A New Critique of Theoretical Thought. Deel 4. Index of Subjects and Authors

B

Baal, J. van, II, Godsdienst en samenleving in Nederlandsch Zuid-Nieuw-Guinea, 267, 317.

Baal, J. van, II, dema, personal and universal; a fluid distinction; dema stones; cocodemas, 317.

Babel, II, Tower of, 262.

Bachoven, J.J., III, Das Mutterrecht, eine Untersuchung über die Gynäkratie der alten Welt nach ihrer religiösen und rechtlichen Natur, 331.

Bachoven, J.J., III, human sexual intercourse was at first promiscuous; matriarchy among the ancient Lycians; the father being unknown, the centre of the family was the mother; patriarchy came afterwards, 331.

Bacteria, III, have no cell nucleus, 719, 772.

Baer, C.E.v., III, chance is the concurrence of mutually independent causal series, 747.

Bähr, Otto, III, Der Rechtsstaat, 430.

Bähr, Otto, III, his essentially civil juridical view of the administrative judicature as a requirement of the modern constitutional State, 430.

Balbino, Giuliano, III, L'idea etica del fascismo, 415.

Barbaros, II, 199.

Barth, Karl, I, Kirchliche Dogmatik, 66.

Barth, Karl, I, there is no point of contact between nature and grace, 66.

Barth, Karl, II, Kirchliche Dogmatik, 34, 300, 301, 302.

Barth, Karl, II, dialectical view of creation and sin, 34; denies the science of ethics, 148; his conception of Christian faith as a new creation, 300; identifies subjective believing with the Christian himself; faith has no connection with the temporal order; the New Testament mentions analogies explained by Barth as metaphors; nature and super-nature in his view, 301.

Bastian, III, similarities in the culture of different peoples are not due to derivation, but independent developments, 332, 333.

Bavinck, H., II, The Philosophy of Revelation, 305, 307, 308, 323.

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Bavinck, H., II, Divine Revelation also has its soterio-logical sense, which has entered into history, 305; development of revelatio particularis, 307; self-consciousness and revelation, 323.

Bavink, Bernard, I, Ergebnisse und Probleme der Naturwissenschaften, 557.

Bavink, Bernard, I, points out that in modern physics the philosophical considerations advanced by Mach and Avenarius have given rise to a trend favourable to the fundamental abandonment of the concept of physical causality, 557; his ‘critical realism’; he holds natural science to be independent of philosophy; ‘for physics the molecules and light waves, the electromagnetic fields and their tensors, etc., are rather of exactly the same sort of reality as stones and trees, vegetable cells and fixed stars’; Bavink here overlooks that physics has eliminated the naïve view of reality, 559; he considers ‘nature’ to be ‘rational’ into its deepest foundation; this is in keeping with his ‘critical realism’ accommodated to the Augustinian doctrine of the Divine Logos; it does not contradict the metaphysical conception of a physical world ‘in itself’, but only implies that in this physical world ‘in itself’ is expressed the ‘Divine Reason’ which is also the origin of human reason; the ‘objective’ rationality of ‘nature in itself’ has as such no relation to the logical subject function of man, but the latter has a relation to the former, 560; Bavink's view of reality is false, there is no ‘nature in itself’, 561; he holds that in the course of centuries physics has achieved its greatest results without any aid from epistemology, 561; the truth is that modern physics rests on epistemological pre-suppositions that had to oust Aristotelian views of nature; Bavink's arguments in defence of the philosophical neutrality of physics are not free of pre-suppositions exceeding science and are based on an absolutization of the functionalistic viewpoint of natural science which leaves no room for naïve experience, 562.

Bavink, Bernard, III, Ergebnisse und Probleme der Naturwissenschaften, 23, 36, 84, 100, 645, 646, 647, 699, 719, 723, 744, 758.

