritain depart from the Thomist tradition in this respect, 524; there is a Reformed and a neo-Scholastic Christian Philosophy; the latter remains bound to the motive of nature and grace, and breaks through the boundaries between the natural and the supernatural spheres in order to show the insufficiency of natural philosophical thought in respect to the Christian faith; from French Spiritualism arose the philosophy of Maurice Blondel, 525; the philosophy of the Cosmonomic Idea approaches each philosophical system from the standpoint of its own basic motive it opens the way to a better mutual understanding of the various philosophical trends by means of its transcendental Critique so that supra-theoretical prejudices shall no longer be propagated as theoretical axioms; it embraces a theory of the modal structures, and of those of individuality, 526; these theories disclose real states of affairs which are the same for every philosophical standpoint, 527; Chr. phil. and science should interpenetrate, 566.

Christian Position, The, II, is that of a pilgrim; he loves creation and hates sin; relinquishes the ‘world’ in the sense of sin, and is given everything in Christ, 34.

Christian Religion, I, connects the meaning of the creation and the Being of the Archè, 104.

Christian Religion, II, should penetrate philosophy, 566.

Christian Revelation, II, 356.

Christian Science, II, the Christian Idea of truth should permeate scientific thought, 572.

Christian State, III, is impossible says C. Brunner, 403; is expressed in a faith community; the possibility of Christian politics; a Christian state is not an ecclesiastical State, 502.

Chromosomes, II, the typical numerical relations between the chromosomes, 425.

Chromosome Maps, III, of Morgan and his school, 755.

Chrysyppus, I, opposed the philosophers

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who viewed theoretical life as an end in itself, which he called refined hedonism, 539.

Chrysippus, III, valued the positive laws of the state, 228.

Church, The, III, its competency marked off from that of the State by Gelasius, 216; its institution became a sacramental hierarchy of grace with absolute authority over the souls, identified (gradually) with the ‘invisible’ Church, the Corpus Christi; it became the only integrating factor of Western culture; feudal interlacement with the State; the rise of the ecclesiastically unified culture; a universalist view of the Church; the Holy Roman Empire pretended to embrace spiritual and secular relationships; the struggle between pope and emperor, 217; theory of the two swords of the Corpus Christianum; a new problem posed by Scholasticism, 218; the Church is the perfect society in the super natural sphere of grace, 220; the infallible interpreter of natural law and of the limits of the State's competency, 221; the Christian conception of the ‘invisible’ Church as the corpus mysticum with Christ for its Head and the faithful for its members was transformed by the Canonists (cf. sub voce), 234; 235; in the late Middle Ages the Nominalists rejected the canonic legal theory and viewed the Church as a congregatio fidelium (democracy versus hierarchy), 234; visible and invisible Church; the una sancta ecclesia is the Body of Christ; the terms visible and invisible; Kuyper's noumenon and phenomenon; Kattenbusch introduces ‘Kirche des Glaubens’ and ‘Kultgemeinde’; like Brunner; this is fideism, 509; a State separated from the Body of Christ is part of the civitas terrena; the body politic as such is a divine institution; its subjective actualization does not coalesce with its structure but is defective on account of sin; Augustinus did not sufficiently distinguish between the Church as the kingdom of Christ in the hearts of men and the temporal Church; and thus laid the foundation for the medieval view of the Holy Roman Empire; the medieval Church view identified visible and invisible Church in a universalistic way, 510; Scholastical compromise with the classical Greco-Roman view of human society; Gregorius VII viewed the visible Church as the hierarchy of a sacramental institution of grace transcending all the ‘secular’ social relationships as the absolutized perfect Christian society; Thomas based this view on the motif of nature and grace; the dogma of papal infallibility; the seven sacraments; the supra natural power of the clergy; the ecclesiastical juridical community was modelled on the public juridical organization of the State, 511; Boniface VIII's bull Unam Sanctam and the two swords; Luther's view of the Church: the invisible Church is the true Body of Christ; but as such it has no temporal organization; Luther held that the Church is both visible and invisible; the formula of the Augsburg Confession; the Church in its essence is invisible, as a congregation it has ‘visilbe marks’, 512; Luther's dualism; its origin; he hypostatized the faith aspect of the institutional organization and thus favoured the formation of sectarian conventicles; the idea of the ‘congregatio fidelium’; ecclesiola in ecclesia; the Conciliar Movement of the XV century, 513; the peasant revolt in Germany induced Luther to appeal to the secular government to give the Church its oganization; he distinguished between the external juridical organization and the spiritual essence of the Church; the lord of the country as the praecipuum membrum ecclesiae had to supplement the spiritual order of the Church with a compulsory secular legal order; he turned to the Elector of Saxony with the request to institute visitation, 514; the lord of the country also instituted consistories; they could impose secular public juridical penalties; Luther did not want the government to affect the pure doctrine and the right administration of the sacraments; the old Lutheran conception of Church government distinguished between jurisdictio ecclesiastica and jurisdictio saecularis; the Christian sovereign was the guardian of the two tables of the decalogue in his capacity as the praecipuum membrum ecclesiae; then the brothers Stephani tried to find a positive juridical justification for the secular Church government, 515; their juridical construction was the episcopal system; later on episcopal authority was considered to be an illegal usurpation; the arrangement of the religious peace was thought to be a final restitution to the sovereign of his natural rights within the Church; Gerhard, Carpzovius and others promulgated the doctrine of the three estates oriented to a universalistic conception of the Church relationship; the secular government has to maintain public worship, to institute the ministry, etc. the family fathers have potestas communis and their consent is required for the government and the ministers to impose any iudicium on the family fathers, 516; the juridical aspect of the Church as an institutional community continued to be viewed as external political; the doctrine of the three estates originated from the late medieval nationalist view of the Church; it was not sufficiently clear that the internal church authority has an original legal competence independent of the secular government; episcopal theory therefore fell a victim to the Humanistic natural law theories of

