A New Critique of Theoretical Thought. Deel 4. Index of Subjects and Authors

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A

Aalders, W.J., II. Handboek der Ethiek, 154. De Grond der Zedelijkheid, 154, 156, 159.

Abbild Relation, II, is the representational relation within an objective perceptual image, 375.

Abbild Relation, III, see sub.v. Representational relation, 147-150.

Absolute, I, the Idea of the Absolute must be related to the supratemporal, 31.

Absolute Consciousness, I, in Husserl; it is a speculative metaphysical concept, 92.

Absolutism, II, of the State, in Hobbes, 167.

Absolutization, I, the rationalistic metaphysical way to an Archè transcending human thought absolutizes the logical function, 13; transcendental logicism absolutizes the transcendental logical function of theoretical thought, 19; the proclamation of the self-sufficiency of philosophic thought, even ‘within its own field’, is an absolutization of meaning, 20; the restriction ‘within its own field’, intended to allow man freedom in religious, aesthetic or moral fields, is, theoretically, polytheism; such thought fights shy of proclaiming the theoretical god to be the only true one, 21; the idolatrous absolutization of the temporal cannot be explained from the temporal horizon of human existence; the idea of the absolute must be related to the supra-temporal; Parmenides absolutized the modal spatial aspect, 31; the purely intentional, modal structure of the logical function can be made into a Gegenstand, but not our actual logical function; we never arrive at a ‘transcendental logical Subject’ detachable from all modal structures of time and ‘absolute’, 40; the absolutization of a special synthetically grasped modal aspect is the source of all -‘isms’ in the theoretical picture of reality; the attempt will entail the reduction of all other aspects to mere modalities of the absolutized one; thus in: materialism, biologism, psychologism, historicism, etc.; absolutization leads to antinomy; it points to a supra theoretical starting point, 46; a special aspect is made into the basic denominator of all the others on the immanence standpoint, 47; Kant supposed that he could gain a startingpoint in theoretical reason itself, which would rest at the basis of every theoretical synthesis, and was not obtained by the absolutization of a special scientific view, 49; the apostate man who supposes that his selfhood is something in itself, loses himself in the surrender to idols, in the absolutizing of what is relative; this absolutization is a manifestation of the ex-sistent character of the religious centre of our existence, 58; in the religious absolutizing of the historical aspect of our existence in the self-surrender to an aspect of time we transcend the aspect of time, 59; the spirit of apostasy from the true God is the source of all absolutizing of what is relative even in the theoretical attitude of thought, 61; the absolutization of special aspects which are relative, evokes the correlata of the latter; these correlata claim an absoluteness opposed to the deified aspects; thus arises a religious dialectic in the basic motives of such views, 63, 64; the classical Humanistic science ideal was inclined to eliminate the typical structures of (83) individuality and to dissolve empirical reality into a continuous functional system of causal relations; this is an absolutization of the scientific concept of function; the deeper penetration of scientific thought into its ‘Gegenstand’ revealed the fundamental deficiency of theoretical thought in comparison with naive experience, 84; the absolutization of aesthetic individuality, in Hemsterhuis, 463; of temporal love, in E. Brunner, at the expense of justice, 320.

Absolutization, II, of theoretical thought in Immanence Philosophy, 8, 14; of certain modal aspects in speculative metaphysics, 38; of causality, 40; in the argument of God as prima causa, 41; of the moral aspect in Kant, 44; and of complexes of functions, 45; of ‘absolute’ space in Newton, 100; Emil Brunner absolutizes temporal love, 158; of the historical view in positivism, 200, 201; Rickert and Dilthey, 206-208; absol. destroys the modal meaning; in Oswald Spengler, 220, 221; the origin of absolutizations, 331; the absolutization of feeling in Hume; Kant's inadequate criticism -of Hume, and his own absolutization of transcendental logical thought; Hume's view is self-refuting; epistemological nihilism, 332; Kant's epistemological criticism, 333; absol. in the Archimedean point of Immanence Phil., 333; absol. and the cosmic order, 334; absolutiz. of mathematics in Leibniz, 338; Duguit's droit social is an absolutization of modern industrial law, 396; in Volkelt's epistemology, 431,

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432; of theoret. thought, 433; Kant's thesis that synthesis makes analysis possible is based on the absolutization of theor. thought, 443; abs. in Husserl, 458; Bergson's metaphysical absolutization, 482; abs. of the phenomenological attitude in Husserl, 489; Kant first absolutized the primary meaning-synthesis and then discovered the problem of the inter-functional synthesis, 528; abs. of the phenomenol. attitude, 546; of theoretical synthesis, 549; of the horizon of experience into an eternal rational order, 551; of the experiential aspects, 553; of reason in Synthesis philosophy with its theory of the universalia ante rem in God's mind, 559; of the theoretical-synthetical horizon, 571; of what is relative, 572; in Kant's Principles of Pure Understanding, 575.

Absolutization, III, of ousia (essence) in A. Brunner, 6; of the Gegenstand-relation, 64; Stoker's substance concept lands in metaphysical absolutizations, 68; meaningless absolutizations of theoretical abstractions incompatible with the Biblical conception of creation, 69; Historicism starts from the absolutized historical viewpoint, 82; Sorokin minimizes the divergence between the different sociological schools which are characterized by the absolutization of a specific modal aspect, 161; the concept ‘capitalist society’ is oriented to the absolutization of the economic aspect in Marxism, 165; absolutizations are inevitable on the immanence standpoint, 169; in Thomism the Greek absolutization of the State is (169) broken through, 221; Spann's error in qualifying individualism as the absolutization of the individual man to a self-contained substance, 239; transpersonalistic universalism continues to absolutize temporal society at the expense of the radical religious unity of human personality, 239, 240; abstract idealist morality denies to the love between parents and children moral purity; this is the result of its absolutization of the ethical modus, 270.

Abstraction, I, is unavoidable in formulating the concept of philosophic thought, 5; theoretical abstraction in the theoretical attitude of thought, 40.

Abuse of Right, II, in Josserand, 396.

Abuse of Right, III, Josserand's theory, 463.

Accommodation, I, in Thomism Aristotelian metaphysics and the view of nature are accommodated to the doctrine of the church, 36, 72; rejected by Christian philosophy, 119; that of Greek thought to the Christian doctrine was started by Augustinus, 178; of Aristotle's metaphysics to the Christian doctrine, 180, 181; accommodation was rejected by Occam, 183; accomm. in Scholasticism, 509.

Action, I, according to Hume action in man only arises from emotion, 307; a concrete action is always ‘empirically determined’, i.e., derives from the sensory experience of nature, 378.

Act-Structure, II, acts are not aspects; Franz Brentano and Edmund Husserl conceive of an ‘Erlebnis’ as an intentional act of human consciousness; many psychologists consider feeling to be the undifferentiated origin of the other classes of ‘Erlebnisse’; but an Erlebnis is not a ‘sensation’; then feeling can be no act, but is the general term for the affective aspect of human experience; every real act functions in the integral modal horizon of human experience embracing all the modal aspects, 112; an inner act of experience as a concrete Erlebnis cannot be restricted to its feeling aspect, 113; animal psychology; the volitional, the intellectual, the fantasy directions of human act-life, 114, 115; Affects, 116.

Act-Structure, III, in man qualifies his temporal existence, 88; phantasy, 115.

Actino-Spherium, III, may possess more than a hundred similar nuclei, 721.

Actualization, III, in man's body, 78, 148, 149, 150; of subject-object relations, 149, 150, 192.

Aesthetical Aspect, I, its position in the series, 3, 5; a bird's nest has objective aesthetic qualities, 43; aesthetic valuation is subjected to a norm, 152; the aesthetical aspect is subsumed under mathematical thought in Leibniz, 251; aesthetic judgment in Kant, 391, 462; aesthetic morality in Shaftesbury, 462.

