De Gids. Jaargang 86

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Buitenlandsch overzicht.

26 Jan. 1922.

Briand vervangen door Poincaré. Het is beter zoo. De felle criticus zal ondervinden, dat ook hij tegen de kracht der feiten niets vermag.

Voorloopig zal de vervanging groote gevolgen hebben. Wat er van dit Genua worden zal, is geheel onzeker. Dat er een Genua komen moet, is daarentegen zekerder dan ooit.

Het moratorium aan Duitschland is slechts een korte opschorting; Duitschland is uitgenoodigd de oplossing voor te stellen van een probleem dat Duitschland alleen niet oplossen kàn, omdat het het probleem ook van de Geallieerden (en van Amerika) is.

De ziekte waaraan de wereldeconomie lijdt, is het verschil tusschen binnen- en buitenlandsche koopkracht van op de wereldmarkt gedeprecieerde betalingsmiddelen. Aan Duitschland is nu de eisch gesteld, dit verschil gewelddadig op te heffen, door zijn spoorwegvrachten, zijn briefporto's, zijn binnenlandsche kolenprijzen, zijn invoerrechten, zijn belastingen, met den wereldmarktprijs van zijn betaalmiddel in overeenstemming te brengen; de staatsbijslagen af te schaffen; de productiekosten der Duitsche nijverheid te brengen op wereldpeil. Met het gevolg dat de Duitscher niet meer zal kunnen reizen, geen brieven meer schrijven, zijn fabrieken niet meer aan den gang zal kunnen houden noch zijn huis verwarmen, niets meer uit het buitenland zal kunnen ontbieden, en dat den staat, om al deze euvelen te bestrijden, geen middel zou overblijven dan nieuwe inflatie met al de gevolgen van dien: nieuwe inflatieconjuncturen voor de

[p. 317]

Duitsche nijverheid, nieuwe werkeloosheidscrisissen in de landen met niet-gedeprecieerd betaalmiddel; ijdelheid van alle belastingsmaatregelen de Duitsche regeering door de Entente voorgeschreven, omdat alle verhooging, eer zij werken gaat, door koersdaling blijkt te zijn ingehaald.

Wat voor verschil - vraagt terecht de Berlijnsche correspondent der N.R. Ct. - maakt het inderdaad uit ten aanzien van het wereldprobleem, of den Duitschen staat b.v. verboden wordt voortaan milliarden papiermark uit te geven tot het drukken van den broodprijs? Hij zal morgen aan den dag diezelfde milliarden beschikbaar moeten hebben tot salarisverhooging.

Duitschland, met andere woorden, is genoodzaakt geworden een ontwerp aan te bieden van maatregelen waarin het niet gelooft. ‘Wij moeten’, adviseert Schücking, ‘de Geallieerden in kennis stellen van onze bezorgdheid, dat de nakoming van het afgedwongen voorstel een verdere daling van ons economisch leven zal veroorzaken, en verder gelaten afwachten, wat de tijd zal brengen’. Wirth en Rathenau er den bons voor te geven, komt, meent hij, niet in aanmerking.

Die beiden namelijk loopen ernstig gevaar. De termijn, hun door de Commissie van Herstel gelaten, was zóó kort, dat zij omtrent de belastingplannen, in het voorstel opgenomen, nauwelijks vooraf de partijen hebben kunnen raadplegen; zij moeten dit, zoo te zeggen, tegelijk met de afzending doen, en daarbij blijken alleen de sociaal-democraten ten volle bereid, eene heffing-in-eens te aanvaarden; Centrum, Beiersche Volkspartij en democraten geven de voorkeur aan een gedwongen leening van een milliard goudmark, die de eerste jaren geen, vervolgens geen hooger rente dan 2½% zal dragen, en de Duitsche Volkspartij vindt ook dit nog te kras¹⁾.

Voor de wereld in het gemeen is thans het al of niet aanblijven van Wirth en Rathenau vrij onverschillig. Anderen zullen het niet beter klaren; het vraagstuk zelf immers is zonder uitkomst, zoolang men deze van Duitsche legislatieve maatregelen alleen verwacht.

1) Zoowel Sociaal-Democraten als Duitsche Volkspartij hebben zich, blijkens nadere berichten, tot goedkeuring der gedwongen leening laten overhalen.

[p. 318]

Geen die het zegevierender aantoont dan Keynes in zijn nieuwe boek: A revision of the Treaty.¹⁾ Keynes, een onbekende in 1919, spreekt nu met verhoogd gezag: hoeveel voorspellingen uit zijn eerste boek zijn niet uitgekomen!

Dit tweede is, zoo mogelijk, nog minder rhetorisch dan het eerste. Het begint met, door een nuchter relaas van wat sedert het perfect-worden van het verdrag van Versailles is voorgevallen, ten toon te stellen, hoe dit verdrag zichzelf inderdaad reeds vernietigd heeft.

