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Advaita and Neoplatonism (1961)

Advaita and Neoplatonism

(1961)–Frits Staal–rechtenstatus Auteursrechtelijk beschermd

A Critical Study in Comparative Philosophy


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1. Evaluation of the tradition. Action and contemplation

It seems at first sight that nothing like śabdapramāṇa occurs in Plotinus because in general the Greeks did not accept authority and were convinced of the value of free thought, investigation and speculation. Moreover, the form of Plotinus' writings seems to point in the same direction; they were not commentaries, but independent investigations into philosophical topics, often suggested by somebody in the audience.4

 

This view cannot be maintained unless it is subject to some modification. First the term Neoplatonism implies that a certain authority must have been attributed by the Neoplatonists to Plato. In addition there are Neoplatonic commentators, for instance Proclus (who wrote important commentaries upon the Timaaus, the Parmenides and other Platonic dialogues). Lastly Plotinus himself refers always to Plato as (ho theîos Platōn), ‘the divine Plato’, and always quotes him uncritically without questioning the validity of his affirmations.5 He tries to show how his own opinions are in accordance with those of Plato:"....we will now give our opinions concerning this matter, attempting to bring them back

(anágein) to the opinion of Plato,6 or: ‘Thus it seems according to us; and thus it is in accordance (sumphōnos) with Plato's opinion.’7 There is sufficient justification for comparing this Plotinian sumphōnia with the Advaitic samanvaya of all texts. Plotinus also declares himself a traditionalist: ‘We have undoubtedly to believe that the truth has been discovered by some of the ancient and blessed philosophers.’ But he adds; ‘It is advisable to see who were those who found it and how we can ourselves reach it.’8 He sometimes quotes a number of important previous philosophers in a somewhat traditionalistic spirit.9 But he mostly refers to Plato himself. Sometimes Plato is not mentioned but understood, as for example where Plotinus speaks about ‘teachings received from the ancient thinkers.’ Here he wants to show that his own thesis is ‘in accordance (śúmphōnos) or at least not incompatible (díaphōnos) with them.’10 From these passages we conclude that the Corpus Platonicum constitutes the śruti for Plotinus, whereas in certain respects he looks upon his own work as smṛti.

 

In general, the traditional attitude was relatively rare among most Greek philosophers from Thales to Aristotle. There were schools, as there have always been in the development of philosophy, where pupils followed the masters; but philosophers among the former did not, as far as we know, explicitly claim the infallibility of the founder, with the possible exception of the Pythagoreans (autòs éphē). There is some truth in Nietzsche's remark that the early Greek philosophers were lonely giants who called each other over empty intervals of thought. This reveals the difference that exists between the development of early Greek thought and the development of philosophical traditions which grow side by side, e.g., in the Christian and Muslim middle ages and in āstika Indian philosophy.

 

In Aristotle the absence of the traditional attitude manifested itself perhaps most clearly. He is able to see continuity (with all Greek predecessors in the first book of Metaphysics and with Plato everywhere), but he does not hesitate to differ. With Plato and

Aristotle the Academy of the Platonists and the Lyceum of the Aristotelians came into being together with a certain kind of traditionalism. The two great thinkers were looked upon as the masters; however, it was in principle not impossible to surpass them. By Plotinus' time, the third century, traditionalism had become widespread; it is, as Bréhier expressed it,11 an age of commentators.

 

At the same time the concepts of the Golden Age of Hesiodus and the Age of Kronos of Plato are raised to a philosophical status and manifest themselves with a seriousness, which reminds us of the four yugas of the Hindus. The ideal time was considered to have existed at the beginning, and there was no progress or evolution. ‘If the things become gradually better, they were evidently not good in the beginning! Or if they were good, they have to remain always identical with themselves.’12

 

This parallelism might be explained by observing how both in Greece and in India the ‘classical’ age existed before the times of Plotinus and Śaṅkara respectively though the interval of time elapsed in each case is not the same. Both could look back for a ‘golden age’ to earlier manifestations of cultural activity. Belief in a past golden age cannot be expected to arise during the first creative periods of a civilisation.

