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Advaita and Neoplatonism (1961)

Advaita and Neoplatonism

(1961)–Frits Staal–rechtenstatus Auteursrechtelijk beschermd

A Critical Study in Comparative Philosophy


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12. Vivarta, Nāmarūpe

Several adhyāsas have been noticed to which several āśrayāḥ, ‘loci’, correspond: the texts speak of superimposition upon an

image, upon a king's charioteer, and generally upon essence (ātman). But ‘essence’ was for instance the element silver in a silver ornament i.e., what Aristotle called the material cause. In the Indian terminology the formal cause is superimposed upon the material cause and this is a wrong identification because the formal element is ultimately unreal. In the case of the king and the charioteer, it is simply the wrong name or concept, ‘king’ which is superimposed upon the king's charioteer: no other reality whatsoever. These two examples illustrate the two elements, which are generally superimposed upon essence: i.e., nāmarūpe, ‘(the world of) names and forms.’ Śaṅkara called avidyā or adhyāsa, anādi ‘beginningless’ and ananta, ‘endless’. This can be specified by the fact that there are avyākṛte nāmarūpe, ‘unmanifest names and forms,’ and vyākrte nāmarūpe ‘manifest names and forms.’ They denote respectively the material cause of the world403 and the phenomenal world as it appears.404 Śaṅkara says that avidyā ‘makes’ the nāmarūpe, which ‘fixes’ them ‘upon’, ‘attaches’ them ‘to’, ‘throws’ them ‘over’ the essence (Ātman).405 All this activity is superimposition, and since this is a temporal activity, whereas the nāmarūpe which are māyā are beginningless and endless, the nāmarūpe are called avyākṛte before the superimposition and vyākṛte afterwards. He quotes406 as scriptural support for this ‘in the beginning this was that only which is not’407 and ‘non-existent (asat) indeed this was in the beginning.’408 Here not absolute non-existence is meant, but ‘only a different quality or state, viz., the state of names and forms being unmanifest, which state is different from the state of names and forms being manifest.’ And also: ‘the designation of ‘non-existence’ applied to the effect before its production has reference to a different state of being merely. And as those things which are distinguished by name and form are in ordinary language called ‘existent’, the term ‘non-existent’ is figuratively applied to them to denote the state in which they were previously to their differentiation.’

What strikes us in this way of thought is the continuity; it is the idea that nothing can come out of nothing, and that for this reason and in this sense only the world is beginningless and endless. This solves at the same time another difficulty. If adhyāsa is not a situation but an activity, or at any rate nearer to the second concept than to the first, the question arises as to when this activity took place; whether it was for instance a unique occurrence comparable to creation in the monotheistic religions. Although it is an activity, it has a continuous, everlasting and also omnipresent character. The only thing that ‘happens’ through it is that the unmanifest becomes manifest. When looked upon from the Absolute, nothing happens at all. This is why adhyāsa could be called anādirananta. The erroneous identification by which a world of names and forms seems to come into being is a continuous ephemeral phenomenon, superimposing itself upon Brahman but not affecting Brahman.

 

Thus we find the archaic continuity back in the celebrated Advaitic doctrine that the effect is only an illusory imposition upon the cause, or, popularly speaking, the opinion that nothing comes out of nothing. A specific form of the universal adhyāsa is that we superimpose upon what we call ‘causes’ other entities which we call ‘effects.’ As the superimposition is erroneous, the effects are unreal and the causes are no causes. Because of this specific form of our adhyāsa we create a world of change and causality by supposing that the cause transforms itself into the effect (pariṇāma); it seems to us (this is the satkāryavāda or parināmavada of the Sāṁkhya system409) that there is always a material cause which manifests itself in different forms. The truth is that the forms are superimposed, i.e., neither real, nor unreal, but anirvacanīya. In connection with this view of causality, a special technical term for adhyāsa is introduced in post-Śaṅkara Advaita: vivarta. This may be defined as adhyāsa of the effect upon the cause. satkāraṇavada is therefore also called vivartavāda.

 

These indications may be further specified by a closer examination of some of the texts. The examples with the help of which satkāraṇavāda or vivartavāda is illustrated are mostly

taken from the material realm. We are here concerned with an evaluation and not with a phenomenological observation: when it seems that the clay is transformed into a jar, we can either attach a higher value to the material cause (clay) and look upon the form as ephemeral (as Śaṅkara does), or we can evaluate the form more highly and speak of the creation of something new, the jar. This shows that the way in which we conceive of causation is a priori and depends on us rather than on the phenomena. Because of this we are entitled to say that the archaic universal desire for continuity continues to live in satkāraṇavāda. But in addition to that we have also to note that our rational thinking cannot accept creation out of nothing, which makes a very irrational impression. Satkāraṇaväda is therefore more rational. Rationality requires continuity. Satkäraṇavāda or vivartavāda, therefore, depend on a mental status and on a rational or rationalizing attitude, not on phenomenological data. We shall discuss this below and note that there is much in common with Aristotle's doctrine of ‘potentiality’ and ‘actuality’.