‘It is difficult to keep distinct the series of a dozen discussions between the Premiers of the Allied Powers which occupied the year from April 1920 to April 1921. The result of each Conference was generally abortive, but the total effect was cumulative; and by gradual stages the project of rivising the Treaty gained ground in every quarter. The Conferences furnish an extraordinary example of Mr. Lloyd George's methods. At each of them he pushed the French as far as he could, but not as far as he wanted; and then came home to acclaim the settlement provisionnally reached (and destined to be changed a month later) as an expression of complete accord between himself and his French colleague, as a nearly perfect embodiment of wisdom, and as a settlement which Germany would be well advised to accept as final, adding about every third time that, if she did not, he would support the invasion of her territory. As time went on, his reputation with the French was not improved; yet he steadily gained his object, - though this may be ascribed not to the superiority of the method as such, bat to facts being implacably on his side.’

19-26 April 1920: San Remo. - Nitti is tot revisie genegen, Millerand onbeweeglijk; Lloyd George bewaart het midden. ‘He concentrated his forces on arranging for a discussion face to face between the Supreme Council and the German Government, such a meeting, extraordinary to relate, having never yet been arranged, neither during the Peace Conference nor afterwards. Defeated in a proposal to invite German representatives to San Remo fortwirth, he succeeded in carrying a decision to summon them to visit Spa in the following

1) Londen, Macmillan 1922. - De voorrede is gedagteekend Dec. 1921.

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month “for the discussion of the practical application of the Reparation Clauses”....Mr. Lloyd George had had to concede to M. Millerand that the integrity of the Treaty should be maintained; but speaking in the House of Commons on his return home, he admitted a preference for a not “too literal” interpretation of it’.

Mei 1920: Hythe, ter voorbereiding van Spa. ‘A Committee of Experts was appointed to prepare for examination a scheme by which Germany should pay a certain minimum sum each year, supplemented by further sums in accordance with her capacity. No agreement was yet in sight as to actual figures. Meantime the Spa Conference was put off for a month’.

19-21 Juni 1920: Hythe-Boulogne¹⁾. ‘On this occasion the Allies got so far as definitely to agree on the principle of minimum annuities extensible in accordance with Germany's economic revival. Definite figures were even mentioned, namely, a period of 35 years and minimum annuities of 3 milliard gold marks. The Spa Conference was again put off into the next month’.

2-3 Juli 1920: Brussel. ‘The Premiers discussed the proportions in which the still hypothetical Reparation receipts were to be divided amongst the claimants.²⁾ No concrete scheme was adopted for Reparation itself’.

5-16 Juli 1920: Spa. ‘Although it occupied twelve days, no time was found for reaching the item on the agenda which it had been primarily summoned to discuss-namely, Reparations. Before this dangerous topic could be reached, urgent engagements recalled M. Millerand to Paris... The chief significance of the meeting³⁾ lay in the fact that then for the first time the responsible ministers and experts of Germany and the Allied States met face to face and used the methods of public conference and even private intimacy. The Spa

1) De eigenlijke conferentie te Boulogne (21 Juni) was voorafgegaan door een ‘informal week-end’ te Hythe (19 Juni).

2) 13 Aug. 1920 vervolgens te Spa als volgt vastgesteld: Frankrijk 52%, Engeland 22%, Italië 10%, België 8%, Japan, Portugal, Joegoslavië, Griekenland, Roemenië de rest.

3) Die, naar men zich herinnert, in hoofdzaak slechts eene regeling omtrent de levering van steenkool door Duitschland tot stand bracht.

[p. 320]

Conference produced no plan; but it was the outward sign of some progress under the surface’.

16-22 December 1920: Brussel. - Deze bijeenkomst van ‘deskundigen’ heeft een lange voorgeschiedenis gehad:

‘Whilst the Spa Conference made no attempt to discuss the general question of the Reparation settlement, it was again agreed that the latter should be tackled at an early date. But time passed by, and nothing happened... French official opinion steadily receded from the concessions, never fully admitted to the French public, which Mr. Lloyd George had extracted at Boulogne. They now preferred to let the machinery of the Reparation Commission run its appointed course. At last, however, on November 6, 1920, after much diplomatic correspondence, it was announced that once again the French and British Governments were in “complete accord”. A conference of experts, nominated by the Reparation Commission, was to sit with German experts and report; then a conference of ministers was to meet the German Government and report; with these two reports before it the Reparation Commission was to fix the amount of Germany's liability; and finally, the Allied Governments were to meet and “take decisions”...The first stage of this long procedure was in fact undertaken... The officials of the two sides met in an informal fashion and talked together like rational beings... The Brussels experts did not feel themselves free to consider an average payment less than that contemplated at Boulogne. They recommended to the Allied Governments, accordingly, (1) that during the five years from 1921 to 1926 Germany should pay an average annuity of 3 milliard gold marks, but that this average annuity should be so spread over the five years that less than this amount would be payable in the first two years and more in the last two years, the question of the amount of subsequent payments, after the expiry of five years, being postponed for the present; - (2) that a substantial part of this sum should be paid in the form of deliveries of material and not of cash ...’

