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Politiek en historie. Opstellen over Nederlandse politiek en vergelijkende politieke wetenschap (2011)

Politiek en historie. Opstellen over Nederlandse politiek en vergelijkende politieke wetenschap

(2011)–Hans Daalder–rechtenstatus Auteursrechtelijk beschermd

Vorige Volgende

The consociational democracy theme*

I

The books that are the subject of this review share three important characteristics.

1. They deal exclusively, or at least predominantly, with the political experiences of some smaller European countries which have traditionally been terra incognita on the map of comparative politics. Most writing in the field of comparative politics has centered either on the larger developed countries or on the developing states in the Third World. The Scandinavian and Benelux countries, Austria, and Switzerland have either been neglected or treated as isolated phenomena, mainly of folkloristic interest. As a category, they have been written off (with the exception of Austria) as ‘the sober parliamentary democracies’, or as examples (listed with a note of surprise) of ‘working multi-party systems’. In Gabriel Almond's famous typology they appeared as systems which combined certain features of what he called the ‘Anglo-American type’ on the one hand, and the ‘continental European system’ on the other.1 Paradoxically, the smaller developed countries of Europe therefore remained an underdeveloped area in political science.

2. These books are much more than simple studies of particular countries. In fact, the books by Huyse, Lijphart, and Steiner are, in Lijphart's words,

‘an extended theoretical argument based on a single case of particular significance to pluralist theory’, without an attempt ‘to provide an exhaustive description of all facets of the political system’ (p. 15, n. 43). Lehmbruch's study is more of a general essay; G. Bingham Powell chooses the narrow focus of a single Austrian city to administer a survey that seeks answers to major theoretical issues. These books therefore graphically reveal the superficiality of the view that configurative studies can contribute little to general theory - a vacuous assumption disproved convincingly earlier by Harry Eckstein in his study of Norway.2

3.These studies present a formidable challenge to existing typologies of democratic regimes, and to widely held beliefs on the conditions of effective and stable democratic rule. Against prevailing normative views, based mainly on American or British perspectives, they contrapose the model of what Lijphart has called ‘consociational democracy’,3 or what Lehmbruch first termed Proporzdemokratieand later Konkordanzdemokratie.4 Since 1967, when this concept was first developed independently by these two authors, an extensive body of theoretical writing has sprung up.5 Jürg Steiner and Lucien Huyse have added their intimate knowledge of their native Switzerland and Belgium, respectively, to Lijphart's analysis of the Netherlands and to Lehmbruch's comparative essay which was based mainly on Austrian and Swiss democracy. Lijphart and Nordlinger contributed to a further systematization of the theory. Lijphart's counter-typology has now acquired the imprimatur of the editors of the Little, Brown Series - Gabriel A. Almond, James S. Coleman, and Lucian W. Pye - who advertise Kurt Steiner's recent volume in that series, Politics in Austria, as showing ‘the Austrian republic's transformation from the “centrifugal democracy” of the interwar period, to “the consociational democracy” of the Great Coalition after World War ii, to the current “depoliticized democracy”.’6

These books should therefore not be read chiefly as studies of specific countries; those in search of detailed historical or institutional knowledge will occasionally find themselves disappointed. Instead, we are presented with sophisticated monographs that have much to offer, not only to specialists in comparative politics, but also to students of normative and empirical democratic theory and of political sociology, and even to those specialists in international relations who are interested in the interaction of domestic and international politics.

