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Politiek en historie. Opstellen over Nederlandse politiek en vergelijkende politieke wetenschap (2011)

Politiek en historie. Opstellen over Nederlandse politiek en vergelijkende politieke wetenschap

(2011)–Hans Daalder–rechtenstatus Auteursrechtelijk beschermd

Vorige Volgende

European political traditions and processes of modernization: groups, the individual and the state*

I Introduction

When S.N. Eisenstadt gave me his position paper Historical Traditions, Modernization and Development to read, I could not help commenting: ‘You're only asking us to treat the universe!’ His comment, characteristically, was: ‘I'll only give you Europe, with economic and social developments going to other authors!’ Such restrictions are small: the topic is daunting.1 In approaching it, I cannot help thinking of Winston Churchill visiting Strasbourg shortly after World War ii. To the assembled crowd he put the rhetorical question in his (easily imitable) accent: ‘Voulez-vous que moi, je parle français?’ When the crowd roared its approval, he continued with ‘Alors ce serez-vous qui serez responsable!’

The following paper treats no less than: the rise of the state (Section ii); the development of the notion of the individual as a political actor (Section iii); the importance of groups in European political traditions (Section iv), and finally, after a short analytical interlude (Section v), some issues in which the relation of individuals, groups and the state are at stake: i.e. processes of democratization; the manner of economie modernization; state and nation; and the debate (recently revived) on the role of corporatism in modern European societies (Section vi).

II The rise of the state

In any review of European processes of modernization, the rise of the ‘state’

must undoubtedly rank high. The world has known other and earlier forms of political organization, varying from oriental despotisms to city ‘states’, from the Roman empire to feudal arrangements, and many others. Yet, there is substance in the argument that not only the word ‘state’ (lo stato, in the words of Machiavelli) is of relatively recent origin, but also the concept of state and the particular phenomena for which the concept of state stands.2 Bookcases have been filled on the notion of the ‘state’. The matter, moreover, is complicated because the shorthand concept of ‘state’ is used in reference to many different historical forms of state.3 However, with the advantage of hindsight, certain characteristic features of the modern ‘state’ can be isolated.

1 The separation of ‘temporal’ and ‘spiritual’ powers

Both in the biblical injunction (‘Render unto Caesar that which is Caesar's) and in Christian doctrine, notably in the Middle Ages, ‘spiritual’ and ‘temporal’ power were undoubtedly distinct. But the actual notion of ‘state’ only began to crystallize when the old doctrine of Pope Gelasius about the ‘two swords’ came to be reinterpreted in the sense that wordly powers derived their position not from the Pope, as intermediary between the eternal God and merely passing worldly rulers, but directly enjoyed their place by God's grace. Even then, many different positions remained possible in the relation between ‘temporal’ powers and religion, from those close to theocracy in which the temporal Lord saw it as his mission to impose religious doctrine and observance on the ruled, to one in which the specific religion seemed rather to become one of convenience (as in the famous cuius regio, eius religio-doctrine of the Augsburg Peace of 1555). Even then, the importance of religion as one of the most essential props of political authority was readily recognized, as in the dictum of James i: ‘No bishops, no Kings’. Yet, for all this the trend was increasingly towards secular power per se, with religion eventually becoming a matter of secondary political importance or even a matter of private concern alone, rather than the source and end of all existing authority. In that light it is no accident that the theorist of modern doctrines of sovereignty par excellence, Jean Bodin, (one of les politiques), was also one of the first to regard religion as a matter to be left alone - peace being best preserved when worldly power kept at some distance from religious differences.

2 The concept of sovereignty

The concept of sovereignty developed along two dimensions: externally, in the insistence that no other power than the sovereign had any right to take decisions in a given territory, and internally, in the claim that within that

territory no other actor than the sovereign one had ultimate authority. The archetype is the French doctrine of droit divin for an absolute monarch. But the doctrine also developed in England: although power at the centre was less unified in England than in France, the assumption that the King's writ was universally law - and the later claim on behalf of the King-in-Parliament to be the supreme lawgiver of the land - became unchallenged doctrine. One might even argue that in actual practice sovereignty came to be more securely established in Britain than in France, where the claim of absolute rule was more one of eventual aspiration than of actual practice. Was the British judiciary not far more present and effective than any French counterpart, and were not the twin forces of Parliament and the Common Law Courts a clear match in the expression of the will of central government, compared to the French bureaucratie authorities or the Intendants prior to 1789?

3 Direct rule

In the development of the state, the idea of direct rule became an indispensable principle. Even though elements of indirect rule might persist for some time, and even though the total role of central government in the periphery might remain distinctly marginal, the assumption that the lawful commands of government were valid anywhere in the realm was an essential feature of the concept of the modern state. With the development of this principle, the people became subjects, who might then develop into citizens. By itself, the idea of citizenship was not new. (It was known in Greek city-states, in the city of Rome, and later in the Roman Imperium.) But only in the (modern) state were effective direct links forged between governments and subjects over large geographical areas.

