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Advaita and Neoplatonism (1961)

Advaita and Neoplatonism

(1961)–Frits Staal–rechtenstatus Auteursrechtelijk beschermd

A Critical Study in Comparative Philosophy


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8. Action - meditation - knowledge: Advaita and other systems

The term karman characterises the atmosphere of the beginning of Vedic literature. It denotes any action which is conceived as causation and it can be applied to different levels, which coincided in the beginning. It denotes everyday action consciously applied on the basis of causal connections which are generally observed (or, with a philosophical critique, which manifest themselves to the observer): every action establishes a cause desired for the sake of an effect. It denotes the sum total of activities which result after death in a certain status leading to a new life; and lastly it denotes certain magically efficient acts, the sacrifices, which lead to various desirable results. In the last two cases it is not always obvious what constitutes the substratum of the causal connection (e.g. dharma and adharma or puṇya and pāpa subsisting after death). For this reason Prabhākara and his followers in Mīmāṁsā call the result of sacrificial acts apūrva (litt. ‘never before’).253 This apūrva is a typically magical concept and by rejecting it Śaṅkara shows the magical and unintelligible character of all activity, even there where the result is immediately present so that no apūrva is needed. The evidence for Advaita, the jīvan-mukta, ‘wbo is released while embodied’, is dṛṣṭa, ‘visible’, whereas the proof for Mīmāṁsā, apūrva, is adṛṣṭa ‘invisible’. Sureśvara therefore says: ‘The Vedānta-texts have seen fruit (dṛṣṭa-

phala), whereas svarga or the result of agnihotra is an unseen fruit (adṛṣṭaphala)’.254 Elsewhere he calls jñāna a dṛṣṭārtha.255

The Karmakāṇḍa deals with all these aspects of karman but the Jñānakāṇḍa supplements it. The difference between the two corresponds to the difference between Brāhmaṇas and Upaniṣads, between sacrifice or action in general and knowledge (with meditation as a link between the two) and between Pūrva and Uttara Mīmāṁsās. In Pūrva Mīmāṁsā Vedic injunctions are interpreted as referring to action only; in Advaita knowledge is Vastu-tantra dependent on the thing and not on injunction. One school of Pūrva Mīmāṁsā is nearer to Advaita: the school of Kumārila Bhaṭṭa. Whereas the rival school of Prabhākara holds that scriptural statements point only at things to be accomplished (sādhya), the school of Kumārila Bhaṭṭa believes that scriptural statements may either point to sādhya or else to siddha, an existent and accomplished thing. Both schools agree that action is the major mode of our being referred to in the Veda and prescribed there. Even if the existence of passages which merely refer to existent things (siddha) is recognized, these are looked upon as arthavāda, ‘explanatory passages’, i.e., passages explaining the injunctions. In the context of any siddha passage another passage can be found which prescribes an action and to which the siddha can be related. It is obvious that this practice may become artificial when dealing with passages like the famous ‘tat tvam asi.’

The Advaita view is that the Vedic propositions refer to both siddha and sādhya, but that the siddha statements are the most important. We saw already instances of the fact that Śaṅkara does not reject, but subordinates. The same occurs in this context. Whereas the activity which is prescribed in śruti is supposed to be able to help us and to lead us to heaven (svarga) and prosperity (abhyudaya),256 Śaṅkara holds that the siddha passages are not connected with any action but establish the knowledge of Brahman, which is mokṣa and the highest good (niḥśreyasa).257 Such siddha

passages treat directly of matters of fact (bhūta-vastu), which is especially important in mahāvākyas like ‘tat tvam asi’. The relative validity of the Mīmāṁsaka point of view is expressed in the saying quoted above: vyāvahāre Bhāṭṭa-nayaḥ, ‘in the level of everyday experience the opinion of the Bhāṭṭa holds’.258

 

It may be lastly remarked that Advaita remains close to this Mīmāṁsaka point of view in as far as even these purely indicative passages are of importance only in as far as they embody the knowledge which is mokṣa. They are not of purely theoretical interest, as are greater portions of Western philosophy in certain respects.259

It is clear that according to Śaṅkara the Pūrva and Uttara Mīmāṁsās are not conflicting views but merely refer to different realms. The higher goal is that for which the Uttara Mīmāṁsā-unstrivingly-strives. It must be remembered however260 that Uttara Mīmāṁsā is in certain respects a continuation of Pūrva Mīmāṁsā. Advaita has developed on the basis of Pūrva Mīmāṁsā and it can be rightly said that ‘Śaṅkara's work is entirely pervaded by Mīmāṁsā’.261 Notwithstanding the explicit differences between the two Mīmāṁsās, it is possible to trace several common points. This is also the view of Pūrva Mīmāṁsā itself.262 A comparable view is advocated by Viśiṣṭādvaita as against Advaita: ‘The two Mīmāṁsās are really integral parts of one systematic whole, and their object is to lead the seeker after truth step by step till he ascends to his home in the absolute. Rāmānuja, following Bodhāyana, therefore thinks that the entire Mīmāṁsā Śāstra.... has a definite spiritual meaning and value .... The Vedavādin who follows karma .... realizes its perishing value and tries to become the Brahmavādin. The transition from karma-vicāra to Brahmavicāra thus involves temporal sequence as well as logical consequence’ says Srinivasachari.263 The same opinion is defended by the Viśiṣṭādvaitin Vātsya Varada, about whom Dasgupta remarks: ‘Vātsya Varada holds that the study of Vedic injunction and the