II

The model of consociational democracy stars from a familiar proposition in pluralist theory: that social cleavages are moderated if different cleavages cut

across one another, but become loaded with conflict if they cumulatively reinforce one another. Societies that show the latter pattern are designated by a variety of terms, such as ‘vertical pluralism’, ‘segmented pluralism’, ‘social fragmentation’, ‘ideological compartmentalization’, or by a Dutch metaphor (often misspelled and practically always mispronounced), verzuiling - literally meaning pillarization. In Almond's view, the fragmented political culture and the poorly differentiated role structure of such systems make for an ideological style of politics, immobilism in policy making, and an erosion of democratic legitimacy and stability. In an extreme form there would be such a hardening of cleavage lines that civil war is likely to erupt, as indeed happened in the case of the Austrian Lager in 1934. I first experienced the full force of this argument when a leading American political scientist confronted me with the statement: ‘You know, your country theoretically cannot exist.’ A sense of bewilderment lies at the bottom of the literature under review. Basically, the authors seek to explain what at first sight seems to be the paradox of coexistence of strong subcultural divisions with democratic stability. Pared to its essentials, their argument runs as follows:

1. Strongly divided societies can be stabilized by a conscious effort on the part of political elites, provided they deliberately seek to counteract the immobilizing and destabilizing effects of cultural fragmentation. Patterns of inter-elite accommodation therefore form an independent variable that may impede and reverse the centrifugal forces at the level of the masses.

2. In order to be successful in these efforts, elites must consciously eschew the competitive practices which underlie the norms of British-style democracy. Instead, they must regulate political life by forming some kind of elite cartel.

3. Elites must therefore drop the assumption of simple majority rule. They must rely instead on forms of proportional representation in which no single actor acquires an independent mandate. In segmented societies, ‘rational’ theories of coalition behavior therefore do not hold. The characteristic form of politics is that of grand coalitions in which all major segmental groups share and find security.

4. Governmental power must be narrowly circumscribed, so as to allow subcultural groups considerable autonomy in arranging their own affairs. Mutual vetoes and concurrent majorities are vital in matters that might affect values which are of overriding importance to any or all of the subgroups in the society.

5. Consociational democracy therefore tends to show a curious mixture of ideological intransigence on the one hand and pragmatic political bargaining on the other. Separatism makes for a dogmatic, expressive style of politics within ideological families. But relations among subcultures are settled by a process of careful and businesslike adjustments.

6. To prevent the stagnation brought on by ideological immobilism, such

societies must develop procedures of purposive depoliticization. Preferably, matters must be treated in technocratic terms so as to prevent them from catching ideological fire. That can be done most easily by a process of bargaining behind closed doors. Carefully articulated compromises can then be offered as the only possible solution which can find acceptance by all.

7. Such politics inevitably reduce the importance of elections and even of the direct accountability of leaders. Elections are conducted in strong ideological terms. Since political groups cater above all to their own particular ideological clienteles, elections result in little real change. Elite groups therefore remain largely insulated from direct political upsets. And they need this insulation to work out the careful compromises that serve to stabilize highly divided societies.

8. Autonomous elite politics therefore presuppose that the electorate on the whole play a rather passive role - as both a condition for and a consequence of stable politics in divided societies. At least two of the authors (Jürg Steiner and Lucien Huyse) first came to the subject of consociationalism by way of empirical studies of political participation, which revealed a low degree of political participation combined with a substantial belief in the legitimacy of the existing political system.7

9. Successful consociational democracy tends to have an extensive network of functional organizations within ideological families, which allows a means of controlled representation for special interests. The prevalence of myriad ideological organizations is therefore not necessarily a sign of impending battle. Rather, it provides the organizational infrastructure on which elites can operate in an atmosphere of discretionary freedom, coupled with a fair guarantee of consensus. In the view of some authors, such ideologically separate groups also help to minimize opportunities of conflict: ‘good social fences’, in Lijphart's words, ‘may make good political neighbors’. (See his article in World Politics[fn. 3], p. 219.)

