Cold war or détente? The Soviet viewpoint

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Chapter 6 A Few Words about the Future

Now, after many hours of discussion and many months of work, I would like to ask you the same question that I asked you at the beginning: is Cold War II possible?

I would not take back a single word of my first answer to this question. But I could add a few words.

This is precisely why I have repeated my question.

In addition to all I have said already, Cold War II would be different in the sense that it would be sort of a phony cold war - a drôle de guerre froide, as the French would say. It would be phony because, unlike Cold War I, it would hardly be backed by conviction. The conviction of Cold War I was wrong, based on misplaced fears, prejudices, and ignorance; but it was there as an important psychological factor.

This time, one would have to have a very low opinion of people's mental capacities, Mr. Oltmans, to expect Europeans to believe in the 1980s what your family did in the 1940s when they left for South Africa. Even the Americans seem to me too sophisticated to be easily drawn into the kind of a state that characterized them in the late 1940s and early 1950s. It is difficult to believe that their prophets could once again become people like Senator Joseph McCarthy or Representative Parnell Thomas, those oracles of Cold War I who later were recognized as simple crooks, or, to put it a different way, crooks whom the Cold War helped turn into

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oracles. Indeed, it would be a phony cold war, with very few people believing in its aims and rationale. What is even more substantial, against the background of the experience of détente, not very many would agree to consider such a war the only alternative to a hot war. And it would be a phony war in the sense that the United States would start it without the wherewithal to win it. It could not win Cold War I, when its position vis-à-vis the world was incomparably stronger than now. There is absolutely no way for the United States to win such a war in the last decades of this century. But the fact that there are Americans who are still trying to start it portends great dangers to world peace and stability.

How do you visualize the future of Soviet-American relations?

Whether there will be any future at all depends on whether there will be at least minimally decent relations between the USSR and the United States. In terms of what would be the most desirable future, I would say without any hesitation a future characterized by peaceful coexistence, détente, arms limitation and disarmament, broad cooperation, and increased mutual confidence. But, I am sorry to say, at this moment we do not seem to be heading for such relations. There is a rising concern, shared by some Americans, too, that the United States has set upon a course providing for an intensified arms race. It attempts to strengthen its military alliances. It tries to demonstrate a greater readiness to use military force wherever it deems it necessary. If it goes on this way, the situation is likely to get worse before it gets better.

Can it get any worse?

Unfortunately, it can. Lately, Washington has done almost everything, short of direct military hostilities, to spoil the political atmosphere, heat up the rhetoric, rupture economic and cultural ties, and freeze arms-control talks.

Would you rule out any bold new initiatives, unexpected actions, or turns of events that could bring about significant improvements in the world situation, including Soviet-American relations?

Of course, such initiatives or turns of events cannot be ruled out. What's more, I am sure that the Soviet Union will be coming up with such initiatives, as it has done in the past. But an improvement of relations requires goodwill on both sides, and I am far from certain that we can expect such initiatives from the other side. Of course, you asked about unexpected things, those that cannot be forecast at present. In case there are pleasant surprises, we shall welcome them, naturally.

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Forecasts will always then be imprecise, for life is full of surprises.

Certainly. This is why forecasts based on a simple extension of current trends into the future almost never come true. Here is a good example: I have heard of one of the very first attempts to forecast the development of urban problems, undertaken by the Parisian authorities in the middle of the last century. The authorities asked the experts to prognosticate the major problems awaiting the capital of France in the twentieth century. The experts pondered and replied: horse manure. They predicted that Paris would literally be buried in it, given the rate of development of horse-driven transportation at the time. I don't think we should follow the example of those early futurologists. We have to consider the possibility of surprises, including positive and negative ones. Also, one of the major arguments in favor of détente is that it creates additional guarantees in case of bad surprises, making both peace and the international system more durable. That is why it is so bad that we have entered the 1980s with international relations so gravely darkened by the relapse to enmity and elements of the Cold War.

So, again the crucial question: what can be expected of the coming years?

If we manage to break the present trends - and I hope we do - there can be a return to more stable relations, which would make a lot of things possible: firm guarantees of peace, disarmament, fruitful and mutually beneficial cooperation, and so forth. If we do not reverse these trends we shall have serious problems for years to come. The worst of them is that we shall be faced with a strong possibility of an all-out arms race, leading to probably the most dangerous period in the history of mankind. Political developments will be augmented by trends that work independently of whomever has been elected. I have in mind, first and foremost, the acceleration of scientific and technological development, which can produce many new types of deadly weapons, as well as heighten the danger of nuclear proliferation.

