A New Critique of Theoretical Thought. Deel 1. The Necessary Presuppositions of Philosophy

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Part I
Prolegomena

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Introduction
The first way of a transcendental critique of philosophic thought

If I consider reality as it is given in the naïve pre-theoretical experience, and then confront it with a theoretical analysis, through which reality appears to split up into various modal aspects¹ then the first thing that strikes me, is the original indissoluble interrelation among these aspects which are for the first time explicitly distinguished in the theoretical attitude of mind. A indissoluble inner coherence binds the numerical to the spatial aspect, the latter to the aspect of mathematical movement, the aspect of movement to that of physical energy, which iself is the necessary basis of the aspect of organic life. The aspect of organic life has an inner connection with that of psychical feeling, the latter refers in its logical anticipation (the feeling of logical correctness or incorrectness) to the analytical-logical aspect. This in turn is connected with the historical, the linguistic, the aspect of social intercourse, the economic, the aesthetic, the jural, the moral aspects and that of faith. In this inter-modal cosmic coherence no single aspect stands by itself; every-one refers within and beyond itself to all the others.

The coherence of all the modal aspects of our cosmos finds its expression in each of them, and also points beyond its own

1 Here are meant the fundamental universal modalities of temporal being which do not refer to the concrete ‘what’ of things or events, but are only the different modes of the universal ‘how’ which determine the aspects of our theoretical view of reality. For instance, the historical aspect of temporal reality is not at all identical with what actually happened in the past. Rather it is the particular mode of being which determines the historical view of the actual events in human society. These events have of course many more modal aspects than the historical. There does not exist a purely historical reality. The same holds good for all other modal aspects.

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limits toward a central totality, which in its turn is expressed in this coherence¹.

Our ego expresses itself as a totality in the coherence of all its functions within all the modal aspects of cosmic reality. And man, whose ego expresses itself in the coherence of all its temporal modal functions, was himself created by God as the expression of His image².

1 We shall subsequently see why this deeper totality necessarily transcends the mutual coherence of all modal aspects of temporal reality, just as our selfhood transcends the coherence of its functions in these aspects.

2 This was wiped out when man intended to be something in himself. Cf. the splendid pronouncement in Calvin's Épitre à tous amateurs de Jésus Christ 1535, (ed. J. Pannier, Paris; 1929) p. 36: ‘Car il lavoit formé à son image et semblance, telleme(n)t que la lumière de sa gloire reluysoit clairement en lui... Mais le malheureux voulant estre q(uel)que chose en soymesme... son image et semblance en estoit effacée...’

Meaning as the mode of being of all that is created³.

This universal character of referring and expressing, which is proper to our entire created cosmos, stamps created reality as meaning, in accordance with its dependent non-self-sufficient nature. Meaning is the being of all that has been created and the nature even of our selfhood. It has a religious root and a divine origin.

Now philosophy should furnish us with a theoretical insight into the inter-modal coherence of all the aspects of the temporal world. Philosophy should make us aware, that this coherence is a coherence of meaning that refers to a totality. We have been fitted into this coherence of meaning with all our modal functions, which include both the so-called ‘natural’ and the so-called ‘spiritual’. Philosophy must direct the theoretical view of totality over our cosmos and, within the limits of its possibility, answer the question, ‘Wie alles sich zum Ganzen webt’.

Philosophical thought in its proper character, never to be disregarded with impunity, is theoretical thought directed to the totality of meaning of our temporal cosmos.

These single introductory theses contain in themselves the entire complex of problems involved in a discussion of the possibility of genuine philosophy.

3 Translator's note: In the original Dutch text this passage reads: ‘De zin is het zijn van alle creatuurlijk zijnde’. ‘Het zijn van het zijnde’ has no more an equivalent in English than Martin Heidegger's ‘das Sein des Seienden,’ which is its German equivalent.
W.Y.

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Philosophical thinking is an actual activity; and only at the expense of this very actuality (and then merely in a theoretic concept) can it be abstracted from the thinking self.

This abstraction from the actual, entire ego that thinks may be necessary for formulating the concept of philosophical thought. But even in this act of conceptual determination it is the self that is actually doing the work. That ego is actually operating not merely in its thought, but in all the functions in which it expresses itself within the coherence of our temporal world. There is no single modal aspect of our cosmos in which I do not actually function. I have an actual function in the modal aspect of number, in space, in movement, in physical energy, in organic life, in psychical feeling, in logical thought, in historical development, in language, in social intercourse with my fellowmen, in economic valuation, in aesthetic contemplation or production, in the juridical sphere, in morality and in faith. In this whole system of modal functions of meaning, it is I who remain the central point of reference and the deeper unity above all modal diversity of the different aspects of my temporal existence.