Bavink, Bernard, III, on secondary qualities; his refutation of ‘naïve realism’, 36; he states that modern physics has abandoned any visible model of its formulae, 37; his view of the virus is connected with his so-called emergent evolutionism, 84; he thinks that the rejection of the substance concept in physics affects the transcendental Idea of an individual whole; he confuses reality with its physical aspect, 100; he considers an atom as a real part of a cell, because he depends on his emergent evolutionistic standpoint, 641; his pan-psychical principle of continuity, and his ‘psychology of plants’, 646; colloids are very sensitive to changes of electric and temperature conditions, 719; the acceptance of a second limit in the internal bio-physico-chemical constellation of a living organism can never contradict the results of modern physics and chemistry, 734; his criticism of Driesch, 744; he is an adherent of ‘emergent evolutionism’, 762.

Bayard, Emile, III, L'art de reconnaître les styles, 142.

Bayle, Peter, I, had undermined the foundations of the mathematical science ideal; he set forth an absolute cleft between Christian faith and natural reason by his nominalist doctrine of two kinds of truth; he separated ‘practical reason’ from the Humanistic science ideal; the Christian religion was in open conflict with human reason; he opposed the idea of the ‘Vernunftreligion’ and retained a place for the Christian religon in the ‘heart’, which view was blasphemy to Leibniz, 260.

Bayle, Peter, II, Dictionnaire historique et critique, 353.

Bayle, Peter, II, he applied Cartesian doubt to historical tradition; facts are not given, but must be established; he eradicates any bias of faith, education, etc.; but facts are not ‘history’; Cassirer's praise of Bayle, 353.

Be’, The Copula: ‘To, II, its linguistic meanings; its logical meanings (Lask); does not only signify a logical relation of identity; and analytical implication, 436.

Beautiful Soul, The, I, in Schiller's conception, 463, 465.

Beauty, I, is ‘freedom in appearance’ according to Schiller, 463.

Beauty, II, of a landscape, 381.

Beaver Dams, III, as psychical objects, 109.

Bebel, III, Die Frau und der Sozialismus, 457.

Bebel, III, with the disappearance of the State also the civil legal order will vanish; the capitalistic system of production and the economic interests of the bourgeois, and also private property will be at an end; Locke was right that the State is for the protection of these ‘innate human rights’, especially private property, 457.

Behaviour, II, human behaviour is not an aspect, 68; is subjectivity, 113.

Behaviour, III, the factual behaviour of people occurs within the cadre of an intricate network of typical structures of correlated communal, inter-communal, or inter-personal relationships, 178.

Being, I, is only to be ascribed to God, whereas creation has only meaning, the dependent mode of reality or existence;

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a true concept of being is impossible; the word being has no unity of meaning; it may denote ‘essence’, e.g., in the thesis: ‘meaning is the mode of being of all that has been created’, 73; being and validity, reality and value; is ‘validity’ one of the categories of modality in the Kantian sense?, in Neo-Kantianism, 76.

Being, II, a metaphysical concept in Plato: ousia; a dialectical unity of movement and rest; transcendent, 9; Aristotle: the immanent essence of material substances, 10; being is not a genus proximum of the aspects, but an analogical concept, 15; reason is the origin of being in Humanistic thought; Kant; Nicolai Hartmann comprises subject and Gegenstand in various ontological spheres, 19; N. Hartmann's being is an undefined notion. In Aristotle ‘being’ is the noumenal ground of all generic concepts; the first transcendental determinations are, a.o., the being true and the being good; Augustinus identifies truth and being; the Scholastic ens realissimus or nous, 20; Thomas Aquinas: Duns Scotus, 21, the universal determinations of being; Nic. Hartmann's concept was made for the occasion, 21; Heidegger on being, Sein und Zeit, 22-26; the being of all that is, in the philosophy of the cosmonomic Idea, is meaning; sinful subjectivity and meaning, 25; being and causality in Thomas Aquinas, 39; analogia entis in Greek metaphysics, and the form-matter motive; Parmenides identifies being and logical thought; being is held together by Dikè (anangkè), 56.

