A New Critique of Theoretical Thought. Deel 3. The Structures of Individuality of Temporal Reality

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Chapter III
The subject-object relation in the thing-structure of reality

§ 1 - The inner structural character of the subject-object relation in a thing.

Up until now we have examined only the structures of things which, with respect to their radical type, are qualified by an internal subject-function in the physical and biotic modality respectively¹.

The temporal reality of things determined by these structures is not completed in the modality in which they have their leading or qualifying function.

A brief modal analysis of the thing-structure of a tree (a macro-thing), discloses that in all later modal aspects it possesses possible object-functions. The latter are as yet unopened in full temporal reality. For their disclosure they depend on corresponding subject-functions, which are not found in the tree itself.

Again we are confronted here with he subject-object relation within the temporal horizon of reality. Previously, in our theory of the modal spheres, we were able to examine only the abstract modal significance of this relation. But now, in our theory of the structures of individuality, it takes on a new aspect, determined by the plastic horizon of human experience, within which we must re-examine the subject-object relation.

1 We have already noted that the animal kingdom has a psychical qualification in its radical type.

The structure of a thing expresses itself in each of its modal aspects of meaning.

In this investigation, too, our leading viewpoint is that the structure of a thing expresses itself in each of its modal aspects.

The modal subject-functions of our linden-tree are not objectified without plastic structure in the tree's objective-sensory

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perceptional image. Rather, it is the biotically qualified natural thing which, according to the full plasticity of its internal structure and variability-type, expresses itself within the psychical object-side of reality in the sensorily perceptible image familiar to us¹.

The internal structure of our tree in its variable realization expresses itself also in all the later modalities in which it functions as this individual living natural thing.

Only after we have gained a theoretical insight into this continuous expression of a thing's internal structure and variability-type in all its modal aspects, can justice be done to our naïve experience.

The actual subject-functions of our linden are objectified in its object-functions in such a way that the latter betray the structural architecture of the whole, in the typical groupage of its aspects. In its sensorily perceptional image, for example, the qualifying function, as such, delineates itself in an objective modal analogy, which hereby acquires a dominant position in the total image. In naïve experience this immediately distinguishes the objective sensory image of a living tree from that of a dead thing though doubt may arise with respect to trees affected by disease. And similarly the objective sensory total image of an animal, generally speaking, expresses the leading psychical function of the latter. If we do not consider theoretical border-line cases, we are almost directly conscious whether or not a sensorily perceived image belongs to an inorganic or an organic living thing, to an animal or a plant.

In such instances the internal structural functions of a thing display an extremely complicated character. If the thing-structure actually expresses itself in every one of these functions, then in the first place its leading function must be the expression of the structural totality.

1 Earlier empiricistic psychology erroneously resolved this sensory total image into functionally distinct impressions only subjectively associated by our function of perception.

The internal structural-character of the qualifying function.

If we return to the micro-structure of the atom, we may thus establish that the leading function of the latter will display an internal structural individuality in the physical modality.

Qualified by the nuclear moment of the modal structure of

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energy, the modal analogies of number, space and motion individualize themselves within an internal typical structure in the leading function of the micro-whole we call an ‘atom’. In this internal structure they are determined by the nuclear moment individualized in the leading function.

The entire complex system of modal foundations¹, examined in the theory of modal spheres, reappears in a new complication in the modal aspects of a structural whole. And what applies to the theoretically disclosed micro-totalities is valid a fortiori for the macro-things of naïve experience, whose individuality-structure is much more directly accessible to us. It is profitable to penetrate this extremely intricate state of affairs, so that we are fully aware of the distortion of naïve experience by a functionalistic conception which bypasses the problem of a thing-structure, and by abstract simplification theoretically demolishes what is given in the pre-theoretical experiential attitude.

1 The Dutch text has the term ‘funderingen’, which means that the retrocipatory analogies in a modal structure in the last instance are founded in the original modal nuclei to which they refer.

The structural principles are not dependent on the genesis of individuals in which they are realized.

We have seen that the structural principles, which appeal to the continuity of the cosmic temporal order, are, as such, in no way dependent upon the genesis of individuals in which they are realized. As we saw in Volume II, they rather belong to the plastic dimension of the temporal world-order.

It is of course impossible to determine in a subjective a priori manner what actual individual things exist in our cosmos. But the typical structural principles of things are not subjective, but are of a structural a priori determining character². This does not mean that our theoretical knowledge of these structural laws of individuality is a priori. Their a priori character only refers to the ontical temporal order. This is to say that they are the structural frame in which alone the process of genesis and decay of individual beings is possible.

2 Cf. Vol. II p. 478 for the distinction between structural and subjective a priori.

Objective thing-structures qualified by a psychical structural function.

It is indeed the various types of structural principles of indi-

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vidual totalities that are here being subjected to a theoretical analysis.

Our present interest is with the subject-object relation in connection with a thing-structure. Our investigation will be concerned, in the first place, with the question whether or not there are structures of individuality in which a thing is not qualified by a leading subject-function, but rather by an individual object-function.

Provisionally limiting our investigation to natural things, and temporarily leaving alone the more complex normatively qualified products of human formation, we can in fact establish the existence of natural things, qualified by a structural object-function.

All things of nature, formed or produced by animal activity, are to be considered as objective natural things. The macro-world of naïve experience, as well as the micro-world show a very varied wealth of such animal products: ant hills, bird nests, honey-combs, spiders' webs, beaver dams, shells of molluscs, silicious forms produced by protozoa, and the numberless other amazing formations produced by animal instinct.

With respect to their internal structure, these things undoubtedly have individual subject-functions in the mathematical and physical aspects, but their qualifying function is not in these spheres. The subjective vital instinct of animals has formed them into objects of animal life, qualified by a typical animal-psychical object-function, which has the leading rôle in the structure of this thing. The actualization of this object-function is dependent on animal subjectivity.

This state of affairs clearly shows the secondary character of these form-products, which lack an independent radical-type and can only exist and be experienced in their subject-object relation to the animals which have produced them.

Nowhere else is the intrinsic untenability of the distinction between meaning and reality so conclusively in evidence as in things whose structure is objectively qualified.

Anyone who theoretically restricts the reality of these animal products to the pre-biotic modalities, is left with a theoretical abstraction in which the actual natural thing does not structurally express itself. The mistake, inherent in the distinction between created reality and meaning, is nowhere more apparent

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than in things whose qualifying function is only given in a subject-object relation.

For it is really impossible to ascribe their typical nature to an independent ‘substance’. Their very nature is meaning, realized in a structural subject-object relation. A bird's nest is not a ‘thing in itself’, which has a specific meaning in the bird's life. It has as such no existence apart from this meaning.

Anyone who theoretically eliminates the latter does not retain the objective reality of a bird's nest, but an aggregate of materials of different structure, which lacks the very nature of this animal form-product as an individual whole. Such things are united with the animal creatures which formed them in an individual bio-psychical relationship. Even when detached from the latter they remain qualified as objective animal formations.

To account for many remarkable phenomena in this domain, science, in the narrow sense, must have an insight into this state of affairs.

The protoplasm of rhizopodes, for example, produces firm formations which consist of minerals (in particular silicic acids, as in the case of radiolaria and the diatoms, and calciumcarbonate, as in the case of foraminiferes and calc-algae). The siliceous lattices, -tubes and -radii, or the calc-shells, -lattices and -spiculae formed in this way, display different shapes and patterns from type to type, which are unrelated to the physico-chemically qualified crystalline forms of silicic acid and calcium carbonate.

Woltereck observes that if the Si 0₂-formations of radiolaria were composed of Si 0₂-crystals, these animal products could be conceived of as aggregate forms, whose law-conformity would be based on the crystallization laws of silicic acid. Actually the plasm of these protozoa produces thousands of specific siliceous forms which all deviate from the formational laws of the mineral silicic acid anhydrite¹.

Typical mathematical structural functions of these formations are here revealed, which have an unbreakable coherence with the physico-chemical, the biotic, and (with the radiolaria) the psychical functions of the protophyta and protozoa concerned. Their total-structure appears to be of a typical biotical and

1 Woltereck, op. cit., pp. 118 and 119.

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psychical qualification respectively, which reveals itself in a typical subject-object relation.

And the reality of these natural things cannot even be restricted to the pre-logical aspects. In connection with subjective human existence, these natural things have closed structural object-functions in all the normative modalities. These object-functions can be disclosed and actualized by subjective human activity.

Reality as a continuous process of realization.

For the reality of a thing is indeed dynamic; it is a continuous realization in the transcendental temporal direction.

The inner restlessness of meaning, as the mode of being of created reality, reveals itself in the whole temporal world. To seek a fixed point in the latter is to seek it in a ‘fata morgana’, a mirage, a supposed thing-reality, lacking meaning as the mode of being which ever points beyond and above itself. There is indeed nothing in temporal reality in which our heart can rest, because this reality does not rest in itself.

§ 2 - The objective thing-structure of a sculpture.

Our provisional analysis of the typical structures of objective natural things made us aware of manifold interweavings between things. Consider for instance the heterogeneous constituents of a bird's nest, joined by a typical form-totality resulting from animal shaping. These materials have their own internal structure, which may be very complicated and which differ radically from that of a bird's nest. Beaver dams, ant hills, and honey-combs are themselves the objective products of co-operation carried on in a subjective animal societal relationship. The latter has itself been organized by a group instinct into a real unity amidst the diversity of individual animals.

In our subsequent treatment of enkapsis we shall examine, in a more inclusive and basic manner, these structural interlacements. They become increasingly complex if we focus our attention upon the normatively qualified thing-structures, instead of upon those belonging to the three natural radical types.

For the present we are considering the subject-object relation in the thing-structures of reality and our immediate concern is with things qualified by a normative object-function. Enkaptic

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structures will be dealt with, therefore, only insofar as it is necessary to do so in the context of this enquiry.

As a first example of a normatively qualified objective thing we shall examine a work of fine art of the primary-type sculpture¹: Hermes with the boy Dionysus, the master-piece of the Greek sculptor Praxiteles.

1 Translator's note: ‘Primary types’ are geno-types. Pheno-types are ‘variability-types’.

Do all works of fine art actually have an objective thing-structure? If they do not, can we still speak of ‘works of art’ as a secondary radical-type?

It would be incorrect to assume that all works of fine art display the structure of objective things. This will be obvious if we compare plastic types (i.e. painting, sculpture, wood carvings, etc.) with music, poetry and drama.

Works of art belonging to the last category lack the constant actual existence proper to things in the narrower sense. They can only be constantly objectified in the structure of scores, books, etc. And we shall show later on that such things as scores and books, are, as such, symbolically qualified. They can only signify the aesthetic structure of a work of art in an objective way and cannot actualize it.

