The conceptual foundations of decision-making in a democracy
(2003)–Peter Pappenheim– Auteursrechtelijk beschermdPeter Pappenheim, The conceptual foundations of decision-making in a democracy. Barjesteh van Waalwijk van Doorn & Co's Uitgeversmaatschappij, Rotterdam 2003
DBNL-TEI 1
Wijze van coderen: standaard
-
gebruikt exemplaar
eigen exemplaar DBNL
algemene opmerkingen
Dit bestand biedt, behoudens een aantal hierna te noemen ingrepen, een diplomatische weergave van The conceptual foundations of decision-making in a democracy van Peter Pappenheim uit 2003.
redactionele ingrepen
In deze digitale uitgave zijn correcties van de auteur doorgevoerd.
p. IV: This book may not reproduced→ This book may not be reproduced.
Op de achterkant van p. 295 is abusievelijk p. 40 gedrukt, waarna een blanco pagina volgt. Deze beide pagina's zijn in deze digitale editie komen te vervallen.
Bij de omzetting van de gebruikte bron naar deze publicatie in de dbnl is een aantal delen van de tekst niet overgenomen. Hieronder volgen de tekstgedeelten die wel in het origineel voorkomen maar hier uit de lopende tekst zijn weggelaten. Ook de blanco pagina's (p. II, X, 30, 82, 126, 164, 230, 244, 248, 272, 372, 386, 398, 418, 440) zijn niet opgenomen in de lopende tekst.
[pagina III]
The Conceptual Foundations of Decision-making in a Democracy
Peter Pappenheim
Website: www.project-democracy.com
Barjesteh van Waalwijk van Doorn & Co's Uitgeversmaatschappij
Rotterdam 2003
[pagina IV]
Published and produced by Barjesteh van Waalwijk van Doorn & Co's Uitgeversmaatschappij,
PO.box 42518, 3006 DA Rotterdam, the Netherlands,
e-mail: barjesteh@planet.nl
© Copyright 2003 by Peter Pappenheim and Barjesteh van Waalwijk van Doorn & Co's Uitgeversmaatschappij.
ISBN 90-5613-072-2
This book may not be reproduced, in whole or in part, by photocopy or print or any other means, without written permission from the publishers.
[pagina V]
CONTENTS OF VOLUME ONE
INTRODUCTION | |
A) Background + objective, intended audience and standards | 1 |
B) The structure of this book | 5 |
C) Conclusion: democracy must be earned | 8 |
1) PART ONE: THE DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY AND ITS NORMS | |
1.1) Norms in general | 11 |
1.2) What is democracy? | 15 |
1.3) Decisions in a democracy | 19 |
1.4) Norms in a democratic society | 23 |
1.5) Democracy is a culture, including ethics and morals | 26 |
1.6) Truth and justice in a democracy | 28 |
2a) PART TWO: LIFE AND INFORMATION, A) WHAT IS LIFE | |
2a.1) Introduction | 31 |
2a.2) The main features of living beings | 31 |
2a.3) The language of life | 33 |
2a.4) Life is a process with a direction | 34 |
2a.5) How does life do it? | 40 |
2a.6) Evolution is now | 43 |
2a.7) Some remarks about functionality | 44 |
2a.8) Steps in evolution | 46 |
2a.9) Living/inert versus organic/inorganic | 48 |
2b) PART TWO: LIFE AND INFORMATION, B) INFORMATION | |
2b.1) What is information? | 51 |
2b.2) An illustration of the subjectivity of information | 55 |
2b.3) Subject, object and the notion of ‘I’ | 61 |
2b.4) Communication | 65 |
2b.5) The holistic nature of life and information | 67 |
2b.6) Parallel versus sequential information processing; reason and rationality | 72 |
2b.7) Holarchy | 74 |
2b.8) Knowledge versus information | 78 |
3a) PART THREE: TRUTH and KNOWLEDGE, A) KNOWLEDGE | |
3a.1) Introduction | 83 |
3a.2) Can knowledge be objective? | 86 |
3a.3) Private versus social knowledge | 96 |
3a.4) Science and culture | 97 |
[pagina VI]
3b) PART THREE: TRUTH and KNOWLEDGE, B) SCIENTIFIC THEORIES | |
3b.1) Introduction | 99 |
