A New Critique of Theoretical Thought. Deel 2. The General Theory of the Modal Spheres
(1969)–H. Dooyeweerd– Auteursrechtelijk beschermdH. Dooyeweerd, A New Critique of Theoretical Thought. Deel 2. The General Theory of the Modal Spheres (vert. H. de Jongste en David H. Freeman). The Presbyterian and Reformed Publishing Company, z.p. 1969 (2de druk)
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Dit bestand biedt, behoudens een aantal hierna te noemen ingrepen, een diplomatische weergave van de tweede druk van A New Critique of Theoretical Thought. Deel 2. The General Theory of the Modal Spheres van H. Dooyeweerd, in een vertaling van H. de Jongste en David H. Freeman uit 1969. De eerste druk van deze vertaling dateert uit 1955. Het oorspronkelijke werk verscheen in 1935-1936 onder de titel De wijsbegeerte der wetsidee.
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[pagina III]
A NEW CRITIQUE OF THEORETICAL THOUGHT
BY
HERMAN DOOYEWEERD Dr jur.
Professor of Philosophy of Law, Free University of Amsterdam Fellow of the Royal Dutch Academy of Sciences
TRANSLATED BY
DAVID H. FREEMAN
Assistant Professor of Philosophy, Wilson College
AND
H. DE JONGSTE
English Master in the 1st Christian Secondary School of Rotterdam
VOLUME II
THE GENERAL THEORY OF THE MODAL SPHERES
THE PRESBYTERIAN AND REFORMED PUBLISHING COMPANY
1969
[pagina IV]
LIBRARY OF CONGRESS CATALOGUE CARD NUMBER A 54 - 7310
Original title:
DE WIJSBEGEERTE DER WETSIDEE
Printed in the United States of America
[pagina V]
CONTENTS
TRANSLATOR'S PREFACE | xxix |
PART I - THE GENERAL THEORY OF THE MODAL SPHERES
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CHAPTER I - THE FUNCTIONAL STRUCTURE OF THE MODAL SPHERES, BOTH IN THEIR SOVEREIGNTY WITHIN THEIR OWN ORBIT AND IN THEIR TEMPORAL COHERENCE OF MEANING | 3 | |
§ 1 - | The criterion of a modal sphere | 3 |
The relation between the specific sovereignty of each separate modal law-sphere and the temporal coherence of meaning of all the modal spheres is not intrinsically contradictory | 3 | |
The criterion of a modal sphere and its abstract theoretical character | 4 | |
The criterion of a modal law-sphere, though of a theoretical nature, is nevertheless not founded in thought, but in order of cosmic time | 6 | |
The criterion of a law-sphere as a modal concept of function. The functional structure of a law-sphere can only be understood after abstracting modal individuality | 6 | |
The functional modalities of meaning | 7 | |
§ 2 - | The criterion of the modal aspect of meaning in its absolute contrast with the ‘form’-notion of immanence-philosophy | 9 |
The form-matter scheme in ancient and medieval metaphysics | 9 | |
The concept of substance | 11 | |
The form-matter scheme in Kantian philosophy | 12 | |
The relapse of neo-Kantian legal philosophers into the Aristotelian method of concept-formation | 14 | |
The modal aspects have no genus proximum | 14 | |
Why the Kantian categories cannot be subsumed under a genus proximum | 15 |
[pagina VI]
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Stammler's concept of law | 16 | |
The delimitation of the phenomenological ‘regions’ in Edmund Husserl | 17 | |
§ 3 - | The criterion of the modal diversity of meaning and the problem of the denominator of comparison conceived as ‘the being of what is’ (sein des seienden) | 18 |
The ‘being of what is’ in Greek and scholastic realistic metaphysics | 20 | |
The ‘being of what is’ as a philosophical basic denominator in Heidegger's ‘Sein und Zeit’ | 22 | |
§ 4 - | Meaning as the basic denominator in immanence-philosophy and the ground for the distinction in this philosophy between meaning and reality as merely having meaning | 25 |
The metaphysical basis for the distinction between meaning and reality in immanence-philosophy | 26 | |
‘Nature’ as meaningless reality in Fichte and the South-Western German school of neo-Kantianism | 27 | |
Meaning in Husserl's phenomenology | 27 | |
The subjectivistic view of meaning in Paul Hofmann | 29 | |
A more detailed explanation of our own conception of meaning | 30 | |
Meaning in the fall of man | 32 | |
The Christian as a stranger in this world | 34 | |
The apostate world cannot maintain any meaning as its own property in opposition to Christ. Common Grace | 34 | |
The religious value of the modal criterion of meaning | 36 | |
§ 5 - | The logical aspect of the modal criterion of meaning and the method of antinomy | 36 |
The principium exclusae antinomiae in its relation to the logical principle of contradiction | 36 | |
The nature of the theoretical antinomy. The principium exclusae antinomiae | 37 | |
Antinomy in its inter-modal character may not be identified with the intra-modal relation of contrariety | 37 | |
The essentially antinomic character of all speculative thought. The antinomy of the sole causality of God in speculative theology | 38 | |
The Thomistic proofs of the existence of God | 39 |
[pagina VII]
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Kant's conception of the nature and the origin of the theoretical antinomies | 42 | |
The origin of the special theoretical antinomies in the light of our transcendental basic Idea | 44 | |
The cosmological principium exclusae antinomiae is not identical with the logical principle of contradiction, but the former is the foundation of the latter | 47 | |
The analytical criterion of a modal law-sphere | 48 | |
§ 6 - | The cosmic temporal order in the succession of the law-spheres. Substratum-spheres and superstratum-spheres | 49 |
The two terminal spheres | 52 | |
The Scriptural conception of order in creation | 52 | |
The foundational and the transcendental direction in the cosmic order of time | 53 | |
CHAPTER II - THE MODAL STRUCTURES OF MEANING | 55 | |
§ 1 - | Introduction | 55 |
The origin of the analogical concept of Being | 56 | |
