Bijdragen en Mededelingen van het Historisch Genootschap. Deel 77

(1963)– [tijdschrift] Bijdragen en Mededeelingen van het Historisch Genootschap– rechtenstatus

Taxation and the Decline of Empires, an unfashionable Theme

Mijnheer de voorzitter,

Dames en Heren.

Allereerst wil ik U hartelijk dankzeggen voor Uw vriendelijke en vererende uitnodiging om hier te komen spreken. Deze uitnodiging heb ik gaarne geaccepteerd, want de roemruchte historie van Uw Genootschap is ook buiten de grenzen van Uw land bekend.

Zoals U weet, handelt mijn inleiding over: De invloed van de belastingheffing op de volkshuishouding, in het bijzonder de neergang van de Republiek der Nederlanden in de achttiende eeuw.

In het verleden heeft men bij de behandeling van de staatkundige historie deze belastingheffing gezien als een der belangrijkste oorzaken voor de neergang. In dynastieke regeringsvormen lag juist hier dikwijls het zwakke punt, dat tot de ondergang leidde.

De nieuwere historische school heeft ongetwijfeld haar aanpak van de economische geschiedenis aanzienlijk verbreed. Zij betrok factoren als demografie, wijzigingen in het maatschappelijk patroon, prijsbewegingen, conjunctuurschommelingen, enz. mede in haar beschouwingen.

Maar door deze verbreding is het element van de belastingheffing op het tweede plan geraakt. Ik hoop U vanmorgen aan te kunnen tonen, dat dit element onmisbaar is bij het verklaren van een economische ontwikkeling. Met name geldt dit bij onze beschouwingen van de Republiek in de achttiende eeuw.

Ik roep Uw clementie in voor het feit, dat ik hierbij voornamelijk uit Engelse bron zal putten, als ook voor mijn gebrekkige kennis van het Nederlands. Daarom zal ik mij voor mijn verdere betoog van mijn eigen taal bedienen.

During the past half century, the subjects and methods of historical enquiry have alike undergone radical change. Some branches of history e.g. pure constitutional history, are less popular than they were formerly. Such declining interests are offset by the newer branches of economic and sociological enquiry and explanation. A phenomenon which still retains in

full the fascination it exercised on the generations of Machiavelli or Gibbon is the rise and decline of the great civilisations of the past, as recent academic tourneys between Professor Geyl and Toynbee amply witness. Yet, even here, the methods of the 20th century historians differ markedly from those of their predecessors. The older, and in the broad sense, liberal school of historians was largely content to explain these phenomena in political terms - by the qualities, great or foolish, of those who were held to govern the destinies of nations, or by the moral strength or decadence of peoples. This allowed economic factors to operate mainly as a function of political wisdom or political folly. Wars, for example, brought great financial burdens in the shape of taxation, debt, debased currencies. These in turn obstructed or destroyed material progress. This line of argument logically placed taxation in the forefront of the explanation of national decline. In Samuel Dill's classic study of Roman Society in the Last Century of the West (1898), the burdens of taxation and the problems of the curiales are the central point in the explanation of material decline. A fine rhetorical chapter in vol. IV of the original Cambridge Modern History (1906) on Spanish decline in the 17th century centres on the alcabala and the millones, whose catastrophic effects are placed alongside the exploits of decadent kings with actresses, court brawls and intrigues, as the root cause of Spanish decadence. The volume on the coming of the French Revolution in the same series had only one economic chapter: it was on taxation and public finance, and its writing was, significantly, entrusted to an official in H.M. TreasuryGa naar voetnoot1. And generations of English students were brought up to interpret the collapse of the absolute monarchy in England in terms of ship money, to explain the American revolt by reference to ‘No Taxation without Representation’ and the Boston teaparty.

The coming of economic history as a separate branch of enquiry and the rise of so-called economic interpretation has changed all this. Historians, no longer content with older explanations, have re-written these chapters of history in terms of a growing variety of economic and social phenomena - demographic change, economic fluctuations, technological change, price movements, and the like. An influential re-

