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De Zeventiende Eeuw. Jaargang 20 (2004)

De Zeventiende Eeuw. Jaargang 20

(2004)– [tijdschrift] Zeventiende Eeuw, De–rechtenstatus Auteursrechtelijk beschermd

Vorige Volgende

The organisation of seventeenth-century tapestry production in Brussels and Paris
A comparative view
Koenraad Brosens*

In 1694 the Amsterdam artist Jan Luyken (1649-1712) published Het Menselyk Bedryf.1 The book contains a collection of one hundred depictions of trades with moralistic verses. A tapestry entrepreneur figures among the craftsmen (Fig. 1). He shows a tapestry, which is hung rather casually, to a potential customer while in the background a weaver mans a loom. The open door links the workshop to the town. The configuration of the tapestry workshops in the Parisian Manufacture royale des Gobelins (est. 1662) was completely different, according to the 1765 engravings in Diderot's and Dalembert's Encyclopédie (Figs 2 and 3). The cool rationalism that characterises the French factory contrasts sharply with the nonchalant and intimate atmosphere of the small-scale Netherlandish workshop. Neither doors nor windows link the Gobelins to the city.

Though these illustrations presumably offer a romanticised or idealistic vision of reality,2 they depict most accurately the prevailing dichotomous view on the organisation of tapestry production in the Netherlands on the one hand and in France on the other. This antithetical mode is firmly rooted in pioneering nineteenth-century studies on Brussels and Parisian tapestry. Alphonse Wauters' Les tapisseries bruxelloises (1878) sketched out a production model dominated by entrepreneurs running small-scale workshops and contracting out commissions to other tapestry weavers.3 The industry was supervised by the tapestry guild that carried influence in the entire urban socio-political field. The local authority granted limited financial privileges to a number of important tapestry entrepreneurs, yet the Brussels workshops preserved their autonomy from both local and central government. Jules Guiffrey's Les manufactures parisiennes de tapisseries au XVIIe siècle (1892) demonstrated that the organisation of seventeenth-century Parisian tapestry production was manifestly different from that of its Brussels counterpart.4 The industry in the French capital was funded and directed by the royal state machinery. Prior to 1662, Parisian tapestry production was concentrated in the privileged and large-scale manu-



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Fig. 1. Jan Luyken, De Tapeitwerker, c. 1694. Pen and brush, c. 9 × 7.5 cm. Amsterdam, Historisch Museum.


factories of the Louvre (est. 1603), the faubourg St Marcel (est. 1601) and the faubourg St Germain (est. 1627); this preoccupation with concentration culminated in 1662 when Colbert grouped all production units in the Manufacture royale des Gobelins.5 The tapestry guild, it is tacitly assumed, played no role in these royal factories that were isolated from the city. Much as the Parisian manufactories were prestigious undertakings, they appear to have been lame ducks and in constant need of royal financial support.

The different views behind the organisation of Brussels and Parisian tapestry production have never been the subject of systematic study. Art historians tend to focus on the history, iconography and style of tapestry sets rather than on the configuration of the trade.6 Socio-economic research on guilds in the Southern Netherlands bypassed Brussels tapestry production, and analyses of the luxury guilds and markets in



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Fig. 2. ‘Tapisserie de Haute Lisse des Gobelins’, from the Encyclopédie, 1765.


Paris added little more to our understanding of the French configuration as they minimized the role of the Parisian tapestry guild while stressing the special and isolated position of the royal manufactories.7 It has been made clear, nonetheless, that Brussels and Parisian tapestry entrepreneurs maintained close contacts throughout the seventeenth century. Brussels tapestries were imported into France,8 French designs were leased to Brussels tapissiers,9 and numerous Flemish tapestry weavers and producers



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Fig. 3. ‘Tapisserie de Basse Lisse des Gobelins’, from the Encyclopédia, 1765.


migrated to France.10 Moreover, some small-scale production units that were independent from the royal and privileged manufactories operated in Paris, while in the beginning of the eighteenth century a large-scale factory was established in Brussels.11 Comparing Parisian and Brussels configurations may therefore shed new light on the rationale and the arrangements that shaped the organisation of the production in both cities. This article, which is largely based on both published and new archival material, focuses on three major facets of the organisation of tapestry production in Brussels and Paris: the role of the tapestry guilds, the development of the privileges granted in both cities and the configuration of the production models in Paris and Brussels.