Aesthetical Aspect, II, aesthetic economy, 67; retrocipations: harmony in feeling, in logical analysis, in sociality, in language, in economy; juridical harmony is an anticipation; aesthetical economy, exuberance; Christian aesthetics does not absolutize the artist's aesthetic subjectivity; aesthetical irrationalism; the denial of aesthetic norms is antinomous, 128; lingual analogy in the aesthetic aspect; objective beauty of nature is based on the symbolic meaning substratum; animals and beautiful natural scenery; beauty of nature is signified meaning to susceptible subjects, 139; aesthetic norms vary with time and place, 240; the importance of cultural (historical) harmony, 286; mathesis universalis and aesthetics in Leibniz; Taine's condemnation of classicism; style is an historical analogy; great artists are shapers of style, in every style works of genius are possible, 345; rigidity of the theoretical aesthetical Idea of Classicism; Descartes' rules for music; art as imitation; Le Bossu; art based on reason; Boileau; ‘Art poétique’; law giver of Parnassus; he wanted to discover the basic law of poetry, 346; Classicism discovered mathematical, logical, economical retrocipations in the aesthetical aspect, unity in multiplicity; economy; ostentation; burlesque; precocity; simplicity; frugality

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in the means of expression; imagination and feeling; relative deepening of aesthetic meaning in Classicism; no modal sphere universality; beauty is identified with truth; the individuality of a work of art is reduced to aesthetic law-conformity, 347; misinterpretation of mathematical and economical retrocipations; German Sturm und Drang Romanticism; the limits of art; adequacy of symbolic expression as a criterion; truth; clarity; sobriety; pregnancy of expression; Condillac's view of the connection between art and science; Lanson; Cassirer; 348.

Aesthetical Aspect, III, plastic art and music, drama, poetry, dancing; thing structures by the side of inconstant individuality structures; books, scores, signify objectively, but do not actualize the aesthetic structure of a work of art; the art of performance; secondary radical types, 110; a sculpture is an interlacement of subject and object structures qualified by an objective aesthetic function, 111; structural analysis of Praxiteles' Hermes; does it lack a biotic function? 112; the representational relation in the objective sensory aspect of a sculpture; Urbild and Abbild, 113; the mimetic and the truly aesthetic appreciation of a sculpture, 114; the productive aesthetic fantasy of the artist is founded in the sensory function of the imagination; the latter displays a productive objectifying function; e.g., a visual phantasm; a phantasm is not related to an existing thing; but it is the product of our imagination; aesthetic phantasms are projected as merely intentional visionary objects; intentional objects, 115; objectum intentionale; it is bound to the plastic horizon; the fancied object can be represented in a real thing, 116; Christian aesthetics does not recognize any humanistic ‘pure art’; the adage ‘art for art's sake’, 139; harmony in family relations, 274, 283, 284.

Aesthetical Economy, II, implies frugality, the avoidance of the superfluous, or of excessive ways of reaching our aim; the Greek aesthetic adage: medèn agan, 67; the superfluous, the ‘piling it on’, ‘overdoing it’, ought to be warded off in harmonic sobriety, 128.

Aestheticism, I, versus moralism, 121; aestheticism in Schiller, 123; aesthetic morality in Shaftesbury, 462; aesthetic Idealism of Schiller, 462, 463, 465.

Affolter, III, Arch. f. öffentl. R., 407.

Agapè, II, Agapè is the fulness of meaning of love, 160.

Agapè, III, eros, and original sin, in Luther; sexual pleasure is ascribed to original sin; agapè, etc., in Protestant ethics, 314, 315.

Aggregates, III, are un-ordered; lack the typical total form of an inner structural whole, 702; the aggregate theory is refuted by Driesch, 771.

Agnatic Kinship, III, this community is the leading and central structure of the ‘gens’, 353.

Agnatic Patrician Family, III, the Roman concept is concerned with an undifferentiated societal relationship; a husband's jus vitae ac necis, 325.

Agricola, I, was admired by Melanchton, 513; Agricola's dialectic as an art of reasoning in the Nominalist sense, was taken as a model for his reform by Melanchton, 514.

Agriculture, II, the term ‘agriculture’ indicates the cultural subject-object relation between human technè and the soil in its objective cultural potentiality, 258.

Akkermann, J.B., III, Het ontstaan der Ambachtsgilden, 674, 675.

Aktionsarten, II, in language, 127.

Albers, O.J., III, Het Natuurrecht volgens de Wijsbegeerte der Wetsidee, 72.

Albers, O.J., III, his objection to the phil. of the Cosmon. Idea is that the substance concept is rejected so that no justice is done to the autonomous being of the creature in its relation to God; cf. Stoker, 72.

Alberti, Leo Battista, I. voices the Idea of the ‘uomo universale’ in his autobiography’, 192.

Albertus Magnus, I, Physicorum, 26.

Albertus Magnus, I, he ascribed to the movement of things, independent of the soul, a form and a structure of its own, in the so-called numerus formalis, e.g., time, 26.

Albertus Magnus, II, on being, 21.

Albert of Saxony, II, on the a priori, 542.

Albig, W., III. Modern Public Opinion, 490.

Albumen, II, the typical albumen formations of the different biotic species and the anticipatory modal types in the energy aspect, 425.

Albumen, III, each type of organism produces its own type of albumen, 642.

Albuminoids, III, and the building of the living cell substance, 642.

D'Alembert, II, Diderot on D'Alembert, 339.

Alexandrian School, I, Clemens and Origen and their speculative Logos-theory, 177.

Alexander of Aphrodisias, III, his commentary on Aristotle's Metaphysics; his interpretation of Aristotle's view of works of art, 127.

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Algae, III, all things of nature formed or produced by animal activity, are objective natural things; thus the silicious forms produced by protozoa, 107; the silicic acids of radiolaria, and diatoms; and calcium carbonate of foraminiferes; and calc algae, 108; blue-green algae have no cell-nucleus, 719; the restricted number of undifferentiated algae figures, 772, 773.

All-inclusive Group, III, in Gurvitch's sociology, 164, 165.

Althusius, Johannes, III, Politica, 663.

Althusius, Johannes, III, his theory of human symbiosis took account of the internal structural principles in an anti-universalistic spirit: ‘every type of social relationship has its proper laws’, 662, 663.

Alverdes, III, avoids the dilemma between mechanistic and vitalistic views, 733.

Amoebae, III, unicellular beings display a restricted number of almost undifferentiated figures, 772.

Analogia Entis, I, the Thomist metaphysical concept of being is not of a generic and specific character but analogical; being is a whole in which everything participates, because the concept of the whole is here taken in a transcendental analogical sense; it is the pre-supposition of all generic and specific concepts of totality; criticism of this concept: it does not direct the modal diversity of meaning to its unity of root, but remains dispersed by this diversity; it can, therefore, not replace the transcendental basic Idea; its claim to being an autonomous concept of theoretical thought must be rejected, 71; it is ruled by the dialectical motive of form and matter which was modified by Thomas to adapt it to the Christian motive, and became the motive of nature and grace, 72; and the transcendental critique of theoretical thought, 71-73; analogia entis in Thomas Aquinas, 181.

Analogical Concepts, II, in the different branches of science the use of analogical concepts of a fundamental character differs with the different modalities of the scientific viewpoint; Greek and Scholastic logic and metaphysics distinguished these fundamental analogical concepts from generic and specific ones; they sharply distinguished real analogy from the mere metaphor of common speech, 55; to the analogical fundamental concept of ‘being’ (analogia entis) all the others were related; its origin in Greek thought, 56; analogical concepts lacking any relation to the cosmic time order and radical unity of meaning cannot be the foundation of our inquiry into the modal structures of meaning; the relation of analogy in the modal structures points to their intermodal coherence and to the radical unity of the human ego and the Divine Origin, 57; in the metaphysical doctrine of analogia entis the transcendental determinations and distinctions of ‘being’ are themselves of an analogical character, so that the vicious circle is closed, 57, 58.

Analogical Unity, I, in Greek metaphysics, 47.