interpretation of the English Civil War hinges on the economic decline of the gentry. The Revolt of the American Colonies is seen as the result of the workings of the Old Colonial System, mixed with domestic social change. The decline of Spain is explained by Professor Hamilton as an effect of the influx of Spanish American silver and the resulting price rise in Spain. The new 18th century volume of the Cambridge Modern History, I notice, will contain several chapters on economic and social factors that helped to bring about the French Revolution. In all these revisions, little attention seems to be given to the subject of public finance and taxation. One reason for this swing of opinion is not far to seek. E.H. Carr has recently told us that before assessing the merits of any historical interpretation we must look at the historian himself, at his background, at his prejudices. There has indeed been a change in our attitude to taxation. In the world of democracy and the welfare state, taxation has come to be accepted as an unavoidable and necessary adjunct of welfare. It is no longer the grievance it was for liberal historians writing of an age of dynasticism or tyranny: it is at worst a nuisance. And great historical principles are not easily manufactured out of nuisances. An excellent survey of modern research on Spain recently published by a Cambridge colleague, dr. Elliot, mentions taxation only as one of many factorsGa naar voetnoot1. His conclusion remains that the root trouble lay with the habit of Spanish governments in consistently trying to take on tasks beyond their powers. In an earlier generation, I have the feeling he would have crystallised his reasoning into a critique of Spanish fiscal policy.

The question I want to examine is whether we have, in the reaction against the older view of the importance of government actions, gone too far. Did the conscious actions of governments, so often expressed in terms of fiscal policy, have more fundamental effects than we allow? In particular, how does the question look in terms of the history of the Dutch Republic and its so-called decline in the 18th century?

We are fortunate in having an authoritative survey of the classical and recent literature of the Dutch rise and decline provided by two eminent Dutch scholars in the Algemene Geschiedenis der Nederlanden. In volume VII (1954) dr. Van Dillen gives a masterly summary of the economy at its peak. In volume

VIII (1955) dr. De Vries provides the most comprehensive account so far of the 18th century decline, and this is expanded in his book De economische achteruitgang der Republiek in de achttiende eeuw.

The picture that emerges may be very briefly summarised as follows. By the mid-17th century, the Dutch staplemarket had come to be the directing centre of European trade. Within the economy great industries - textiles, shipbuilding, refining and finishing processes - had arisen employing technologies far in advance of those known elsewhere. Leiden, as an industrial town, had only one superior: Lyons. The Zaan was the greatest shipbuilding centre in the world. Yet by 1700, the strength of this famous system was being sapped by the emergent economic nationalism of other countries, England and France in particular, which set up tariffs and restrictive barriers like the Navigation Acts. Yet ‘decline’ can be exaggerated. It cannot be established with any certainty before 1730. Down to the 1790ies there was no long term quantitative decline of trade or shipping. Foreign investment and financial activities actually grew. Only for manufacturing industry was there positive and quantitative decline, even collapse. At Leiden, output was halved and unemployment widespread in the second half of the 18th century. The textile industries generally were in a poor way; so was shipbuilding. Pauperism was everywhere in evidence.

What were the reasons for this state of affairs? Did they lie in a psychological or moral change in the people, in a decline of energy and enterprise, or did they spring from a change in the material world context in which the Dutch economy perforce had to operate? Dr. Van Dillen has put the answer quite explicitly: decline, he says, was ‘...the consequence of international factors, of a structural change in the economic life of Europe’. This conclusion need not, I believe, be questioned. But it calls for further interpretation. This is, I believe, suggested in part by comments made by dr. Van Dillen and dr. De Vries. But I think they would agree that so far, the logic of these comments has not been fully explored. They apply with special force to the decline of industry, though I believe they also affected trade and shipping too. At the core of this problem lies the level of wages in the Republic, more especially in the larger towns. The competitive strength of Dutch industry, dr. Van Dillen has written, ‘was restricted above all by the relative

height of wages, caused partly through the high excise on food stuffs...’Ga naar voetnoot1.

Dr. De Vries has likewise referred to the frequent complaints of the cost of wages, especially in the province of Holland, the most industrialized area. This was clearly connected intimately with fiscal policy, which laid heavy burdens on food. Higher food prices meant higher wagesGa naar voetnoot2. Now it is not uncommon for employers to make this kind of complaint, and the case should not be accepted uncritically. But, as dr. De Vries goes on to show, the argument that wages were relatively high seems to be established. Cottonprinters' wages, for example, were about three times those paid in similar employments in Germany and Switzerland. Other historians have shown that even in 1690 it was asserted that Dutch wages were 16% higher than in EnglandGa naar voetnoot3.

The evidence of Leiden suggests that the level of wages in Holland had risen sharply during the first half of the 17th century, following a sharp rise in the cost of living. This must presumably have presented a problem to the exporting industries at a time when European price levels were beginning their long decline and when competition for markets, textiles especially, was sharpening everywhere. When the cost of living rose again between 1740 and 1795, wage levels followed suit - but not fully. Although the Leiden manufacturers kept wages down, they were apparently still too high to enable them to offer prices competitive with those of foreign rivals. Thus the Netherlands got the worst of both worlds; a grave social problem of widespread unemployment and poverty, combined with falling sales at home and overseasGa naar voetnoot4.