24-30 Januari 1921, Parijs. - ‘Opinion in France was rising against the concessions contemplated. M. Leygues, it appeared, would be unable to carry in the Chambers the scheme discussed at Boulogne. Prolonged political intrigue

[p. 321]

ended in the succession of M. Briand to Premiership, with the extreme defenders of the literal integrity of the Treaty of Versailles, M. Poincaré, M. Tardieu, and M. Klotz, still in opposition. The projects of Boulogne and Brussels were thrown into the melting-pot, and another conference was summoned to meet at Paris at the end of January 1921.

It was at first doubtful whether the proceedings might not terminate wirth a breach between the British and the French points of view. Mr. Lloyd George was justifialbly incensed at having to surrender most of the ground which had seemed definitely gained,...but as the business proceded he became aware that M. Briand was a kindred spirit, and that, whatever nonsense he might talk in public, he was secretly quite sensible. A breach in the conversations might mean the fall of Briand and the entrance to office of the wild men, Poincaré and Tardieu ... Was it not better that Mr. Lloyd George and M. Briand should remain colleagues at the expense of a little nonsense in unison for a short time? This view of the situation prevailed, and an ultimatum was conveyed to Germany ...’.

Men herinnert zich den inhoud daarvan. De eerste twee jaar zou Duitschland 2, de volgende drie jaar 3, de daaropvolgende drie jaar 4, de daaropvolgende drie jaar 5, de daaropvolgende een-en-dertig jaar 6 milliard goudmark 's jaars betalen, en daarenboven ieder jaar 12% van de waarde van den Duitschen uitvoer. ‘The Paris Decisions, coming as they did after the discussions of Boulogne and Brussels, were not meant seriously, and were simply another movement in the game, to give M. Briand a breathing space. I wonder if there has ever been anything quite like it - best diagnosed perhaps as a consequence of the portentous development of “propaganda”. The monster had escaped from the control of its authors, and the extraordinary situation was produced in which the most powerful statesmen in the world were compelled by forces, which they could not evade, to meet together day after day to discuss detailed variations of what they knew to be impossible.

Mr. Lloyd George succesfully took care, however, that the bark should have no immediate bite behind it. The consideration of effective penalties was postponed, and the Ger-

[p. 322]

mans were invited to attend in London in a month's time to convey their answer by word of mouth’.

1-7 Maart 1921, Londen: ‘Instead of stating in plain language what Germany thought she could perform, Dr. Simons started from the figures of the Paris Decisions and then proceeded by transparent and futile juggling to reduce them to a quite different figure... The actual substance of this proposal was not umreasonable and probably as good as the Allies will ultimately secure. But the figures were far below even those of the Brussels experts, and the mode of putting it forward naturally provoked prejudice. It was summarily rejected ...’; waarop een ultimatum: indien Duitschland niet vóór 7 Maart de Parijsche cijfers aanneemt ‘or submits proposals which would be in other ways an equally satisfactory discharge of her obligations’, worden Duisburg, Ruhrort, Dusseldorp bezet en de Rijn door een tolgrens van Duitschland afgesloten. - 7 Maart protest van Simons tegen deze sancties: ‘Germany could not be technically in default in respect of Reparation until the Reparation Commission had made the pronouncement due from them on May 1¹⁾... The arguments as to the illegality of the Sanctions were indisputable, and Mr. Lloyd George made no attempt to answer them. He announced that the Sanctions would be put into operation immediately... The economic penalties, whether they were legal or not, were so obviously ineffective for the purpose of collecting money, that they can hardly have been intended for that purpose, and were rather designed to frighten Germany into putting her name to what she could not, and did not intend to perform, by threatening a serious step in the direction of the policy, openly advocated in certain French quarters, of permanently detaching the Rhine provinces from the German Commonwealth. The grave feature of the Conference of London lay partly in Great Britain's lending herself to a furtherance of this policy, and partly in contempt for the due form and processes of law’.

29 April-5 Mei 1921, Londen. - Duitschland had een nieuw voorstel uitgewerkt (50% beter dan het vorige, schat

1) Datum vóór welken de Commissie aan Duitschland het door haar vastgestelde bedrag der vordering mede te deelen heeft, die het vervolgens in 30 jaar moet afbetalen (art. 233 vredesverdrag).

[p. 323]

Keynes het), en trachtte dit ingang te doen vinden door bemiddeling der Vereenigde Staten. ‘The United States Government, having first ascertained privately that this offer would not be acceptable to the Allies, refrained from its formal transmission’. Onderwijl maakt, 27 April 1921, de Commissie van Herstel Duitschland het totaal bedrag van zijn verplichtingen onder de bepalingen van het tractaat van Versailles bekend: 132 milliard goudmark. ‘Allied Finance Ministers had foreshadowed 300 milliard gold marks; at the time of the Decisions of Paris, responsible opinion expected 160-200 milliards’. (Doumer sprak toen nog van 240; Keynes zelf was niet weinig doorgehaald wegens het bedrag becijferd in zijn eerste boek (137 milliard)). ‘It now turned out that the Decisions of Paris, which had been represented as a material amelioration of the Treaty which Germany was ungrateful not to accept, were no such thing; and that Germany was at that moment suffering from an invasion of her territory for a refusal to subscribe to terms which were severer in some respects than the Treaty itself....