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the territorial and the collegial system, 517; under the influence of Thomasius the territorial system ousted the episcopal system and was inspired by the desire to guarantee ecclesiastical tolerance to pietists; all organizational authority in the Church was merged into that of the territorial sovereign and the ministry were denied any influence on Church government; the establishment of the doctrina publica had to safeguard the external peace in the interest of the State and was entrusted to secular governors ‘sine concursu necessario Theologorum’; finally the collegial theory destroyed the last remnants of the insight into the specific structural character of the Church institution, 517; the latter was conceived as a mere ‘societas’, a social contract between individuals having the same religious faith; the State has sovereign authority over the Church; the Church possesses the jura collegialia including the contractual establishment of dogma, the regulation of liturgy, the ordaining of the ministry, etc. The majority has the power to decide upon everything, 518; Zwingli also started from the ecclesia invisibilis, characterizing it as the community of the elect; only the visible Church has an organization; Zwingli opposed the sects; the visible Church consists of the assemblies of the local Churches; ecclesiastical organization and government are left to the reformed lord of the country, 518; and are to be performed in accordance with the congregation in the name of the Church; Zwingli, Bullinger and Thomas Erastus were opposed to the Calvinistic conception of Church discipline; Calvin conceived the temporal Church institution as a real organized community and inferred this from the New Testament; the visible Church is essentially connected with the invisible Church; he recognizes only the absolute authority of Christ exercized through Christ's Word and Spirit; the internal organization is indissolubly related to Holy Scripture and the confession of faith; from the basic thought of Christocracy it follows that the Church has sovereignty within its own sphere in a juridical sense, 519; the internal structural principle of the institution expresses itself in all the aspects of its actual existence; Church authority is not exclusively qualified by faith, but has its juridical, moral, economic, aesthetic, historical, psychical aspects, etc.; the Church institution is not exclusively an institution of salvation (Heilsanstalt); his conception of the Church offices was derived from the Scriptures; he did not advocate a theory of people's sovereignly, nor of political democracy, 520; the Church institution has its qualifying function in the aspect of faith and displays a typical historical foundation; this is a radical typical qualification which is not intended to subsume this institution under a higher logical genus as a pseudo-general concept; A. Kuyper's remark, 521; other societal structures only function in faith, the Church is qualified by it; the Church institution is a temporal manifestation of the ecclesia invisibilis. the una sancta ecclesia in Jesu Christo, 522; a non-Christian Church is a contradictio in terminis, one that is precluded by the internal structural principle which characterizes the Church as a manifestation of the supra-temporal corpus Christi; its transcendental limiting character does not allow of an apostate isolation from its Head, Jesus Christ; it is a manifestation of the ‘gratia particularis’, 523; particular grace has a radical-universal character, changing the direction in the root of life and revealing itself in temporal reality in its conserving effect as well as in its regenerating operation already in the present dispensation, so that the disintegrating effect of the fall into sin is checked, 524; common and particular grace; the Church ‘as an organism’ is intended by Kuyper to oppose the dualistic separation between special and common grace, 525; the temporal revelation of the ‘corpus Christi’ in its broadest sense embraces all the social structures of temporal human existence; the antithesis between the civitas Dei and the civitas terrena; the institutional Church should not be identified with the supra temporal Body of Christ, but is nevertheless the institution of ‘gratia regenerativa’; as a temporal organization it has been instituted by Christ within the modal and radical typical structures of temporal reality given at the creation, preserved by temporal grace from the disintegrating operation of sin; it does not embrace believers and unbelivers alike as to its inner nature, but only those who have been included in the New Testament Covenant by baptism and (when adults) by their confession of faith; it is qualified as a Christian community of faith, 526; thus it is a particular institution of regenerating grace; gratia regenerativa reveals itself also in the institutional Church as the true root of temporal conserving common grace, for in this institution the structure of the function of faith implanted in the human race at the creation is again opened to the Divine Word revelation in Christ Jesus; the problem about the Church and the sects is discussed by Weber and Troeltsch; Troeltsch calls Church and sect two independent sociological types, 527; in ‘the religious basic scheme of Christianity, with its radical tension between individualism and universalism a sect is perfectly equivalent to the Church in a sociological sense; the Church is an ‘Anstalt’ of saving grace; bears the treas-

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ure of grace independently of the possible personal unworthiness of the office-bearers; membership starts at birth as a rule; the inherent miracle working power of the Church institution; it will conquer the world; all temporal societal relationships are incorporated into the Church as a lower, previous stage of the Christian community of grace; Evangelical standards are relativized by combining them with Stoic and Aristotelian conceptions of the lex naturalis; the Church type always aims at an ecclesiastical cultural unity, 528; the Church type is universalistic; the sect is individualistic, prefers an associational form of organization relying on the personal, individual dignity of its members, and their conversion; its standards are exclusively derived from the Gospel; there is no compromise but patient avoidance, or open conflict, when wordly ordinances are incompatible with Evangelical norms; all differences in social position are meaningless in comparison with the infinite value of the individual person as a child of God; Troeltsch's view is oriented to the medieval Roman Catholic view of the Holy Roman Empire; his idea of the ‘religious basic scheme of Christianity is dependent on the ‘Religionssoziologie’, rooted in the Historicistic immanence standpoint, 529, 530; his erroneous dilemma; his ‘ideal type’ is an unscientific generalization of the Roman Church; he wrenches the Gospel from its context; and he misinterprets Calvin's views, 531; the universalistic conception of the institutional Church embodies the medieval synthesis with the Greek ‘perfect society’; Troeltsch approached the structure of the Church from a Humanistic religious point of view with its dilemma: the motive of domination or that of personal freedom; the sect type is of an individualistic nominalistic origin, and serves to construe the temporal Church community from the ‘converted individuals’; the latter cannot be the basis of the Church; for the foundation of our salvation is solely to be sought in Christ Jesus, 532; the institutional Church cannot be an ‘association’; Christ builds His Church by His Word and Spirit in the line of the Covenant; He alone is the judge of the regeneration of its members; human judgment would interfere with Christ's authority and invert the relation between the visible and the invisible Church; the institutional administration of Word and Sacraments constitutes the centre of the ecclesiastical corporative temporal structure as a congregatio fidelium; the Word is the norm of faith; the congregatio is an outcome of the Divine Covenant embracing the believers with their children, 533; a sect considers the visible Church as a group of converted individuals, misinterpreting its divine structural law; the visible Church is an institutional manifestation of the invisible Church; spiritually dead members cannot be outwardly distinguished from the elect and are left to the judgment of Christ, the King of the Church; in a sect the same state of affairs obtains; the institutional Church is not superior to all the other societal relationships, for the visible Church is not limited to the Church institution, 534; the invisible Church is the supra temporal religious radical community in Christ in which all temporal societal structures are of equal value; in temporal life institutional structures are more fundamental than free associations; societal relationships that are subjectively withdrawn from the Corpus Christi fall outside of the ecclesia visibilis and remain enclosed within the Civitas terrena, viz. in a subjective sense; Civitas terrena and civitas Dei do not form an axiological hierarchy, but an irreconcilable antithesis; societal relationships are equal in rank only in their common root, viz. the invisible Church; they are mutually irreplaceable in their own temporal value, and fundamentally diversified in their structures; the Church institution occupies an exceptional position as the mother of our faith in Christ Jesus, 535; the institutional Church is founded in the historical law-sphere, its leading function is that of faith; it is a power-organization, 536; which directly expresses the transcendental limiting character of the Church, pointing as it does to the transcendent root of the ecclesia visibilis, i.e. Christ's Kingdom in the hearts of men; it is the power of the ‘sword of the Divine Word’; therefore the Church has no territorial boundaries; its task is to gain spiritual dominion over all nations and peoples; in its non-institutional manifestations the visible Church also has faith power, 537; in the Church institution faith power is a typical internally qualifying form of organized power; its internal organization has to be realized by sinful human action; its offices and the Word and the Sacraments are holy, but the human instruments are only sanctified in the hidden ecclesia invisibilis in Christ; the basic rules of its organization have been ordained in God's Word; communicant members invested with the general office (diakonia) cooperate in forming and re-forming the Church institution; special offices have been ordained for the administration of the Word and the Sacraments; eldership and diaconate; in this organization of faith power the institutional and the corporative factors have been harmoniously combined; the power of the institutional administration of the Word and the Sacraments is the centre of the ecclesiastical organization, 538; Tillich and Dibelius hold that the Church as a ‘socio-