This schematic representation inevitably neglects many nuances in the analyses found in these books. Moreover, the authors have moved beyond such general statements. Powell and Steiner present original survey work. Lijphart has used secondary analyses of survey material to test the relative importance of religion and class as dividing lines.8 Lehmbruch has published a series of review articles on the literature of individual countries included in the typology;9 he has scrutinized the normative debates on electoral reform and the functioning of political parties and coalitions.10 Lijphart is extending his work by treating Northern Ireland, Canadian linguistic controversy, and the possible applicability of the model of consociational democracy to the new states. Steiner, more than other authors, includes sketches of actual policy-making processes. The authors have commented on one another's work, moreover, so that one can indeed begin to speak of an incipient school.

The fertility of theoretical debate and the impressive array of arguments

derived from the political experience of a number of polities constitute impressive testimony to the internationalization of the discipline. The books under review are, after all, the work of a German with close knowledge of Austria and Switzerland (Lehmbruch); a Dutchman who received his doctorate from Yale and studied and taught in the United States for twelve years before he returned to the Netherlands to take up a chair at Leiden University (Lijphart); a Swiss who received a doctorate in Mannheim and is now Professor of Political Science at the University of North Carolina (Steiner); an American who has been closely associated with Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba in projects on comparative politics and whose present book is based on original fieldwork in Austria (Bingham Powell); and a Belgian who worked in Oxford for some time and whose book is perhaps the fullest theoretical critique yet published of the literature of the other writers (Lucien Huyse, whose perceptive analyses may be compared with the theoretical essay of Nordlinger, but whose work is, alas, less readily accessible for linguistic reasons).

III

The typological coining of the model of consociational democracy constitutes a major contribution to the literature. It widens our understanding of the variegated possibilities of effective democratic rule, and undermines the assumptions of dichotomous models based implicitly or explicitly on the contrast between Britain and the United States on the one hand and Weimar Germany, the French Third and Fourth Republics, and Italy on the other. But it does notanswer the vitally important question why and how such consociational systems developed.

From the literature under review one may derive at least five different lines of argument.

I Consociationalism as the privilege of small states

A first trend of thought regards consociationalism as typical of the politics of smaller states. Practically all writers single out external threats as a major reason why political elites draw together and deliberately submerge their differences for the sake of the larger interest of preserving the independence of the system.11 The proposition seems plausible, but it is analyzed in little depth. Different interpretations are in fact possible.

a. One possible argument stresses the importance of imposed neutrality: Switzerland, Belgium, the Netherlands, and more recently Austria, have all had neutrality forced upon them at one time by agreement (explicit or im-

plicit) of the surrounding foreign powers. In this view, the possibility that smaller states might jeopardize international peace by internal conflicts would not be tolerated by the big powers. Consociationalism was therefore, so to speak, thrust upon them.

b. A somewhat similar argument emphasizes anticipatory self-restraint rather than foreign imposition: elites in smaller states who are conscious of the precarious situation of their country might decide to lower the temperature of internal strife so as not to give cause to one power or another to intervene in such internal quarrels. Political elites, in this view, are well aware of the grave dangers to their society from the interaction of internal and external conflicts, and deliberately move to reduce the first in order to lessen the threats of the second.

c. A third view runs counter to this argument to some extent. Instead of stressing the overbearing load which a combination of foreign threats and internal conflicts may pose, small states are assumed to carry a comparatively low load in international politics. This position is rather similar to older arguments put forward in the 1930's by writers like Ferdinand Hermens and Carl J. Friedrich, to the effect that institutions fragmenting political authority (such as coalition governments, proportional representation, or a low level of bureaucratic development) were luxuries which small nations might be able to afford, but not states which carried a larger responsibility in international affairs.

d. Yet another opinion holds that the relatively more exposed and open international position of smaller states would make their leaders aware that many decisions cannot in fact be taken within the confines of the nation-state; ceteris paribus, they would therefore be more sensitive to the need to leave specific sectors alone. A sense of self-restraint would be nourished, and the number of sites in which decisions are taken more or less autonomously would multiply.12

This short review suggests that more work must be done to study the interaction of internal and external conflicts. In particular, one should investigate the issue whether (or under what conditions) an increase of external pressure aggravates or lessens domestic conflicts. Comparative studies of this problem in the consociational states and other smaller countries should answer the question whether we are faced with a general property of small states or with phenomena that are particular to consociational societies. Before one concedes the view that consociationalism can only flourish in small states, one should study cases in which small states did not handle their external policies successfully, and contemplate the question whether an active stance in international politics by larger states (with all its consequences for internal politics) is a matter of inescapable fate or of political choice.