The role of the Parisian tapestry guild(s)

Throughout the Middle Ages, tapestry production in Brussels and Paris was organised in a corporative framework. In the first quarter of the fourteenth century, the Brussels legwerckers, a name that makes clear that they used low-warp looms,12 were a division of the guild of the cloth manufacturers, which was also known as the ‘small guild’.13 In or shortly after 1418 they were detached from the cloth manufacturers only to become part of the ‘large guild’, which grouped the wool manufacturers.14 In the first half of the fifteenth century, the number of legwerckers gradually outnumbered the wool manufacturers, and in 1447 they broke away from the ‘large guild’ and formed an independent guild. Autonomy enabled the development of a self-interested production and marketing strategy, and allowed the tapissiers to secure this strategy at a higher level as the deans of the tapestry guild could penetrate the Cloth Guild - the institution monitoring all textile guilds - and the Brussels city administration.15 The statutes of the tapestry guild were recorded in 1451 and remained basically unaltered until the end of the eighteenth century.16 Throughout the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, Brussels tapestry flourished and was of paramount importance to the urban economy.17 The local authority therefore meticulously monitored the industry. When in 1528 the Brussels waged workmen complained about the lack of adequate quality control and the growing number of counterfeit tapestries, the municipality decreed the introduction of the famous ‘B∇B’ quality mark to safeguard the level of employment (Fig. 4).18



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Fig. 4. Brussels mark on a tapestry from the Life of Man, c. 1550. Private collection (photo G. Delmarcel).


The development of the Parisian tapestry guild was diametrically opposed to the evolution of its Brussels counterpart.19 The Parisian tapissiers-hautelissiers, a name revealing the use of high-warp looms, were originally grouped in an autonomous guild but fused with the guild of the tapissiers-sarrazinois, who made carpets à la façon du Levant, in 1301.20 Parisian tapestry of the sixteenth century could not match the Flemish success, and many Parisian tapissiers started to specialise in the import of Brussels, Antwerp and Oudenarde tapestries.21 In 1551 King Henry II (1519-1559) issued lettres patentes that offered privileges to the Hôpital de la Trinité where orphans and homeless children were trained in various professions, including tapestry weaving.22 The Trinité workshop, however, was never successful. While in the Southern Netherlands tapestry production was exclusively organised within the urban-corporative framework, the most prestigious French tapestries were produced at the royal workshop of Fontainebleau, established around 1534 by King Francis I (1494-1547), that operated independently of corporative structures.23

The moribund tapestry production in Paris was fundamentally reformed by King Henry IV around 1600. He originally planned to develop the Fontainebleau workshop, but after his move to Paris in 1594 Henry IV decided to group all court artists, including the tapissiers Girard Laurent and Maurice Dubois, in the former residence of the Jesuit priests located in the faubourg St Antoine (1597).24 Laurent and Dubois had been registered as masters in the guild of the tapissiers-hautelissiers et sarrazinois prior to their appointment as court tapissiers, yet their new status placed them outside the corporative framework - the fact that they worked in the faubourg St Antoine, a suburb where free trade flourished and the guilds' prerogatives to supervise labour were constantly challenged, only underlined their insular position.25 Thus, after the move of all court artists to the Louvre in 1603, Laurent and Dubois kept their privileged position. Lettres patentes, issued by Henry IV in 1607 and registered by the Parlement in 1608, make clear that all court artists and artisans were allowed to open a ‘free’ boutique anywhere in Paris.26

Apart from establishing a high-warp workshop in the Louvre, Henry IV also realized an older project by luring Flemish tapestry weavers and entrepreneurs to Paris and creating a Flemish low-warp production unit in the French capital.27 In 1600 Frans van der Plancken (1573-1627) from Oudenarde and his Antwerp brother-in-law Marc Coomans (1563-in/after 1644) conducted ‘plusieurs négotiations’ with the French king that resulted in a reciprocal agreement. On January 12, 1601 the king ordered Jean de Fourcy, Intendant des Bâtiments, to supervise the ‘ouvriers étrangers que Sa Majesté a fait venir des Pays-Bas pour travailler des tapisseries en la ville de Paris’ and to assist them with the establishment of their workshop.28 On January 20, 1601 Coomans, Van der Plancken and Hiëronymus Coomans contracted to produce tapestries in a joint venture.29