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logically approachable societal relationship’ can be explained by means of general sociological concepts, 539; the organization of Church power is incompatible with political dominion and also with the vassalage of the secular sword; the structural principle of the Church is constant and based on the temporal world-order, but as an actual formation the Church institution could only appear after Christ's incarnation, death and resurrection; the leading function qualifies the Church as an institutionally organized community of Christian believers in the administration of the Word and the Sacraments, 539; the idea of a national Church is a deformation, even a disintegrating power; the bond of unity in the institutional Church is faith, and is realized by unity of confession; Brunner's preference for a national Church, 540; infant baptism is based on the Covenant and must not be detached from the Church confession as the expression of its communal faith; baptism is not an empty cultic ceremony about which everybody is free to confess what he likes; fundamentally different confessional tendencies in a national Church are conflicting and make the internal ecclesiastical unity illusory; a confessional Church allows for non-fundamental differences; Church doctrine is subject to the Scriptures; the Church Confession gives to the norm of faith for the congregation a positive form; this positivization is the work of man and must be tested by the Divine Word, 541; a confession requires actual adaptation to the historical development of the pisteutical insight into the Wordrevelation under the Spirit's guidance; a confession should never be elevated to an infallible authoritative document stifling the freedom of believers; nor should it degenerate into theological dogmatics; fundamental differences in confession disrupt the institutional ecclesia visibilis; an appeal to ‘pluriformity’ cannot justify fundamental deviations from the Divine Word Revelation, 542; the need of ecumenical cooperation; its essential requirements; the Church confesses the sole sovereignty of Christ in this community of faith and recognizes that such authority is exercised by means of the ecclesiastical offices; these offices are qualified and destined as instruments of faith and founded in the formative power of the Divine Word and Spirit in historical development, 543; a Church office is service in the faith community; this qualification retains its pregnant sense in the juridical aspect of the institution's authority; the authority of the State is public legal authority of the government founded in the power of the sword; it is only service in a moral sense and in its pisteutical aspect; its authority is coer|cive; ecclesiastical authority is service also in juridical respects, 544; typical political forms of government such as monarchy, democracy, etc., are incompatible with the structural principle of the Church; Calvin did not at all favour the idea of any sovereignty on the part of the congregation and did not try to introduce a representative system; Sohm's summary of all kinds of misconceptions of Calvin's view, 545; Kampschulte tries to prove that the Reformer started from the sovereignty of the congegration, but K. is in error; Calvin's use of the term ‘representative’, 546; Calvin says that in appointing men to an office in the Church Christ does not transfer His own right and honour to them but only uses them as a workman does his tools, 547; Calvin observes: ‘Christ attributes nothing but a common ministry to men, and to each of them a particular part.’ - German synods and congregational representation in the 19 century was oriented to modern political thought; offices were not really services; the synod was a ‘parliament’; every change in the political regime was bound to reflect itself in the Church organization, 548; in a moral sense the institutional Church is a community of love among fellow-believers in Christ; this is a retrocipation; as such it is qualified by faith expressed in a common confession; this love does not allow of competition by any other love, and interlaces all those who are of the ‘household of faith’; its realization is imperfect, especially in large towns; it explains the character of the diaconate as the organized office of charity towards the poor members of the Church, 549; outside of the Church institution charity belongs to the general priesthood of all believers; the diaconate is a Chris|tion institution of faith, the institutional official expression of Christ's divine priestly office; it differs from civil care of the poor on the part of the State or of private persons; Lutheran countries mixed ecclesiastical with civil charity, contrary to Luther's view; civil relief is qualified by public interest; private charity is qualified by the moral aspect, 550; Sohm holds that the legal order and the nature of the Church are mutually exclusive; this statement is rooted in the Lutheran antithesis between the Gospel and the Law; the essence of the Church is spiritual, law is secular, says Sohm; the same in E. Brunner's opposition of love and secular ordinance; they think of law in terms of the coercive State Law; E. Brunner knows of no other than State Law, 551; Sohm's investigations of the Church organization in the course of history start from his petitio principii; he identifies the essence of the Church institution with the perfect Kingdom of Heaven; E. Brunner distinguishes be-

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tween a cult community and the Church of faith; the former needs a material Church order, which is subservient to the ‘commandment of the moment’; the latter cancels the former, 552; the cult community has some share in the divine authority as regards matters of faith; its legal orders are derived from the State; in content Church law is ecclesiastical, in form it is purely secular-political; this view is based on Neo-Kantianism; the juridical form is thus considered to be alien to the content embraced by it; the dualism between ‘nature’ and ‘grace’, law and Gospel, asserts itself here, 553; the individuality structure of the Church as an organized community necessarily possesses an internal-juridical structural aspect; its law is not coercive, nor is it determined by its formal juridical source; its genetic juridical form functions as a nodal point of enkaptic structural interlacements within the juridical lawsphere; alien legal forms may intrude upon Church law: an official Church rate, e.g., 554; internal Church law displays its pisteutical qualification in regulating the inner constitution of the Church, the competence of its offices, its discipline, alteration of the confession, etc.; by Roman Catholics legal regulations of marriage are held to be the exclusive competence of the Church; this view denies the ‘natural’ substructure of marriage requiring ‘secular’ sanction, 555; Roman Catholic ecclesiastical authority presumes giving a binding interpretation of a ‘natural’ ethical law; Church law displays the meaning of a retributive harmonization of interests; it is a genuinely legal order of an ecclesiastic stamp, distinct from State law; Church law is an instrument of faith; it does not permit any coercion by the State; Church law is not unchangeable, not a ius divinum positivum; it does not permit any formalism, 556; it is a sensitive instrument for the working of God's Word and Spirit in the community of Christian believers; it is service and never qualifies the community, 557; other functions of the institutional Church: ecclesiastical harmony, economy, etc.; the subject-object relation; objective thing structures structurally bound art; ecclesiastical symbolism; the subject-object relation in which art functions is not aesthetically qualified, should not obtrude at the expense of the faith function; objects of an explicit political structure do not belong in a Church; the Garnisonskirche in Potsdam; Westminster Abbey in London; structural interlacements may give the Church an external variability type, 558; external variability types of the organization of a Church may result in the ‘pluriformity’ of the Church, which never affects its internal constitution; political boundaries have an external sense in the structure of a Church; the local congregation is the primary institutional manifestation of the Church of Christ; the apostles never mention a Church which is a more comprehensive body embracing a number of local Churches; the Church service requires a local centre for it to be performed regularly, 559; the spatial structure of a Church should express the universality of the ecclesia invisibilis; Churches of the same confession all over the world form a unity expressing itself in organizational bonds (synods, e.g.); the authority of a synod is that of a ministry, 560; the external limitation by the difference in language, the impossibility of actual communication, etc., is only variable in character; national groupings of congregations into a more comprehensive organization are variability types of the institutional structural principle of the Church; the Roman Catholic idea of this principle lacks the moment of dynamic growth from local congregational unities; the papal centralized hierarchical institution is held to embody the all-inclusive unity of all present and future parts of the Church; its static universalism originates from the absolutization of the institutional Church; the full realization of the spatial universality of the body of Christ expresses itself only in the transcendental direction to the eschatological future of the Kingdom of Heaven, 561.