Analogy, II, in the terms for the fundamental concepts of different sciences; refers to the intermodal coherence; is to be distinguished from methaphor and from analogia entis; in Scholasticism and Greek metaphysics, 55; the Greek motive of form and matter, 56; the origin and central importance of this motive in Aristotle and Scholasticism; the concept of analogy cannot serve in our structural analysis, 57; the vicious circle in speculative metaphysics; substance and accidents; ontological analogy and cosmic modal diversity; the transcendental horizon of theoretical thought, 58; analogical terms are not metaphorical, 64; a psychologist will maintain that, sensory space is ‘real’ and assert that the term ‘mathematical space’ is a metaphor; but mathematical space is not illusionary, nor a logical construction, 65; analogical concepts, 55-72; numerical and spatial analogies in the analysis of the law-spheres do not prove that our philosophy has relapsed into the objectifying attitude of special science, 76.

Analysis Situs, II, Leibniz programme of an ‘analysis situs’ was intended to discover the anticipatory principle of progression in space; it was carried out in Poncelet's founding of projective geometry; its meaning in the theory of the law-spheres, 104.

Analytical Concept, II, analytical and synthetical concepts in Kant, 435; analytical and synthetical judgments in Kant, 438-440.

Analytical Criterion of an Aspect, II, its abstract theoretical character, 4, 5, 6, 7; and the method of antinomy; (cf. s.v. Aspects) - 48; the material (synthetical) criterion of an aspect, 48, 49; cf. also s.v. Antinomy, 37 ff.

Anangkè, II, in Plato, 10; being is bound to its spherical form by the Dikè which is identified by Parmenides with the ‘powerful Anangke’, 133.

Anangkè and Tychè, III, in Driesch, 746.

Anaxagoras, I, time is a divine order of Dikè avenging the injustice of things which have originated in an individual form by dissolving this latter in pure

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matter and carrying back all things to their form-less Origin, 26; the matter motive had the primacy up until Anaxagoras, 532.

Anaxagoras, II, rejected Parmenides' ouranic elements; form became the ideal pattern for the formgiving nous or Demiurge, 56.

Anaxagoras, III, before him the matter-motive was given primacy, 7; his idea of a teleological worldplan, 633; he distinguishes between homogeneous and heterogeneous wholes, 638.

Anaximander, I, one of the Ionian thinkers; they were fully aware of the religious conflict in the form-matter motive: the form principle is deprived of its divine character; the true God is form-less; the eternally flowing stream of life; in Anaximander it is conceived of as an invisible ‘apeiron’, flowing in the stream of time and avenging the injustice of the transitory beings originated from it in an individual form, by dissolving them in their formless origin, 67; his ‘materialism’ is ruled by the Greek ‘matter’-motive, 122; the formless, or the unlimited, invisible apeiron, 532.

Anaximander, III, apeiron versus existing things, 7; in the first book, the third chapter of his Metaphysics, Anaximander is not mentioned among the Ionians by Aristotle, 8.

Anaximenes, I, his materialism is qualified by the Greek matter-motive, 122.

Ancestor Worship, III, among the Greeks and the Romans; the generations of one and the same gens form an ‘internal’ whole; it testifies to a continuous exchange of love between the living and the dead among the Bataks, the Dschagga negroes, and other less civilized primitive races, 352, 353; the Roman gens, 353, 354.

Ancille Theologiae, I, in Aristotle philosophy is the handmaiden of theology, 178.

Andreae, Johannes, III, the unity of a universitas is not real but pertains to an aggregation, 233; he thought independent corporations very dangerous and opposed them by the monarchical principle, 235.

Andreae, W., III, Staatssozialismus und Ständesstaat, 230, 231.

Anglo-Saxon Attitude, The, III, with respect to the deeper fundamentals of party principles, 623.

Animal Psychology, III, embraces emotional sensations, 85, 86.

Animals, I, logical analysis is not the only mode of distinction, for animals distinguish their mates, food, etc., although their manner of distinction is not of a logical nature, 39; an animal is a typical individuality structure with many functions, 554.

Animals, II, animals have a sense of plurality, 81; subject functions in the pre-logical spheres; object functions in the post-logical spheres, 114; animal ‘intellect’ in the psychical reaction upon new factual situations, based on a deliberate presentiment of causal and teleological relations (not upon rational analysis), animal feeling is not susceptible of anticipation in an axiological sense; Pavlov's experiments with dogs, 184; animals have no cultural history; they inherit instincts; their tradition is instinctive, 202; their sensory phantasy, 425; they are extatically absorbed by their temporal existence, 480; they undergo, but do not experience sensory impressions, 539.

Animals, III, the cells of their body; protozoa; infusoria; protophyta; in the macro world of naive experience there is a radical difference between animal behaviour and merely vegetative reactions to physiological stimuli; the error of anthropomorphic interpretations, 85; behaviorism ignores the plastic dimension of human experience; animal behaviour has a psychical qualification; an animal's psycho-motor structure requires a complete plasticity of the cells of its body, 86; radical types; geno-types; sub-types; mutations; phylon, 94; protozoa, protophyta; rhizopodes; radiolaria; diatoms; foraminiferes; algae, 107, 108; birds' nests; ant-hills; beaver dams; honeycombs, 109; a dog resting on a chair, 136; animal care and protection of their young ones, 267; difference between animal mating and human marriage, 324; animal plasm has an internal motive centre, the centro soma, 720; the sensorium binds the lower individuality structures of the living organism and the cell's material components, 766.

Animal Functions, Opened, II, the so-called ‘intellect’ in the psychical reaction to new factual situations rests on a deliberate presentiment of causal and teleological relations, 184.

Animism, II, according to Frazer, magic is directed to the impersonal forces of nature and does not strive after the propitiation of a deity, but aims at controlling and dominating the forces of nature; magic turns out to be inefficacious and man feels helpless with respect to nature; then arose the worship of the personified forces of nature and that of death; Frazer applies the principle of economy of thought to explain the transition from animism to polytheism, and from polytheism to monotheism, 313.

Ankermann, III, an adherent of the doctrine of cultural orbits, 333.

A-normative Sociology, III, Weber's concept, 183.

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Ant-Hills, III, as objective thing structures, 107, 109.

Anthropology, III, its pre-requisites in the philosophy of the Cosmonomic Idea; and in Existentialism, 781.

Anticipations, II, there is an increasing structural complication in the modal anticipations; they are only complex, 169; they are direct or indirect; the ‘irrational’ function of number anticipates the spatial modus, 170; the imaginary function anticipates movement, 171; economy of thought is a complex anticipation, 175; justification of a theoretical judgment is a juridical anticipation of the logical aspect; a feeling of justice anticipates the juridical modus in the psychical sphere, 176; animal feeling of revenge, 177; modal anticipations deepen the primary meaning of a law sphere in the coherence of its nucleus and retrocipations; e.g. subjective juridical guilt deepens the meaning of an illegal act, approximating the moral attitude of the agent; the concepts of causality, illegality and guilt belong together, 185; a concept may grasp a modal aspect in its restrictive meaning, an Idea in its expansive meaning, 186; the Idea points in the transcendental or anticipatory direction, and cannot be closed up in time; if the Idea of a modal aspect is used as if it were a concept, the modal boundaries are eradicated, and the result is antinomy, 187; the restrictive expression of a normative modus is formalistic in character, e.g., Old English aew, 188; the Christian Idea of God's guidance in History assumes a normative meaning, but not as the execution of God's hidden counsel; the normative historical meaning of this guidance refers to the juridical anticipations disclosed in history which are brought to light in the sense of an historical retribution, 290; sexual propagation and blood relationship is an original type of meaning individuality (a nuclear type) but their substrata are anticipatory modal types, because they refer to a nuclear type lying outside of their own modal sphere; other anticipatory modal types of individuality, 424, 425.

Antinomy, I, the identification of cosmic diversity with logical diversity leads to antinomy, 19; on the immanence standpoint Rickert's view is involved in antinomy, 22; Plato laid bare the antinomies involved in Parmenides' absolutization of the spatial aspect, 31; antinomy cannot be resolved according to Proudhon and Kant, 65; antinomy in Hume's thought, 300; antinomy is sanctioned in modern Humanistic thought, 404.