This is why artistic works of these types are always in need of a subjective actualization lacking the objective constancy essential to works of plastic art. Because of this state of affairs they give rise to a separate kind of art, viz. that of performance, in which aesthetic objectification and actualization, though bound to the spirit and style of the work, remain in direct contact with the re-creating individual conception of the performing artist. The latter's conception, as such, cannot actualize itself in a constant form, though modern technical skill has succeeded in reproducing musical sound-waves by means of a phonograph.

In the third section of the preceding chapter we have introduced the term ‘secondary radical types’ to denote the ultimate genera of the different human societal relationships. The secondary character of these radical types appeared from the fact that they are of a human character and therefore pre-suppose human nature, without being able to define the latter. The objectified products of the human ‘mind’ are in addition of a secondary typical character, since they can only exist in a structural subject-object relation.

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A radical type, as such, cannot imply an answer to the question whether or not the individual totalities belonging to its ‘kingdom’ are to be viewed as ‘things’ in a narrower sense¹.

Therefore, there cannot be raised any justified objection against the assumption that all works of fine art (inclusive of such which can only be constantly objectified in a symbolically qualified structure) show the same radical type.

And this assumption, quite familiar to naïve experience, is well founded from an ontological viewpoint.

A work of art qua talis is not a mere general logical concept resulting from an arbitrary abstraction. It is a radical type of a strictly a priori character. It is firmly rooted in the plastic horizon of our experience and the plastic dimension of the cosmic-temporal order. As such it embraces constant geno-types and variability-types.

1 A thing in its proper sense implies a relatively constant realization of its individuality-structure. A poem, a musical composition or a drama are imaginative totalities of an aesthetic qualification which can be reproduced only in a coherent series of mental acts and acts of performance, with the aid of their symbolical objectification in books and scores.

Analysis of the internal typical structure of Praxiteles' Hermes with the boy Dionysus.

We shall now examine the structure of individuality of Praxiteles' sculptural master-piece: Hermes with the boy Dionysus. If our first concern is with an analysis of the modal functions of its internal thing-structure, it might, at first glance, seem that the whole inter-modal foundational relationship, previously examined in the theory of modal spheres, breaks down at a critical point.

Unquestionably the last modal subject-function of this marble statue is found in the physico-chemical aspect. Equally certain is the fact that with respect to its radical type it is qualified by an objective-aesthetic function. And unless endowed with an internal structure of individuality, anticipating the aesthetic object-function, the physico-chemical subject-function could not be the expression of the internal structure of the objective work of art, as a thing.

The first difficulty, however, arises when we try to re-discover the temporal order of the modal aspects, explained in the second Volume, within the internal structure of the statue. At first sight the latter seems to lack an actual function in the biotic modality.

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This would contradict the theory of the modal law-spheres, according to which the aesthetic object-function is founded in all its substratum functions, inclusive of the biotic aspect. If the structure of Hermes lacks a biotic function, the entire foundational relationship becomes highly problematical.

That all post-physical structural functions of the statue must possess an objective character and stand in an unbreakable coherence with the corresponding subject-functions of human temporal experience is clearly evident.

Beginning with the psychical modality it is no trouble to analyse these objective structural functions in the work of art. It is just the biotical modality that seems to be a stumbling block.

The artist was obliged to work with an inorganic material and as a consequence the statue seems to lack a biotic object-function. For in the context of the work of art there can in the nature of the case be no question of marble as a ‘means of life’, which objective biotic function we really may ascribe to water and other in-organic matter. So we seem to be confronted by a thing-structure lacking an essential modal aspect of reality, if the theory of law-spheres be true.

Is this really the case? Generally speaking we can say that the sculpture must have a biotic object-function because without the latter it could not be sensorily perceptible. We refer to our earlier statement that biotic stimuli excercised on the nerves of the sense-organs cannot be caused by external things and events, if the latter would lack an objective biotic aspect¹. But in the present context we are not satisfied with this general statement since we are engaged in the analysis of a particular structure of individuality.

We wish to gain an insight into the typical structure of Praxiteles' Hermes even in its objective biotic function, whose presence in a general sense may be granted. In the work of art under consideration the living body of the god and that of the boy Dionysus are objectively represented in a sensorily perceptible image. This is doubtless a structural particularity which is not proper to all sculptures. We might just as readily have chosen as an example an abstract sculptural work, exclusively dominated by the harmony of lines, the proportional configuration of planes, etc.

1 Cf. p. 40 of this Vol.

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The complicated representational relation in the objective-sensory aspect of sculpture.

Nevertheless, let us pause a moment to consider the above-mentioned particularity of Praxiteles' sculpture in more detail. For in its objective sensory aspect it contains the interesting ‘Abbild-relation’, whose modal structure we have analysed in Volume II¹. Yet it might be that from this structural particularity we get a deeper insight into the inner coherence between the modal aspects of the sculpture's total structure.

Let us suppose that the artist had used a living model. The objective sensorily perceptional image of the marble statue is certainly not a simple copy of that of the living pattern. Although possessing an individual aesthetic aspect, the human body is not qualified aesthetically; properly speaking, it is not a work of art; it has not the typical inner destination of the latter. The artist, in his subjective aesthetic conception, rather visualized his Hermes as a product of his aesthetic fantasy in the body of his living model. He was concerned essentially with the individual, aesthetically qualified total structure of his conception, to which he must give expression also in the visual sensory form of the sculpture.

In this respect the critical idealism of Rickert loses sight of the actual situation. It restricts the empirical reality of a work of art to a matter of sensory impressions in time and space formed by the understanding into the synthesis of a thing, which our aesthetical judgment only relates in a subjective individualizing manner to an ‘aesthetic value’. But the qualifying individuality of the Hermes in its full empirical reality is really aesthetic in nature. If the realization of Praxiteles' aesthetic conception as such were not of an incomparable artistic individuality, the individuality of this work of art would be ascribable to a ‘sensory material’ only. For an abstract ideal world of values, as such, lacks any individuality.

Our contention, on the contrary, is that the proper sensory ‘Urbild’ reproduced in Praxiteles' Hermes, is not the sensory form of the living model. In the individual ‘Abbild-relation’ the sensory image of the marble statue is much rather directly related to the ideal harmonious sensory shape evoked in the productive fantasy of the artist by the contemplation of his living model.

1 Vol. II, pp. 375 ff.

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Lacking an original sensory objectivity¹, the sensory form of the marble Hermes has thus the objectivity of an aesthetically qualified structural ‘Abbild’. To understand the structural subject-object relation implied in Praxiteles' master-piece, an insight into this state of affairs is of the utmost importance. The relation in question is in principle different from a merely natural ‘Abbild-relation’ (such as is implied in the inverted image of a thing on the retina of the eye).

The structural-sensory object-aspect of a natural thing (in its individual beauty) is not necessarily related to the individual productive fantasy of the perceiving subject. And it does not have an inner aesthetically qualified structure, but expresses the structure of a natural thing.

This is why the ‘natural’ beauty of such a thing is also not especially related to the productive fantasy of the artist. Rather it pertains to the subjective aesthetic experiential function of everybody who is receptive to beauty. We can only say that this objective beauty, which is present in the thing in a latent objective function, is made manifest, i.e. disclosed, in the actual subject-object relation to the receptive aesthetical appreciation of the observer. But there is no question here of the realization of an aesthetic conception in an artistic thing-structure.

In Praxiteles' Hermes, in contrast, we are really confronted with such a structure. With respect to its sensory form, this thing is actually an image or copy of the visionary sensory shape, originally born in the productive fantasy of the artist.

1 Vol. II, pp. 374 ff.

Productive and reproductive fantasy respectively in the creation and appreciation of a work of art.

To comprehend the objective reality of this work of art, the observer must contemplate it as the structural objective realization of the subjective aesthetic conception of the artist. By deepening and enriching his natural aesthetic vision, he must actually acquire a reproductive aesthetic fantasy. When this is lacking, he can view the objective aesthetic structure of a work of art only as a more or less close resemblance of the beautiful ‘living model’ and in consequence judge it solely in terms of its similarity to natural beauty. The objective reality of the work of art entirely escapes him, since he does not experience its individual structural meaning.

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To say that such an observer does experience the actual thing, viz. as an individual natural entity, while losing sight only of the aesthetic ‘idea’ realized in it, is inaccurate. The thing presented here is the work of art. A natural thing is not given at all in this structure. Praxiteles' Hermes does not have any real existence apart from its incomparable aesthetically qualified structure. By viewing the real work of art as a copy of a beautiful natural object, the observer lacks a real experience of this sculpture.

The merely intentional character of the object of fantasy.

In this context we have still to consider a question concerning the objectification of an aesthetic conception.

We noticed, in our analysis of the modal subject-object relation, that a transcendental modal subject-function cannot objectify itself within its own modality¹. If this be true, how can the subjective aesthetic conception be aesthetically objectified in a work of art? To answer this question the productive aesthetic fantasy must be studied more closely.

In Volume II (p. 425/6) we have explained that the latter is typically founded in the sensory function of imagination, which in a restrictive sense is also to be observed in animal psychical life, at least in that of the higher organized animals.

Sensory imagination really exhibits a productive objectifying function.

And a peculiar subject-object relation is disclosed in the visual fantasm. Our theory of the modal spheres did not yet permit us to investigate this subject-object relation in more detail. The latter is only intelligible in connection with the intentional structure of a fancied thing or event.

The sensory fantasm is not really related to the pre-psychical subject- or subject-object functions of an actually existing thing or actually occurring event; it is rather the objective sensory aspect of the product of our imagination. In the aesthetically qualified conception of Praxiteles this productive imagination has projected the sensory image of his Hermes as a merely intentional visionary object.

In our productive fantasy we are thus indeed confronted with an intentional object, in the sense explained in the modal analy-

1 Cf. Vol. II, part I, p. 370.

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sis of the subject-object relation in context with the scholastic logical conception of the objectum intentionale¹. In itself this object does not have any relation (except an intentional one) to the concrete object-side of temporal reality, presented in the structure of a thing.

This intentional object is nevertheless bound to the modal and the plastic dimensions of the temporal horizon of experience and of reality. And just because it is bound to the transcendental horizon of experience, the fancied objective structure of a thing is a potential structure capable of being represented in a real thing. And it is essential to the reality of the latter that it be a representation of the fancied thing-structure.

Viewed modally, it is therefore incorrect to speak of an aesthetic objectification of the aesthetic subject-function of the artist.