Untill now (art) historians tacitly assumed that the Coomans and Van der Plancken workshop operated independently of the tapestry guild and that their appointment even was the coup de grâce for the disintegrating would-be guild; the tapissiers were believed subsequently to have converted into upholsterers and - contested - furniture dealers.30 Parisian tapissiers, however, actually played an important if not decisive role in

the development of seventeenth-century Parisian tapestry production. The tapissiers-hautelissiers et sarrazinois understandably opposed the establishment of the Flemish manufactory in Paris. An ordinance issued by the Bureau de la Ville (city administration) in the very beginning of the seventeenth century demonstrates that they tried to divert the investment from the Flemish to the Parisian tapissiers, as they argued that tapestries woven on high-warp looms were ‘beaucoup plus précieuse et meilleure’ than the Flemish low-warp production ‘qui est celle que l'on veult establir’.31 The tapissiers-hautelissiers et sarrazinois had to concede the establishment of the Coomans and Van der Plancken manufactory, yet the Flemish entrepreneurs were not exempted from registration with the guild. Via a decree issued by the Conseil de Commerce on 25 May 1604, the guild urged ‘les maistres tapissiers flamens’ who ‘ne vouloient se représenter en la compagnie’ to fulfill this obligation, as integration was regarded as a means of controlling the alien competitors.32 It is not clear, however, if the Flemish tapestry entrepreneurs actually complied with this order. Four days later, ‘le maistre tapissier des tapisseries façon de Flandres’ - either Coomans or Van der Plancken - tried to butter up the Conseil de Commerce by committing himself to employing Parisian trainees in the workshop, so that in the medium term low-warp production could become a French undertaking as well.33 The Flemish director stressed the fact that he was not obliged to train Parisian tapestry weavers, but that he very much liked to meet ‘la volonté du Roy’ - though he also frankly admitted that ‘son profit particulier’ was going to benefit from the additional manpower. It may be assumed that the Parisian tapissiers exercised their prerogative to visit the manufactory anyway; in 1581 the guilds had been entitled to supervise all artisans in all the faubourgs of Paris, except for the faubourg St Antoine.34

In addition to the tapissiers-hautelissiers et sarrazinois, a second Parisian guild of tapissiers monitored the developments and mingled in the debate as well. In the sixteenth century, the guild of the tapissiers-courtepointiers, which originally supervised the production of beds, settees and tents, had become the institutional framework in which the importation and distribution of nearly all meubles meublants for interior decoration, including tapestries, was organised.35 Hence, when Henry IV favoured Coomans and Van der Plancken by embargoing the import of ‘tapisseries à personnages, boccages ou verdures des pays estrangers’ in September 1601, he violated a very lucrative prerogative of the

tapissiers-courtepointiers.36 Moreover, they feared that the Flemish entrepreneurs planned to import tapestries themselves. They therefore requested the Bureau de la Ville to issue an ordinance that prohibited Coomans and Van der Plancken from dealing in tapestries. It was decreed that all pieces produced by the Flemish entrepreneurs had to be marked with ‘la fleur de liz et première lettre de la ville òu elle aura été manufacturée’, so that during their visits the deans of the guild could distinguish imported tapestries from the Coomans/Van der Plancken pieces.37 The introduction of the famous ‘P/lilly’ mark thus resulted from the tapissiers-courtepointiers' concern about their prerogative to market foreign tapestries (Fig. 5).

Despite the growing aura of absolutism, the Parisian guilds firmly stood their ground throughout the seventeenth century. In 1622 the tapissiers-hautelissiers et sarrazinois fused with the tapissiers-courtepointiers and three related guilds.38 The statutes of the new guild of the maîtres et marchands tapissiers, recorded in 1622 and registered by the Parlement in 1636, show that ‘tapisseries de toutes sortes comme de Flandres, Bruxelles’ were still imported into Paris - which had forced the state machinery to grant the Coomans and Van der Plancken families importation privileges as well.39 The statutes further highlight the pivotal role played by the maîtres et marchands tapissiers in the distribution of these tapestries: all pieces had to be assembled in the bureau of the guild where they were checked and sealed by the jurés before they could be marketed in Paris (article XXI). Moreover, the regulations stress the deans' prerogative to visit all production units, ‘quand bon leur semblera en tous lieux, magasins, hôtelleries, tant de cette ville que faubourgs de Paris, où ils sçauront qu'il se fera ou qu'il y aura tapisserie neuve’ (article XXII).