The direction of philosophical thought to the totality of meaning implies critical self-reflection.

Can philosophy - which ought to be guided by the Idea of the totality of meaning - then ever be possible without critical self-reflection? Evidently not. A philosophy which does not lead to this reflection must from the outset fail to be directed to the totality of meaning of our cosmos. Γνῶϑι σεαυτόν, ‘know thyself’, must indeed be written above the portals of philosophy.

But in this very demand for critical self-reflection lies the great problem.

To be sure, the ego is actually active in its philosophical thought, but it necessarily transcends the philosophical concept. For, as shall appear, the self is the concentration-point of all my cosmic functions. It is a subjective totality which can neither be resolved into philosophical thought, nor into some other function, nor into a coherence of functions. Rather it lies at the basis of all the latter as their presupposition. Without conceptual determination, however, we cannot think in a theoretical sense, and consequently we cannot philosophize.

How then can self-reflection be possible, if it does not transcend the concept and consequently the limits of philosophical thought?

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However, there seems to be a way out of this difficulty.

There is no sense in requiring philosophical thought to exceed its immanent limits in order to attain to self-reflection.

If it be granted, that in philosophical thought the ego is active when actually thinking, it follows that this thinking must be concentrated from the outset upon the selfhood, only in so far as the latter functions in the logical sphere as a subjectivity which is no longer to be eliminated. This thinking ego then is the residue of a methodical elimination of all those moments in the concrete ‘individual self’ functioning in ‘time and space’ which I can still make into a ‘Gegenstand’¹ of the ultimate subjective logical function of thought.

1 Translator's note: ‘Gegenstand’: this German term commonly translated by ‘object’ in epistemological discussions, is used by Dooyeweerd in the sense of the non-logical aspects of reality which in the theoretical attitude of thought are opposed to the logical function. It is sharply contrasted by him with the ‘object’, the meaning of which will be explained in a later context.
W.Y.

The supposed reduction of the selfhood to an immanent, subjective pole of thought.

That which remains is a so-called ‘transcendental-logical subject’. It no longer has anything individual in itself and does not transcend the boundaries of our logical function. It is conceived of as an immanent, subjective pole of thought, in opposition to which the entire experienceable reality recedes into the counter-pole of ‘Gegenständlichkeit’. As such it is considered to be a transcendental pre-requisite of all concrete theoretical knowledge. For all knowledge is necessarily related to an ultimate ‘I think’. And the latter is nothing but the ultimate logical unity of the epistemological subject.

However, in taking cognizance of this experiment of thought, there appears to us the ghost of the ‘blessed Münchhausen’. For, in point of fact, the so-called transcendental logical subject of thought is here again abstracted from the ego which is actually operative in its logical function. It is even isolated to the greatest conceivable degree of abstraction, since it is the product of a methodical process of elimination by which the thinker imagines, he is able, ultimately, to set the logical function of thought apart as a self-sufficient activity.

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The transcendence of our selfhood above theoretical thought. The so-called transcendental subject of thought cannot be self-sufficient as a theoretical abstraction.

But this entire reduction of the thinking ego to the would-be ‘transcendental logical subject’, executed in the process of thought, can be performed only by the selfhood. This latter, which thinks theoretically, cannot itself in turn be the result of the abstraction formed by thought. The ‘transcendental logical subject,’ in the supposed sense of universal subjective logical pole of thought, is, in the final analysis, nothing but the bare concept of the subjective logical unity of thought which presupposes the thinking ego. Besides, this is a pseudo-concept, since it is supposed to be incapable of analysis.

Philosophical thought, however, cannot isolate itself in its subjective logical function, because it has no selfhood as mere thought, as so-called ‘reines Denken.’ All actuality in the act of thinking issues from the ego, which transcends thought. The actual ‘transcendental-logical subject’ remains an abstraction, produced by the thinking ego. And it is, moreover, a meaningless abstraction involved in internal contradictions. For the actual logical function of thought never can be ‘an sich’. Apart from the transcending ego, it simply is not actual, or rather has no existence at all.