The aesthetic object-function of the work of art is only the aesthetic representation, in the objectively-aesthetically qualified structure of a real thing, of a merely intentional aesthetic object of the fantasy of the artist. Nevertheless, this intentional object can only function in an intentional subject-object relation of aesthetic modality. And so its aesthetical objectification in the sculpture is an implicit objectification of this intentional relation. It is not, however, an objectification of the aesthetic subject-function as such, i.e. apart from a particular intentional relation to the Hermes, as an object of Praxiteles' aesthetic fantasy². And this was meant by the term ‘transcendental modal subject function’

*

With our present background, let us examine more closely the coherence of structural functions inherent in Praxiteles' work of art. First, observe that the vital function of Hermes and the boy Dionysus was objectively intended in the artistic conception

1 Cf. Vol. II, part I, pp. 387 ff.

2 It is absolutely necessary to make our analysis as careful as possible here, although the modal distinctions made are extremely hard to follow. The modal import of the concepts is sharply defined, but they are unintelligible unless an insight is gained into the theoretical states of affairs under investigation. The difficulty connected with a clear analysis of the modal aspects of a structure of individuality originates from the fact that every aspect is an expression of the structural whole. Thus it must seem that the aspects pass into each other, if we lose sight of their different modality.

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of these figures. In the aesthetically qualified structure of his artistic conception, the artist indeed had a productive vision of two living deified human bodies. The organic vital function of Hermes and the boy Dionysus was thus undoubtedly implicitly intended in his productive fantasy. This aesthetic intention is realized in the objective structure of the statue, as a thing.

The marble Hermes does not live subjectively, as does a living model. But, in its aesthetic structure, the intentional vital function has been objectively represented or depicted. And this objective representation belongs to the reality of the marble Hermes with the boy Dionysus. The artist must have viewed the anatomic structure of the living bodies, but in its individual disclosure and deepening by the productive aesthetic fantasy.

This is undoubtedly a peculiarity of Praxiteles' Hermes which other works of art need not have. It is of essential importance, however, for an understanding of the internal structure of this particular work of art.

The typical foundational function of a sculptural work of art and the problem of its modal determination.

According to the structural principle of Praxiteles' Hermes, the leading appears to belong to a typical aesthetic object-function of an internal structural character; namely, to the harmonious objectification of an intentional (imagined) aesthetically qualified Hermes- and Dionysus-figure. And, the aesthetic expression of the vital function of the sculptured bodies appears to be essential in the typical leading structural function.

Of course the artist could also have given a sculptural expression to an aesthetic vision of two dead bodies. But then the character of the work of art would have been entirely different. The essential character of the intended vital function is directly evident if you consider the wonderful technique Praxiteles employed to acquire such a life-like effect in marble. Consider the inimitable position of the head of Hermes; the dreaming-pensive expression of the face; the tender warm tone of de body achieved by rubbing the surface with wax; the application of a refined technique of painting to the hair and eyes; and the gracious position of the left arm, bearing the boy Dionysus, while the right arm¹ playfully shows a bunch of grapes to the child.

1 The damaged statue present in the Louvre at Paris shows only a fragment of this arm.

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A closer examination immediately reveals that a structurally unbreakable relationship with a typical foundational or substratum-function is expressed in the leading structural function of Hermes. The type of individuality of the leading aesthetic function is not original, but has its final typical foundation in an earlier modal type, in a manner generally explained in Volume II, Chap. VI, § 3 (pp. 423 ff.).

This peculiar feature of a structural principle was already encountered in our earlier investigation of structures of individuality in natural things. We were, however, obliged to defer a closer analysis of this state of affairs because it appeared to cohere with an intricate complication in the structure of a natural whole displaying the character of a so-called enkaptic form-totality.

But in the present context we must proceed to a first reconnoitering of such internal structural interlacements insofar as they are revealed in Praxiteles' sculptural work of art. For we cannot penetrate any further into the structure of individuality of this masterpiece apart from a provisional investigation of these interlacements. In addition we need such a provisional enquiry for the structural analysis of all the other products of human formation. But the necessity of this enquiry in the present context cannot appear before we have discovered the orginal or nuclear modal type of individuality in which the typicalness of the leading aesthetic object-function of Praxiteles' Hermes is founded. For, since the latter does not show this nuclear type, the internal geno-type of this work of art must have a typical foundational function and consequently be characterized by two typical structural functions.

But, in which modal law-sphere is this foundational function enclosed? What modality of meaning does it have? This problem is extremely difficult and of great importance for our subsequent investigations.

If our thinking were conditioned by the Aristotelian form-matter schema, our inclination would be to seek the typical foundational function of the work of art in the marble material. It is, however, certain that this material itself possesses a natural structure of individuality and is therefore not to be comprehended in a merely modal-functional manner.

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Why the typical foundational function of the work of art cannot be found in the natural leading function of the marble.

The internal structure of individuality of the unfinished marble is undoubtedly qualified by its typical physico-chemical structural function (as the ‘leading’ function). The type of individuality revealed in the qualifying energy-aspect of its structure can only be brought to light by a physico-chemical analysis. As we shall see presently, this analysis shows that, as to its chemical structure, marble is nothing but a variability type of an original geno-type of inorganic matter.

Is the typical foundational function of Praxiteles' Hermes to be found in this leading function of the natural marble?

A seemingly strong case can be made against an affirmative answer to the above question. In the treatment of the problem of modal individuality, in our general theory of law-spheres, we discovered that the subjective aesthetic conception, with its merely intentional objectivity, is typically founded in the sensory function of fantasy. Doesn't this imply that the objective fully-realized work of art must find its typical objective foundation in the same modality; namely, the modality of feeling? In other words, is it not the sensory objectified fantasy-form which is to be viewed as the typical substratum function of Hermes, rather than its pre-sensory, physico-chemical structural function?

But we should not overlook an essential fact, viz. that the objective sensory fantasy-form of the Hermes is not a merely intentional one, in the same sense as that of the subjective artistic conception. This fantasy-form has been depicted and realized in the marble material. Therefore we may ask: does not this fantasy-form refer to the original meaning-individuality of the physico-chemical function of the marble?

It is impossible, however, for the internal leading function of the natural product, as such, to be the typical original substratum function of the marble Hermes. The raw marble, as a natural product, does not yet have within itself anything that can serve as the typical original foundation of the individuality of this work of art.

As an object of human moulding, the marble is fully a δυνάμει ὄν, i.e. a material that can assume every possible cultural form, and can just as well be made into a thing entirely lacking the inner structure of a work of fine art.

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The physico-chemical aspect of the marble Hermes cannot contain the leading structural function of a natural thing, but only an internal structural function of this specific sculptural work of art. But, as such, it can no more be considered as the typical foundational function of the latter, because, even in its internal physico-chemical function within the work of art, the marble continues to be a bare material for the aesthetic expression.

The sensory structural function of Praxiteles' Hermes does not have an original individuality.

The marble statue, as such, is the objective plastic representation of an aesthetically qualified intentional fantasy-object, which itself appeared to be typically founded in a sensory fantasm. Since the physico-chemical function of the marble-material appears to be eliminated as a possible typical foundational function of the Hermes, it may seem once again that this rôle is only to be ascribed to the objective sensory image of this sculptural work. On closer observation, however, it is evident that such a solution does not touch the real state of affairs.

For on the one hand, the objectivity of this sensory image is not original but representational; and on the other the artist's plastic activity is an original free formation, as such pointing beyond the sensory aspect.

To be an adequate typical foundation of the aesthetic typicalness of the marble statue, the sensory image should have to be given in nature, and it has been conclusively demonstrated that it is not.

The sensory figure of the Hermes is not a natural form of marble, but is only the sensory expression of an aesthetically qualified controlling formation of the material after the artist's own free project. It is, in other words, not original in its own typical individuality, but anticipatory.

The typical historical foundational function of a sculpture in connection with the stylistic element. Style as a differentiating factor in its geno-type.

Our conclusion is that the real typical foundational function of Praxiteles' work of art is found solely in the historical law-sphere, modally qualified by free formative control¹.

1 Cf. Vol. II, Part I, pp. 192 ff.

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The nuclear type of individuality of the statue is thus to be ascribed to its objective historical structural function, and not to its physico-chemical or objective sensory functions: the objective-technical depictive form given to the marble material by the hand of the artist, is in truth the typical modal substratum of the statue's aesthetic individuality.

This conclusion may appear strange at first, but it undeniably explains states of affairs essential to this plastic work of art.

If we consider the inner articulation of the geno-type: plastic work of art, we first meet with the pictorial, the mimic and the sculptural types¹. The latter embraces the narrower type of sculptured figures of deities and, as a sculptural type, it shows the variability-type of marble-sculpture which we shall examine presently.

The type ‘sculptured figures of deities’ doubtless finds its modal nuclear type of individuality in the cultural or historical aspect.

The entire further differentiation of the narrower geno-type ‘sculptured figures of deities’ is dependent upon a style-moment; and from our general theory of modalities we know that a style-moment is a typical historical analogy (already endowed with a type of individuality) in the aesthetic modality.

This moment, too, typically points back from the aesthetic modality to the historical. A style-moment is essential only to the aesthetic typicalness of art and is naturally absent in the beauty of nature.

It must be acknowledged, moreover, that also in naïve experience the technical form appears as the typical bearer of the entire aesthetic structure of the free work of art², even though this foundational function is here theoretically unanalysed.

Technical form and the leading aesthetic expression of the artist's conception are the two aspects characterizing our experience of every sculptural work of art. Their inner structural unity is a requirement of every good and mature sculpture.

1 Cf. p. 123, note of this vol.

2 A work of fine art is free, when it is not enclosed in an enkaptic structural whole which lacks an aesthetic qualification. We shall subsequently elaborate this point.

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The secondary radical-type of a work of art reconsidered. Why all secondary radical types of man-made complete things imply two radical functions.

Is it only the geno-type ‘sculptural art-work’ that has a typical historical foundation, or does the radical type of the entire ‘kingdom of works of art’ imply such a typical cultural basis?

If we take the term radical-type in its orginal sense defined previously, this question must cause some surprise. For a radical-type in this original sense was conceived as the ultimate genus of a structure of individuality, in which the qualifying function of the whole is only determined in its general modal meaning. The typical foundational function did not make its entrance into our investigation before we had considered the gradual types of individuality which the leading or qualifying function assumes in the inner differentation and articulation of a radical type.

In the present context, however, we are not concerned with original radical-types, but with such of a secondary character as pertain to human societal life. And here we are confronted with the particular state of affairs that the different objective products of human formation as well as the typical spheres of a differentiated human society exhibit a radical difference of qualifying functions, which precludes the possibility to ascribe them to the same radical type. At the same time it appears impossible to conceive the different ‘kingdoms’ of these secondary human structures without taking account of their typical modal foundational functions. Every attempt in this direction would land us in an arbitrary method of classification, lacking any foundation in the plastic dimension of the temporal order. This will clearly appear from our further investigations. We are, therefore, obliged to acknowledge kinds of secondary radical types implying two radical functions, which, as such, are as yet only determined as to their general modal meaning.