3b.2) Induction: the rationality of learning from experience | 99 |
3b.3) Scientific theories | 103 |
3b.4) The testability of scientific theories | 108 |
3b.5) A demarcation criterion for empirical scientific theories | 113 |
3b.6) Comparing empirical scientific theories | 115 |
3b.7) The axiomatisation of scientific theories | 119 |
3b.8) Summary and conclusions of truth in social decision-making | 123 |
4a) PART FOUR: JUSTICE, A) THE THEORY | |
4a.1) What is justice? | 127 |
4a.2) Justice as a function and a tool | 131 |
4a.3) Subjective/conventional is not synonymous with arbitrary/capricious/random/irrational | 133 |
4a.4) Justice is a matter of authority. To preserve our autonomy, we must establish its priority and fight for it | 135 |
4a.5) Some remarks on the culture of individualism and rationalism | 137 |
4a.6) Justice: man's alternative to instinct | 140 |
4a.7) Individualism, autonomy and freedom | 142 |
4a.8) A pure contract theory of justice | 148 |
4a.9) The principles of justice in pure contract theory | 150 |
4a.10) Three types of procedural justice | 151 |
4a.11) Justice versus efficiency | 153 |
4a.12) Getting the contract signed | 155 |
4a.13) From theory to practice | 157 |
4b) PART FOUR: JUSTICE, B) A JUST INCOME DISTRIBUTION | |
4b.1) The issues and some definitions | 165 |
4b.2) The libertarian income distribution | 167 |
4b.3) The egalitarian income distribution | 177 |
4b.4) The two boundary conditions of a democratic income distribution | 182 |
4b.5) A grey area: common goods | 184 |
4b.6) Functions which the state has to fulfil | 191 |
4b.7) Financing state functions | 192 |
4b. 8) Enter economics | 195 |
4b.9) The democratic income policy | 200 |
4b.10) Capital and inheritance | 206 |
4b.11) Social security | 210 |
4b.12) The right to work | 215 |
4b. 13) Conclusions and remarks | 217 |
[pagina VII]
5) PART FIVE: DEMOCRATIC ARGUMENTATION | |
5.1) Introduction | 219 |
5.2) The need of procedures for establishing facts | 219 |
5.3) Logic and mathematics: shared conventions to establish relations between facts | 220 |
5.4) The rhetoric of democratic argumentation: conviction, not persuasion | 223 |
5.5) The social context | 225 |
5.6) Towards democratic argumentation | 226 |
6) PART SIX: DEMOCRACY MUST BE EARNED. | |
6b.1) Introduction | 231 |
6b.2) The institutionalisation of the establishment of facts | 233 |
6b.3) The social responsibility of science | 237 |
CONTENTS OF VOLUME TWO
JUSTIFICATIONS AND ADDENDA (J&A) | ||
(The number between brackets is the number of the corresponding chapter in volume one) | ||
J&A TO PART ONE: ‘THE DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY’ | ||
Philosophers on norms and morals(1.1) | 245 | |
J&A TO PART TWO: ‘LIFE AND INFORMATION’ | ||
Nurture versus nature (2a.4) | 249 | |
Evolution as an explanation of the origin of species (2a.6) | 250 | |
The quantification of information (2a.9) | 252 | |
a) The potential of information | 252 | |
b) The efficiency of information processing tools | 253 | |
More than physics and chemistry (2a.9) | 255 | |
Meaning: Michael Polanyi. (2b.1) | 259 | |
Subjective and functional have no connection with selfish (2b3.3) | 265 | |
Sense and Referent: Frege (2b.4) | 267 | |
JUSTIFICATIONS AND ADDENDA TO PART THREE: ‘TRUTH’ | ||
Truth and falsity (3a.1.2) | 273 | |
Freeman on Objective knowledge (3a.2) | 278 | |
Against Feyerabend's anarchy (3b.1) | 279 | |
Summary | 279 | |
Feyerabend's arguments do not justify radical anarchism | 279 | |
New theories often lack testing methods | 283 | |
No rules are absolute | 284 | |
