Politiek en historie. Opstellen over Nederlandse politiek en vergelijkende politieke wetenschap

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Government and opposition in the new states^*

Introduction

By definition, political opposition by mass parties calling freely for votes against an established government, in parliaments and in regular, open elections, is a comparatively recent phenomenon. It could originate only when governments became effectively accountable to an ever-expanding electorate and is therefore intimately tied to the complex processes of democratization, which even in the more established Western democracies are barely a century old.¹

On the eve of independence, practically all new states² were committed to full democratic politics, for which careful constitutional arrangements were thought to offer definite guarantees. Yet in most of them competitive politics³ has not lasted long and has given way to autocratic government in one form or another. In these, politics may still be heavily competitive, but dissent can no longer be expressed through the channel of public opposition parties. This paper seeks to probe some of the reasons for the rapid decline in the fortune of the latter. It is intended mainly as a basis for discussion, which explains its tendency towards excessive generalization. I am painfully aware of the rather questionable nature of such an exercise which inevitably does injustice to many nuances in the politics of individual countries.

Generally speaking, stable oppositions would seem to require certain specific conditions: (a) the existence of a sense of shared political community, which transcends the issues over which the various contestants battle; (b) a relatively stable, pluralistic balance between various social groupings, each enjoying definite political resources with which to defend their interests; (c) the presence of special attitudes, which favour a certain relativism in policy

* Paper presented to the Round Table on Opposition and Control: Problems and Prospects, International Political Science Association, Grenoble, 14-15 september 1965. Originally published in: Government and Opposition, Vol. 1, nr. 2. (1966), 171-196.

1 Dahl, Political Oppositions in Western Democracies, ch. i.

2 By ‘new states’ I mean states that have only recently become independent. See on this point Edward Shils, On the Comparative Study of the New Nations, in Geertz, Old Societies and New States. I have found Shils's various writings on the new states an inexhaustible fund of brilliant insights.

3 See Coleman's concluding chapter to The Politics of the Developing Areas, especially, 532-44.

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demands, and in the choice of the means of striving for their fulfilment; (d) the general recognition of the need for effective accountability to an independent electorate.

In listing these four conditions, I do not claim that they offer an exhaustive list, nor that they are individually and logically distinct. The development of stable political oppositions in the context of democratic politics has been the outgrowth of highly complex historical processes, which cannot be subsumed in facile categories. I mention these four conditions therefore only because they provide convenient points around which to arrange the following remarks.

The first condition: a sense of shared political community

Otto Kirchheimer has distinguished between various forms of conflict, which he calls ‘political competition’, ‘political opposition’, and ‘opposition of principle’ respectively, according to whether those who challenge the existing rulers contest only the personnel, the dominant policy goals, or the constitutional character of a given political system.⁴ Political conflict in the new states consists generally, not only of these three forms, but in addition of an even more severe conflict, which one might term ‘the denial of political society’. This denial results from the circumstance that in most of the new states a relatively modernized state structure is superimposed on a congery of disparate social groupings that ‘have little sense of identity with one another or with the national whole’.⁵

The absence of a common political society reveals itself in a variety of ways:

Dissent as to the geographic delineation of the polity: Constant vituperations against the insanity of imperialist cartography notwithstanding, practically all the new states have begun life as sovereign independent powers within the boundaries bequeathed by colonial rule. They have therefore inherited a situation in which large parts of the population tend to lack any sense of actual identification with the new national polity. Whereas the majority of the population may be passively acquiescent, directing its political loyalties to smaller, parochial units, certain sections tend to become increasingly rebellious against existing government authority, as political independence leads to rapid politicization, and governments become increasingly activist in relation to society. They come to deny the legitimacy of the existing state jurisdiction, and turn to secessionist activity, or wish to join up with other neighbouring states. Attempts by the new independent government to repress such activities then tend to provoke further resistance.

4 See his chapter on Germany in Dahl, Political Oppositions in Western Democracies.

5 Cf. Shils, On the Comparative Study of the New Nations, 3; and Geertz, The Integrative Revolution: Primordial Sentiments and Civil Politics in the New States.

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Contrary to a prevailing view, secessionist leanings are not confined exclusively to traditional parochial groupings, while the wish to maintain or extend existing state sovereignty is not a characteristic of modernizing politicians alone. Although traditionalist groups tend to be parochial in their political orientation, this has not prevented some of them from wishing to align themselves with equally traditionally oriented groups across state boundaries. Similarly, modernizers in some states have been anxious to break away from larger units with the wish to reserve their own wealth and development potential for themselves, and not to have to share these with more traditionbound dominant regimes. The lesson of Bismarck's formula of nation-building through successful konfrontasi (to use a more modern term) with neighbouring states has been lost neither on traditionalist nor on modernizing leaders. Consequently, in many of the new states the geographic size of the polity has tended to be unsettled, if not in fact, at least in the political consciousness of many of its nominal members.