4 The separation between public and private

A further step in the development of the modern state came in the increasing separation between the public and private affairs of the sovereign - a process that often took a very long time. After all, the very notion of sovereign authority was initially intimately tied up with the view that authority was a matter of absolute discretion. That view was also held among lower ranks - offices being largely regarded as private affairs - available, for purchase, their holders deriving an income in exchange for services charged for private gain rather than rendered as public service. But in the development of the state, exchequers and treasuries attained an increasingly independent status, and one means of enforcing central government control became the establishment of Courts of Account which were to oversee the regularities of expenditure. Increasingly, ‘public’ authorities were brought under some closer form of control and supervision, although only a few attained the full para-

phernalia of an ideal Weberian-type bureaucracy at a relatively early period in time.

5 The new importance of law

Again, both the concept of law and of legitimate authority were not unknown before the advent of the ‘modern state’ at the end of the Middle Ages. Distinctions between ‘positive’ and ‘natural’ law, or ius civile and ius gentium, had an ancient pedigree. What was new, however, was the reception of Roman law in a number of West European countries at the end of the Middle Ages as an instrument of the new temporal power of the state. In a more revolutionary way, law came to be identified with the formal expression of sovereign will - which meant that it could also become an instrument of purposive change, rather than the earlier notion of law which had had to be ‘found’. Such claims did not of course go unchallenged. Early modern times are replete with rebellions in the name of ancient rights and privileges. The assumption that the King could make law, and thus be himself above the law, was countered by the claim that the King himself was subject to the law. If in Britain this eventually resulted in the successful imposition of the supremacy of Parliament and the Common Law over the King, it did not gainsay the actual arrival of sovereign power as a characteristic of the state (though represented by the King-in-Parliament rather than the King alone). Together with it, arbitrary power also came to be circumscribed: what was once regarded merely as possibly immoral became first illegitimate, and then illegal.

6 An increasing number of state agencies and instruments of government

The development of the modern state was also accompanied by an increasing differentiation of governing agencies. A process of differentiation from what was once the Court resulted in the establishment of many judicial agencies, executive and/or advisory councils, institutionalized forms of representation, royal inspectors, both central and local bureaucracies, new armed forces, etc. Regrettably, the analysis of such developments has remained largely the preserve of legal historians. For all the insistence on the role of centres - for example in the seminal work of Stein Rokkan4 - the process of centre-formation is too often taken for granted rather than subjected to analysis. The exact nature of the processes of institutional differentiation, the various powers of different agencies in relation to one another, the sequence of their respective developments, requires more study if the precise nature of political development is to be understood.

Developing states also created increasingly varied instruments of control; for example the development of different systems of law, new forms of cen-

tral/local interaction, the development of state taxation, the establishment of forms of government enterprise and/or the encouragement of private enterprise by government (through charters, régies, subsidies, government orders, and so on).

7 The state and growing intervention in social and economic matters

Eventually the state was to become an important equalizer of standards; thus, one might note that in classical political economy (whether in its Liberal or Marxist version) the state had to provide, at a minimum, for basic security through the enforcement of standards in contracts and markets. From that minimal concept, clamour for the removal of evident abuses would easily follow. But, in some European societies, the role of the state became far wider. The need (or wish) to expand state power, against both foreign and domestic enemies, made for extensive government intervention early on. It is no accident that ‘political arithmetic’ blossomed as a result of the desire on the part of sovereign rulers to assess resources of power (whether in people or wealth). It is also no accident that governments which pursued an active policy of territorial security (let alone expansion) became the most interventionist and bureaucratie: witness developments in France and Prussia, as distinct from Britain or the Dutch Republic.5 The latter remained relatively free from the danger of invasion, and concentrated more on the development of naval power, which was much closer to commercial than state-bureaucratic activity. Clearly, the feedback of experience of overseas colonial rule on domestic government and political developments in Britain and Holland differed considerably from the effects of landlocked expansionism on Prussia.6

The greater ‘weight’ of the state in some European countries than others was also to influence later developments: one might note the resemblance, in principle, between older traditions of Kameralistik in Prussia and the pioneering of social insurance - both being part of an effort to mobilize people and resources for the further development of a strong state. In that light, both Hegelian philosophy and Rechtsstaat doctrines contributed to the assumption that the state was the great integrator and dispenser of political good, in a collectivist spirit which was eventually also to be exported to Britain - through the work of Hegelian philosophers such as Bosanquet and Thomas Hill Green, who in turn influenced the Fabians and the so-called social-imperialists.7 Similar, though less drastic, developments should be noted for France. There, the rise of a new nation une et indivisible, and of Napoleon who was to reap the fruits of the French Revolution, was to create the effective instruments of central government to which absolutist kings had only aspired. (But, at the same time in France both the opposing forces of

traditionalism on the one hand and republicanism on the other remained powerful rival inspirations which were to blunt the full force of the French state in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, as compared to Prussia and the German Reich.)

8 State and society

In the development of the modern state the separate spheres of ‘state’ and ‘society’ came to be consciously distinguished in a way not found in earlier societies. Paradoxically, that recognition is also present in later analyses which seek to trace the increasing interpenetration of state and society in the present century, variously denoted by metaphors like: osmosis, the Vergesellschaftlichung des Staates and Verstaatlichung der Gesellschaft, neocorporatism, and similar concepts. Once we have surveyed the rise of individuals as political actors, and the role of groups in relation to state and individual, we shall return to such issues.