Church and State, III, the Church is merged into the State by Hobbes, 236; they differ radically, 411; the Scholastic conception of their relation, 425; the Humanistic natural law theories, 426; the task of the Church in political affairs, 620; Church confession and political party, 621.

Church Fathers, III, their synthesis of the Stoic-Aristotelian idea of man as a ‘rational animal’; Stoic ethics; and its doctrine of natural law, 217; they knew the theory of the organic character of human society, 218; and held that the State is based on the power of the sword instituted by God because of sin, 219; they favoured the Stoic view of the State, 230.

Church Government, III, the old Lutheran conception distinguished jurisdictio ecclesiastica from jurisdictio saecularis, 515; the territorial system of Church government; the collegial system, 517; Rieker's view of Church government, 520, 521, 544, 545, 546, 547.

Churchill, Winston, II, prime minister in the English Cabinet, 234.

Church-Law, III, displays the meaning of a retributive harmonization of interests, 556.

Church Organism, III, according to

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Kuyper; it is not identical with the institutional Church, 524.

Church-Rate, III, is an alien legal form encroaching on Church-law, 554.

Church Service, III, requires a local centre, 559.

Cicero, III, De Republica, 227, 231, 232, 429; Topica, 370.

Civil and Non-Civil Law, III, and claims whose fundamentum petendi is found in non-civil legal relations, 680.

Civil Property, III according to Comte, 453.

Civil Wrong, III, a new criterion: acts that are contrary to the due care pertaining to another's person or goods in inter-individual social intercourse, 682.

Civitas Dei, I, and Civitas terrena in Augustinus, 119; the Civ. Dei in Leibniz is composed of the spiritual monads participating in mathematical thought together with the Deity, 257; in Kant it is the mundus intelligibilis, 350.

Civitas Dei, II, and civitas terrena, the central motive in the philosophy of history, was replaced by that of the steady advance of mankind towards autonomous freedom, 268; and civitas terrena are at war in the religious root of our cosmos, 294; and civitas terrena; their struggle is the basic motive in the temporal course of history, 363.

Civitas Dei, III, and the institutional Church; and human society; this Church is the mother of our faith, 535.

Civitas Maxima, III, This idea is speculative 660.

Clan, III, in the clan the family bond takes the lead, 357; and collective reponsibility, according to Vierkandt, 358; is posterior to family and Kinship, 354; a clan is a peace organization, 361; (or sib) as an undifferentiated societal interlacement, 653.

Classical School of Economics, II, and the liberal idea of the State of law, 360.

Classicism, II, the rigidity of its theoretical aesthetical Idea, 346; it discovered retrocipations of the aesthetic aspect, but identified truth and beauty; reduced the individuality of a work of art to law conformity; the burlesque in Classicism, 347.

Classicism in Art, II, is condemned by Taine, who can only find impoverishment in the spirit of classcism, 345.

Classification, III, in biology, 81.

Class-Struggle, III, the class struggle reveals the illusory character of the idea of a common interest, according to F. Engels, 457; labour became impersonal marketware; the individualistic contractual view; unlimited competition; Hobbes' ‘homo homini lupus’, 596.

Cleanthes, III, valued the positive laws of the State, 228.

Closed, II, and open condition of physical chemical processes, 184.

Closed Sphere, III, in Litt, 252-255, 271.

Clovis, II, and cultural integration, 244.

Club, A, III, its genetic form is the nodal point of interstructural intertwinements, 576; is a voluntary association and touches man's temporal existence only superficially, 603; its structure described, 604.

Codrington, II, The Melanesians, 316.

Coelenterates, III, in animal colonies, 649.

Cogito, I, in Descartes, had to call a halt to scepticism, 12; is his Archimedean point, 13; it is merely a logical unity in a multiplicity, 17; the absolute cogito of phenomenology, 52; Kant holds that the cogito can never be a Gegenstand, 53; the Cogito in Litt, 140; Descartes' cogito is a ‘res cogitans’ checking scepticism, 195; in it he implicitly proclaimed the sovereignty of mathematical thought, and deified it in his idea of God, 196; the logical creation motive in Descartes' Cogito was modern; it is explainable in terms of a secularized Christian Idea of creation in the Humanistic personality ideal, 197, 203, 205, 222, 247, 250; Kant's transcendental Cogito has no metaphysical meaning, it is the formal origin of natural phenomena and a logical function, 358; a law given to nature, 359; Descartes concludes from the selfconsciousness in the cogito to the esse, 365; cogito as Archimedean point, 501.

Cogito, II, Kant's: is the form of the representation ‘I think’; ‘the law of the unity of apperception, 499; Kant qualified the original unity of apperception in the ‘pure’ self-consciousness, as a synthetical unity, which was the original a priori relatedness of a multiplicity to the cogito, 500; he conceives of an ultimate logical unity above a logical multiplicity in the ‘cogito’, 519; Kant was the first to explain both time as such and the cogito (I think) as such transcendentally; he brought them together in their original identity, says Heidegger, 528.

Cogito, III, of Descartes rejected by Driesch, though he retains it as his starting point, 737, 743.

Cognatic Family, (or kinship community), III, leges barbarorum of Germanics, 343; Litt's first and second degrees; the natural family comprises the children under

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age; changed relations when they become of age; authority is at an end; the structural principle of the kinship community; different functions, 344; numerical and spatial aspects; organic biotic feeling; historical aspect; social intercourse; economic aspect; ‘affective value’; juridical aspect: duty of alimentation; guardianship; inheritance; religious fulfilment of kinship, 345; the cognate family or kinship community is found among the least developed primitive cultures that do not know the sib (or clan), 354; [cf. s.v. Kulturkreislehre].

Cognition, II, in the transcendental religious subjective a priori of the cosmic selfconsciousness the whole of human cognition is directed either to the absolute Truth, or to the spirit of falsehood, 562.

Hermann Cohen, I, Logik der reinen Erkenntnis, 75, 235; Ethik des reinen Wollens, 75; Logik des Ursprungs, 91.