Why symbolic logic is not serviceable in our examination of the analogical concepts | 59 | |
The ambiguity of pre-theoretic terminology and the psychological study of the ‘significa’ | 61 | |
Some examples of scientific expressions denoting fundamental analogical concepts. The original and the analogical use of numerical terms | 62 | |
The original and the analogical use of the term space | 63 | |
The original and the analogical use of the term economy | 66 | |
The original and the analogical use of the terms control, command, mastery or power | 68 | |
The complexity of the analogical concepts | 71 | |
The provisional elimination of the philosophical prejudices in the description of the ‘states of affairs’ and the influence of the religious starting-points in this stage of the inquiry. No ἐποχή in the phenomenological sense | 72 | |
§ 2 - | The cosmic order of time in the structural coherence | 74 |
Nuclear meaning, modal retrocipations and anticipations | 74 | |
Modal retrocipations and anticipations remain qualifed by the nucleus of the modal meaning | 75 | |
The architectonic differentiation in the modal structure of the law-spheres | 75 |
[pagina VIII]
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The value of the analysis of modal meaning in tracing the original and irreducible nuclei of its modal structure | 77 | |
§ 3 - | Preliminary analysis of the first three modal structures of meaning | 79 |
A - A brief analysis of the original meaning of number | 79 | |
The original nuclear meaning of number, and the numerical analogy in the logical modality of meaning | 79 | |
The relation between number and logical multiplicity | 80 | |
Number and the class-concept. Russell | 83 | |
B - A brief analysis of the original modal meaning of space in its coherence with the meaning of number | 83 | |
Meinong's ‘Gegenstandstheorie’ and G.H.Th. Malan's critique of the first modal law-sphere | 83 | |
The modal meaning-nucleus of space. Dimensionality and spatial magnitude as arithmetical analogies in the modal meaning of space | 85 | |
The so-called transfinite numbers and the antinomies of actual infinity | 87 | |
The functions in the numerical aspect that anticipate the spatial, kinematic and analytical modi | 87 | |
Malan's defence of the concept ‘continuous number’ | 88 | |
Number and continuity. Dedekind's theory of the so-called irrational numbers | 90 | |
The complete theoretical elimination of the modal meaning of number, through the giving-up of finite numbers as the basis for the infinitesimal functions. The modal shiftings of meaning in the logicistic view | 91 | |
The rationalistic concept of law in arithmetic | 92 | |
C - A brief analysis of the original (mathematical) meaning of motion in its coherence with the original meaning of number and space | 93 | |
The differential as an anticipation of movement in the original meaning of number | 93 | |
The logical movement of thought as a retrocipation of the original aspect of movement | 94 | |
The erroneous view of classical physics concerning the relation between sensory phenomena and absolute space | 95 | |
Movement in its original modal sense and in its analogical meaning | 97 | |
The spatial analogy in the modal structure of the kinematic aspect | 98 |
[pagina IX]
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Physical movement as an analogy qualified by energy | 99 | |
The general theory of relativity and the un-original character of physical space | 101 | |
The discretion of spatial positions and the un-original or analogical character of this discretion | 102 | |
The antinomies of Zeno are due to the attempt to reduce the modal meaning of motion to that of space | 103 | |
Analytic and projective geometry viewed in the light of the theory of the law-spheres | 103 | |
The logicistic shiftings of meaning in projective geometry | 106 | |
§ 4 - | Some examples of the structural analysis of later modalities of meaning, intended to give an insight into the order of succession of the law-spheres | 107 |
Meaning-nucleus and retrocipations in the original modal sense of organic life | 107 | |
The modal viewpoint of psychology | 111 | |
Feeling as a supposed chief class of psychical phenomena. Felix Krueger's discovery and its interpretation in genetic psychology | 111 | |
The ‘Erlebnisse’ and the modal delimitation of the psychological viewpoint. Erlebnis and behaviour | 113 | |
Animal psychology and the unity of the psychological viewpoint | 114 | |
The pseudo-psychological conception of the human ego and the I-thou relation | 115 | |
The impossibility of a definition of feeling as the meaning-kernel of the psychical aspect. The psychological distinction between ‘feelings’ and sensations (Empfindungen) | 116 | |
The retrocipatory structure of the modal feeling-aspect | 117 | |
The retrocipatory structure of the logical aspect | 118 | |
The anticipatory structure of the logical aspect. Historical, linguistic and social anticipations | 120 | |
The economic anticipation in the modal meaning of logical analysis | 122 | |
Linguistic economy as an economic anticipation in the modal meaning-aspect of symbolic signification. The ‘Aktionsarten’ (the ‘characters’ and ‘aspects’) and the structure of primitive verbal languages | 126 | |
The economic retrocipation in the aesthetic meaning-aspect. The μηδὲν ἄγαν | 127 | |
The modal meaning-kernel of the juridical aspect | 129 |
[pagina X]
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Leo Polak's inquiry into the meaning of the term retribution | 130 | |
Retribution and economical life | 131 | |
Justice as suum cuique tribuere and the older cosmological conception of retribution. Dikè, Anangkè, Rita, and Tao | 132 | |
Retribution and love in the Christian religion | 133 | |
The retributive character of every juridical relation. Retribution and ultra vires. The retributive meaning of rights | 133 | |