The eight points noted in the development of the concept of the state do little justice to the many variations in the processes of the formation of states in Europe, and in fact offer a telescoped picture, as if the dimensions of time and geography were of no importance. They should serve, however, to make the case that the development of the concept of the state was, at the least, a major factor to note in analysing the role of European political traditions in processes of modernization.

III The individual as a political subject

Singling out the rise of the individual as a political subject, in an analysis of the role of European political traditions in processes of modernization, smacks of considerable arrogance: as if ‘men’ have not lived, loved, worked, thought and suffered throughout history and in all societies. Yet, an analysis of the manner in which individuals have been regarded as independent political actors is too powerful a characteristic of European development for us to stop at that ready recognition.

1 Old traditions of citizenship

In any mention of the role of individuals in politics, the important recognition of the idea of citizenship in classical antiquity should receive first place. Both the role of the individual ‘citizen’, and the rights of the ‘many’ were readily acknowledged in classical Athens, and with it the idea of equality developed easily. But, as has often been noted, the individual was con-

ceived as living in and through the polis, inevitably a zoon politikon, and not yet an independent actor who had rights against the polis as well as being a participant in it.

2 The separation of individual and society

A clear step in the recognition of individuals as distinct from the society in which they lived only came when the ‘autonomy’ (in the literal sense of the word) of the polis was broken up and the polis itself was divided into parts of larger political organizations (for example Macedonia and the Hellenistic World first, and later Rome). Then, a distinct role for the individual, set apart from his own society, but part of a newly recognized ‘cosmic order’, was seen to exist. For a time this implied more a ‘privatization’ of the individual than the attribution to him of individual roles in a larger world. Yet, the Stoa, with its emphasis on rational and natural man, was to exert a powerful influence, and this was revived in the Renaissance, which put man at the centre of the stage, and fostered rationality and secularism as challenges to the Thomistic world system.

3 The individual as a believer

Similarly, the advent of new theological currents, ending with the formal Reformation, loosened the link between individuals and the inherited order of thought and things, postulating instead a direct link between the believer and his God. Calvinist doctrine notably gave individuals a more independent role, emphasizing independent prayer and work, and providing for forms of church organization in which hierarchical authority was to some extent replaced by the free association of like-minded believers. In the final analysis this could mean the disentanglement of the individual from any formal bond (even though, in practice, Calvinist, let alone Lutheran, versions of Church organization might remain a massive regulatory presence).

4 Resistance and consent

The breakdown of universal religion also created new problems in the relationship between individuals and authority. Both Calvinist Monarchomachs and ultramontane Catholics developed doctrines about the right to resist heretical rulers. Initially, such rights to resist were given to groups and magistrates, rather than to individual believers, but, in the process, the idea of a social contract began to be elaborated, making allegiance to rulers dependent on the fulfilment of the conditions on which authority had been granted.8 Such views logically led both to the concept of consent as a condition of legitimate authority, and to the construct of the demarcation of rights

against worldly rulers. If the basis for such rights was originally one of groups, rather than of individuals, the transition from the one to the other came about eventually.

5 Secularization and a new interpretation of natural law

Again, the loss of a common belief strengthened the development of more secular views of political authority. Thus, older concepts of natural law were disentangled from the great Thomistic synthesis, strengthening the concept of natural man as a secular and rational agent. New systems of philosophy worked in the same direction, with scientific ways of reasoning replacing older religious doctrines. The transition is neatly seen in the work of Thomas Hobbes, which is still full of religious discussion, yet makes the revolutionary step of deriving political authority from the rational calculations of individuals motivated by selfinterest. If Hobbes himself was to conclude from this that only one individual right could really be claimed against the effective political authority of the Leviathan (i.e. the right to life), others - most notably John Locke - were soon to expand the concept of natural rights into a much wider sphere.

6 The link between absolutism and individualism

Later observers have often missed the link which in the late seventeenth and eighteenth century was seen clearly to exist between absolutist rule on the one hand, and individualism on the other. During the French Enlightenment that connection was readily made, both absolute rulers and individuals having every interest in seeking to destroy the vested interests of different estates and regional authorities, which were thought to make for inequality and privilege. (We shall see later - Section iv, 3; Section v, 1; and Section vi, 1 - how different systems of thought developed during the Enlightenment between pluralist preferences as exemplified by Montesquieu on the one hand and more individualistic preoccupations shared by proponents of absolutist rule and ‘totalitarian’ democrats on the other.)

7 Proclamations of individual rights

If the concept of ‘rights’ took some few centuries to develop, the clamour for rights became a movement of massive proportions from the late eighteenth century onwards. The various Declarations and Bills of Rights of the American Revolution, the Déclaration des Droits de l'Homme of the French Revolution, and similar statements in country after country, until the eventual adoption of supranational declarations by the United Nations (1948) and in the Rome Convention (1950), became an almost inevitable ingredient of

modern political discourse - even if wide differences have remained in the actual implementation and enforceability of human rights in different parts of the world.