The indefinite state of the argument on matters such as these is evident also in the ambiguous treatment of the importance of nationalism among the

writers under review. There is a tendency to de-emphasize the importance of nationalism and national identity as an independent explanatory factor. One even finds the statement that a strong sense of nationality might jeopardize the carefully worked-out internal balances which a consociational system allows. Further empirical study of this intricate problem is necessary. One should analyze in greater detail, for instance, under what conditions and to what degree loyalties to subcultural groups and to the state are compatible with one another. The older literature on ‘subjective’ versus ‘objective’ views of nationality might be helpful for a better insight into this problem.13

2 Consociationalism as a ‘self-denying hypothesis’

A second explanation of the rise of consociational democracy is put forward with great force by Arend Lijphart, who speaks a consociationalism as ‘a self-denying hypothesis’. This argument grants the supposition of the explosive potential of a society in which cleavages reinforce rather than cut across one another. But, Lijphart argues, as they become aware of this peril, elites may move to neutralize the effect of such divisions by establishing a network of overarching cooperation among themselves. This argument places heavy demands on elite groups, not only in their relation with one another, but also with their followers. In particular, there may be a severe strain on their relation with those secondary leadership groups (Val Lorwin once dubbed them Lumpenelites) who may have every incentive to mobilize sectional groups against their own top leaders by fanning hostile ideological sentiments within individual subcultures. This theory puts considerable emphasis on the specific circumstances and conditions that allow elites at a particular moment to work out some kind of lasting compact. Among the factors referred to in the writings of Huyse, Lijphart, and Nordlinger are the following: external threats; a relatively low load on decision-making processes; the existence of a clear balance of power among subgroups in a country; political and economic stakes of all sections, and in particular of leading groups, in the political functioning of the system; a low degree of mobilization and/or a high degree of encapsulation of the masses; and above all, an awareness of clear and present dangers to the system as a whole. Paradoxically, this trend of thought combines a somewhat deterministic belief in the explosive potential of social cleavages and in the ability of autonomous elite groups to thwart their effect. It would seem to offer a better explanation of cases in which a viable state was reconstructed after an actual explosion (as in Austria after 1945) than of societies in which conflicts never reached such heights (as in Switzerland or the Netherlands).

3 Consociationalism and the specific nature of cleavages

A third trend of reasoning concentrates more on the nature of the cleavages than on autonomous elite behavior. This body of thought may be further classified into a mechanistic and a qualitative version.

The mechanistic version seeks an explanation in the ways and frequencies in which cleavages intersect one another. Thus, it makes a considerable difference whether one subculture has any chance of obtaining an independent majority, whether two camps roughly balance one another out in equal strength, whether there is is a multiple balance of power between three or more segments, or whether one can indeed speak of a fragmented political culture in the sense that there are a large number of clearly distinguishable groups. The major differences between Austria and Switzerland, for instance, as Lehmbruch and Steiner convincingly show, lie in the much greater number of groups, subcultures, and parties and the much more variegated organizational structure of Switzerland as compared to Austria. In view of the many groups and the large number of cross-cutting social differences (in addition to the low degree of exclusive identification with any particular subgroup) in Switzerland, one wonders whether Steiner's characterization of Switzerland as ‘segmented pluralism’ and Bingham Powell's description of Austria as ‘social fragmentation’ are not etymological misnomers; it might be more appropriate to reverse these labels.