 

It is probable that we have to look deeper13 and that Neoplatonic and Advaitic traditionalism depend consciously or unconsciously upon the concept of time as a cyclical phenomenon, where progress or evolution is never ultimate and there is degradation within each cycle. Modern consciousness on the other hand has as one of its main constituents a concept of time which originated and developed mainly under Christian influence.14 In early Christianity, which

was like early Islam characterised by an atmosphere of ‘eschatological expectation’, time is rectilinear and qualified by a few well-marked phenomena, each of which is unique: creation, incarnation of Christ, day of judgment. In Antiquity this attitude was mainly absent, with few exceptions (i.e. Polybius and cf. Thucydides).15 In the West it is predominant (all the main social and political currents of the day depend on it), and exceptions are extremely rare (e.g. reactionary movements like the traditionalism of R. Guénon, F. Schuon and others). The modern Western judgment of Advaitic and Neoplatonic traditionalism depends on this rectilinear concept of time, which is also the main attitude in philosophy. This is not only explicit, as abundant examples could show, but also implicit, e.g.: ‘to understand Kant means to go beyond him’ (the attitude of Neokantians, which is quite different from that of Neoplatonists). When, on the other hand Neo-advaitins and Aurobindo adopt a more evolutionary view, it is due to the influence of the nineteenth century West (which is still extremely great in India) and perhaps also to the missionary activities of Christianity and Islam (which is less likely, as the rectilinear concept of time seems to be almost absent from the consciousness of Indian Christians and Muslims). The susceptibility to such an influence may be explained by the fact that a not very important ‘eschatological expectation’ existed in India also, connected with Maitreya (among Mahāyānists) and Kalkī (among Hindus).16

 

As for a theory of transmigration, it is well known that the Pythagoreans believed in metampsychosis. Xenophanes ridicules this theory and relates how Pythagoras recognised the soul of one of his former friends in a dog.17 Empedocles subscribed to the same doctrine in his Katharmoí ‘Purifications’. Plato's doctrine of remembrance or recollection (anámnēsis) presupposes preexistence of the soul in a higher world, and one of his main topics is the immortality of the soul. Both subjects are illustrated by myths, as for instance the myth of Er in the tenth book of the Republic. There we find the doctrine of rebirth referred to,

moreover the souls are given retribution according to actions performed during their earthly life. Tnere is no elaboration of this doctrine analogous to the Indian systematisation and no concept like beginningless saṁsāra has been evolved. Plotinus follows Plato in these matters.

 

Though it is impossible to explain Neoplatonism like Advaita mainly as a revolt against the supremacy of karman, Plotinus has nevertheless definite views about the place to be allotted to activities. This will again be dealt with in three stages: sacrifice, meditation and knowledge.

 

Plotinus did not belong to an ancient and established religion with a caste of priests, with temples and sacrifices (though such entities did exist in Rome). However during his age, there was an invasion of Oriental cults in the Roman Empire (such as Gnosticism and other forms of Christianity), which Plotinus opposed.18 Moreover the character of the Stoa became increasingly religious; it prescribed prayers and the abandonment of man to God and it conceived of a philanthropist God. These developments were also rejected by Plotinus. Concerning prayers, he has expressed his opinion in a curious passage, where their impersonal, ritualistic and unintentional character is stressed. It is manifest that they do not belong to the philosophical, but to a magical realm. The effect of prayer, says Plotinus, neither depends on the will of the God i.e., a heavenly body, nor on the intention of the believer, but on the correctness with which the prayer is performed.19 ‘In the stars (i.e. in the Gods) there is no will to answer our prayers.... Their powers are used without will, whether they are provoked (by us) or not, through a scientifically efrective procedure (tékhnē) ....the performer may be a bad person (kakós)-it need not surprise us; bad people fetch water from the rivers; the being which gives, does not know that it gives; it simply gives’.20 This tékhnē is an impersonal ritualistic act, which can be compared to the tékhnē of doctors and of magicians (epaoidoí). The explanation of the efficacy of prayers lies in the fact that the whole universe is one and is like one organism. ‘The universe thus gives to its parts,

whether by itself or through some influence....he who prays for some influence is himself not separate from the universe’.21 ‘Prayer is effective because one part of the universe sympathises with another part, as in the stretched string (of a lyre), where the vibration moves from below upwards. Often also, when one string vibrates, another one perceives the vibration as it were, because they are tuned in accord and harmony. If vibrations even move from one lyre to another, it can be seen how far the ‘sympathy’ (sumpátheia) stretches. In the universe too there is one universal harmony (mía harmonía) even if it consists of contraries....’22

 

The Plotinian universe starts by being the kósmos in the established Greek sense, and become one wonderful organic harmony (harmonía), like a symphony (sumphōnía) held together in universal sympathy (sumpátheia). As early as Chrysippus in the Stoa, this idea was called ‘sympathy of the whole (s)’, sumpátheia tōn hólōn.23 If we disregard its well ordered and esthetic character, which is the heritage of the idea of kósmos and of the artistic ideals of Hellas, we are left with a universe which is unified, the parts being related by magical connections;24 it resembles the universe of the Brāhmaṇas. But the similarity is still more striking in the idea of the ritual act (sat), where it is the exactness (satyam) which counts and not the intention of the sacrificing priests. The ‘visible’ Gods i.e., the heavenly bodies, are according to Plotinus, like mechanical parts or organs of an organism-like universe-almost the ‘hypothetical entities’ of Pūrva Mīmāṁsā.