Hermann Cohen, I, ‘only thought can create what should have the value of being’, 10; philosophic thought (Vernunft) is selfsufficient ‘thinking of being’ (Ursprungsdenken) creating reality in a transcendentallogical process according to the ‘principle of continuity’, he breaks up the ‘Vernunft’ into, 74; logical, ethical, and aesthetical reason; his ‘principle of truth’ (Grundsatz der Wahrheit) implies a continuous coherence between logos and ethos, although thought and volition are to have different meanings; the principle of origin and that of continuity are to bridge the meaning diversity; his ‘unity of reason’ remains an asylum ignorantiae; his continuity principle; this is derived from the infinitesimal calculus; his statement: ‘Thinking in which movement is inherent, transforms itself into will and action’, 75; the transcendental Idea is nothing but the ‘self-consciousness of the (logical) concept’; it no longer points to the transcendent sphere, 91; he divides philosophy into: Logic of pure knowledge, Ethics of pure will, and Aesthetics of pure feeling, 530.

Hermann Cohen, II, on legal person; state and society, law, 167; legal theory is the mathematics of the socio-cultural sciences, 343.

Coherence, I, of all temporal aspects finds its expression in each of them, and also points beyond its own limits to all the others (3) and toward a central totality, 4; man transcends the temporal coherence, and at the same time he is fitted, with all temporal creatures, within the coherence in a status of being universally bound to time, 24.

Coherence, III, structural coherence of modal functions; internal and external, 59, 60.

Cohn, Vereinsrecht, 234.

Coincidentia Oppositorum, I, in Giordano Bruno, 200.

Collective Consciousness, II, in Durkheim's sociology, 188; in primitive society, 460.

Collective Enkaptic Symbiosis, III, forest, heath, meadow, steppe and plants and animals, 649.

Collective Soul, II, Durkheim's view, 247.

Collegial System, III, of Church government, 517.

Colloids, III, are sensitive to changes of electric and temperature conditions, 719.

Colloid System, III, most living cells have the material structure of a colloid system; its protoplasm may pass from a sol- into a gel-condition, and vice versa, 719.

Colloidal Plasm, III, 773.

Commandment of the Moment, III, the material Church order is subservient to the ‘Commandment of the moment’ in E. Brunner, 552.

Commercial Transactions, III, were restricted to movables in the Dutch Commercial Code; brokers in real estate were not considered as merchants, 692; this was an encroachment on the internal sphere of competence of Commerce and industry; it was abolished in 1928, 693.

Common Grace, II, and fallen creation, 33; owing to Christ's redemptive work Common Grace saves the whole world from destruction, 35; common grace and general revelation, 309.

Common Law, III, English ‘Common Law’ praised by Dicey, 439, 440. British Common Law, 440.

Communal Life, III, in the home; is guided ethically and implies authority of the parents, 288; in the biotic aspect of the individual existences of the members of a family there are communal relations interweaving the members, 299; they function in an anticipatory way, 300.

Communal Soul, The, III, and suchlike notions, 295.

Communal Thought, III, in the home is adapted to the cultural sage of development of the children and the family's historical position, 290.

Communal Whole, III, a summary of the theories of a communal whole, 260 ff.

Communism, is a secularized eschatological faith, 602.

Communism, II, the liberalism of the 19th century evoked socialism and communism, 362.

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Communist Distribution, III, according to needs, in Pasjoekanis's view, 459.

Communistic Community, III, is incompatible with the State institution, 464.

Community, I, the religious community; a common spirit; a basic motive in historically determined forms; the fall into sin, redemption, the Holy Spirit, 61.

Community, II, the central spiritual comm. of mankind, 200; the essential community (Scheler), 589.

Community, III, a cultural community is not all-embracing, 164, 165; Comte's view of humanity as an all-embracing community, 167; community in Plato's Phaedo, 168; mankind is the central religious community, 169, 170; the term community defined, 177; natural unorganized communities, 179; institutional and non-institutional communities, familistic communities; the State; the Church; the conjugal community; community according Max Weber; community implies a normative task, 183; institutional; and non-institutional communities, 187; differentiated and undifferentiated communities, 188; institutions; voluntary associations, 189; organized communities in naïve experience, 192; organized communities in Thomas Aquinas; autonomy; not sphere-sovereingty, 220; external and internal functions of marriage, family, and kinship, 336; organized and natural communities, 411; of human beings in the unity of their social relationships, 298.

Community of Love, III, in a moral sense the Church is a community of love among fellow believers in Christ, qualified by faith expressed in a common confession, 549.

Community Structures, III, cannot occur outside a correlative enkapsis with inter-individual structures; Eve and Adam, 656.

Commutative and Distributive Justice, according to Aristotle, 212.

Companies, The Dutch East and West Indian, III, exercised a genuine State authority, 175.

Competence, II, in jurisprudence, is an analogical modal concept, 69.

Competence of the State, III, is limited, 216.

Complex Function of Numbers, II, anticipates spatial dimensionality and magnitude, 170.

Complex Numbers, they are also called multidimensional by Natorp, 172.

Compromise, III, within a political party, 612; between different parties, 613.

Compulsory Organisations, III, enkapsis with the State, 190.

Comte, Auguste, I, the continuity postulate in his positivistic philosophy, 204; his positivistic sociology; law of the three stages (derived from Turgot); historical development is a necessary causal process, 209; the first two stages were the theological and the metaphysical periods; they were abandoned to historical relativity; the Ideas of the third stage embody the classical science ideal and its domination motive in a positivistic form; they are the goal and standard of historical development: faith in the freeing power of science; positivistic historicism later claimed to be a new Christianity, 210; he systematized the sciences in a successive continuous procession from the simple to the complex spheres of thought, in an encyclopaedical way and applies the method of mathematical natural science to every field of investigation, in accordance with the continuity-postulate of the science ideal, 530.

Comte, Auguste, II, cf. 194, 200, 269, 270; progressive evolution of mankind is subject to sociological laws, 194; rationalistic and naturalistic conception of society and culture: a social whole with many qualities (economic, legal, etc.), 200; view of history, 269; his law of the three stages; his optimistic view of development, 270, 271.

Comte, Auguste III, Cours de philosophie, 455; Discours préliminaire, 455.

Comte, Auguste, III, he intended to reintegrate Western Culture; he viewed society as an organism, 163, 164, 167; founder of positivist sociology, 452; the State is a secondary product of civil society; civil property causes class distinctions; political authority belongs to the ruling classes; the method proper to sociology is the same as that of mathematical natural science (Galileo and Newton), 453; the three stages in the historical development of human society; theology, metaphysics, industry; Roman society; feudal-Christian medieval society; industrialism, 454; the moral bond of a new solidarity, 455.