Antinomy, II, used as a critical method; the term explained; it is a subjective opposition to law; laws as such are never antinomic; the cause of theoretical antinomies; antinomy is not an intra-modal contrariety; nor logical contradiction between opposites, 37; the principium exclusae antinomiae; speculative thought is antinomic; the ‘sole causality’ of God in speculative theology is antinomic; the argument of free causes, 38; there is antinomy in the concept of the sole causality of God, 40; its origin, 41; theoretical antinomies and the transcendental Idea of the meaning-coherence; Kant's conception, 42; mathematical and dynamic antinomies, 43; their origin; sphere-sovereignty prohibits antinomic speculations, 44; a particular antinomy is due to the violation of sphere-sovereignty; the number of antinomies according to Kant; according to Christian philosophy; Zeno's antinomies, 45; in Hume; Kant; Kelsen; logical contradiction and antinomy, 46; the origin of all cosmological antinomies, 47; the method of antinomy is one of immanent criticism, 48; this method and the discovery of the nuclear meaning of an aspect, 49; and the logification of multiplicity, 81, 82; antinomic theories of Cantor and Veronese, 87; Newton's ‘absolute space’, 95; Kant's view of space, 96; in the concept of movement as a change of place, 98; in the thought that matter is enclosed in space, 102; the antinomies of Zeno, 103; antinomy in the concept of a totality of transformations which is dense in every direction, 106; in Driesch's neo-vitalism, 110; in historicism, 217; formal logic as pure analytics is antinomic, 464; in Kant's attempt to isolate ‘pure sensibility’ theoretically, 495; in Kant's cogito as merely a logical form of the unity of self-consciousness, 500.

Anti-Revolutionary Party, The, III, and ecclesiastical authority, 622.

Antithesis, I, the only radical antithesis is of a religious nature, 123; it is that between the apostasis of nature and its destiny according to creation, 522; this religious antithesis passes transversally through the existence of every Christian personality, 524.

Antithesis, II, the radical antithesis in the subject side of the root of our earthly cosmos, 32.

Antithesis, The Religious, III, in the political struggle, 507.

Antoninus, III, Inner Dialogues (ad se ipsum), 229.

Apeiron, I, in Anaximander, 67; the endless, the Platonic ‘mè on’ is the highest principle for modern man, 194, Bruno, Cusanus, worshipped the infinite, 199.

Apeiron, II, Greek metaphysics depreciated individuality; if primacy was ascribed to the form motive they conceived of individuality as an apeiron, which in its ultimate indeterminateness was of no consequence for philosophy, 417, 418; if the matter motive had the primacy, indivi-

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duality was viewed as a guilt which must be reconciled by the dissolution of individual beings, 418.

Apeiron, III, versus existing things, 7.

Apostasy, I, from the true God is the source of all absolutizations, 61; apostate thought also contributes to the fulfilment of the Divine plan, 119.

Apperception, II, apperception and perception, the former is logical, the latter is psychical; Leibniz discovered this coherence, but interpreted it in the line of the lex continui, 118.

Appetition, I, as a causa finalis, 235.

Appetitus Socialis, I, in Aristotle, Thomas Aquinas, and Hugo Grotius, 311.

A Priori, I, a priori knowable and a posteriori knowable components of history, in Fichte, 484.

A Priori, II, an a priori structure can only be known from experience, 7; it is not permissible to develop an a priori philosophical theory about the coherence of the fundamental concepts of the different sciences, 72; the meaning of the word ‘a priori’ in immanence philosophy; its opposite is ‘a posteriori’; in Aristotle: the universal, as the ‘ground of being’; it comes later in cognition; in Scholasticism ‘a priori’ also has a metaphysical sense, 542; in pre-Kantian rationalism the a priori was logical necessity; the universally valid; in Kant: the universally valid transcendental forms: all synthetical judgments of universal validity not founded on sensory experience; in Husserl: the ‘universal Logos of all thinkable being’, 543; Husserl's ‘universal concrete ontology’, 544; with Scheler the a priori is the whole of all ideal units of signification encompassing the whole realm of essences, 545; the a priori is not opposed to ‘empirical’ facts; Scheler's ‘pure and immediate experience’ is a priori; the a posteriori depends on the senses; the concept of ‘pure superhuman’ experience is objectionable; Scheler's view criticized, 546; Husserl's ‘epoche’; to Scheler the cosmos is exhausted in its pre-logical aspects; he thinks that ethics can do without logic; he opposes pure logic to pure axiology, 547; the structural and the subjective a priori; the subjective a priori is either true or false; it is delimited by the a priori structures of all human experience; the latter is bound to the horizon of experience, viz. the a priori meaning structure of the cosmos as subject to the Divine Origin and centred in the religious sphere of the creation; the experiential horizon is identical with our earthly cosmos, 548; but not in the sense of transcendental idealism; the world is not created by the human transcendental theoretical consciousness, nor by the transcendental intersubjectivity of the egos; the fall into sin has obfuscated our experiential horizon; the light of Revelation opens it, 549; our horizon in its religious dimension implicitly belongs to human experience and constitutes its a priori element; it is made explicit in transcendental and radical self reflection, based on intuitive insight into the cosmic temporal order, 550; the levels of the a priori; the transcendental horizon; (the cosmic coherence), 552; the modal horizon, 553; the temporal horizon; the synthetical a priori of theoretical experience, its law side and its subject side; of subjective insight, 554; are mathematics and formal logic a priori sciences?, 555; the plastic horizon, 556-559; cosmic selfconsciousness, 562; Kant's a priori, 568, 569; that of Husserl, 569; Husserl's anonymous a priori, 570; the a priori transcendental level of truth, 573; the subjective a priori synthesis, 574; the a priori criterion of theoretical truth, 576.

Archè, I, from the Archimedean point of philosophic thought we discover that the view of totality is not possible apart from a view of the Origin or Archè of both totality and speciality of meaning, 8; all meaning is from, through, and to an origin; non-Christian philosophy sought the Archè within the realm of meaning itself, 9; the true Origin is absolute and self-sufficient; in critical philosophy one or more of our cognitive functions are regarded as independent and thereby elevated to the Archè of our knowable cosmos; thus the question about the meaning of our knowledge is automatically precluded; this position is taken in Neo-Kantianism, where reality derives its meaning from transcendental logical thought, 10; philosophic thought cannot withdraw itself from its tendency towards the Origin; this tendency is a manifestation of the restlessness of our ego; our ego comes to rest in the Archè, which transcends all meaning, 11; beyond this Archè the formulating of any question has no longer any meaning, 12; metaphysics, in its rationalistic currents, deified thought comprising in itself the fullness of being as the intellectus archètypus; the Archè, 13; Rickert and his School consider ‘transcendental’ thought as Archimedean point and Archè of the ‘theoretical cosmos’, 14; all modal aspects converge in the transcendent centre of the fulness of meaning into the unity of direction towards the Archè, 16; in transcendental logicism Archè and Archimedean point coincide, in rationalistic metaphysics Archè and Archimedean point remain distinct, the Archè is the absolutized logical aspect, or Intellectus Archètypus; then logical thought stands as Archè beyond which nothing meaningful may be further asked, and exists in

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and through itself, 20; in Maimon it is creative mathematical thought, 407.

Arch-Consciousness, I, a term used by Troxler to denote immediate knowledge in opposition to reflecting and discursive thought, 471.

