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Chapter 5 The Two Giants and the World
It is clear that relations between the Soviet Union and the United States continue to be a tremendously important part of modern international relations. But the whole complexity of the international scene can't possibly be reduced to the Moscow-Washington equation. Almost nine-tenths of the world's population live outside the United States and the USSR. In this age of growing interdependence, the nine-tenths cannot afford to forget about Soviet-American relations; nor can the two giants disassociate their bilateral relations from what's going on in Asia, Africa, and Latin America, not to mention Europe.
Exactly so. The idea of the two superpowers' special rights always has been alien to the Soviet Union. We regard the development of our relations with all the other countries as very important, and we never ignore them because of Soviet-American relations.
So, let us touch upon the problems of other countries and regions in the context of both Soviet foreign policy and U.S.-Soviet relations. One of these is the problem of Soviet-Chinese relations. In the West, a notion has been advanced that, in its policy of détente, the Soviet Union was primarily moved by its fear of China and its growing military might.
This notion is totally unfounded. Quite to the contrary, our policy of détente became one of the reasons for the deterioration of our relations with China. As far back as the late 1950s, the Soviet intentions to pursue détente
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with the West were bluntly called by the Chinese ‘treacherous to the cause of revolution.’
Would you say there were no other reasons for Chinese-Soviet relations developing the way they did?
Sure, there were other reasons, at least from the Chinese point of view, apart from the announced Soviet policy of détente with the West and, in particular, with the United States. Among those reasons I would mention our refusal to give them the nuclear bomb. Also, quite obviously, Mao saw in the Soviet Union a serious obstacle to Chinese claims for leadership over other socialist countries and the world communist movement, claims that became evident after Stalin's death.
The West, the United States first of all, banked on Mao's anti-Sovietism, calculating that the development of ties with China, and the offer of military aid, would change China into their ally and bring about a drastic shift in the global balance of power. Psychologically, it may have had something to do with a mythology that has surrounded China over the years. This mythology probably received an especially strong impetus at the time of the euphoria prevailing in Washington after Richard Nixon's so-called ‘epoch-making’ trip to the Far East. It is a human weakness to romanticize the exotic and unknown. The Chinese succeeded in playing on this attitude toward the Orient and impressed their American visitors with a certain mystery about the biggest nation in the world. Thousands of years of history, an ancient culture, exquisite cuisine, and human values different from those of the West apparently combined to infatuate and intrigue American visitors almost to the point of overwhelming them. Political platitudes spoken in a very foreign language and in a very foreign way can assume some hidden meaning, charm, and wisdom. Look how cleverly the Beijing leadership nurtured and encouraged this newly found curiosity in the mandarins of the White House, Capitol Hill, and Wall Street.
By the way, China has always occupied a special place in the American mind. Just recall all those missionaries and businessmen who have tried their luck in China since America became a Pacific power.
What about the Realpolitik aspect of the new Western attitude toward China?
I am not trying to argue that lack of relations between the West and China was not abnormal. After 1949, when the People's Republic of China was formed, we did our best to persuade the United States and other Western nations to recognize the new government of China, establish normal diplomatic relations with her, and admit the PRC into the United Nations. But the West balked. What's more, many American sinologists and diplomats
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who called for diplomatic recognition of China were intimidated and blacklisted during the McCarthy era. Nevertheless, the fact is that the rapprochement between China and the West came only after the Maoist leadership became outspokenly anti-Soviet. Naturally enough, this caused some apprehensions on our part.
But it might have been logical from the point of view of the West, and particularly of the United States, to try to strengthen its position vis-à-vis the Soviet Union by means of improving relations with China.
Well, in a rather open and simple form you have just described the conceptual foundation of this policy - the nineteenth-century balance-of-power game. Its essence is to increase one's own power by putting additional weight on one's own side of the scale.
But is it not quite logical?
Of this I have grave doubts, at least if your goal is to prevent a nuclear holocaust and assure stability in international relations. The concept presupposes a free play of forces. And each participant will of course play at his own risk, as he sees fit, taking into account only his own rules. The historical experience shows that nothing good ever comes out of such games.
Shades of Metternich, Talleyrand, and Castlereagh. It seems that just such principles were codified and even sanctified at the Vienna Congress of 1815.
There's a definite and conscious parallel. But this very parallel also helps us to understand why the old concept is inapplicable in the last quarter of the twentieth century. The world has changed too much. Take just one difference: in the first half of the last century, a miscalculation leading to a disturbance of the balance promised, at worst, another recarving of European frontiers, a replacement of one dynasty by another, or something of the kind. All that was rather limited in scale and frequently reversible. The tide of history could in the long run curb and correct the Realpolitikers of the nineteenth century. So, even if the arrangements of the Vienna Congress did not bring Europe significant stability, they at least could not bring about the destruction of the European civilization.
Today, the balance-of-power concept inevitably leads to a situation where one participant in the balancing act can possess sufficient nuclear capability to destroy one or several of his opponents, and a miscalculation could easily lead to an irreversible outcome. To think of any stability in
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such an arrangement is nonsense. Even if the worst-case scenario did not materialize, it is hard to imagine how, in such a pseudorealistic world, one could utilize, short of a test by actual war, any advantage of joining hands with one country against the other.
What about a general possibility of war between the Soviet Union and China?
We do not want such a war and are ready to undertake everything possible to avoid it. More than that, we want to normalize our relations with China. As you know, we have continued our negotiations with Beijing whenever possible.
But all Western visitors to China come back saying they were told at all levels of an imminent Soviet aggression.
This was said some time ago. But I would greatly doubt that even then the Chinese leaders were really as afraid of a Soviet invasion as they said, or that they really suspected us of planning a war against them. Even if one were to look at the problem through the eyes of a Western geopolitician, a Soviet attack on China would be an absolutely stupid proposition.
Zbigniew Brzezinski wrote on one occasion that he felt Beijing could make a meaningful contribution to the shaping of a more stable U.S.-Soviet relationship.
