On Growth Two

20. Hiroshi Minami

Professor Hiroshi Minami was born in 1914 in Tokyo. He studied psychology at the universities of Kyoto and Tokyo. From 1940 to 1947 he was in the United States and obtained a doctorate at Cornell, where he conducted research at Cornell's Behaviorial Farm (1943-1946). Since 1948 Professor Minami has been connected with Hitotsubashi University in Tokyo, where he teaches social psychology. In 1950 he became director of the Institute of Social Psychology in Japan, in 1962 he obtained a degree in literature at Kyoto University, and in 1964 he was appointed director of the Institute of Social Behavior. He is secretary-general of the Japanese Psychological Association, president of the Japanese Society of Social Psychology, member of the Executive Committee of the International Association of Applied Psychology, member of the Japanese Society of Psychiatry and Neurology, and holds posts in other national and international organizations. Professor Minami has published many books and articles, some in English, including Psychology of the Japanese People.

Against the background of traditional values in Japan, how do your people coexist with modern conceptions of democracy? Is there a clash? Or are the Japanese masters in symbiosis?

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I think Japan can not be democratized until we abolish the imperial system.

You mean the leftovers from feudal times?

The Japanese ruling class is still utilizing the imperial system, which blocks the democratization of the Japanese people. An effort is made to democratize the imperial system. In the view of some people we will continue to have a kind of mass imperial system in our mass society. Therefore, it is very difficult for the general public in Japan to abolish the imperial system because it is deeply rooted in the Japanese mind.

I was in the United States when the war broke out. I was contacted, at Cornell, where I was studying, by somebody from the American government. Washington wanted to know about the possibility of the Japanese people resisting the invasion of American or Allied forces toward the end of the war. They assured me that the Japanese practiced deep-rooted emperor-worship. I answered that the Japanese people were living under very tight wartime controls. They were forced to worship the Emperor. But I did not think they would really miss him if the Allied forces decided to abolish the imperial system. Nevertheless, the Americans believed that Japan would fight until the last man -

- to defend the Emperor?

To defend the Emperor. When the war ended, the American forces landed prior to the Soviets. My guess is that the Americans decided to bomb Hiroshima and Nagasaki so that they could end the war before the Soviets had the chance to reach Japan; it's quite logical and possible.

Then a terrific argument developed in the American government whether to abolish the imperial system or not. They decided to keep the Emperor in order to block a social revolution after the war. The American occupation policies did succeed in ‘democratizing’ the Emperor system by utilizing mass communications, such as permitting public appearances and showing the imperial family on television on various occasions. Another tactic was to allow the showing of sumo, our national wrestling competition, on television.

Even the ‘love-romance’ of the crown prince was utilized for the humanization of the imperial family and was widely publicized. At the time the Americans knew that Mao Tse-tung would defeat Chiang Kai-shek and that China would go socialist. They felt they had to keep Japan as a stronghold to oppose continental China. That is the reason Washington decided to keep the Emperor after the war. Many professional insiders tried

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to convince the American government to abolish the imperial system, because they felt that it would otherwise be impossible to really democratize Japan. But, obviously, these specialists on Asian affairs were defeated. I recall during the first or the second year of the war the posters in the streets of Ithaca, where Cornell is situated. They showed three pictures: Emperor Hirohito, Hitler, and Mussolini. All three had red crosses over their faces. The captions read: ‘Hang Hitler,’ ‘Hang Mussolini,’ and ‘Hang Hirohito.’ I will never forget the cross over the face of Hirohito.

And today they want him to make a visit to the United States.

It seems quite clear that the Japanese people never realized that the Emperor was a war criminal, or war criminal number one. At least that is my opinion. They still think the Emperor was not responsible for World War Two.

When Hirohito came to Holland some years ago, it was said in the press that the Emperor had tried to stop the war.

He was the highest commander, the Commander in chief. I don't think he really made efforts to stop the war. Anyway, all information about the Emperor is controlled, even now, so nobody can tell with certainty in Japan; we can but guess. However, according to the detailed analysis of the Emperor's wartime activities by David Bergamini in his book Japan's Imperial Conspiracy, the Emperor took an active part in planning and executing the 1941 to 1945 war. This book was translated into Japanese in 1973, but is not widely read and discussed despite its challenging contents. This might be another proof that criticism against the imperial family is still taboo with the general public.