After this explanation of the modified sense in which the term radical type is used with respect to works of art and other products of human formation, we may return to the question raised above.

The answer must be that indeed all works of fine art exhibit the same secondary radical type with a typical aesthetic qualification and a typical historical foundation. With respect to their internal structure of individuality, musical and literary works are no more based on an original-typical physical or

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sensory natural substratum than the different types of plastic art appeared to be. Musical compositions are typically founded in a free controlled rhythmic formation of musical sounds, as a cultural tonal substratum of the leading aesthetic conception of the composer. And literary works of art show a typical foundation in a cultural formation of lingual means of expression, which is modally different from the formative moment inherent in the aspect of symbolic signification as such. The cultural formation intended belongs to the technique of literary art.

The interwovenness of a natural and an aesthetically qualified structure in a sculptural work of art, as an enkaptic binding of the former.

We must now consider a further point of essential importance to plastic art, because a work of art, included in this geno-type¹, actually displays an objective thing-structure.

In our analysis of the internal modal functions of the Hermes of Praxiteles, we concluded that the natural structure of individuality of the marble cannot play a constitutive rôle in this artistic work. Nevertheless, the question arises how the structure of the latter is related to the internal structure of the natural material.

Naturally it cannot be denied that the material, however much moulded by the artist, continues to be marble, and that the actual qualifying function of the latter is still physico-chemical in nature.

Is it not necessary, therefore, to distinguish two structures closely interwoven in the statue itself, viz. that of the natural product, marble, and that of the marble work of art, Hermes? And could not we say that the natural product marble functions separately as an individual whole so as to form the typical substratum of the statue as a sculpture?

If the preceding questions are to be answered in the affirmative, our analysis of the two radical-functions of the internal structure of individuality of Hermes is still correct. However, we must supplement this analysis by an investigation of the

1 Primarily differentiated according to the ancient classification into architectonic, sculptural, and pictorial art. We have replaced the architectural type by that of the mimic art (of dancing, etc.), because architecture, as such, does not belong to the radical type: work of fine art. The reason is that a work of architecture, however beautiful it may be, is, as such, not aesthetically qualified. This will appear from our later investigations.

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close relation sustained by this latter structure with another structure, presenting itself as its foundation.

This new problem, now requiring our full attention, was not solved in our earlier structural analysis.

We are unaware of any objection that could vitiate our argument that the qualifying physico-chemical function of the natural product marble is unable to ground the type of individuality of the statue, revealed in the internal leading structural function of the latter. Nor can our analysis of the objective cultural form, as the typical foundational function of the aesthetic individuality of Hermes, be effectively argued against.

Nevertheless, this does not refute the thesis that the objective marble-form necessarily pre-supposes the natural structure of individuality of the marble, as a natural product, and that for the reality of the statue a close connection is essential between the natural material and the work of art.

Homogeneous aggregate and a non-homogeneous individual whole.

What is the nature of this relationship? According to its natural structure of individuality marble is a granular crystalline aggregate of calc-spar crystals; and its objective sensory feature, colour, etc., depend upon the particular kind of material. The work of art itself, however, is not an aggregate, but an unbreakable non-homogeneous whole. Its parts are not indiscriminate pieces of marble but the members of the moulded marble bodies. They are determined by the inner structural law of the sculpture and can only function in the individual totality of the latter.

The natural aggregate condition of the marble is under certain geological conditions (e.g., a volcanic soil and contact metamorphosis) determined by the crystallization laws of calcium carbonate (CaCo₃). Because of the dependence of its formation upon such external geological conditions, marble is to be viewed as a variability type of calcium carbonate. The aggregate is a homogeneous whole, in which atoms are arranged in specific directions to form a stable lattice-work, held together in a balanced state of firm material by very strong electro-magnetic forces.

In the structure of the work of art, in contrast, the marble does not function as a homogeneous aggregate, but in an aesthetically qualified cultural form, whose parts are not homogeneous,

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but each of which has its own plastic function in the total composition. To the artist the marble is important solely as a medium of expression.

The natural physical-chemical processes in the marble do not play the leading rôle in the structure of the work of art, but only in the natural product. Nevertheless, by the artist's technical procedure they may be directed in an anticipatory way to the expression of his aesthetic conception.

In other words, we encounter here a typical example of an enkaptic interlacement in which a natural structure of individuality is bound by the structure of a work of art¹.

In such an enkaptic union there ought not to be any dualism observable between the natural and the aesthetically qualified structures. In its enkaptic functions, the natural material ought not to appear as a resistance to aesthetic representation; instead it should be completely opened to the expression of the artist's conception. Consequently, the natural physico-chemical and the objective sensory functions of the statue, directed toward the leading aesthetic structural function of the work of art, ought to be opened, thereby enriching their own structural functional meaning. To the degree that the marble strikes us as a resistive natural material, not completely controlled by the artistic technique, the work of art is a failure, or at least lacking in perfection. The internal structural unity, intended in the aesthetic conception, is then not fully realized objectively in the marble statue. An obtrusive dualism exists between the enkaptically bound natural structure of individuality of the marble and the objective expression of the aesthetic project.

1 Part III of this volume is devoted to a detailed investigation of such enkaptic interlacements. Provisionally, I can only circumscribe the meaning of the term ‘enkapsis’ as follows: enkapsis takes place, when one structure of individuality restrictively binds a second structure of a different radical- or geno-type, without destroying the peculiar character of the latter.

The internal unity of the art-work is also disturbed by a dualism between the typical foundational and the leading function.

Neither should a dualism exist between the typical foundational and the typical leading function of a sculpture. The technical formative function ought not to obtrude at the expense

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of the leading aesthetic structural function, instead of becoming the full expression of the latter.

The musical counterpart of such a dualism is found in a musical performance when the technique of the performer obtrudes at the expense of the musical expression, or when the tonal waves (which bear the musical structure) obtrude at the expense of the unity of musical harmony.

The natural structure of individuality of the marble material is not abolished but its meaning is enriched and opened in its enkaptic function within the inner structure of the work of art.

Thus it appeared that the natural structure of individuality of the marble functions in the objective thing-structure of the sculptural art work as an enkaptically bound structure only. And this enkaptic relation is subject to the normative law requiring that in the inner structure of the work of art the marble can only function as a material for the expression of the artistic conception.

This does not imply that the natural structure of the material is eliminated or abolished. The artist cannot transform marble into flesh and blood. His plastic aesthetic activity remains bound to the natural structure of his material.

The task of the artist is to open or disclose the natural structure of his material through the aesthetic structure of the work of art, so that the natural structure itself (although only in its enkaptic functions) becomes a complete expression of this aesthetic structure.

The enkaptic intertwinement of these two structures of individuality can no more be explained by the metaphysical Aristotelian form-matter schema than the inner structure of the art-work itself can. In fact Aristotle did not recognize a substantial form proper to a work of art. The reason is that he did not consider a work of art, as such, to be an individual substance¹. From this metaphysical viewpoint Aristotle is obliged

1 An opposite contention is still defended by those who hold that Aristotle mistook the art forms for substantial forms. This view is refuted by the entire 2nd Chapter of the 8th Book of the Metaphysics. In Z 2, 1943a, Aristotle explicitly states that art products, as such, even in their union with matter, are not substances, but only analogies of substances:
‘Now none of these things mentioned (viz. art-products such as a honey-drink, a book, a cupboard, a threshold, a house, etc.) is substance, even when coupled with matter, yet it is what is analogous to substance in each case’. (I have made use of W.D. Ross's translation here. D.H.F.).
With respect to Praxiteles' Hermes, Aristotle's conception implies that the marble statue is a substance only insofar as it is a piece of marble, but not insofar as it is an aesthetically formed figure. The essence of the material is not changed by its being formed into a figure.
This agrees with the interpretation of Alexander of Aphrodisias in his commentary on the Metaphysics.
Our conception is in no way vitiated by the fact that in Book VII, the contrast between matter and form is illustrated by pointing to the relation between the ore and the form of a statue. This illustration does not concern substantial forms. This does not detract from our view, explained in an earlier context, that in Aristotle's religious basic motive the cultural form-motive of the Olympian religion has acquired the primacy.

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to view Praxiteles' sculpture only as an accidental form of the ‘natural substance’ marble. By so doing the internal structure of the work of art and the enkaptic function of the marble-material in the latter cannot be accounted for. In addition, the conception that a ‘natural substance’ may become ‘matter’ with respect to an ‘accidental form’ implies an intrinsical antinomy. For the marble is supposed to retain its proper ‘substantial form’ and the latter cannot become ‘matter’ of a merely accidental form. Substance is the absolute point of reference for all its accidental properties. How then can marble become ‘matter’ with respect to the art-form?

Naturally, I am not opposed to the terms ‘form’ and ‘matter’, but only to their dualistic metaphysical connotation. The metaphysical concepts of form and matter do not fit to the structures of individuality and their enkaptic interlacements.

As such the moulded marble is a variability- or phenotype of the sculptural art-work.

The reader can now understand why we previously characterized marble-plastic as a variability-type of the geno-type ‘sculptural art work’¹.

The structure of individuality of the marble, as such, is that of a natural product, and qua talis never enclosed in the structural principle of the sculptured art work, nor in the internal differentiation of this geno-type.

But the variability-type always points to an enkaptic interwovenness of structural principles.

1 Cf. § 3, where we provisionally applied the distinction between radical-, geno- and variability-types to work of art.

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And the enkaptic relation, analysed in the sculptural art-work, has the peculiarity that an irreversable foundational relationship exists between the natural and the aesthetically qualified thing-structures. The marble can function separately from its enkaptic interlacement with the sculptural work of art, Hermes of Praxiteles, but the reverse is impossible. This is why the structural principle of the marble statue is founded in that of the marble as a natural product.

In our general analysis of enkaptic intertwinements we shall notice a great many of such irreversible foundational relationships between structures of individuality belonging to the most different kingdoms.

§ 3 - Radical types of other normatively qualified objective thing-structures.

We will now examine normatively qualified object-structures - entirely different in character from those inherent in works of fine art -, in which we shall discover new structural peculiarities. In this context we shall analyze the structure of some ordinary everyday utensils, such as chairs, tables, etc.