Yes, he did write that. But remember that certain illusions concerning the use of the Chinese ‘card’ to intimidate the Soviet Union were, to my mind, an important reason why Washington made its 1979-80 turn off the road of détente to the rough and dangerous path of confrontation. You see, I don't think Mr. Brzezinski has ever sincerely favored stable and normal Soviet-American relations. When he talked of using ‘the China card’ to stabilize those relations, he meant a kind of stability the Soviet Union would never agree to. The real meaning of ‘the China card’ - the poker-game connotation of the term betrays the approach behind it, cynical, deceptive, adventurist - has nothing to do with détente. What in fact is being attempted here is to obtain quick gains for the West from the bad state of relations between us and China. These attempts are made in total neglect of the long-term goals and interests even of the United States itself. Washington seemed to be striving to make a fast political buck during a period of serious difficulties between the Soviet Union and China, disregarding long-term consequences. The American policy toward China has already increased instability and undermined détente, and has worsened the political situation in Asia.
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But is that not what the game of international relations is all about? Does Beijing not play the American card as well?
Yes, it did, and in my judgment it has shown itself to be a better player than Washington with its China card.
Chinese-American trade has doubled, and may triple in the 1980s.
Well, a doubling or even a tripling of trade, considering the low level from which this increase started, is not that significant. There was a kind of euphoria in American business circles when the news about the Chinese modernization programs reached the United States and normal diplomatic relations were established. China was almost flooded with delegations of businessmen from the United States, Japan, and other Western nations. Many contracts were signed. But now a more sober mood prevails in the headquarters of Western corporations. The reason is that the plans for modernization have been severely cut, many contracts broken off, many credits not used. The Chinese themselves are looking at the future somewhat more cautiously.
What are the indications of this more cautious approach as you see them? And a broader question - how are the recent changes within China regarded in the Soviet Union?
China's internal situation is an extremely complex matter. I am no expert on this country, and can only rely on estimates of real sinologists. China, as you know, has gone through a very difficult period of almost two decades. The Great Leap Forward and Cultural Revolution undermined the country's economy, led to a grave sociopolitical and moral crisis, and exhausted and disoriented China's Communist Party. Now there seems to be a growing understanding in Beijing that the country's enormous and neglected problems of social and economic development cannot be solved exclusively through reliance on the West and its military aid.
We in the Soviet Union hope that all this will also help the Chinese leaders realize that their people badly need peace, détente, and cooperation with its neighbors, and China will develop its policy accordingly.
What is the Soviet attitude toward the prospect of China's getting sophisticated weapons from the West?
Naturally, we view the expansion and consolidation of military ties between China and the West as a trend toward an anti-Soviet alliance - a trend fraught with many dangers for international security.
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How would you explain the complications in the U.S.-China rapprochement that have emerged under the Reagan administration? One would have thought that Mr. Reagan would have pursued this accord.
The Reagan administration's posture on China is rather contradictory. On the one hand, like its predecessors, it counts on China as a sort of counterweight against the Soviet Union. On the other hand, there is the dogmatic anticommunism of the Reagan team, for whom the PRC remains ‘Red China,’ existing side by side with ‘free China’ - the Taiwan regime set up by and allied to the United States.
The traditional stand of American conservatives on China has always been noted for its skepticism about Beijing's real value for the United States. The conservatives are afraid that, having traded its anti-Soviet rhetoric for American aid, Beijing would preserve its freedom of action and be able to use its increased potential against U.S. interests in the Pacific and the Third World. According to this logic, the United States should demand certain guarantees from China and put greater pressure on her. At the same time they view Taiwan, with its half-million armed forces, as a reliable ally of increasing strategic importance.
These factors have caused some cooling off in U.S.- Chinese relations. But it is too early to make any far-reaching conclusions from that.
President Brezhnev, in his Tashkent speech of March 1982, emphasized that the Soviet Union is ready to negotiate an improvement of Soviet-Chinese relations without any preliminary conditions. How is that to be understood?
The normalization of relations with our neighbor China has long been one of the most important objectives of Soviet foreign policy. We continue to hope that sooner or later this objective will be realized. Leonid Brezhnev, in the same speech you mentioned, pointed out that, although we have criticized many aspects of the Chinese leaders' policy, especially in foreign affairs, we have never tried to interfere with the PRC's domestic affairs or deny the existence of the socialist order there.
The negotiations on the improvement of Soviet-Chinese relations, should they succeed, in our view may be of a great long-standing significance for consolidation of peace in Asia and the whole world. The improvement of these bilateral relations would cause no damage to other countries.
Turning to Japan, what is the Soviet position on Japanese claims to the so-called ‘northern territories’?
The Japanese government has been claiming several islands belonging to the Soviet Union since the end of World War II, when they were returned
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to us according to the decision of the Yalta and Potsdam conferences. Japan herself recognized our rights to the islands at the 1951 San Francisco conference. We consider the problem nonexistent from either a legal or a practical point of view.
But this is the heart of the matter: even if justice is on your side, why not yield on the question of a few small islands for the sake of improving relations with a country with which good relations are of such great importance both today and in the future?
We see more in those two or four islands than little pieces of land. We believe that a territorial problem, no matter how small the piece of land in question, demands particularly cautious treatment. In the past, such problems have often enough caused international conflicts and even wars. We have made great efforts to make recognition and inviolability of existing frontiers a norm of modern international relations and a basic principle of détente. We hold that the establishment of this principle helps remove major threats to world peace. Therefore, agreeing to an exemption from this norm in any place, and even on a small point, may very well open a veritable Pandora's box of troubles: many other old territorial disputes would be likely to be reopened, and new ones to emerge. International stability would be further undermined. I am well aware of the sentiments and emotions many Japanese have about this problem, but the Japanese policies have punished themselves here, because it is mostly due to these policies that such emotions were generated. I do hope that in time this question will lose some of its present acuteness for the Japanese and cease to be an obstacle on the way to positive development of Soviet-Japanese relations.
But will the Japanese be ready to take this road if the problem of the islands remains unsolved?
I don't know when they will be emotionally ready to do so. If approached rationally, the problem looks entirely different. You see, I don't believe this question is of any serious importance for the Japanese interests. Japan's major interests lie with guaranteeing her security and economic well-being. None of these interests has anything to do with the islands. All of these interests depend to a large extent on the overall state of relations between Japan and the USSR. And it seems to me that ensuring these most vital interests is of much greater importance than the fate of a couple of islands, particularly if one takes into account the overall economic situation in the world, the growing scarcity of natural resources, difficulties in world trade, and the protectionist wave in the Western countries.