Philosophical self-reflection then supposes in any case, that our ego, which transcends the limits of theoretical thought, should direct its reflecting act of thought toward itself. Philosophical thought does not return to itself, in the process of reflecting, but it is the ego which in the process of philosophical thinking should return to itself. And this actual return to oneself in the reflecting act of thought must finally transcend the limits of philosophical thought, if indeed the desired self-reflection is to be arrived at. This same conclusion may be reached along a different road. It may be drawn from the idea of philosophical thought as theoretical thought of the totality.

How does philosophical thought attain to the Idea of the totality of meaning?

The proper character of philosophical thought, as we have said, may never be disregarded with impunity. Philosophical thought is theoretic thought directed towards the totality of meaning.

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Therefore, I must first give my thought a fixed direction in the idea of the totality of meaning.

If this idea¹ is not to remain completely without content, if it is to succeed in showing a direction to my philosophical thought, then it must be possible that I, who am to practise philosophy, should choose my standpoint in this totality of meaning of our temporal cosmos. For, unless such a standpoint can be found, the latter will remain strange to me. In my central selfhood I must participate in the totality of meaning, if I am to have the idea of it in my philosophical thought.

To speak in a figure: In the process of directing my philosophical thought in the idea towards the totality of meaning, I must be able to ascend a lookout-tower above all the modal speciality of meaning that functions within the coherence of the modal aspects. From this tower I must be able to survey this coherence with all the modal diversity of meaning included in it. Here I must find the point of reference to which this modal diversity can be related, and to which I am to return in the process of reflecting thought. In other words, if I am not to lose myself in the modal speciality of meaning during the course of philosophic thought, I must be able to find a standpoint which transcends the special modal aspects. Only by transcending the speciality of meaning, can I attain to the actual view of totality by which the former is to be distinguished as such.

1 Translator's note: ‘Idea’ is used here in the technical sense of a ‘limiting concept’ which refers to a totality not to be comprehended in the concept itself.
W.Y.

The Archimedean point of philosophy and the tendency of philosophical thought towards the Origin.

This fixed point from which alone, in the course of philosophical thought, we are able to form the idea of the totality of meaning, we call the Archimedean point of philosophy.

However, if we have found this Archimedean point, our selfhood makes the discovery that the view of totality is not possible apart from a view of the origin or the ἀϱχή of both totality and speciality of meaning.

The totality in which our selfhood is supposed to participate, may indeed transcend all speciality of meaning in the coherence of its diversity. Yet it, too, in the last analysis remains meaning,

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which cannot exist by itself, but supposes an ἀϱχή, an origin which creates meaning.

All meaning is from, through, and to an origin, which cannot itself be related to a higher ἀϱχή.

The genetic relativity of meaning, the fact that it is not self-sufficient, lies in its very character. And if it is impossible that philosophical thought be something different from theoretical thought directed to the totality of meaning of our cosmos, then the direction toward the ἀϱχή is necessarily included in its tendency to totality.

All genuine philosophical thought has therefore started as thought that was directed toward the origin of our cosmos. From the outset, non-Christian philosophy sought this origin within the realm of meaning itself, although it gave many exalted names to it. However, for the present I am not concerned with this fact. My sole concern at this moment is to place in the forefront the basic genetic tendency of philosophical thought as thought directed to the origin.

The introduction of the critical question as to the limits of our knowledge would be premature at this stage. The epistemological problem: What are the limits to our knowledge? presupposes, in fact, some insight into the meaning of knowledge as necessarily related to the ego. So long as this insight has not been achieved, the appeal to the epistemological inquiry is premature; it may seemingly banish the whole of the basic genetic tendency from philosophical thought, but this verdict can never be peremptory.

The opposition between so-called critical and genetic method is terminologically confusing, because it is not clearly defined in its sense.

For the basic tendency mentioned above is so essential to philosophy that it makes its appearance at the heart of all epistemological questions. In its reference to the apriori conditions of all human knowing, the critical question how universally valid knowledge of our cosmos is possible may need to be sharply distinguished from all questions relating to the non-apriori moments of our knowledge. Yet it is to a high degree terminologically confusing to speak of a critical, in opposition to a genetic mode of thought, as is usual in certain currents of the neo-Kantian philosophy.

For the critical question, after a little reflection, necessarily

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leads to the genetic: What is the origin of our knowledge and of knowable reality?¹

The only thing that matters is the question about the meaning of the genetic problem, and no sooner has this question been raised, than it is seen to imply the problem of how a theory of knowledge is at all possible.