A second mechanistic argument lies in the attempt to prove that in most of the countries under consideration there are a large number of cross-cutting cleavages. These may be found in relation to actual groups or, more likely, in relation to reference groups or potential groups in the sense of Arthur Bentley and David Truman. An unclear point in these arguments is, however, whether such crosscutting cleavages operate primarily on the elite level or on the mass level. Lehmbruch argues that in Austria the elites are more likely to be ideologically motivated than the masses; the latter have more diffuse ideological positions. Lijphart's version of the consociational model, on the other hand, would seem to emphasize the moderating effects of elite linkages on the potential (but organizationally controlled) ideological separatism of the masses. Nordlinger presents some major objections to using the hypothesis of crosspressures by itself:

There are thus four reasons for not using the crosspressures hypothesis to explain conflict regulation: 1) it is not especially plausible, given the limited, weak, and indirect supporting evidence; 2) two necessary conditions - the nearly equal salience of crosscutting divisions and their simultaneous triggering - have been omitted from the explanatory variable, and, if included, they would drastically restrict the hypothesis' applicability; 3) since the vast majority of deeply divided societies manifest only the mutually reinforcing pattern the hypothesis'
applicability is further restricted in its applicability to the regulation of severe conflicts; and 4) there is reason to doubt the presence of a correlation between crosscutting divisions and successful conflict regulation (p. 100).

A more promising line of argument may be the one that centers on the qualitative differences of specific cleavages. Somewhat surprisingly (in view of the overwhelming and almost determinative importance ascribed to the existence of divisive cleavages), there is in this literature little systematic reflection on whether particular cleavages are more likely to lead to conflict or accommodation than others. This is perhaps an unfortunate consequence of the loose usage of the term ‘cleavages’, which is held to refer indiscriminately to matters of class, status, region, religion, language, race, and so forth - a tendency enhanced by ambiguous expressions such as ‘communal’ or ‘ethnic’ divisions.

In addition, as Lucien Huyse shows with great finesse, there is the danger of regarding divisions in society as static properties. Instead, one should pay attention to the hierarchy of cleavages, and to their successive replacement by One another in a process of dynamic change (depending on elite behavior and the solution or non-solution of particular conflicts). The Belgian case, with its combination of divisions of class, religion, and language - all apt to acquire political content - offers an interesting arena for such a study. Even more fascinating would be a study comparing Belgium and Switzerland; in the latter country, similar divisions are present in even greater variety and flexibility, but are causing far less political controversy.

A further reason for investigating the nature of specific cleavages more closely is the circumstance that seemingly insoluble conflicts may sometimes be successfully regulated through package deals in which different groups receive different favours. Both Lehmbruch and Steiner offer interesting glimpses of the importance of such political deals: the literature is full of terms like ‘pacification’, ‘accommodation’, ‘entering compacts’, litizieren, and junktimieren. Such practices offer interesting material to students of political decision making. They should also be of interest to students of comparative political recruitment and political leadership, as these seem to demand a special kind of politician.

4 Consociationalism and the degree of politicization of social divisions

A fourth line of thought focuses on the degree of intensity of particular cleavages. This is perhaps the most neglected variable in the books under review. All too often, authors assume without detailed political analysis that social divisions are automatically translated into political conflicts. This point is noted by Nordlinger, who criticizes Steiner and Lijphart for confusing the

regulation of intense conflict with the continuity of conflict-regulating outcomes. He writes of Steiner:

The author claims to be explaining that society's [Switzerland's] success in regulating its intense religious and linguistic conflicts. Yet, the linguistic conflict never became intense, the intense religious conflict was regulated in the nineteenth century, and [the author] deals almost exclusively with contemporary Swiss social and political patterns... Similarly, in Lijphart's study of Dutch politics, the conflict-regulating explanations refer almost exclusively to the post-1945 period, whereas the severe religious and class conflics were regulated at the beginning of the twentieth century (15).