Concentric Law, I, our ego restlessly seeks its Origin in order to understand its own meaning and the meaning of our entire cosmos; in this tendency towards the Origin the fact is disclosed that our ego is subjected to a central law, which limits and determines the centre and root of our existence, 11; the Archimedean point of phil. thought must not be divorced from the concentric law of the ego's existence, 12; the concentric law of human experience, 162.

Concepts, I, for the formulation of the concept of philosophical thought it is necessary to abstract thinking from the actual entire ego that thinks; conceptual determination is required in thinking, 5; a pseudo concept cannot be analysed, 7;

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a transcendental Idea is a limiting concept, 24; a theoretical concept joins in logical simultaneity the analysed characteristics of what it defines in subjection to the principles of identity and contradiction, expressing the analytical order of simultaneity in the sense of logical implication and exclusion, 30; the theoretical concept of a modal aspect is directed to the modal diversity of meaning and separates the aspect from all the others, 69; the metaphysical-analogical concept of totality; that of being, 71; the metaphysical concept of the whole and its parts is a pseudo-concept, 72; the ‘logical formalizing’ of the concept of totality, 73; the question about the meaning of the concepts validity and being, 76; generic versus total meaning; in special science generic concepts (class-, genus-concepts, etc.) join together the individual phenomena within a special modal aspect; generic concepts cannot level the irreducible modal meanings of the various aspects, 77; concepts without sensory intuitions are empty, intuitions without concepts are blind, according to Kant, 363; Hegel affirms that concepts precede representations, 457.

Concepts, II, generic and specific in Kant, 15; concept and Idea, 45; analogical concepts in science, 61; in logic; logical unity and plurality; totality, 62; in jurisprudence; moral bi-unity in marriage; tri-unity in theology; the word ‘space’; space as a mode of existence; formal logic and spatial analogy, 63; space in pure, non-formalized geometry; sensory space; physical space; legal space; economic space; extension, 55-71; Russell's class-concept an incomplete symbol, according to Malan, 84; the intentional content of a concept, 387; and actus intelligendi, 388; the concept of the juridical aspect defined, 406; extension and content of concepts in Kant, 420; analytical and synthetical, 435; attributionsurteil; concepts, logically and ontologically, 440; ‘a plane triangle has three interior angles’ and the principle of identity, according to Pfänder; Kant's empirical judgments are a posteriori -, Pfänder's distinction between subjective concept, logical object, and Gegenstand -; his formal (= intentional) object; the Gegenstand is not a logical object but an aspect opposed to theoretical thought; a subjective concept must intend the full logical objectification of the Gegenstand; incomplete subjective concepts, 441; the objective logical traits of the Gegenstand are not exclusively logical; ‘all bodies are heavy’ expresses universally valid law-conformity; Sigwart's subjective interpretation, 442; Schleiermacher's view; a concept is always in the state of becoming; analytical and synthetical refer to different stages of becoming; this explanation is contrary to Kant's ideas; Kant's view of transcendental synthesis preceding analysis; this view cancels the contrast between analytical and synthetical judgments, 443; Kant's dualistic cosmonomic idea, 444; ‘general concepts’, 450; Bergson's ‘fluid concepts’ as the expression of ‘psychical empathy’ lacking the analytical epochè, 481.

Concept, Pseudo-, I, a pseudo-concept cannot be analyzed, 7; of the whole and its parts, 72.

Conceptus Singulares, I, space and time; intuitus singulares puri; opposed to conceptus universales by Kant in his inaugural address at Königsberg, 345.

Conciliar Movement, III, of the 15th century, 513.

Condillac, II, art and science are related to language, but have different symbols; simplicity is beauty; Cassirer, 348.

Condorcet, II, adhered to Voltaire's view of history, 350.

Conditio sine qua non, II, J. Stuart Mill's theory identified the physical and the logical meaning of causality, 119.

Confession of Faith, III, allows for non-fundamental differences; is a positivized norm of faith, 541; requires actual adaptation to the historical development of the insight of faith into the Word Revelation, but should not degenerate into theological dogmatics, 542.

Congregatio Fidelium, III, the Nominalistic late Medieval view of the Church, 234.

Consanguineous Family, III, in L.H. Morgan's view, 339.

Consciousness, II, the phenomenologist seeks to restrict himself to the data by directing his intuitive gaze to the intentional acts of consciousness. Then meaning is identified with the intentional relationship of the absolute pure ego to the ‘Gegenstand’ intended; it becomes identical with the ‘reine Aktwesen’ in its subjective noetic and its objective noemetic aspect, (Husserl) 27-29; its intentional content distinguished from sensory impressions by Brentano, 28; historical stream of consciousness, in Freyer, 225; cf. s.v. Satz des Bewusztseins.

Constant -h-, the, II, the typical constant -h- in quantum mechanics, 425.

Constant and Inconstant Structures, III, Praxiteles' Hermes is a relatively constant structure; music, etc. is an inconstant individuality structure, 110.

Constitutional Law, II, as a contract, 359.

Contact, II, language, and social contact, 112, 113.

Continuity-Postulate, I, Cohen derives

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it from the infinitesimal calculus; it has to bridge the meaning diversity, in Cohen's thought, 75; Fichte's idea of continuity; it broke through the boundaries accepted by Kant with respect to the theoretical Idea of freedom, 90; Neo-Kantian view, 91; in Hobbes, 200, 216; it is employed as the scepter of the absolute sovereignty of reason, 203; this postulate in Comte, and in Natorp, 204; the Neo-Kantians applied Leibniz' continuity principle as a transcendental logical principle of creation to Kant's categories, 407; in Maimon this postulate halts before the boundary of sensory phenomena, 411; Fichte elevated the moral function to the basic denominator of all the aspects, 417; with him the personality ideal has absorbed the science ideal, 447; this principle and the concept of function, 555.

Continuity, II, and number, 88; of thought, in Leibniz, 103, 104; actual continuity cannot occur in the numeral aspect; only in that of movement, in its original form, 105; historical, control or mastery always seeks new roads in such a way that what precedes fructifies what follows later on, thus preserving a certain measure of continuity, 198; the antinomy in the construction of a ‘continuum of points’, 385.

Continuity and Identity, III, of a communal whole, 296.

Continuous Number, II, this concept was introduced by Weierstrasz, Cantor, Pasch and Veronese, 91.

Contract Theory, II, Troeltsch's interpretation moves in a vicious circle, 356; cf. s.v. Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau.

Contract theory of the State, III, the Stoics emphasize the juridical bond externally holding the individuals together in organized communities; they also speak of an internal social instinct, 226; they valued positive laws in the state, 228; Roman Stoics held the external tonos of the functional legal order to be founded in the lex naturalis; this natural law implied the original freedom and equality of all men in the ‘golden age of innocence’; the state existed for bridling human dissoluteness, 230; the legal order is the order sanctioned by the State; the republican Roman jurists on the consensus populi as the origin of the State's authority, 231; the Stoical idea of the social instinct in man, 232; the Humanist theory of natural law; the Humanist contract theory; Hugo Grotius; Thomas Hobbes; positive law as the general will; in Marsilius of Padua; Kant's volenti non fit iniuria; positive law is the general will; the contract theory was gradually applied both to Church and State, in Hugo Grotius, 232; Locke, Wolff, Hobbes, Rousseau, 237.

