Advaita and Neoplatonism

A Critical Study in Comparative Philosophy

10. Identifications and the central Advaitic identity

The result of identification is complete identification. This identification was called magical, because the two identified elements are not ordinarily identical. When Śaṅkara comments upon that text of the Brhadāraṇyakopaniṣad where sampad, ‘meditation based on resemblance’ is spoken of³⁴¹ he explains this as follows: ‘By this is meant a meditation, by virtue of some point of resemblance (sāmānya), on rites with inferior results like the agnihotra, as rites with superior results, in order to obtain these results’.³⁴²

While meditation is being spoken of in connection with saguṇabrahman, nirguṇabrahman, is exclusively connected with cognition (knowledge);³⁴³ therefore there may be different meditations on saguṇabrahman, whereas there is only one knowledge (which is identical with) nirguṇabrahman. Assuming that in meditation on saguṇabrahman identity is reached, we shall only consider the real nirguṇabrahman in the following investigation. In a sūtra of the fourth adhyāya³⁴⁴ the pivotal question is taken up;

341 3.1.6-10.

342 Ad. 3.1.6. transl. Swami Madhavananda 421; cf. also ad. 1.4.10

343 See above II, 7: 82 sq.

344 4.1.3.

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in how far in the knowledge³⁴⁵ of the highest Brahman the latter is known as identical with something else, known before, so that this cognition would in fact be a recognition.³⁴⁶ As the ego is the starting point of each meditation and the basis of any knowledge, it is asked whether the highest Brahman is to be understood as the I or as different from it. The siddhānta view, basing itself exclusively upon scriptural authority, is that the Absolute must be understood as the self. For this several texts are quoted of which the most important are: ‘I am Brahman’³⁴⁷ and: ‘That thou art’.³⁴⁸ With regard to these scriptural passages an important assertion of the pūrvapakṣin has to be refùted first. Is it not possible that these passages merely teach the seeing (darśana) of Brahman in certain symbols (pratīka), analogous to the seeing of Viṣṇu in an image? This is rejected for two reasons: (1) it would violate the principle that texts should, if possible, be understood in their primary sense (mukhyārtha) and not in their secondary sense (lakṣyārtha): ‘mukhyatvāt’ as Śaṅkara himself enunciates it ad. 4.3.12. This is known in Pūrvamīmāṁsā under the name barhirnyāya, ‘the maxim of the Kuśa-grass’.³⁴⁹ (2) It would contradict the syntactical form generally used in the scripture for teaching contemplation by means of a symbol, e.g., ‘Brahman is mind’³⁵⁰ or ‘Brahman is Āditya’.³⁵¹ Moreover the contrary interpretation is explicitly rejected in other important texts such as: ‘Now if a man worships another deity, thinking the deity is one and he another, he does not know’³⁵² and: ‘whosoever looks for anything elsewhere than in the Self is abandoned by everything’.³⁵³

345 Not meditation, as Thibaut says in his conspectus (I lxxvi). I have never found that Śaṅkara uses the term meditation in immediate connection with the highest Brahman; but the term dṛṣṭi ‘vision’ occurs, e.g. in 4.1.5.

346 In how far in Advaita all cognition is in reality recognition is a point (resulting directly from the unreal character of avidyā) developed further by Coomaraswamy in his Recollection: Indian and Platonic, Suppl. Journal of the American Oriental Society 3 (April-June 1944) 1-18. In this paper smṛti is unconvincingly equated with the Platonic anāmnēsis.

347 BAU. 1.4.10.

348 CU. 6.8.7.

349 Jha, Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā, 379, n. 34; cf. Mahadevan, Philosophy of Advaita, 45 sq.

350 CU. 3.18.1.

351 CU.3.19.1.

352 BAU. 1.4.10.

353 BAU. 2.4.6; also quoted: BAU 4.4.19.

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Śaṅkara discusses again in his commentary upon the next sūtras the exceptional cases where Brahman is viewed as a symbol. He sharply differentiates these ‘pratikopāsanās’ from the knowledge that Brahman must be understood as the Self. In the commentary upon sūtra, 4.1.3 the significance of the statement is brought out by answering the main objections which can be made against it. These developments are important and have to be followed in greater detail.

Firstly, it is clear that almost exclusively śabdapramāṇa is used in establishing the central doctrine of identity of the self and the Absolute. Scripture, especially the Brāhmaṇas, goes in its identifications even beyond the establishment of connections and relations. That amongst all these, identification of the Self with the Absolute occurs is not surprising. But with Śaṅkara the identity is neither magical, nor can its foundation in śruti be termed dogmatic.