Meaning, as we said, constantly points without and beyond itself toward an origin, which is itself no longer meaning. It remains within the bounds of the relative. The true Origin, on the contrary, is absolute and selfsufficient!

Suppose now, that one or more of our cognitive functions in their apriori structure are from the outset theoretically regarded as independent, i.e. thought of apart from all further possible determinedness (as is done by a certain idealistic trend of philosophic thought, which is falsely called critical). In that case these functions are necessarily elevated to the rôle of apriori origin of our knowable cosmos.

If philosophic thought comes to a halt at this assumed ἀϱχή, the question as to the meaning of our knowledge is automatically precluded. For the ἀϱχή is transcendent to all meaning. In this case, the knowable cosmos rather derives all its meaning from the supposedly self-sufficient apriori structure of the cognitive functions.

At this stage of the preliminary fundamental questions which concern the foundation of philosophy, philosophic thought has come to rest in the pretended origin of all knowable meaning.

Thus for example, from the standpoint of the neo-Kantian of the Marburg School, there is no sense in inquiring after the origin of transcendental-logical meaning, in which this philosopher supposes he can understand the whole of cosmic reality. According to him, the very origin of our knowable world is transcendental-logical in nature. Thus reality derives all its possible meaning from transcendental-logical thought!

If, however, the thinker finds no rest in logical meaning, he is necessarily driven further into preliminary philosophical questions. The pretended ἀϱχή appears not to be the true origin, but rather to exist merely as meaning, which points beyond itself towards its true origin.

1 The ‘critical’ Marburg school, for instance, even speaks of an origin of being in a transcendental-logical sense. ‘Nur das Denken kann erzeugen, was als Sein gelten darf’ (Cohen). Here one can clearly see how critical and genetic problems coincide in a transcendental logical sense.

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Thought will not be set at rest in the preliminary philosophical questions, until the ἀϱχή is discovered, which alone gives meaning and existence to philosophic thought itself.

Philosophic thought cannot withdraw itself from this tendency towards the origin.

It is an immanent conformity to law for it to find no rest in meaning, but to think from and to the origin to which meaning owes its ground and existence. Only after the raising of questions ceases to be meaningful, does philosophic thought attain to the Origin, and is it set at rest.

The restlessness of meaning in the tendency of philosophic thought towards the origin.

This restlessness, manifests itself in the tendency of philosophic thought to move toward the origin. It is essentially the restlessness of our ego which is actually operative in philosophic thought. It issues from our own selfhood, from the root of our existence. This restlessness is transmitted from the selfhood to all temporal functions in which this ego is actually operative.

Inquietum est cor nostrum et mundus in corde nostro!

Our selfhood is actually operative in philosophic thought. As certainly as philosophic self-reflection is impossible apart from the direction towards the ego, so certainly does it require to be directed towards the ἀϱχή of our selfhood and of the totality of meaning. The ego must participate in this totality, if genuine thinking in terms of totality is to be possible.

Philosophic thought as such derives its actuality from the ego. The latter restlessly seeks its origin in order to understand its own meaning, and in its own meaning the meaning of our entire cosmos!

It is this tendency towards the origin which discloses the fact, that our ego is subjected to a central law. This law derives its fulness of meaning from the origin of all things and limits and determines the centre and root of our existence.

Thus, a two-fold pre-supposition of philosophic thought is discovered at the outset. In the first place, philosophic thought pre-supposes an Archimedean point for the thinker, from which our ego in the philosophic activity of thought can direct its view of totality over the modal diversity of meaning. Secondly, it presupposes a choice of position in the Archimedean point in the face of the ἀϱχή, which transcends all meaning and in which our ego comes to rest in the process of philosophic thought.

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For, if the attempt is made to go beyond this ἀϱχή, the formulating of any question has no longer any meaning.

The three requirements which the Archimedean point must satisfy.

The Archimedean point should satisfy these three conditions: First - It may not be divorced from our own subjective self. For it is our self that is actually operative in philosophic thought. And only in this centre of our existence can we transcend the modal diversity of meaning.

Second - It may not be divorced from the concentric law of the ego's existence. Without this law the subject drops away into chaos, or rather into nothingness. Only by this law is the ego determined and limited.

Third - It must transcend all modal diversity of meaning and be found in the totality and radical unity of the latter. Our ego must participate in this totality, if it is to have an idea of it in the process of philosophic thought.