This may seem to be a trivial subject. Does it really imply philosophical problems? It may be granted that the analysis of a work of art is a subject worthy of philosophic discussion. But must a serious philosophy concern itself with the endless multiplicity of structures inherent in the most ordinary things of everyday life? Is it not sufficient to qualify this entire category of objects simply as ‘cultural things’, in which man has formed a natural material in relation to specific values of life? Is it, in other words, necessary for philosophy to lose itself into a detailed examination of the typical structures of such things as these?

We can reply that our philosophy cannot neglect the things of naïve experience, as its attitude toward the latter is quite different from that of modern immanence philosophy. Any resemblance of triviality is the result of the attitude of apostate human self-consciousness casting its shadow over the richness of God's creation and levelling out its structural particularities in the monotonous uniformity of general schemes. Naïve experience, when viewed in the light of Divine Revelation, becomes rich in meaning. It becomes a caricature when the things of daily life

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are no longer experienced in the perspective of meaning, pointing to its Divine Creator.

In Plato's dialogue Parmenides, the aged founder of the Eleatic School warns the young Socrates that he should not disdain relating the seemingly most trivial things, as e.g., hairs and mud, to ideal forms (eidè).

Modern philosophy will, generally speaking, leave a closer examination of ‘hairs and mud’ to natural science, and that of chairs, tables, lamps and other utensils to technology. Philosophical problems, however, will not be discovered in such things because modern thought has lost the interest in structures of individuality presenting themselves in pre-theoretic experience. The latter, as such, is viewed as a triviality.

It is this very attitude with respect to naïve experience which our philosophy rejects in principle.

The radical type of everyday utensils and the enkaptic interwovenness of their structure of individuality with the natural structure of the materials.

What thing-structure does a table or chair display? Such utensils are also formed out of specific materials in accordance with a free human project. Both organic and inorganic matter may furnish the raw material. And again we can ascertain that the natural structure of the material is enkaptically bound to the internal structure of the utensil. The latter is irreversably based on the natural structure.

In modern life, materials are technically formed into semi-manufactured products, before they are again formed into utensils.

The primary natural structure of wood used in the construction of furniture is found in the trunk of a living tree. This structure is, as we have seen, typically qualified by a biotic subject-function. The tree, as an individual thing, must be destroyed in order to make planks out of its trunk.

Certain agglomerations of cells (viz. the parenchymal wood-cells) may continue to live for a certain time, but they are separated from the individual total unity of the tree. Thus, when it is no longer bound in this non-homogeneous whole but detached from it, the wood tissue is in an entirely different condition. Of course, as a type of wood, it still displays a secondary-natural structure of individuality, but it no longer discloses its original natural structure. This does not detract from the fact

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that it continues to reveal a typical relation to its natural origin. The tree produces its wood-cells out of cambium, and the wood remains qualified as the organic product of the tree, even after it has been separated from the total structure of the living tree and after its cells have died.

It is not easy to establish what in this condition is its qualifying or leading function. At first sight we might be inclined to consider the latter as a biotic object-function since the wood is a product of the tree. Are not also the shells of molluscs typically qualified by an object-function in the modal aspect in which the leading function of the animals concerned is found?

But, on second thought, this conclusion per analogiam appears to be unsound. The typical biotic and the psychical subject-object relations which are bound to specific structures of individuality pre-suppose that the object-functions concerned are either actual or at least potential, so that they may be actualized by a biotic or psychical subject-function to which they are typically related in a qualifying manner.

With respect to wood originating from a destroyed tree this is not the case. It cannot function in a biotic subject-object relation able to qualify its structure of individuality.

The dead wood is nothing but a physico-chemically qualified kind of matter, which is no longer enkaptically bound in a living organism. Left to itself it would be subject to a physico-chemical process of dissolution. What then is its qualifying function so long as it retains its typical structure as wood, produced by a typical kind of tree? One should not think that this is an artificial question resulting from our concern to bind the empirical phenomena to a pre-conceived system of modalities. The different modal spheres are not construed by us. They are given in the temporal horizon of empirical reality and do not permit themselves to be levelled out by a supposedly simplifying reduction of reality to a so-called physico-psychical scheme. The plastic dimension of the temporal horizon is bound to the modal dimension; and a theoretical destruction of the latter results in a destruction of the structures of individuality.

Therefore we must insist on a satisfying answer to the question raised. If we must conclude that wood, in its condition as dead matter, is necessarily of a physico-chemically qualified structure, the difficulty remains how to account for its relation to the tree from which it originates.

This difficulty can only be solved when we consider that the

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matter of the wood, which as such is qualified by a typical physical combination of atoms, has assumed a variability-type by its enkaptic interlacement with the living organism of this particular kind of tree. This variability-type reveals itself so long as the wood in its separate condition exists. Wood of oak is clearly distinct from wood of the beech and from any other kind of this matter. And it is in its variability-type that the wood maintains its relation to the tree from which it originates.

The material forms of the organs, which betray the original enkaptic function of the wood-matter in the living organism, have lost their typical meaning. Although still retaining water, after their separation from the total structure of the tree, the woody fibres and woody ducts can no longer fulfil their proper function of conducting water to the top. Similarly, the still living parenchymal wood cells remain storage centres of reserve materials, but this function is no longer the original structural function in the total structure of the living tree.

The structural type of the so-called semi-manufactured products.

These reserve materials, which have become useless and harmful to the material, must now be eliminated from the wood by a technical refining process. After being sawed into planks and treated against decay, the wood becomes a technical product. As such it has its objective foundational function in the historical modality; but it is only a semi-formed technical product, in which the secondary natural structure of the wood is enkaptically bound.

The relation between the structure of individuality of the wood and that of the planks is an irreversable foundational relation.

A characteristic of the structural type of these so-called semi-products is that they do not possess an internal typical leading function.

The structural leading function of the enkaptically bound natural structure of the material cannot be considered that of the semi-product. The most that can be based upon enkaptic structural interwovenness are the variability-types.

It is much rather characteristic of the structure of technical materials that their potential historical-technical destination can only acquire a more precise specification (but no longer an internal one) in relation to the types of utensils or other kinds of

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man-made products in whose structure they are to function enkaptically.

As appeared from our analysis of the structural interlacement between the marble material and the sculptured art-work, the material, considered in itself, is completely δυνάμει ὄν. Its natural leading function can never be the typical foundational function in the structure of a work of art.

The structural type of a technical semi-product is thus by nature semi-defined. This is why I no longer speak of a radical type of these materials, as was done in the first (Dutch) edition of this work. For a radical-type, even a secondary one, requires an internal leading function, which is lacking in the material as a semi-product.

Having investigated the typical incomplete structure of the material as a ‘semi-product’, we must observe that he foundational function of this structure is not that of things formed out of such material. The technical form of a plank or a slab of marble does not possess any other nuclear type of individuality than that of a semi-manufactured material. It is only the technical form which the material assumes in the structures of the end-products that can found the individuality-type of the leading structural functions of the latter. But this technical form does not belong to the internal structure of the material, neither to that of the technical semi-product nor to that of the secondary natural product. It belongs to the internal structure of the work of art or the utensil, or any other end-product of human formation. The material is only bound by this technical form in the manner of an enkaptic interlacement with the art-work, the utensil, etc.

A thing formed out of semi-manufactured materials is thus founded on at least two structures of individuality, enkaptically bound in its own structure. A parallel state of affairs is not found in things directly formed out of raw material; in such things only the raw material is enkaptically bound.

Analysis of the internal structural functions of a chair in relation to the modal foundational system of law-spheres.

Having completed our analysis of the structural type of raw and of semi-manufactured material, we can return to our original problem: What is the thing-structure of a table or chair?

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It must be clear that this structure pre-supposes that of the materials, without being identical with the latter.

The material employed must of course be suitable for the objective destination of these utensils. Nevertheless, the natural structures of individuality of the various materials and those of the semi-products made out of them can be very different. Wood, metal, leather, wool, etc., can be utilized in the same chair, and thus function in the same enkaptic interlacement.

This state of affairs re-emphasizes the fact that the inner structures of the materials remain clearly distinct from the internal structure of the chair as an individual whole.

A chair has internal structural functions in all the modal law-spheres. However, the functions preceding the typical foundational function in the cosmic temporal order do not have an original type of individuality, but only an anticipating one. We shall show this by a methodical analysis of these different modal functions.

The typical numerical and spatial relations in the structure of a chair are necessary conditions for its typical technical form. But the mathematical figures of the seat, back, arms, and legs of a chair are typically determined by the internal structural principle of such furniture, in which the cultural function of technical formation has again the foundational rôle.

It stands to reason that these spatial figures, modally based on numerical relations, are not given in the materials, neither in their structure as semi-products, nor in that of the natural product. Rather they are freely projected in the internal conception of their designer, and are realized in the actual thing by a free formative activity.

In the project, the structural functions in question (i.e. the numerical and spatial) are intentionally directed to the typical leading function of the chair. In the realization of this project they must open their anticipatory possibilities and give expression to the entire structure of the object.

The other structural functions of the chair, preceding the objective historical function in the inter-modal order, are also essential to the individual reality of the chair's totality.

The internal physico-chemical function of this thing is its last subject-function. Its later functions are not subjective but objective in nature¹.

1 Translator's note. The terms ‘subjective’ and ‘objective’ are used in the sense previously defined in Vol. II, Part I, Ch.V. Cf. pp. 366 ff. D.H.F.

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The physico-chemical structure of the individual whole is not that of the separate materials, though the latter have an enkaptic function in the thing's energy-aspect. Bound by the cultural form of the individual totality, the materials in their enkaptic physico-chemical function are no longer qualified by the internal energy-function of their natural structure. They are freely arranged after the project of a typically qualified whole, whose internal structure is also expressed in its energy-aspect.

This internal structural energy-aspect of the chair is opened in its anticipatory possibilities and directed to the leading function of this thing. Its typical weight and bearing power are brought into accordance with its typical objective destination by rational consideration and calculation. This may suffice to understand that its typical physico-chemical constellation is not that of a natural thing, though it continues to be subject to the general laws of the energy-aspect. Human technical activity has realized those typical structural anticipatory potentialities in physical-chemical constellations which cannot be actualized in a natural way without human leading.

A chair should be accommodated to the sitting posture of the human body to give it rest and support. Periodic rest is a biotic need in human life and thus it is evident that the chair must have a biotic object-function related to the subjective biotic function of man. But it stands to reason that this biotic object-function cannot be of the typical restrictive character found in the vegetable and animal kingdoms.

It has a strongly anticipatory structure and cannot be experienced apart from the typical total structure of the chair expressing itself in this modal function. A chair satisfies a biotic-cultural¹ need of man, a need which in addition is qualified by a post-historical function, whose modality we shall examine presently. This typical qualification is objectified in the leading function of the chair's total structure.