Archimedean Point, I, is the point from which we are able to form the idea of the totality of meaning, 8; philosophic thought presupposes an Archimedean point for the thinker from which to direct his view of totality over the modal diversity of meaning; it also presupposes a position in the face of the Archè, 11; the three requirements which the Archimedean point must satisfy: it must not be divorced from our own subjective self; nor from the concentric law of the ego's existence; it must transcend all modal diversity and be found in the totality and radical unity of the latter; since Descartes the necessity of an Archimedean point has been generally recognized, at least, if the need of critical selfreflection was realized; modern philosophy seeks the Archim. point in philosophic thought itself, 12; the so-called transcendental subject of thought does not satisfy the requirements of an Archimedean point; this ‘subject’ is the subjective pole to which the empirical world is related as ‘Gegenstand’; ‘transcendental consciousness’, ‘transcendental cogito’, or transc. ‘unity of apperception’, transc. ‘logical ego’, is conceived of as a logical unity of the thinking consciousness, without multiplicity or diversity of moments, 16; the transcendental subject of thought does not satisfy the requirements for the Archimedean point, 16, 17, 19; in transcendental logicism Archè and Archimedean point coincide; rationalistic metaphysics absolutized the logical aspect in the Archè, but distinguished Archè from Archimedean point, 20; even on the immanence standpoint the choice of the Archim. point is impossible as a purely theoretical act prejudicing nothing in a religious sense, 21; the I-ness shares in the Archim. point in which the total meaning of the temporal cosmos is concentrated, 59; the I-ness is rooted in the spiritual community of mankind, of the ‘we’ which is directed to the Divine ‘Thou’, 60; Theodor Litt seeks the Arch. point in ‘pure reflection’ of theoretical thought on its own activity, 77; the Archimedian point of philosophy, 99.

Architecture, III, Berlage's Views, 139; is bound art, 140.

Aristotle, I, Physics, 25. Metaphysics, 72. Categories, 203, 537. Topica, 537.

Aristotle, I, on time and motion; motion is a striving of matter after form and from potentiality to actuality; it is a flowing plurality of earlier and later, without unity and consequently without actual being; the psychè can give unity to this plurality in the subjective synthesis of counting; time cannot exist outside the soul, 25; he deified Form; psychè is the form of the material body, matter is only potentiality, 26; the philosophical theoria of the Greeks was dominated by the same religious basic motive, which was called the form-matter motive since Aristotle, 36; Aristotle tried to prove that the nous poetikos (i.e. the active intellect) must be independent of the organs of the material body in the formation of logical concepts; the theoretical activity is hypostatized as an immortal ousia or substance, 44; the form-motive has primacy, the deity has become ‘pure Form’, and matter is completely deprived of any divine quality by becoming the metaphysical principle of imperfection and ‘potentiality’, 67; the metaphysical concept of being in its Aristotelian sense is not at all an autonomous concept of theoretical thought, 71; it is ruled by the religious dialectical form-matter motive; in Thomism the Aristotelian concept of deity is accommodated to the Christian doctrine of creation; Aristotle was fully aware of the religious character of his form-matter motive, and in his Metaphysics he speaks of the mystical moments of union of human thought with the divine pure Form through theological theoria, 72; Aristotle's theistic philosophy, (121); his idea of the divine nous as actus purus (pure actuality) and pure Form, first transcendent cause, unmoved mover and final end of the cosmos is the hypostatization of theoretical thought ruled by the Greek form-motive; an idol, 122; his conception of philosophy as the handmaiden of theology, the queen of sciences, 178; the change in Aristotle's metaphysics brought about in Thomas Aquinas synthesis philosophy, 180; the natural component of the Thomistic cosmonomic idea is the Aristotelian basic Idea accommodated to the Augustinian Idea of the lex aeterna; in Aristotle's view all nature is dominated by a dual teleological order: every natural substance strives according to its nature toward its own perfection enclosed in its essential form; there is a hierarchichal order in which the lower form is the matter of a higher form, 181; this is the content of the lex naturalis; the deity is the origin of the motion which proceeds from matter toward its goal; the deity is not the origin of matter with its blind arbitrary anangkè; categories of matter (spatiality, number) are to be distinguished from those of form; substance is the central category of being and unites the form and matter of natural beings into a merely analogical unity, 182; his definition of ‘substance’

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and that of Descartes, 203; he refers to the principle of the economy of thought in his criticism of the Platonic ideas, 272; Aristotle's nous praktikos, 535.

Aristotle, II, 9-12, 15, 122, 123, 135, 144, 145, 240, 321, 449, 496, 512, 542, 558. Metaphysics, 20, 419, 445. Praedicam, 20. Eth. Nic., 145. De Anima, 434, 566.

Aristotle, II, A metaphysical and an epistemological form-matter scheme was used in ancient and medieval metaphysics; ousia imparted delimitation to matter (hylè), in Aristotle the dynamei on (potentiality), 9; the Platonic process of becoming was the startingpoint for Aristotle in his last period; he rejected the eidè, conceived the Platonic eidos as the immanent essence of the material substances in the empirical world; their essential form (morphè) is the theological cause of the development of matter, 10; the immanent teleological principle of their genesis is an entelechy; the world order is intelligible and relativizes the entelechy; a lower form in its turn becomes matter for a higher kind; the actual nous cannot become matter, because it is the archè; this concept of Being is founded in an absolutized theoretical Gegenstand-relation; substances are excluded from the subject object relation which is essential to naïve experience; the substantial forms qualify and determine the eidos i.e. the essence of things, and are not conceived in the cadre of a modal aspect, 11; Aristotle's conception of the soul as the organizing form of the body, the body's entelechy; the substantial form is entirely directed to the supposed internal structure of individual things and to the teleological order between their forms, 12; Aristotle's method of concept formation according to a genus proximum and differentia specifica presupposes the existence of genera and species independent of logical thought, 15; his principle ‘all that moves is moved by something else’ refers to the transition of matter to form, of potentiality to actuality; its use in the Thomistic proofs of the existence of God as unmoved Mover, 39; the economic anticipation in the analytical modus was appealed to by Aristotle in his critique of the Platonic Ideas, 122; on retribution, 135; the idea of the highest good determines the ethical sphere, but in his metaphysics the idea of the natural good can only be determined by the essential forms of natural beings; everything strives after its specific natural good, i.e., the actualizing of its substantial form, 144; human nature finds its specific form in the rational soul; human behaviour in conformity to natural reason is good and virtuous; virtue consists in the permanent control of the lower sensory functions by the will according to natural reason; its consequence is eudaemonia, happiness; logical virtues; their ethical meaning is derived from the human will; control is cultural, not ethical, 145; Arist. started from popular morality in his ethics, 321 (note 3); the substantial form of a natural being, as such, lacks individuality and must be combined with matter into a súnolon (τόδε τι) the ‘principium individuationis’ is found in ‘matter’ in its quantitative potentiality, 419; the Aristotelian categories are basic forms of predication about the existent; substance or ousia, subject or hupokeímenon; all other categories are accidentia (sumbebekóta), 445; the ousia or substance was quite independent of human thought, but thought was intrinsically related to the substances, 496; the relations of possibility and actuality are founded in the metaphysical form-matter scheme (dunámei ón - and - énergeía), 512; the universal is the metaphysical ground of being of individual things; this is the essential form and the próteron phúsei as well as the hústeron pròs hemâs, that which comes later in cognition, 542; he tried to approach the plastic horizon of experience with the doctrine of the substantial essential forms of things; form is a dynamic principle of development immanently operative in the ‘matter’ of natural substances; the lower forms are matter with respect to a possible higher formation, 588.

Aristotle, III, Metaphysics, 7, 8, 9, 10, 12, 13, 14, 87, 126. Pol. 203, 204, 208, 211, 369. Eth. Nicom. 204, 219. cf. 179, 201-204.