As Richard Barnet points out, by the year 2000 as many as one hundred nations will know how to acquire nuclear weapons.

Quite conceivably. And some of them may actually decide to acquire them if the rest of the world just sits back and counts. Recent trends in nuclear proliferation are very alarming indeed. There have been reports that South Africa and Israel have exploded a bomb, and that Pakistan may soon follow suit. Here we come to another very strong factor for a low predictability of events in the 1980s - an increased number of participants in world politics.

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When do you expect an improvement in Soviet-American relations?

In the long run, it is almost inevitable, for in a very real sense there is no acceptable alternative to détente. But if a significant improvement should come very soon it would be a pleasant surprise. I can say for sure that the later such a turn of events should come about, the greater time and effort it will take to restore what has been so hastily destroyed.

If we are talking about the possibility of bringing back détente in the near future only as a pleasant surprise, then the prospect for Soviet-American relations and for the international situation as a whole in the 1980s must look rather gloomy.

Let me clarify. We are at a crossroads in Soviet-American relations now. A decision has to be made on which way to go - to greater tensions, into the trenches of another cold war, or to negotiations, détente, and cooperation. And much will depend on what will be done in the near future. Unfortunately, we have entered this decade in a very complicated situation. The hard fact of life is that the current trends in the foreign policies of the United States and some other countries can only have a very negative impact on the world situation.

We are cautious in giving a final assessment of these policies, in taking what the Reagan administration says and does for its last word. But the time is coming when we shall have to do it, just as all other countries will have to, because it affects them as well. The United States is acting as if it feels offended and angry not only with the Soviet Union, but with other countries as well - adversaries, allies, neutrals - angry with the whole world. This is a very bad, very dangerous attitude not only for other countries, but for the United States itself.

But one must also see the opposite trends that are operating now and will certainly continue to operate in the 1980s. These trends stem from very real and, I would add, more and more compelling interests of the two countries and the world at large - such interests as securing peace, decreasing the burden of the arms race, and developing cooperation. Looking at the long-term trends, I remain certain that positive and realistic tendencies will become much stronger again and will be even more relevant to the real problems we all face.

Why are peace and coexistence even more relevant in this decade?

I would not deny an emotional involvement in my judgment here: I wish it to be so. And it is not just my personal attitude. I am sure all Soviet people think likewise, as well as most Europeans and Americans. But there

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is more to it than just emotions. My analysis leads me to a conclusion that a policy that aims at a return to cold war cannot be too durable; its goals are neither relevant to the vital interests of any country, including the United States, nor attainable. The military buildup and the jacking up of the arms race are said to be necessary to provide for U.S. national security, but the fact is that it is the arms race that presents the major threat to security. The idea of seeking military superiority is just as preposterous, for there is no way that America, or anyone else, for that matter, can achieve it.

The revival of interventionism is just as senseless and dangerous. I do not believe that even the best imaginable rapid deployment force could have prevented the Iranian hostage situation. Besides, the United States will hardly be able to create a bigger or better expeditionary force than the one sent to Vietnam.

Neither do I consider realistic the NATO program for a steady increase in arms spending for years to come.

Do you expect the West to go bankrupt because of that program?

No, but providing both guns and butter will be increasingly problematic. America, like many other countries, is facing lean, not fat, years. The present trends in the American economy are very indicative in this respect - slow growth, rising unemployment, declining productivity, difficulties on the world markets, stagnation, and even a decline of living standards. The economies of some American allies are also entering a difficult period.

If you add to this economic squeeze the growing global problems involving resources, environment, food supplies, and so on, you realize that even trying to sustain the present habitual standard of living in the United States, Western Europe, Japan, and other industrialized nations will become an increasingly difficult task. In these circumstances many things become luxuries one cannot afford.

What luxuries do you have in mind?

First of all, an unlimited arms race. A new massive military buildup can be financed, if at all, only by deep cuts in social expenditures, as the Reagan administration is finding out. Such a redistribution, aside from its negative economic effects, is bound to have explosive political consequences.