Below, Von, III, Der deutsche Staat des Mittelalters, 440, 441. Die Entstehung der deutschen Stadtgemeinde, 440. Der Ursprung der deutschen Stadtverfassung, 440. Territorium und Stadt, 440.

Below, Von, III, his studies of the ‘medieval German State’; he points out the erroneous absolutization of the economical historical viewpoint in the interpretation of the legal historical material; he does not realize the necessity of applying a structural insight into the character of the State, 439, 440.

Benevent, Roffredus V, III, Quaest. Sabbathinae, 235.

Bergmann, Ernst, I, Fichte und Goethe, 451.

Bergson, H., I, time is the psychical duration of feeling; all its moments interpenetrate qualitatively; psychical durée is the absolute time, 27; he took over Nietzsche's pragmatist and biological conception of the theoretical picture of the world created by scientific thought, 466.

Bergson, H., II, Introduction à la Métaphysique, 480. La Pensée et le Mouvant, 481. Les deux sources de la morale et de la religion, 312, 318.

Bergson, H., II, la durée is the creative qualitative vital stream of time; his irrationalistic psychologistic metaphysics isolates psychical intuition and durée theoretically; yet he feels obliged to connect intuition with concepts; [cf. s.v. Concept], 481; he misinterprets the cosmic continuity of time as psychic duration; he isolates intuition theoretically from analysis in order not to fall back into the naïve attitude; he starts from the metaphysical prejudice that the full reality is given us in the actual psychic stream of time; he lacks critical selfreflection; his optimistic belief about the end of philosophical strife if only his intuitive metaphysical method were generally accepted, 482.

Berkeley, I, Alciphron, 273.

Berkeley, I, criticized the Humanistic metaphysics of nature, 203; he overcame the extreme sensationalist nominalism of his earlier writings and recognized the logical conformity to laws in the relations between the Ideas, although in a nominalistic fashion he only ascribes universality to the signs; signs are material and instrument of scientific knowledge and no arbitrary names; the representative character of symbols has become the foundation of the possibility of knowledge as representing the validity of the relations in our thought, 273; he criticized Locke's ‘abstract ideas’, but overlooked the fact that Locke's ‘simplest psychical element of consciousness is no less abstract than the concept of a ‘triangle in general’; from his ‘idealist’ psychologistic standpoint he had completely resolved ‘nature’ into sensory impressions; his thesis: ‘esse est percipi’ was the counterpart to Leibniz' mathematical idealism; Berkeley discarded Locke's distinction between ‘primary’ and ‘secondary’ qualities of matter that had been made in accordance with Galileo's and Newton's physics, 274; B. gave up his earlier extreme nominalism, 283; he explained the belief in the existence of an external world by his metaphysical conception of God, 291.

Berlage, III, his views of the Artist's task in architecture, 139.

Berlin School, III, founded by R. Smend, 387.

Bernouilli, II, Diderot on him, 339.

Bertallanffy, v., III, Handbuch der Biologie, 721, 733. Kritische Theorie der Formbildung, 771.

Bertallanffy, v., III, speaks of ‘autonomous totality

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phenomena’ instead of ‘vital’ phenomena, 733.

Berth, Edouard, III, French syndicalist; l'état est mort, 465.

Berthelot, R., II, L'Astrologie et la pensée de l'Asie, 324.

Berthelot, R., II, rita; the astronomical world-order; derived from the Chaldeans, 324.

Beseler, Georg, II, criticism of the historical school of jurisprudence, 277.

Beseler, Georg, III, a Germanist adherent of the Historical School of Jurisprudence, 462; his theory of the formal autonomy of private associations, 667, 670, 685.

Beth, Karl, II, Religion und Magie bei den Naturvölkern, 314, 319.

Beth, Karl, II, a cult is never without the ethical moment, 319.

Beyerhaus, Gisbert, III, Studien zur Staatsanschauung Calvins mit besondere Berücksichtigung seines Souveränitätsbegriffs, 504.