Conflicts about membership in the polity: Considerable uncertainty often exists in the new states about the claims of various social groupings to citizenship. Racial tension clashes with legal fiction of the equality of all, whether relatively recent arrivals (such as European colonizers, or Chinese, Indians, Lebanese, Greeks, Arabs, etc. who have settled in many of the new states), dominant ethnic groups, or ethnic minority groupings. In addition, there is great inequality in the effective right to participate according to the location, class, religion or education of various groups. Implicitly, or explicitly, effective citizenship is denied to many groupings that are regarded as potential enemies of ‘the’ people, as retrograde forces, as henchmen of foreign regimes, as saboteurs of the new revolution, etc.

Controversy about the legitimacy of authority: In many of the new states disagreement on the legitimacy of rule is rife. There is often an uneasy and changing syncretism of traditional authority patterns, new procedures of constitutional legitimacy, historicist claims for a mandate to forge the future, and direct demagogic appeals by presumably charismatic leaders or candidates for leadership. Rival claims to leadership are numerous, and are given little chance to sort themselves out peacefully in a coherent pattern. There is dissension about policies, and about the extent to which political decisions should seek to change established social patterns. Consequently, it is somewhat difficult to speak of political life in the new states in terms of shared values, or even agreed political procedures. Opposition does not operate within a common and recognized political and social framework, but tends to represent fundamental challenges to basic life patterns which allow little room for compromise through political accommodation. The unsettled character of political rule, on the other hand, whets political appetites and raises exaggerated expectations of what the seizure of governmental power can achieve.

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Uncertainty about international loyalties: The relatively weak internal consensus in many of the new states tends to be reflected in their relations with foreign powers. Whereas many of their nominal citizens have overriding loyalties to units smaller than the new states, some potentially influential groupings may not hesitate to ally themselves with foreign elements. This is particularly important, because enduring political instability offers, in fact, a strong temptation to foreign agents (whether private or public) to meddle in the internal political processes of the country concerned. This inevitably aggravates the search for a common political framework, by adding to the uncertainties about the legitimate object of ultimate political loyalties.

The blatant character of these various dissensions easily explains the emotional search for the establishment of an overriding political community through a strong insistence on the value of nationalism. However synthetic as yet, the new nationalism seeks to make the existing state and those who control it the common focus for exclusive political loyalties. It seeks to undermine the rival claims of smaller political units inside, or larger political forces outside the state boundaries. By stressing the fundamental need to build a nation, it seeks to derive the recognition of existing authority from reference to a teleological goal. The new nationalism also strives to establish a title for itself in the world at large: by stressing sovereign authority and political neutralism, the new states seek to warn others off, and to allow domestic forces to work out a new society without interference. This stance is, at the same time, not incompatible with an inclination to strike an attitude on the international diplomatic scene far out of proportion to actual political power and effective political interests. For the playing of an active international role helps to compensate for psychological uncertainties, strengthens a sense of national pride and national existence, and makes opposition to the existing government by definition unpatriotic.⁶

Assuming that the existence of a stable, widely accepted political community is an essential condition for the development of successful and stable government-opposition relations, it is clear that the way in which such a community is actually built up is just as important. Judging from European experience, there would seem to be a considerable difference between those cases where national statehood results from a slow and peaceful knitting together of enduring pluralist groupings, and those, where it is imposed from above durch Blut und Eisen.⁷ Exclusive nationalism does not live easily with peaceful government-opposition relations, nor does the inclination of a small vanguard to hurry history along seem to be conducive to the development of a tolerant political culture.

6 Pye points in addition to the circumstance that leaders in the new states ‘often find the international political process more clearly structured than the domestic political scene. Consequently they can make more refined calculations as to the advantages in taking a definite position in world politics.’ The Non-Western Political Process.

7 I have elaborated this point somewhat in Daalder, Publikatielijst, nr. 42.

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The second condition: a pluralist balance between various social groupings

Obviously, the existence of stable political opposition depends largely on the distribution of political resources between various contesting groups. Dahl has suggested that a formal opposition is likely to be permitted in a political system if (a) the ‘government’ believed that an attempt to coerce the opposition would be likely to fail, or (b) even if the attempt were to succeed, the costs of coercion would exceed the gains.⁸ Historically, it has taken governments a long time to learn this lesson. A factor of great importance, in other words, is the enduring coexistence of strong groups over a relatively extensive period. The situation in most of the new states has so far been different. They are still in a somewhat fluid state in which political roles have not had time to settle down in a generally recognized, relatively stable pattern. The reasons for this must be sought, first, in the peculiar character of the sudden transition to political independence, and, second, in the uneven rate at which, in the course of time, different social groupings are being drawn into political activity.

8 Dahl, Political Oppositions in Western Democracies, ch. i.

A The effects of recent independence

The crystallization of political forces at the dawn of independence depended largely on the influence which colonial governments previously exerted on indigenous society, and on the way in which independence itself came about.

The effects of colonial governments: Colonial regimes differed greatly in their methods of control, depending on their own policies, and on the character of the societies they dominated. Consequently, the conditions they left behind in such vital spheres as the relative strength of traditional ruling groups, of newer bureauratic and military elites, and of modern party politicians varied greatly from one nascent new state to another.