The immanence-standpoint in philosophy.

The prevailing conception accepts the self-sufficiency of philosophic thought in accomplishing its task, notwithstanding the fact, that for the rest there exists a great divergence of opinion about the nature, task and methods of philosophy. While regarding this autonomy of reason as the alpha and omega of philosophic insight, many thinkers are sure to concede the necessity of the Archimedean point. Descartes in his ‘cogito’ supposed that he had found the only fixed point in the universal methodical scepticism with respect to all reality present in experience. Since this great thinker the necessity of an Archimedean point has generally been recognized by modern philosophy, at least so far as the latter realizes the necessity of critical self-reflection. But modern philosophy will have to rise with might and main against our position, that this Archimedean point cannot be sought in philosophic thought itself. In regard to the Archimedean point of philosophy, it must cling tightly to the immanence-standpoint. Consequently it rejects every support that is found in something which transcends the immanent boundaries of theoretic thought, as such. At the utmost it will agree that - within the latter - the theoretic intuition (‘Wesensschau’) is the ultimate ground of philosophical certainty.

Every attack against this immanence-standpoint will mean

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an attack on the scientific character of philosophy itself. Or - in so far as the very field of philosophic inquiry is considered to be of a supra-scientific character - it will be regarded as an attack on the freedom of philosophic thought.

The immanence-standpoint does not in itself exclude the so-called metaphysical way to that which transcends human thought.

In itself the acceptance of the immanence-standpoint does not in any way imply the rejection of the so-called metaphysical way to that which transcends human thought. Classical immanence-philosophy was even entirely based upon a metaphysical prima philosophia.

This metaphysical road to the totality of meaning and the ἀϱχή, at least in the rationalistic currents, involves the attempt to overstep the boundaries of philosophic thought in the idea of an absolute deified thought. The latter should comprise in itself the fulness of being, it should be the νόησις νοησέως, the ‘intellectus archetypus’ in a purely logical sense.

In other words, the rationalistic-metaphysical way to an ἀϱχή that transcends human thought absolutizes the logical function of thought.

Deified thought, the νόησις νοησέως, becomes the ἀϱχή; human thought in its assumed participation in divine reason, is understood to be the Archimedean point. The totality of meaning is sought in the system of the Ideas immanent in thought.

The immanence-standpoint, however, does not necessarily imply belief in the self-sufficiency of the logical function of human thought, in contradistinction to the rest of the immanent functions of consciousness.

The age-old development of immanence-philosophy displays the most divergent nuances. It varies from metaphysical rationalism to modern logical positivism and the irrationalist philosophy of life. It is disclosed also in the form of modern existentialism. The latter has broken with the Cartesian (rationalistic) ‘cogito’ as Archimedean point and has replaced it by existential thought, conceived of in an immanent subjectivistic historical sense¹.

1 We are only referring to the Humanistic philosophy of existence.

We employ the term immanence-philosophy in the widest possible sense.

Thus we do not take the term immanence-philosophy in the

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usual narrow meaning of philosophy which sees all reality as immanent in consciousness and has broken every bridge between the functions of human consciousness and an extra-mental ‘Ding an sich’. Rather we mean it in the wide sense of all philosophy that seeks its Archimedean point in philosophic thought itself, irrespective of its further understanding of this latter, whether in a rationalistic, irrationalistic, metaphysical, transcendental-logical, vitalistic, psycho-logical or historical sense.

On this standpoint, the task of philosophy can be viewed more broadly or more narrowly. Thus there exists in modern immanence-philosophy a current which stresses the purely theoretical character of philosophic inquiry and recognizes, that the theoretical is merely one of the many aspects from which we may view the cosmos, even though it be the only one from which we can really grasp it in the view of totality.

Alongside of the theoretical cosmos, the religious, the aesthetic, the moral and other a-theoretical ‘worlds’ are recognized. To philosophy is expressly denied the right to claim the monopoly of value for its ‘theoretical cosmos’.

So much the more powerfully, however, does this school of philosophy bring to the fore the self-sufficiency of ‘transcendental’ thought as Archimedean point for philosophy and at the same time as ἀϱχή of the ‘theoretical cosmos’.

The theoretical cosmos, on this standpoint, is really the ‘creation’ of philosophic thought. The latter must first of all demolish methodically everything a-theoretical, leaving a chaotic material of consciousness, which is to be ordered as a cosmos in the creative forms of philosophic thought (Rickert).

