On Growth Two

41. Takahiko Noguchi

Professor Takahiko Noguchi was born on June 28, 1937, in Tokyo. He was graduated from Waseda University in Tokyo in 1963 and took his doctorate in literature at Tokyo University in 1966. Since 1968 he has taught literature at the University of Kobe, where this interview took place. From 1970 to 1972 he was a guest lecturer at the Yen Ching Institute at Harvard University. His writings include The World of Yukio Mishima, Poetry and Truth in Edo Literature, and Tanizaki Junichiro.

Would you characterize modern Japan as a nation or as a huge tribe?

Japan is a so-called monoracial nation, linguistically and ethnically,

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though there are complicated arguments prevailing on the origin of the Japanese people. We could say modern Japan is especially characterized by its strong uniformity.

The emphasis lies on group identity?

Yes.

In other words, the sanity of the masses is kept in balance by feeling secure through the group.

Here we might have a problem of finding a definition for the word ‘group.’ If you mean by ‘group’ a family and its analogous system, such as a small society or a company, my answer is yes.

You would include companies such as Mitsubishi, Yamaha, Sony, Honda, and the like?

Before World War Two, Mitsubishi, for example, was a very important family, a giant family trust with strong influence. But I think this group changed its character.

In what way?

They ceased to be a mere family. They moved into another system of grouping, beyond the family system in its narrow sense.

More like a small society.

Right. It contains various social elements.

And class differences?

It does contain some classes. Mitsubishi is a superclass: many other Japanese companies are under its influence. They have the system of white collar workers who harbor strong feelings of fidelity toward the company.

One reads in the papers about radical student groups, pro-Moscow leftists and pro-Peking leftists, attacking one another.

What we often read about these days is a conflict between two major groups of young radicals who are neither pro-Moscow nor pro-Peking. They are the Chukaku-ha, the Revolutionary Core Group, and the Kakamura-ha, the Revolutionary Marxist League. The two groups continuously clash and attack each other in an almost tragic way, though originally both came from the same organization. They are independent of the political influence of the Japanese Communist Party, as well as of Moscow and Peking. After being

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hardened by several bloody riots, the police power in Japan has become very strong, so it has become increasingly difficult for these radical groups to attack political causes.

But are there also Communist students who support either Moscow or Peking?

Yes, there are. But the situation is rather complicated. Before the well-known polycentralization of the Communist world, being under the influence of the Japanese Communist Party meant per se being loyal to Moscow or Peking. Now, after the schism, the political climate has changed. There is a younger group, called Minshuseinen-domei, the Union of Democratic Youths, which is under the influence of the JCP. There is also a smaller pro-Peking group that is independent of the JCP.

What is the background of radical students attacking fellow students?

There is a technical term for this in psychoanalysis - the sibling complex - which explains hatred among blood relations, for instance, that which may occur between an elder and a younger brother. We could compare these violent clashes with the same kind of clashes in the past among groups intimately related to one other.

Also among friends?

Yes. I used the term sibling complex in a rather allegorical way.

What feeds this hatred?

That is an extremely difficult question. First, many of these young radicals have lost their common political vision.

Because of police pressures.

Right. Secondly, traditionally in the Japanese radical movement there exists a kind of hatred among members. The reason for this is that young radicals are excessively sensitive and alert in theoretical matters. There are sharp conflicts concerning the differences of their political opinions. Very often these are only slight differences in minor variance with the viewpoint of the common people, say, for instance, different ideas concerning minute details of revolutionary plans and programs. But to these young men, even the slightest difference can be of crucial importance.

I have the impression from talking to a number of students that a general mood of pessimism prevails about changing the power structure.

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I think the young progressives are too much in despair to design concrete plans which force sudden changes. The Liberal Democratic Party is still very strong - strong enough to maintain a half-eternal government. The young are disappointed. In their view the Communist Party and the Socialist Party exist simply to complement the Establishment.

But your nation seems rich, welfare for most is abundant, the economy is strong and healthy. People therefore don't fight for ideals.

That, unfortunately, is not how things are in this country. Here is a hidden truth about the Japanese economy. Ask any average Japanese worker. He does not feel he is rich. Japan as a nation may seem rich, but the majority of its people have no feeling of being wealthy and its welfare is lagging behind.