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Do you expect the Japanese to follow what you call a rational line of behavior in the eighties?
I do hope they will.
But now the picture looks different. Quite to the contrary, in Japan there seems to be developing a growing hostility to the USSR, including general discontent at the appearance of new Soviet military forces and medium-range missiles in the Soviet far east.
I am aware of this sentiment, as well as of the itch some Japanese feel to join actively in the arms race. But the real cause of the recent deterioration of Soviet-Japanese relations, including the economic ties, was not the question of northern territories, but U.S. pressure to compel Japan to follow the American line. In Japan itself strong doubts are voiced about this policy. Many Japanese realize that, in the context of growing tensions in the world, the Soviet Union cannot help taking adequate measures to provide for its security. And yet I am absolutely sure that the incentives for Japan to develop closer cooperation with the Soviet Union will grow in the 1980s. It is my deep conviction that the Soviet Union and Japan have vast common interests.
You mean economic interests?
Not exclusively. I would even put the main emphasis on the interests of security. Both the Soviet Union and Japan are interested in the preservation of peace and a lowering of the level of military confrontation in the region as a whole. It's evident that due to its geographic position and population density Japan is extremely vulnerable in case of a conflict. And this vulnerability cannot be eliminated by means of arms buildups and military alliances. The only way for Japan to guarantee its own security is to consolidate peace and détente in the region, which will lead to a system of collective security and cooperation.
I was in Japan at the end of 1981, and my impression was that the Japanese were becoming more conscious of the implications of the increased East-West tensions and an all-out arms race for them. And I do hope and expect that with such a great objective interest in peace and détente, a nation that still remembers the horror of atomic bombing will become a much more active participant in the international efforts to insure peace in the world.
The economic aspect is also tremendously important for Japan. There is hardly any other country in the world with an economy so dependent on both peace and international stability. And, of course, there are also very important Japanese interests connected with the development of cooperation with the Soviet Union.
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Japan is currently spending about 1 percent of her gross national product on defense. What do you think of the argument that she should have a military might commensurate with her economic potential? In particular, it is argued that as an island nation she should be able to defend her sea-lanes against foreign threats.
Such arguments are based on hopelessly obsolete notions about the utility of military power for economic and political purposes. When Japan tried to enhance her economic position in the world through territorial expansion and militarism she got into a terrible disaster. But look what Japan has managed to accomplish in the last three decades without war and aggression. What would Japan gain now by a remilitarization? An undermined economy? An easier life for her competitors?
As for the talk about defending sea-lanes - the only real defense is peace. Japan was not able to defend these lanes in World War II by military means. To think that she could protect her communications today by creating a big navy is to think in terms of children playing with toy ships.
David Rockefeller's Trilateral Commission aims at a network of close cooperation between Japan, Western Europe, and the United States. Does this triangle policy enhance feelings of encirclement in Moscow?
By itself, the attempt to improve cooperation between Japan, Western Europe, and the United States does not arouse feelings like that in Moscow. It all depends on the political context in which such strengthening of ties takes place. If it should develop in the overall context of détente and go hand in hand with growing cooperation between socialist countries and the states from each apex of the capitalist triangle, as well as with the Third World, there would be nothing wrong with it. But if this increase in cooperation between the three capitalist centers takes place in conjunction with a revival of the Cold War, and if it means strengthening military ties and amassing greater military potential against the Soviet Union or any other country whose policy the West may not like at the moment; if coordination in the economic sphere means participation of all the countries of the triangle in Washington-led boycotts, blockades, or embargoes - then we are definitely against this kind of triangular relationship.
Obviously, the Japanese economy is bursting at its seams. It seems a natural development that Japan should try to penetrate the Chinese market at full force.
Naturally, Japan would like to seize the Chinese market. This desire has deep historic roots. But we talked already about the limitations on trade with the Chinese. Trade is not charity, and I don't believe that Japanese
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businessmen are searching for a place where they can give away their goods for nothing. Of course, the potential for Japanese-Chinese trade would increase if Japan, which has almost no raw materials, could import them from China. But their development, considering the state of the Chinese economy, will demand huge investments and a lot of time. So, there are prospects, but they will demand efforts and also require a stable political situation in that region and in the world at large.
In 1973, I had a discussion with the then prime minister of Japan, Kakuei Tanaka. Expectations were high at that time for fast development of both friendship with the Chinese and expansion of investment and business. But recently I met with Japan's former foreign minister, Saburo Okita, sometimes called the Robert McNamara of of Japan because of his economic expertise. He had been invited by the present leadership to Beijing as chairman of the Japan Economic Research Center to render advice on financial and economic matters. Minister Okita seemed to caution against overoptimism regarding quick deals and rapid development of trade.
Well, that is exactly what I was talking about. The euphoria is over. The time has come for a more sober and realistic assessment.
Takashi Watanabe, Minister of Finance and former Trilateral Commission chairman in Japan, and also former president of the Asian Development Bank in Manila, assured me that, historically and culturally, the Japanese were naturally closer with the Chinese. He added, ‘Soviet diplomacy toward us is often “clumsy.”’
I do not know what Mr. Watanabe means by clumsiness. Perhaps the fact that we did not yield to their territorial claims; but to yield would be much clumsier, I'm afraid. As far as we are concerned, there are also some aspects of Japanese foreign policy we don't like; however, I guess we and the Japanese should not stress the things we don't like in each other's policy, but think more about ways of developing truly constructive and mutually beneficial relations, in which both countries are objectively interested. As for natural closeness between Japan and China, well, taking into consideration the several times those two countries have bitterly fought each other, one could interpret that closeness a bit differently than Mr. Watanabe. In many cases the Japanese were responsible for those clashes; in others, the Chinese were to blame. It is said that Japan was once saved by kamikaze, the holy wind that dispersed the hostile navy approaching from mainland China. In our time it is difficult to rely on holy winds. Much more important is a clever, wise foreign policy, promoting peace and international cooperation, removing thick layers of mutual distrust and fear.