The immanence-philosopher has the sincere conviction, that the scientific character of philosophic thought can only be maintained in this conception of philosophy. What would become of the ‘objectivity’, of the ‘universal validity’, of the controllability of philosophic thought, if philosophy were to bind itself to presuppositions which go beyond its own immanent boundaries? Religious and ‘weltanschauliche’ convictions may be highly respectable; indeed, a philosophy that understands its limits, will guard against attacking them. But, within the domain of philosophy, their claims cannot be recognized. Here it is not a matter of believing in what exceeds ‘the limits of our cognitive faculty’. But it is solely a question of objective theoretical truth, valid alike for everyone who wants to think theoretically.

Observe the presence in this same connection of the so-called

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neutrality-postulate in respect to religious conviction and personal life-view. However, this postulate is in no sense inherent in the immanence-standpoint. It is accepted only by those currents in immanence-philosophy which deny to the latter any dominion over personal life.

All the acumen which the advocates of this standpoint have at their disposal is brought to bear on the demonstration of the correctness of this neutrality-postulate. When later on we enter upon a more special discussion of the relation of philosophy to a life-and-world-view, we shall have to face two of the most acute modern pleas in its behalf, those of Heinrich Rickert and Theodor Litt.

The inner problematic situation of the immanence-standpoint.

In this Introduction it suffices for us to bring to the fore the inner problematic nature of the immanence-standpoint. It will suffice to show, how the choice of this standpoint is not possible, unless the limits of philosophic thought are actually transcended.

At this point we proceed from that which we learned above to be essential to the Archimedean point of philosophy. The latter, as we demonstrated, must be elevated above the modal diversity of meaning. Should the Archimedean point itself be enclosed in this diversity, then it would be per se unsuitable as a point of reference, from which the view of totality must be directed over the different modal aspects of our cosmos.

Furthermore, the Archimedean point, as we previously observed, must also transcend the coherence in the diversity of the modal aspects. Of this thesis we are now to render a further account.

Why the totality of meaning cannot be found in the coherence of the modal aspects.

Why can the totality of meaning not be found in the immanent coherence of meaning among the different modal aspects? Because the immanent coherence among all special aspects of meaning of our cosmos lacks in itself the inner concentration-point in which these latter meet in a radical unity. This truth becomes immediately evident to us in the act of self-reflection.

In this Introduction we began by observing, that our ego expresses itself in all special modal aspects of our existence. This is possible only because the latter find their concentration-

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point in the ego. Now the self is elevated above the modal diversity of meaning and is thus transcendent with respect to it. Our selfhood does not coalesce with the mutual coherence among all functions which we have in the cosmos.

The modal diversity of meaning exists only in the coherence of all modal aspects, but it is the expression of a totality of signification which through the medium of time is broken up into a modal diversity of aspects.

The totality or fulness of meaning is the necessary transcendent centre where, in their mutual coherence, all modal aspects converge into the unity of direction towards the Origin, towards the Ἀϱχή of all meaning.

The Archimedean point as concentration-point for philosophic thought.

Thus, in connection with the preceding, the Archimedean point of philosophy must truly be the concentration-point for philosophic thought and as such it must transcend the modal diversity of meaning even in its coherence. Can this concentration-point be found in philosophic thought itself? In other words, can we, discover anywhere in theoretical thought a point that really transcends the modal diversity of meaning?

Does the so-called transcendental subject of thought satisfy the requirements for the Archimedean point?

With all sorts of terms not properly analysed in their meaning, the attempt is made to suggest to us, that we possess such a unity beyond the diversity of meaning in philosophic thought. The ‘transcendental consciousness’, the ‘transcendental cogito’, the ‘transcendental unity of apperception’, the ‘transcendental logical ego’ and such like are conceived of as the subjective pole of thought, to which the empirical world is related as ‘Gegenstand’.

This unity is thought of as a logical unity of the thinking consciousness which does not imply any multiplicity or diversity of moments. Instead, every special synthesis of a multiplicity of perceptions should be necessarily related to this unity.

Consequently, the latter should also transcend the coherence of the modal aspects. For, indeed, this inter-modal coherence of meaning, too, presupposes the transcendental subject of thought as central logical point of reference.

However, this argument rests upon a serious misunderstanding

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which is caused by the pitfall concealed in the conception of the ‘transcendental cogito’ itself.