Especially with the worldwide energy crisis. How does the state of emergency declared by the government during late 1973 affect people? Is there panic? How do the masses react?

So far there is little sign of the Japanese being seized by panic. People seem to expect a gradual improvement in the government's economic policy to stop the progress of inflation. However, there also is a serious accumulation of social discomforts. Nobody can foretell what will be the result of this mass frustration. Some even say that the present social atmosphere reminds them of the eve of World War Two.

Does the average worker in Japan share in the affluence?

I do not think so. One sign of affluence may be the number of people who can afford to travel abroad. I just returned from Europe, where I saw many Japanese traveling. I admit we must have money to go abroad. Sometimes we have money to go abroad, but very often we do not have enough money to own a house or even to rent a decent apartment.

How would you describe the present mood of your own students? What is on their minds?

A kind of change of climate is taking place. What I mean is this: Two or three years ago, every university professor had to go through a period of so-called students' aggressive actions. But now the atmosphere is very calm at the universities. To be sure, there still are some strong radical student movements at a few universities, but on the whole the younger generation turned calmer and milder.

As in the United States?

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In Japan we undergo a kind of cycle, a period of uprisings and then a calming-down stage.

Like the seasons.

I think so. I wonder myself why this occurs. Senior students learned a lot from their older brothers' generation - I mean, the Japanese radical generation that preceded them. I think they were made conscious of the damage caused by exaggerated hopes.

Are they pessimistic?

Not necessarily pessimistic. They have become rather pragmatic and realistic. They are concentrating their efforts on their studies and plans for later life.

The American behaviorist John Platt pointed out to me how most of the San Francisco hippies of the sixties became Establishment men - surburban homes, two cars in the garage.

I closely observed hippies in the United States, and never expected much from them, because they were rich and came from wealthy families. Japanese hippies have been copying the American model and as you said, they will sooner or later turn to the Establishment and become white collar workers. At the same time, however, the hippies as a worldwide phenomenon changed the social mood to a considerable degree. I know some students here who finished their studies at the university and found good jobs with one of our largest companies, but gave up their security and position and came back to the university to begin graduate work. They simply felt lost and disappointed to be one small element in the gigantic mechanism of such companies. Another striking phenomenon is that of so-called free workers, for example, free-lancing editors and copywriters. I think this section of our population is growing rapidly. They are liberating themselves from the lifelong employment system most common in Japanese society.

Individualism is growing?

Yes, if the world is defined as an attitude to prefer one's own initiative to his social rank.

How do you think the Yukio Mishima incident affected Japanese youths?

That's a very touchy subject with the younger Japanese generation. Mishima taught the youths that if they harbored an ideal, they must be

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prepared to die for it. I think the first outcome of Mishima's death was the so-called Asama Mountain incident, when young radicals killed their companions by collective lynching in the mountains and fought back against the riot police with guns. During the twenty-five years following the Second World War, we thought we had lost this kind of tradition. Suddenly it reappeared in the symbol of Mishima's suicide. I remember right after Mishima's suicide one of the leaders of the most leftist group said, ‘Mishima taught us how to die for one's political ideal.’ Mishima's initiative was a kind of impulse to reorganize the rightist movement in Japan.

Did he succeed?

No, I don't think so, at least up to this moment. He separated himself from any kind of rightist organization. He was basically a man of letters. He lived as a writer and he died as one. I believe he himself knew the irony of his pseudoarmy, called the Association of the Shield. He knew better than anyone else that it was a caricature of an army. He was a writer and at the same time he was a man of irony.

What was Mishima's influence on Japanese literature? Or is it too early to make an evaluation?

Perhaps. His subjects concerned the present literary situation in Japan in a very paradoxical way. Paradoxical, I said, since his subjects were how to reform Japanese culture by means of reactionary imagination from past tradition, like the faith in the Emperor. Furthermore, it would be very difficult to imitate Mishima's style. Young Japanese writers now start their own literary world filled with their own subjects through which they criticize and, in a way, evaluate Mishima's precedent, from a detached point of view.

But he did stir literary discussion.

Yes, exactly. Nobody can ignore the problems he proposed dealing with.

Do you believe that with the global rise of materialism, Japanese youths will change or lose their values based on Japanese culture for so many generations? Yours is a very special nation with very special traditions.