Contractual Liberty, II, was only a principle that was adapted to the juridical interindividual relations, 361.

Copernican Deed, I, of Kant, is the reversal of the relation between the knowing subject and empirical reality, 107, 354.

Copernicus, I, introduced the heliocentric view of the world, 194.

Copernican Revolution, II, of Kant; his Transcendental Idealism regarded the Gegenstand of knowledge as the product of a universally valid subjective formative process, 430.

Copyright, II, is a ‘personality right’ recognized by Dutch law; and objectifies an economic interest of the party entitled, 412, 413.

Copy Theory, I, ascribed to naïve experience, 34-43, 44-47, 49-51, 53, 54.

Coral Polyps, III, 774.

Coral Zoophytes, III, in animal colonies, 649.

Cornelissen, A.J.M., I, The Doctrine of the State of Calvin and Rousseau, 517.

Cornelissen, A.J.M., I, ‘if faith requires neither a praeambula furnished by reason, but the reverse, if rational knowledge is strengthened by faith, then, if one is consistent, the act of super-natural “knowing” is only an act of feeling. Calvin drew this conclusion and thus fell into sentimentalism’; this statement is based on a misunderstanding of the Biblical meaning of the word ‘heart’, interpreted by Calvin, 517.

Corporation, I, is supposed to be a purely technical juridical concept, 551.

Corporations, III, on the possibility of forming corporations during the Roman republic, 234; (independent) are dangerous, 235; Free corporations were not recognized by the Canonists, 235.

Corporative Law, III, versus inter-individual law in Gierke's view, 259.

Corpus Christi and Church, III, cannot be identified, 215; the Corpus Christi embraces all the social structures of human existence, 526.

Corpus Christianum, I, this idea dominated the medieval ecclesiastically unified culture up to the times of the Renaissance, 188.

Corpus Christianum, II, in the Middle Ages the Holy Roman Empire was considered to be the corpus Christianum, 288; the real corpus Christianum is a religious organism revealing the individuality of its members to the full, 418.

Correlative Enkapsis, III, unites intercommunal and interindividual relation-

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ships in undifferentiated organized communities, 655; and the first formulation of the married order in Scripture, 656; and the intertwinement of natural communities with intercommunal and inter-individual relations.

Cosmic Structural Temporal Order, The, II, the limit to the cosmos, making the aspects relative; modal laws; no antinomy between sphere sovereignty and cosmic coherence, 3; refractional time, 4; law, subject, object, and time, 8; theoretical thought and cosmic temporal order, 47; aspects are arranged in an order of increasing complication, 49; how to have access to the cosmic order theoretically, 74; nucleus, retrocipations, anticipations, 75; terminal spheres; foundation and super-structure, 76; cosmic order as a lex aeterna based on divine reason in Christian synthesis philosophy; universalia ante rem and in rē, 559.

Cosmic Time, I, is the indissoluble correlation of time order and time duration; it is only transcended in the religious centre of our existence; but not in a concept, nor in the transcendental Idea as a limiting concept qua talis, 24; the classical Greek dilemma of time as something subjective mental or objective physical; Aristotle considers time to be the numerability of motion, 25... Anaximander's view of time as a divine order of Dikè; Albert the Great defended the objective physical conception; Thomas Aquinas held the subjectivistic psychological position with respect to time, following Augustinus, 26; in Humanistic thought there are objectivistic and subjectivistic views; Kant calls time a transcendental form, of intuition of sense experience; he coordinates time with space, the other form of intuition; Einstein considers time as a fourth dimension of physical world space; Bergson calls time the psychical duration of feeling; the actual ‘durée’ is the ‘absolute’ time; Phenomenology says that ‘true time’ is an ‘Erlebnisstrom’; Dilthey and Heidegger conceive of time irrationalistically as historical; in Heidegger historical time has a dialectical existential meaning, 27; the idea of cosmic time constitutes the basis of the philosophy of the Cosmonomic Idea; time has a cosmonomic and a factual side; the cosmonomic side is the temporal order, the factual side is the factual duration; the duration remains constantly subjected to the order; an example in the aspect of organic life; temporal order and duration are each other's correlata and must not be dissociated; rationalism absolutizes the cosmonomic side, irrationalism the factual subject side of time; the duration is disclosed in a subject-object relation; the objective duration can never exist actually independently of the subjective duration in the subject-object relation; the measurement of time depends on the latter, 28; the modal structures and the typical totality structures of individuality are based on the order of cosmic time; and necessarily related to the factual duration of transitory beings, events, processes, acts, social relations, etc.; the cosmic character of time discloses itself in the indissoluble inter-modal coherence into which it fits the modal aspects; in the empirical opening-process in which anticipatory moments develop cohering with later aspects, 29; we can form a theoretical concept of the separate aspects of time, but time itself in its all-embracing cosmic meaning can never be comprehended in a concept; it can only be approximated in a theoretical limiting concept in critical self-reflection as to the necessary presupposita of the theoretical attitude of thought; then we get a transcendental Idea of cosmic time-order in the theoretical discontinuity of the aspects caused by logical analysis; in the logical aspect cosmic time discloses a modal analytical sense; cosmic time offers no concentration point for philosophy to start from; in time meaning is broken into an incalculable diversity having its radical unity only in the religious centre of human existence where we transcend time; some seek this concentration-point in time and suppose the religious centre to be pre-functional but not supra-temporal; but ‘eternity is set in the heart of man’ so that he can direct himself to things eternal; even in idolatry the idea of the absolute is a priori related to the supra temporal, 31; the term ‘central trans-cosmic time’ is objectionable, 32; the eschatological aspect of cosmic time in faith is a limiting aspect; it embraces the eschaton, i.e., that which is or happens beyond the limits of cosmic time, e.g., the days of creation, the order in which regeneration precedes conversion, etc., 33; in theoretical thinking we approximate time only in the analytical setting asunder of its modal aspects, 34; cosmic time cannot be the starting point for the theoretical synthesis of the two terms in the Gegenstand relation, 45; the transcendental Idea of time is the basic denominator of the various aspects; their diversity pre-supposes a temporal coherence as the expression of a deeper unity; if they had nothing in common, they could not even be distinguished from each other; their unity is in a religious root, 79; cosmic time in its correlation of duration and order, and the successive refraction of meaning, 106.

Cosmic Time, II, its lawside is order, its subject-side is duration, 3; it overarches and permeates all the aspects; it splits up the fulness

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of meaning into modal diversity, 4; the law of refraction of cosmic time; concept of modal function requires abstraction; the cosmic temporal order is the basic denominator of the aspects 6-8; spatial time is simultaneity, 384; before and after in the spatial time function refers to magnitude, 384; cosmic time is the guarantee of the temporal coherence but not the deeper identity of the functions, 529; it cannot contain the totality of meaning but refracts it into meaning diversity, 532.