Under the Treaty it was for the Reparation Commission to propose a scheme. In these circumstances the Allies met once more in London in the closing days of April 1921. The scheme there concerted was really the work of the Supreme Council, but the forms of the Treaty were preserved, and the Reparation Commission were summoned from Paris to adopt and promulgate as their own the decree of the Supreme Council ...

M. Briand had found it necessary to placate his Chamber by announcing that he intended to occupy the Ruhr on May 1...There was every reason for anxiety. Mr. Lloyd George and M. Briand had walked hand-in-hand to the edge of a precipice; M. Briand had praised the beauties of the prospect below and the exhilarating sensations of a descent. Mr. Lloyd George, having indulged to the full his habitual morbid taste for looking over, would certainly end in drawing back, explaining at the same time how much he sympathised with M. Briand's standpoint. But would M. Briand? ....

Considering all the circumstances, including the past commitments of the principals, the result was, on the whole, a victory for good sense... The new proposals, concerted at

[p. 324]

this Conference¹⁾ were, whether they were practicable or not in execution, a lawful development of the Treaty... The Ultimatum made no demand on Germany to which she was not already committed by her signature of the Treaty... I hoped, at the time, that Germany would accept the notification of the Allies and do her best to obey it, trusting that the whole world is not unreasonable and unjust, whatever the newspapers may say; that Time is a healer and an illuminator; and that we had still to wait a little before Europe and the United States could accomplish in wisdom and mercy the economic settlement of the war’.

Zóó heeft Wirth toen mede durven hopen, althans er naar moeten handelen.

De bepalingen van Londen zijn dan uitgevoerd met het gevolg dat thans ieder kent.

Hoe kan inderdaad Duitschland aan deze bepalingen voldoen? Door zijn uitvoer?

In 1920 heeft die 5 milliard goudmark bedragen (in 1921 minder); daartegenover stond een invoer van 5.4 milliard. ‘The bulk of Germany's imports are necessary either to her industries or to the food supply of the country. It is therefore certain that with exports of (say) 6 milliards she could not cut her imports so low as to have the surplus of 3½ milliards, which would be necessary to meet her Reparation liabilities. If, however, her exports were to rise to 10 milliards, her Reparation liabilities would become 4.6 milliards. Germany, to meet her liabilities, must therefore raise the gold-value of her exports to double what they were in 1920 and 1921 without increasing her imports at all.

I do not say that this is impossible, given time and an overwhelming motive, and with active assistance by the Allies to Germany's export industries; but does any one think it practicable or likely in the actual circumstances of the case? And if Germany succeeded, would not this vast expansion of exports, unbalanced by imports, be considered by our manufacturers to be her crowning crime? That this should be the

1) 2 milliard goudmark per jaar, benevens 26% der waarde van den uitvoer.

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case even under the London Settlement of 1921 is a measure of the ludicrous folly of the figures given out in the General Election of 1918, which were six times as high again’ (men verwachtte toen in Engeland, of zeide te verwachten, dat Duitschland een annuiteit van 28.6 milliard goudmark zou kunnen betalen).

Uit belastingen dus moet de som worden opgebracht? ‘Whilst the liability is fixed in terms of gold marks, the revenue is collected in terms of paper marks.... In the long run, all values in Germany, including the yield of taxation, will tend to adjust themselves to an appreciation or depreciation in the value of the paper mark outside Germany. But the process may be a very slow one, and, over the period covered by a year's budget, unanticipated fluctuations in the ratio of the gold to the paper mark may upset entirely the financial arrangements of the German Treasury.’ Reeds bij eene verhouding van goud tot papier van 1: 20 (men weet dat het thans 1: 45 is geworden) is een annuïteit van 3½ milliard goudmark aan 70 milliard papiermark gelijk; stijgt, bij een uitvoer van 10 milliard goudmark, de annuïteit tot 4½ milliard, dan zouden 90 milliard papiermark zijn op te brengen. Nu wijst de nog loopende Duitsche begrooting (1 April 1921-31 Maart 1922), buiten de uitgaven krachtens het vredesverdrag, 93½ milliard papiermark uitgaven aan, waartegenover 59 milliard inkomsten staan. ‘Thus the present Reparation demand would by itself absorb more than the whole of the existing revenue. Doubtless expenditure can be cut down, and revenue somewhat increased. But the Budget will not cover even the lower scale of the Reparation payments¹⁾ unless expenditure is halved and revenue doubled...’ (Dit alles, als de mark weder tot... drie cent wil rijzen)²⁾.

1) De annuïteit van 3½ milliard (bij een uitvoer van 5 milliard).