Does retribution essentially imply a reaction corresponding to egoistic motives? Retribution and altruism | 134 | |
Aesthetic, economic and social analogies in the modal structure of the juridical aspect | 135 | |
The lingual analogy in the modal meaning-structure of retribution | 137 | |
The lingual analogy in the modal aesthetic meaning | 139 | |
The juridical and the aesthetic anticipations in the modal lingual meaning | 139 | |
§ 5 - | Juridical and social retrocipations in the modal aspect of love | 140 |
The prevailing logical distinction between law and morality | 141 | |
A preliminary question. Does there exist a modal ethical law-sphere or moral aspect of experience with an irreducible modal meaning? The distinction between the world of experience and the I-thou relation in Jewish and Christian existentialism | 142 | |
The scholastic distinction between moral theology and natural ethics. Natural ethics and the Greek form-matter motive | 144 | |
The analogical character of the Aristotelian concepts of virtue and of the good | 145 | |
Ethics and the human character | 147 | |
Why a moral law-sphere must exist | 148 | |
Criticism of Kant's criterion of morality. Love and the imago Dei | 149 | |
The original meaning-nucleus of the moral law-sphere. Love in its original modal sense and its analogies in the other aspects | 151 | |
Love and the conventions of social intercourse | 152 | |
Eros and Agapè | 153 | |
The ‘Cape Horn’ of Christian ethics | 154 | |
The social retrocipation in the modal meaning of love | 158 | |
The retributive analogy in the modal meaning of love | 160 |
[pagina XI]
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The internal antinomy arising from the theoretical eradication of the modal boundaries of justice and love | 162 | ||
§ 6 - | Complications in the modal meaning-structure of the law-sphere in both the retrocipatory and the anticipatory direction | 163 | |
A - Retrocipations | |||
The totality of the structure of the meaning-modus | 164 | ||
Simple and complex, directly and indirectly founded retrocipations | 164 | ||
The directly founded, but complex structure of the spatial analogy in the aspect of movement | 165 | ||
The complex, indirectly founded arithmetical and spatial retrocipations in the modal meaning of the legal aspect | 165 | ||
A brief analysis of the complicated spatial analogy in the psychical aspect with its indirect foundation | 168 | ||
Why do we perceive the sensory images of motion in the objective sensory picture of space? | 168 | ||
B - Anticipations | |||
The complex modal structure of the so-called irrational function of number as a direct anticipation, and that of the so-called complex function of number as an indirect anticipation | 170 | ||
The logicistic concept of ‘Dimension überhaupt’ (dimension in general), and the modal shift of meaning in this pseudoconcept | 172 | ||
Complex systems of number and the theory of groups. The formalistic conception of the symbol i | 173 | ||
A brief analysis of the complex anticipatory structure of the economy of thought | 175 | ||
A brief analysis of the structure of the feeling of justice as a complex modal anticipation | 176 | ||
The low degree of differentiation in the axiological spheres of feeling at a primitive stage of culture | 178 | ||
Some new complications in the anticipatory structure of the modal meaning-aspect. The normative anticipations do not refer to the merely retrocipatory structure of the anticipated aspect | 179 | ||
CHAPTER III - THE OPENING-PROCESS IN THE ANTICIPATORY MEANING-STRUCTURE OF THE LAW-SPHERE | 181 | ||
§ 1 - | The functional structure of the opening-process and the relation between concept and transcendental idea in the two fundamental directions of the cosmic temporal order | 181 |
[pagina XII]
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The primary structure of a founded meaning-modus | 181 | |
The expression of the modal meaning of retribution in a primitive legal order | 182 | |
The primitive closed structure of the feeling-aspect in animal life | 183 | |
The closed structure of the aspect of energy-effect | 184 | |
The law-sphere in its restrictive function and in its expansive function. Guiding modal functions | 184 | |
Deepening of the modal retrocipations through the opening-out of the anticipatory spheres of the modal aspect | 185 | |
Concept and Idea of the modal meaning-aspect and their relation in the foundational as well as in the transcendental direction of time | 186 | |
The theoretical antinomy in mistaking the Idea for a concept | 187 | |
The retrocipatory and the anticipatory directions of time in the opening-process of the normative anticipatory spheres | 188 | |
Does the opening-process of the normative anticipations start in a particular law-sphere? | 189 | |
The historical law-sphere as the foundation of the entire opening-process of the normative anticipatory spheres of the modal aspects | 190 | |
§ 2 - | The modal meaning-nucleus of history | 192 |
The pre-theoretical and the theoretical conceptions of history | 192 | |
Different views of the meaning of history | 194 | |
The modal nuclear meaning of the term culture and the ambiguity of the term history | 196 | |
The universality of the historical view-point | 197 | |
Cultural and natural formation | 197 | |
Mastery over persons and over things (‘Personkultur’ and ‘Sachkultur’) and the analogy of this distinction in the legal sphere | 198 | |
Culture and civilization | 199 | |
Culture and human society | 199 | |
K. Kuypers' view concerning tradition as the modal nucleus of the historical aspect | 202 | |
The indirect test of the correctness of our conception concerning the modal nucleus of the historical viewpoint | 203 | |
The cultural modality and its typical empirical contents | 203 | |
The origin of the Humanistic concept of culture | 204 |
[pagina XIII]