‘Biblical’ Humanism, I, of Erasmus, etc., 512, 513.

Biblical Motive, II, religious motive, 54.

Biel, Gabriel, I, a more radical Nominalist than Occam, 225.

Bierens de Haan, J.A., III, Die tierische Instinkte und ihr Umbau durch Erfahrung, 85.

Bina Marriage, III, among primitive peoples, 338.

Binder, Julius, II, Philosophie des Rechts, 213, 215.

Binder, Julius, II, systematic and historical sciences of law share the same Gegenstand, 213; language, social intercourse, religion, etc., are historical; cultural development is the dialectical-temporal development of the absolute reason; legal science is related to ‘value’ in Rickert's sense; but legal science is not identical with the science of legal history; he unintentionally formulates the antinomy of his view; his Idea of justice, 214; from this Idea he tries to infer some transcendental juridical categories; he is aware of the difference between juridical and cultural categories; but he historicizes law, 215.

Binder, Julius, III, Das Problem der Juristischen Persönlichkeit, 279, 688.

Binder, Julius, his individualistic conception of legal subjectivity misinterprets the organic analogy in legal relations when he says that legal representation destroys the juridical personality of the represented in favour of that of the representative, 279.

Binding, III, and Triepel denied that the genetic form of an association has any contractual character; they called it ‘Vereinbarung’, i.e., a unifying volitional act; parties are opposed to each other; the association is based on the egotistical principle of do ut des, 573.

Binswanger, III, on the meeting between I and Thou, 781.

Bio-Chemical Constellation, III, it starts where the molecular or quasi crystalline structures of organic matter end; irradiation of nervous tissues; tendons; fibres; muscular contraction and myosin molecules, 726; is denied by Driesch, 741.

Biogenetic Law, III, formulated by Haeckel, 95.

Bio-Impulses, III, direct bio-physico-chemical constellations qualified by the central subjective vital function of the organism, 725; these impulses use a minimum of energy and are spontaneous, 726; and metabolism, 731.

Biologistic, II, biologistic interpretation of princ. of logical economy, 175; biologistic view of History of Spengler, 195.

Biology, I, and individuality structures, such as a tree, a cell, etc., 554.

Biology, II, and society, 344.

Biology, III, the modern biological theory and its substance concept, 23; Driesch's entelechy and psychoid and Woltereck's substantial ‘matrix’ of ‘living matter’ are confusing, 23, 24; Müller's theory of the specific energies of the sense organs and Locke's doctrine of the subjective secondary qualities, 39; the terms ‘external causes’, ‘energy’ in a biological sense; an optic nerve does not see, 40; the meaning of Müller's theory; inadequate stimuli are of rare occurrence; the distinction between adequate and inadequate stimuli presupposes the existence of objective sensory qualities, 41; Müller's theory refuted by the empirical facts supposed to confirm it; an adequate stimulus is required for the normal activity of the sense organs; the untenable consequences of Müller's theory in animal life, 42; Helmholtz's theory of differences of modality and those of quality; sensations of musical tone, 43; the central function in the thing structures of a tree is biological, 56; the central vital function is the qualifying function; it is the last subject function of a tree's temporal structure; but a tree does not only function in the pre-psychical aspects; if it did, it would be a ‘Ding an sich’; thinghood is not enclosed in any single modal aspect, 56; a tree's object functions, 57; the result of a theoretical elimination of the logical object function, 57, 58; the qualifying vital function unfolds the earlier aspects and directs them in a typical manner, and they acquire an internal intermodal structural coherence of which we have an implicit inarticulate awareness in naïve experience, 59; the