Aristotle, III, matter can only become actual by assuming a form in an individual thing, 7; his view of the Ionian philosophers; he does not mention Anaximander in this context; he misinterpreted the atomists Leucippus and Democritus; ‘intelligible matter’; he conceived of ‘substance’ in two ways; the mathematical is present in the sensible without being sensible; the substance is the immanent point of reference in the process of change, 8; substance in a secondary sense; the pure ‘essence’ of a thing is its eidos, has only an intellectual mode of being, 9; ousia (substance) and its accidents; thing in itself and human sensibility; qualitates occultae; and the subject-object relation; Aristotle's ‘ousia’ as a ‘noumenon’ is Gegenstand of the logical function; this is a hypostatization; ousia synthetos; Aristotle mistook the Gegenstand of theor. thought for the reality of pre-theoretical experience, 10; the antinomy in the substance concept; substance is knowable from its accidentalia; it is principle and cause; syllable and letters; the whole and its components, 12; his difficulty with the metaphysical ‘Gegen-

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stand’; the cause of ‘matter’ is the ‘form’; this is a contradiction; original and later conceptions, 13; later he elevated the forms of natural composites to the rank of ousia, which contradicted his view that these forms cannot have an independent being; the deity and pure spirits; the soul, 15; his primary ousia and Newton's concept of substance, 23; his genus concept ‘sensory beings’, 87; the task of a sculptor is to open the natural structure of his material through the aesthetic structure of the artistic artefact so that the material becomes a complete expression of his conception; this combination is an enkapsis; but Aristotle's form-matter schema is no use here; Aristotle did not consider a work of art to be a substance; he called them analogies of substances; Praxiteles' statue is only a substance insofar as its marble is a substance, but not as an aesthetically formed figure, 126; he considers this sculpture merely as an accidental form of the ‘substance’ marble; the antinomy in this view, 127; metaphysical foundation of Aristotle's universalistic view of the polis as founded in the substantial form of human nature; man must unfold his essential form; his social impulse realized in the hierarchy of communal levels; the polis; the societas perfecta, embraces all other communities and individual men as parts in a whole; the state is prior to the household and the village; and ought to provide individual man with everything pertaining to a good life; the State aims at the highest good, 201; genetically the State orginates from the household; but structurally the State determines the nature of the household in the part-whole relation; the household is a relationship embracing those of husband and wife, parents and children, as parts of a domestic community whose primordial relationship is that of master and slave; it is an economical unity and serviceable to the propagation of the human race; the household is a monarchy, the polis is ruled by many, 202; the State is autarchical; a community is determined by its purpose; the household is the germ of the State; the union of man and wife is driven by instinct; although it involves friendschip and mutual service, 203; the aristocratic authority of the husband over his wife, the monarchical nature of paternal authority; as a master the husband is despotic towards the slaves; the householder is economist, producer, administrator; property is necessary to existence and citizenship, 204; his absolutist universalism: the polis regulates human procreation; voluntary organizations are contingent; his division of the citizens into occupational classes; common state-ruled meals, 205; the unity of the polis is guaranteed by the reality of its normative eidos (= essence) founded in an objective teleological world-order; the polis is not a ‘collective person’; there is no juridical organ-concept in Aristotle, 206; the relation of ruler to subject joins a plurality to a unified community; this is a general metaphysical relation; applicable also to plants and animals; this ordering relation is called taxis; it is a law concerning the distribution of political authority and benefits; taxis guarantees the identity of the State; when the control in the State shifts to another social group, taxis is changed, and a different state arises, 208; taxis is the eidos of a polis, its essential form; this taxis is the constitution, insofar as it ensures the unity of the whole of society; the aim of society is the good life of its members; it embraces human life in its totality; there is not any restriction to the competence of the State; the rule of law is that of reason; two different kinds of government, 209; three different forms of government; their perversions; unpolitical criteria; nobility and wealth; freedom and poverty; democracy and the political rule of the proletariat is due to an enkapsis; Athenian democracy during the Persian wars; its decline in the days of Aristotle, 210; Aristotle rejects the principle of majority; his concept of taxis is metaphysical and not exclusively sociological; his theory of the relation between body and soul, 211; the sociological meaning of taxis was analogical; his idea of the two forms of justice; commutative and distributive justice, 212; justice requires the principle of equality to be applied by giving each his due; justitia distributiva takes account of inequality and requires a geometrical proportioning between unequal terms; justitia commutativa demands equality in the exchange of values, in an arithmetical proportion; voluntary transactions of exchange, although inter-individual, are components of the communal life of the all-embracing polis; tokos and tokouein with respect to money; profit making is unworthy of a citizen, 213; Aristotle's commutative justice presupposes the autarchical all-inclusive polis based on the economy of undifferentiated agrarian households, 214; the State is based on the rational moral essential form of man; it is an organic ‘unitas ordinis’; the will follows reason only with the help of the laws of the State, 219; authority is based on the social nature of man and the lex naturalis as a teleology; it renders unity possible; the authoritative structure of organized communities is founded in the substantial form of human nature, 223; the Stoics denatured Aristotle's nous to immanent world logos; his eidè to logoi spermatikoi; the cosmic pneuma binds the cosmos into a unity according to the Stoics;

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Aristotle's entelechy (orexis) became the Stoic syndesmos (material coherence), 224; his theory of the State is metaphysical teleological; authority and subordination implied in man's social nature founded in his substantial essential form; the principle of inequality among men justified slavery; his distinction between to archon and to archomenon for all organisms, 230; universalia only exist in abstracto, 233; the relation between parents and children is part of the domestic community; the rational-moral perfection of undeveloped human nature in their education to good citizens, 267; the Aristotelian theory of organized communities and the undifferentiated structure of the Greek phylae and phratries; his conception was man's social impulse realizing itself in ever more inclusive communities culminating in the State as the all-inclusive social whole; Aristotle's concept ‘family’ is the Greek household; his ‘village community’; polis, 368; natural communities cannot be conceived as parts of a sib, so that Arist's view of social life is erroneous; the polis was not a whole of vicinages and households, 370; Aristotle could not overcome his idea of the totalitarian State, 398; his teleological order of essential forms in the scheme of superior and inferior, form and matter, telos (= end) and means seems to be transparent and rational, but does not correspond to the really complicated state of affairs; it is speculative; and necessarily leads to a universalist conception of the cosmos, 634; he distinguishes homoiomeres from anhomoiomeres, i.e., that which has perfectly similar parts from that which has qualitatively different parts, 638; the Aristotelian-Thomistic concept of substance, 710, 711; Arabian Aristotelians, 713; substance, 718; natural primary substances, 740, 741; his view of the animate body was subjectivistic, ascribing the ‘formal’ qualities of the body to the soul as its substantial form, 779.

Arithmetical Aspect, II, natural cardinal numbers; rational, irrational, complex numerical functions are based on the natural cardinal numbers; nuclear meaning of arithm. aspect is discrete quantity in serial order in a negative and a positive direction; Kant's view, 79; mathesis universalis; counting is not the origin of number; logical, sensory multiplicity, 80; 2 + 2 = 4 is not an exclusively logical proposition; the extension of a class concept pre-supposes number, 82; number has no retrocipations but is the substratum to all other aspects; in Aristotelian Scholasticism number is an ontological category implying spatial extension, 83; dimensionality is a numerical retrocipation in space; irrational and differential functions anticipate space and movement and logical distinction, 87; they are not actual numbers but relations; anticipatory numeral functions are not arbitrary products of the mind; Malan on discreteness and continuity; the continuous number concept, 88; inserting new values in a series can be continued indefinitely, but the actual series at one moment is not infinite; space and number; is there a continuous, dense, series? 89; Dedekind on irrational numbers; Leibniz' continuity of the movement of thought; section is the irrational function of number; logification of points, and number is related to points, 90; Natorp logifies number and space, 91, 92; infinitesimal, deepening of natural numbers, 93; directions of movement are numerical spatial analogies, 98; arithmetical time, 102; organic relation is numeral retrocipation in the biotic aspect, 109; numeral retrocipations in the legal validity sphere, 166, 167; mos geometricus in ‘natural law’; the State; juridical person, legal order, construed out of their ‘mathematical elements’, 167; spatial analogy in irrational function; the complex function of number, 170; anticipation of movement; imaginary function; Natorp; Grazmann's Ausdehnungslehre; Hamilton's quaternion calculus; Leibniz, 171; logicistic arithmetic; unidimensional series; relative functions; complex functions; anticipations; Dimension überhaupt, 172; group theory; the symbol i, 173; quaternion systems in which multiplication has no commutative quality refer to movement (direction); Hankel on the symbol i, 174; irrational and differential functions are limiting functions opened by space and movement, 185; spatial magnitude and number; irrational numeral function, 384; the antinomy in a ‘continuum of points’; points have only an objective existence in the spatial subject-object relation; a dense set of points cancels distance, 385.