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Let's switch to Europe now. In 1936, Italian diplomat Count Carlo Sforza wrote: ‘Either we shall serve the European ideal or we shall perish.’ What was the origin of the Soviet idea for an All-European conference, which was for a long time a constant theme of the Soviet diplomacy?
We came up with this initiative for the first time as early as 1955. Since then, the Soviet Union and other socialist countries have worked consistently for the convening of a European conference on security and cooperation.
Professor Johan Galtung of Norway has suggested an All-European symbiosis between East and West, turning the entire unit into a political and economic colossus of intertwined cooperation and action.
Actually, the idea is not his. Eighty years ago it was called ‘the United States of Europe.’ The idea was sharply criticized by V.I. Lenin, who believed that under the then-existing conditions such a symbiosis would be either impossible or reactionary, in the latter case turning into an alliance of imperialist states united in order to consolidate the system of colonial plunder.
But what is the Soviet position on a united Europe now?
United to what extent? If you have in mind it becoming a kind of new superpower, such a prospect looks rather utopian. We see objective trends in favor of economic integration in Europe, as well as generally in the world, although we recognize the difficulties standing in the way of that process. Suffice it to point out the existing inequalities and the predominance of richer and more powerful nations. One could hardly expect this process to lead in the near future to any unification of European, or even Western European, economies. The other, noneconomic aspects of the problem are even more complicated. Take the growth of national consciousness, particularly evident lately in rather acute forms and unexpected instances: the Walloons in Belgium, the Scots and the Welsh in Great Britain, the Corsicans in France, to say nothing of the regions where the national problem has acquired the characteristics of an open armed conflict - such as Northern Ireland or the Basque country. How can one expect an amalgamation into a superpower of European nations so different in their major characteristics? I've been talking about historic trends. As to the political projects stemming from such unification plans, they look to us rather sinister.
Why?
First and foremost, because, if the projects involve a unification of capitalist Europe only, we cannot help but see in this an attempt to solidify and
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make permanent the division of Europe into two opposing military-political blocs. And our position, as I am sure you know, is aimed at ending this abnormal situation and ultimately disbanding these blocs, or, at least, their military organizations altogether. If a unification of all Europe is envisaged, then a question immediately comes to mind - on what grounds? The socialist countries are not planning to become capitalist, and, as far as we know, the West does not have immediate plans to become socialist. To try to enforce one's own system on the other side would mean war.
So, after all, you foresee a split in Europe for years to come?
If you have in mind the existence of socialist and capitalist societies in Europe, yes. But this does not mean that hostile relations and tensions are inevitable in Europe. I have already dwelled on our attitude toward blocs. We are for further development of political cooperation to promote arms control and disarmament, and to achieve a greater mutual confidence. We also favor all-around development of intra-European economic, scientific, and technical cooperation; of cultural ties, tourism, and other types of contacts. We are sure that the two parts of Europe can live in conditions of security, close cooperation, and, if you will, harmony, regardless of their different socioeconomic systems.
Speaking in conceptual terms, how would you define the problem of security in Europe?
In the first place, it is a problem of effecting a rather radical change in the whole system of international relations in the region. In Europe, countries belonging to two different social and economic systems meet head-on. And they meet not only politically, but militarily as well. There is no other region in the world where so many deadly weapons have been accumulated, no other region that has become a powder keg that can explode so easily in case of a conflict. Here we face in a particularly clear-cut form the most important, I would say crucial, question - whether peaceful coexistence and cooperation are possible at all. To some degree, Europe has become a testing ground for solutions to the most vital problems of our time.
Willy Brandt left me with the impression that he considers bis Ostpolitik as neither having failed outright, nor fully succeeded.
Are there many human endeavors that have been fulfilled completely? On the whole, Brandt's Ostpolitik has undoubtedly brought considerable results. I think that Willy Brandt and his colleagues can be proud of what they have done, since they have contributed to starting détente in potentially the most explosive region, where the conflict between East and West
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is of a central, rather than a peripheral, nature. It is vital that this movement be preserved and developed further. The existing problems and difficulties show that political relations in Europe have not been transformed as much as was desirable, and that whatever transformations may have taken place have not yet become absolutely irreversible. But this does not detract from the importance of the positive changes in Europe, to which Ostpolitik has contributed in a very important way.
In spite of these positive changes, former West German Defense Minister Hans Apel has said that talks between East and West really lead nowhere unless they are backed by military preparations.
One would expect exactly such an opinion from a West German defense minister, although it only serves the arms race and incites tensions. And it is military preparations that lead nowhere nowadays. We have three decades of them behind us. Have they helped in negotiations, led to agreements or cooperation in a single instance? Si vis pacem para bellum is a song mankind has heard for centuries. But in our day and age the ancient aphorism is not working.
The Western Europeans have big economic stakes in détente. There are the human contacts, the feelings of a common destiny, a common cultural heritage shared by the peoples of all Europe, West and East. There are many strong historical ties. Our common struggle against Hitler, shared by the United States, was one experience that brought Europeans especially close together. Soviet people who fled Nazi concentration camps in Western Europe fought in the resistance movements in France, Italy, Belgium, and many other countries. French officers fought in our air force.
The Soviet army played a decisive role in the liberation of Europe, which is understood by the Europeans better than by the Americans. The graves of Soviet soldiers who gave their lives to defeat the Nazis are strewn all over the continent. All in all, peace and détente receive a much higher priority in Western Europe than in the United States, In a way, Western Europe on some occasions was virtually dragging the Americans into détente, and now it is resisting, sometimes timidly and inconsistently, the American attempts to revive the Cold War. I don't mean to say that cold-war hangovers have evaporated from all Europeans minds. There are forces in Western Europe that are afraid of détente and would prefer a tenser atmosphere between East and West.
What forces do you have in mind?
Well, for one thing, every Western European country has a military-industrial complex of its own, with much the same attitude toward détente as the American one. Then there are people who are concerned about domes- | |
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tic instability in their countries and scapegoat détente as a major reason for that instability. To them, a climate of renewed East-West hostility and polarization looks like an effective means to discipline those struggling for social change in Western Europe, to bring about national unity on the issue of an outside threat, whether such a threat exists or not. One should also mention anticommunism. In Western Europe, particularly in those countries where communists are a strong political force, anticommunism takes different forms than in the United States. But it is there as a considerable factor for increased international tension.