For the latter neglects the basic transcendental problem concerning the relation of the ego and its logical function of thought¹.

It may be true that I myself transcend the coherence of all modal aspects of meaning, but this does not hold good for my logical function of thought. The unity of the ego which thinks cannot be of a transcendental logical character. For the ego is the concentration-point not only in respect to my logical, but to all of my modal functions. The logical unity of the thinking subject remains a unity within a multiplicity of moments. For the logical aspect together with all other aspects is also bound to the inter-modal coherence of meaning. As we shall show in detail in a later context of our inquiry, this coherence is expressed in its own modal structure, and the latter is the very transcendental condition of our logical function of thought. Consequently, the logical function of the act of thought does not transcend the modal diversity of meaning, and therefore it must lack that unity above all multiplicity which characterizes the central ego. But, it will be objected, is not the very diversity of meaning which is in view, a state of affairs that is meaningful only for thought that makes distinctions? Thus it may be true, that the logical function of thought, so far as it is still conceived of as an aspect of experienced reality, is confined to the diversity of meaning. But this does not prove, that the transcendental-logical subject of thought (understood as the ultimate subjective pole of thought) is unable to transcend the coherence of the modal aspects. On the contrary, does it not appear, just at this point, that all modal diversity of meaning is irreversibly dependent upon this transcendental subject of thought, and does it

1 ‘Pure transcendental thought’ is always meant in a logical sense. For the other modal aspects of the real act of theoretical thinking e.g. the psychical or the historical, do not satisfy the requirements of ‘pure thought’ in the sense which is meant here. Only the linguistic aspect is usually comprehended in it, but in a strict conception of ‘pure thought’ that aspect, too, should be eliminated, because it cannot be ‘pure’ in the sense ascribed to ‘transcendental reflexive thought’, ‘Linguistic signification’, taken in its modal meaning, remains always bound to time, and to the coherence with the other modal aspects of temporal reality. Only by reducing the linguistic aspect of meaning to a purely logical one can it be maintained as belonging to supposed ‘pure thought’. However, we shall see, that the logical function of thought itself is nothing without the inter-modal coherence of meaning.

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not appear that in respect to the latter we can in fact speak of a ‘Transcendenz in der Immanenz’? At this juncture we have indeed approached a very fundamental point in our discussion with the adherents of the so-called ‘transcendental’ inmanence-standpoint.

In the last objection we meet a new pitfall, which we have to lay bare carefully, in order that it shall not catch us again and again.

We must attribute logical meaning to the subjective pole of thought under discussion in so far as it is conceived of as an ultimate logical unity of our thinking self-consciousness; and more precisely, in so far as it is presented as a subjective logical pole of philosophical thought, we must attribute theoretical logical meaning to it.

Now in the sequel, we shall demonstrate in still further detail, that in theoretical thought we are constantly active in an opposition of the non-logical aspects to the logical aspect of meaning. It is from this very opposition that the theoretical problem is born.

The theoretical synthesis supposes the modal diversity of meaning of the logical and the non-logical which is its opposite.

In this process of theoretical thought, characterized by its antithetical attitude, every correct formation of concepts and judgements rests upon a sharp distinction among the different aspects of meaning and upon a synthesis of the logical aspect with the non-logical aspects of our experience which are made into a ‘Gegenstand’³. This synthesis is in itself a basic problem of philosophy.

However, in every case it supposes the inter-modal coherence as well as the modal diversity of logical and non-logical meaning.

Consequently, the logical meaning of the assumed subjective pole of thought is different from all non-logical aspects of meaning. But at the same time it is fitted with the latter in an indissoluble coherence.

Now there is a logical diversity which is immanent in the logical meaning of thought, but which could not exist apart from a cosmic modal diversity of meaning, within which the

3 We must observe that the modal aspects of our experience are at the same time the modal aspects of all reality in its integral empirical sense. Empirical reality is by no means exhausted in sensory perceptions. We shall have to return to this point in different later contexts.

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logical side itself functions. A closer discussion of this state of affairs will follow in a later context.

The pitfall in the conception of the so-called transcendental subject of thought as Archimedean point: cosmic diversity of meaning and diversity in the special logical meaning.

The pitfall in the last objection made by the adherents of transcendental logicism consists in the identification of cosmic diversity of meaning with diversity in its logical or analytical sense.