The latent or open hostility between the king and the guilds that resulted in conflicting ordinances and regulations was characteristic of the organisation of early-modern trades in Paris. It has been convincingly argued that French policy coordinated the needs of an elite group of entrepreneurs with the fiscal needs of the government, thereby disadvantaging small producers who rarely benefited from royal favours and hence were less likely to be loyal to the king.40 Moreover, conflicts between the Parisian guilds were normal practice as well and presumably explain why the statutes of the guild of the maîtres et marchands tapissiers were only registered by the Parlement after fourteen years.41 The political-legal market for Parisian luxury trades was thus characterised by inefficiencies, as litigations dragged on for years and quite often triggered new conflicts, since rulings tended to violate the prerogatives of a third party. Meanwhile, however,



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Fig. 5. St Marcel workshop (Paris), Soldiers on foot, from the Story of Artemisia, c. 1625. Wool and silk, 493 × 437 cm. Paris, Galerie Chevalier. Parisian mark in the lower corner left. (Photo Galerie Chevalier, Paris)


factions within the guilds, as well as individual maîtres with a very selective recall of decrees and regulations, zealously continued to serve their self-interest.

In summary, the maîtres et marchands tapissiers benefited from the institutional masquerade and the weak legislature, and seriously hampered the development of tapestry production in Paris as the continuous import of Flemish tapestries cast a shadow over the growth of the manufactories of the faubourg St Marcel, the faubourg St Germain and the Gobelins - in 1609, for example, the church masters of the Parisian Sainte-Croix-en-la-Cité preferred to buy a Flemish set for the church rather than ordering a series in Paris.42 As abolishing guilds was no option since they generated revenue, the French kings tacitly had to concede the marketing of foreign tapestries to the tapestry guild. Royal policy, however, aimed to monopolise tapestry production, and created and sustained a competitive disadvantage by granting the ‘royal’ entrepreneurs drastic financial

and organisational privileges that were immune to guild jurisdiction. While this strategy certainly was successful in Paris, these privileges also impacted on the organisation of the Brussels industry, as will now be discussed.

Pressing for privileges

Apart from the - stillborn - embargo on foreign tapestries, Henry IV had promised Coomans and Van der Plancken financial support in 1600-1601. Though the ‘Flemish’ workshops must have been operational by 1604 at the latest, as is shown by the ordinances issued by the Conseil de Commerce in 1604, the royal investment was delayed. On July 21, 1606 Henry IV had to inform his minister Maximilien de Béthune (1559-1641), duc de Sully, that the Flemish entrepreneurs were losing their patience: ‘J'ay eu plusieurs plainctes des srs. de Comans et de la Planche que depuis qu'ils sont en France et qu'ils y ont estably la manufactory des tapisseries, ils n'ont point esté secourus de moyens’.43

The Brussels authority and the central government of the Southern Netherlands were alarmed by the developments in France. To be sure, throughout the sixteenth century Flemish tapestry weavers and entrepreneurs had been migrating to numerous European countries, yet by 1600 the foreign workshops established by the émigrés were usually small-scale enterprises often supplying tapestries to the courts.44 The establishment of a large-scale privileged manufactory in Paris and the intended embargo on imports of tapestries, however, constituted a major threat to Flemish tapestry, and the Brussels city administration encouraged the industry. From 1603 onwards, the municipality subsidized the dyer Ferdinando de Vergara.45 On July 24, 1606 - three days after Henry IV complained about the fact that the Flemish entrepreneurs were still waiting for financial support - the Brussels authority granted the tapestry guild exemption from taxation on beer which the entrepreneurs were permitted to brew themselves.46 One year later, the exemption was fixed on 200 amen or 26,000 litres (about 320,000 glasses).47 This privilege allowed the Brussels producers to reduce the labour costs, for, together with bread and meat, beer was the most important source of nourishment, and the workmen and apprentices were paid partly in kind.48 In addition, the Brussels tapissiers managed to get support and privileges from the central authority.49 The Arch-

dukes Albert and Isabella not only commissioned a number of tapestry sets from the Brussels tapestry producers, they also issued a decree in August 1606 that had to support the ‘redressement de leur mestier’. They prohibited the export of all base materials used in tapestry production, and granted all tapestry entrepreneurs and weavers exemption from the compulsory burgerwacht (vigilante patrol) in order to guarantee continuity in production.50 They further urged the tapissiers to file additional requests for privileges with the local authority.