2) (Noot bij de correctie:) De begrooting voor 1922-'23, die heden (28 Jan.) den Rijksdag bereikte, schroeft, bij eene verhouding van goud tot papier als 1: 45, de gewone inkomsten tot 103 milliard op en heeft de gewone uitgaven tot 85 milliard beperkt, zoodat 18 milliard beschikbaar komen voor de Reparatie-begrooting. Doch thans deze Reparatie-begrooting zelve (waarbij geen rekening is gehouden met het te Cannes voorloopig verleende moratorium, doch die de volle bedragen omvat, welke ver- schuldigd zijn krachtens het verdrag van Versailles en het ultimatum van Londen). Zij luidt in uitgaaf 187½ milliard, waarvan 18 milliard door inkomsten gedekt zijn (zie boven), zoodat in een tekort van 169½ milliard papiermark blijft te voorzien. Eene gedwongen leening van 45 milliard papiermark is het uiterste dat Wirth daareven van de partijen wist los te krijgen; - een buitenland dat meer dan deze en de bovengenoemde 18 milliard verlangt, zal dus moeten bewerken dat eerst over de 100 milliard papiermark aan Duitschland worde voorgeschoten. ‘Nous pataugeons dans l'absurde’, heet dit (meen ik) op zijn Fransch.

[p. 326]

‘Payment takes on a different aspect when, instead of being expressed in terms of milliards and as a liability of the transitory abstraction, it is translated into a demand for a definite sum from a specific individual. This stage is not yet reached, and until it is reached the full intrinsic difficulty will not be felt. For at this stage the struggle ceases to be primarily one between the Allies and the German Government and becomes a struggle between different sections and classes of Germans. The struggle will be bitter and violent, for it will present itself to each of the contesting interests as an affair of life and death... Conceptions of the end and nature of Society will be ranged in conflict. A Government which makes a serious attempt to cover its liabilities will inevitably fall from power’.

Zeventig milliard papiermark wel zeggen 1170 mark per ingezetene: man, vrouw of kind. De Rijks- en locale belastingen voor binnenlandsche doeleinden vorderen 1000 mark per hoofd; tezamen maakt dit 2170 van de 5000 mark uit waarop Keynes het inkomen per hoofd meent te mogen stellen (de Duitsche schattingen varieeren tusschen 2500 en 6500 mark). Bij een annuïteit van 3½ milliard goudmark moet dus 43% van het inkomen worden geconfisceerd; mocht de uitvoer tot 10 milliard en het inkomen tot 6000 mark stijgen, dan 42%. ‘If Germany was given a respite, her income and with it her capacity would increase; but under her present burdens, which render saving impossible, a degradation of standards is more likely..... For these reasons I conclude that the settlement of Londen can be no more permanent than its predecessors.’

Het verdrag dat wegens economische bezwaren onmogelijk blijkt uit te voeren, staat ook zedelijk veroordeeld.

[p. 327]

Keynes somt aldus nog eens op wat hij reeds in zijn vorige boek heeft trachten te bewijzen:

(1) That the claims against Germany which the Allies were contemplating were impossible of payment; (2) that the economic solidarity of Europe was so close that the attempt to force these claims might ruin every one; (3) that the money cost of the damage done by the enemy in France and Belgium had been exaggerated; (4) that the inclusion of pensions and allowances in our claims was a breach of faith; and (5) that our legitimate claim against Germany was within her capacity to pay.

‘Whilst time is so dealing with (1) and (2) that very few people now dispute them, the amount of our legitimate claim against Germany has not been brought into so sharp a focus by the pressure of events. Yet if my contention about this can be substantiated, the world will find it easier to arrange a practical settlement.... I still urge on France that her cause may be served by accuracy and the avoidance of overstatement.’

Frankrijk heeft, afgescheiden van de pensioenen, zijn eisch tot vergoeding, in April 1921 bij de Commissie van Herstel ingediend, op 127 milliard francs papier bepaald, een bedrag dat toen is gelijkgesteld met nagenoeg 58 milliard goudmark. In dezelfde maand April 1921 verklaarde Briand in den Senaat:

dat de bevolking der vernielde gebieden toen 4.100.000 bedroeg, tegen 4.700.000 in 1914;

dat 95% der akkers weder in orde gebracht waren en op 90% weder producten waren geteeld;

dat 132.000 nieuwe woningen waren gebouwd (293.700 waren in den oorlog geheel vernield);

dat van 296.500 woningen, in den oorlog gedeeltelijk vernield, er 281.000 weder hersteld waren;

dat de helft der fabrieken weder werkte;

dat de 2404 K.M. vernielde spoorweg geheel hersteld waren.

Neemt men nu aan dat de 296.500 gedeeltelijk vernielde woningen ieder voor de helft vernield zijn geweest, dan kan men deze categorie geheel uitschakelen, mits men het getal geheel vernielde woningen op 442.000 berekent. Frankrijk heeft daar bijna 37 milliard francs voor in rekening gebracht. Dit loopt naar de 90.000 francs per huis.

[p. 328]

‘This is a claim for what were chiefly peasants' and miners' cottages and the tenements of small country towns. M. Tardieu has quoted M. Loucheur as saying that the houses in the Lens-Courrières district were worth 5000 francs a-piece before the war, but would cost 15.000 francs to rebuild after de war, which sounds not at all unreasonable... Even if we take the cost in francs at five times the pre-war figure, the claim lodged by the French Government is stil three and a half times the truth. I fancy that the discrepancy may be partly explained by the inclusion of indirect damages, namely, for loss of rent - perte de loyer. But I do not think that such claims are admissible under the Treaty...