That is a very difficult question, because it covers a vast area and many aspects of civilization.

They seem much more open and frank, like other youths throughout the world.

Yes, they are more like youths in Europe or the US. Their new attitudes

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are symbolized by blue jeans. I myself now wear a tie, which somehow symbolizes that I have become rather a middleaged man, whereas youngsters wear jeans. They are expressing a new form of kinship with their contemporaries all over the world.

Also through dress?

They assert themselves by all wearing bleached jeans.

But similar behavior could bring all youths closer to each other.

Yes, I think this is the case. And the closer the ties are between youths of different nationalities, the more our Japanese youngsters change. At the same time, I am continually reminded of the fact that Japanese youths are Japanese youths. It might sound too matter of fact, but this question has two aspects. While Japanese youths approach some uniform identity on an international level, they nevertheless remain extremely Japanese.

They are not losing their proper identity?

No, they aren't. I think there are three strata or three dimensions in our culture. First, the surface of everyday life. It has become a matter of course in average Japanese families that we eat bread and wear Western clothes. But on some occasions that concern traditional customs such as New Year's day, even young girls put on the kimono. This I call another stratum of our culture. Then, there is the third element, which I'd like to call the core part of the Japanese mentality, or the unconscious sense of our nationality.

We already talked about Mishima's suicide. This incident had such a shocking impact that even those of us who were critical of his suicide at least thought about, and sometimes even rediscovered, their identity as Japanese. Mishima suddenly reminded us of our past, and of deep-rooted behavior patterns.

That is the psychological part.

Yes, you could say so. Only twenty some years ago the majority of the Japanese still clung to the imperial system in order to identify themselves as Japanese. That was an integral symbol to belong to a nation as one family. I would abhor, however, the reappearance of this situation.

Is there a danger it might return?

I hope not. In that sense, the Japanese fortunately lost a unique symbol. We might say they are looking for a new type of symbol of our integrity.

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In its place came smaller symbols, like Japanese Airlines?

Oh, no. That is too superficial to be called a symbol. I think a better example is a catch phrase, ‘Discover Japan,’ on the posters of the National Railways, which you find all over the country. Or, as a minor example, the revival of the traditional flower arrangement and tea ceremony, which young girls want to learn before they get married. Or recognition anew of many other traditional arts and crafts. Or even the fact that our national costume, the kimono, is regaining its popularity.

You mean that the Japanese middle class is now beginning to act like the former upper class?

I don't think so. This has nothing to do with any class structure, but, rather, points to the fact that the Japanese people are reembracing their heritage.

With the communications explosion of the seventies, do you expect Japan to become internationalized?

Yes, especially the younger generation will be internationalized. A growing number of Japanese youths will have a chance to travel abroad, although this group will always be a minority and will not immediately affect the majority. There also will be an increase in the number of foreigners coming to Japan. On the whole, the Japanese will be increasingly exposed to foreign people and cultures. This trend has already begun and it is an entirely new experience for most Japanese.

You feel this is good for them?

Yes, very good. Permit me to mention something seemingly unrelated. Less than a year ago, one of our popular writers, Komatsu Sakyo, wrote a science fiction story about the submersion of Japan. The book became a best seller, which shows that although no one believes this submersion will really happen, interest in futurology and the environment have increased enormously.¹

I spoke with him recently. He told me it took him eight or nine years to write the book. Let me ask you to make one more evaluation or prediction. Japan depends very much on the import of energy and resources from abroad. Futurologists expect a worldwide energy crisis. Some expect a catastrophe. In the future, how would the Japanese people react to such a disaster? Become a military power again and invade Southeast Asia to take the resources it needs?

1 See conversation no. 43.

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I may sound rather detached, but I think nothing ever happens in such a dramatic way. I don't anticipate a sudden catastrophe. But I don't deny that the energy crisis will gradually affect our life, and there is a possibility that some economic-political crisis will push the Japanese people to again invade Southeast Asia, at least economically. Nationalism in developing countries is certainly understandable, but in advanced countries this shows up as imperialism. However, at this moment I believe in the sanity of the Japanese. I hope we can, before that possibility becomes probability, reform the economic structure to something other than the presently over-industrialized state. To be an economically smaller but civilized country is far better than to be an economic giant under a military shadow.