But the true democratization of Japan will never be carried through as long as these feudal leftovers remain?

That's my opinion. The influence of the Emperor, of the imperial system, is increasing in Japan. Social control is getting tighter and tighter despite the so-called democratization of the imperial family or the imperial system. The Japanese ruling class has firmly decided to keep the Emperor until the last day of this earth.

How does the race for material values, now so obvious in America and in Western Europe, affect the new generation in Japan?

Have you noticed, for instance, the blue jeans fad? It seems to have a kind of fascination, because Japanese youth are quite sensitive to European or

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American life-styles. But it remains an imitation and is quite superficial. For example, in the United States, long hair and superstars and so on are the symbols of indirect resistance or protest against Nixonian militarism.

We can say criminal Nixonian militarism. He is war criminal number one today.

Yes, that's right. Long hair is a protest against the crew cut of soldiers; the glittering clothes young people wear in America seem to be a protest against uniforms. This is therefore quite understandable so far as American youth are concerned. But while our youth are quite apathetic politically speaking, they are most eager to adopt American life-styles.

Why don't they question the system? Why don't they study how it functions?

They are very pessimistic or, rather, indifferent to the political scene, because they know Japanese politics are controlled by the establishment, the ruling class. They are not too well informed about the political situation in Japan, because we still have strong controls over the press and the news media. Our student movement was suppressed by the government as well as the university leadership. As a result, only the ‘new left’ students are still active, but they fight among themselves in factional opposition. Moderate or mildly motivated students belong to the Communist Party or other political organizations, and are not acting directly in violent opposition to university administrations.

Is there an underground press?

Well, I know there's one pamphlet published by an unknown citizen in Nagoya, who criticizes the imperial system. But that's the only one as far as I know. There are also various books condemning the Emperor as a war criminal. One was written by a former Japanese soldier. He once tried to shoot the Emperor.

He actually tried to shoot Hirohito?

Not with a real gun - a toy pistol. It was a sort of satirical act - a joke - because he thought that the Emperor was not even worth being shot. By the way, Hirohito was really shot at by a Communist, Daisuke Namba, in 1924, when he was still crown prince. The bullet missed, and the assailant was sentenced to death by hanging.

But are students not more conscious of what happens around them here, as well as outside Japan; of trends in China, in Western Europe? Why are they

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so pessimistic about changing the system. Is it too deeply rooted, this feudal authority?

Authority in Japan, the older ruling class, is losing its power, but slowly. Japanese youth don't trust the older generation. There is much corruption in political parties. But still, they don't fight. They seemed tired or bored with the general situation in Japan. So they look for outlets in music, sex, or drugs. There are very tight controls in Japan. The police is quite strict. I myself am teaching at a university. Not only at my university, but at all universities, there are small groups of students who are quite active in the political field. Particularly, the Communist Party is organizing youths. They have grown quite big.

When I was in Japan in 1970, I witnessed a demonstration of youths against the so-called American security pact. What amazed me was that thousands of demonstrators came down a main street of Tokyo shouting and waving flags. However, when the traffic light switched to red, they stopped. In Europe they would have pulled out the traffic lights!

I think this depends on the group. The youth movement led by the Communist Party is very careful to maintain public order. The students of the new left are therefore critical of the Japanese Communist Party; they denounce everything. But they are a minority. Some new left students belong to the ‘Red Army,’ which was several times involved in Arab guerrilla activities, like the Tel Aviv airport incident and a series of hijacking incidents. Obviously, they are not satisfied to limit their activities to Japan, and are trying to join the ‘simultaneous revolutionary movement’ anywhere in the world. Miss Fusako Shigenobu, a former girl student, for instance, is a well-known Red Army leader who lives somewhere in Europe and is said to be active in these international activities.

Would you say a confrontation of generations is in full force in Japan?

You mean between the old and the modern young?

Yes, a real clash.

Except for the most radical part of our youth, this collision is cultural or social, but not political. For example, young people are very idealistic about new music. Their fathers and mothers simply cannot stand their children making so-called modern noises. They are all complaining about it. But the young people don't give a damn.

That seems a new symptom in family relations in Japan.

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Well, yes, reckoned since World War Two, of course. It is a cultural confrontation. The older generation is constantly complaining about the manners and the way of life of youths. But this is not only among Japanese parents. All parents in the world entertain the same complaints. We have seen this happen in history since ancient times. Fathers are considered by their children as being either cold or incompetent in matters of family education. Many youngsters complain that their fathers do not scold or criticize them. They are rather anxious to be guided by their elders. This lack of leadership on the side of the elder generation is the main cause of the generation gap in Japan.