8 The individual as a unit of measurement

One later development of the theories of natural rights is represented by utilitarianism, where the individual became both the goal of political action, and the unit of measurement by which to judge it. The adoption of the principle of ‘the greatest happiness of the greatest number’ potentially heralded a new conception of rights, validating reforms and positive state action. If originally it was held that true reasoning proved non-intervention by the state in the economy to be in the best interest of all, the new yardstick was soon to assist the elaboration of new forms of co-operative and collective action (as developed by John Stuart Mill, the proponents of the theory of positive freedom, and later reformist socialists alike). One can construe a logical sequence, leading from the idea that individuals had inalienable rights which must be upheld against both the state and other individuals, to the view that the actual enjoyment of rights might depend on the provision of minimal collective provisions through common action, to the view that rights must be effectively guaranteed through state action.

9 The expansion of citizenship9

Initially, it was held that only those who were socially and materially independent possessed the basic requirements for independent judgement which citizenship assumed, that is, heads of families with sufficient property; this excluded both women and those with insufficient personal means. Such reasoning is clearly seen in the work of John Locke - accused by Harold Laski of regarding the state as little more than a limited company of property owners.10 The same view was evident among many who regarded the Tiers État as equivalent to the Nation in the French Revolution, or among those who regarded the later extension of citizenship to non-property owning groups as leading to tyranny rather than to a free society. The idea that a good state demanded ‘independent’ citizens who had a proper stake in public order and carefui rule was extended far into the nineteenth and even twentieth centuries. But, in the longer run, the force of individualism and human rights was such that the burden of proof came to rest, not on those who pleaded for the inclusion of all, but on those who continued to advocate the exclusion of some. Thus, the concept of citizenship was freed from any necessity for proof of capacity or suitability, and regarded as one inalienable human right amongst others.

10 The expansion of rights

Not least due to the acceptance, and the weight of, universal suffrage, the notion of individual rights came to be widely expanded. The state was no longer held to have the duty to respect individual rights alone, but also to provide for the common good of all, and eventually to take responsibility for the general well-being of citizens. With this duty, the notion of rights increasingly assumed a dimension of ‘revendication’ - individuals claiming performance and provisions as of right. This not only implied a change from the Liberal State to the Welfare State, but also an increasing emphasis on equality of access to services and justice. A new definition was given to political participation, in terms of the ‘subjective competence’ to obtain recognition of individual problems.11 Also, new forms of judicial appeal were instituted, by changes in the application of civil law on the one hand, and by the elaboration of a wide range of administrative law procedures on the other. If these developments led to what Robert Dahl has called the new democratie Leviathan,12 that Monstrum theoretically rests, nevertheless, as much as the old one of Thomas Hobbes, on the basis of individual interest.

IV Groups

Although groups are here treated last, logically they come first, being in comparison to ‘state’ and ‘individuals’ the more accepted and general variable in political discourse. Groups were the undisputed starting-point, as in Aristotle's view of balanced government, for example; in the conceptualization of different ‘orders’ in ancient Rome or the Middle Ages; in the ‘organic’ conceptualizations of both absolutist kings and the romanticist anti-individualist reactions of the nineteenth century; in what has been termed ‘ethical’ as well as in the ‘analytical’ pluralism of more recent days. Groups provide a fairly constant Leitmotiv against the claims of state and individuals alike. One can distinguish the following developments in the concept of groups in European political traditions.

1 Groups in the ancient ‘polis’

As emphasized earlier, classical political thought held individuals to exist only in and through groups. The polis, as distinct from other poleis, could be regarded in itself as the most fundamental group of all - the usual translation of city-‘state’ being really a misnomer by definition. But, more importantly, politics was also seen in ancient times in terms of the struggle between different groups, the ‘rich’ and the ‘poor’ being the most obvious ones that

prompted Aristotle to seek a balancing role for the ‘middle state’ - men who ‘will neither covet what belongs to others, as the poor do’... ‘nor will others covet what is theirs’,13 they themselves not being rich enough to arouse envy.

2 Groups in the ‘organic’ reading of history

From time immemorial, society has been represented as an organism, with different parts fulfilling different functions - all essential to the well-being of the whole. One finds this image in ancient Rome, as well as in the Thomistic system, in the reasoning of absolutist kings, as well as among schools of natural law (being understood as the fundamental reflection in the social order of eternal and divine law on the one hand, the nature of man on the other). Later, a revival of organic theories was to occur in protest against the ruptures of the French Revolution, and the extreme individualism of laissez-faire doctrines.

3 A Contractual version of the formation of state

Contractual theories about the origin of political communities initially also had a group base, rather than an individualist one (which it mainly acquired through the twist that Hobbes, and later Locke, gave to theories of a social contract). As we saw, contractual theories were put forward to safeguard religious minorities against sovereigns of a different faith. The right to resist infringements of religious rights was thought initially to belong to groups rather than individuals. Interestingly, in a somewhat later version, Althusius developed a contractual theory which derived the establishment of sovereign rule from below, with groups delegating the right to make decisions to common authorities (consociationes), formed among themselves for the resolution of issues which could not be treated lower down, and for those issues alone. At the base were the most elementary groups of the extended family and small village communities, and at the top confederal authorities which looked after issues such as defence, but always with due respect for inherent rights, and in full conciliar patterns of decision-making. (It is a moot point whether a system of public authorities formed in this way can really be described as meeting the criteria of statehood which were singled out in Section ii.).14

4 Montesquieu's insistence on ‘corps intermédiaires’

The literature on the French Enlightenment often suggests far greater unanimity among the Philosophes than really existed. In fact, there was a vast gap between the reasoning of the Comte de Montesquieu on the one hand, and both the Enlightenment individualists and a J.J. Rousseau on the other.