inquiry relating to Brahman form the parts of one unified scripture, i.e. the latter follows or is a continuation of the former; and he mentions Bodhāyana in his support’.264

 

The word atha with which the Brahmasūtra commences (athāto brahmajijñāsā) is not an argument in favour of the opinion that Uttara Mīmāṁsā is merely a continuation of Pūrva Mīmāṁsā. For the Pūrva Mīmāṁsā sūtra starts in the same manner (athāto dharmajijñāsā). Śaṅkara and Śabara commenting upon the first sūtra of Jaimini and Bādarāyaṇa respectively interpret atha in the same manner: it denotes immediate sequence and signifies that both jijñāsās follow immediately upon the recitation of the Veda (Vedādhyāyana). Śaṅkara denies that Brahmajijñāsā can only take place after dharmajijñāsā: ‘For a man who has read the Vedānta portions of the Veda it is possible to enter on the inquiry into Brahman even before engaging in the inquiry into dharma’. The reason is of course that no action can give access to Brahman: ‘the knowledge of active religious duty has for its fruit transitory felicity, and that again depends on the performance of religious acts. The inquiry into Brahman, on the other hand, has for its fruit eternal bliss and does not depend on the performance of any acts’.265

 

There were also important teachers, not only amongst the Mīmāṁsakas but also amongst the Vedāntins, who apparently disagreed with Śaṅkara that only jñāna effects mokṣa. In Mīmāṁsā, through Vedāntic influence attention was also paid to mokṣa as a higher aim than svarga. But it was held that the seekers for mokṣa should not abstain from all karma but only from kāmyaharma and pratiṣiddhakarma, the activities leading to respectively good and bad births. Nobody can abstain from the performance of nityakarma; otherwise he will be disobeying the Vedic law.266

 

A combination of knowledge and works, jñānakarmasamuccaya, was not only held by the Mīmāṁsakas (e.g. Kumārila), but also by the Vedāntin Brahmadatta.267 It occurs likewise in the

Yoga-Vāsiṣṭha.268 It is noteworthy, that also Maṇḍana Miśra was apparently a samuccayavādin; but not the celebrated Sureśvara269 (the latter two were therefore not identical, notwithstanding tradition, unless there was a change of opinion which is perfectly possible),270 who was on the contrary very clear about the difference between karma and jñāna:271 ‘He alone is eligible to the study of the Vedāntas, who has renounced all actions without residue ....’.272 And elsewhere: ‘Action is required in respect of what is to be accomplished (sādhya). In respect of the established (siddha) it is of no use.’273 ‘Knowledge removes entirely all action’274 And more in particular about rites and about the act of meditation: ‘Rites are enjoined on the man who is endowed with nescience’.275 According to Sureśvara, Mīmāṁsā is wrong when it holds that mokṣa results from the injunction ‘meditate’ (upāsīta), just as abhyudaya results from the injunction ‘perform the rite’ (kurvītḥ kratum).276 For ‘the good (śreyaḥ) is one thing, the pleasing (preyaḥ) quite another’.277 And combined: ‘Nor is knowledge of one self dependent on practice (abhyāsa); nor is it dependent on meditation (bhāvanā) for the sake of release’.278 The jñānakarmasamuccaya-sādhana is also explicitly mentioned and refuted in the Aitareyopaniṣadbhāṣya ascribed to Śaṅkara.279

 

In later Advaita a difference arises concerning the relation between karma and jñāna between the Bhāmatī and the Vivaraṇa schools. In the Bhāmatī karma is called a remote auxiliary (ārādupakāraka) for the generation of knowledge; for through its influ-

ence sin can decrease, and with the cessation of sin sattva, i.e., the intellect, is purified. This leads to the desire for knowledge and hence to pure knowledge.280 That karma is cause of the desire for knowledge can be inferred from a text of the Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad:281 ‘That (Self) the Brahmins desire to know through study of the Veda, through sacrifice, through gifts and through austerities like fasting’.282 Following the same śruti Sureśvara says: ‘Reciting the Vedas etc. are for the sake of generating the desire to know the inner Self (pratyagvividiṣā)’.283

 