How were these problems related to the policies of governments? How far was it possible to have avoided or modified them? I should like at this point to refer to some evidence from contemporary 17th century English observers of the Dutch scene. They found, as you know, very little to comfort them when they surveyed the various advantages of commercial skill

and technology which seemed to give their Dutch rivals such a lead in the struggle for wealth and power. One spark of comfort they nevertheless almost all discerned. The Dutch, they declared, bore an almost unbelievable burden of taxation. Here is a striking passage from a letter written by George Downing, then English agent in the Hague, in January 1658/9. In many ways a repulsive character, Downing was a shrewd observer of economic matters. ‘....its strange to see (he writes) with what readyness this people doe consent to extrerordinary taxes, although their ordinary taxes be yett as great as they were dureinge the warr with Spaine, and indeed such as would make any man admire at, a barrell of ordinary beere payeinge 40 stivers excise, and 5 stivers for bringeing in, each stiver beinge more than an English penney, and every man payes the 6 penney of the rack rent of his lands, besides an infinity of other taxes, so that I have reckoned that a man cannot eate a dish of meat in an ordinaryGa naar voetnoot1 but that one way or another he shall pay 19 excises out of it. This is not more strange than true’Ga naar voetnoot2.

A similar comment occurs in the classic description of the Netherlands written a decade or more later by Sir William Temple. A fish dish eaten in Holland, he remarks, paid 30 excisesGa naar voetnoot3.

John Ray, who travelled through Holland in 1663, was a different kind of observer, a casual visitor. Later to be famous as a pioneer of scientific botany, he too was a shrewd and accurate observer. ‘All manner of victuals both meat and drink (he wrote) are very dear, not for the scarcity of such commodities, but partly by reason of the Great Excise and Impost wherewith they are charged...’Ga naar voetnoot4.

Such are a few of the stray comments made by visitors on the spot. They could be multiplied many times. The evidence about the nature and incidence of taxation in Holland was collected and printed in a different way by another late 17th

century English writer. Gregory King may justly claim to be the father of national income studies, and his survey of the income and expenditure of the different classes that composed English society is a mine of information for the economic and social historian. In recent years, his methods and conclusions have been subjected to searching tests by several modern economists and social scientists, notably Miss Phyllis Deane in Cambridge and Professor Glass at London. They have stood up to the trial very well. I doubt whether the figures I am about to quote can be regarded with the same confidence as those which refer simply to the English situation. They are nevertheless of great interest and should not, I think, be dismissed as wholly implausible. In 1696, King set out to estimate the relative strength of the French, English and Dutch economies in so far as the current war might affect them and its issue be in turn influenced. Holland, a country whose population he estimates at 2,2 millions, with a total national income of £ 17.7 millions or £ 8 a head, had spent £ 22 million on the war in seven years. Yet so great was her trade that she, alone of the three contestants, was richer than at the start of the war. The most striking statement in relation to our problem, however, is his estimated comparison of public expenditure and taxation between the three countries for 1695:

	Population	Annual Income per cap.	Public Revenue £ million	Taxes per cap.	Comsumption per cap.
England	5.450.000	£ 7.16.	6.5	£ 1.4.	£ 7. 3.
France	13.500.000	£ 5.18	17.5	£ 1.5.	£ 4.18.2.
Holland	2.240.000	£ 8. 2	6.9	£ 3.1.7.	£ 4.13.9.

If these figures were accurate, one would conclude that Holland, with a population less than half that of England, and perhaps one-sixth that of France, raised a public revenue larger than that of England and over a third that of France. The fictitious Dutchman-in-the-street, however, had less to spend on himself than his neighbours, because he was required to pay in taxes nearly three times what the average Frenchman or Englishman paidGa naar voetnoot1.

The figures quoted are not indisputable. They are the guesses of an intelligent and discerning statistician, accustomed to handling this kind of problem. I think they merit serious attention. At the very least, they emphasise the persistent, underlying problem of the Republic: the cost of defending not merely her territory but her peculiarly vulnerable economy, with its enormous trade routes stretching out over the oceans of the world. This in itself is enough to explain the weight of taxation falling on trade and industry. But of course the costs of defence were too great to be met by even extraordinary taxation alone. Like many other States before and since, the Republic had to fall back on the device of anticipating revenue, of living beyond her immediate means, in short of contracting a debt to her own citizens. To calculate the size of these evolving, growing debts, provincial and federal, is not easy. The territory called public finance is not well charted. Moreover, the technical problems of measurement are complex. We can, nevertheless, obtain some impressions. Temple suggests that it was Venice and Holland - both rich but small states - which inaugurated the era of professionalised warfare in modern Europe and thereby created the need for public debts. Ships, standing mercenary troops and frontier garrisons were beyond the pocket even of the Republic, with an annual revenue which he estimated at 120 million guilders or over £ 10 million. The Province of Holland alone had a debt which he calculates at over 65 million guilders. Paying 4% interest this meant an annual charge of over two and a half million guilders. The service on the debt was provided mainly from excise and customsGa naar voetnoot1.