The largest claim of all is for “industrial damages” (namelijk bijna 39 milliard francs, of één milliard zestig millioen pond sterling. De waarde der gezamenlijke kolenmijnen van Groot-Brittanje, die vijftien maal zooveel produceerden als de in den oorlog vernielde Fransche, werd vóór den oorlog op £ 130.000.000 begroot; het schijnt dus wèl hoog, de kosten van herstel dier vernielde Fransche mijnen nà den oorlog op £ 80.000.000 te berekenen. Maar al geeft men dit cijfer toe, dan is er nog bijna een milliard pond sterling te verantwoorden.) “The great textile industries of Lille and Roubaix were robbed of their raw material, but their plant was not seriously injured, as is shown by the fact that in 1920 the woollen industry of these districts was already employing 93.8 per cent and the cotton industry 78.8 per cent of their pre-war personnel. At Tourcoing 55 factories out of 57 were in operation, and at Roubaix 46 out of 48”. (Cijfers van.... Tardieu!)

Altogether 11.500 industrial establishments are said to have been interfered with, but this includes every village workshop, and about three-quarters of them employed less than 20 persons. Half of them were at work again by the spring of 1921. What is the average claim made on their behalf? Deducting the coal mines and dividing the total claims by 11.500, we reach an average figure of £8500. The exaggeration seems prima facie on as high a scale as in the case of houses...’

Op dergelijke wijze wordt betoogd, dat ook de Belgische rekening niet klopt.

[p. 329]

‘The claim, actually submitted by Belgium, for property, shipping, civilians and prisoners (that is to say, the aggregate claim apart from pensions and allowances), amounted to 34.254 million Belgian francs. Inasmuch as the Belgian Ministry of Finance, in an official survey published in 1913, estimate the entire wealth of the country at 29.525 million Belgian francs, it is evident that, even allowing for the diminished value of the Belgian franc, this claim is very grossly excessive....’

Keynes staat in deze opvattingen niet alleen: de Commissie van Herstel moet ze voor een deel althans tot de hare hebben gemaakt. De gezamenlijke rekeningen, door de Geallieerden bij haar ingediend, beliepen 225 milliard goudmark (95 voor pensioenen, 130 voor de rest), waarvan door de Commissie slechts 132 milliard zijn erkend, na scherpen strijd (heeft Poincaré in de Revue des Deux Mondes van 15 Mei 1921 verklapt) tusschen de Engelsche en Fransche leden: ‘Sir John Bradbury voulait s'en tenir au chiffre de 104 milliards, et avait défendu la thèse du gouvernement britannique avec une habileté passionnée’.

‘The claims for pensions’, merkt Keynes op, ‘being capable of more or less exact calculation, can hardly have been subject to an initial error of anything approaching 42 percent. If, for example, they reduced the claim for pensions from 95 to 80 milliards, they must have reduced the other claims from 130 to 52 milliards, that is to say, by 60 per cent... The figure of 104 milliards, attributed by M. Poincaré to Sir John Bradbury, is probably the nearest we shall get to a strictly impartial assessment.... This total is exclusive of the sum due under the Treaty for the reimbursement of sums lent to Belgium by her Allies during the war... I take, therefore, as my final conclusion that the best available estimate of the sum due from Germany, under the strict letter of the Treaty of Versailles, is 110 milliard gold marks: 74 milliards for pensions and allowances, 30 milliards for direct damage to the property and persons of civilians, and 6 milliards for war debt incurred by Belgium.

This total is more than Germany can pay. But the claim exclusive of pensions and allowances may be within her capacity. The inclusion of a demand for pensions and allo-

[p. 330]

wances was the subject of a long struggle and a bitter controversy in Paris. I have argued that those were right who maintained that this demand was inconsistent with the terms on which Germany surrendered at the Armistice’ - in zijn vorige boek, meent hij. Een vriend schreef hem, na de verschijning daarvan:

‘The application of morals to international politics is more a thing to be desired than a thing which has been in operation. Also, when I am made a participant in crime along with many milions of other people, I more or less shrug my shoulders.’ Naar aanleiding hiervan merkt thans Keynes op:

‘There is some sense in this... International morality, interpreted as a crude legalism, might be very injurious to the world. It is at least as true of these vast-scale transactions, as of private affairs, that we judge wrongly if we do not take into account everything.... But whilst I see that nothing rare has happened and that men's motives are much as usual, I do still think that this particular act was an exceptionally mean one, made worse by hypocritical profession of moral purpose. And if for practical reasons we can agree to drop this claim, we shall make a settlement easier.’

Toen Wilson in zijn veertien punten melding had gemaakt van ‘restoration of invaded territory’, vulden de Geallieerden dit aldus aan¹⁾: ‘By it they understand that compensation will made by Germany for all damage done to the civilian population of the Alltes and to their property by the aggression of Germany by land, by sea, and from the air.’ - ‘The Allies,’ zegt Keynes, ‘rightly apprehended that, if they accepted the phrase as it stood, “restoration of invaded territory” might be limited to damage resulting from military aggression by land’. Geheel daarmee overeenkomstig was de uitleg die later ter conferentie de Amerikaansche delegatie aan de bepaling gaf: zij betrof ‘direct physical damage to property of non-military character and direct personal injury to civilians.’ - ‘I doubt’, vervolgt Keynes, ‘if any one would ever have challenged this interpretation if the British Prime Minister had not won a General Election by promises

1) Bij hun 5 Nov. 1918 door Lansing ter kennis van Duitschland gebrachte mededeeling (zie mijn Wereldgeschiedenis 1915-1919, II, 155).