The individualists abhorred the intervention in the body politic of intermediate groups, echoing Hobbes' dictum that private societies were ‘like worms in the entrayles of natural man’, whereas Rousseau regarded partial societies as by definition conflicting with his notion of a general will. Montesquieu, on the other hand saw in the destruction of ‘corps intermédiaires’ the essence of despotism. If the individualists embraced absolutism, and Rousseau argued in similarly absolutist terms for popular sovereignty - undivided and fundamentally at one - Montesquieu sought to preserve pluralist traditions. His writings in fact served as an inspiration for very different schools which were to follow in the nineteenth century: institutionalists, thinkers of the Restauration, socialists and modern pluralists (i.e., points 5-8 which follow).

5 The new institutionalism

Both in the elaboration of the American Constitution, and in the writings of post-revolutionary thinkers such as Benjamin Constant, Guizot and others, Montesquieu's writings could serve to propagate doctrines of the need for a clear separation of powers and a modern constitutionalism.15 From then on, a verbal allegiance at least to institutional guarantees against a concentration of powers was to reverberate throughout the modern world, whatever the realities behind the institutional façades might be.

6 The restoration and the conservative reaction

But Montesquieu's teachings could also be put to more conservative uses. His insistence that social groups should be balanced as much as constitutional powers was not fundamentally different from organicist arguments which again became popular in nineteenth-century political thought. An abhorrence for revolutionary turmoil could equally base itself on Montesquieu's emphasis on the close relationship between traditional rights and natural pluralism. Montesquieu's respect for corporate forms of social organization could inspire all those who sought to resist both modern individualism and collectivism, whether in the writings of the traditionalists of the German Historische Rechtsschule; sympathizers of the Hegelian attempt to synthesize the traditions of primary group life on the one hand, and the extreme individualism of laissez faire on the other in a higher form of community called ‘state’; Kathedersozialisten; or Catholic thinkers, pleading for a new solidarism rather than liberal individualism or collectivist socialism, as set out in great encyclicals like Rerum Novarum (1891).

7 Socialist doctrines

The desire to preserve the forces of group life against the onslaught of indi-

vidualist modernization also formed a notable feature of developing socialist thought. One powerful impetus of socialism was rebellion against modernization, in a desire to preserve existing social bonds and pre-industrial skills. Projects for communitarian forms of social organization often reflected such sentiments, being Utopian in the belief that mankind could contract out of the realities of modern social life rather than develop with the modernist tide. For all Marx's adherence to the tenets of classical political economy and materialist historical determinism, his teachings did not neglect group traditions, whether in stipulating the inexorable development of class (that is: group) conflict, or in his idealization of post-revolutionary communism. Again, group elements could be found in a variety even of statist socialist teachings, whether of Lassalle, Eduard Bernstein, or Fabian gradualist collectivism.

8 Theories of pluralism proper

But, above all, groups were to be the key variable in the theories of pluralism proper.16 The locus classicus is Madison's Federalist x, in which he argues the case for the inevitability of factionalism, whatever advocates of popular sovereignty and/or direct rule might hold. From this Madison concluded the reverse of Rousseau: if Rousseau wanted small communities to obviate the adverse effect of factional strife which would conflict with the volonté générale, Madison concluded that a large territory would make for a greater spread and lessened danger from individual factions. American experiences inspired de Tocqueville who concluded from them that the future was bound inexorably towards mass democracy, but who also saw in the tendency of people to join together freely in associations the best means to combat the levelling tendencies of mass societies. Pluralist doctrines were also elaborated elsewhere. Thus, Otto von Gierke found inspiration in Althusius to formulate alternative theories of law and sovereignty to both laissez faire and statist collectivism in his famous multi-volume work Das Deutsche Genossenschaftsrecht (1913).17 Study of the experiences of the Dutch Republic was to inspire J.N. Figgis and F.W. Maitland to reject the axiomata underlying prevailing doctrines of unified sovereignty. Following in their wake, the younger Harold Laski was to argue in similar terms, also being inspired by the constitutionalist writings of Léon Duguit which he and his wife translated into English.18 At about the same time, French syndicalism and English guild socialism provided comparable inspiration, to combat widespread collectivist teachings in the socialist orbit.