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concept of ‘species’, 80; classificatory and typological method in biology and psychology and, psychiatry, 81; the difference between animals and plants, 83-87; there is no higher ‘logical’ genus embracing plants, animals and man; there is not a type: ‘living being’; Aristotle's genus of ‘sensory being’, 87; geno- and variability types, radical type; parasitical forms of symbiosis, 93; cf. Type Concept; examples of genotypes within a radical type in animals; subtypes, 94; the cell is the last independent viable unity of a living mass; its thing-structure is not resolved in the biotic function; the reality of a cell is beyond doubt, but not directly accessible to naïve experience; its vital function directs the pre-vital modes; its thing-structure expresses itself objectively in the theoretically opened sensory image of perception, in its post psychical functions, etc.; histological discoveries; exoplasmatic constituents; endoplasmatic corpuscles in a cell deprived of its nucleus, 102; ant-hills, birds' nests, beaver dams, spiders' webs, etc., 107; mineral formations in the protoplasm of rhizopods, 108; organic and inorganic, 105; wood cells of a tree, 129, 131; mechanistic versus vitalistic biology, 733.

Bio-Molecules, III, are the smallest living units within a cell-structure, 722; their existence has not been proved, 757.

Bio-physical Aspects, III, of family life, 301-306.

Bio-physico-chemical Constellations, III, have biotically directed physico chemical functions of material components, 725.

Bio-politics, III, negro- and kaffir-problems in S. Africa and the U.S.A.; tyranny, 498.

Bio-Substance, III, is denied by Driesch, 732; in Woltereck; he means: ‘living mass’; comparable with radio active elements, 750, 751, 752, 755, 759, 760.

Bio-Synthesis, III, Woltereck's programme, 728.

Biotic Aspect, II, its meaning-kernel is life; its phenomena are a.o. autonomous procreation; preservation in change, 107; these phenomena are subjective analogies; the contest between mechanists and vitalists; life belongs to the fundamental modal horizon of human experience; its presence cannot be decided by experiments; as soon as we establish the fact that a living being has originated, we appeal to an irreducible modal aspect of experience and not to phenomena whose interpretation presupposes this fundamental aspect, 108; life expresses itself in an organic relation, which is a retrocipatory moment; this organic relation implies unity in multiplicity (number); biotic space in the bio-milieu; biotic movement, 109; botic movement is intensive and qualitative development founded in the original meaning of movement; energy exchange in the living organism has an organizing biotic direction, 110; sensory space refers back to biotic space, 168; biotic retrocipations in primitive culture, 270.

Biotic Aspect, III, of a sculpture, 112; of the State, 494.

Biotic Interlacements, III, in a community; in a family: 229, 300, 301.

Biran de, Maine, I, a French spiritualist, 525.

Bird, II, feeding its young ones, 374.

Bird's Nest, A, I, is conceived of as a typical object of life, in the naïve attitude, 42; it has objective aesthetic qualities, 43.

Bird's Nest, III, as a psychical object, 107, 109.

Bismarck, II, as a leader of history, 243.

Black, Max, II, The Nature of Mathematics, 78, 79.

Blastopore, III, the invagination of the gastrula, in case of transplantation of cells from the blastopore; the blastopore must contain the organizing centre, according to Spemann, 752, 753.

Blond Beast, The, I, according to Nietzsche, 211.

Blondel, Maurice, I, his thought breaks with Thomism; he was influenced by French Spiritualism (Maine de Biran), Ravaisson, Lachelier, Boutroux and others, and continues the Augustinian tradition, although he does not reject (in a radical sense) the autonomy of philosophical thought. Blondel is a disciple of Ollé Laprune, and starts with the immanence standpoint to show its deficiency by means of an irrationalistic and activistic metaphysical interpretation of thought and being inspired by Leibnizian thought and its irrationalist and universalist turn in Schelling's ‘concrete and absolute thought’; later on he underwent the influence of Bergson's philosophy of life; Malebranche's ‘visio omnium rerum in Deo’; Blondel lacks in principle a transcendental critique of philosophic thought, 525; he attempts a dialectical synthesis of the Humanist and the Scholastic motives; there is no inner connection between Blondelism and the philosophy of the Cosmonomic Idea, 526.