According to the Vivaraṇa school, however, karma is useful in generating vidyā itself: it is a proximate auxiliary (sannipatyaupakāraka). This comes nearer to the Mīmāṁsakā view. The Vivaraṇa view occurs in the Vedāntaparibhāsā: ‘And this knowledge (i.e., brahmajñāna) results from consumption of sin (pāpakṣaya), while this (in turn) results from observance of (obligatory) rites (i.e. nityakarma); there is thus indirect utility for rites’.284

At first sight it seems that a kind of samuccayavāda of jñāna and karma occurs in the Bhagavad Gītā for it teaches renunciation from the fruits of works as the means to mokṣa and this is not the same as jñāna. Moreover the Gītā seems to combine different tendencies. Since the Gītā is one of the three members of the prasthānatraya Śaṅkara has in his Gītābhāya given an Advaitic interpretation. This interpretation can neither be logically proved, nor refuted, as it declares that all non-Advaitic passages, like the saprapañca-passages of the Upaniṣads, refer to the vyāvahārika-realm (see below). This interpretation, which recon-ciles the different tendencies, is defended by some scholars,285 but rejected by others.286 The historical problem need not occupy us

here,287 neither the kindred problem of Śaṅkara's correctness in interpreting the Brahmasūtras.288

 

To give an idea of the complications which can arise in interpreting the Gītā we may quote a verse translated by F. Edgerton as follows:289

 
Action arises from Brahman, know;
 
And Brahman springs from the Imperishable (akṣara);
 
Therefore the universal Brahman
 
Is eternally based on worship (yajñe pratiṣṭhitam).

This śloka seems to state clearly the efficacy of karma for those who want to reach Brahman. But according to the traditional view, if the words are understood in their ordinary sense Brahman cannot be the highest in the Gītā, where Kṛṣṇa is an avatāra of Brahman (not of Viṣṇu). Therefore the terms akṣara and brahma are said to denote each a different concept according to the great commentators. But the Ācāryas differ on the other hand greatly

in the actual interpretation of what the terms denote. Thus Śaṅkara interprets brahma as the Veda and akṣara as the nirguṇabrahman; Rāmānuja interprets brahma as prakṛti (hesitatingly followed by Edgerton in his note) and akṣara as the jīvātman; and Madhva accepts brahma in the ordinary sense whilst interpreting akṣara as the text of the Veda.290

 

As an example of the typical Advaitic way of interpretation another śloka may be quoted, which again seems nearer to Mīmāṁsā or the Brāhmaṇas than to Advaita or even samuccayavāda. This śloka is translated by Edgerton as follows

 
The (sacrificial) presentation is Brahman; Brahman is the oblation;
 
In the (sacrificial) fire of Brahman it is poured by Brahman;
 
 
 
Just to Brahman must he go,
 
Being concentrated upon the (sacrificial section that is Brahman).

Śaṅkara stresses the unreality of everything apart from the absolute by speaking about ‘the instrument by which the oblation is poured in the fire’ as being ‘nothing but Brahman (tat brahmaiva iti). He declares in the commentary that ultimately all action is unreal: ‘the action performed by him who wishes to set an example to the world is in reality no action (karma paramārthato 'karma), as it has been destroyed by the realisation of Brahman (brahmabuddhyupamṛditatvāt)’. The reason is that ‘to one who realises that all is Brahman there is no action’.291

 

The Bhagavad Gītā presents fundamental problems. It cannot easily be maintained that it reacts against karma in an Advaitic way; it cannot even be said with certainty that its teaching constitutes at all a reaction against karma. It may be that in the Gītā an attempt is made to synthetise the karmic and the non-karmic trends of Indian thought. One example from later Indian thought shows that the doctrine of karma was also overcome in

another way-although related to the Gītā. It occurs in Viśiṣṭādvaita, especially in the Teṅkalai school. In the whole of Viśiṣṭādvaita bhakti-yoga counts more than jñāna-yoga. Mukti is defined as the conquest of karma by kṛpā, ‘redemptive love’.292 Īśvara rules the world by His relentless law of karma’, says Srinivasachari,293 ‘and His holy wrath against the evil-doer is inescapable, but the rigour of karma is overpowered by the redemptive love of kṛpā. Evil is destroyed and the evil-doer saved’.

 

In the two schools of the later Viśiṣṭādvaita, the Northern school (Vaḍakalai) recognizes a certain usefulness of works, whereas the Southern school (Teṅkalai) only believes in grace, prapatti and the utter inefficacy of works, emphasising the unconditional nature of God's grace (nirhetuka kaṭākṣa)294 and the emptiness of all other means (upāya-śūnyatā).295

 

These doctrines parallel the attitude of Protestantism in Christianity, where salvation can be gained sola fide, ‘through faith alone’. This parallelism has been studied by R. Otto.296

 

So karma is replaced by jñāna i.e., the sacrifice, with its unity of the spiritual and the material, has been overcome by a purely spiritual entity (indicating therefore the presence also of a purely material entity). Thus a new concept of being is evolved. It remains for us to understand this jñāna which is as mokṣa and Brahman at the same time the new concept of being.


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