All such writings were later to be subsumed under the label ‘ethical pluralism’, to distinguish them from so-called analytical pluralism, as elaborated by Arthur F. Bentley, David B. Truman, Robert A. Dahl, William Kornhauser and others, in a variety of analytical theorems which came to form the gist

of social science writing on contemporary society since the 1940s.19 As that literature has gone into the common fund of writings on the development and working of modern political systems, no further elaboration is necessary in the context of this paper. Suffice it to say that we owe to that literature such various contributions as the group approach in political analysis, most writings on political development, the emphasis on intermediate groups as the major factor preventing mass society from falling into the hands of totalitarian leaders, the concept of polyarchy, considerations on the feasibility of democracy in plural societies, including the consociational democracy literature, etc.

V Groups, individuals and the state: compatibility or conflict?

If one surveys the many trends and traditions treated in the introduction to this paper, one is struck by the many combinations which are theoretically possible. Thus, one can analyse pairs: state and individuals; state and groups; groups and individuals. But one must also elaborate the triad, since the relations between each pair are bound to be greatly affected by the third element.

I Paired relations: the state and the individual

In this category one finds both the theories of absolutist rule and theories of popular sovereignty. Both theories insist on the need to secure direct access for authority and individual alike. Both reject the claims of intermediate groups, which are written off as ‘private interests’ likely to thwart the interest of the whole. From either side one may arrive at the concept of equality: equality of subjects, leading to equality before the law in absolutist reasoning; equality of participation in Rousseau's theory of the general will. We must pay tribute to the late J.L. Talmon for his elaboration of the concept of totalitarian democracy,20 and should underscore the relevance of that concept in a great variety of political ideologies and practices, whether in totalitarian doctrines of fascism, national socialism, soviet communism, or in the weaker forms of populism and more embryonic ideologies in the new states.

2 Paired relations: the state and groups

In this dyad one might place theories which emphasize the special relations which connect certain groups, rather than others, to states. One early example is Aristotle's description of ‘oligarchies’. Closely related to this are those

theories of the ‘mixed state’ which seek to balance social groups. Another case is that of traditional medieval doctrine, which argues in terms of different estates and groups, each having its own appointed station in life under God's plan. The idea is also found in more modern versions, for example in conceptions of politics in terms of ‘interests’, which is a normal feature of conservative doctrine, but also in those theories in political development which lay particular stress on the alliances of particular groups (such as landed or commercial interests, aristocracies or peasants, the bourgeoisie or the proletariat) and state power in processes of social change. That approach is given a more formal elaboration in both traditional corporatists views of society and in the analysis of authors on neo-corporatism or countervailing powers, and so forth.

3 Paired relations: individuals and groups

This pair mirrors much of what has been said above. On the one hand, there is the argument that freedom of individuals as well as freedom of groups, against the state are intimately connected. Where there is only freedom for individuals, and not for the groups they associate in, such freedom is not likely to be real. Conversely, when there is only some measure of freedom for groups, but not for individuals, individuals are likely to fall prey to control by state and groups alike, in a highly arbitrary manner. One could therefore argue that individual freedoms and group freedoms are logically complementary. But one cannot reverse this argument and claim that individuals are free when groups are free. For groups themselves might be potentially repressive, and individuals are only secure against repression if they have a clear chance of exit and association with other groups.

4 The triad: groups, the individual and the state

One can only speak of such triangular relations once the idea of ‘state’ and the concept of ‘individual political actors’ had sufficiently crystallized in order to deny the all-inclusive claim of groups to being the sole real actors in politics. Hence, the more significant alternatives are arrangements of modern politics rather than traditional or transitional ones. One could distinguish three possible alternatives, depending on the degree of relative independence which the state, the individual and groups enjoy:

 

a. The polyarchical model.21 In this model groups are given paramount place, though without absorbing the individual, who retains his freedom against any particular group, precisely because there are many specialized groups catering for specific interests only. The model presupposes the freedom to establish associations, but also the presence of a partisan-electoral

channel next to a corporate-pluralist channel, so as to give the state an independent basis on the one hand and the individual a guarantee that he can escape groups through political and judicial action on the other. In this view, politics is very much the result of group action, but at the same time the degree of independence which the state and the individual enjoy prevents political systems from being entirely dependent on the interaction of groups alone.

Perhaps the most idealized picture of such a polyarchy is that of Gabriel Almond's concept of the Anglo-American system, which he contrasts with the continental European system.22 Almond sees as the major differences between his two models that in the latter case groups are not strongly differentiated, but form parts of ideological subcultures which encapsulate the individual rather than freeing him. He also concludes that political decision-making in such systems is likely to be heavily ideological and immobilist, signalling the possible advent of a ‘Caesaristic break-through’ in the form of synthetic ‘nationalist’ leaders, as a substitute for the much more homogeneous political culture of Anglo-American political systems. Almond's analysis was, of course, the starting point of Arend Lijphart's rebuttal which led to the elaboration of the consociational democracy model.23 But it should be noted that Lijphart retains many features of Almond's reasoning even when he speaks of ‘plural’ societies (that is: societies consisting largely of mutually exclusive groups), rather than ‘pluralist’ societies (that is: societies with many interwoven group allegiances).

 

b. The corporatist model. In this model, as elaborated notably by writers in the neo-corporatist school,24 the emphasis is on mutual penetration between state and group, with private interests given public powers, and groups given an established position verging on a monopoly of representation for given interests. In this analysis, little is left of the freedom of the individual, or of the autonomy of the state, though a plurality of groups is maintained.