Blondel, Maurice, II, he aims at a synthesis between Augustinianism and phenomenology, and the irrationalistic philosophy of life, 590; and Scheler, 591.

Boas, III, Kultur und Rasse, 495.

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Boas, Franz, III, American ethnologist of the critical school, 332; accepts historical coherences between primitive cultures; reject the method of ‘complex formation’, 333; rejects the existence of ‘primary races’ for political reasons, 495.

Bodin, Jean, I, his concept of sovereignty, 311.

Bodin, Jean, III, his idea of sovereignty; absolutist theory, 395, 398; the State embraces the whole of society and all organizations and relationships, 452, 662.

Body, II, human body, 147; in Kant: material body, the concept, and ‘extended’, and ‘heaviness’, 437.

Body and Soul, III, cf.: The Human Body; the body is the structural whole of man's temporal appearance; the soul is the radical unity of his transcendent spiritual existence, 89; the human body is qualified by the act-structure; it is not a ‘thing’, 198; Body and soul in Aristotle, 211; Plato viewed the body as the vehicle of the soul, 778; Aristotle's subjectivistic view of the human body, 779.

Body of Christ, The, (Corpus Christi), III, the Biblical phrase ‘from one blood’ does not have a universalistic sense; three transcendental problems of sociology, 168; the central religious community and the Christian motive of creation, fall and redemption, 169; sphere sovereignty, coherence, radical unity, meaning totality, 170; structure and factual reality, 171; positivization, 173; genetic and existential forms, 174; correlation between communal and inter-individual relations, 176; their enkapsis, 181; human society cannot exist as an unintegrated diversity, 182; institutional and non-institutional communities, 187; differentiated and undifferentiated communities, 188; Church and State; voluntary associations, 189; naïve experience of communities, 192; inter-individual intercourse is the background to the community of family life, 194; the radical spiritual solidarity of mankind, 195; membership of the Body of Christ is independent of all temporal communal relationships, 196; St. Paul on the Body of Christ; Thomas Aquinas synthesis with Aristotle's view; the transcendent religious root of the human race, 214; the Church cannot be identified with the fulness of the Body of Christ, the Corpus Christi; and it is not the perfect society of the whole of Christian life, 215; limitations put on the competence of the state in connection with the Church, the family, education, the religious centre of personality, by God's sovereignty; the social bonds of mankind cannot be enclosed in earthly life; Gelasius distinguished between the competence of Church and State, 216, 218, 240.

Boethius, III, De duabus naturis et una persona Christi, 6.

Boethius, III, definition of personality with the aid of the substance concept, 6.

Bohatec, J., II, Calvin und das Recht, 161.

Bohatec, J., III, Calvin und das Recht, 480; Die organische Idee in der Gedankenwelt Calvins, 510; Calvin's Lehre vom Staat und Kirche, 532.

Böhmer, J.H., III, Jus ecclesiast. prot., 517.

Böhmer, J.H., III, defended the territorial system of Church government, and made room for the settlement of doctrinal controversial questions, 517.

Bohr, Niels, III, his formula concerning the atom spectrum results, 706; his ‘relation of incertitude’ shows the limits of mathematical causal explanation as regards a living organism, 715, 726, 727.

Boileau, II, L'Art Poétique, 346.

Bolingbroke, II, Letters on the Study and Use of History, 350.

Bolshevist Views, III, of the State; Pasjoekanin, 459.

Bonhoeffer, Dietrich, III, his poem: Der Freund, 179, 180.

Book, III, the structure of a book, 110; a reading book, etc., 151-153; the opening of its lingual function by a reader's actualization, 152.

Bouwman, H., III, Gereformeerd Kerkrecht, 513, 514.

Borkovsky, S. von Dunis, I, Spinoza, 250.

Bossu, Le, II, Traité du poème épique, 346.

Bossuet, II, and the Christian view of history, 268.

Bourgeois, II, bourgeois money makers, 361.