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Troeltsch's and Dilthey's struggle with the problems of Historism | 205 | |
Rickert's distinction between individualizing and systematic cultural sciences | 207 | |
The confusion caused by the application of the form-matter schema to the relation between the post-historical modi and the historical aspect of empirical reality | 208 | |
The neo-Hegelian philosophy of culture yields no criterion for the historical law-sphere either | 213 | |
The distinction between the juridical and the specifically historical view-point in Julius Binder | 213 | |
The modal nuclear moment of cultural development is irreducible | 216 | |
§ 3 - | The internally antinomic character of the humanistic concept of culture as the basic denominator of all the normative aspects of reality | 217 |
Spengler's historicizing of the intrinsic meaning of science | 218 | |
The modal meaning of language is irreducible to that of cultural development. The historical retrocipation in the modal meaning of language | 221 | |
Remark: Modern phonology and the new trends in semantics | 224 | |
Husserl's structural conception of the lingual sign | 225 | |
The real failure in Husserl's ‘reine Bedeutungslehre’ | 226 | |
The irreducibility of the modal meaning of intercourse to that of cultural development | 227 | |
The modal meaning of intercourse is founded in that of language | 228 | |
§ 4 - | Analysis of the modal meaning of cultural development with regard to its retrocipatory structure | 229 |
The logical analogies in the modal meaning of culture and the normative character of the historical law-sphere | 229 | |
The Historical school and the normative conception of historical development. Fr. J. Stahl's view of the secondarily normative character of God's guidance in history | 232 | |
Reaction as an anti-historical meaning-figure | 236 | |
The peculiar character of the modal structure on the law-side of all the post-logical law-spheres. The relation between the temporal normative principle and human formation. Positivizing formation as an historical analogy in all the post-historical law-spheres | 237 |
[pagina XIV]
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The distinction between ‘absolute’ and ‘empirical’ norms is untenable | 239 | |
The formation of history and law-formation. The historical struggle for power between tradition and formative will. Tradition as the guardian of historical continuity, and the principle of continuity as a modal normative principle | 241 | |
The historical formative will as a psychical retrocipation on the law-side of the modal meaning of cultural development | 243 | |
The rôle of great personalities in history | 245 | |
Power as a normative historical mission in the modal meaning of history. Mastery over persons and social-psychical influence | 246 | |
The romantic quietist conception of God's guidance in history | 248 | |
The biotic analogies in the retrocipatory structure of the historical aspect | 250 | |
The inter-modal meaning-coherence between the historical aspect and that of energy-effect. The problem of historical causality and Toynbee's idea of ‘challenge’ | 251 | |
The so-called individual causality in history and the rejection of the concept of historical causality by the Diltheyan school | 254 | |
The retrocipation of movement in the modal structure of history | 255 | |
Numerical analogies in power | 256 | |
The spatial analogy in the modal moment of the cultural area. The normative call to win the control over nature, and the positivizing of this modal historical principle in technical industry. The instrument as a document of civilization and its relation to the cultural area | 257 | |
§ 5 - | The anticipatory structure of the historical aspect and the transcendental idea of historical development | 259 |
The rigidity of the cultural meaning in the still closed primitive cultures. The historical norm of integration and its divine foundation | 259 | |
The problem of the original historical state of civilization and the Idea of progress | 263 | |
Historical science works with a transcendental Idea and not with a rigid concept of historical development. Its relation to ethnology and the science of pre-history | 265 | |
The necessity of a normative Idea of cultural development for historical thought | 266 |
[pagina XV]
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The developmental Idea of progress. Its ὑπόϑεσις in the Humanistic science-ideal | 268 | |
Kant's Idea of development oriented to the Humanistic personality-ideal in its rationalistic conception | 270 | |
The essential function of individuality in the historical developmental Idea | 272 | |
The rise of nationalities in the opening-process of history. Nationality and the idea of ‘Volkstum’ in national-socialism | 274 | |
The modal norm of individualization for the opening-process in the historical law-sphere. Its connection with the norm of differentiation and integration | 274 | |
Herder's irrationalistic Idea of humanity and his conception of historical individuality | 276 | |
The numbing of the Idea of development in the organological conception of the Historical School, and the crux of the historical explanation of the reception of Roman Law by an appeal to the national mind | 277 | |
The intensive conception of world-history in Hegel. The orientation of his dialectical Idea of development to the Humanistic personality-ideal in a transpersonalistic-conception | 279 | |
The necessity of an intensive Idea of historical development | 282 | |
Directionless Historism destroys the Idea of development, and deprives scientific historical thought of its necessary ὑπόϑεσις. Spengler's morphology of the civilizations of the world | 283 | |
§ 6 - | Continued: The coherence of the anticipatory spheres of the historical aspect and the relation between power and faith | 284 |