 

c. The totalitarian model. In this model there is room neither for independent groups nor for free individuals, both being mobilized in a system of unified control, possessing all the panoplies of state power. We know, of course, that this model is also of an ideal type. Even the most influential framer of the model, Carl J. Friedrich, recognized the existence of what he termed ‘islands of separateness’ in totalitarian systems (including to some degree the family, the army, churches and universities).25 We have also been taught early on that there are many ‘cracks in the monolith’,26 and have witnessed attempts to apply group analysis to the study of totalitarian political systems. Yet, the model of totalitarian rule remains - almost by definition - the clearest example of the subjugation of groups and individuals to the state in modern times.

VI Groups, the state and the individual in modernization: some great debates

Using the three categories - groups, the state and the individual - in a developmental perspective, one arrives at some of the great debates in modernization literature. I shall treat these (as other subjects in this paper!) in barest outline.

I The manner of democratization

In the literature on processes of democratization27 one finds two opposing schools, which one might term the ‘Whig’ School and the ‘Jacobin’ School respectively. The latter school reads somewhat as follows: democracy requires the direct participation of every individual in the formation of the general will. For this, equality is an important element. The ground on which modern democracy can develop was the rise of the bourgeoisie who demanded increasing rights in a society in which, owing to the heritage of feudal times, inequality was engrained. In attacking the remants of feudalism, absolutist kings fulfilled a historically necessary role. Once absolutist kings had established the principle of a universalist state it was up to the bourgeoisie, as the historically indicated class, to topple absolute monarchs and to establish a new republican rule on the basis of equal rights for citizens. Although some parts of the bourgeoisie might then seek to occupy new, exclusive positions of privilege, revolutionary momentum should secure the extension of civic and political rights to all members of the political community. As the Jacobins were the true democrats in the time of the French Revolution, so only radicals and, later, socialists could be depended on to bring about a genuine democratic republic on the basis of equal rights and popular sovereignty. Emphasis should also be constantly given to the need to secure widespread political participation, which is both a condition for the formation of a genuine popular will and a good in itself. Democracy should therefore be defined above all in terms of constant individual emancipation. For intermediate groups there is little space. At most they might represent a prototype and a training ground for full participation in the larger democratic community.

Against such reasoning, a ‘Whig’ School argues rather as follows: If one surveys modern democracies, systems which show greatest democratic stability are those which developed democracy only gradually, without many revolutionary upheavals, but also with no reversals. The roots of modern democracy in these societies should be sought in earlier pluralist traditions. In certain European countries (e.g. Britain, Holland, to some extent Sweden) the attempts by kings to establish absolutist rule were thwarted by entrenched social groups (including the remnants of feudal groups, but also by representatives of the new moneyed classes). As a result, oligarchical rule

persisted for a long time, though without power becoming concentrated in the hands of one particular body. On the contrary, the struggle between holders of different institutional powers (king, ministers, parliaments, judges) came to supplement social and economic struggle. From that base, the advent of the industrial revolution (with its concomitant processes of urbanization, increased social mobility, new policy challenges, etc.) led to increased competition amongst elites, and to new claims for influence and power among strata as yet excluded from the pays légal. These reciprocal competitive processes eventually led to democratic reforms, including responsible parliamentary government, changes in the electoral system, expansion in the suffrage, the formation of modern mass parties, the introduction of merit appointments to bureaucratic positions, and eventually the spectrum of state provisions which made up the present welfare state.

If one compares this Whig reading of the historical record with the Jacobin one the major difference is in the emphasis on the importance of early pluralist traditions. Rather than being an impediment to the development of later democracy (as the ‘Jacobins’ were to argue), they were the crucible from which later democracy could develop. The ‘Whig’ theory is both much less ‘statist’ and less ‘individualist’ than its ‘Jacobin’ counterpart, laying greater stress on institutional guarantees than on the need for participation, and trusting the market-place more than the pedagogue. Clearly, then, the two different theories read the empirical record differently, but they also continue to differ in certain normative aspects. Of the two, groups loom larger in the ‘Whig’ theory; ‘collectivist’ assumptions, centring on the state, and the direct role of the individual in it, in the ‘Jacobin’ view.

2 The manner of economic modernization

European societies have also differed greatly in the role that the state has played in processes of economic modernization (and the political theories which have accompanied it). The assumption that in come countries there was at one time only a ‘night watchman-state’ is in many ways a fiction. Even guaranteeing the free working of the market (including on the one hand the breaking of local monopolies and guild-like interests, providing on the other for the necessary guarantees for standards and contracts) required substantial action by public authority, and states stepped in with further regulatory measures as soon as evident abuses appeared in the wake of massive urbanization, health hazards and the like. Even so, the role of the state in promoting economic development was much greater in some European societies than others. This had a powerful effect on such factors as: the type of bourgeoisie that developed, the outlook of state officials, the status of different social strata, the role of the peasantry, the position of the working class (or of certain parts of it) in relation to the state, etc. To the extent that the state was

the prime mover, a close network developed between state authorities and certain social groups that was to have a powerful effect on the specific chances of political parties and on the character of democratization processes.