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to extract from Germany more than this interpretation could justify.’ De Britsche delegatie begon zelfs met, ondanks de voorwaarden van den wapenstilstand, vergoeding der volle oorlogskosten te vragen. ‘It is a shameful memory that the British delegates never withdrew their full demands, to which they still adhered when, in March 1919, the question was taken out of their hands by the Supreme Council. The American Delegation cabled to the President, who was then at sea, for support in maintaining their position, to which he replied that the American Delegation should dissent, and if necessary dissent publicly, from a procedure which ‘is clearly inconsistent with what we deliberately led the enemy to expect and cannot now honourably alter simply because we have the power.’ Daarop veranderden Lloyd George en Clemenceau van batterij, en beweerden dat ‘damage done to the civilian population’ de militaire pensioenen en de vergoedingen aan gezinnen met een kostwinner te velde insloot. Wilson antwoordde ‘that financial loss resulting from the absence of a wage-earner did not cause any more ‘damage to the civilian population than did an equal financial loss involved in the payment of taxes to provide military equipment and like war costs.’ In fact, a reparation allowance or a pension was simply one of many general charges on the Exchequer arising out of the costs of the war. If such charges were to be admitted as civilian damage, it was a very short step back to the claim for the entire costs of the war, on the ground that these costs must fall on the taxpayer who, generally speaking, was a civilian....... The President's conscience, though very desirous by now to be converted (for he had on hand other controversies with his colleagues which interested him more than this one), remained unconvinced...... The final argument which overbore the last scruples of the President was contained in a Memorandum¹⁾ prepared by General Smuts on March 31, 1919. This argument was, that a soldier becomes a civilian after his discharge, and that, therefore, a wound, the effects of which persist after he has left the Army, is damage done to a civilian....... At this straw the President's concience clutched, and the matter was settled.

1) Gepubliceerd in het bekende boek van Baruch, bl. 29.

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‘It had been settled in the privacy of the Four. I will give the final scene in the words of Mr. Lamont, one of the American delegates¹⁾:

I well remember the day upon which President Wilson determined to support the inclusion of pensions in the Reparation Bill. Some of us were gathered in his library in the Place des Etats-Unis, having been summoned by him to discuss this particular question. We explained to him that we couldn't find a single lawyer in the American Delegation that would give an opinion in favour of including pensions. All the logic was against it. ‘Logic! logic!’ exclaimed the President, ‘I don't care a damn for logic. I am going to include pensions!’

‘Perhaps’, besluit Keynes dit hoofdstuk, ‘I was too near these things at the time, but I cannot “more or less shrug my shoulders”. Whether or not that is the appropriate gesture, I have set forth, for the inspection of Englishmen and our Allies, the moral basis on which two-thirds of our claims against Germany rest’.

Besluit van het boek:

‘In England, opinion has nearly completed its swing, and the Prime Minister is making ready to win a General Election on Forbidding Germany to Pay, Employment for Every one, and a Happier Europe for All. Why not, indeed? But this Faustus of ours shakes too quickly his kaleidoscope of halos and hell-fire, for me to depict the hues as they melt into one another. I shall do better to construct an independent solution, which is possible in the sense that nothing but a change in the popular will is necessary to achieve it, hoping to influence this will a little, but leaving it to those, whose business it is, to gauge the moment at which it will be safe to embroider such patterns on a political banner...

The actions of those in power have been wiser than their words. It is only a slight exaggeration to say that no parts of the Peace Treaties have been carried out, except those relating to frontiers and to disarmament. Many of the misfortunes which I predicted as attendant ou an execution of the Reparation Chapter have not occurred, because no serious attempt has been made to execute it. And, whilst

1) What really happened at Paris, p. 272.

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no one can predict with what particular sauce the makers of the Treaty will eat their words, there can no longer be any question of the actual enforcement of this Chapter.....

Two obstacles remain. The Treaty, though not executed, is not revised. And that part of organisation, which consists in currency regulation, public finance, and the foreign exchanges, remains nearly as bad as it ever was. In most European countries there is still no proper balance between the expenditure of the State and its income, so that inflation continues and the international values of their currencies are fluctuating and uncertain.’

Hij komt op zijn voorstel tot schrapping der inter-geallieerde schulden terug:

‘My suggestions are not novel. The now familiar project of the cancellation, in part or in their entirety, of the Reparation and Inter-allied Debts, is a large and unavoidable feature of them. But those who are not prepared to these measures must not pretend to a serious interest in the Reconstruction of Europe.’