(1) It is not magical because we are here concerned with an identity and not with an identification. ‘Identification’ means ‘making identical’, e.g., through an act of meditation; according to Śaṅkara, this is a subjective process, e.g. (an example of Zimmer) the gradual identification of the ego with a cow to which no objective reality need correspond.³⁵⁴ ‘Identity’, on the other hand, means ‘being identical’ in reality. This is according to Śaṅkara,³⁵⁵ objective and does not depend on any activity on our part. As it is real or true, the question is only whether we ‘see’ it or ‘know’ it. Therefore Śaṅkara speaks in connection with the identity of the Self and of Brahman, of dṛṣṭa ‘vision’, and vidyā, ‘knowledge, cognition’,³⁵⁶ which are not activities. The difference between identity and identification

354 Cf. for instance, the identification of certain points with other points in topology, a branch of modern mathematics, which can be arbitrarily done (at least in principle), and where it is not required that these ‘magical’ identifications correspond to identities, i.e. ‘exist’ (a dubious concept in mathematics). They can be developed into a formal system of connections.

355 Cf. previous section: yathābhūtavastu, ‘just like the things as they exist’, i.e., objectively.

356 We should consequently translate the acts dhyāna and upāsanā as respectively ‘meditation’ and ‘contemplation’, and dṛṣṭa as ‘vision’ (not as contemplation, as Thibaut does ad 4.1.5: brahmadṛṣṭi....).

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reveals a new aspect of the struggle against magical and subjective applications of the idea of karma.³⁵⁷

(2) Śaṅkara's use of the śabdapramāṇa is not dogmatic. This is sometimes misunderstood because we are here in a kind of vicious circle. Those who are seeking for justification by means of pramāṇas do not possess the vision of the Absolute, which conceals all duality. They deny the truth of the central Advaitic identity because they are enveloped by ignorance concerning it. If they would possess the highest knowledge (paravidyā), śabdapramāṇa -and all other pramāṇas-would altogether vanish for them. The position of Advaita regarding this point is clear. Advaita is not based upon scripture: all relations and contradictions disappear in mokṣa which is the goal of the system. Advaita is therefore consistent, which need not lead to any conviction regarding its truth.³⁵⁸ Plotinus said: ‘Thus we arrived at a proof; but are we convinced? A proof entails necessity, but not conviction. Necessity resides in the intelligence, and conviction in the soul.’³⁵⁹ Theorems in logic are only acceptable for those who accept certain axioms and rules of inference.

In the same adhikaraṇa Śaṅkara refers to this problem and accepts unhesitatingly, paradoxically enough on scriptural authority, that śabdapramāṇa and śruti and smṛti themselves are unreal, as soon as the Brahman-knowledge arises: "Nor do we mind your objection....that scripture itself ceases to be valid (becomes unreal: abhāva); for this conclusion is just what we assume. For on the ground of the text ‘Then a father is not a father’³⁶⁰ upto ‘Then the Vedas are not Vedas’³⁶¹ we ourselves assume that when knowledge springs up scripture ceases to be valid. And should you ask who then is characterised by the absence of true knowledge, we reply: You yourself who ask this question! And if you

357 It may be mentioned here that there is still a tradition in India that one of the important achievements of Śaṅkara was to control and limit magical practices which were widespread at the time, partly due to exaggerations and abuses of Tantric practices. Tantric elements have, on the other hand, been traced in Śaṅkara's works. Cf. Lacombe, o.c. 379 (IV).

358 Cf. above II, 7.

359 Enneads V 3.6.8-10 (Bréhier).

360 BU, 4.3.22.

361 Ibid.

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retort: ‘But I am the Lord as declared by scripture’, we reply: ‘very well, if you have arrived at that knowledge, then there is nobody who does not possess such knowledge’. The position of the last sentences can be summed up by saying: he who disagrees is ignorant; if he knew he would agree. This excludes the possibility of somebody who knows and nevertheless disagrees. This is evidently appropriate in the case of brahmavidyā; whoever knows that the self is Brahman will certainly have no objection against the doctrine which propounds this thesis. But one might perfectly well understand the meaning and significance of the statement ‘the self is identical with the Absolute’, without having confidence in its truth and without agreeing with it.³⁶²

The topic of the unreality of śabdapramāṇa has repeatedly occupied the later Advaitins. Appaya Dikṣita for instance asks³⁶³ whether the śabdapramāṇa, which is the evidence for Brahman is real or unreal. ‘If it be real, then, as there is a reality which is other than Brahman, the latter's non-duality will be destroyed. If it be unreal, then, what is revealed by an unreal evidence should also be unreal’. But the latter conclusion is invalid, as what is unreal can nevertheless be practically efficient, just as the roaring of a dream-lion in a dream can sublate the dream-experience itself and awaken the dreamer.³⁶⁴

The commentary upon the same sūtra, 4.1.3. also refutes other objections. One objection is that Advaita is not in accordance with experience. It seems to contradict all our experiences radically; we know the Self as ourselves, i.e., our egos, invested with a number of qualities which cannot belong to the Absolute which is nirguṇa, without qualities³⁶⁵; e.g., all evil qualities and qualities of ignorance. But this opposition of qualities has to be declared false, says Śaṅkara: ‘Nor is there any force in the objection that things with contrary qualities cannot be identical; for this opposition of qualities can be shown to be false.’ Not false in the sense that the evil qualities have to be ascribed to the

362 It is unfortunately an all-too-easy opinion among some Advaitins that whoever disagrees with Advaita, evidently does not understand it. This is defining disagreement a priori as ignorance.