The same state of affairs presents itself in the sensory image of this thing. Referring to our explanation of the analogous state of affairs in the sensory image of Praxiteles' Hermes, we may establish that the objective sensory function of the chair is not given in nature. It anticipates the two typical radical functions of this piece of furniture and can only be experienced as the

1 This means a cultural anticipation in the modal structure of the biotic aspect.

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sensory objectification of the intentional subject-object relation present in the free project of the designer. The sensory structural image of the chair is related to the sensory human feeling of rest and support. And these subject-object relations also exhibit a typical anticipatory character.

The objective logical modality of the chair's typical structure is related to the subjective logical idea of the latter in human thought as a result of an implicit (pre-theoretical) or explicit (theoretical) analysis. As an inherent aspect of this thing it gives expression to the logical coherence of the structural plan of the whole by which the latter is clearly distinct from any natural product. The structural type of individuality revealed in this logical object-function is no more originally logical than that of the preceding functions is original in their pre-logical modalities. It exhibits an anticipatory character since it appeals to the post-logical radical functions of the chair's structure.

The typical foundational function of utensils and the problem of the individual identity of a thing.

We shall now try to make it still clearer that the typical foundational function of this type of utensils can only be found in their cultural (historical) aspect. The implicit concept that we have of a chair in our naïve experience does not adequately explain its inner structure of individuality. It clings to sensorily perceptible characteristics, though the latter are implicitly conceived in an anticipatory sense. The current explanation of the lingual meaning of the word chair as denoting a seat which may have different forms, does in principle not exceed this implicit naïve concept. It cannot satisfactorily account for the internal structure of individuality revealed by this thing.

Numerous other things, which no one would call a chair, are made to sit on, e.g., a saddle, a piano stool, a cushion, a bench, etc.

However much attention be focused on the sensory form, this cannot serve as a foundational function in the structure of the chair. The type of individuality revealed in the sensory image appeared to lack an original character in this aspect of the thing in question. Rather it immediately suggests a cultural human formation (of a material) by which an intentional sensory image is objectively represented in the sensory figure of an actual thing.

Naïve experience is involved in the difficulties indicated in

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the first chapter of this Volume, when asked to explain what part of the sensory form of a chair can change without destroying its individual identity. Such a problem cannot be coped with by the employment of a subjective, sensorily limited, general concept of a chair. Neither is this question answered by pointing to sensory form as a whole. This simply raises a new problem, because this entirety or whole appeals to the internal structural totality of the thing concerned. And this structural whole only finds expression in its sensory image, without being identical with it.

Is the identity of a chair, for example, destroyed by the recovering of its seat and back with tissue of the same or somewhat different pattern or by the replacement of a broken leg? Of course not. Nevertheless, several such partial modifications can give it a completely ‘new face’. So it appears that the individual identity of the parts cannot be essential to that of the whole.

But suppose that the wooden or wicker seat of an ordinary kitchen chair is replaced by a well springed bottom covered with expensive upholstery; this certainly would affect its individual unity. And certainly the typical ‘style’ of a parlour chair cannot be altered without affecting its individual identity. These facts will appear to be relevant for tracing the inner structural principles of these things.

The presence of a seat is of course essential to the primary type chair. But even this characteristic is not related to the sensory form only. A dog choosing a beautiful easy chair as a resting-place, certainly perceives a sensory form associated with the satisfaction of his sensory desire for rest. But a dog does not really perceive the sensory form of a ‘chair’. His power of perception is limited to the sensory psychical function. An animal cannot relate the perceived form to its total underlying structure. To the dog the only essential point is that the sensory figure of the seat affords satisfaction to his sensory desire for rest.

With man it is quite different. Even without engaging in a theoretical analysis, he is able to experience such things as tables and chairs, as individual totalities, in accordance with their typical structural meaning.

The only condition is the historical opening of his experiential horizon by a proper cultural education.

A primitive man does not need tables and chairs to meet his natural or social requirements. When he is tired, the ground or

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a tree trunk provide an adequate resting place. The introduction of furniture and the cultivation of its habitual societal use are dependent on a historical disclosure of human society.

We cannot doubt, therefore, that these utensils have a typical historical foundation, also when considered from the standpoint of human subjectivity (i.e. in the structural subject-object relation in which they are necessarily included).

As to their foundational function such things as chairs and tables are rightly called ‘cultural objects’ belonging to a higher level of civilization. But what modality is to be ascribed to the typical leading function of their structure of individuality?

This question cannot be escaped by the traditional reference to specific human aims to which these things are serviceable. Such teleological characterizations may suffice in practical life, but they do not satisfy the requirements of a due theoretical analysis of the structures of individuality. This already appeared from the current teleological definition of a chair as a cultural object made to sit on.

Though it is undeniable that the presence of a seat is essential to this piece of furniture, this characteristic appeared to be insufficient to distinguish a chair from other things made to sit on.

The typical qualifying function in the radical type of utensils.

How then shall we discover the qualifying function of such things with respect to their radical type? First, we must observe that the geno- or primary types, tables and chairs, although susceptible to further structural determination, are already differentiated, since they belong to the more inclusive geno-type furniture.

The relation between the concept table or chair to the concept furniture is not that of the logical particular to the logical universal without any reference to the structural order of temporal reality. Much rather a fixed structural articulation of the type of individuality is here given, which is well founded in this order.

With respect to their inner structure, the utensils in question are furniture with an individualized leading function.

The typical objective destination of furniture is inseparably interwoven with the entire arrangement of a human dwelling. The further differentiation of the structural type, table or chair, depends upon whether they are to furnish a living-room, kitchen, garden, library, restaurant, office, etc.

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This differentiation does not pertain to merely external structural peculiarities of furniture or to merely subjective purposes in human consciousness. A parlour chair is objectively different from a kitchen- or garden chair. The various intentional structures of the objects, according to which they are fashioned, have been objectively realized in the material.

The individual identity of a kitchen chair is destroyed when the latter is re-upholstered and embellished in a manner that makes it out of place for kitchen service.

With respect to its radical type, the individualized leading function of such furnishings is enclosed in the modality of social intercourse. Within the structural subject-object relation¹ it is subject to the norms of sociability, class or rank obligations, style, and so on.

In a work of fine art there should not be any dualism between its technical form and its leading structural function. This principle also applies to furniture. A good piece of furniture ought to be of a reliable build. Whether factory or hand made, its technical construction should be adequate and its material durable. Quite similar to this requirement is the demand made of the artist that he show ability in the technical side of his craft. However, in works of art as well as in furniture, the leading structural function is not found in technical form.

1 All things qualified by a normative object-function are necessarily included in this relation.

The relation between free and applied or bound art².

A comparison between the internal structure of a piece of furniture and that of a work of fine art gives rise to a difficult problem, a problem which has played an important part in modern aesthetics. The same difficulty is encountered in our theory of the relation between the radical type ‘work of fine art’ and the radical types of all other objective thing-structures in which an aesthetic structure plays a special rôle.

Historically viewed, the plastic arts grew out of hand work, or to state it more accurately - so as to avoid the misunderstanding caused by any evolutionism eliminating the structural principles -, hand work served as an historical occasion for the rise of independent plastic art.

2 Cf. also Susanne K. Langer, Feeling and Form, Scribner's, New York 1953, pp. 303 ff.

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Applied art should, however, be sharply distinguished from free art. The former has recently succeeded in reconquering an increasing domain of architecture which in the process of mass fabrication had been left to bad taste and the pursuit of gain.

The architecture of buildings constructed for a practical purpose can never be ‘pure fine art’. The wellknown views of the famous Dutch architect Berlage on the task of the artist in this field - apart from their special elaboration - are classic rather than modern.

Although the terms leave much to be desired, what do we mean by ‘pure’ art in contrast to ‘applied’ art?

The word ‘Reinheit’¹, in its general philosophical usage, has become suspect for us. It has often been employed to express the tendency of immanence philosophy to absolutize a specific modal aspect of experience. Both the modal functions of meaning and the structures of individuality were theoretically eliminated from the cosmic coherence of the temporal order and rendered independent, assumed to exist ‘an sich’, which deprived them of their very meaning!

Christian aesthetics cannot recognize any ‘pure art’ in this sense. The slogan of last century ‘l'art pour l'art’ (art for art's sake)² is simply the expression of a deification, because it absolutizes the aesthetic modality. Our objection to this slogan, however, does not concern its intention to defend the right of free artistic expression against those who intend to make art always serve a specific utilitarian or moral purpose. Our opposition is only directed to the absolutization of the aesthetic modality by restricting a work of art to its leading structural function and ignoring its post-aesthetic aspects. We shall therefore define the term ‘pure art’ in such a way that any misunderstanding as to the meaning of the adjective is precluded.

By ‘pure art’, in contrast to ‘bound’ and ‘applied’ art, we will understand such artistic works whose inner structural principle has really an aesthetic qualification and has been detached from any enkaptic inclusion by the structural principle of things not aesthetically qualified, whereas, conversely, the internal structural principle of a work of pure art binds things of an other qualification. This view of ‘pure art’ enables us to comprehend

1 i.e. purity.

2 In the so-called ‘movement of the eighteen eighties’ in Dutch belles lettres.

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a state of affairs not fully intelligible to modern trends of aesthetics whose vision of the structure of temporal experience is enmeshed in the immanence-standpoint.

When commissioned to design a bank building or city hall, an architect should first realize that the structural principle of his architectonic work does not have an aesthetic qualification. The aesthetic structural function of such a building must remain bound to the structure of the latter according to its own typical leading and foundational functions. This is to say that the aesthetic function should itself give an adequate expression to the structural principle of the building which, as such, is not a work of fine art.

This does not mean that in the design and construction of the building, aesthetic requirements must be minimized. It does imply, however, that the artist is not engaged in the production of a free aesthetically qualified object. The aesthetic aspect of his conception is here subordinate to the proper structural principle of the building.

The beauty of a natural thing, that of a free work of art, and that of a building or a piece of furniture lacking as such an aesthetic qualification, is quite different in each instance.

It should now be clear that ‘pure art’ in principle pre-supposes a differentiated civilization. Generally speaking, the aesthetic aspect of all human products in undifferentiated cultural life remains entirely bound to the structure of things not qualified aesthetically; but this need not in any way detract from the possibility that such products show real beauty.

The structural function of furniture styles and the pompous character of the style Louis XIV.

The above explanation has in principle clarified the relation between the structural principle of furniture and that of a work of fine art. It has appeared that the aesthetic function can never have the leading and qualifying rôle in the structure of furniture.

The artistic beauty of such things and of other useful objects is properly bound beauty. It ought itself to be the expression of the internal structural principle of the thing in question. Of course a work of fine art can function in an enkaptic condition within the structure of a piece of furniture.