Another luxury none of us can afford anymore is the present high level of tension and the absence of cooperation. If we are to provide for our survival, and for a decent life on this ever smaller and more complex planet, we will have to change our behavior. I am afraid Earth is too fragile for increased international rivalry. Cooperation is becoming the sine qua non of both survival and decent existence.

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Do you mean that it is the very problems and difficulties faced by the two countries and by the planet as a whole that will work as a strong impetus to better relations and cooperation between the Soviet Union and the United States?

For some reason or other, dangers and difficulties turn out to be stronger and more effective stimuli for cooperation than abstract considerations of mutual benefit. In the face of Hitler's aggression it took the Americans, the British, the French, the Dutch, and others a rather short time to become our allies. I am fully convinced that should our planet be invaded by some creatures from outer space with hostile intentions, we would again become allies overnight.

Whenever there is a specific, palpable common enemy, particularly a deadly enemy, cooperation gets very easy. Unfortunately, when the threats are not so clearly embodied and personified, it is vastly more difficult to cooperate, even if those threats are no less serious than the guy with the gun aiming at you.

Which dangers could ultimately bring East and West closer together?

Well, one obvious danger is the danger of war, which we have already discussed at great length. Another is the aggravation of such global problems as the supply of energy and other natural resources, the problems of food, environment, and Third World poverty. One can dispute the precise estimates of the Club of Rome and other experts, but I think they are talking of some real problems. The population of the globe is expected to grow from 4.5 billion to over 6 billion by the year 2000, which means that we shall have to build as much in the coming two decades as used to be built in centuries. Pressures on natural resources will grow immensely, particularly on the energy resources. Food supply will become more difficult. If the present tendencies hold, the number of people seeking jobs will grow to a billion by the end of the century.

And you expect the imperative of finding solutions to these problems will be a powerful incentive for building détente and cooperation?

Yes. To borrow a phrase from former President Carter, these threats can be regarded as a moral equivalent of war, in the sense that they demand a maximum mobilization of efforts and necessitate cooperation among all nations - the Soviet Union and the United States in the first place.

Threats and fears do remain strong forces for sensible deeds.

Well, mankind is still in its formative stage, so it's understandable. Besides, the threats are real, not mythical. As to fear, it does remain one of

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the strongest human emotions. The important thing is not to let it be misplaced, misdirected. I would very much prefer that people be moved mostly by compassion and love, but we are not yet mature enough for it.

You don't expect me to believe that you consider such feelings important for Soviet-American relations?

No, and not because of any cynicism. Maybe things will change in the future, but now we are talking not of love, but of a rational and accurate perception of one's own interests. As a Russian, I do not have to love America to advocate good Soviet-American relations. It is enough for me to be a deeply convinced Soviet patriot, for such relations are in the interests of my country. The same is true for Americans. There is no need for them to love the Russians or the communists, or even trust the Russians, in order to favor good relations with the USSR. Suffice them to be good American patriots and love their country. Certainly, if after a while this rational calculation and self-interest is compounded by some nice emotions, that will only help. But right now it is another luxury we can do without.

But will the Russians, the Americans, and all others be sensible enough to avoid these threats?

In a long-term prospect, I think they will - that is, provided they survive in the meantime. I think this problem was very aptly formulated by a well-known Soviet scientist, Nobel laureate Nikolai Semënov. He believes that, according to the criteria and measures of both organic and inorganic nature, mankind has not yet emerged from its early childhood. When it grows up and matures, there will be no problem it will not be able to solve. The danger is that it may make some really bad, incorrigible, irreversible mistakes in childhood. Semënov sees two such mistakes as possible: a nuclear war, and an irreversible breakdown of the balance between man and his natural environment.

What would you forecast for mankind - doom or prosperity?

You see, any forecast of social and political developments is inevitably value oriented and problematic to one extent or another. It is not like forecasting weather or earthquakes. We are participants in events; we make forecasts in order to be better able to influence them, to manage them if we can.

The program of action implied in my forecast is détente. The connection between it and the prevention of war is self-evident. As to the global problems, détente itself does not solve them, but without détente it is pointless even to think of beginning to solve them.

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But how do you get back on the road to détente? When will the two sides be mature enough to understand its necessity?

I can assure you that in the Soviet Union the awareness of the necessity of détente and normal relations with the United States has not disappeared.