The symbolical anticipation in the modal aspect of history | 284 | |
The ‘social’ anticipation in the modus of history | 285 | |
The economic anticipation. The historical principle of cultural economy | 286 | |
The inner connection between the economic and the aesthetical anticipations in history | 286 | |
The juridical anticipations and the true meaning of the ‘Weltgericht’ in world-history | 289 | |
God's guidance in history as a realization of the juridical anticipations | 290 | |
The moral anticipatory sphere in the modal structure of history. Cultural love and cultural guilt | 290 |
[pagina XVI]
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The anticipation of the function of faith in the opening-process of history | 291 | |
The so-called ‘Religionsoziologie’ of Weber and Troeltsch and the schema of a sub-structure and a super-structure in the Marxist view of history | 292 | |
The meaning of history in the light of the Divine Word-Revelation | 294 | |
Objections raised on the part of some of our fellow-Christians against the conception of the modal meaning of history as cultural development, and the misunderstanding from which they spring | 296 | |
Primitive culture as an apostate state of the cultural aspect | 296 | |
The new problem | 297 | |
§ 7 - | The position of the aspect of faith in the opening-process | 298 |
Dr A. Kuyper's conception of πίστις as a function | 298 | |
The Barthian conception of faith | 300 | |
The importance of a clear insight into the modal function of faith | 302 | |
The transcendental character of the modal meaning-nucleus of πίστις. The Greek conception of πίστις as δόξα and its revival in Husserl's phenomenology | 303 | |
Can the function of faith occur in a closed state as well as in a deepened condition? If so, how is this to be understood? | 305 | |
The Revelation of God in ‘nature’ and in His Word | 306 | |
The restrictive function of the faith-aspect as the extreme limit of the transcendental apostasy of the πίστις | 309 | |
Two kinds of starting-points for the opening-process in the transcendental direction | 310 | |
The revelational principle of faith in its restrictive function and the theme of magic and cult | 312 | |
The desintegration of the sense of personal identity in the belief in mana and in totemism | 316 | |
The transcendental moral retrocipation in the restrictive structure of the aspect of faith | 318 | |
§ 8 - | Continued: The opening of the function of faith in the apostatical direction | 319 |
The aesthetic humanizing of Greek polytheism by Homer and Hesiod and the opening-process in the Greek cultural community | 320 |
[pagina XVII]
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The true character of the disclosure of faith in transcendental apostasy | 322 | |
The transcendental freedom of πίστις, deepened in its apostasy, in devising idols. Cassirer's critique of mythical consciousness | 323 | |
Mythos and Logos. The criterion of the distinction between mythical and non-mythical thought | 325 | |
Mythical consciousness under the guidance of the ‘magical’ faith in nature and of faith in reason. The problem of magical thought | 328 | |
CHAPTER IV - THE UNIVERSALITY OF THE ASPECTS WITHIN THEIR OWN SPHERES AND THE INTER-MODAL DISHARMONY IN THE PROCESS OF DISCLOSURE ON THE LAW-SIDE OF THE LAW-SPHERES | 331 | |
§ 1 - | The universality of the modal aspects within their own spheres | 331 |
Why the different attempts at absolutizing seem to be acceptable | 331 | |
The Divine irony in the history of apostate philosophy | 333 | |
The new problem: The intermodal disharmony in the opening-process | 334 | |
§ 2 - | The guidance of the faith in the humanistic science-ideal in its mathematical conception as an impediment to the full disclosure of the idea of sphere-universality | 337 |
The internal rigidity in the Idea of the mathesis universalis due to the misinterpretation of the universality of the aspects in their own spheres | 338 | |
The Humanistic Idea of the mathesis universalis and biology | 340 | |
The Humanistic Idea of mathesis universalis and the social and juridical anticipatory spheres of the mathematical aspects | 342 | |
The Humanistic Idea of mathesis universalis in pure economics | 344 | |
The rigidity in the aesthetic Idea under the guidance of the faith in the science-ideal. French classicism | 345 | |
The rigidity in the Idea of development in the philosophy of history of the ‘Enlightenment’ | 349 | |
Bayle's method of critical analysis of the facts in historical research | 353 | |
§ 3 - | Continued: The disharmony in the opening-process on the law-side, guided by the faith of the enlightenment | 354 |
[pagina XVIII]
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The historical ‘explanation’ of the ideals of the Enlightenment, and the vicious circle in this attempt at explanation | 354 | |
The opening-process in the historical law-sphere guided by the ideas of natural law of the Enligtenment | 356 | |
The relative disclosure of the economical law-sphere; the disharmony of this process under the guidance of the faith of the Enlightenment | 360 | |
§ 4 - | Final remarks on the christian idea of cultural development | 362 |
The methodical application of the Christian Idea of cultural development in historical science | 364 | |
CHAPTER V - THE SUBJECT-OBJECT RELATION IN THE MODAL ASPECTS | 366 | |
§ 1 - | Introductory formulation of the problem | 366 |
§ 2 - | The subject-object scheme in immanence philosophy | 367 |
The subject-object relation in Scholastic philosophy, and in modern pre-Kantian metaphysics | 367 | |
The subject-object relation as an epistemological schema and the identification of the object and the ‘Gegenstand’ of theoretical knowledge | 368 | |
§ 3 - | The coherence between the modal subject-object relation and the retrocipatory meaning-structures of a law-sphere. The subject-object relation in the modal aspect of feeling | 370 |