How could the fundamental modal diversity of meaning, to which the logical function of thought necessarily remains bound, itself be of logical origin? If this supposition were dealt with seriously, it should destroy itself at the outset in the following antinomy: the proclamation of logical meaning as the origin of the cosmic diversity of meaning is tantamount to the elimination of the modal diversity, and consequently to the abandoning of theoretical thought itself. For the latter is possible only in the process of analysis and inter-modal synthesis of meaning. This consequence was inferred by some Sophists from the logicism of Parmenides.

The so-called transcendental subject of thought cannot be maintained, unless, from the start, the inter-modal synthesis is introduced into the logical aspect itself. But, as soon as this occurs, the ‘transcendental-logical subject of thought’ is thrown back into the midst of the modal diversity of meaning. For the inter-modal synthesis presupposes the modal diversity and the mutual coherence of the logical and non-logical aspects of meaning. Consequently how could an Archimedean point be given within theoretical thought?

Misunderstanding of the intermodal synthesis of meaning as a transcendental-logical one.

Transcendental logicism can be maintained apparently only by a curious shift of meaning, which interprets the truly inter-modal synthesis as a so-called transcendental-logical one, as an act of the would-be self-sufficient transcendental subject of thought.

What really happens in this first choice of a position is an absolutizing of the transcendental-logical function of theoretical thought and this absolutization is not to be explained in terms

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of a purely theoretical conclusion from the inner nature of reflecting thought itself. Consequently, ἀϱχή and Archimedean point coincide in this transcendental logicism.

The rationalistic metaphysics which distinguished ἀϱχή and Archimedean point absolutized the logical aspect of actual thought only in the ἀϱχή, regarded as Intellectus Archetypus.

The necessary religious transcending in the choice of the immanence-standpoint.

By this original choice of a position, the attempt is made to detach the logical function of theoretical thought (whether only in the ἀϱχή or in the ἀϱχή and Archimedean point alike) from the inter-modal coherence of meaning and to treat it as independent. In the nature of the case, this choice is no act of a ‘transcendental subject of thought’, which is merely an abstract concept. It is rather an act of the full self which transcends the diversity of modal aspects.

And it is a religious act, just because it contains a choice of position in the concentration-point of our existence in the face of the Origin of meaning.

In the choice of the immanence-standpoint in the manner described above, I myself elevate philosophic thought, whether in the transcendental-logical or in the metaphysical-logical sense, to the status of ἀϱχή of the cosmos. This ἀϱχή stands as origin, beyond which nothing meaningful may be further asked, and in my view no longer occupies the heteronomous mode of being which is meaning. It exists in and through itself.

This choice of a position in the face of the ἀϱχή transcends philosophic thought, though in the nature of the case it does not occur apart from it. It possesses the fulness of the central selfhood, the fulness of the heart. It is the first concentration of philosophic thought in a unity of direction. It is a religious choice of position in an idolatrous sense.

The proclamation of the self-sufficiency of philosophic thought, even with the addition of ‘in its own field’, is an absolutizing of meaning. Nothing of its idolatrous character is lost by reason of the thinker's readiness to recognize, that the absolutizing ϰάι᾽ ἐξοχήν which he performs in the theoretical field is by no means the only rightful claimant, but that philosophy should allow the religious, aesthetic or moral man the full freedom to serve other gods, outside the theoretical realm.

The philosopher who allows this freedom to the non-theo-

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retician is, so to speak, theoretically a polytheist. He fights shy of proclaiming the theoretical God to be the only true one. But, within the temple of this God, no others shall be worshipped!

Thus the first way of our critique of philosophical thought has for a provisional conclusion:

Even on the immanence-standpoint the choice of the Archimedean point proves to be impossible as a purely theoretical act which prejudices nothing in a religious sense.

In truth the selfhood as the religious root of existence is the hidden performer on the instrument of philosophic thought. Only, it is invisible on the basis of the immanence-standpoint.

Actually, philosophic thought in itself offers us no Archimedean point, for it can function only in the cosmic coherence of the different modal aspects of meaning, which it nowhere transcends.

The immanent Ideas of the inter-modal coherence of meaning and of the totality of meaning are transcendental limiting concepts. They disclose the fact, that theoretical thought is not self-sufficient in the proper field of philosophy, a point to which we shall have to return in detail.

No other possibility for transcending the inter-modal coherence and the modal diversity of meaning is to be found, except in the religious root of existence, from which philosophic thought also has to receive its central direction.