Professor Dieter Senghaas of the Frankfurt Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies recently observed that no one in the world really knew what Moscow was thinking.

I find this an ignorant statement. It is widely accepted that Soviet foreign policy is more consistent and predictable than the policies of many other countries. It is not difficult at all to learn what they think in Moscow. Besides, we maintain the kind of relations with virtually all countries that allow them, in case of need, to ask questions. This is what I would answer Professor Senghaas.

He may have had in mind the most recent period, since late 1979, when the deterioration of the world situation led to breakdowns in the dialogue and to overall weakening of contacts.

Any deterioration of this kind inevitably has such consequences, and not just because of the complications in contacts. It seems to me that tension always has a profound emotional impact on people's minds and on their ability to perceive and understand. A person driven by emotions such as hatred and jingoism is a poor partner for a dialogue.

Some people think that international relations resemble a pendulum, or a tide - after a high comes a low, so we just have to wait a bit.

Conventional wisdom would suggest that, just as in a family quarrel, we should sit back and wait for the passions to subside and only then make peace. But the logic of political life does not follow conventional wisdom. According to conventional wisdom, détente could not have even begun. In the early 1970s, not only did passions rage, but there was a war in Vietnam. American boys were being killed, many by Soviet-made weapons. Soviet boys were dying in Haiphong and Hanoi, hit by American bombs and mines. American behavior was outrageous, from our point of view, in Vietnam, in the Middle East, and in other places. At the same time there were many things in our policies that Washington did not like. The first summit was hanging by a hair. And yet détente did start. But

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what if we had waited for more favorable conditions? What would we have gained?

Do you think this is the way the question stands now, too?

Yes. It would make no sense at all to wait for the situation to become more favorable for a return to détente. The current trends are such that the situation cannot possibly calm down by itself. Rather, one can expect that if we just do nothing but wait, the tensions will be building up. In other words, time is running out for all of us.

Yes, but someone must take the first step.

I don't think this is how we should look at the situation now. At this point the problem is not that, out of unwillingness to chicken out, or fear of being rejected, or just caution, no one dares say the first word. We did say it, and would be willing to do it again, but the way it looks from Moscow, the U.S. government simply has not wanted any easing of tensions.

Would the situation change if the Soviet Union made a step toward the American position and, say, started withdrawing its troops from Afghanistan?

If you imply a political solution to the problems of Afghanistan, we are all for it. This is our official position. The Afghan government also favors a political solution. But if you have in mind the withdrawal of our military contingent from that country without any settlement, what would it bring? Confirmation that one can talk with the Soviet Union only in the language of threats, blackmail, and pressure? I have serious doubts as to whether it could open up any opportunities for bringing Soviet-American relations back to the road of détente. Besides, the reasons that made us send a military contingent there must be removed. In general, I think it would be futile to put forward some preliminary conditions for normalization of relations between the two sides.

What other specific steps might be taken to bring Soviet-American relations back to détente?

I do not think, Mr. Oltmans, that you and I are well enough equipped to discuss specific diplomatic measures. Provided there is a mutual intent to return to détente, finding a way of making the first step in this direction would not be too difficult. Did we not once witness a Ping-Pong competition chosen as a first step toward a serious restructuring of relations?

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True enough. But there may he another question: since, in your view, it was the American side that spoiled these relations, should they also make this first step toward their improvement?

Generally speaking, it would be quite logical, particularly since on many questions the ball is in their hands. But I do not think the Soviet Union wants to turn this question of who should be the first into a principle. Quite the opposite: during 1980 and 1981 we made a number of steps that could be considered invitations to the American leaders to normalize our relations.

For instance?

For instance, a proposal for an immediate beginning of negotiations on limiting intermediate-range nuclear weapons in Europe in conjunction with the U.S. forward-based systems there and our new proposals on Vienna talks. The United States finally came to accept the former, although it took a lot of effort not only on our part but on the part of the American allies as well. I would also mention some of the recent initiatives proposed by the Twenty-sixth Party Congress here in the Soviet Union: there was a proposal to move ahead with SALT talks and introduce some specific arms-control measures - for instance, to limit the deployment of the new U.S. ‘Ohio’ and Soviet ‘Typhoon’ class submarines. There was a proposal to extend the sphere of confidence-building measures to the whole European part of the USSR on a basis of reciprocity from the West. And there was a proposal to resume an active Soviet-American dialogue on all levels, including a summit meeting.