3 The state and the nation

Perhaps the most powerful influence of European modernization processes has been the forging of the concept of ‘nation’. Coupled with the notions of ‘state’ and of ‘sovereignty’, it came to provide the dominant formula of ‘national self-determination’, which was a powerful factor both in decolonization processes and in the refusal of new ‘nation states’ to accept any intervention in their internal affairs (even when groups or individuals were victimized). One great problem has always been, however, that concepts like ‘nation’ or ‘nationalism’ have stood for rather different things.28

First, there is the concept of ‘political nationality’, comprising all those living in a given territory under one sovereign regime. Second, there are any number of ‘objective’ definitions of nationhood, including definitions based on race, colour, language, religion, etc. Finally, there is the emphasis on ‘subjective’ definitions of nation, arguing that the only factor which counts is the constantly reaffirmed sense of allegiance, given freely by citizens whatever their ‘objective’ characteristics. Whenever the ‘political’ and the ‘objective’ criteria of nationhood are lumped together there are bound to arise problems for minority groups. They are at best given the position of second-rate citizens, and at worst made the victims of genocide. Only the subjective definition permits free individual choice, and the possibility of free association of different ‘objective’ groups in one state. Yet, the famous dictum of Ernest Renan that a nation should be a ‘plébiscite de tous les jours’29 is more a rhetorical than an analytical success, assuming as it does the possibility of constant free choice which is hardly a reality except for the few individuals who have a real option to leave the territory of a given state.

The problem is raised as one of the great debates on the relations between groups, the individual and the state since, in the actual historical development of European societies, great differences have occurred. On the whole, the slow development of statehood in most countries in Western Europe has allowed the welding together of different groups in states which are either definite nation-states, or at least states which have permitted the coexistence of different ‘objective’ groups without too much tension. To that extent, state, group and individual are not in conflict with one another. (Even here, however, an area which has its problems in Northern Ireland, the Basque and Catalan territories, Corsican nationalism, tensions between Flemings and Walloons, and a new world of massive immigration of new minority groups in recent years, should not be too self-satisfied.) Historically, the sit-

uation was already very different in Germany, where state, Volk, language, and eventually fictitious race (for the ‘Aryan’ masters, that is), coagulated into a heinous amalgam. Even more complicated has been the situation of Eastern Europe which arguably fell asunder when neither multinational empires, nor new nation-states, proved feasible alternatives in a period in which democracy was pushing for self-determination, but the intermingling of groups was such that national self-determination threatened in fact to become what C.A. Macartney has rightly called ‘national determinism’. We have the (mainly Jewish-inspired) attempt at post-1918 ‘protection of minorities’ treaties under the auspices of the League of Nations as eloquent - and eventually portentous - evidence of the feeble defence which both individuals and minority groups could exert against the notion of ‘one-and-indivisible’ nation-states.

4 Parliamentary democracy and neo-corporatism

As a final example of a possibly great debate in terms of the relationship between groups, state and the individual, we should return to the concept of corporatism and neo-corporatism. One major question to be posed is which societies historically showed the greatest trend towards corporatist processes of decision-making. It would seem that rather different hypotheses can be put forward: that is, those societies in which the state loomed largest in initial economic development; those societies which had a distinctly plural group structure rather than one of cross-cutting pluralist group structures; small states which need to engage in accommodationist practices if they are to compete successfully on the world market; large states with a strong ‘military-industrial’ complex, are all thought to be particularly susceptible to the forces of (neo-)corporatism.

A second problem is the actual measurement of the degree of corporatist decision-making. It would seem that there are not only great differences between countries, but also between different sectors of societies - agriculture showing a very different picture from commerce or industry, social services being a rather different field from the defence sector, etc.

A third issue is the extent to which the network of corporate decisionmaking really pre-empts the influence of what Rokkan called the ‘partisan-electoral channel’.30 The latter works on the assumption that both the state and the individual remain to some degree autonomous from groups, and can therefore if necessary organize independently from them, or against them. To the extent that they can, corporatism is not an irreversible trend.

VII Groups, individuals and the state: their importance in european political traditions

If one seeks to summarize the preceding sections, two contradictory sentiments may be felt. Clearly, the categories used are overly general: they lack specificity in content, and are used in dimensions of time and space which do far too little justice to actual conditions and processes in European history. At the same time, both the concepts of state, and the rise of the individual as an independent political actor, are among the most important innovations resulting from European modernization. The way in which older groups related to processes of state-formation and a growing individualism, and the way in which newer groups formed themselves in interaction with developing states and increasingly emancipated individuals, go far to determine the specific outcomes of modernization processes in different European countries. The foregoing pages offer little more than a listing or an inventory of possible factors at work. But they are not irrelevant. Problems such as: the arrival and the working of democracy, the manner of economic development and the role in it of the state and different social groups, the relationship between individuals, national groups and the state; and the role of partisan-electoral processes over against the realities of corporate decision-making are among the most important features of European modernization processes. Both empirical explanations, and normative assessments, will make little headway until one disentangles the way in which states, groups and individuals have interacted in the past, and do interact to this day.


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