Nordlinger distinguishes analytically between (a) social differences; (b) segmental divisions or segments that develop when groups of persons become subjectively aware of their similarity and value that similarity positively; (c) conflict groups that develop when a significant number of individuals believe that their segment's social identity, cultural values, or material interests conflict with the segmental attachments of other individuals, and are inspired to political efforts designed to influence the conflict's outcome; and (d) conflict organizations that are structured relationships among members of conflict groups devoted wholly or in part to the struggle with an opposing conflict group. In the rest of his study Nordlinger devotes little attention, alas, to the ways in which social differences give rise to conflict behavior, and even lapses into a tautological phrase: ‘If segments take on a high degree of political salience, as they invariably do in deeply divided societies, they will form the bases of conflict groups’ (p. 7).

The force of the canons of sociological pluralism is evident in the fact, therefore, that even their critics remain hostage to them. There is little analysis of the vital issue of which forces make for what degree of politicization (or non-politicization) of what dividing lines. Nor does one find that much attention is given to the question of how the earlier politicization of one particular cleavage line affects the exploitation of other cleavage lines, or how, historically, particular cleavages have superseded or become superimposed on one another.

The neglect of these questions may perhaps be explained by two factors; first, what might be termed the coding tautology, and, second, a lack of historical depth. In comparative research, variables of social background are often more easily collected than attitudinal variables. If they show certain skewed distributions, such demographic variables are often assumed to be of attitudinal importance, with little investigation of the degree to which this is actually true. Lack of detailed historical knowledge leads analysts to single out particular cases of accommodation which are not posed against a background of longer time-perspectives. Perhaps one should, therefore (Nordlin-

ger's counsel notwithstanding), focus after all on persisting regulatory process rather than on incidents of ad hoc accommodation?

5 Consociationalism and elite behavior: cause or consequence?

A fifth view gives rise to the suggestion that the relation between cleavages and elite behavior should conceivably be reversed: rather than seeing accommodationist practices as an elite response to threatening political divisions, one might argue that earlier consociational practices facilitate the accommodation of new emerging cleavages.

This point may be illustrated by differing interpretations of the Dutch case. In Arend Lijphart's perspective, differences of class and religion threatened to pyramid to such an extent in the Netherlands that, by 1910, there was a real danger to the stability of the system. The elites then acted to forestall the breakup of society by agreeing to submerge their differences, and in 1917 acceded to a package deal in which demands for religious schools, general suffrage, and proportional representation were granted in one great compromise. Consociationalism, then, was an answer to the perils of a real split.

In contrast, one might argue that accommodationist styles developed in the Netherlands in the sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth centuries.14 The absence of a central executive in a confederal state nurtured the develoment of an accommodationist elite culture in transactions within collegial city councils, among cities, and among provinces. Did not Althusius coin the word consociationes in the early seventeenth century to characterize that very process? For this reason, the elites were never internally homogeneous, but at the same time they were very adept at accommodating new groups when a slow process of democratization began to develop. In this reading of Dutch history, Calvinists, Catholics, and Socialists never developed the threatening militancy that Lijphart ascribes to them. By 1910 none of these movements (with the possible exception of the Calvinists, who by that time had already secured safe cabinet positions) had a well-organized mass base. The great Pacification of 1917 was therefore not a response to Dutch verzuiling, but in many ways its prelude. Only after 1917 did the various Dutch groups develop their strong networks of subcultural interest organizations. Although such organizations were conducive towards isolating Dutchmen of different ideological origins, none of these segments ever was an effective threat to the Dutch state as such. Consociationalism in the Netherlands should therefore not be regarded as a response to the perils of subcultural splits (as Lijphart argues), but as the underlying reason why slowly developing subcultural divisions never did become perilous when social modernization led to mass mobilization.

If one assumes this point to be of wider relevance than a local dispute between two Leiden colleagues, a number of new questions will follow.

