Indo-European language which led to comparative linguistics. In this field objective standards enable us to pass judgments which may be universally accepted by scholars as ‘objectively true.’
Likewise, the study of a variety of religious developments, partly Indian, led in Europe to the comparative study of religions. Here the material is completely different from that of the preceding case: the contents of a religion represent absolute truth for the adherents, whereas the student of different religions has at the same time either his own religion, or conceptions which he believes to take the place of a religion. In this context the problem of truth arises and two attitudes become possible: (1) the ‘phenomenological attitude’, which leaves out the question of truth; this is embodied in the ‘phenomenology of religion’; (2) what may be called the ‘missionary attitude’ (though its propounders need not be missionaries, nor have any desire to make propaganda for their own religion), which takes as its starting point the acceptance of the truth of one's own religion. Advantages and disadvantages of both attitudes are obvious: the first method is more reliable and makes a more scientific impression, but it is poor in that it is restricted to the studies of forms and manifestations (‘phenomena’ in the pre-phenomenological sense) and cannot have access to what is most essential to the religious human being: religious belief, faith, experience or conviction, each with its presumed transforming power. Apart from this, the first method may unconsciously depend upon what is accepted as truth according to one's own religion. The second method is at any rate at the same level as the religion studied, but it is subjective.
In the comparative study of philosophy the complications are greater. Whereas the comparative study of religions has no pretention of being itself a religion, comparative philosophy is, according to the term, philosophy. This makes the subject dependent upon the concept of philosophy, itself one of the major problems of philosophy. If it is denied that the subject is an aspect or part of philosophy, the situation becomes easier, the question of truth can be left out and it seems that a purely descriptive phenomenological method would be sufficient. But, apart from the inevitable danger caused by the influences of unconscious prejudices, a new question arises: what is the significance of comparative philosophy?