 

In another passage Plotinus shocking and surprising those who heard him, expressed his opinion of the Gods and showed his personal feelings about sacrifices. His pupil Porphyry25 records in his biography: ‘Amelius was a lower of sacrifices (philothútos), who would neither miss the New Moon offerings nor any of the recurrent festivals. Once he wanted to take Plotinus with him, but the latter answered: ‘It is up to the Gods to come to me; not

up to me to go to them’.26 What the mentality (dianoía) underlying these proud words was we could neither understand, nor did we dare to ask. It is remarkable how near the Mīmāṁsakas are to those philothútoi and how close their opponent Śaṅkara is to Plotinus. The pride attributed to Plotinus resembles the uncompromising attitude of the Advaitin, who rejects the samuccayavāda which combines sacrifices and knowledge.

 

Though these isolated passages do not form an integral part of the metaphysics of the Enneads, as the rejection of karman does in Advaita, they throw much light on the mentality of Plotinus and show how like Śaṅkara he reacted against any formal ritualism.

 

The relation between action (prâxis) and contemplation (theōría), is not a central topic of the Enneads but is the object of metaphysical considerations and forms the subject of almost all the chapters of the treatise, ‘About nature, contemplation and the One.’27 We propose to give an analysis of this treatise as it deals with the problems concerned and gives at the same time an excellent introduction to Plotinus' thought. In the next section we will discuss the material which is thus made available. The analysis follows the text rather closely and a general survey of the significance of its ideas is not given in advance: the reader is first invited to judge for himself.

 

Chapter 1. The thesis is put forward that all beings desire (ephíesthai) contemplation (theōría) and aim at that end. The reason is that they are themselves the outcome of contemplation. This will be discussed with particular reference to some fundamental entities28 such as nature (phúsis), soul (psukhḗ) reason (lógos) and lastly with reference to intelligence (noûs)29 and the one (hén).

 

Chapters 2-4. Nature like reason produces while remaining immobile. Like reason it is not an activity. (prâxus), but a contemplation (theōría). This is however a kind of contemplation which is a production (poíēsis) or generation (génnēsis). If nature could

speak, she would explain this as follows: ‘When I contemplate, the traces (grammaí) of the bodies (sōmata) come into being (huphí stanai) as if they fall from me (ekpíptein).30 ‘I am myself born from a similar non-active contemplation’. Thus silently nature produces its own object of contemplation ‘in all its splendour and grace’. This contemplation is higher than any activity: ‘Also human beings, if their (power of) contemplation becomes feeble, come to action, which is a shadow (skiá) of contemplation and reason’.31

 

Chapters 5-7. The relation between action and contemplation is further discussed and applied to the soul: action follows and derives from contemplation; it is weakened contemplation, Conversely, contemplation which is the principle of action is also its goal. Acting with such a goal, the soul ceases to act; it does not continue striving, it is full (‘filled’: plērōtheîsa); it possesses its contemplation internally....thus unity is introduced in it; the more unity, the more calm it is. Then the knowing part of the soul (ginōskon) is one with what is known (hèn tōi gnōsthénti).

 

The soul has greater powers of contemplation than nature. But it seeks further, abandons contemplation and goes to the multiplicity of things. After this it returns and contemplates with its superior part, which it has abandoned. ‘This does not happen, however, when the soul remains in itself. The sage therefore.... manifests to others only what he finds in himself; his sight is turned towards himself (pròs autòn ópsis). He isolates himself from the outside world (éxō), turning towards the One and quietness. He turns towards himself and finds everything inside (pánta eísō).’32

 

Chapter 8. The soul finds unity with its object only in its superior part. But contemplation is more unified (henouménos) in the nous. The soul does not have plenitude (ou plḗres) but is inferior to the nous which is prior to it. In the nous there is no difference between subject and object at all. Therefore it is said: ‘The same is being and thinking.33 But this unity and contem-

plation, which is ‘thought’ or ‘intellection’ (nóēsis), is also life (Zōē) as it was in nature. Thus there is a first intellection, a second, etc, and likewise a first life, a second, etc.

 

The nous itself is a product of becoining (gínetai) and by contemplation it enters again into multiplicity: it unfolds itself. It is therefore not the primary (prōtos) and highest entity.

 

Chapters 9-11: Beyond the nous therefore is the One (tó hén). It is neither intelligence nor intelligible, for it is that from which intelligence and all intelligibility originate. It is good and simple, known only through the nous. It can be known by what in us resembles it. As principle of all beings it can only be beyond being. It is the (dúnamis) (power, potency) of everything. ‘Imagine a well (pḗgē) without origin; it gives itself (hautḗn) to all rivers; but it is not diminished by that, it remains quietly in itself......’34


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