The latter, for example, may possess independently constructed carvings, which, when separated from it, must be considered

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as free works of art. But, in its enkaptic condition, such carving has a structural function within a whole that is not aesthetically qualified, and it ought not to obtrude at the expense of the proper character of the latter.

This also brings to light the nature of furniture-style. Furniture-style is a typical aesthetic structural function of a bound character. It can never be a leading or foundational function, but ought to express within itself the inner structural principle of furniture, in the typical context of a collectivity to which it belongs.

Style inseparably binds an individual piece of furniture to the entire interior for which it is intended, as long as it serves its proper function. And as a subjective-objective structural function, style is subject in a normative sense to a structural principle.

Consider the massive and imposing arm-chairs in the style Louis XIV, as designed by A. Lepautre! They form a structural whole, with the heavy tables decorated in overwhelming detail with festoons and carvings and their consoles, garnished with rare marble and other materials; a whole, with the many-branched crystal crowns, and monumental mirrors, designed for the repeated reflection of the rich decoration; with the ebony secretaires, inlaid with rich mosaics, garnished with arabesques in engraved copper; with the ceilings and wainscots, whose frames were decorated with white and gold ornaments exhibiting shell-motifs and rosettes, and with the rich tapestries, whose soft tints had to temper the extreme brilliance of the furnishings!

In this entire style is expressed the splendour and pride of the social milieu of Louis XIV, based on a culture marked by unrestricted lust for power.

This is not a mere subjective view of objects, in themselves existing only as natural things. Rather it is a typical social function of intercourse that is objectively expressed in this furniture and in the whole interior to which it belongs. And it is exactly this social function which qualifies the entire structure of the interior of this style and completely determines the character of the arrangement as it really is; furniture in the style Louis XIV does not exist apart from this function.

From this it clearly appears that things belonging to such a typical, socially¹ qualified collective are themselves qualified

1 The term ‘social’ is used in this context in the modal sense of the aspect of human intercourse.

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by a leading object-function of social modality. They necessarily function in structural subject-object relations which make them subject to norms.

The style Louis XIV cannot be uncritically accepted as being its own self-sufficient norm (a typically irrationalistic view).

Our admiration of the art in evidence in the furnishings, gardens and buildings in the style Louis XIV, is accompanied by the critical reserve that the pride and apostate tendencies of the court of the ‘roi soleil’ gave rise to unbalance and disharmony. The inner unity and proper character of things were often sacrificed to the desire for monumentality and ostentation.

The colonnade of the Louvre, and various church buildings, such as Lemercier's chapel at the Sorbonne, illustrate what we mean. Claude Perrault, the artist responsible for the colonnade of the Louvre, seems to have intentionally disregarded the bound character of building-style. For the sake of monumentality, he sacrificed the inner unity of the architecture and disregarded the fact that his task was not to create an entirely new building. As a result the Louvre shows a dualism between the architectural work of Pierre Lescot and that of Perrault.

In the chapelle de la Sorbonne, the heavy set monumental dome seems to press down the entire external architecture of the church.

The furniture style Louis XIV betrays the inner tendency to erase the structural difference between furniture and architecture. Following Emile Bayard¹, we can call it a façade style.

The disharmony in the opening process, discussed in Vol. II in connection with the functional modal structure of reality, is here very clearly seen in connection with the individuality-structure of things.

This style cannot be comprehended in terms of abstract aesthetic standards, but only in relation to the entire historical context of the cultural sphere in which it is formed. Historicism irratonalistically misinterprets this connection between style and history; it ignores the entire plastic horizon of empirical reality and its non-arbitrary structural principles. In contrast, our contention is that these plastic structural principles are the necessary pre-requisites of all objective products of human formation executed in a specific style.

1 Emile Bayard L'art de reconnaître les styles (Paris) p. 232.

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A reconsideration of the difference between the objective leading structural function of things and the merely subjective purposes to which they can be made serviceable. A new problem.

One peculiarity of the narrower geno-type furniture examined by us is that these useful objects¹ belong to a structural collective relationship which ought to express itself objectively in their own thing-structure.

Once again we wish to establish that the objectively realized leading function of these everyday utensils is not to be confused with the subjective ends for which they can be used. The merely subjective teleological concepts, generally employed to distinguish cultural objects theoretically, is inadequate here.

There is nothing to prevent my using a parlour chair as a kitchen chair, a table as a seat, or a tea-cup as a wine-glass. However, no matter what abnormal subjective end I may use an object for, I am always conscious that, according to its entire inner structure, it is not objectively destined for such arbitrary aims. Normal subjective use is inseparably bound to the objective qualifying function of the object itself. And this function is not eliminated by a haphazard usage deviating from the norms of intercourse.

This raises a new problem. It is undeniable that in the course of time the objective social destination of various utensils seems to change. An antique shawl, for example, can now be used as a wall decoration. How can we account for this? This problem brings us to the consideration of a new theme, requiring separate attention.

1 This group type belongs to the radical type: the kingdom of historically founded and objectively and socially qualified utensils. This kingdom includes innumerable primary types and sub-types.

§ 4 - Actualization and inactualization² of the objective qualifying function of objects typically founded in the historical aspect.

Let us notice first of all that, functioning in their typical structural subject-object relation, the things of this radical type can be so narrowly bound to a certain office, social status, family or

2 Translator's note. ‘Inactualization’ means the condition in which something is rendered no longer actual, no longer in operation or in effect.
D.H.F.

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person, that apart from such they cannot be used in accordance with their individual qualifying function.

This structural peculiarity is thus due to the subject-object relation without which these things cannot function according to their objective destination. It may be that for every subject able to experience their structure, these things are the same, but they are not, therefore, useable for each of these subjects (consider for example, a throne, a chair of honour, a smoking jacket, an admiral's uniform, a family portrait, a wedding ring, and so on).

It is in some instances possible for the subjective individualization of the destination of a thing to be objectively expressed in its symbolic aspect in a manner that is only external to its inner structure, e.g., by the carving of initials or a family-blazon. In such cases this objective symbolical indication of the thing's individual destination can generally be removed, so that such objects are no longer bound to a special office, family, or person.

Such is not the case, however, in the various specific types of things that we discussed first, because in these instances, the individualization of the social destination is objectively expressed in a thing's entire inner structure.

The radical type of things qualified by an object-function in the faith aspect.

An identical observation can be made with respect to other radical types of useful objects, whose foundational function is historical, but whose objective qualification is not enclosed in the social modality (i.e. the aspect of intercourse).

The entire structure of an altar, a chapel, a temple, a crucifix or rosary, betrays their objective destination for worship. The majority of such things are connected with the sacred character of the subjective community to which they belong, which is obviously qualified by the function of faith.

Such unbreakable coherence between a specific subjective ‘societal group’ and things qualified by an object-function were already encountered in the animal kingdom. But how much more complicated and richer are they revealed in human society!

When such things as these are no longer used according to their objective destination, and placed in a museum, for example, they more or less continue to express their original societal destination, in accordance with their objective structure of individuality. Their objective reality, however, cannot really be ex-

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perienced unless one is sympathetically aware of the typical group-structure to which they belong, including their qualifying subject-object relation¹.

Otherwise, even though we know their names, they continue to be as strange to us as an airplane, or a telephone would be to an uncivilized primitive, or a performance of Beethoven's Heroica to a man unreceptive to music.

1 This point is important for the ethnological ascertainment of the objective destination of primitive utensils, in whose technical form the qualifying function is not always clearly expressed. Cf. F. Graebner Methode der Ethnologie (Heidelberg 1911) pp. 56 ff.

The routine view of modern daily life may not be confused with actual naïve experience. A restatement of the relation between intuitive and symbolic knowledge according to modern phenomenology.

It must be recognized, however, that in the routine of modern daily life, we are usually satisfied if we can name a thing that is strange to our normal experience. The most that we ordinarily demand is that we can form a notion of its immediate utility. Modern phenomenology undoubtedly has this in mind in its desire for more than an impersonal merely symbolical knowledge of things. Hence, its insistence on an intuitive ‘Wesensschau’, designed to eliminate entirely the symbolical aspect of experience, in order to penetrate to a full view of its essence. In Vol. II, we have shown why this view is not acceptable.

The symbolical aspect of meaning cannot be detached from the individual reality of a thing. Its elimination results in a theoretical abstraction, in which a theoretical ‘Gegenstand’ replaces a thing's full reality.

Nevertheless, it is true that in the routine of daily life, the knowledge of a thing's name and its utility does not penetrate to its empirical reality. We simply cannot speak of naïve experience here, but only of an abstract technical mode of inculcation. Unfortunately, the enormous extensiveness of modern society often leads to an inevitable loss in the intensity of ‘naïve experience’.

Fortunately, however, this routine does not affect our experience of things essentially familiar to us. As we demonstrated earlier, a person of modern culture does still have naïve experience.

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The inactualization of the objective leading function of useful objects.

The above observations imply, first of all, that in the subject-object relation to which the radical types of the things in question are necessarily bound, a sharp distinction must be made between the objective empirical reality of things and the subjective actualization of their objective qualifying function.

It may be that the actualization in question has become impossible in any way because historical development has given a new cultural form to human society. The unbreakable coherence between the typical leading function and the typical foundational function of these things is here disclosed in an extremely pregnant manner.

Whether or not historically founded useful objects of earlier times can still be used nowadays in accordance with their original objective destination, primarily depends upon the question whether they still fit to the present historical milieu. As to some kinds of things which are typically qualified by a subject-object relation in the aspect of social intercourse, the powerful influence of fashion can bring about that really antiquated objects, especially antique furniture, are even preferred in certain social circles to modern products. It may be that this preference is also caused by the solidness and beautiful forms of the objects concerned. But as a matter of fact it may be established that imitation antique furniture is readily accepted when one has no money to pay for the original.

In any case, antique furniture, glasses, etc., can still be used according to their original objective destination, though nowadays they are perhaps not always practical. And their seemingly fitting to the present cultural milieu is to be ascribed to the influence of fashion already mentioned.

As to things which do not satisfy this condition, the possessor will try to give them another actual destination. Old shawls, which as articles of dress have got out of fashion, may be used as wall-decoration. Old armours and weapons may be preserved or collected for their decorative value or historical interest.

The splendid patrician houses of the 17th century's merchant families along the wonderful canals of Amsterdam are for a great deal transformed into offices.

Medieval castles have lost any capability to be used according to their original objective destination. Insofar as they have not retained the function of dwelling-houses, they are only preserved

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as cultural curiosities of particular historical interest. For the same reason a great many preserved things belonging to earlier times, have found a place in museums.

