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Advaita and Neoplatonism (1961)

Advaita and Neoplatonism

(1961)–Frits Staal–rechtenstatus Auteursrechtelijk beschermd

A Critical Study in Comparative Philosophy


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1. Scripture: śruti and smṛti

A few well known facts, to be constantly referred to below, will be mentioned here. The term śruti (‘what is heard’), denotes the revelation received by the seers (ṛṣis) and handed over by them to their descendants who did not receive any direct revelation.23 Being itself not of human or personal origin (apauruṣeya), it consists of the mantras (saṃhitās), the brāhmaṇas, the āraṇyakas and the upaniṣads. The smṛti (‘what is remembered’), which is of human origin but inspired by the texts of the śruti, consists for example of the sūtras24 along with the Darśana literature, vedāṇgas, upavedas, dharmaśāstras, itihāsas and purāṇas.25

 

The doctrine of the superhuman, impersonal origin of the Veda (apauruṣeyatva), stressing the principal difference between śruti and smṛti as between direct experience and memory, is the Mīmāṁsā doctrine and was rejected for instance by the Naiyāyikas who held the Veda to be the work of Īśvara and therefore pauruṣeya. The position of Advaita is that the Vedas are apauruṣeya but nevertheless the work of Īśvara, who is the Absolute conditioned by māyā.26 The Naiyāyika reasoning does not hold, as any utterance by a person need not be paurunṣeya: the guru for instance utters knowledge which is apauruṣeya, as there is

‘contingence of personal origin through the succession of teachers’.27 Accordingly, apauruṣeyatva ‘consists in the fact that the Vedas in this creation are exactly like those in the previous creation and so on without beginning’.28 According to the Vedāntaparibhāṣā: ‘in the initial period of creation Parameśvara created the Veda with the same sequence as the sequence of the Veda existent in earlier creation, but not a Veda of a kind different from that....’.29

 

It seems that the Vedāntic view concerning the superhuman character of the Veda finds more support in the text of the Ṛgveda itself than the Nyāya view. There are references to knowledge supernaturally communicated or favours divinely conferred on Vaśiṣṭa and on Viśvāmitra. Sometimes the divine speech (vāk) is described as having entered into the ṛṣis, whereas a miraculous power is attributed to their prayers. Ghate who gathered these references concludes therefore that ‘it is quite clear that some of the ancient ṛṣis entertained a belief, though, no doubt, indistinct and hesitating, in their own inspiration.’30 Thus, the words of the Veda were ‘expired’ by Brahman and immediately observed (‘heard’ - cf. śruti: ‘seen’ - cf. ṛṣi) by the ‘inspired’ sages.31

 

This impersonal and superhuman ‘sacred knowledge’ (veda) consists in the saṁhitā portions mainly of hymns, prayers and ritual formulas. The object to be secured is not mokṣa (release, as in the Vedāntic systems) or even svarga (heaven, as in the Pūrva Mīmāṁsā), but ‘a long life for full hundred years, prosperity, warlike offspring, in short, all pleasures of this earth. Conquest of enemies, freedom from diseases, abundance of food and drink seem to be the happiest ideal which the Vedic ṛṣis placed before themselves’.32 When sacrifice is introduced how-

ever, the above aim undergoes, as we will see, a certain modification.

 

The Brāhmaṇas are in particular concerned with the sacrifice or ritual act (karma) par excellence, which we will consider below. The Āraṇyakas form the transition to the Upaniṣads, which represent the jñānamārga, ‘way of knowledge’, in opposition to the karmamārga, ‘way of action’. The respective portions of the Vedic literature are accordingly called karmakāṇḍa and jñānakāṇḍa. But this Vedāntic distinction is not accepted by Mīmāṁśā, which looks upon the Veda as karmakāṇḍa only. The road which (according to Advaita) having started with the recitation of the mantras, leads from action to knowledge, goes via meditation (upāsanā), as could be seen for instance from the parallelism which is sometimes established between the four parts of the śruti and the four stages of life (āśrama): the student, brahmacārī has to recite the mantras; the householder, gṛhastha, has to perform the actions and rites as prescribed mainly in the Brāhmaṇas; the forest-dweller, vānaprastha, has to perform meditations as dealt with in the forest books, Āraṇyakas; and the saṁnyāsin's task is to find the ultimate knowledge (jñāna). Mīmāṁsā accordingly rejects saṁnyāsa. But in Advaita, since knowledge is unconnected with karma or meditation, one can at any time go beyond the āśramas33 and become a saṁnyāsin who is atyāśramin. This is a typically Advaitic view, which is for instance expressed in the Mahābhārata in the ‘dialogue between father and son’, where the father represents the orthodox view, that renunciation should come at the end of the āśrama discipline, whereas the son wants to take up saṁnyāsa immediately.34 Śaṅkara himself became according to tradition a saṁnyāsin at an early age

(as still do his successors in the four maṭhas).35 The Nambudiri Mīmāṁsakas of his community disapproved of this. On the other hand, the legendary conversion of the Mīmāṁsaka, Maṇḍana Miśra, to Advaita36 is expressed in his taking up of saṁnyāsa under the new name Sureśvara.