The internal modal subject-object relation in contrast to the theoretical ‘Gegenstand’-relation | 370 | |
Modal objectivity cannot be reduced to modal law-conformity | 370 | |
The necessary functional coherence between a sensitive subjective feeling of extension and an objective sensory image of space | 372 | |
Implicit objectification in the modal aspect of feeling | 373 | |
The objectification of pre-psychical modal subject-object relations in the aspect of feeling | 374 | |
The representational relation (Abbild-Relation) within the objective perceptual image. The pre-psychical aspects cannot be psychically represented and do not produce a psychical copy | 375 | |
A sensory copy is an implicit, dependent object-structure in the modal meaning of the psychical law-sphere | 376 |
[pagina XIX]
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Is an objectification of post-psychical subject-functions and subject-object relations possible in the objective sensory perceptual image? The modal sphere-universality of sensory perception in the objective direction | 376 | |
The objectification of symbolical and post-lingual anticipations in the objective sensory image of a thing or event. Conventional and non-conventional, explicit and implicit symbolism | 379 | |
The lingual anticipation in objective sensory symbolism which has no natural coherence with the meaning signified. Abstract symbols | 380 | |
§ 4 - | The subject-object relation in the aspect of space | 383 |
The subject-object relation in the modal aspect of space | 383 | |
The dependent existence of a point in space | 383 | |
The antinomy in the construction of the so-called ‘continuum of points’ | 385 | |
§ 5 - | The subject-object relation in the modal aspect of analysis and the struggle between nominalism and realism | 386 |
The Scholastic doctrine of the logical intentional object | 387 | |
The logical object-side of temporal reality. The content and the object of a concept are not identical | 389 | |
The limits of logical objectivity | 390 | |
The element of truth in the so-called ‘geisteswissenschaftliche Methode’ | 390 | |
§ 6 - | The subject-object relation in the juridical aspect and the problems of subjective right | 391 |
The ‘thing’ concept with the Roman jurists | 393 | |
The distinction between corporeal and incorporeal things in Roman jurisprudence | 393 | |
The conception of subjective rights in the theory of natural law | 395 | |
Hegel's theory of volitional power | 396 | |
The distinction between jura in personam and jura in rē | 398 | |
The consequence of the elimination of the juridical subject-object relation is the cancelling of the concept of subjective right | 398 | |
The volitional theory in its positivistic-psychologistic form | 400 |
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The theory of interests also eliminates the juridical subject-object relation | 400 | |
The fundamental difference between juridical competence and subjective right. The content and the object of a subjective right are not indentical | 402 | |
Subjective right and reflex permission | 404 | |
§ 7 - | The juridical subject-object relation and the limits within which juridical objectification is possible | 405 |
The modal meaning of the juridical object | 405 | |
The cosmic boundaries of the possibility of juridical objectification. The economical and historical analogies in the juridical object-function | 406 | |
The possibility of moral and pistical anticipations in the juridical object-function | 407 | |
The construction of rights to rights | 408 | |
The cosmic boundaries of the possibility of juridical objectification and the juridical meaning of slavery | 411 | |
The so-called rights of personality and the juridical subject-object relation | 412 | |
CHAPTER VII - THE PROBLEM OF INDIVIDUALITY WITHIN THE MODAL CADRE OF THE LAW-SPHERES | 414 | |
§ 1 - | The modal functions of individuality and the gradations of the modal individuality of meaning | 414 |
The distinction of juridical facts according to the modal structural moments of juridical meaning | 414 | |
The typical structures of juridical facts in which the modal distinctions are individualized | 416 | |
True structural concepts of individuality can never be acquired by means of the current method of gradual abstraction | 417 | |
§ 2 - | The elimination of the modal meaning-individuality in the form-matter-scheme of immanence-philosophy | 417 |
Individuality in Kant's form-matter-scheme | 420 | |
The Baden School and the problem of individuality | 421 | |
The consequences for jurisprudence of the distortion of individuality because of its subsumption under the form-matter scheme | 422 |
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The consequences of the form-matter scheme for the view of individuality show that this scheme is not capable of accounting for the real states of affairs | 423 | |
§ 3 - | Original, retrocipatory, and anticipatory types of meaning-individuality within the modal structure of the law-spheres | 423 |
The subject-object relation in the modal types of individuality | 425 |
PART II - THE EPISTEMOLOGICAL PROBLEM IN THE LIGHT OF THE COSMONOMIC IDEA
CHAPTER I | 429 | |
§ 1 - | The way in which the epistemological problem is posed on the immanence-standpoint and the metaphysical background of the critique of cognition rooted in this standpoint | 429 |
The inter-modal systasis of meaning as the condition for all theoretical synthesis | 429 | |
The erroneous identification of the datum in cognition and that which has been theoretically isolated | 431 | |
§ 2 - | The critical formulation of the epistemological problem. meaning-systasis, logical synthesis and inter-modal synthesis of meaning | 433 |
The necessity of distinguishing between analytical synthesis and inter-modal theoretical synthesis of meaning | 434 | |