The adage, Tempora mutantur et nos in illis may rightly be extended to include these socially qualified products of human formation because of their typical historical foundation. At the end of the preceding section we provisionally described this state of affairs as a change or shift in the objective destination.

What do we really understand by this shift? Does it imply a real change in the structure of a thing? No, in empirical reality the objective structure of a thing is constant so long as the latter exists. The clothing of knights, nowadays on view in museums, is still the same dress previously worn as attire distinctive of a privileged social class. But, if I may use the expression, because of modern cultural development, the objective qualifying function of such costumes has been in-actualized; it is no longer in operation. In the medieval feudal society knighthood had an actual military function. Since the end of the Middle Ages it lost any military significance but it retained its position as a rank endowed with political power. The French revolution destroyed this position and thereby knighthood disappeared as a particular privileged social rank. The present generation can still experience knightly attire as objective socially qualified things of a by-gone historical period. Their objective qualifying function is the objectification, in the real clothing material, of an intentional conception of the designer of these costumes. This state of affairs remains unchanged by the transitions of cultural development. But the socially qualified objective destination of knightly costumes can no longer be actualized by the present generation, because the feudal class-system has disappeared.

The qualifying subject-object relation implied in radical types of the thing-structures here discussed, thus displays a special peculiarity.

The three figures in the subject-object relation of these thing-structures: the intentional representational relation, the unfolding relation, and the actualization relation.

The ‘shift in the objective destination’ of historically founded utensils is really only a shift in a specific aspect of the subject-object relation in which these things stand. To be specific, it is only a change in the actualization relation between their objective qualifying function and human usage.

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We must, therefore, sharply distinguish the following modes in the subject-object relation of these things.

1.	The objectification, in the structure of a real object, of the intentional object, as the latter is conceived in the design of a thing (intentional representational relation).
2.	The subjective unfolding or opening in human experience of the closed objective thing-structure (unfolding or opening relation).
3.	The actualization of the objective thing-structure by human activity, which uses the thing according to its objective and opened qualifying function (actualization relation).

If our analysis is correct, a ‘shift in the objective destination’ does not affect a thing's original structure; it leaves intact both the intentional representational relation and the unfolding relation; it is exclusively concerned with the actualization relation. A thing's objective destination is inactualized, i.e. its original destination can no longer be practically realized. However, its qualifying function can still be understood in our experience.

The actualization relation shifts from a thing's qualifying function to its historical or aesthetic object-function. Knightly attire, for example, can still only be actualized in an historical pageant, a historical spectacle, or a play, whereas it otherwise belongs in a museum as a cultural curiosity.

This shift in the actualization relation between a thing's subjective use and its objective qualifying function is, moreover, in no way dependent upon the subjective whims of human intention. It provides no basis for a subjective teleological view of the reality of these things.

An old shawl is properly used for decorative purposes if, and only if, it possesses an objective attractive harmony expressing its beauty as an antique piece of dress.

Old knightly garb is a museum piece only because an historical feature of a certain cultural period is objectively expressed in its typical foundational function. It is a cultural curiosity because the freely designed form of the clothing and the accompanying weapons objectively reflect the powerful socially qualified position of knighthood in former times.

The shift in the actualization relation, in other words, continues to be connected with the internal structure of real things and does not merely depend upon the subjective human arbitrariness of changing purposes.

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§ 5 - The relation between the internal structural principle and the modal foundational system in the subject-object relation of symbolically qualified things. The biotic structural function in the unfolding- and actualization relations.

Having gained an insight into various radical types of the structural principles of normatively qualified objective things, we can now engage in a more detailed examination of the way in which the temporal order of the modal aspects is maintained in the subject-object relation, to which these things are bound.

From the outset it had to be made clear that this general order of modalities cannot be dependent upon a thing's internal structural principle, but that the latter must express itself in the former.

Our problem is simply to gain a clear insight into this state of affairs with respect to things whose structural principles do not immediately disclose their connection with the modal dimension of our experiential horizon.

In our analysis of the structural functions of the plastic work of art, Hermes of Praxiteles, we, at first, had difficulty in locating its biotic structural function. And this difficulty seemed to return with regard to all the other things formed out of inorganic material.

Though a closer analysis of some structural principles of such things has shown the indubitable presence of a biotic object-function, yet it might seem that this presence is only due to certain structural peculiarities of the types of things explicitely examined. We shall, therefore, now pay attention to a secondary radical type of historically founded objects which at first sight does not betray any connection with the biotic aspect of experience.

We wish to demonstrate that a biotic structural function is as such necessarily included in the subject-object relation of these things, both with respect to the unfolding-relation, whereby they are related to human experience, and with respect to the actualization relation, whereby they are related to subjective human usage.

From the analysis of this type of objects it will become completely clear that the biotic object-function concerned is necessarily inherent in all products of human formation, irrespective of their structural peculiarities.

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The biotic structural function of things in the unfolding relation of their objective empirical reality.

We have already observed that objects produced by man must necessarily function in the biotic subject-object relation, because they are sensorily perceptible. A house, a candelabrum, or a chair must function objectively in our biotic space, if their objective sensory image is to be disclosed to our subjective perception. The reason is that our sense perception pre-supposes the biotic stimulation of our visual nerves and, in the biotic subject-object relation, nothing can affect these organs which does not itself function subjectively or objectively in the biotic modality.

All things, however, function in the biotic modality in their own typical structure. It is only in this structure that things are related to human experience.

Thus, it is first the previously analysed unfolding relation in objective empirical things that pre-supposes their having a function in the biotic subject-object relation.

Upon a little reflection it is also dear that without an objective-biotic structural aspect, things qualified by a normative object-function could not be actualized in this qualifying function according to their objective inner destination. All these things belong to the objective human environment, which in comparison to the milieu of plants and animals, is incomparably richer. By actualizing their objective destination, man enlarges his environment and frees it from its static dependence on the physico-chemical functions given in nature. And thereby he places his natural vital requirements under the direction of a free formative control.

In their inner structure, things objectively symbolically qualified and historically founded, lack the previously analysed representational relation to an intentional object that itself is not symbolically qualified.

To illustrate this state of affairs just described we have chosen a primary group belonging to a radical type, as yet unanalysed. Our example is a book intended solely for reading.

Such a book belongs to the kingdom of historically founded and symbolically qualified things (letters, scores, signs, banners, flags, monuments, and so on, also belong to this kingdom).

In contrast to those previously analysed, thing-structures of this radical type do not depict an intentional object not sym-

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bolically qualified. At the utmost depictions of an non-symbolically qualified intentional object are enkaptically contained in their own structure (cf. the illustrations in the text of a book, the depiction of a historical figure or event in a monument).

The objective material letters are realized in a symbolically qualified structural relation on the pages and cover of a book. In this coherence the intentional conception of the author is only signified in an objective thing structure; it is not really depicted or represented.

Of course the connection with the thoughts signified, or the musical or literary conception respectively, of the author is essential in the objective symbolical qualification of the book. The entire internal differentiation of the primary type of the latter is always bound to the nature of the ideas and conceptions signified, thus determining whether or not a book is of a scientific, literary, musical or some other type. This intentional relation, however, is not objectified in the formerly analysed depicting or representational relation; instead, it remains symbolical in character. It is given only in the inseparable coherence between the objective sign, the subjective signification and the signified idea or conception, which intentionally points to a specific state of affairs.

From our earlier investigations we may conclude that the typical foundational function of the book is neither to be found in the leading function of the natural structure of the raw materials, nor in the cultural foundational function of the semi-manufactured technical materials out of which it is formed.

These materials belong only to the variability types of a book. A great diversity of materials, e.g., paper, silk, leather, may be used in its construction, and can enkaptically function in its proper structure.

The internal structure of individuality of a book, however, cannot possess any other foundational function than the cultural book-form constructed according to an intentional technical design. And this book-form includes the size and binding of its pages as well as the symbols printed, drawn or (type)written on them¹.

1 Aristotle has tried to explain the structure of a book with the aid of his form-matter schema. Though he agrees that this scheme in its proper sense is only applicable to natural substances, he thinks it can analogically be applied to cultural products. But he views the form of a book - which according to the form-matter scheme determines its essence - exclusively in the glued material sheets. This is to say that its leading structural function, namely the symbolic, is completely overlooked (Cf. Met. H, 2, 1042 b). From this it appears again that this form-matter scheme is unserviceable to explain the structures of individuality.

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It is only by taking into account the full structural coherence of this foundational function with the symbolical qualifying or leading function that the structural principle of such a book can be theoretically approached.

Objectifying realization of the intentional project, unfolding of the leading object-function to human experience, and actualization of the book's objective destination can be clearly distinguished in the subject-object relation in which this thing functions.

As soon as the author's ideas or his artistic conception are symbolized in the objective letters (or notes) of a book, the symbolical objectifying realization is complete - and, as observed, this occurs without an essential depiction of the intentional subject-object relation inherent in the conception of the author. This objectifying realization can occur through the agency of persons to whom the meaning of the letter- or note-combinations is entirely inaccessible or closed. Of course the author is the sole agent of this realization in his hand-written manuscript.

The objective linguistic function, in a still latent condition inherent in the thing-structure of the book, is opened by every reader (in his subjective, historically founded linguistic function) who understands the meaning of the objective letter- (or note-) combinations.

It is not necessary that he himself uses the book. It may be read to him so that he has only to listen.

The actualization of the book, according to its objective symbolical destination, is possible only if we pick it up, turn its pages, and so on. In other words, both its opening to human experience and its actualization demands that we use our body in its organic vital function.

But then it follows that a book must have an objective structural aspect in the biotic modality. This structural aspect cannot be theoretically eliminated without at the same time losing sight of the book as a thing. Modally viewed, the sensory objectivity of a book, its sensorily perceptible image, is necessarily grounded in its biotic objectivity, through which it is objectively at hand for our use and able to stimulate our sense-organs by the material signs which fill its pages.

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In this modal function of the book, however, the entire objective thing-structure of the latter is expressed. It is not an abstract biotic function, but much rather this concrete thing which by the material symbols contained in its pages exercises a physiological influence upon our sense-organs.

The same statement applies to the entire inter-modal coherence of meaning to which the plastic structure of the book is bound.

It must be evident that especially the objectively-symbolically qualified things tremendously enrich and enlarge man's individual life.

By means of books our horizon is broadened and enriched; lifted out of our actual natural environment, we are brought into intentional contact with imaginary or real human life of the past or the present. These things furnish us with an intensive intentional contact with the immense societal experience of mankind, signified in their symbolically qualified structure. By means of books our subjective individual experience is permeated with a perspective of the richness of human society in the past and the present.