It is both easier and more helpful to think in terms of interest charges rather than capital values. Thus, Temple thought the annual cost of the Republic's debt was another 13 million guilders. This is not difficult to reconcile with dr. Houtzager's calculation that Holland's debt alone in 1667 stood at 131 million guildersGa naar voetnoot2.

In 1728 the annual charges stood at over 13 million guilders. Between 1728 and 1750 the debt rose again by over 70 million

guilders and in that year expenditure exceeded income by nearly 3 million guilders.

Opinions differed, and may still differ, as to how far such debts were necessary, how far economies could have been made. But the fact remains that the system of state and federal debts meant that a growing block of permanent obligation was steadily built into the fabric of the Republic. Repudiation was unthinkable; total repayment impossible. Fortunately, interest rates were lower than elsewhere and falling. Nevertheless, the cost was a grievous burden on people, industry, shipping and trade. Indirect taxes were heavier than direct - a contrast with England, where direct taxation on land was, even in 1700, still the largest single source of revenue. There were many local variations. But at Leiden the salt tax was levied at a rate of 100% on value, beer at 60%, bread at 25%, meat 14%. Vinegar, sugar, cattle, fish, oil, tobacco, butter, paper - all these and many other articles paid their toll. Customs at the great ports were probably not yet unreasonable, but internal tolls, vehicle and canal dues were heavy.

Modern research has revealed that long before the Industrial Revolution, economic life was marked by fluctuations, sometimes violent and far-reaching in their social and economic consequences. As the room for manoevre lessened, the recurrent depressions in trade and the chronic malaise of industry (especially textiles) provoked complaints about the effect of taxation on production costs. As dr. De Vries has shown, the economy of the Republic did not suffer a uniform decline. Industry was hit harder than trade or agriculture. He has added that it was those industries whose product represented primarily the accumulation of labour value - what he has called arbeidsintensieve industries - that suffered most. Industries employing large aggregations of fixed capital - brewing, distilling, sugar boiling etc. - fared much better. I would go further than this. Even within the arbeidsintensieve industries, of which the outstanding example was the textile manufactures, it is possible to discern substantial differences. Take, for example, the Leiden cloth industries. I have pointed out elsewhereGa naar voetnoot1 that the fortunes of the Leiden industries and their English rivals followed quite different courses in the 17th and 18th centuries. At Leiden,

the cheaper worsted industries - baaien, saaien, fusteinen - declined rapidly in the later decades of the 17th century and thereafter. The much more expensive lakens survived better, and even grew down to 1700. In England, the most striking feature is the rise of the worsted manufacture. Invert, that is to say, the fortunes of Leiden and you have those of Norwich or Exeter. This was not accidental. The reasons were analysed by an anonymous writer as early as 1651. The price of an English cloth (he says) represents, to the extent of 75%, the labour it embodied - carding, spinning, dyeing, weaving, fulling and working. Wool only represented 25%. The labour cost only (this is his estimate) about half ‘what the Hollander pays, by reason of their high rate of Houses and Victuals, to which all Labourers' wages are proportioned’. But it was different with fine cloths. Here the Spanish wool cost three times as much as English wool. And a customer could be persuaded to pay 10% more on what he calls ‘the fancy of the Buyer’, which could not be done with cheap cloths.

The explanation sounds plausible: and it accords perfectly with the later evolution of the Dutch and English industries. It seems that as labour costs rose, the profit margins of the Leiden makers disappeared. Their products were no longer competitive. I need not labour the importance of this. At its peak the value of Leiden's output may have been 9 million guilders a year (or nearly half the value of England's total export trade). By 1700 it had fallen by a third or more. Its population and employment fell catastrophically. Now I do not want to suggest that high taxation and high wages are a deus ex machina that explains everything. Other factors were important. But if, for example, monetary factors, the high circulation of money, the strength of the guilder, or even the growth of economic nationalism elsewhere, had been the dominant cause of decline, one might have expected industries would have suffered more uniformly than they did. The selective character of industrial decline, and the special problems of these arbeidsintensieve industries, suggests strongly that labour costs were of fundamental importance.