§ 3 - | The kantian distinction between analytical and synthetical judgments | 435 |
The relation between the logical and linguistic structure of a judgment. The multivocality of the word ‘is’ | 436 | |
The distinction between ‘formal object’ and ‘material object’ | 438 | |
Criticism of Pfänder's theory about analytical and synthetical judgments | 441 | |
Sigwart's and Schleiermacher's interpretations of Kant's distinction | 442 | |
Kant's dualistic cosmonomic Idea as the background to the distinction | 444 | |
Sigwart confounds the linguistic and the logical structure of a judgment | 444 |
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Can Aristotle's theory of the categories have influenced Kant's distinction? | 445 | |
The rationalistic conception of the analytical is in an impasse with regard to the logical criterion of the truth of concrete experiential judgments | 449 | |
§ 4 - | The distinction between analytical and synthetical judgments and the limits of meaning of logical formalization | 450 |
Husserl's conception of analytical judgments as completely formalized propositions | 450 | |
The supposed purely analytical character of modern symbolical logic | 451 | |
A criticism of Husserl's conception of complete formalization. A cosmological meaning-analysis of the analytical relation of the whole and its parts | 453 | |
Husserl's formalization implies an inter-modal synthesis of meaning of which he is not aware | 456 | |
The cosmic limits of the possibility of formalizing in the formation of concepts | 458 | |
The false formalism in the formation of concepts and the multivocality of formalistic notions | 459 | |
§ 5 - | The problem concerning the possibility of a so-called formal logic as a science | 460 |
The distinction between analytical and synthetical judgments should be replaced by that between theoretical judgments of an implicit and those of an explicit synthetical structure of meaning | 460 | |
The systatic structure of the non-theoretical judgments of experience | 462 | |
Is a theoretical logic possible as an independent science? | 462 | |
The seeming paradox of the analysis of the analytical aspect | 462 | |
Is ‘formal logic’ possible? What is to be understood by a Christian logic? | 464 | |
CHAPTER II - THE STRUCTURE OF THE INTER-MODAL SYNTHESIS OF MEANING AND ITS TRANSCENDENTAL AND TRANSCENDENT PRE-REQUISITES | 466 | |
§ 1 - | The theoretical character of the ‘gegenstand’ in the scientific cognitive process | 466 |
Is it possible to speak of the ‘Gegenstand’ of knowledge? | 467 | |
The enstatic and the antithetical attitude of thought | 468 |
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The problem of meaning-synthesis is rooted in the problem of time, in the problem of the ἐποχή from the continuity of the temporal cosmic meaning-coherence | 468 | |
Varieties of ‘Gegenstände’ | 469 | |
§ 2 - | The relation between inter-modal meaning-synthesis and deepened analysis. The objective analytical dis-stasis and the analytical character of the theoretical ἐποχή | 469 |
The reason why the naïve concept of a thing cannot be based on an inter-modal synthesis of meaning. The analytical character of the ἐποχή | 470 | |
The disclosure of the logical anticipatory spheres in the prelogical ‘Gegenstand’ | 471 | |
The deepening of the logical object-side of reality in theoretical thought. The objective-analytical dis-stasis | 471 | |
§ 3 - | Intuition in the continuity and in the functional refraction of cosmic time | 472 |
Actual analysis exceeds the modal limits of the analytical law-sphere | 473 | |
Self-reflection on the modal functions as being our own | 474 | |
The misconception with regard to the possibility of non-intuitive knowledge. All theoretical knowledge rests on conscious insight | 475 | |
Volkelt's incorrect contrast of logical necessity and intuitive certainty | 475 | |
Even sensory impressions can only be related to myself and to things by conscious intuition | 477 | |
The inter-modal synthesis of meaning is only possible through the theoretical intuition of time | 478 | |
The relation between theoretical and pre-theoretical intuition. Cosmic and cosmological self-consciousness | 479 | |
Rejection of a separation between intuition and analysis | 480 | |
The metaphysical psychologizing of intuition in Bergson | 480 | |
Why theoretical intuition can never operate apart from the analytical function. Intuition and instinct | 483 | |
Even pre-theoretical intuition cannot function without logical distinction | 484 | |
§ 4 - | The limits of a concept and of a definition, and the so-called phenomenological attitude of mind | 485 |
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The internal antinomy in the idea of an adequate ‘Wesensschau’ | 486 | |
Phenomenology is a more dangerous adversary of a Christian philosophy than any other variety of immanence-philosophy | 487 | |
CHAPTER III - THE PROBLEM REGARDING THE POSSIBILITY OF THE SYNTHESIS OF MEANING IN THE SO-CALLED CRITICAL TRANSCENDENTAL PHILOSOPHY OF KANT | 491 | |
§ 1 | The dogmatic character of the crypto-religious attitude in critical epistemology | 491 |
The reason why in this context we do not discuss the doctrine of the transcendental Ideas of the Kritik der reinen Vernunft and base our exposition for the present on the second edition only | 492 | |
§ 2 - | Kant's doctrine of the synthesis and of the unity of our self-consciousness | 494 |
The influence of the metaphysical substance-concept upon Kant's epistemology | 495 | |
Kant's first discussion of the problem of synthesis. His lack of distinction between the logical synthesis and the intermodal synthesis | 496 | |
The internal antinomy in Kant's conception of the transcendental unity of self-consciousness | 500 | |
Summary of our criticism of Kant's conception of the transcendental unity of self-consciousness | 502 | |