First, one should investigate the historical factors which may account for the development of that special type of political culture at the elite level that allowed the later peaceful transition to modern pluralism. None of the writers (with the exception of Lehmbruch and, in a more abstract fashion, Nordlinger) deals with historical conditioning factors of this kind in any detail. But one may glean certain interesting glimpses from their studies. Lehmbruch refers to the amicabilis compositio of the Peace of Westphalia between different religious groupings as one main source. In the Austrian case he attributes further importance to corporate representative traditions and to the deliberate attempt in the Habsburg Empire to accommodate a large number of nationalities. Steiner emphasized the importance of a merchant aristocracy in Swiss cities and cantons, as well as old practices of adjustment between different regions and religions in Switzerland. These facilitated the later transition to party proportionality in the Swiss collegial executive, as well as the compact between capital and labour in the 1930's, and above all, the non-politicization of linguistic lines. The low degree of centralization in these states is probably a major factor as political resources remained distributed over many sites. And, in cases where centralization did occur, it was of vital importance whether all segments of society obtained access to executive and bureaucratic positions or not. A corollary of these factors would be the persistence of long-standing pluralist traditions which militated against the individualist and majoritation assumptions of popular sovereignty, and which allowed the evolutionary development of accountable government and the large number of social organizations which mediate between elites and masses in a modern society.

Second, one should attempt to disentangle more clearly the properties of consociationalism on the one hand and democracy on the other. Most of the books under review tend to take democracy for granted, and only seek to specify the particular features of the consociational subtype of general democracy. Yet, just as there may be democracies that are and others that are not consociational, so consociational societies need not be democratic, though some are. The term consociationalism was, after all, first applied by David Apter in the context of his work on emerging African countries.15 it is also no accident that some of the authors (Nordlinger in particular, but also Lehmbruch and Steiner) use the general language of the literature on conflict regulation in addition to that of democratic theory. There would therefore seem to exist an imperative need for comparative study - of consociational systems (democratic or not), and of democratic systems (consociationalor not) - if one is to get a closer grip on the specific character of consociationalism on the one hand and democracy on the other, as a prelude to a fuller understanding of their interaction.

Third, the analytical distinction between consociationalism and democracy further raises the important question to what degree a consociational democracy can be the result of choice on the part of particular elites (as is implicit in Lijphart's ‘self-denying hypothesis’). Or should it be regarded more as the product of an older pluralist inheritance? A comparative study of the four European consociational systems under consideration would probably reveal a continuum in which post-1945 Austria would be placed on one end, and the Netherlands and Switzerland on the other, with Belgium in an intermediate position. But a more careful elaboration of the particular factors at work in each case would seem necessary before the model of consociational democracy is extended to the new states generally (as Lijphart and Nordlinger explicitly suggest). If consociationalism presupposes the earlier existence of a special elite culture rather than intelligent choice by particular elites at a critical juncture of a nation's history, its transfer to other societies is likely to meet with greater difficulty. Many of the new states do have old pluralist traditions. But do not most of their present-day elites tend to regard such traditions as obstacles to modernization rather than as a vital inheritance to be preserved in the development of a new pluralist democracy?

IV

Ironically, the consociational model is coming under considerable stress at the very moment at which it is belatedly being recognized on the map of comparative politics. In at least three of the four states treated in the literature under review, recent developments are undermining the neatness of existing structures. In the Netherlands, verzuiling is rapidly breaking down, and so are the parties which are most closely associated with it. In Austria, the rigor of the Lager is also declining, and the grand coalition once thought vital to guarantee the persistence of the state has given way to single-party cabinets. In Belgium, linguistic controversies and centrifugal forces generally are threatening the traditional balance of the families spirituelles of Catholics, Socialists, and Liberals, without as yet providing for a new organizational infrastructure to channel these new divisions. Switzerland shows perhaps the fewest changes; but politics in that country have traditionally been so flexible that one wonders whether it ever really fitted the consociational model: although it might have certain consociational practices at the elite level, it never had the tightness of segmented organizations which the model stipulates.