Boutroux, I, his anti-rationalistic Neo-Scholasticism, 525.

Brahman, II, 324.

Brain, The, III, the brain is the physico-chemical condition, the partial ground of what happens in it, in Driesch, 742.

Bréhier, III, Théorie des incorporels dans l'ancien Stoicisme, 226.

Brentano Franz, I, he ascribes to feeling an intentional relation to a ‘Gegenstand’; he posits the intentional relatedness of every act of consciousness to a ‘Gegenstand’, 52.

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Brentano, Franz, II, distinguishes the intentional content of consciousness as ‘meaning’ from sensory impressions, 28; Erlebnis, 112; space perception, 367, 373.

Brentano, L., III, Eine Geschichte der wirtschaftlichen Entwicklung Englands, 673.

Broglie, Louis de, III, La physique moderne et les Quanta, 706.

Broglie, Louis de, II, incongruity between quantum mechanics and the conception of physical space in Einstein's theory of relativity, 101.

Brouwer, II, an intuitionist mathematician, 78; criticized Cantor's ‘set-theory’, 340.

Brown, I, his mechanistic association psychology, 264.

Brunner, August, III, Der Stufenbau der Welt, 5, 6.

Brunner, August, III, Neo-Scholastic writer, on the concept ‘substance’, 5; essence and accidental changes; his view of the human -I-ness contradicts the concept of ‘substance’, 6.

Brunner, Emil, I, Das Gebot und die Ordnungen, 519, 520, 521; Das Einmalige und die Existenzcharakter, 519; Gerechtigkeit, 521.

Brunner, Emil, I, there is a point of contact between nature and grace, 66; he rejects the Biblical view of Law and replaces it by an irrationalistic ethics of love which must break through the temporal divine ordinances because they are not the true ‘will of God’; he fulminates against the Idea of a Christian science, philosophy, culture, 519; politics, etc.; this indicates a new synthesis, this time with Kantianism and Existentialism; he tries to accommodate Lutheran Nominalistic dualism of nature and grace to Calvin's view of the Law; if a Christian philosophy, etc., is impossible, this sphere is withdrawn from Christ; and then accommodations are unavoidable; Brunner absolutizes love at the expense of justice, misinterprets the central commandment of love; his Idea of justice is Neo-Kantian, it is a ‘purely formal value’; he denies the fulness of meaning of the Cross, 520; his thought must lead to antinomies, 521.

Brunner, Emil, II, Das Gebot und die Ordnungen, 156; Die Gerechtigkeit, 157; Cf.: 143, 158, 159.

Brunner, Emil, II, his dialectical theological ethics, 143; his definition of Christian ethics, 156; the perfect cannot be just; the meaning of Divine Justice; in his work: ‘Die Gerechtigkeit’ Brunner avoids this erroneous view; here he holds that love presupposes justice; he opposes the fulness of religious love to the temporal ordinances; he wants to build Christian ethics on the basis of the actions proceeding from religious love within the framework of all the temporal ordinances; this is an after effect of the dualistic schema of nature and grace in Luther's thought; it leads to the identification of morality and the Christian religion; everywhere in his thought there arise antinomies, 157; he absolutizes temporal love; his conception of the Law is erroneous, 158, 159.

Brunner, Emil, III, Das Gebot und die Ordnungen, 281, 302, 322, 402, 403, 422, 506, 522, 530, 532, 534, 539, 540, 541, 542, 550, 551, 552, 553.