If and when we get back to détente, I think it must be a Détente II, free of some of the weaknesses of its predecessor, but preserving and advancing its strong sides.

Could you outline those weaknesses?

For one thing, during Détente I arms limitation fell far behind the progress in the political sphere. To put it more exactly, the arms race continued and even intensified despite the political progress, the improvements in the atmosphere between us, and even the partial agreements on arms control. That doomed détente to great difficulties, as L.I. Brezhnev had warned as early as 1973. This movement in two opposite directions at once could not possibly continue for long. Hence the lesson: the problems of arms limitation must receive attention and be solved faster and more radically. And there should be no attempts on either side to keep or gain or regain military superiority. There simply has to be much more restraint in military programs.

Another valuable lesson of Détente I was that it was not some geological

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era that took thousands of years to develop - it was a situation that opened up some possibilities that had to be grasped quickly. It is important to keep getting results. I would compare the process of détente with riding a bicycle: the faster, the steadier, and no standing still.

Another observation: I have noted that our Western partners, Americans particularly - and I am talking about some very influential political and academic circles - began, under a not unseemly pretext of desiring more tangible results, to exhibit growing skepticism. From almost the very first steps of détente, they somewhat downgraded the importance of the overall atmosphere of relations.

Well, but you have said yourself that the downgrading of more general issues could be motivated by a simple desire to gain tangible results in specific spheres.

Could be. But unfortunately, such a desire is often unfounded and impossible to realize. It seems to me that those people, in fact, underestimated the scale of work to be done to create a firm foundation for relations, to bridge the gap of asymmetries in political thinking and approaches, or simply to learn to understand the other side better. As a wise American friend of mine put it, to assume the worst when evaluating the other side, and to exclude all lesser possibilities, could actually invite the worst.

I'd like to point to yet another vital problem: the importance of work in creating mutual understanding and building confidence. This importance should be realized not just by the government, but by the media as well. Détente is in the interest of a great majority. But it means that one must create for it the broadest possible, enlightened, vocal, and politically active constituency.

None of it is easy.

Right. But only these things can make détente, or Détente II, if you will, durable enough. The experience we have now in Soviet-American relations shows unmistakably that to clear out the backlog of the Cold War, exhibit restraint, work for mutual understanding, seek solutions that Would be mutually acceptable, make compromises - in short, to do all that détente requires - is excruciatingly hard work, demanding great effort, patience, wisdom, and political courage. It demands much more of these qualities than does the Cold War, with its emotional fits. I am sure that détente is the only appropriate yardstick to measure and test political leaders in a nuclear age.

Today, a correct choice of policy is important as never before. In fact, the options are not many. In the final analysis, eternal remains the truth voiced many centuries ago by Plato: ‘Everybody must live his life in peace, as long and as well as possible.’

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May I ask you a personal question? We have covered a wide range of problems in our discussions. How do you look upon them as a human being, as Citizen Arbatov?

I think I shall repeat what I once wrote for Newsweek. It is very personal, but I am sure that this thought is shared by most Soviet people of my generation.

My father went to war when he was eighteen. I also went to war when I was eighteen. Both of us were lucky - we returned home. And I am very glad that my son, who is now thirty-one, did not have to fight in a war. For there will be no homecomers from the war threatening humanity nowadays. And there will be no winners.

Do you sympathize with the young people of today who are pessimistic about the future, having lost hope for a saner and more peaceful world?

Antonio Gramsci defined the best combination of pessimism and optimism in human temperament as pessimism of the intellect and optimism of the will. I think he meant that people should be able to see, to recognize all the threats and adverse trends, but be determined to overcome them and achieve a better world. Unfortunately, we often see quite the opposite mix, when people shrink from really hard, critical scrutiny of reality and find themselves helpless and despondent in crises.

Personally, I would hate the idea of entrusting the fate of the world to a generation that has lost hope. To be sure, some of today's challenges are unique in the magnitude of their danger to mankind. But I am certain that mankind does have the means to cope with these challenges. The crucial element is the will to do it.

I don't think all the youth of today is pessimistic. As to those who are, I can understand them to some extent. They do encounter serious problems and deep disappointments. And they should not be blamed for it. I see a great responsibility here for the older generation. We must leave them not only hopes for a better life on this planet, but the planet itself.