Henry IV responded to the dynamism in Brussels in January 1607 by granting Coomans and Van der Plancken lettres patentes that clearly listed all privileges and obligations, and thus presumably shed light on the 1600-1601 agreement51 The Flemish tapissiers were granted a monopoly on the production of low-warp tapestries in France for a period of twenty-five years. Financial support was considerable: accomodation was offered by the king; the Flemish émigrés were exempted from taxation; following the Brussels example they were allowed to establish an autonomous brewery; most raw materials imported from other countries were not taxed; and board and lodging of all Parisian trainees were paid by the king. The entrepreneurs further received an annuity of 1,500 livres and 100,000 livres starting capital. The embargo on the import of foreign tapestries was confirmed. After three years, the maîtres of the manufactory were allowed to open a boutique in Paris without presenting a masterpiece to the tapestry guild; the trainees had to work six years in the manufactory before they could establish a boutique in Paris. In exchange for these privileges, Coomans and Van der Plancken had to operate at least eighty looms; sixty of these looms had to be located in Paris.52 By promulgating the lettres patentes, Henry IV obviously confirmed his prior commitment, yet the lettres did not guarantee Coomans and Van der Plancken immediate and complete satisfaction. This is demonstrated by two letters written by Henry IV in March 1607 that urged Sully to pay the Flemish entrepreneurs as soon as possible 100,000 livres, ‘affin qu'ils continuent à travailler’.53

Some years later, in 1613, the nine major Brussels tapestry producers filed a request with the city administration for additional privileges.54 They not only stressed the economic importance of the industry, but also put pressure on the local authority by referring to the foreign competition. The tapissiers had experienced that ‘tzedert die voers. gunste die gemeyne werckgesellen ewat meer zyn gencourageert ende hen getal vermeerdert ende eenige van buyten dlants alhier overgecommen ende verkoesen henne

woonstede binnen deser stadt’.55 Still, it was clear, according to the applicants, that ‘verscheyden aftgeweken vuyt andere provincien ende coninckrycken wederomme alhier souden wederkeeren, behalven dat die van den ambachte mochten ewat meerder voirdeels genieten’.56 The tapissiers argued that additional privileges would quickly yield results, for the news would be ‘terstont verbreydt van d' een landt in d'ander’.57 The local authority granted the additional privileges: the tapestry producers could brew taxfree beer (maximum 200 amen) and they were exempted from taxation on 1 aam (130 litres) Rhine wine or 1 ponchoen French wine per year - a privilege that facilitated plying tapestry dealers with drink.58

Despite the privileges and the embargo on raw materials, Brussels workmen still emigrated and raw materials were still exported, as is shown by a request successfully filed with the Archdukes in 1617 by the Brussels tapestry entrepreneurs to reinforce prior stipulations.59 In 1626 the central authority further expanded the support by granting the tapestry guild an annuity of 3, 125 guilders.60 The exemptions from the vigilante patrol and the taxations on beer and wine were granted to the next generation of tapestry entrepreneurs in 1629.61 After 1629 these privileges were granted to individual tapissiers, dyers, tapestry designers and tapestry dealers. At least seventy-five tapestry entrepreneurs were exempted from taxation on beer and wine between 1613 and 1700.62 Tapestry entrepreneurs filing a request with the local authority often referred to the privileges enjoyed by émigrés and to the competition with France, particularly after the establishment of the royal manufactories of the Gobelins (1662), Beauvais (1664) and Aubusson (1665). In 1638 Peter van Sinay and Everard Leyniers stated that foreign rulers aimed to suppress Brussels tapestry production by luring workmen with ‘vele ende verscheyden vrijdicheden ende exemptien’.63 In 1675 Adriaen Parent stated that ‘hij niet alleenelijck de alderbeste werckmans (die hun in Vranckrijck hadden nedergeslaegen) binnen dese stadt heeft gebraght, maar oock vuijt vranckrijck heeft becommen drij vande schonste ende principaelste patroonen die alhier [...] worden opgemaeckt om daer naer in vranck. tot een notabel achterdeel van de fransche man-

ufacture gedebiteert te worden’.64 Six years later Guilliam Foulon was granted privileges by the Brussels authority. His involvement in Brussels tapestry production was of paramount importance, as the industry was ‘gedurich door de omliggende fransche steden [...] affgetrocken door de privilegien ende vrijdommen die aldaer vergunt worden’.65 In 1685 the tapissier Vincent Zegers was granted Brussels citizenship on favourable conditions as his father Jan had moved back from Paris to his hometown Brussels around 1650.66 One year later Jacob ‘A Castro’ van der Borcht was granted privileges. In his request he touched a tender spot, as he stated that he was working ‘voor Franse opdrachtgevers de welcke aen hem presenteren te doen geven twee hondert pistolen t'jaers voor gagie bij soo verre hij maer in vranckrijck en wilt commen woonen om aldaer sijn ampt te doen’.67