 

Śaṅkara discusses causality at length in the commentary upon the apparently creationistic passages of the Bṛhadāraṇyaka beginning with ‘there was nothing whatsoever here in the beginning’.410 K.C. Bhattacharyya analysed this passage411 and we may refer for further details to his discussion. Śaṅkara says that ‘nothing’ should not be conceived as a mere void (śūnya), but rather as ‘something’. This follows from the scriptural context and also from the eternity of both cause and effect. Elaborate proofs for both views are given. Even if the text seems to speak about a kind of creation, Śaṅkara infers ‘the existence of cause and effect before creation’. In this way the idea of creation become meaningless. The eternity of the cause is plausible when we regard cause as material cause, as Śaṅkara does, and take the example of the clay. For clay continues to exist in the jar. This is subsequently generalised. The eternity of the effect is less obvious. But according to Śaṅkara existence refers only to the manifest state, whereas the effect exists in the cause in the unmanifest state as the form of the jar previous to its production in the clay. It seems that the term ‘unmanifest’ in this case has no meaning at all. But even if it

were meaningful, we are speaking at the level of māyā as if this world of names and forms and of causes and effects existed. Actually it is anirvacanīya and in Brahman neither cause nor effect has any meaning. Analogously Śaṅkara shows that what is in the future and not in the present is not non-existent, but only unmanifest. If objects lastly would not be eternally existent how would foreknowledge of God or of the yogin be possible?

 

‘This elaborate discussion of causality’, concludes Bhattacharyya, ‘leads to the recognition of Brahman as the material cause of the universe and of the primal hiding principle, co-eternal with Brahman, viz., māyā, which by itself is nothing, like the blue tint which seems to pervade objects viewed through blue glasses.412 But he adds, that the ‘dynamic principle’ he has been seeking for ‘remains undiscovered’. This will occupy us again.413 That Brahman is the material cause of the universe414 is more in accordance with strict non-dualism than calling avidyā positive or stressing the nāmarūpa-prakṛti, which is extremely near to Sāṁkhya. It expresses the same as the doctrine of super-imposition of the ‘inessential’ upon essence. To say that Brahman (or Īśvara: see below) is the material cause of the universe is the same as saying that Brahman is the āśraya of all superimpositions.

 

The same problems-though with less emphasis upon the theory of causation-are discussed in the Chāndogyopaniṣadbhāṣya. First415 the Upaniṣad says: ‘just as through a lump of clay, all that is made of clay would become known;-all products being due to words, a mere name; the clay alone is real....’; and Śaṅkara adds: ‘the product (effect) is non-different from its (material) cause....it exists in name only’. This shows that it is irrelevant whether the apparent difference in the effect is ascribed to the form or to the name; both have the same function and are erroneously superimposed upon the one and only real material cause.416 When discussing the question whether there

was being or non-being in the beginning, he refutes the Vaiśeṣika asatkāryavāda, ‘the doctrine that the effect is non-existent before its production’. But not only the Vaiśeṣika asatkāryavāda (which is obviously unacceptable to Advaita) but also the Śāṁkhya satkäryaväda has to be refuted. The differences between these two is brought out more clearly by later Advaitins than by Śaṅkara himself. The latter seems for instance inconsistent when he explains the fact, that Brahman is the material cause of the universe, with the term: pariṇāmāt, ‘because of transformation’, following the term of the sūtra upon which he comments.417 A later commentator, Nārāyaṇānanda Sarasvatī, therefore says that in this passage pariṇāma denotes vivarta. It would also be possible to interpret Brahman in this passage as saguṇabrahman, as is done elsewhere when it is said:418 ‘The view of Brahman as undergoing modifications will, moreover, be of use in the devout meditations on the saguṇabrahman’. It would be rather confusing if the qualification saguṇa had been left out in the present context. On the other hand, the explanation of this pariṇāmāt in the commentary sounds more like vivartavāda than like pariṇāmavāda. ‘The Self, although in full existence previously to the action, modifies itself into something special, viz., the Self of the effect. Thus we see that causal substances, such as clay and the like, are, by undergoing the process of modification, changed into their products’. The term ‘Self of the effect’ seem to point in the direction of vivartavāda, the second sentence again in the direction of pariṇāmavāda. No reference is made to the saguṇabrahman, but only to cause in general. In Śaṅkara the terms pariṇāma and vivarta did not yet possess the specific technical meaning which they would later possess.