363 Siddhāntaleśasaṁgraha ap. Mahadevan, Philosophy of Advaita, 57 sq.

364 Mahadevan o.c. 59.

365 Śaṅkara treats it in this context rather as saguṇa.

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Absolute so that the Lord would not be a Lord; but in non-ascribing these same qualities to the other side of the duality, i.e., the Self, which is not the same as our transmigrating soul: ‘Nor is it true that from our doctrine it would follow that the Lord is not a Lord. For in these matters scripture alone is authoritative, and we, moreover do not at all admit that scripture teaches the Lord to be the Self of the transmigrating soul, but maintain that by denying the transmigrating character of the soul it aims at teaching that the soul is the Self of the Lord. From this it follows that the non-dual Lord is free from all evil qualities, and that to ascribe to him contrary qualities is an error.’

Thus we arrive at the real Self ‘by denying the transmigrating character of the soul’ (ātma) saṁsāritvāpohena.³⁶⁶ This being posited as the truth it becomes a matter of realisation to see this non-transmigrating Self as the deeper ground of our transmigrating selves. This knowledge cannot arise for the transmigrating soul for it has to be gained by ceasing to transmigrate, i.e., by attaining mokṣa. To conceive of the deepest Self as the transmigrating soul constitutes the principal ignorance (avidyā) which obstructs insight and real knowledge (vidyā). All positions differing from the ultimate truth are affected by avidyā. Avidyā is the main stumbling-block obstructing the brahmavidyā. It poses the main metaphysical problem of Advaita. Although it is a unique concept in Śaṅkara, its central position in the system and its psychological appeal could only be explained by a series of older ideas, such as the dangerous actions performed in erroneous sacrifices, which have to be expiated by prayaścitta, and also the magical inefficiency of avidyā as it occurs in the Chāndogyopaniṣad.

The Sanskrit term Ātman does not fully correspond to the English term Self, as the latter can only be used in connection with persons whereas the former has a much wider application. Commenting upon the sūtra 4.1.4, Śaṅkara speaks for instance of gold as being the ātman of golden ornaments: ‘for golden ornaments and figures made of gold are not identical with each other but only in as far as gold constitutes the ātman of both’. Lacombe³⁶⁷

366 Note here the occurrence of the term apoha, which is of central importance in Vijñānavāda and in several speculations about language.

367 o.c. 52.

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quotes a passage, where quality (guṇa) has its ātman in substance (dravyātma).³⁶⁸ Here ātman could be translated as ‘essence’.³⁶⁹ Compare also the usages of ātman in BAU 1. 2.1 and 1. 2. 4, where it might be similarly translated by ‘essence’. According to Lacombe, ātman designates ‘the metaphysical moment where being interiorizes and becomes perfect, complete, final, reaching the Absolute by this very interiorization’.³⁷⁰ But in Advaita ‘interiorizing’, ‘becoming’, ‘reaching’ cannot be understood as changes or transformations and seem rather to denote a situation. Though we need not deviate from the established usage of translating ātman by ‘Self’, we have to realize that the term has a greater extension. Were we to adopt the term essence the central Advaitic doctrine could be formulated in a way which sounds more familiar in Western philosophical terminology: ‘the Absolute, i.e., the essence of the All, is identical with the essence of myself’. What prevents us from seeing this is avidyā, the incapacity to see the essence underlying the manifestations.

It may be remarked here, that in this formulation the similarity with some later phases of Muslim thought, becomes exceedingly great. The doctrine of Ibn 'Arabī can be summarized as: ‘the essence of the creator is identical with the essence of the creatures’. Kindred formulations occur also in Angelus Silesius.

368 Ad. 2.2.17; not as Lacombe has it: the guṇa is the ātman of the dravya (tasmāddravyātmakatā guṇasya).

369 Lacombe (o.c. 51; cf. 104) mentions on the other hand as the Sanskrit equivalents of ‘essence’: svarūpa, svabhāva, bhāva, sāra.

370 ‘Le moment métaphysique ou l'être s'intériorise et de quelque façon s'achève, se termine et finalement se hausse à l'absolu par ce mouvement même d'intériorisation’. ‘Mouvement’ is certainly misleading: the French language is too dynamical.