The incommensurability of scientific theories | 285 |
[pagina VIII]
Popper's non-solution of Hume's problem of induction and rationality (3b.2) | 287 | ||
Hume's problem of induction | 287 | ||
Only a functional concept of rationality can solve Hume's problem | 289 | ||
Popper on scientific theories (3b.3) | |||
Why Popper's demarcation criterion is not adequate | 291 | ||
Popper on stochastic theories | 292 | ||
The role of initial conditions in evaluating tests | 293 | ||
Against the autonomous existence of Popper's world three objects (3b.3) | 296 | ||
Lakatos: Research as a program (3b.3.2) | 304 | ||
The context of the evaluation of scientific theories (3b.8) | 307 | ||
ADDENDA TO PART FOUR A/B: ‘JUSTICE’ AND ‘A JUST INCOME DISTRIBUTION’. (These do not refer to specific chapters) | |||
Kant's legacy | 311 | ||
Introduction | 311 | ||
Autonomy | 313 | ||
Freedom | 316 | ||
Categorical imperative versus subjective equality | 317 | ||
Who can claim a right? | 321 | ||
Concluding remark | 321 | ||
Locke/Nozick | 321 | ||
Summary | 321 | ||
Locke | 322 | ||
Nozick | 324 | ||
The foundation of a society antedates the emergence of rights | 325 | ||
Locke's and Nozick's theory rests on an atrophied concept of man and society | 327 | ||
More concrete objections | 329 | ||
Nozick's weakness is his professional modesty | 331 | ||
Rousseau | 332 | ||
Conclusions of our historical review of contract theory | 337 | ||
Rawls | |||
Summary | 338 | ||
Introduction | 339 | ||
Justice as fairness | 340 | ||
A contract theory can be based only on one principle: autonomy. | |||
The original position is at best a heuristic devise, and never can be a justification for any principle | 341 | ||
The original position does not lead to all of Rawls' conclusions | 344 | ||
Rawls' original position is not the state of nature | 345 | ||
Justice can refer only to decisions | 346 |
[pagina IX]
In contract theory, justice is uncompromising. Okun's conflict between justice and efficiency is self-created through an erroneous concept of justice, as is Rawls' problem with compliance | 346 | ||
Rawls' view of society is not very clear and seems one-sided | 347 | ||
The difference principle is not unequivocal | 348 | ||
Rawls' reflective equilibrium is an interesting concept | 349 | ||
Buchanan: a pure but ‘asocial’ contract theory | 352 | ||
Roskam Abbingh: the ethics of income distribution | 355 | ||
CAPITA SELECTA | |||
Body and mind | 361 | ||
Introduction | 361 | ||
The identity theory: Herbert Feigl | 362 | ||
Duality of body and mind: John Eccles | 365 | ||
Paradoxes: a sure sign of an error of thought | 373 | ||
The liar: misunderstanding the information process | 373 | ||
Achilles and the tortoise: assumes the autonomous existence of world three objects | 375 | ||
Determinism versus free will | 377 | ||
Introduction | 377 | ||
Determinism | 377 | ||
Own will versus free will | 381 | ||
Marx and Hegel and democratic decision-making | 387 | ||
Marx | 387 | ||
Hegel. 1) Hegel's Spirit | 389 | ||
2) Dialectic and Antinomies | 393 | ||
Wittgenstein | 399 | ||
Knowledge and human understanding as a social venture | 401 | ||
1) Stephen Toulmin: Human understanding | 401 | ||
2) Incommensurability of conceptual systems and scientific research programs: Collingwood/Kuhn | 407 | ||
3) The social responsibility of scientists: Ravetz | 410 | ||
Order, disorder and chaos as applied to living systems | 419 | ||
The confusion about reality | 423 | ||
1) Quantum theory | 423 | ||
2) Philosophical postmodernism and its guru Rorty | 427 | ||
BIBLIOGRAPHY | 436 |