The dynamism in Brussels contrasts with the Parisian bureaucratic inertia. In 1655 Frans van der Plancken's son Raphael, who had established a workshop in the faubourg St Germain after a quarrel with the Coomans family around 1627, filed a complaint with the king, as the state machinery owed him a large sum.68 In his capacity as treasurer of the Bâitiments du Roi he had a credit of 33,000 livres; in his capacity as director of the tapestry manufactory he had a credit of 61, 500 livres, as the yearly support of 6, 150 livres had not been paid since 1645. De La Planche stated that he needed the money to prevent his workmen from moving back to the Southern Netherlands, ‘non plus que l'Archiduc ne les pourroit conserver à Bruxelles s'il ne leur donnoit leurs logements à ses despens’.

These data show that Henry IV's measures to lure and support Coomans and Van der Plancken triggered a similar policy in Brussels. The tapestry entrepreneurs appear to have been well aware of the foreign privileges. While Henry IV's policy certainly was successful in the short run, it may also have inspired and armed his main competitors. The question now arises if the Parisian production model also inspired the Brussels tapestry entrepreneurs, and vice versa.

Parisian and Brussels production models

The inventory recorded after the death of Frans van der Plancken in 1627 sheds light on the configuration of the Parisian St Marcel manufactory.69 The hôtel des Cannayes in the

rue Mouffetard was the nexus of the undertaking. It encompassed a brewery, a dye works, a storeroom and four tapestry workshops: the boutique d'or with thirteen low-warp looms; the boutique neuve with fifteen low-warp looms; a boutique with one low-warp loom; and finally the boutique de haulte lyce with one high-warp loom. Six boutiques in the surroundings of the hôtel that housed twenty-four looms in total also made part of the St Marcel manufactory.70 As on average three workmen manned a loom, about 140 to 180 waged labourers (skilled tapestry weavers and untrained helpers) were presumably employed by Coomans and Van der Plancken. While in the first decades of the seventeenth century the St Marcel manufactory was a dispersed factory, the relocation of the Flemish weavers in 1630 to the hôtel des Gobelins - the former dwellings of the wealthy Gobelins family who had been involved in the Parisian dyeing industry which was also located in the faubourg St Marcel - presumably concentrated all workshops in a single unit.71 The managerial advantages of the factory system are obvious: labour productivity and the quality of the goods can be supervised while the risk of the embezzlement of raw materials is suppressed.72 Raphael de La Planche's manufactory in the faubourg St Germain also was an integrated manufactory, as is demonstrated by the inventory recorded after the death of his wife in 1661.73 The production unit contained about sixty looms - the number required in the 1607 lettres patentes - and included a dye works. Legal documents suggest that a considerable number of the workmen, presumably about 140 in number, lived on the premises.74 Colbert's concentration of about 250 tapissiers and dyers (Fig. 6) on the Gobelins premises in 1662 therefore was a mere expansion of an exisiting configuration. The direct management by the state and the descending hierarchical structure of the manufactory, which was headed by Colbert, supervised by Le Brun and run by a limited number of tapestry entrepreneurs and one dyer, however, were unprecedented in Parisian tapestry production.75 All Gobelins employees had to work on the premises, so that ‘Monsieur Le Brun puisse voir leurs ouvrages à tous momens, qu'il les puisse corriger, et qu'il voye qu'ils avancent, et s'ils ne perdent point leur temps’.76 The close affiliation or even identification of the Gobelins with the state, however, led to a temporary closure of the manufactory between 1694 and 1699 when France's economic situation forced the Treasury to shut down the luxury industries.77



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Fig. 6. ‘Teinture des Gobelins’, from the Encyclopedic, 1765.