Cosmological, II, cosmological ideas, 43; the meaning of the term ‘cosmological’ in Christian philosophy, 47; cosmological and cosmic self-consciousness are logicized in Kant, 498; the ‘categories of knowledge’ in ‘Critical’ epistemology belong to the cosmological analysis of modal aspects, 517; cosmic and cosmological self-consciousness, 540, 541.

Cosmology, I, rationalist cosmology was reduced to absurdity by Kant, 367.

Cosmonomic Idea, I, the origin of the term, 93; and special science; and logicism; and mechanistic biology; and the ‘pure theory of law’, 98; the content of the Cosmonomic Idea, 101; the cosmonomic structure of the aspects, 105.

Cosmonomic Idea, II, in Neo-Kantianism, 27; the Christian Cosmonomic Idea determines the sense of ‘meaning’ in relation to the Origin and the unity of all temporal meaning, 30, 31.

Counting, II, is not the origin of number but implies logical distinction, 81, 82.

Covenant, The, III, Christ builds His Church by His Word and Spirit in the line of the Covenant, of which the Congregatio Fidelium is an outcome, 533.

Creation, II, and religion, in Aalders, 155.

Creative Ideas, III, in the Divine Logos; in Augustinus and in Thomas Aquinas; antinomies in the view of immortality of the soul, 17.

Criminal Law, II, in primitive society is based on the principle of ‘Erfolgshaftung’, 182.

Criminal Organization, III, relation between purpose and structure; adduced by Sinzheimer as an argument in favour of a non-normative legal view, 577.

Criteria of Transcendental Theoretical Truth, II, principium exclusae antinomiae the first criterion; infringement of sphere sovereignty entangles thought in antinomies; the second criterion is the datum of pre-theoretical thought, 579; naïve experience is not a copy theory; critical epistemology and its ‘universal a priori validity and necessity’ of transcendental truth; idealist and phenomenologist hypostases of theoretical synthesis are mythological, 580; the experimental criterion, 581; this criterion requires the disclosure of our objective sensory experience, 582.

Critical Realism, I, of B. Bavink, 559; is accommodated to the Augustinian doctrine of the Divine Logos, 560.

Critical Realism, III, of Riehl, 46.

Critical School of Ethnologists, III, an coherences between primitive cultures, 333.

Critique of Philosophical Thought, I, the first way and its conclusion, pp. 6-21; the second way of transcendental critique of philos. thought, 34; this way is concerned with the theoretical attitude of thought as such; alle immanence philosophy stands and falls with the dogma of the autonomy of theoretical thought: traditional metaphysics, Kantian epistemology, modern phenomenology, Nicolai Hartmann's phenomenological ontology are involved in this autonomy dogmatism; it has meant something different in each trend of thought: Greek philosophy; Thomistic Scholasticism; modern Humanistic thought; this difference is due to a difference in religious starting-point; the Greek theoria claims autonomy over against popular faith, as it pretends to be the true way to the knowledge of god; pistis (faith) clings to sensory mythological representations giving only a doxa, i.e., an uncertain opinion; cf. Parmenides; according to Plato it is exclusively destined for philosophers to approach the race of the gods, 35; Greek, Scholastic, and modern Humanistic basic motives; the autonomy of theoretical thought impedes a mutual understanding between philosophic schools, 36; the different schools of philosophy seem to reason at cross-purposes because they do not penetrate to each other's starting-points; this point is masked by the dogma of the autonomy of theoretical thought; this autonomy is not an axiom but a critical problem, a quaestio iuris; the necessity of a transcendental critique of the theoretical attitude; this critique inquires into the universally valid conditions of theoretical thought insofar as they are required by the immanent structure of such thought; transcendent criticism versus transcendental criticism, 37; the drawbacks of transcendent criticism; and of dogmatic theology; why transcendent criticism is valueless in science and philosophy, 38.

Crouzas, I, Examen du Pyrrhonisme, ancien et moderne, 275.

Crouzas, I, he was the ‘connaisseur’ of Pyrrhonism; there is a striking agreement

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between Hume's theories and Crouzas' work on Pyrrhonism, 275.

Crucifix, III, has an objective destination for worship (a pistic qualification), 144.

Crusades, I, in the historical process of individualization and differentiation, 189.

Crusius, Chr. Aug., I, followed his teacher Rudiger; he opposed the geometrical method in metaphysics and related the material principles of knowledge to sensory experience; he combated Leibniz' monadology; the grounds of being are divided into causal and existential grounds, 339; physical and mathematical grounds, 340.

Crypto Religious Attitude, II, in critical epistemology, 491.

Crystals, III, inorganic crystals are enkaptic structural totalities, 702; have a net-like form whose nodal points are occupied by the atomcentra, 705.

Crystal Lattices, III, and atom structure, 704; a heterogeneous continuum, according to Hoenen, 709; a typically qualified enkaptic form totality embracing three different structures, 710, 711.

Cult, II, in a primitive cult is expressed the restrictive transcendental function of pistis, 318, 319; always has an ethical moment, 319.

Cult Community, III, opposed to the Church of faith, by E. Brunner, 552.

Cultural Aspect, III, of family life; the parents' formative power; school and family, 286, 287.

Cultural Derivations, III, Ratzel's Idea, 333.

Cultural Orbits, III, Fr. Graebner, etc., 333.

Cultural Realms, II, and cultural phenomena, 203.

Culture, I, as a subjective relating of reality to values, in Rickert, 76.

Culture, II, Windelband, Rickert and Lask denied the reality of culture and made it into a transcendental mode of judging ‘nature’ by relating it to values, 201; Rickert, 204; in Troeltsch's view, 205, 206; its origin is a metahistorical question, 264; opened cultures, 266; and their historical development; Rousseau's view of culture, 270.

Culture, III, similarities of culture in different peoples, 332, 333; cultural orbits theory; Ankermann adherent, 333.

Curator and Curandus, III, their legal relation, 279.

Curiae, III, in Roman society, 369; in ancient Rome, 369.

Curtius, S.G., II, Die Bildung der Tempora und Modi im Griechischen und Lateinischen, 127.

Cusanus, Nicolaus, I, wants to rediscover man in the endless, in his boundless impulse of activity, 194; his system was a preparation for the principles of Modern Humanistic philosophy, 194; his changed attitude toward knowledge, 203.

Cusanus, Nicolaus, II, on the faculty of imagination, 515.

Cyclic Time, II, in Greek conception of history as the eternal return of things, 294.

Cyon, E. v., II, on eye and ear, 373.

Cyprianus, III, on the election of a priest in the people's presence, 546.

Cytoplasm, III, arbitrary cut pieces of cytoplasm can become complete individuals, 721.