 

This short description shows that the Upaniṣads, the jñānakāṇḍa, constitute the most important source for all later philosophical systems, which each in their own way aim at knowledge besides the other aim, especially stressed by some, i.e. release (there is in Advaita a close connection between the two). But it should not be forgotten that this knowledge is in fact the successor of meditation, so that the later generations were facing two possibilities: either to accept these results as apauruṣeya, revelation, faithful and dogmatic, as authority; or, to perform again the original existential act and arrive at the same knowledge by performing themselves the meditation as prescribed in the text, i.e., meditating on the basis of the text, not ‘freely’. Thus the apauruṣeya experience of the ancient seers is utilised, but personally regained.

 

The old duality karma-jñāna corresponds among the later darśanas (viewpoints, rather than systems)37, to the two-fold aim: dharma and brahma of (Pūrva) Mīmāṁsā and Vedānta respectively. The proper denomination, pūrva and uttara mīmāṁsā is more instructive. Mīmāṁsā is a term derived from the root man-, ‘to think’ (cf. manas). This derivative has the function of desire and intensification; mīmāṁsā could therefore be translated as ‘attempt an intense reflection’. In both cases this refers to meditation which will lead to (Mūmāṁsā) or which will have to make place for (Advaita) knowledge. The difference is gradual: Pūrva Mīmāṁsā means the first, the earlier, the previous meditation (a denomination given, of course, by the Vedāntins expressing their advancement with regard to the Mīmāṁsakas); Uttara Mīmāṁsā

means the ultimate, final meditation. When it is said that Pūrva Mīmāṁsā deals with the interpretation of acts and rituals as prescribed in the Veda (especially in the Brāhmanas) and Vedānta with pure knowledge, it should not be forgotten that the link between the two is the act of meditation. The reflection on texts dealing with sacrifice in the Pūrva Mīmāṁsā can be intensified and become a meditation which will ultimately be replaced by the highest knowledge. The word dharma as occurring in the first sūtra of Jaimini's Mīmāṁsāsūtra: ‘Then therefore the enquiry into dharma’ (athāto dharmajijñāsā) refers to the religious duties and acts to be performed; their study can be looked upon as a first meditation. The ultimate meditation, however, will make place for the knowing of the Absolute itself, and thus it is but natural that Bādarāyana's Brahmasūra begins with: ‘Then therefore the enquiry into Brahman’ (athāto brahmajijñāsā).

 

Terms like jñāna (also vidyā) cannot be simply identified with Western terms like knowledge, Erkenntnis, connaissance or even gnōsis (though the Gnostic use of the latter term resembles the Vedātic usage of the Sanskrit term). They have to be understood in their context and against the background of the sacrifice, of which they are, as it were, an interiorisation in a particular way to be specified below. Thus Sénart could translate the term vidyā and its counterpart avidyā, as they occur in the Chāndogyopaniṣad, by ‘magical efficiency of knowledge and inefficiency of its contrary’.38

 

We are now in a position to see: (1) that śruti and smṛti are related to each other as immediate experience and mediate memory; (2) that the second depends on the first in such a way that smṛti as ‘second-hand (human) exposition of the (divine) inspiration’, can become ‘memory’ through a meditation or reflection and thus become knowledge, i.e., first-hand knowledge, comparable to the original immediate experience of the sages; (3) therefore that knowledge as used in this context is derived from a meditation on a revealed text, in such a way that the derived knowledge rises to the level of the original knowledge.39

We see, therefore, that where there seemed to be an unbridgeable gap between human and divine knowledge, a closer analysis shows that there is in fact continuity, the reason being that smṛti ‘memory’, becomes knowledge, when the original knowledge, which constituted śruti, is regained. There are texts, where this fundamental and cognitive aspect of ‘memory’ is stressed; some are collected by Coomaraswamy.40 We may quote as an example the Chādogyopaniṣad: ‘Memory is from the Self’ (ātmatah smaraḥ).41 There are traces in Buddhist literature too. In the Dīgha Nikāya it is said that the Gods fall from heaven only when their ‘memory fails and they are of confused memory’.42

 

If meditation on a revealed text leads to a knowledge comparable to that which was possessed by the seers of the revealed text, we find here announced a very interesting doctrine which combines infallible authority with independent philosophical reflection.

 

There seems to be no justification in śruti itself, which directly enjoins that one should attempt to regain the original knowledge. The term vidhi43 means injunction, formula, precept, especially (in the Brāhmanas) the injunction for the performance of a rite, a ritual act or sacrifice, as for instance injunctions of the form: yajeta, ‘he ought to sacrifice’, kuryāt, ‘he ought to perform’. This is further developed in Mimāṁsā. While Advaita accepts the Mīmāṁsaka interpretation of vidhi, it lays more stress on the jñāna aspect, as we shall see below.


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