Briefwisseling en aantekeningen. Deel 1

CCXXVI.
De Hertog van Newcastle aan Willem Bentinck.

[B.M., Addenda 32.809]

Newca(stle) Ho(use), 28 Juli (8 Aug. N.S.) 1747.

I have the honor of your letter of the 1^st Aug. N.S.

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and am very sorry, that any account you may have received of the present dispositions here, should have given you any uneasiness. I shall take the liberty to lay before you what I apprehend to be the true state of the case; at least as far as I can make any judgement of it. I hope I need not make any professions of my sincere zeal for the service of the common cause; and how sorry I should be to see us reduced to accept any peace from France, that does not effectually secure the true interests of Europe. This principle induced me the last year to oppose, to the utmost of my power, the acceptance of the conditions of peace, contained in M^r. d'Argenson's plan, even at the hazard of differing with the Republic of Holland upon that great and material point.

The same principle engaged me to propose to H.M. in October last, such a plan for forming a confederate army in Flanders and Italy, as, had it been duely executed, after it was formally accepted by all parties, would have given us an evident superiority in both places; and from whence we may reasonably affirm, that the armies of the allies might have been at this time in the heart of the Kingdom of France, instead of the frontiers of the Republick, and their strongest towns being now attacked by the French army. But these engagements were so far from being complyed with, that the confederate army in Flanders, which by the convention of January last, was to consist of 135.000 men, by the last returns is not above 57.000, exclusive of the troops employed in Zealand and at B. op Z., before the arrival of Prince Waldeck's detachment. Although the King has actually furnished two or three thousand men over and above the forty thousand men which was his quota; and the army in Italy is little more than half what it ought to have been by the express stipulations of the convention. This great deficiency of the stipulated quotas, has not only occasioned the misfortunes lately happened in Flanders, and Italy, and prevented all the good effects hoped for from the great efforts made by England and Holland this year, but has also created a general opinion here, of the necessity of putting an end to the war; since it is thought that greater resources, than we have had this year, can

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scarce be hoped for; and experience has shew'd that they are not sufficient.

This argument prevails so much that I must own those, who have been the most forward hitherto, for carrying on the war, begin to fear, that no advantage can be had by it: and therefore it seems very advisable, that we should see upon what terms France will make peace; and if they are such as cannot be accepted, we must make all the joint efforts we can, for the support of the war, if there be any appearance of a possibility thereby of obtaining better conditions of peace. The great point, which I have ever pressed is, that both in peace and war, we may act in the most perfect concert with our allies; and especially the Republic of Holland, formed as it is at present. For if any peace should be made without the concurrence of all the allies, France would gain more by that division, than by the most advantageous conditions of peace, which she might otherwise procure. You have seen the answer H.M. thought proper to give to the overture of peace made by the Marshal Saxe. Nothing could more strongly demonstrate H.M.'s resolution to act in concert with his Allies, and to support their interests. Lord Sandwich will communicate to you the short question put by Mar^l. Saxe in answer to Gen^l. Ligonier's letter; and I am pensuaded H.M. will do nothing thereupon, but what will be or ought to be agreable to all his allies; but as a faithfull well-wisher to the alliance - - the basis of all the good that can be expected for Europe, in opposition to the ambitious views of France - - and as a most sincere, and faithfull servant to the Prince of Orange, who thinks the interest of the King and this country most essentially concerned in supporting the independency, grandeur and prosperity of the Republic of Holland, under the immediate influence of H.H., I should hope, that the Allies, and particularly the P. of O., would give all possible facility towards discovering the real intentions of France; and, if possible to put an end to the war, by a reasonable peace, which might secure to the allies their respective interests; and thereby make a tolerable provision for the security of the liberties of Europe. The difficulty, which by many is called the impossibility of carrying out

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the war another year, is the only reason that makes me advise this measure. I own I despair of having more assistance from the Courts of Vienna and Turin than we have had this year; and I am very sorry to say that the condition of the Republic is represented to be such, as scarce to be able to furnish money for the current expences of this year; much less to provide for a great augmentation of expence, the next; and however willing or zealous the Republic is now admitted to be, with the Statholder at their head, to augment their forces, by the addition of 30,000 men, and to contribute to the taking of 30,000 Russians besides, the means of doing it are extremely doubted, from the exhausted condition things are now in. You will forgive the frankness I am now using; but as it is one very material consideration in the present question, I should not have thought myself excusable, if I had omitted it; and I shall be extremely glad to be able to prove, that the present condition of the Republic has been mistaken, and to remove these doubts and apprehensions, which cannot fail of making great impression here.

If the overture of Mar^l. Saxe goe on, Lord Sandwich will be employed in the negotiation. You know him too well to imagine him capable of doing anything, but with the utmost regard to H.M.'s allies and particularly the Republic of Holland. He is already ordered to communicate everything to the P. of O. and will act in the most perfect concert with H.H., and if the allies will show the same disposition on their part, we shall either make such a peace, as ought to be satisfactory in the present circumstances; or must, jointly, and effectually, enter into such measures, as may enable us to carry on the war, with a prospect of success; and at least secure the performance to each other, of what shall be stipulated.

I beg pardon for having given you this trouble. I have taken the liberty in confidence to lay before you my private thoughts; what I write is without the knowledge of the King, or any of my fellow ministers; and therefore you will not take any measure upon this; but act only upon what shall be in form communicated to you by Lord Sandwich, in the regular channel.