Finally, there is a traditional factor for tension in Europe: the German imperial syndrome. Of course, it's weaker now than forty years ago or seventy years ago, but there still are people in West Germany, including very influential sections of the power elite, who think that Germans should have another try at hegemony in Europe and other parts of the world. They chafe at the existing limitations on German military activity.
So what are other Europeans - Europeans anxious for peace and détente - to do?
The same thing as anxious Russians and anxious Americans: understand that military power alone does not guarantee security, and that a durable peace requires détente, arms limitations, and broader cooperation between East and West. Besides, the Europeans should not yield to fears about their alleged defenselessness, spread by proponents of a continued arms race. All that deterrence can give, it gives also to the Europeans, Because a war in Europe will inevitably become a world war, and a nuclear war. This is a political reality of today's world. I am sure this is well understood in the Soviet Union. One could only wish it would be understood in the West, too.
But isn't the unprecedented rise of the peace movement in Western Europe proof itself of this understanding?
Exactly. This movement has grown out of genuine and powerful grassroots feelings among millions of Europeans who have sensed the futility of arms racing and military confrontation. No wonder all this happens in Europe - a continent devastated by wars and still saturated with modern armaments. Hence, the vitality, the persistence, and the political impact of this movement, for there is nothing so strong as an idea taking hold of millions of people.
The initial response of high American officials to this movement was a clumsy attempt to write it off as a Soviet propaganda plot, but they have ultimately had to recognize the new European climate.
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Granted, the 1949 model of a Soviet threat to Western Europe looks odd today; but there still exist fears of a Soviet military action - say, in response to a crisis in Eastern Europe.
Yes, current NATO thinking has evolved in this direction. They've got to have a credible image, to keep at bay the force of reasonable doubt in the public mind. But I wonder whether people would find credible this latest product of the NATO brain trust. Just think of it. They say they have to defend Western Europe from a possible Soviet attack, which might result from some event in Eastern Europe the USSR might not like. If there's any logic in this, it can only be based on the assumption that Western Europe would have a lot to do with events in Eastern Europe - otherwise, why expect any hostile reaction to the West from the Soviet Union? To put it simply, NATO seeks to defend its intention to meddle in the internal affairs of East European states. Does such an intention have anything to do with the real interests of Western Europe, of Europe as a whole? The West has to accept the fact that socialism is here to stay in Eastern Europe.
What would you say in this respect about Poland? Have not the recent events there demonstrated a serious discontent with the existing conditions?
There is discontent, of course. But it is not centered on the whole social system. It has to do with things not inherent in the system - mistakes, economic difficulties, corruption, and other misdeeds of certain officials.
And there were other factors involved. From the very beginning of the events in Poland, the United States, with certain circles in the West, did their best to turn these events into a major international crisis. I am sure that the extreme positions taken by some Solidarity leaders and other opposition figures were inspired by a firm belief - cultivated from the outside - that they would be thoroughly supported by the United States and NATO in putting pressure on the Polish government, as well as on the USSR and other socialist countries.
Of course, Poland is going through difficult times. But this does not conceal the obvious fact that Poland, which in the past was one of Europe's poorest countries, has achieved a great deal under socialism. And it will find a way out of the present troubles as well.
You have said that Washington tries to use increased international tensions to strengthen its relations with its allies.
Yes, it is trying to do that. One can even assume that quite a few American politicians did not like détente and preferred an atmosphere of tension for the very reason that tension helps shorten the reins and ‘discipline’ the allies, as well as the folks back home. As to the effectiveness of this tactic,
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I would say that it's working to a limited extent, and in the short run, while at the same time exacerbating the long-term problems between America and Western Europe, creating and increasing both open and hidden tensions in their relations. As a matter of fact, we are already witnessing it.
You mean that if a new cold war has ‘ersatz’ motives, it can only bring about an ‘ersatz’ unity in the West?
Yes, the world has changed since the 1950s, and no matter how strong the nostalgia in Washington, it can't make time run backward. Having become much stronger economically and less dependent on the United States politically, the allies now demand that their interests be taken into account.
I realize the great significance of the European peace movement, but I must tell you that many citizens in Europe are annoyed and bored, if not puzzled, by the endless talk about unimaginable dangers and missiles soaring through the skies at the speed of sound, carrying their unholy loads of destructive power.
The annoyance is explainable; this talk has been going on a long time, but it's impossible merely to wave off the importance of the problem of survival. You cannot get annoyed with survival. If you allow a more general comment, I do not want to create a false impression of being some sort of Eurocentrist, but to all of us this continent is very dear. ‘All of us’ includes Soviet citizens living not only on this side, but also beyond the Urals, as well as Americans, most of whom have deep ancestral roots in Europe. It is extremely important to preserve this continent and secure fair conditions for its future existence. It is up to the Europeans themselves, in the first place, to take care of that. But the same issue should be present, as one of the most important problems, in Soviet-American relations. The latter cannot be separated from Europe. Europe has been both the hotbed of the Cold War and the birthplace of détente.
The European issue is not merely a question of altruism of the two superpowers toward Europeans. It is the question of self-preservation for both the USSR and the United States.
What would be, from your point of view, the most desirable situation in Europe in terms of international relations?
I would say enduring security and extensive cooperation. To reach these, it is necessary to end the abnormal situation of the continent being split into two opposing camps armed with powerful nuclear and conventional weapons and spending billions and billions on military needs. Therefore, we favor disbanding both military blocs, or, as a first step, dismantling their military organizations. The Warsaw Treaty Organization's Charter
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contains a special article according to which the organization would disband if NATO ceased to exist.
And while trying to reach that goal you want to get the United States out of Europe?