Generally speaking, colonial government weakened the position of traditional rulers, even when (and partly because) they sought momentarily to strengthen their position as an instrument of colonial control. For by making them, directly or indirectly, part of a bureaucratic, centralized regime, the colonial regime tended imperceptibly to destroy the sacral legitimization which traditional rulers had previously enjoyed. Colonial subjects soon became aware of the inherent duality of the intermediate role of the traditional rulers, and tended slowly to grant less importance to traditional rank, now that former overlords were themselves seen to be subject to higher authority. (The actual extent of this erosion of the authority of traditional ruling groups obviously differed according to the intensity of colonial domination, and the particular attitude which the various traditional groupings took towards the colonial regime.)

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Colonial regimes also differed greatly in the extent to which they relied on indigenous bureaucratic and military personnel. Whereas they used expatriate civil servants for all but the most minor posts in some parts of the world (notably in Africa), in others they employed native personnel widely, even for relatively influential official and military posts. On the eve of independence, certain of the new states therefore tended to possess strong bureaucratic and/or military corps, whereas others had practically none.

Again, parties were given much greater scope in certain colonial countries than in others, both as regards the role they were allowed to play, and the extent to which they could operate freely to acquire a mass base. In some cases, parties were banned almost to the end. In others, a measure of carefully controlled elite representation was the maximum activity tolerated. And in yet others, for instance in India and in some of the African countries, once independence had been agreed to in principle, party politicians were given considerable opportunities to establish mass organizations and used them actively. Thus, considerable differences existed in the relative articulation of traditional ruling groups, newer bureaucratic and military elites, and political party leaders respectively.

Not only the extent of the articulation of these elements was significant, but also their respective positions with regard to the social structure and to the new nationalist aspirations. In some countries, political parties on the eve of independence tended to be mainly representative of traditional elite interests, whereas the factor of merit recruitment and promotion tended to make the bureaucracy and/or the military relatively more ‘progressive’ in orientation. In other countries, the situation tended to be the reverse. Such native elements as were found in the bureaucracy tended to represent distinct upper-crust attitudes, and regarded the new politicians as little more than upstart verandah boys. The existence of a relatively powerful bureaucratic apparatus exercised comparatively little weight, when the colonial power had deliberately staffed it with half-castes or members of an ethnic minority. Another factor which bore heavily on the exercise of future power was the extent to which militant nationalists gained the upper hand before independence: whereas in some countries revolutionary nationalists were strong enough to deny any independent political influence to those who had been ‘lackeys of the earlier imperialism’, in others an easy fusion took place between those who had actively cooperated with the former colonial regime and the new nationalists.

The transition to independence: Again, independence itself came in very different ways. In some countries authority was transferred slowly and smoothly, after due consultation between the outgoing colonial power and the new nationalist leaders. There tended to be little opportunity for sudden political shifts, since new authority patterns had been consolidated long before independence. This was even more the case where former colonial civil

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servants and military officers continued after independence to prop up the new holders of authority (whether as well-intentioned humanitarians, or neo-colonialist éminences grises is, in this respect, unimportant).

In countries which had to fight substantial revolutionary wars to gain their independence (as in Algeria, or Indonesia), or in countries which were thrown into independence completely unprepared (as was the Congo) there was no such easy transition. Where actual wars were fought, considerable conflict tended to emerge between civilian and military nationalist groupings, and between sections within each. Nationalist guerrillas of the first hour challenged new authorities again and again, and because of their military aptitude, often with considerable chance of success. Violence occured also in other countries, where the political forces had not enough time to crystallize, and the central power crumbled once the colonial regime had ended. In some countries conflicts broke out which were civil wars in all but name.

The establishment of single-party regimes: In countries where one dominant party had succeeded in channelling nationalist activities before independence, life for the opposition parties automatically tended to become very difficult. Often strengthened by free elections held under colonial auspices, dominant nationalist movements assumed authority as of right, thus initiating a process by which party and state tended to become indistinguishable. This was inevitably true at the higher echelons, as party and government leadership practically became one. But at lower levels, too, party and bureaucracy tended to flow together, particularly when the amount of qualified manpower was small in any case. Parties might seek deliberately to appoint their members to bureaucratic office to ensure effective control over suspected bureaucrats or simply to reward faithful followers with relatively lucrative posts. Non-party bureaucrats, in their turn, often rushed into the dominant party, in order to give vent publicly to nationalist feelings which they could not openly express in colonial days, or simply in order to protect their jobs as well as possible.