Do these stresses make the model a matter of the past? Should one conclude that its somewhat static quality makes it of little help in accounting for future developments, just as its main weakness lies in its lack of clarity about

the reasons for its genesis? Paradoxically, this need not be so. For the very clarity of the model makes it possible to explain why it is now experiencing such obvious strains.

Perhaps Lijphart's parsimonious analysis is most suggestive here.16 He divides political systems along two dimensions, one axis being the one of fragmented versus homogeneous political culture, and the other that of coalescent versus competitive elite behavior. He thereby distinguishes four forms: that of centripetal democracy where political culture is homogeneous and elite behavior competitive; that of its logical opposite, consociational democracy where political culture is fragmented and elite behavior coalescent; that of centrifugal democracy where political culture remains fragmented and elite behavior is competitive; and that of depoliticized democracy where elite behavior remains coalescent while political culture becomes homogeneous. Movements of systems in one or the other direction along these axes would then determine their main future properties.

One may also investigate to what degree particular features of consociational democracies are breaking down. What about the erosion of strong segmentation? To what extent do elites begin to reject the assumptions of cartel accommodation? Do the systems still respect the principle of mutual vetoes, and do they cling to grand coalitions in preference to simple majority rule? To what extent are we witnessing the end of ideology, and with it the disappearance of the peculiar accommodational styles of depoliticized bargaining behind closed doors which seemed to be the paradoxical corollary of ideological segmentation? What about the effect of elections that have become more unsettling to elite positions as voters have become more independent? To what degree is proportional representation - which for two generations or more ensured stability by guaranteeing entrenched ideological positions - now becoming a source of political fragmentation? How do linkages between elites and masses develop now that former organizational links are breaking down? How do elites behave when they are suddenly faced with direct mass pressures? The neatness of the model of consociational democracy provides an interesting measuring rod for the study of its demise.

At the same time, however, the model seems to some extent to be in danger of being overworked. It was developed as a deliberate counter-model to the Anglo-American type of democracy, and it should make its mark as such. But it should not be reïfied: common dissimilarity from other types does not necessarily prove similarity. Future work should therefore systematically explore the differences as well as the common traits of systems subsumed under the label of consociational democracy. As a control, one should also compare these countries with other small European democracies which may have fewer social divisions, but which may be similar in other respects (for instance, in their institutional structure, or in the specific impact which foreign

factors exercise on internal politics). It will be necessary to incorporate these countries in the general literature of comparative development, so as to answer questions on the origin of consociational practices and the way in which different cleavages became or did not become politicized in successive waves of democratization.17 The literature on consociational democracy - like other writings on democracy - runs the danger of aprioristic normative notions. These should be spelled out in greater detail, and impressionistic evaluations of the democratic quality of particular states should be tested in studies of actual political performance. Only then can one speak with any conviction of their relative record in comparison to other political systems. Finally, one should watch contemporary and future developments. For if it is true that these systems are more affected by particular historical factors than the neatness of the model implies, their present political properties must also influence the way in which they meet the many changes of the contemporary political scene.

For the time being, however, one should be grateful for the very substantial contributions which these books make, each in its different way. There is great intellectual clarity in Lijphart and in Huyse. There is subtle and studious wisdom in Lehmbruch. There are many perceptive remarks in Powell and in Steiner, although neither is free from a certain naiveté. Nordlinger's study presents a courageous attempt to grapple with theoretical issues on a comparative basis. It lacks the advantage of detailed first-hand knowledge of the countries on which he bases his theoretical reasoning; this sometimes gives his arguments a somewhat arid quality. This reader must therefore confess to a preference for the earlier genre of the ‘theoretical country-study’. Is the present state of comparative politics not such that a book by a specialist on one country, with a thorough theoretical grounding, is likely to make better reading than the work of the generalist who inevitably must construe his propositions mainly on the basis of secondary sources?


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