What makes you think so? We are realists and don't set before ourselves unattainable goals. Besides, reaching the positive goal I referred to is unthinkable without American consent - more than that, without the active participation of the United States in the process of détente and disarmament. Finally, we want détente, security, and cooperation, not just in Europe but around the world. I would say that it is difficult to imagine a stable system of international relations without stable relations between the United States, Western Europe, and the Soviet Union. I would repeat that our goal is good relations with Western Europe, good relations with the United States, good relations with all other countries.
Summing up our talk of things European, I would like to stress that Europe, after all, is becoming too small and crowded for all the hostilities and confrontations pressed on her from the outside.
China, Japan, India, and Europe are important for Soviet-American relations, no doubt. But in connection with the trials and tribulations of détente over the past five years, different places come to mind - Angola, the Horn of Africa, Afghanistan, and, of course, the Middle East. The evermore dynamic events in the Third World are creating problems for any rapprochement between the United States and the USSR. In turn, increased tension between the two superpowers complicates dealing with the pressing problems of developing lands.
Indeed, the world has been changing rapidly, and some developed countries are finding it more of a problem than others. But I do not think it justified to regard the Soviet Union and the United States in similar terms as regards their policies toward developing countries. Let's look at the basic facts in the Third World. For generations, this part of the world has been a colonial or semicolonial backyard of the capitalist West. If one is to look for any outside forces responsible for the dismal state of those hundreds of millions of people in Asia, Africa, and Latin America, the responsibility lies squarely with the West.
And Russia.
Russia got out of the colonial club in 1917. Before that, Russia had its own colonies, which were ruthlessly oppressed and exploited. It was one of the main tasks of our Revolution to provide for a political liberation and an economic and cultural rebirth of those parts of our country.
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Evidently, the Central Asian republics of the Soviet Union have come a long way since 1917. At least that was my impression when visiting there.
In a very short time span those peoples have passed from medieval backwardness to modern civilization. What's no less important, their ethnic heritage has not only been preserved, but has flourished. So we think that to the extent that we had been directly responsible for the plight of colonial peoples, we have done our duty to redress the wrongs.
Does that mean that you are not going to assist developing countries anymore?
No. We do so now and we shall assist them in the future as much as we can. But we also believe that those who owned and exploited colonial empires, embezzling their wealth and resources, carry a special responsibility. The West's private corporations continue to invest in those countries in order to squeeze superprofits out of them.
But don't many developing countries themselves do everything possible to attract foreign investments, private or public?
You are right; they do need substantial investments, capital funds, technology, know-how, skilled manpower, etc. And the multinational corporations have enormous resources the Third World could use. The big question is, on what terms and in whose interests? When a private corporation invests in a Third World nation, the main corporate goal is to obtain a rate of profit it can't get in a developed country because of higher labor costs. This in effect means superexploitation of developing countries. There lies one of the reasons for conflict between them and the West.
Obviously, different developing countries have different attitudes toward multinational corporations.
That's true. Some Third World regimes are totally or nearly totally subservient to multinational corporations, allowing them to play a free hand in exchange for a payoff. The results are usually the same - the country is bled white, popular discontent builds up, sooner or later a coup d'état or even a revolution follows, and the new regime tries to strike a more equitable bargain with the corporations. But renegotiating a bargain is always a rather painful process. In many cases the corporations, aided by the governments protecting them, try to destablize the new regime or to buy it off. So, developing countries learn to be on alert, as well as to develop other options.
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Like turning to the Soviet Union?
For many developing nations, relations with the Soviet Union play an important countervailing role, permitting them to increase their bargaining power in dealing with the West, and to obtain better terms from the multinational corporations. Had there not been the Soviet Union and other socialist countries as an alternative to capitalism, a substantial part of the Earth's population would still live in colonies.
But can there ever be a working détente with this competitive approach to Third World nationalism?
Nothing of what we do in the Third World is inconsistent with international law and U.N. Charter resolutions and declarations. Besides, even the West has realized by now that the old system of relations with developing countries is hopelessly obsolete. It has been repeatedly recognized by the international community that developing countries are entitled to a fair share of the world's resources. All the developed nations have a vital interest in solving this global problem - this is the essence of the work for a new international economic order. The Soviet policies in the Third World are aimed at helping find a solution. Why it should be inconsistent with détente, I can't see. Of course, it is possible to turn the Third World into an arena for a power struggle between East and West, but the problems of developing countries can also be regarded as an additional incentive to global cooperation. We would prefer the latter option.
What about Angola?
All right, let us begin with that country, and remember some basic facts that are now almost forgotten in the West. The crisis in and around Angola flared up in 1975. The major political force in that country was, just as it is now, the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA). It had been engaged in a war for liberation from Portuguese rule since the early 1960s. The U.N. General Assembly supported that struggle by adopting a series of resolutions and urging all nations to render assistance to liberation movements against colonialism in every way. The MPLA sought help from the United States but got a cold shoulder. So they turned to the Soviet Union, and we gave them considerable material aid, to say nothing of moral and political support. All that was strictly in accordance with the U.N. mandate. As a matter of fact, other countries were also helping the MPLA, Sweden among them.
In 1974, a revolution took place in Portugal. The new Lisbon government declared its intention to withdraw from all its colonies, including Angola. The MPLA was recognized by most Angolans and by Portugal as the leading political force of the emerging nation. However, the United States,
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China, South Africa, and Zaire were actively interfering in Angolan affairs and supporting two rival movements - FNLA and UNITA. The CIA was pumping money and arms into these two political factions, which even in colonial times had devoted almost all their energies to fighting the MPLA rather than the Portuguese colonial rulers. South Africa invaded the Angolan territory, at one point almost reaching the nation's capital. Faced with foreign aggression, the Angolan government, formed by the MPLA, asked the USSR, Cuba, and a number of African nations for help. That help was given. Cuba even sent some military personnel there. But contrary to Western predictions, Angola has not been turned into a Soviet colony or military base. It might be proper to recall here that most of the Angolan oil is still extracted by the Gulf Oil Company of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania.
And the Cubans are still there.
As a matter of fact, they are ready to withdraw their personnel step by step, and they even reached an agreement with the Angolan government to do so. But each time the withdrawal had to be postponed in the face of attacks by South African troops and their separatist proxies within Angola. With the danger of this aggression removed, the Cuban personnel would leave, as was emphasized in the Cuban-Angolan statement of February 1982.