This confluence of state and party represents a concentration of political resources which opposition parties find hard to equal. Sometimes they succeed in maintaining a measure of local strength in certain regions, but generally speaking they find themselves in a hopeless position. They are thus faced with what Shils has called: ‘the twin dangers of oppositions ... allowed a shadowy existence, but ... deprived of any prospects of the exercise of substantial influence’, i.e. a tendency ‘to dissolve into a supine renegacy before the increased power of the executive, or to take refuge in unrealistic denunciation and obstruction reaching towards subversion at its outer edge’.⁹ Many former representatives of an opposition party join the government's bandwagon, to share in the spoils or to escape social ostracism. Those hardy elements which hold out find that previous facilities disappear, because the

9 Shils, Political Development in the New States, 391.

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governing party monopolizes all means of communication and uses all the resources of the state machine to harass its opponents. Soon, opposition to the party in power is regarded as opposition against the state and the nation itself, hence as potential treason. Opposition parties have no choice but to disband, voluntarily or compulsorily, to join the ranks of the party in power, or to carry on such further oppositional roles as exile and secret organization permit.¹⁰

The displacement of party politics by military and/or bureaucratic intervention: In other new states autocratic government has come about as a result of the seizure of power by the military. Generally speaking, this situation has prevailed in those countries which had a relatively strong military and bureaucratic establishment and a relatively ineffective party system. Stubborn resistance in the social structure tended in some countries to turn parties into little but cliques representing mainly distinct geographic and class interests. Showing little cohesion, and lacking an effective mass base, such parties did not succeed in entrenching themselves powerfully in government positions. Fleeting coalitions made for unstable government and declining government prestige. Whereas in the case of the single-party regimes, parties tended to permeate the bureaucracy, in these cases the bureaucracy and the military remained beyond the range of their effective influence, and free eventually ‘to save the nation from the politicians’ by a military coup d'état. These revolts often took place under a progressive and populist banner. Whatever the merits of this claim,¹¹ here, too, political opposition tended to be banned in the name of the national interest. At most the new rulers attempted to build up a somewhat half-hearted, manipulated mass-movement to give the new government a semblance of popular assent. If parties were given a somewhat wider scope to operate in (as in Pakistan), this was still on the understanding that they would behave well, i.e. within the limits of carefully laid-down government instructions.

The single-party regimes and the military-cum-bureaucratic autocracies have thus reached a somewhat similar situation by different routes. The distinction between the state and the specific holders of government power has broken down. Opposition parties are regarded as being in conflict with the national interest. Effective opposition thus shifts either into channels which are by definition revolutionary, or else is driven underground, to re-emerge in intra-party and intra-bureaucratic strife.

Continued competitive politics in some of the new states: If most countries have tended to follow either the path towards single-party dominance, or the path towards military autocracy, in some of the new states democratic politics still continue: established opposition parties compete with the governing parties in relatively unrestricted ways, whether at the ballot-box, in public meeting or on the floor of parliament. What then are the factors which have allowed this situation to continue until the present?

10 There is, of course, considerable difference in the extent, to which single-party regimes have become actually oppressive in the new states. Hence the attempt of LaPalombara and others to distinguish between sub-types like ‘one-party totalitarian’, ‘one-party authoritarian’, and ‘one-party pluralistic’ systems. All single-party regimes do have in common, however, the refusal to tolerate the challenge of rival opposition parties - and are hence not really party systems, but party-state systems. Cf. Giovanni Sartori's remarks on this point in his stimulating The Typology of Party Systems.

11 I attempted a short assessment in Daalder, Publikatielijst, nr. 23.

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Apter suggests that one factor might be size. In large states, he writes, there are inevitably ‘diverse power clusters which are regionally based. Democracy may come in such systems less for reasons of positive acceptance of its desirability than because no single group is powerful enough to do away with others. A functional democracy is possible that is different from the populist forms. It is organized around multiple parties (regionally, linguistically, or ethnically strong) and a decentralized government, mainly federal or confederal in structure.’¹² The main examples illustrating this ‘general’ case are, presumably, Nigeria and India, and possibly Malaysia. However, even in these states governing parties have not always found it easy to leave the distinct power base of their opponents intact (note the division of the Nigerian Western Region, the special measures taken in connection with Kerala, and the recent secession of Singapore). It would seem that the very heterogeneity of political life in such states can be sustained partly because the political domain remains as yet restricted. As and when it expands, both secession and forceful imposition are standing temptations to political contestants.

A second factor facilitating effective competitive politics may be the presence of superior forces above the battle (which implies of necessity the reduction of competitive politics to less essential roles). Such superior power may rest in various hands. The presence of an effective monarch, according to M. Jacques Robert,¹³ permitted the operation of a measure of competitive politics in Morocco until recently. Similarly, the silent, if effective, presence of the army has permitted the restoration of a certain amount of party competition in Pakistan. It is also often argued that competitive politics in India can be maintained partly because the necessary cohesion is for the time being secured by the supposedly steel-frame qualities of the Indian bureaucracy. Finally, a rather special kind of superior power may lie in the hovering presence of a foreign power: the threat of foreign intervention, or the wish to humour a particular foreign power, may persuade holders of government power to go slow in repressing certain opposition groups which are particularly congenial to it. Respect for the opposition on these grounds reflects a cold calculation by a weak government, rather than a positive appreciation of the rights of a political opposition.