There are also many examples of the dubious behavior of elders, such as bribery, tax evasion, ‘me too,’ price increases, and the recently created so-called oil crisis.

What is happening to the age-old Japanese tradition of love of nature?

The Japanese people are supposed to be nature lovers and nature worshipers. But I believe they don't give a damn about nature. So we have quite a contradiction here. I think this is based on misunderstandings on the part of foreigners. Of course, Buddhist teaching says we should unite with nature and the universe. But perhaps you have already noticed that the Japanese are indifferent to Buddhist doctrines and ideology.

But are not seventy percent of the people officially traditional Buddhists?

It is a kind of formal approach to religion and is not deeply felt or even Buddhistic. The Japanese adore all kinds of ceremonies, but these are superficial, social traditions. I always say that our people are functionalists. Japanese gods have many different functions; it's a kind of division of labor on their part. In the house there are many gods. A god for the kitchen, a god for the fire, and so on. Even for skin disease there is a particular god who is supposed to be able to cure it. The emphasis is on material profit. This is the reason there are a lot of gods and Buddhist statues and all kinds of religious institutions in Japan. Moreover, there is also a kind of division of labor among the three main religions in Japan. In matters of birth, weddings, and other rites of passage, such as initiation ceremonies, the native Shinto religion is responsible, whereas the Buddhist monks deal with matters of death: funerals, ancestor worship, and the memorial service for the deceased family. On the other hand, many young couples prefer wedding ceremonies at Christian churches even though they are not Christian. Some of them even travel to Christian churches in Europe for this. It is considered fashionable.

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From reading your book Psychology of the Japanese People, I gather that there are many ancient traditions in Japan which, on the contrary, teach that one should not leave material possessions behind; that possessions mean nothing.

This is not really a contradiction. We still put our emphasis on this side of existence and not on the other, which is the real reason why we must always preach or talk about the other side, about heaven. Of course, this kind of teaching was originated by the ruling class to convince the Japanese masses to be very frugal. Don't waste money, and things like that! But the Japanese people are now changing, as you may have concluded from my book. They are now trying to have some leisure, particularly young people. Young people emphasize money, because they say, if we don't have money we cannot have girlfriends or we cannot enjoy American clothes; we cannot buy cars. They are very frank about wanting to have money; they think it cannot betray us. That's one reason. They have lost hope in the older generation and are looking for something solid.

It gives them a feeling of power.

Power, security, and, of course, material advantages. Money is their new god, and I don't blame them. So, one segment of modern Japanese youth seeks money. On the other side, the other extreme, there are the radicals. They have a political conviction or ideology and are even willing to sacrifice their lives. The majority of Japanese youth emphasize their private life or individual profit and are becoming more and more individualistic and egoistic. That's why they don't give a damn about the political situation; they think it is not their business. Money is more important than any kind of ideology. Until the recent oil crisis, rapid economic growth was accompanied by the slogan, Spending is virtue. Undoubtedly, this idea was welcomed by many, young and old alike. But since the crisis, the Japanese government has introduced a new saying: Thrift is virtue. However, young people seem to have no ears to listen, since they are convinced that this ‘crisis’ is mainly caused by manipulations by big business. Here we find not only a confrontation between generations, but among members of the same generation.

Between the small, radically advanced, politically oriented groups and the masses?

Yes. My point is that the generation gap is not serious, because in all history there has been one. But in this case there is a confrontation among

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young people themselves. It's considerably more tragic. The young radicals try to kill one another.

I asked Professor Skinner what he thought of Mao Tse-tung's method of organising both politically and socially the youth of China. He called it perhaps the most revolutionary experiment we have seen in the history of mankind. What is your view of this enormous Chinese younger generation being prepared to accept a new kind of social consciousness? And, next door, there is the almost completely materially oriented Japan.

I was the first Japanese scholar who visited China in 1952. I was immediately condemned by our government.

You were called a Communist.