You are certainly aware of the fact that this situation is seen quite differently in the West; events in Angola are regarded as a major reason why détente has been replaced by a new period of international tensions.
That is why I tried to refresh the whole episode in our memories.
All right, let's get down to Ethiopia now.
In Ethiopia there was a similar situation in the sense that, had there been no foreign aggression against that country, there would have been no need for Soviet military assistance or the Cuban military presence. It was the Somalis who started a war against Ethiopia. Personally, I am convinced that they never would have attacked their neighbor had they not been led to believe that they would have the support of the United States and some other nations. By the way, when we maintained friendly relations with the Somalis, they never dared interfere in Ethiopian affairs, let alone claim part of the Ethiopian territory. We never gave the Somalis any reason to count on our support or assistance should they decide to commit an act of aggression. And this despite the fact that Ethiopia remained a pro-Western monarchy at the time. If it had not been for the help from the Soviet Union and other socialist countries, Ethiopia, the oldest independent nation on the African continent, would probably have been dismembered and there would have been an enormous death toll among the civilian population.
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But why were the Somalis led to believe that they would get support?
Because Washington wanted to destroy our friendship with Somalia and take advantage of the strategic position of that country, particularly its Indian Ocean port of Berbera.
But it was the Soviet Union that was accused of wanting a naval base at Berbera.
Just at the time we were accused of such plans we agreed to negotiate with the United States an agreement banning foreign military bases in the Indian Ocean. But the talks have been broken by the United States, and Berbera is now an American naval base.
Cuban Vice-Premier Dr. Carlos Raphael Rodriguez explained to me in great detail in his office in Havana the motivation of the Cuban government for their steps in Africa. He might have convinced me, but Washington feels absolutely differently.
Sure they feel absolutely differently. I believe they would have preferred to see South African troops in Angola, or the dismemberment of Ethiopia, just to keep any socialist influence off. I'd like to emphasize that the Cuban assistance to various African nations has not violated any norms of international law. Both the MPLA and the Revolutionary Council in Addis Ababa not only had every right to ask for help, but they had every reason to do so. And the Cubans were wholly within their rights to comply with those urgent pleas.
What Washington above all objected to was that the Cubans seemingly acted on behalf of and in the name of the Kremlin.
Cuba is an independent, sovereign state not inclined to act on somebody else's instigation or blindly follow somebody else's will. It was their own decision to help the Angolans. And we backed their actions because we sympathized with the cause the MPLA was fighting for, namely, the complete independence and territorial integrity of Angola, which was jeopardized by the South African military intervention, white mercenaries, and the CIA.
The constant irritant of Cuba as a Soviet ally on the doorstep of the United States is a new experience in American history.
Yes, it is new, just like many other things the United States will have to learn to live with. An increasing number of countries around the United States are pursuing independent policies. I don't see, however, why an independent state should necessarily be an irritant.
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When talking with Dr. Carlos Raphael Rodriguez, it was clear to me that once Washington lifted its blockade, the Cuban government would be ready to resume normal relations with the United States.
We think such a normalization is possible and long overdue. We are all for it.
A few more general questions on Latin America. Now that there's been a new series of revolutions in Latin America, highlighted by Nicaragua, what do you expect in that region in the coming years?
In Latin America, the United States has laid probably more mines under its own policies than in any other area of the world. Since the early nineteenth century, when the Monroe Doctrine was proclaimed, the United States has regarded Latin America as its own plantation. It's not often recalled, by the way, that, while claiming American hegemony in the Western Hemisphere, President Monroe also pledged American noninterference elsewhere. In no other region does the United States have its way to the extent it does in Latin America. Exploitation by U.S. corporations is most direct there, U.S. political interference most crude, and the overall approach most shortsighted.
On the other hand, Franklin Roosevelt tried a good-neighbor policy and John Kennedy launched the Alliance for Progress.
The hard line that normally predominates in U.S. policy toward Latin America inevitably begets discontent, resistance, and radicalism in the region. Periodically, Washington tries a more reformist, conciliatory approach, gives in on some secondary points. But these modifications of methods have not changed the essence of American policy there, which is to preserve Latin America as an object of neocolonial exploitation. Therefore, reform regularly fails to satisfy the Latins, and Washington goes back to the hard line, using military force and installing pro-American juntas.
I wouldn't exclude that we are witnessing just such a return to the hard line in the whole region. The immediate reason might be the revolutions in the Caribbean and Central America. Just as the Dominican Republic was invaded in 1975 to prevent a ‘second Cuba,’ the United States is getting militarily involved in El Salvador to prevent ‘another Nicaragua.’ The CIA has stepped up its subversive actions against those regimes in the area Washington considers dangerous, and the American support of Britain in its war with Argentina over the Falklands demonstrated Washington's intention to keep the big stick over the Latin Americans' heads.
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Do you see a danger of international complications in this region?
The eighties and nineties could, if U.S. policies remain what they are at present, turn out to be rather stormy for the Western Hemisphere.
After all, we were never nearer to a war than during the Cuban missile crisis of 1962.
Well, the increasing social turmoil in Latin America should not necessarily make that continent a crisis zone in international relations - a zone that would become a theater of military confrontation between East and West.
Going back to Africa, you don't regret the aid given Angola and Ethiopia?
As a matter of fact, today more than a few Americans sympathizing with the cause of African liberation recognize that that assistance played a constructive role in Africa.
Let us assume that Soviet and Cuban assistance did help the peoples of Africa, but damaged détente, if only by creating additional reasons for doubting Soviet intentions and charging the Soviet Union with expansionism.
Our assistance to Angola and Ethiopia was, indeed, used as a ground for such charges. But in fact, I think that détente, provided it is deep enough, could help avoid situations where military assistance is required to solve problems like those faced by Angola and Ethiopia.
What would have been different with a deeper, better-developed détente?