Finally, otherwise sufficiently powerful holders of government power may really prefer the continuing existence of oppositional politics, whether from principle, or from a realization that free oppositional politics fulfil functions that are also beneficial to government. After all, opposition parties may play useful roles by channelling dissent into peaceful forms, by providing alternative sources of information, by reflecting particular interests or particular policy concerns, and by serving to test the government's popularity.¹⁴

12 In Apter-Eckstein, Comparative Politics: A Reader, 647.

13 Robert, Oppostion et Contrôle au Maghreb.

14 Cf. Apter, Some Reflections on the Role of a Political Opposition in New Nations.

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B Politicization in the longer run

As long as the majority in the new states continue to live in fairly traditional surroundings, politics leaves society to a large extent untouched. Politics remains a relatively autonomous process, beyond the vision of the common man, while society has a considerable ability to absorb the antics of political competition at the top, and to support regimes of various quality.

However, this situation must inevitably change, as politicians seek to expand the political domain (whether in the course of mutual competition, or simply to lay the groundwork for development), and as society as a whole begins to experience the effect of wider social changes. Consequently, politics takes on an entirely different dimension. New strains put relatively simple autocratic forms to severe tests. What then are some of the main social pressures, which make themselves felt in the long run, often in violent form?

Growing disenchantment within the Westernized political elite: The exaggerated expectations regarding the results of political independence inevitably make for serious disappointments throughout the society, with in some cases the added sting of frustrated personal ambitions. Thus, some of the more active early revolutionaries find that they are shunted away from positions of political and administrative responsibility, as their specific qualities are deemed less appropriate for the new tasks ahead. Most leading politicians and civil servants in the new states tend to be relatively young. This is bound to frustrate the ambitions of the next generation; its appetite has been whetted by the rapid promotion of the first generation of nationalists, but it cannot rise as fast because the generation above them is still good for many years to come.¹⁵ In some countries there is a widening gap caused by the fact that the expansion of educational facilities is growing faster than the rate at which society can absorb the newly trained in a number of fields. This intensifies the oppositional mentality to which university students are generally prone. Social protest then arises, partly through organizational support for oppositional movements, partly as disillusioned political apathy, which may occasionally burst out into violent protest.¹⁶

Resistances inherent in the articulation of power instruments: Political independence and presumed political modernization lead the dominant political groups to expand their instruments of power, notably by means of building up the armed forces (military and police), and extending the civil bureaucracies,¹⁷ and, possibly, the party organization. Such further articulation inevitably makes for the growth of various centres of political power, which at times may provide rival politicians with strongholds from which to press their views, or even to attempt to seize the supreme command. The top leadership may seek to counter this danger by attempting to build in control mechanisms. But these in turn lead to a further differentiation of power centres. Thus autocracy tends paradoxically to make for the development of a

15 Cf. Pye, The Non-Western Political Process, 660.

16 See especially Shils's essay The Intellectuals in the Political Development of the New States, 329-68.

17 J. LaPalombara, F.W. Riggs and others have forcefully argued that allegedly ‘neutral’ public administration assistance serves in fact to strengthen the weight of authoritarian bureaucratic structures in the new states, and hence tends to attain in effect the opposite of what is intended by naïve democratic ideologists. See LaPalombara, Bureaucracy and Political Development.

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number of rival apparatuses which, immediately below the unified supreme command, make for considerable conflict and infighting.

Again and again, leaders of the new states have proclaimed the need to recapture the harmony and unified enthusiasm of the first hours of independence. They have sought to give this an organizational base by building up a mass-movement, thought to embody the whole undivided nation, and hence given a monopoly. But then they have found themselves on the horns of a serious dilemma. In most cases, the confluence of state and party has tended to make the party lose vitality. Its activities remain subordinate to the daily political and administrative concerns of government, its manpower gets absorbed in government tasks. The people come to treat the party with the same deference tinged with cynicism which characterizes their attitude to government authority generally. If, on the other hand, the political leadership attempts to build up the party into an effective spontaneous mass movement, it is bound to find that it will become a potential source of opposition to government policies. Such opposition may stem partly from particular social or regional interests, partly from certain functional sections within the dominant party (such as the youth movement, the women's movement, the trade union-wing, etc.). Usually, the leadership finds it necessary to move against such oppositions, which perforce tends to devitalize the party further.¹⁸

The disproportionate influence of the urban milieu: Lucian Pye has rightly stressed the paradox that the new states are overwhelmingly rural in character, but that their politics are for the time being more urbanized than those of the industrial West.¹⁹ The reasons for this lie partly in the explosive political atmosphere which rapid, uncontrolled urbanization tends to create in many of the new states,²⁰ partly in the still continuing political passivity of the more rural areas.

This accounts for the disproportionate political role which relatively small urban groups play, both on the elite level, and on the level of the urban masses. The urban environment provides a suitable campaign ground for more radical elements, both in the (semi-)intelligentsia, and in the more proletarian sectors of the population. Urban unrest of objectively small dimensions often has an excessive influence, since the psychological uncertainty of the political leaders leads them to magnify its weight and prevents them from distinguishing sufficiently between spontaneous agitation and careful manipulation by activist minorities.²¹

Increasing politicization of the rural areas: In the longer run, the relative passivity of the rural areas will decline. Improved means of communication, and the deliberate penetration of conscious development policies, must lead to increased politicization - the army, the schools, and the expanding administration being the foremost instruments of social change. This strengthens groups in opposition to the traditional ways in the countryside, which in

18 See the interesting essay by Wallerstein in LaPalombara and Weiner, Political Parties and Political Development, 201-216.