 

The position is clearer in a section entirely devoted to the problem of causality,419 from which several important passages have been quoted already. The Chāndogya passage420 is discussed

again.421 The products of causation are non-different from the original situation, because ‘in as far as they are (new) names they are untrue; in as far as they are clay they are true.’ Many objections are again answered, including familiar ones. If there is non-difference of effect and cause and nothing but absolute unity, what happens to the scriptural injunctions and prohibitions? What of the pramāṇas? What of the distinction between teacher and pupil? The answer is also familiar: ‘These objections we reply, do not damage our position because the entire complex of phenomenal existence is considered as true as long as the knowledge of Brahman being the Self of all has not arisen; .... For as long as a person has not reached the true knowledge of the unity of the Self, so long it does not enter his mind that the world of effects with its means and objects of right knowledge and its results of actions is untrue....’ The dialectic of causality is foreshadowed by Gaudapāda in his kārikās, for which reference may be made to Mahadevan's discussion.422

 

The apparently contradicting statements of Śaṅkara can be explained by holding (though Śaṅkara himself is nowhere so explicit) that pariṇāmavāda applies to saguṇabrahman and vivartavāda to nirguṇabrahman. Saguṇabrahman is called the material cause of the universe, and not nirguṇabrahman. This is in accordance with the fact that in the Vivaraṇa school Īśvara is called the material cause of the universe.423 Likewise the saguṇabrahman is meant when Brahman is called the efficient cause (nimitta karaṇa) of the world.424 The nirguṇabrahman cannot be called a cause and stands in no relation to this world. In the taṭaṣṭha-lakṣaṇa, ‘definition by accidents’ it is called ‘that from which the origin, subsistence and dissolution of this world proceed’, as in the second sūtra: janmādyasya yataḥ, where janmādi means: ‘janman, utpatti (birth, origin), sthiti (subsistence, conservation) and bhaṅga, nāśa, pralaya (dissolution, destruction).425 In other words, Brahman is not the

cause but the locus upon which all causal connections are super-imposed through the erroneous activity of avidyā

 

These ideas are closely connected with the ancient ideas of karma and with the Vedic sacrifice. Only the Absolute is really transcendent. Pariṇāmavāda expresses the ideas of saṁsara, of transmigration and of the efficacy of the sacrifice (cf. also the digestion of the food, which could be called pariṇāma). Vivartavāda, on the other hand, expresses that we can attain release from saṁsāra, from karma and from rebirth. Śaṅkara says that ‘the works of him who knows Brahman are extinguished,’426 otherwise it would follow ‘that he must necessarily enjoy the fruits of his works and thus cannot obtain release.’ Likewise all sin is extinguished. It is characteristic of mokṣa and accounts for its desirability (though desire would not bring it nearer it is nevertheless a necessary condition: mumukṣutvam): ‘and his works are extinguished’, as the Muṇḍakopaniṣad says.427

 

Also in as far as it is opposed to the idea of creation, the doctrine of the non-difference of cause and effect is closely related to the Vedic concepts. Doctrines like pariṇāmavāda and vivartavāda were virtually contained in many Vedic modes of thought.428 This explains the relative rareness (in comparison with other religious mythologies) of creation myths in the Veda429 and also the fact that creation is replaced by, for instance, sacrifice (‘the rain, the food, the sperm, etc., are originated from sacrifices’). Creation in general is also looked upon as a sacrifice (Prajāpati).

 

In refuting creation the great predecessor of Śaṅkara was Gaudapāda. According to him, the creation texts of śruti are merely a device (upāya) to introduce the true teaching which relates to the non-dual reality.430 The saprapañca is only a

means; the niṣprapañca is the end.431 The main doctrine of Gauḍapāda, for which he adduces several arguments, is ajāti, ‘non-origination.’432

 

Śaṅkara is equally explicit and clear on this point: for him creation (‘with its ether, air, etc.’) is unreal.433 In the commentary upon one sūtra he deals almost exclusively with creation.434 Here the pūrvapakṣin mentions a number of apparently conflicting scriptural passages. Śaṅkara reconciles them partly (about the principle of such reconciliation we shall speak below), but concludes with the remark: ‘And, to consider the matter more thoroughly, a conflict of statements regarding the world does not even matter greatly, since the creation of the world and similar topics are not at all what scripture wishes to teach. For we neither observe nor are told by scripture that the welfare of man (puruṣārtha) depends on these matters in any way; nor have we the right to assume such a thing; because we conclude from the introductory and concluding clauses that the passages about the creation and the like form only subordinate members of passages treating of Brahman’. Elsewhere, the relative validity of the concept of creation is shown by referring to a number of consecutive creations (with their respective dissolutions, pralaya), which are ‘essentially’ the same and which are embedded in the karma-doctrine: ‘As therefore each new creation is (nothing but) the result of the religious merit and demerit (of the animated beings of the preceding creation), it is produced with a nature resembling that of the preceding creation.’435

 

All this holds for the human being too. Human being is characterized by superimposition; superimposing, it creates a world of names and forms and of causes and effects. This creation is only a manifestation of avidyā and māyā. The change which a human being may cause or introduce cannot be said to be real- though it may not be possible to call it unreal either. Human being itself does therefore not change either; all change is anirva-

canīya. This is realized by whoever has attained brahmavidyā: then everything becomes nothing, tucchā. This is not a transformation but the mere realization of an eternal reality, which was temporarily hidden on account of inexplicable reasons.


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