Their effects were not, of course, limited to industry. The effects of high costs in shipbuilding must have been reflected in higher freight costs. Likewise seamen's wages, which affected shipping and fishing costs. Trade was therefore not immune. Docks, warehouses, weigh-houses, victualling stores all employ-

ed labour on a vast scale. Hence the costs of shipping, of buying, selling and transport would all be susceptible to the rising costs of labour.

The consciousness of the problem grew in the 18th century. The literature of protest and of proposed reformation, is familiar to us. I will only select and comment on three sources which underline in quite different ways the fundamental and intractable nature of the problem. The crisis of 1751 was temporary: but it provoked an important attempt to analyse the reasons for the Republic's economic problems. When the merchants presented their analysis to the Prince of Orange, they selected two broad sets of causes, one external, one internal. The first was the rise of economic nationalism throughout Europe. The second was ‘the oppressive taxes’ which had been imposed upon trade. As merchants they were naturally concerned more with those which affected them most directly i.e. customs, trade and transport dues. Their remedy - lower and more uniform duties - failed for a number of reasons. But a major reason was unquestionably the purely fiscal one. The opposition of the Admiralties was not merely obstructive: it reflected the difficulty of paying for what they had to consider the unavoidable expenses of State.

The nature of the State finances and the problems they posed were clearly set out in the sketch written by the statesman Van de Spiegel in 1782 which dr. De Vries has edited for usGa naar voetnoot1. This is a dispassionate view of the Republic's situation in a radically changing world. For more than a century and a quarter, Van de Spiegel explains, the Republic's debt had been increasing, and alongside it, the burden of taxes. Now the costs of war themselves - of ships, weapons, equipment - were all rising steeply. War, in fact, was a luxury the Netherlands could no longer afford. Hence an empirical, even opportunist view of diplomacy that contrasts with De la Court's statement of policy of the previous century. An Englishman living in 1962 can see the point. Realism itself suggested new and different answers in a world where great neighbours were becoming greater while Holland remained the same size. One sentence I will quote. The author is referring to the financing of war by borrowing. Wars are no longer fought (he says)

‘at the charge of the present generation, but at the charge of posterity’Ga naar voetnoot1.

Finally, a writer of very different kind. Luzac's Hollands Rijkdom is not a wholly reliable book. It is longwinded and repetitive. But it is full of shrewd insights. He was passionately concerned with the effect of food taxes on the economy, and especially with the auction of labour that results from higher wagesGa naar voetnoot2. But he connects the problem with another phenomenon that is once again being enquired into today. The demographic history of Holland, drs. Van der Woude wrote recently, ‘is still the great terra incognita of our national history’Ga naar voetnoot3. Van der Woude's own conclusions, and those of other scholars, notably dr. Simon Hart, suggest that the rise of population in Holland in the later 18th century - if indeed there was a rise at all - was insignificant compared with the spectacular rise which may be found in many other areas in EuropeGa naar voetnoot4.

In England, though the terrain is more explored, the problem of why the increase took place after 1760 remains obscure and controversial. In the last 30 years, much attention has again been devoted to studying the supposed relation between an expanding economy and the rise of the birth rate, or at least its maintenance at a high level. Luzac's comment on the social situation in the Netherlands acquires interest in the light of these studies. ‘The flight of skilled workpeople (he says) is one of the disadvantages which spring from the influence of taxes, because it is apparent that parents will not put their children to a task or craft where there is (as the saying goes) no dry bread to be earned; that small parishes fear to see marriages contracted; that thereby prostitution is encouraged; whence springs in turn the lack of suitable apprentices, from whom in time skilled artisans must be trained; and thus finally a lack of skilled hands to carry on work properly, while diligence and energy diminish and the lower orders of society are reduced to a kind of indifference, indolence and idleness..’Ga naar voetnoot5.

All this must of course be guess-work. But it does suggest the interesting possibility of a relationship between high

indirect taxation, a declining economy, and a falling birth rate.

As I see it, the situation might be summarised thus: in the 18th century, the increasing burden of State expenditure and of debt piled up on an economy that was stagnant or declining. This was a powerful force driving wages up and production down. From the point of view of social welfare, neither the growth of agriculture nor of finance and overseas investment afforded any adequate compensation for the decline of industry and the halting of trade. Let me advert for a moment to other countries, of which England is the best documented example, though France or Prussia could equally be quoted. Everywhere, 18th century economic writers were obsessed by the problems of employment, or rather, of under-employment and poverty. In the period immediately preceding the Industrial Revolution, a high proportion of the people - in England perhaps a third or more - were in a chronic condition of poverty. Hence the schemes for workhouses and compulsory or charitable industry which proliferatedGa naar voetnoot1. The Netherlands problem was unique only in its severity, and in the apparently insuperable problems that obstructed its solution. At the heart of the problem lay not only the structural changes in the world economy, but also the change and relative degeneration in the political situation of the Netherlands in Europe which placed on her people an impossible burden.