19 Pye, The Non-Western Political Process, 660.

20 Cf. Lerner, Comparative Analysis of Processes of Modernization.

21 See on this vital point the brilliant study of Baschwitz, Du und die Masse: Studien zu einer exakten Massenpsychologie.

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turn brings about a heightened political activity in defence of traditional norms. As a result the urban modernizers who have previously held almost a monopoly of the positions of political power are facing a growing challenge from more traditionalist groupings who organize to protect traditional mores, including often orthodox religion. Similar forces also contribute to the heightening of ethnic and other communal conflicts.

Sometimes these tensions crystallize into hostile political parties, each propagating what others consider to be a fundamental attack on their entire way of life. More often such conflicts are driven underground, while intermediaries between the traditionalist groupings and the modernist leadership seek to bring about a measure of peaceful accommodation. But often political leaders move all out to eradicate traditionalist opposition, thus provoking political violence on a considerable scale. For nothing tends to be so stubborn as peasant resistance, ethnic antagonism, and religious anger.

Conflicts about development policies: In spite of the widespread belief in the need for rapid social and economic development its implementation gives rise to a number of conflicts which cannot be ignored by the historicist tenet of inevitability. There is disagreement about the ultimate goals, and even more about the specific means and priorities. Development presupposes the imposing of burdens to ensure future benefits and there is bitter dispute about where the burdens and the benefits are to go. Different regions may consider that development plans discriminate geographically in an unfair way, and the countryside may be loath to share its poverty with expanding cities. Whereas certain political and administrative elite groups live in considerable luxury (socialist professions being no hindrance to the enjoyment of ‘capitalist’ pleasures), the peasantry finds life increasingly impoverished, because of various financial manipulations which seek to create funds for development and unproductive consumption. Further development also changes the relations between the elite and the masses. The latter turn increasingly from detached spectators into activist participants in the political process, demanding results that cannot be met at the existing level of economic growth.

C Political and social mobilization

The new states thus find themselves in a paradoxical situation. Nationalist ideology proclaims the existence of common harmony, actual or potential. In real life, the new nations are facing a rapid accumulation of serious conflicts.

This ambivalence can be maintained as long as the political domain remains essentially restricted. The relative detachment of state and society also makes the continued existence of certain manifest paradoxes possible, e.g.: (a) the paradox of over-urban politics in a heavily rural society; (b) the

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strongly elitist character of most of the regimes under a heavily democratic cloak; (c) the highly verbal character of much development activity; (d) the strongly one-sided character of the communication process, by which leaders talk to the people, but very few people talk to the leaders; and (e) the continuing existence of stable social life, notwithstanding such governmental and administrative inefficiency, that Hugh Tinker has spoken of ‘brokenbacked states’.²²

In other words, the fairly autonomous character of politics in underdeveloped societies makes it possible for them to live with highly different political regimes, and even to witness a certain measure of political demobilization after the initial enthusiasm of independence wears off. This is the correct element in the widespread proposition that new states are better off without competitive politics, since the rivalry of parties is bound to exacerbate political conflicts that are better left dormant. This demobilization is only feasible, however, as long as the relative detachment of politics and society is maintained, and society itself can proceed on its built-in stabilizers without political and administrative intervention.

This implies, at the same time, that such relative quiescence (which is not incompatible with surface-explosions in the self-contained political arena) is inevitably a passing stage. As soon as the various social processes, which Karl Deutsch subsumes under the title social mobilization,²³ get really under way in the new states, the reciprocal importance of politics and social life must inevitably increase. Then, entirely new demands are made on political leadership and administrative competence, which are considerably greater than those which faced political leaders in the West in the past centuries. For whereas developments in the West were slow and piecemeal, in the new states they are likely to be relatively rapid and wholesale. Whereas the West could tackle its various problems such as nation-building, the establishment of constitutional government, political participation, and redistribution of incomes, in successive stages, in the new states these tend to cumulate within a very short time-span.²⁴ While in the West relatively strong states supervised the social and economic developments which took place to a considerable extent through private initiative, in the new emerging countries weak states are pushed by interventionist ideology to ensure development by means of state action. Finally, communications in the past were such that countries, regions and cities could develop in relative isolation. At present, the whole world stands at the elbow of political leaders in the new states, ready to criticize, to interfere and to complicate.

22 Tinker, Broken-Backed States, 6-7.

23 Deutsch, Social Mobilization and Political Development, 492-514.

24 The Committee on Comparative Politics on the American Social Science Research Council is currently engaged in a joint effort to define and describe in historical detail six fundamental crises in the process of political development, termed respectively the crises of (1) Identity (2) Legitimacy (3) Participation (4) Integration (5) Penetration and (6) Distribution. See Pye, Political Systems and Political Development.