Army, III, the ‘morale’ of an army, according to E. Brunner, 422.

Arnim, Joh. van, III, Stoicorum veterum fragmenta, 225.

Ars Combinatoria, I, in Leibniz, 246.

Art, II, Shaftesbury's aestheticism and art, 276, 277; Schiller holds that art reconciles mind and sensibility, 278; Condillac on art and science; adequacy of symolic expression is a criterion of art, 348.

Art, III, the art of performance (music, drama, etc.); the analysis of Praxiteles' Sculpture: Hermes with the boy Dionysus, 110; genotype, sub types and phenotypes; style, free art, 121; music, literature, 122; classification of fine arts, 123; applied (bound) art; mass production, bad taste, pursuit of gain; architecture; Christian aesthetics does

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not recognize an humanistic pure art; the l'art pour l'art slogan; our view of pure art, 139; a bank building as a work of ‘art’; free art pre-supposes a differentiated civilization; the artistic beauty of furniture, etc.; architecture is bound art, 140; Style of furniture; Louis XIV style, 141; our critical reserve; the colonnade of the Louvre, Lemercier's chapel at the Sorbonne, Claude Perrault; monumentality; style Louis XIV is a façade style; the disharmony in the opening process, 142.

Artist's Task, The, III, according to Berlage, 139.

Aryan Race, The, III, according to Alfred Rosenberg, 496.

As - if, I, we may judge of a living organism only as if a teleological activity lay at its foundation, according to Kant, 395.

Aspects, I, aspects are enumerated on page 3; no single aspect stands by itself; every one refers within and beyond itself to all the others, 3; our ego is actually operative in all the functions in which it expresses itself within the coherence of our temporal world; there is no single aspect of our cosmos in which I do not actually function, 5; the modal diversity is the expression of a totality of signification which through the medium of time is broken up into a modal diversity of aspects, 16; a rough, preliminary schema of the fundamental modalities of meaning; their coherence is guaranteed in a cosmic order of time necessarily related to factual duration; the indissoluble correlation of order and duration is cosmic time, which we transcend only in the religious centre of our existence, 24; a modal aspect requires a transcendental Idea of its coherence with other aspects, and of the radical unity of all aspects, 85.

Aspects, II, the criterion of a modal aspect is theoretical in character, 4; its epistemological nature does not imply that the aspect it refers to is epistemological, 5; this criterion is founded in the cosmic order of time, but the aspect intended in it is a modus of human experience; aspects are only implicitly experienced in the naïve attitude; their diversity is based on the law of refraction of cosmic time from whose continuity we abstract the law sphere, 6; the criterion of the latter is its general modal meaning which integrates every specific individuality of meaning within the sphere into a functional coherence with all the other meaning individualities in this sphere; spatial figures of all kinds of individuality are spatially correlated; a circle, a polygon, a tangent, parallel and non-parallel lines, etc.; the modal criterion is a priori functional and guarantees sphere-sovereignty; the general modal meaning is a functional modality of the religious fulness of meaning, 7; it has a subject- and a law-side which are mutually irreducible, but indissolubly correlated; and both are determined and delimited by the cosmic order of time; the criterion is dependent on the transcendental Idea of the meaning totality; the basic denominator of the law spheres is the cosmic time order; reflected in the same manner in the modal structure of every aspect, 8; there is no genus proximum in a modal sense possible under which the aspects can be subsumed; the aspects themselves are the ultimate genera of modal meaning, 14; the modal structures of the law spheres exhibit an order of increasing complication, but not a logically continuous order, 49; law spheres are not ‘categories of thought’; they are arranged in a cosmic succession of prior and posterior, 50; this order of succession is not an ‘arrangement of the classes of knowledge’ in a neo-Kantian sense; the earlier modal spheres are the foundation of all the later modal aspects in an irreversible coherence of meaning; substratum spheres, 51; and super-stratum spheres; two terminal spheres, 52; why Divine Revelation does not mention the relation between foundation and superstructure; according to this relation man is not there before the things of inorganic nature; viewed from the supertemporal creaturely root of the earthly world, the inorganic and the vegetable and the animal world have no existence apart from man, and man has been created as the lord of the creation; the foundational and the transcendental direction in the cosmic order of time; the second terminal sphere is that of faith, 53; the Biblical religious motive gives the view of time its ultimate direction to the true fulness of meaning intended by the cosmonomic Idea, 54; the modal aspects should not be identified with the typical structures of individuality functioning in them; there is a fundamental difference between the modal ‘how’ and the concrete ‘what’; human behaviour is not an aspect, but a concrete activity functioning in all the aspects, 68; each of the aspects is a temporal modal refraction of the religious fulness of meaning and expresses the whole of the temporal meaning coherence, 74; modal sphere sovereignty depends on the nucleus of the aspect surrounded by analogical moments partly referring forward to the transcendental function and partly referring back to the substratum-aspects; modal anticipations and modal retrocipations; the aspects display an architectonic differentiation in their structure, 75; the aspects do not delimit each other; the degree of complication of a law sphere depends on its position in their arrangement, 76; the nucleus gives the fundamental analogical

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concepts a definitive modal qualification, 77; a modal retrocipation may refer to the nucleus of a substratum sphere as well as to the complete coherence of the nucleus and its actual analogies, 163; there are simple, complex, directly and indirectly founded retrocipations; an example is: dimensionality and magnitude in space are simple and directly founded, 164; kinematic space is a complex and directly founded retrocipation; spatial and arithmetical analogies in the legal aspect; the place of a juridical fact, 165; retrocipations in the legal validity sphere, 166; modal anticipations can only be complex, 169; the complex structure of the so-called irrational function of number as a direct anticipation, and that of the so-called complex function of number as an indirect anticipation, 170; the modal nucleus and its retrocipations form the primary structure of a law sphere; e.g., juridical causality of a legal fact, 181; in primitive society the causal legal fact suffices as a legal ground for a juridical consequence; retribution has not been deepened into the anticipatory principle of accountability for guilt, 182; the same restrictive sense attaches to primitive social intercourse: the foreigner is hostis, exlex; the law of contract is governed by the principle of do ut des and by a strict formalism; juridical acts are tied down to a sensory symbol; the closed feeling aspect in animal life, 183; animal proofs of ‘intellect’ do not rest on rational analysis but on a presentiment of causal or teleological relations; an animal's feeling is not susceptible of anticipation in an axiological sense; undirected physico-chemical processes are in a closed state; in a living organism they are deepened by anticipating the directing impulses of organic life; under the guidance of an anticipated lawsphere an aspect is expanded and deepened in the opening process, 184; guiding or directing functions are to be distinguished from guided or directed functions; the anticipatory spheres of the aspect are opened through the guiding functions of later aspects; e.g., the approximating numerical functions point forward to space and motion; thus logical feeling is a modal limiting function of feeling approximating the analytical meaning proper; the modal anticipations deepen the entire primary meaning of the lawsphere in the coherence of its nucleus and retrocipations, 185; [cf. s.v. Opening-Process]; Concept and Idea of the modal meaning aspect; the concept of an aspect is concerned with its ‘restrictive function’ (i.e. closed function), the Idea approximates its meaning by seizing upon the anticipated modal structures in advance, and points in the transcendental direction of time, 186; mistaking the Idea for the concept leads to antinomy; the Idea is a limiting concept; the many ‘-isms’ in immanence philosophy; transcendental Idealism; Kant's homo noumenon, 187; the opening process and faith, 189; and history, 190; the indirect method of ascertaining the existence of a lawsphere, 203.

Asser-Scholten, II, Zakenrecht, 395.

Assimilation (Biotic), III, is supposed to be a crystallization process; but such a view does not explain the centred structure of living plasm, 721.

Association, II, the laws of psychical association, 117; between the feelings of sight and those of touch there exists an innate association based upon the biotic coherence of the organs, 373.