The phenomenon of decline has also a wider importance: we have heard in the last few years much about economic growth, and the stages by which such growth and evolution is said to proceed. In the discussion it often seems to be assumed that any nation that places its feet on the upward path of growth will inevitably reach the top, and stay thereGa naar voetnoot2. Maybe. The lessons of history can be misleading. But the case of Holland shows an example of a society and an economy that reached a high degree of maturity, only to falter, halt and in some respects decline for a century or more before reconstruction could begin. In the so-called Memoirs of De Witt, the

writer could use as his text the slogan Ab furore monarchorum libera nos, Domine. History was to show that though the Dutch nation could rid themselves of their own dynasts, they could not rid themselves of those of other nations. Against the Spaniard they conquered, only to fall victim in the end to the extravagant machtpolitiek of the Ancien Regime itself.

I conclude that we economic historians have in general been too anxious to pigeon-hole the problem of taxation and public finance, because it is thought to be irrelevant, difficult or perhaps just dismal. I believe we shall have to re-examine it. Indeed, there are already signs that this is happening. In a recent paper, Professor A.H.M. Jones of Cambridge has reinstated taxation as a real factor in the decline of the Roman EmpireGa naar voetnoot1. Professor Mousnier has pointed the way for a new approach in France and I believe others are following it upGa naar voetnoot2.

The history of the Dutch Republic, which contains the seeds of all modern public finance, should provide a fruitful source of enquiry into problems whose better understanding would illuminate many larger aspects of economic and social development.

De voorzitter dankt de spreker voor zijn bijzonder interessante voordracht. Hij twijfelt er niet aan, dat een levendige discussie zal bewijzen, dat het gehoor de uiteenzettingen van de spreker nauwlettend gevolgd heeft.

Prof. Van Winter vraagt enkele verduidelijkingen van de door de spreker gegeven vergelijkende cijfers betreffende het inkomen, de consumptie en de fiscale heffingen per hoofd in Engeland, Frankrijk en de Republiek. Het komt hem voor, dat de cijfers niet geheel kloppen.

Dr. Wilson geeft de gevraagde verduidelijkingen en voegt daaraan nog toe, dat de cijfers van King, waarvan hier sprake is, door spr. aanvankelijk, bij zijn eerste onderzoek, als betrouwbaar uitgangspunt zijn gebruikt. Maar bij verder doordringen in de materie bleek al spoedig, dat zij niet helemaal zo betrouwbaar waren als zij er uit zagen. De cijfers, die op

inkomen, consumptie en fiscale heffingen per hoofd in de Republiek betrekking hebben, laten de gedachte opkomen, dat de Nederlander meer moet hebben kunnen verteren dan hij deed. In Engeland en Frankrijk was dit anders. Betreffende dit probleem zijn er ook cijfers, die spr. nog niet vermeld heeft in zijn voordracht. Hij heeft als het ware een kaart in zijn mouw gehouden. Haalt men deze cijfers te voorschijn, dan kan men laten zien, dat de Engelsen en Fransen van hun kapitaal leven en de inwoners der Republiek van hun inkomen; daarbij kan men nog aantonen, dat de Nederlanders sparen. De bedoelde cijfers betreffen, evenals de eerder genoemde, de periode 1689-1696.

Dr. Joh. de Vries begint zijn opmerkingen met een dankwoord. Spr. is door de vroegere onderzoekingen van de redenaar geinspireerd tot zijn eigen onderzoek, waarbij hij meer stond aan de kant van dr. Wilson dan aan die van P.J. Blok, op wiens onderzoek de vroegere studie van dr. Wilson een reactie was. Ook dr. Wilsons recensie van sprekers dissertatie heeft hem veel ter overdenking geboden. Spr. geeft toe, dat de kwestie van de belastingheffing nog wel nader onderzoek verdient en nodig heeft. Door dr. Wilsons onderzoek is zij zelfs actueel geworden. Een belangrijke factor hierbij is de groei van het economisch nationalisme. De werking hiervan moet bestudeerd worden. Daarbij zal dan ook verband gelegd moeten worden met de handel, waaraan spr. in zijn proefschrift eveneens aandacht heeft geschonken. Hierbij treden o.m. naar voren de interne en de externe contractie van de handel. De interne contractie heeft concentratie op Amsterdam tengevolge; de externe contractie leidt tot een voorrang van de handel op meer nabij gelegen gebieden boven die op verderaf gelegen streken. Men richtte zich steeds meer op gebieden waar de meeste mogelijkheden lagen en beperkte zich daartoe. Deze ontwikkeling werd bevorderd door optreden van buitenlandse concurrenten. Maar spr. geeft toe, dat in dit gehele probleem ook de belastingheffing een rol gespeeld heeft. Met verder onderzoek ten deze stemt spr. geheel in.