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The third condition: relativism in political demands and means

The institutionalization of oppositional politics, representing legitimate dissent and claims for alternative policies, took the present, stable Western democracies many centuries. It is as well to remember that it was precisely in the Western world that political intolerance and aggressiveness reached their zenith. It took more than a century of religious warfare before Locke produced his letters Concerning Toleration. Nationalist rivalry and extremism are still very much alive in the West to this day.

At first sight, non-Western societies would seem to offer a better record. Traditionalist beliefs have often made for a measure of genuine acceptance of diversity within society. This fact is adduced in evidence in the familiar argument that institutionalized opposition should be regarded as a specifically Western phenomenon, part of the typical competitive spirit, which presumably has no place in the more harmonious, collaborative traditions of the non-Western world. In the new states, the standard argument runs, consultative procedures without formalized opposition offer a superior way of decision-making, leading to a more genuine consensus than competitive politics can ever offer.

Two arguments can be raised against this proposition: in the first place, it exaggerates the extent of traditional harmony and peaceful accommodation in non-Western societies; and secondly, even if social harmony were as widespread as is alleged, it offers an insufficient basis for effective policy-making as social change sets in. For social development breaks down the agreed traditions, on which the postulated consensus rests. It expands the range of political decision-making, and hence opens the way to greater conflicts on political matters. And it provokes new kinds of conflicting pressures by old as well as new social forces.

Consequently, the real issue at stake is not whether opposition against the government exists in the new states, but in what manner it is allowed to come into the open. For a variety of reasons, existing political attitudes in the new states augur ill for the development of peaceful government-opposition relations.

The dead hand of past attitudes between government and subjects: The idea that government should be accountable is alien to the political traditions in the new states, which have previously experienced traditionalist rule (in which, to use Max Weber's words, rulers are part-bound by inviolable norms, but for the rest enjoy a ‘free arbitrariness’²⁵), and, superimposed on this, autocratic colonial government. The people's dealings with government have been generally of minimal importance. Traditionally they tended to be characterized by a peculiar mixture of deference, the begging of favours (which is something entirely different from an effective recognition of rights

25 See Weber, From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, 296.

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and duties in relation to public authority), and possibly a distant oppositionism (which has little in common with open dissent).

The typical subject-attitude of the people towards authority has been matched on the part of the rulers by exclusivist claims to rule. The belief never existed that rulers were responsible for the exercise of their functions, except to their consciences or to their hierarchical superiors. It was never doubted that the rulers had the right to command, and that they possessed a power and authority well beyond the vision and concerns of the common man. Colonial regimes may have formalized bureaucratic procedures and have laid greater stress on actual achievement as a condition of permanent office. But they, too, represented a higher, if alien power, visibly symbolized in those strange administrative capitals which to this day often seem to dominate the emerging countries rather than to be part of them. When the new nationalists captured the citadels of power, they easily slid into similar patterns of behaviour. As colonial rule had in any case given the bureaucracy wide-ranging political functions there was no sharp break with what had gone before.

The new claims for government authority: Many observers, notably Edward Shils and Harry Benda, have stressed the disproportionate role of the westernized intelligentsia in the leadership of the new nationalist movements.²⁶ This prominent role rests partly on their ability to turn Western ideals against Western colonial practices, partly on their relatively strong commitment to modernization. In addition, a special sociological factor should be noted. As long as colonial rule lasted, only certain groups, notably those in the liberal professions (lawyers, doctors, teachers, etc.), enjoyed sufficient economic independence from the colonial regime to give them some leeway for nationalist activities. The leadership of the nationalist movements thus had little opportunity to acquire administrative skills. This inevitably strengthened the generic tendency of the intellectual to reason in highly abstract, ideological terms, and to underestimate the stubborn resistances which political and administrative realities offer.

Consequently, most nationalist leaders acceded to office with sweeping claims for what government could achieve. They called for an entire recasting of society in the shortest possible time. Government action became all important in this light. Rather than providing a lever for small, incremental changes, it was thought to embody the one weapon with which to fight for future salvation. Such absolute claims are little suited for the relativist outlook, which the recognition of legitimate dissent presupposes. The historic tasks ahead, the beckoning promises of the future, put all government measures beyond the pale of criticism. Inevitable failures are attributed not to human error or impossible policies, but to treacherous sabotage. Typically, governments are not alone in holding such views. Both governments and opposition forces tend to hold a devil-theory when things go wrong. But

26 Shils, The Intellectuals in the Political Development of the New States, and Benda, Non-Western Intelligentsias as Political Elites. For an interesting parallel with the position of the French intellectuals in the 18th century, see de Tocqueville, The Old Régime and the French Revolution, 138-48.

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whereas governments find fault with opposition forces, opposition elements turn against existing governments, accusing them of sacrificing the great march towards future glory to short-term profiteering or inept bungling. Instead of making for a common ground between government and opposition, the absolute nature of goals therefore introduces a witch-hunting atmosphere.