Though the large-scale privileged manufactories of the faubourg St Marcel, the faubourg St Germain, and the Gobelins obviously dominated Parisian tapestry production, some small-scale production units were active in the French capital as well. Around 1650 Pierre Damour, who presumably was trained in the Reims tapestry workshop, produced at least one tapestry set in Paris.78 In addition, some tapissiers had a small boutique; unpublished documents show that they restored tapestries, and they might have been involved in production as well.79 Around 1690 Jean-Baptiste Hinart, former director of the Beauvais manufactory (1678-1683), ran a workshop in the rue des Bons-Enfants that counted twelve looms.80 At the end of the seventeenth century Jan II Jans (1644- 1723), one of the Gobelins entrepreneurs, directed a small workshop in the ‘rue Mouffetard où pend pour enseigne le Grand Louis'; in the beginning of the eighteenth century, this workshop seems to have been run by the Gobelins tapissier Gilles Bacor (d. 1714).81 The closure of the Gobelins between 1694 and 1699 generated a labour force

that was employed by a number of tapestry entrepreneurs. First, at least some of the managers of the Gobelins workshops continued to work at ‘leurs dépens’, as is demonstrated by both published and unpublished documents.82 In addition, Philippe Béhagle (1641-1705), director of the Beauvais manufactory (1684-1705), established a workshop in Paris ‘avec les meilleurs ouvriers des Gobelins’ in the last years of the seventeenth century.83 Thirdly, the painter Claude Tessier opened a new workshop in the faubourg St Antoine in 1695; three of his relatives had worked in the Gobelins.84 Finally, a second workshop located in the faubourg St Antoine, which was closed prior to 1703, is likely to have been established between 1694 and 1699.85 In summary, large-scale integrated manufactories dominated tapestry production in Paris, yet small private initiatives seem to have lingered on throughout the seventeenth century and promptly surfaced and expanded when the royal logistics temporarily disappeared.

Seventeenth-century Brussels tapestry workshops were organised on a small scale compared to the Parisian manufactories, although the 1451 statutes had created a wide scope for entrepreneurs to establish a large-scale manufactory as there were quotas on neither looms nor output. The 1613 request filed with the local authority by the nine major Brussels tapestry producers show that they employed on average sixty to seventy workmen and twenty to twenty-two looms.86 The requests for privileges filed with the municipality by individual tapissiers between 1639 and 1700 demonstrate that the workshops then counted about eight to ten looms.87 Around 1705 the average number of looms employed by the nine most important Brussels tapestry entrepreneurs was six.88 The production capacity of the major tapissiers, however, was not limited to the looms they housed. Documents make clear that the Brussels tapestry entrepreneurs frequently subcontracted to minor masters. In his 1681 application for privileges Jan-Frans van den Hecke (c.1640-c.1705) stated that he ran a workshop that counted eight looms and that he also directed thirteen looms operated by seven other tapissiers.89 Moreover, a number of major Brussels tapestry producers, such as Jan van Leefdael (1603-1668), Willem van Leefdael (1632-1688), Gerard van der Strecken (c.1615-1677) and Gerard Peemans (c. 1645-1725) clustered together in networks and partnerships. So, while the level of integration characterising the factories of St Marcel, St Germain and the Gobelins was not paralleled in Brussels, Brussels tapestry workshops have to be regarded as components of more extensive productive networks rather than isolated units. It may be assumed that at the height of their activity cartels such as the Van Leefdael/Van der

Strecken/Peemans group ran a dispersed manufactory that may have counted up to fifty looms and thus had an output that is comparable with the capacity of the Parisian pre-Gobelins manufactories.

Nonetheless, a single unit encompassing a dye works as well as a tapestry workshop did not exist in seventeenth-century Brussels - ‘è differente professione’, as nuncio Fabio di Lagonissa (1584-1642) reported in 1633.90 Evolutions in the Brussels dyeing industry, however, paved the way for a large-scale integrated manufactory in Brussels. The requests for privileges filed with the local authority by Peter I Huybrechts (d. in/by 1657) in 1636 and Nicolaas Leyniers (1610-1658) in 1642 show that production specialization had occurred in the Brussels dye works: Huybrechts produced for the drapers, Leyniers for the tapestry entrepreneurs.91 Moreover, the Leyniers' application further shows that prior to his involvement in the dyeing industry, Leyniers had been a tapissier.92 As Nicolaas' brother Everard III (1597-1680) ran an important tapestry workshop, while his cousin Daniël II Leyniers (1618-1688) was a tapestry designer, around 1640-1650 the Leyniers family was at the hub of tapestry production.93 Despite this infiltration into the various branches of the sector, there is no archival material suggesting that the Leyniers adopted a centralisation policy or pursued a monopolistic strategy.