Brunner, Emil, III, law and morality are contrasted; this is a result of the absolutization of civil inter-individual law; Brunner knows no other positive law besides state-law; he calls this view the anti-natural attitude of the Reformed view of life, but it is the individualistic ‘natural law’ conception, 281; numerical relations in a family point to monogamy as the order of creation, 302; he calls love a ‘sandy ground’ as the basis of marriage, 322; the fundamental nature of the State is half demonic, namely: power, 402; the State is an enigmatic formation and escapes any univocal theory; this riddle points back to the riddle of creation and fall within man; Brunner relapses into a synthesis with the immanence standpoint by accepting the latter's dialectical principle; his false contrast between nature and grace in his opposition between love and law; he confuses the subjective realization of the factor ‘power’ with its structural meaning and denies the possibility of a Christian State, 403; power is called an irrational product of history with its ‘hidden god’; Brunner tries to combine the Biblical motive of creation and fall with Humanistic irrationalism, 404; the ‘morale’ of an army, 422; Kirche des Glaubens and Kultgemeinde, 509; the organized (Church) institution must at least document itself before the world as a manifestation of the Church..., 522; sects nearly always arise through the fault of the Church, 532; as a rule the sect will approach the Church institution more and more in the second or third generation, 534; his undefined concept ‘order’ (Ordnung) is unserviceable, 538; a confessional Church may become a sect through misunderstanding the Gospel; a national Church, recognizing infant baptism, may influence the whole nation, 540; the manner in which the Church is organized is not decisive; only the living Word of God is decisive, 541; Christ's inheritance is divided, who shall investigate who has retained or acquired the biggest part! this is relativism with respect to the Church, 542; a church without a living congregational diaconate must be mortally ill; necessity of an

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ecclesiastical function of charity, 555; Brunner only recognizes State law, opposing it to ‘natural law’, 551; he only rejects naturalistic positivism; his ‘critical’ positivism is no improvement; he opposes cult community and Church of faith; the cult community and a material legal order; and is subservient to the ‘commandment of the moment’ which cancels the legal order, 552; in matters of faith the cult community has some share in the divine authority, but its legal orders are derived from the State; the juridical form is alien to the content embraced by it; here is the dualism between ‘nature’ and ‘grace’, 553.

Bruno, Giordano, I, is obsessed and enticed by the endless, 194; his pantheistic philosophy embraced Cusanus' doctrine of the Infinite, and of the coincidentia oppositorum; infinite nature is reflected in the microcosm of the human personality; nature as ‘natura naturata’ is the self-development of God (natura naturans); the opposition between the ‘Jenseits’ and the ‘Diesseits’ of Christian dogmatics is ascribed to the standpoint of sensory appearance and imagination, an exploded anthropomorphism in Copernicus' sense; Bruno is at pains to reconcile the unity of homogeneousness of infinite nature in all its parts to the Idea of the creating individuality of the monads, 199, 200; later on Leibniz transformed Bruno's aesthetically tinted individualism in his conception of the monad as a microcosm into a mathematical one, 230; the tendency of activity in the personality ideal penetrated the Idea of the cosmos, 231.

Bruno, Giordano, II, his cosmonomic idea, 593.

Bryce, James, III, Modern Democracies, 606, 607.

Bryce, James, III, political parties are indispensible in a large and free country; they awaken the public spirit of the people; create order in the chaos of the enormous mass of electors; party disicipline counteracts political egoism and corruption, 607.

Buber, Martin, II, Ich und Du, 143.

Buber, Martin, II, Modern Christian existentialism has taken over Buber's distinction between ‘experience of the world’ and the ‘I-thou’ relation; the latter does not allow of rules and laws and boundaries; ethical relations are supposed to be extremely personal and existential; this view is based on the Humanistic motive of nature and freedom; the I-thou meeting is central and religious, not specifically ethical, and not in the temporal order of human existence; Buber has considerably influenced dialectical theologians, 143.

Building, A, III, is a socio cultural object; a Bank building and art, 140.

Building-Plan Theory, III, and the dualistic substance concept, 745.

Büning, Erwin, III, Sind die Organismen mikrophysikalische Systeme?, 644.

Burckhardt, Jacob, I, Kultur der Renaissance in Italien, 192.

Burckhardt, Jacob, II, rejected Ranke's idea of World-history, 282.

Burlesque, II, the burlesque in Classicism, 347.

Burning House, II, Burning house and meaning, 31.