§ 3 - | The problem of the inter-modal synthesis of meaning in Kant's so-called transcendental logic | 503 |
In Kant's transcendental categories the problem of the intermodal synthesis of meaning has not been seen | 504 | |
Criticism of Kant's table of categories | 508 | |
The problem of the inter-modal synthesis in Kant's doctrine of the ‘transcendental imagination’ (‘transzendentale Einbildungskraft’) | 513 | |
The doctrine of the categories does not belong to general epistemology but to the cosmological analysis of the modal meaning-structures | 517 | |
§ 4 - | How the problem of the inter-modal synthesis of meaning has been avoided in Kant's ‘transcendental doctrine of the faculty of judgment’ | 517 |
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§ 5 - | The problem of the intermodal synthesis of meaning in the first edition of the ‘kritik der reinen vernunft’ according to Heidegger's interpretation | 520 |
How Heidegger approaches Kant's critical transcendental philosophy | 523 | |
Heidegger's conception of transcendence | 525 | |
The problem of the primary (ontological) synthesis in Heidegger | 526 | |
Is there really a point of contact in the first edition of the Kritik der reinen Vernunft for Heidegger's interpretation? | 532 | |
§ 6 - | The functionalistic ‘thesis of consciousness’ (‘satz des bewusztseins’) and the view of the limits of experience in the light of the cosmonomic idea | 536 |
The influence of the Kantian conception of ‘empirical reality’ in the normative special sciences | 537 | |
CHAPTER IV - THE STRUCTURAL HORIZON OF HUMAN EXPERIENCE AND OF CREATED ‘EARTHLY REALITY’ | 542 | |
§ 1 - | The a priori moments in human experience and the idea of the structural horizon of experience | 542 |
The meaning of the word a priori in immanence-philosophy | 542 | |
Why the contrast between a priori and ‘empirical’ is useless to us | 546 | |
The reason why Scheler's conception of experience is useless to us | 546 | |
The structural and the subjective a priori in human experience | 547 | |
The horizon of human experience | 548 | |
The identity of the horizon of human experience and that of our ‘earthly’ cosmos is not to be interpreted in the sense of a transcendental idealism | 548 | |
The obfuscation of the horizon of human experience by sin. The necessity of the light of Divine Revelation | 549 | |
Kant's so-called categories of modality | 550 | |
The truly transcendental Idea of possibility and necessity is related to the horizon of the full actual reality | 551 | |
§ 2 - | The structure of the horizon of human experience and the levels of the a priori | 552 |
The transcendent dimension of the horizon of experience. The religious a priori | 552 |
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The transcendental dimensions of the horizon of experience. The a priori of the temporal meaning-coherence | 552 | |
The horizon of the modal a priori structures of human experience | 553 | |
The synthetical a priori of theoretical experience | 554 | |
The synthetical a priori, too, is not to be understood as a constructive creation of the human mind | 555 | |
The system of the law-spheres is an open one | 556 | |
The horizon of the structural principles of individuality | 557 | |
The plastic character of the horizon of the structures of individuality | 557 | |
The interlacements of these typical structural principles | 558 | |
Remark on the so-called ‘universalia ante rem’ in God's Mind | 559 | |
The perspective structure of the horizon of experience. The dependence of our knowledge about the cosmos on our self-knowledge and on our knowledge of God | 560 | |
The restriction of our human experience of the religious fulness of meaning by time is no restriction to time | 561 | |
The law-conformable structure of human experience in the transcendent horizon is originally a law of freedom | 563 | |
The standing in the Truth as freedom in the transcendent horizon of experience | 564 | |
The problem concerning the relation between reason and faith | 564 | |
§ 3 - | The perspective structure of truth | 565 |
Truth as the agreement between thought and being in realistic metaphysics | 566 | |
The criterion of truth in Kant | 567 | |
The phenomenological conception of the transcendental horizon of a priori theoretical truth | 569 | |
The perspective structure of truth | 571 | |
The meaning of the word truth in Holy Scripture | 571 | |
The a priori temporal dimensions of truth | 573 | |
The Idea of transcendental-theoretical truth | 575 | |
The criterion of transcendental theoretical truth in this Idea of verity | 576 | |
The demand that the a priori theoretical insight shall be justifiable in the forum of the Divine world-order | 577 |
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Only the acceptance of the perspective structure of truth can break the spell of subjectivism in philosophic insight | 577 | |
The accordance with the principium exclusae antinomiae as the primary criterion of transcendental theoretical truth | 579 | |
The second criterion of transcendental theoretical truth | 579 | |
The dynamical character of so-called experimental truth in the theoretical process of the disclosure of temporal reality | 580 | |
§ 4 - | The individuality of human experience in Scheler's phenomenology | 583 |
Scheler's theory concerning the individuality of absolute truth as ‘truth of personal validity’ (‘personalgültige Wahrheit’) | 584 | |
Criticism of Scheler's conception of the individuality of personal experience and of absolute truth | 590 | |
§ 5 - | The individuality of human experience within the structural horizon of experience and the view of man as a microcosm | 592 |
The view of man as a microcosm is unserviceable | 592 | |
The societal structure of human knowledge within the temporal horizon | 594 | |
Again about the criterion of Truth | 396 |