Duitschland wil hij belast laten met 36 milliard goudmark: 30 voor het herstel, 6 voor de Belgische oorlogsschulden, waarvan echter maar 21 milliard behoeven te worden opgebracht: het aandeel van Frankrijk en dat van België; van deze schuld kan Duitschland jaarlijks 5% rente betalen en het moet ze in 30 jaar hebben afgedragen. Engeland vraagt niet meer dan één milliard in al, dat het ter beschikking stelt van Oostenrijk en van Polen, om hunne financiën in orde te brengen; Italië en de anderen vragen van Duitschland niets. De linker Rijnoever, niet langer bezet, blijft gedemilitariseerd, en Frankrijk en België worden door Engeland tegen schending dezer demilitarisatie gewaarborgd. Worden tegelijkertijd de inter-geallieerde schulden geschrapt, dan komen Frankrijk en Italië bij de nieuwe regeling boven die van Londen aanmerkelijk in het voordeel¹⁾; - op papier, moeten de Vereenigde Staten en Engeland er bij verliezen. Wat Engeland betreft, ‘on paper she would forgo £ 150.000.000 per annum, altogether. In actual fact, the prospects of securing more than a fraction of this amount are remote. Great

1) ‘Frenchmen, having fed to satiety on imaginary figures, are nearly ready, I think, to find a surprising flavour and picquancy in real ones...’

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Britain lives by commerce, and most Englishmen now need but little persuading that she will gain more in honour, prestige, and wealth by employing a prudent generosity to preserve the equilibrium of commerce and the well-being of Europe, than by attempting to exact a hateful and crushing tribute, whether from her victorious Allies or her defeated enemy... The average American, I fancy, would like to see the European nations approaching him with the cash in their hands, saying: “America, we owe to you our liberty and our life; here we bring what we can in grateful thanks, money not wrung by grievous taxation from the widow and orphan, but saved, the best fruits of victory, out of the abolition of armaments, militarism, Empire, and internal strife, made possible by the help you freely gave us.” And then the average American would reply: “I honour you for your integrity. It is wat I expected. But I did not enter the war for profit or to invest my money well. Return to your homes and use the resources I release to uplift the poor and the unfortunate.” And it would be an essential part of the little scene that his reply should come as a complete and overwhelming surprise.

Alas for the wickedness of the world! It is not in international affairs that we can secure the sentimental satisfactions which we all love.....

One cannot cast up a balance-sheet between incommensurables. But peace and amity might be won for Europe. And England is only asked (as I fancy she knows pretty well, by now, in her bones) to give up something which she will never get anyhow. The alternative is that we and the United States will be jockeyed out of our claims amidst a general international disgust’.

Iets van gelijke kracht, zaakkennis, zelfbedwang en geest, ter verdediging van de Fransche inzichten door een Franschman geschreven, is mij niet bekend geworden. Poincaré's regeeringsverklaring van nu kon ook drie jaar geleden door een Fransch premier opgesteld zijn, en dit veroordeelt haar. Ik weet wel dat Keynes niet Lloyd George is, maar wel, dat deze laatste te loevert van de gebeurtenissen weet te blijven, en dat de opscherping van het internationaal geweten,

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waarvoor gemeenschappelijke ellende zorgen gaat, onder die gebeurtenissen een belangrijke plaats zal innemen.

De lezing en overweging ook van dit Keynes' tweede boek, waarvan ik enkel eenige van de markantste plaatsen aanhaalde, zij den belangstellenden Nederlander met warmte aanbevolen.

28 Jan. 1922.

Hoe dik de muur van wantrouwen is, die Frankrijk het gezicht op de werkelijkheid beneemt, bewijst daareven weer de wijze, waarop de Temps de rede van Wirth in den Rijksdag bejegent. ‘Als wij op het stuk van den herbouw bereid zijn’, zeide daar Wirth, ‘de Fransche belangen te bevredigen, geschiedt dit, omdat wij hopen, dat Duitschland bevrijd zal worden van de vrees, die het tot nu toe heeft moeten voeden, aangaande de onveranderlijkheid zijner grenzen’. In verband met de uitlatingen, te Parijs aan den val van Briand voorafgegaan, beteekent dit klaarblijkelijk: vrees voor de afscheuring van den linker Rijnoever. De Temps daarentegen ziet het revanchespook en roept uit: ‘Welk een argument tegen ontwapening!’

Een argument voor de ontwapening geeft Harding daareven uit in zijne motiveering (tegenover den correspondent der Daily Mail) van Amerika's niet-opgaan naar Genua:

‘De uitgenoodigde landen, in het bijzonder Polen, Frankrijk, Rusland, zijn er niet in geslaagd, hun weermacht in een aanmerkelijken omvang te verminderen. Het op de been houden van legers voor staatsrechtelijke doeleinden is de oorzaak der circulatie van fabelachtige bedragen papieren geld. Ik ben verder van meening, dat een vlugge en redelijke regeling van de kwestie der Duitsche schadevergoeding volstrekt noodzakelijk is voor het economisch herstel van Europa, en dat, tot die is getroffen, het geen nut voor Amerika kan hebben, aan eenige conferentie deel te nemen.’

Heeft hij daarmede, in bewustheid, het scherpe zwaard getrokken, dat Wilson in de scheede liet? Het ware te hopen.

C.