Dr. Wilson zegt, dat ook hij veel geleerd heeft sinds hij zich voor het eerst met deze materie bezig hield. Hij zou thans niet gaarne meer alles uit zijn eerste studie onderschrijven, na kennis genomen te hebben van wat Van Dillen en De Vries hierover sindsdien publiceerden. Spr. herhaalt, dat de belastingheffing in dit probleem geen deus ex machina is, waarmede alles

verklaard kan worden. Er zijn ook andere factoren, die een rol gespeeld hebben in de economische achteruitgang der Republiek. Sprekers doel was allereerst om de belastingheffing wat meer op de voorgrond te brengen als factor in de achteruitgang in de industrie en nijverheid der Republiek. Hierbij speelt het verschil tussen arbeidsintensieve en andere nijverheidstakken een rol, waarop De Vries al heeft gewezen. Daarbij vormen de reële productiekosten een belangrijk element, over welks werking het laatste woord nog niet gezegd is.

Prof. Van Dillen is het met veel van wat dr. Wilson naar voren gebracht heeft wel eens; het moet zeer belangrijk genoemd worden om aan de belastingheffing aandacht te schenken. Maar mèt De Vries is spr. van mening, dat de fiscale zijde van het gehele probleem niet de belangrijkste is. Spr. wijst in dit verband op de door de inleider niet genoemde Haarlemse bleeknijverheid. Voorts meent spr. dat niet zozeer het verschil in lonen, als wel de toenemende concurrentie van andere landen de voor de Republiek minder gunstige gang van zaken heeft beïnvloed. Het Belgische en Duitse protectionisme is stellig een factor, die niet uit het oog mag worden verloren. Ook in Engeland treden krachten op, die de achteruitgang van de nijverheid in de Republiek in de hand werken. Tenslotte wijst spr. op het provinciaal verschil in accijnzen. In Friesland en Brabant bijv. waren die heffingen relatief laag.

Dr. Wilson herhaalt, dat het naastliggende vraagstuk, een onderdeel van het gehele probleem, voor hem is om vast te stellen in welke mate de fiscale heffingen de economische achteruitgang beïnvloed hebben. Het gaat hier ten dele om marginale berekeningen, die grotendeels nog gemaakt moeten worden: kostenberekeningen etc.

Drs. Van de Woude weet heel goed, dat de fiscale politiek in dit probleem niet als deus ex machina op kan treden, maar er is toch heel wat aan te voeren ter ondersteuning van het betoog van dr. Wilson, veel meer dan de vorige sprekers willen toegeven. Allereerst merkt spr. op, dat de Friese vrachtvaart in de 18e eeuw in betekenis toeneemt, o.m. omdat de kosten in Friesland lager zijn dan in Holland. Van dergelijke verschijnselen zouden er meer zijn aan te wijzen. Een ander punt is, dat de belastingdruk stijgt in de jaren 1680-1695. Berekent men indexcijfers, dan ziet men stijgingen van 65%. Ook de belasting op onroerend goed stijgt langzamerhand, de penning 1000 wordt tot de penning 50. Hetzelfde is met de verponding

het geval, omdat naast de ordinaris verponding ook ingevoerd wordt een extra-ordinaris verponding. Daarnaast worden na 1690 nog nieuwe belastingen geheven, niet alleen gewestelijke, maar ook stedelijke. Dit alles kan zeker tot bevestiging van dr. Wilsons mening strekken. Daarbij komt nog iets anders: de heffingen worden ook relatief hoger en zwaarder, want de prijzen en pachten dalen. Omstreeks 1730 is de huurwaarde 50% van de waarde, waarop oorspronkelijk de heffing werd vastgesteld. Men ziet dan ook in deze periode een uitverkoop van land en belegging in buitenlandse waarden. Daarbij komt de achteruitgang van de bevolkingscijfers. Ook die brengt een relatieve lastenverzwaring mede, die in de cijfers per hoofd uitdrukking zou vinden, zodra men deze materie nauwkeurig zou onderzoeken. Tenslotte vestigt spr. er de aandacht op, dat hier ook van belang is de wijze van belastingheffing. Men kent bij accijnzen bijv. de heffing naar waarde en de heffing naar hoeveelheid; beide geven een verschillende belastingdruk. Bij het nadere onderzoek zou men daarom ook het fiscale systeem in het buitenland moeten betrekken.