The self-fulfilling need for repression: Governments in the new states are bound to be relatively weak. The new rulers lack experience and are facing great odds with the aid of pitifully inefficient bureaucratic apparatuses. Even when they work miracles, these still fall far short of the excessive expectations which have been aroused. Weak government itself offers a standing invitation to potential rivals: since it is relatively easy to topple a weak government there is little incentive for rivals to go ‘slow’, and to cooperate rather than to challenge. The possibility both of internal rebellion and external interference creates a climate of considerable uncertainty. In this atmosphere, it makes little difference whether apparent threats to the government in power are real, or only chimerical. Tolerant attitudes towards an opposition depend greatly on the willingness of oppositions to let governments govern well, at least for a stated period. But how can a government govern well, when it doubts that it still will be governing tomorrow?

The relatively weak position of governments in many of the new states thus easily introduces a vicious circle, in which fear of rebellion leads to repressive action which in turn leaves opposition little choice but to become violent, thus apparently justifying repression after all.

The petty character of personal politics: In many of the new states, the number of effective political actors tends at present to be exceedingly small. This lends considerable weight to personal animosities, which often become embittered. Lord Samuel's pronouncement: ‘When there are two Ph.D.'s in a developing country, one is Head of State and the other is in exile’,²⁷ may be exaggerated, but it points to a factor which should not be forgotten in an excessive concentration on structural explanations.

27 ‘Sayings of the Week’, The Observer, 28 June 1964.

The fourth condition: accountability to an independent electorate

Undoubtedly the people have become the exclusive reference point for legitimate government in practically all new states. The will to be modern means to the modern nationalists among other things, to be ‘dynamic, concerned with the people, democratic and equalitarian’.²⁸ A democratic ideology has served effectively to discredit the rival claims of ascriptive traditional rule, or imposed colonial guardianship. It reinforces the nationalist attempt to ban

28 Shils, Political Development in the New States, 265.

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rival foci of political allegiance, echoing the argument of Rousseau that the general will can only be realized when the people are undivided by associations partielles.²⁹ It thus provides a unifying formula, which identifies the rulers with the people. At the same time, it allows the spokesmen of the general interest to regard all opposition to themselves as by definition in conflict with the general will, and hence as an attack on the very heart of the national and popular interest. It thus makes most leaders of the new states ardent adherents of what Talmon called the ‘totalitarian democratic school’. Originating in somewhat comparable social conditions, it also believes in ‘a sole and exclusive truth in politics’ and it has the same messianic streak ‘in the sense that it postulates a preordained, harmonious and perfect scheme of things, to which men are irresistibly driven, and at which they are bound to arrive.’ Like this school ‘it recognizes ultimately only one plane of existence, the political. It widens the scope of politics to embrace the whole of human existence. It treats all human thought and action as having social significance, and therefore as falling within the orbit of political action.’³⁰

One may further detect a psychological cause for the strong populist stance of many of the intellectuals in the new states today. To quote Shils:

Alienated from the indigenous authorities of their own traditional society - chiefs, sultans, princes, landlords and priests - and from the rulers of their modern society - the foreign rulers and the ‘Westernized’ constitutional politicians (and since independence, politicians of the governing party) - the intellectuals have had only the ‘people’, the ‘African personality’, the ‘Indian peasant’, etc., as supports in the search for the salvation of their own souls and their own society.³¹

But at the same time, the people, in spite of all that happens and is decided in its name, remains an abstract concept, an objective postulate and point of reference, but not people in the plural, consisting of myriad groupings all with their own sentiments and desires. Consequently - to borrow a happy phrase of Mary Matossian's - it is perfectly possible at one and the same time to look up to ‘the people’, and down on ‘the masses.’³² The people form an artificial concept, an imaginary group embodying the real will of a society that is yet to be made.

In practice, therefore, the almost universal prevalence of a democratic ideology is by no means incompatible with a high degree of actual elitism. Democracy implies following leaders who know the future, and whose judgments should not be questioned if the teleological promise is to come true. In this view, elections are therefore hardly necessary to prove democratic assent. At best, they will prove the obvious. At worst, they might give undesirable opportunities to ‘private societies in the body politic’ which, to use a Hobbesian phrase, are ‘like worms in the entrayles of a natural man’.³³

29 Cf. Du Contrat Social, Livre ii, ch. iii.

30 Talmon, The Origins of Totalitarian Democracy, 1-2.

31 The Intellectuals in the Political Development of the New States, in Kautsky, Political Change in Underdeveloped Countries, 215.

32 Mary Matossian, Ideologies of Delayed Industrialization, in Kautsky, op. cit., 262.

33 Leviathan, ch. xxix.

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The democratic ideology, in other words, is honoured widely in the word. But then, did not Aron observe correctly, following de Tocqueville: ‘A notre époque, on ne peut établir de régime autoritaire qu'au nom de la démocratie, parce que tous les régimes modernes sont fondés sur le principe de la solution égalitaire et ne peuvent établir un pouvoir absolut qu'en prétendant libérer les hommes’?³⁴

34 Aron, Le Développement de la Société Industrielle et la Stratification Sociale, 49.