Prime Minister Yoshida sent me a special letter of reprimand. I was not dismissed by the university, but many people criticized me. I wrote a book on China telling the Japanese public there were practically no flies in China. I said that there were no drunkards, gambling, or opium. The public reaction was, What Professor Minimi writes is impossible! To many Japanese who were in China before the World War Two, it seemed incredible that the revolution could have changed people so completely - not only materially, but above all mentally. I think there are two ways of liberating a people: First the material revolution and then the spiritual revolution. That is one way. Or, spiritual revolution first and then the material revolution. A third method is, perhaps, the simultaneous or parallel material and spiritual revolutions. In the Soviet Union the material revolution went quickly, because it occurred after World War One. The spiritual revolution came much later. Maybe it came too late, so you see the effects now. But in China, Mao Tse-tung fought the reactionary forces for quite a long time, about twenty years. He and his revolutionary army tried to convince the Chinese masses why they were fighting the nationalist or reactionary forces all over the Chinese continent. They went everywhere and fought everywhere. They tried to educate the masses first. They tried to educate captured nationalist soldiers. In those twenty years they tried to combine the material and the social revolution with a spiritual revolution. It is not a very rapid method; it represents a quite long, slow, and very well planned political education. That's the reason the Maoist revolution succeeded. The Chinese masses readily became socially conscious. They became decent in their manners and stopped vices such as opium as well as other behavioral deviations. I think it's ideal to have a so-called simultaneous or parallel liberation, a combined social-political and spiritual revolution. Many people felt it would

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be impossible for the Chinese masses to change in such a short period, let us say in half a century. But this was a serious mistake.

When I was in China in 1952, I was impressed by their politeness and their obedience to the older generation, considering that Mao and his comrades always taught young people that they were allowed to have different views from their fathers or other people in general, above all in relation to political or ideological theory. But humanly, they had to respect the older generation's experience. Experience cannot be gained in a short time. Even though the father or older person was reactionary in political ideology, or stubborn in refusing to recognize a new system, they had experience in various skills or in some form of knowledge. So the young were taught to be modest and to learn from the experience of the elders.

Psychiatrist Doi Takeo approaches culture and environment from the point of view of individual psychiatry. Would you say that Mao's success in his revolutionary methods could be traced to a basic approach of working through raising the consciousness of the individual to understand the reasons why the revolution is being fought?

As I mentioned, Mao's revolutionary army fought quite a long time all over the country. There were very strict rules concerning their contacts with the rural people in the fighting zone. They therefore made a favorable impression in contrast to the corrupt nationalist soldiers of the Chiang Kai-shek Kuomintang. In his writings of the 1920's, Mao had already pointed out that the emancipation of women, freedom from religion and superstition, universal education, and the abolition of gambling and opium could only be realized under a proletarian dictatorship. Accordingly, he emphasized the supremacy of political revolution over the spiritual revolution. But Mao tried to run these two kinds of revolution simultaneously as much as possible, even during the civil war. He encouraged, for instance, a new movement in the theater and he showed a deep interest in other literary activities. The Great Cultural Revolution is a combined effort of political, economic, and spiritual revolution, and the word ‘Cultural’ is said to include all aspects of life. For example, the question of the Confucian legacy as a reactionary ideology is today intensively discussed in government, army, rural, and industrial circles as the vital problem which influences the life and thought of everyone in China.

But how does all this relate to the contemporary restlessness of Japanese youth? They will not have twenty years to transform their country. How can Japan catch up in the future?

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There are many cultural exchanges between Japanese and Chinese young people, for recently our government decided to let our young people visit China.

Only after Nixon went to Peking. So you can see who decides!

Yes, that is Hirohito and the Japanese ruling class: they have no real power at all.

They take their final orders from Washington.

That's right. They always listen to the American voice and they cannot decide anything unless they visit Washington and get orders from there. So they are quite powerless. Their power is exercised over the Japanese people, but it originates in Washington.

But won't all this clash with the interests of Peking in the long run?

Well, if the American government changes its policy toward China, the Japanese ruling class will follow. I am not very optimistic about the future. Take for instance what is happening in Korea. The Japanese government here, too, cannot move until they get orders from Washington or maybe from the CIA....

If the Socialist Party, the Communist Party, and several other parties could get together, and if they could obtain a majority, there might be some changes. But still, I don't know for sure. I think we must be very patient. I want to live until I am eighty years old or so. Therefore I am very careful about my health. That's my final conclusion.

You are pessimistic about the future, but you want to reach eighty. In other words you do not want to miss doomsday?

I remain full of curiosity about everything concerning the human race, yes.