Dr. Wilson zegt, dat de discussie wel heeft aangetoond hoe complex het probleem is; allerlei factoren spelen een rol en de werking ervan moet zo nauwkeurig mogelijk afgewogen worden. Spr. houdt zich er van overtuigd, dat de fiscale zijde van dit vraagstuk zeker niet de minst belangrijke is.

De voorzitter dankt de inleider nogmaals voor zijn inspirerende voordracht. Om 12.55 uur schorst hij de vergadering voor een uur, teneinde de koffiemaaltijd te kunnen nuttigen.

Ten 2 ure heropent de voorzitter de vergadering en geeft het woord aan prof. dr. E.H. Kossmann (Londen) voor het houden van zijn voordracht over: België en Nederland, 1780-1830; enkele beschouwingen en vragen.

voetnoot1: Henry Higgs, M.A., of H.M. Treasury, Finance, ch. III in: Cambridge Modern History, vol. VIII (‘The French Revolution’, Cambridge, 1904), p. 66-78.

voetnoot1: J.H. Elliott, The Decline of Spain, in: Past and Present, vol. XX (1961), p. 52-75.

voetnoot1: J.G. van Dillen, De economische ontwikkeling van Nederland, in: J.S. Bartstra and W. Banning (ed.), Nederland tussen de natiën, vol. II (Amsterdam, 1948), p. 96.

voetnoot2: Joh. de Vries, De economische achteruitgang der Republiek in de achttiende eeuw (Amsterdam, 1959), p. 107.

voetnoot3: J. en A. Romein, De lage landen bij de zee (Utrecht, 1949³), p. 289.

voetnoot4: N.W. Posthumus, De geschiedenis van de Leidsche lakenindustrie, vol. III ('s-Gravenhage, 1939), p. 851, 1010 sqq., 1089 sqq., 1172.

voetnoot1: An inn.

voetnoot2: C.H. Firth (ed.), The Clarke Papers, vol. III (Westminster etc., 1899), p. 175.

voetnoot3: Sir William Temple, Observations upon the United Provinces (1672), in: Works, vol. I (London, 1720), p. 70; in the edition by G.N. Clark (Cambridge, 1932), p. 153.

voetnoot4: John Ray, F.R.S., Observations topographical, moral and physiological made in a journey through part of the Low-Countries etc. (London, 1673), p. 51. Ten years elapsed before Ray recorded his note.

voetnoot1: Gregory King, Naturall and Politicall Observations (1696), reprinted in: J.H. Hollander (ed.), Two Tracts by Gregory King (Baltimore, 1936), p. 54-56.

voetnoot1: Sir William Temple, Observations etc., p. 70.

voetnoot2: D. Houtzager, Hollands lijf- en losrenteleningen vóór 1672 (Schiedam, 1950), p. 85, 86, 107.

voetnoot1: Charles Wilson, Cloth Production and International Competition in the Seventeenth Century, in: Economic History Review, second series, vol. XIII (1960-1961), p. 209-221.

voetnoot1: Joh. de Vries, Van de Spiegel's ‘Schets tot een vertoog over de intrinsique en relative magt van de Republyk’ (1782), in: Economisch-Historisch Jaarboek, vol. XXVII (1958), p. 81-100.

voetnoot1: Ibid., p. 97.

voetnoot2: E. Luzac, Hollands Rijkdom, vol. IV (Leiden, 1783), p. 82-84.

voetnoot3: A.M. van der Woude, De weerbare mannen van 1747 in de dorpen van het Zuiderkwartier van Holland als demografisch gegeven, in: A.A.G. Bijdragen, vol. VIII (Wageningen, 1962), p. 35-76.

voetnoot4: Ibid., p. 44.

voetnoot5: E. Luzac, Hollands Rijkdom, p. 84.

voetnoot1: See Charles Wilson, The Other Face of Mercantilism, in: Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, fifth series, vol. IX (1959), p. 81-101.

voetnoot2: See P.T. Bauer and Charles Wilson, The Stages of Growth, a review article on W.W. Rostow, The Stages of Economic Growth (Cambridge, 1960), in: Economica, new series, vol. XXIX (1962), p. 190-200.

voetnoot1: A.H.M. Jones, Over-Taxation and the Decline of the Roman Empire, in: Antiquity, vol. XXXIII (1959), p. 39-43.

voetnoot2: R. Mousnier, L'évolution des finances publiques en France et en Angleterre etc., in: Revue Historique, 75e année (1951), vol. 205, p. 1-23.

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