Nicolaas' son Gaspar I Leyniers (1634-1703) was also registered as a master dyer and a master tapissier. While his cousin Jan II Leyniers (1630-1686) continued the Leyniers tapestry workshop (Fig. 7), Gaspar Leyniers steadily expanded the Leyniers dye works (Fig. 8). In 1672 he successfully filed an application with Juan Domingo de Haro y Guzman, Count of Monterey (1649-1716), governor-general of the Spanish Netherlands (1670-1675), to be allowed to put the count's coat of arms and the inscription ‘Teinturier pour la Fabrique de Tapisserie de son Excellence’ on the façade of his dye works. This demand may have been inspired by the French examples of the manufactories in Paris, Beauvais and Aubusson where the royal coat of arms and a similar inscription could be seen at the entrance.94 Moreover, Gaspar Leyniers seems to have toyed with the idea of establishing an integrated manufactory as he bought nine bomen (trunks) that could be converted into looms at the sale of the belongings of the late François I



illustratie
Fig. 7. Jan Leyniers (Brussels), The Death of Meleager, from the Story of Meleager, c. 1675. Wool and silk, 380 x 540 cm. Present location unknown.


van den Hecke (1595/96-1675) in 1 675.95 Yet instead of opening a tapestry workshop himself, Gaspar Leyniers subcontracted to other weavers in the 1680s and 1690s.96

Gaspar Leyniers' son and successor Urbanus (1674-1747), on the other hand, put his multiple guild membership to use and established a manufactory encompassing both a dye works and a tapestry workshop in 1712.97 The daily production of the tapestry manufactory was put under the management of his partner Hendrik II Reydams (1650-1719); the daily production of the dye works was run by Peter Luppens (1687-1726). Between 1712 and 1725 Leyniers engaged Jan van Orley (1665-1735) and Augustin Coppens (1668-1740) as designers of no less than seven tapestry sets. Though the scale of the Brussels integrated manufactory never matched the French capacity as Leyniers employed about twenty-two looms, the Leyniers configuration obviously paralleled the production model of the seventeenth-century Parisian manufactories.



illustratie
Fig. 8. The tapissiers Jasper van der Bruggen, Leonard Wyns, Jacob van Zeunen, Andries van den Dries, Jan van Leefdael, Francois van den Hecke, Everard Leyniers, Koenraad van der Bruggen, Philippe Stryckwant, Gerard van der Strecken, Hendrik Reydams, and Joris Leemans support Gaspar Leyniers' application for privileges, 1671. Belgium, Private collection.


Concluding remarks

By establishing and funding a ‘Flemish’ large-scale manufactory in Paris and embargoing tapestry imports in 1601, Henry IV introduced a revolutionary reorganisation of tapestry production that on paper seemed to guarantee swift commercial success but in reality proved to be a lingering uphill battle. In Paris, Henry IV not only had to tune his wishes and demands to the expectations of the Flemish entrepreneurs, but also encountered stubborn resistance from the tapissiers-hautelissiers et sarrazinois and the tapissiers-courtepointiers. After their fusion, the Parisian tapissiers remained powerful agents in the development of the industry, as their prerogative to market foreign tapestries had a detrimental effect on the development of seventeenth-century Parisian tapestry production. The role played by the Parisian tapissiers was therefore diametrically

opposed to the role played by the Brussels tapissiers who aimed to balance production and marketing interests. In addition to the opposition Henry IV had to face in Paris, he unintentionally inspired the powers of persuasion of the Brussels tapissiers as well as the local and central authorities to develop a copycat policy on tapestry production. Privileges became forceful instruments in the intense competition between the two cities, and while the system was very dynamic and effective in Brussels, the practice in Paris seems to have been stifled by political inertia. The French preoccupation with centralism, which did not exclude the domestic system à la Luyken, on the other hand, did not appeal to the Brussels tapestry entrepreneurs. The apparent fragmentation of the Brussels industry, however, needs to be reassessed as the development of production networks and dispersed manufactories was a key element in the entrepreneurial strategy, and even paved the way for an integrated gobelins-style manufactory in the beginning of the eighteenth century.

Abstract - This article discusses the organisation of seventeenth-century tapestry production in Brussels and Paris by taking a comparative approach. It reveals the remarkable detrimental effect that the Parisian tapestry guild(s) had on the development of the royally privileged French tapestry manufactories, as the guild(s) safeguarded the prerogative to import tapestry. It contends that the privileges granted by the French King to uphold the Parisian industry triggered a copycat, yet more effective, policy in Brussels. Finally, it is argued that while the French preoccupation with centralism did not appeal to the Brussels tapissiers, they developed production networks that consolidated their competitive position.

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