Associations (Societal), III, are voluntary, 189; a factory as an associatory and authoritarian non-institutional organization, 190; a free association is the genetic form of a compulsory enkaptically interwoven organization, 191; an association is based on the principle of ‘do ut des’; a contract of association is a collective inter-individual act of consensus constituting a unified will of a whole bound to a common purpose, 573; this purpose is necessarily directed to the correlation of inter-communal and external inter-individual relationships, prohibitions in France and England; enkapsis between free associations and inter-individual relations is reciprocal, 658; their juridical form presupposes common private law; the State is bound by the opened and differentiated inter-individual societal relations, 575, 660, 670, 685; Beseler's theory of the formal autonomy of associations; free associations; their contractual genetic forms, 667.

Association Psychology, I, Hartley, Brown, Priestly, Darwin, etc, 264, Hume's laws of association, 277, 278, these laws are his explanatory principles, 302.

Astronomy, III, the planets with their satellites, the solar system, spherical groups of stars, the galaxy, etc.; little is known about their mutual relations and internal nature, 651.

Âtman, II, in the Indian Upanishads we find the I-ness conceived of as an absolutely abstract supra temporal centre of the contemplative intuition of the essences transcending all that has the shape of a thing or bears a name; it participates in the Brahman, the spirit of the world, 324.

Atomism, I, of Gassendi is contradictory, 255.

Atomists, III, Leucippus and Democritus; they are misinterpreted by Aristotle, 8.

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Atoms, I, are ‘ideal forms’ in Democritus, 122; E. Mach does not consider them to be real, 213.

Atoms, III, in pre-Socratic phil. are elements; Democritus calls them ‘ideai’, non-sensible but intelligible; Plato includes atoms in the world of the ‘ousiai’; and the choora; the flowing air is the principle of matter, the void; the ‘atoms’ are called ‘full’ of being; matter is void of being, the mè on, 8; the structure of atoms and molecules contradicts the positivistic thesis that they are fictitious, 99; atoms have a veritable individuality structure, 101; atoms are considered as real parts of a living cell by B. Bavinck and Th. Haering; and so are molecules; the atoms in a living cell are enkaptically bound in a molecular union, 641; an atom's nuclear structure is not essentially changed; its existential duration is determined by the typical temporal order of its individuality structure, 704; an atom is a ‘mixtum’ of protons, neutrons and electrons, according to Hoenen, 708; atoms and chemical combinations are not parts of the living organism, 714.

Atom-Spectrum, III, formula for its results, in Bohr, 706.

Attention, II, pre-theoretical attention is rigidly bound to psychical factors; the free direction of our attention to abstract modal states of affairs is typical for theoretical intuition; in this free direction of attention theoretical intuition may grasp certain modal law conformities without a previous exhaustive analysis in the modal field of research, 483.

Attributive Competence, III, of the common courts, 679.

Augsburg, The Peace of, III, and episcopal Church government, 516.

Augsburg Confession, III, its definition of the Church, 512; it leaves the structural principle of the Church institution unexplained, 513.

Augustinian Roman Thought, III, tries to interpret the Scholastic basic motive as much as possible from an Augustinian standpoint; Marlet; they hold that Calvin emphasized God's transcendence too much, denying being to a creature; and that Calvin exaggerated God's immanence in his struggle against Servet's pantheism, 72; Marlet reduces the difference between Scholastic philosophy and the Phil. of the Cosmon. Idea to a theological problem; a comparison of the two respective basic Ideas of these philosophies, 73.

Augustinus, I, Confessiones, 26. De Civitate Dei, 178, 185.

Augustinus, I, Inquietum est cor nostrum et mundus in corde nostro, 11; Augustinus' subjective psychologistic view of time, 26; the struggle between the civitas Dei and the civitas terrena and the historical development of philosophy, 119; his view of theology in its relation to philosophy; he started on the path of scholastic accommodation of Greek thought to the doctrine of the Church; he interpreted Genesis 1:1 in the cadre of the Greek form-matter motive, 178; his later Christian conception of God's Will as Creator and his insight into the obfuscation of human reason by the fall became involved in the proclamation of the ‘primacy of the will’, 185; it came into conflict with realism that sought its Archimedan point in theoretic reason; by way of Franciscan thought Nominalism was related to the Augustinian tradition, 186; all knowledge depends on self-knowledge, and self-knowledge depends our knowledge of God; his refutation of scepticism is radically different from that of Descartes; he did not declare the naturalis ratio autonomous and unaffected by the fall, 196; Deum et animam scire, volo, 196, 223; Augustinianism of Maurice Blondel, 525.

Augustinus, II, 9, 268, 387. Soliloquia, 20. De Civitate Dei, 294.

Augustinus, II, identifies truth and being, 20; his idea of history: Civitas Dei and Civitas terrena, 268; productive, reproductive and synthetic imagination, 514.

Augustinus, III, civitas Dei and civitas terrena, 216; a State which has been separated from the Body of Christ, is part of the civitas terrena; the body politic is a divine institution; he subordinates the State to the temporal Church; his De Civitate Dei prepared for the medieval Holy Roman Empire; he did not sufficiently distinguish between the Church as the Kingdom of Christ and the temporal institution, 510.

Aul, The, III, the Kirghiz Aul is a ‘joint family’, and has an indivisible common property, 351, 352.

Aureoli, Petrus, I, was an Averroist Nominalist, 188.

Austin, II, interpretation of Kant's autonomy and heteronomy, 142.

Austrian School of Economists, I, their concept ‘pure economics’, 555.

Autarchical Sage, The, III, of Stoicism, 228.

Authentic Philosophical Thought, I, an existentialistic notion, 53.

Authoritarian Organization, III, is non-institutional, [Verband], 190.

Authorities, II, the formation of technical principles is only possible through the agency of historical authorities within a cultural group; they intervene in the

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cultural community to conquer reactionary conservatism, 258.

Authority, III, in an authoritarian community; in marriage; family, 180; of the magistrate; of a factory manager, 181; authority and subordination are founded on the inequality of men; slavery; according to Plato, 230; they are based on the legal order in the theories of the Stoics, which show a tendency towards the social contract view, 231; authority and subordination in the family according to Kant, 273; the authority of parents, 274; authority in marriage, 325-329; charismatic authority of a sib's chieftain, 357; authority within the temporal Church institution compared with authority in the State, 544.

Autocracy, III, Kelsen supposes that autocracy is founded in the belief in an absolute verity, 607.

Autonomy, I, of theoretical thought in immanence philosophy, 35-37; of natural reason in Occamism, 67; of theoretical truth is a dogma which hands truth over to the subjective commitment of the apostate personality, 150.

Autonomy, II, and heteronomy in Kant, 141; in Austin, Felix Somlo, 142.

Autonomy, III, of being and value of the cosmos with respect to God, in Stoker, and in Roman Catholic thought, 71, 72; autonomy contra sphere sovereignty, 220, 221; formal juridical autonomy of associations other than the State, 236, 245; Kant's idea of ethical autonomy contradicts the real structural principle of moral community, 273, 274; an individualistic autonomy of thought conflicts with communal family thought, 288.

Autonomous Totality Phenomena, III, are vital phenomena, according to Bertallanffy, etc., 733.

Autos and Nomos, I, in Kant; and in irrationalism, 466.

Avenarius, II, analytical economy, 123; biological interpretation of this economy in Mach and Avenarius, 175.

Averroism, I, in Marsilius of Padua, 188; and in Siger of Brabant, 260.

Averroism, III, of the sociology of John of Jandun and Marsilius of Padua, 224.

Avicenna, I, tried to effect a synthesis between Aristotelianism and the Koran, 173.

Avicenna, II, on being, 21.

Avuncular Relationship, III, among primitives, 338.

Axiological Viewpoint, III, is indispensable to Social Science, 336, 337.

Axiology, II, the low degree of differentiation in the axiological spheres of feeling at a primitive stage of culture, 178; in the retrocipatory direction of sensory perception the objective analogies of the pre-psychical functions of a thing or event are given in a natural way in objective sensory space, independent of any axiological moment in human sensory perception, 377.