If there had been more trust in Soviet-American relations in 1974-75, if the questions of military bases and foreign military presence in the Indian Ocean had lost their importance by coming under the regulation of peaceful agreements, the United States might not only have refrained from fostering false illusions with Somalia, but might even have provided a restraining influence on them. Thus, there would have been no conflict. In Angola, too, many problems could have been solved by consultation and negotiation. Détente cannot deprive the peoples of former colonies of their right to struggle, including armed struggle, if necessary, for their liberation. But détente, a calm international environment, a strengthening of trust between countries - all can help prevent situations when episodes of liberation struggles are turned into international conflicts and even confrontations between great powers.
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No doubt, the liberation of Zimbabwe was an event of historic significance. But it has been definitely overshadowed by developments in the Middle East, the Persian Gulf, and Southwest Asia. For a couple of years now, everyone's attention has been focused primarily on ‘the arc of instability,’ as Mr. Brzezinski called it.
In the Soviet Union we often use the term ‘the Middle Eastern knot’ when we talk about these problems. Indeed, the issues in the area are tangled and tied into a complex whole involving many conflicting interests. The knot has to be untied if we are to remove a major source of danger to world peace. Unfortunately, in the last few years we've seen quite the opposite tendency. New issues have appeared, making the situation even more complicated and explosive, among them, increased American dependence on the Middle Eastern oil. There are illusions growing in Washington about U.S. ability to solve the problems created by this new situation by means of force.
Apparently, you disapprove of the Camp David approach?
We interpret it as a dangerous diversion off the road to a comprehensive, peaceful settlement in the region, a renewed drive for American hegemony in the Middle East, an attempt to evade one of the central issues, which is the right of Palestinian Arabs to self-determination. Despite all the disappointment resulting from the United States backing out of its previous commitment, we still believe that the cooperation of the USSR, the United States, and some other countries is vital to resolve this very complicated and important problem. This would be in the interest of not only the two great powers, but oil-importing and oil-exporting nations, including the peoples of Palestine and Israel. As for the Camp David Accord itself, the fact that that approach doesn't work is becoming more and more obvious. The underlying idea was obviously that if other nations supported the separate deal, the United States wouldn't lose anything. If they did not, the U.S.-Israeli-Egyptian-Iranian axis would be strong enough to provide for American interests without any confirmation at Geneva or wherever.
And then Iran fell out of the game.
Right. And the expected support for Camp David from more conservative Arab regimes like Saudi Arabia and Jordan wasn't forthcoming. The deal was falling apart at the seams. This may also explain why the United States is using every pretext to build up its military forces in the Middle East, the Persian Gulf, and the Indian Ocean. We're witnessing a massive militarization of American policy in the area.
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Do you think the United States will succeed in imposing its will this way?
I doubt it very much.
Why?
The bottom line is what one Middle Eastern leader described this way: ‘Oil burns.’ Before Washington gets anywhere near the hegemony it is seeking, the tensions and conflicts that will inevitably arise from such a policy are likely to disrupt the energy supply to the world economy.
‘Oil burns’ can be an epigraph to the Iran-Iraq war.
Yes, if you take its energy dimension. But this war underlined many other things - in the first place, the dangers of general instability in the region and the possibility of new conflicts that can escalate into serious crises, especially with the smoldering ashes of the old conflicts nearby.
The latest conflagration in the Middle East, the Israeli invasion of Lebanon, added some new features to the situation in that area. Israel is more isolated now, while international sympathy with the PLO has increased. At the same time, Lebanon's tragedy, the cruelty of the war, and the roles played by Israel and the United States have had an impact on the position of the conservative Arab states. The Fez conference was able to come up with a joint Arab approach to the problem. Yet another new feature has been the change of attitudes toward the Mideast problem in America and in Israel itself. The bloodbath in Lebanon staged by Begin and Sgaron opened the eyes of many Israelis and Americans to some key realities of the Mideast crisis.
Why are there no diplomatic relations between the USSR and Israel? Do you intend to restore them?
The diplomatic relations between the USSR and Israel were ruptured during the Six Day war in 1967. That was our reaction to Israel's aggression and its unwillingness to relinquish territorial gains. The restoration of diplomatic relations is possible in the context of the settlement of the Middle Eastern crisis along the lines of the well-known resolutions of the U.N. Security Council.
You are not questioning, then, the right of the state of Israel to its existence?
No. We've repeatedly made official statements that the guarantee of the rights of all the states in the region to existence and security, including the
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rights of the state of Israel, should be an integral and absolutely necessary part of any settlement of the Middle Eastern crisis.
There are speculations in the West concerning the attitude of the Soviet Union toward terrorism, especially in connection with the events in the Middle East.
We are against terrorism.
But you maintain friendly relations with Arafat, and terrorism is often connected with the PLO.
We've always supported the Palestinians and their struggle. This does not mean that we associate ourselves with each step or action of every extremist splinter group driven to despair. As to Yassir Arafat, we see him as the most prominent and influential political leader of the Palestinians. And this view is shared by an ever-increasing number of world political figures, including some Western leaders. Speaking of terrorism in its most pronounced form, we should recall that Begin used to be an active terrorist himself. But this does not prevent him from being accepted in the West.
The USSR is being accused of striving to preserve in the Middle East a situation that can be called ‘neither peace nor war.’
We are as much for détente there as everywhere else in the world. Even if we had thought that a ‘controlled tension’ situation, which is what is usually meant by the phrase ‘neither peace nor war,’ corresponded to our interests, we would not have favored it. For we understand perfectly well that a situation of tension cannot be controlled indefinitely in such an explosion-prone region as the Middle East. Therefore, a ‘neither peace nor war’ policy would be tantamount to an acceptance of war. Actually, the Camp David policies, intentionally or not, are fraught with such a danger.
What about the recent resurgence of orthodox Islam in Asia?
I would not overestimate the role of any religion as an independent force in social and political life. The activization of Islam is a reflection of growing social tensions and political turmoil in Asia. Religion in general, Islam in particular, retains considerable ideological and sometimes political strength. But I think ‘the Moslem world’ is about as much of an abstraction as ‘the Christian world.’ Different social groups and countries in Asia are using religious slogans to pursue different, sometimes mutually exclusive aims. Evidently, the awakening of the broad masses in Asia to
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active political life is giving a new content to the Islamic religion, which, like any other religion, must constantly adapt to changing circumstances in order to survive.
You are certainly aware of the puzzlement in our part of the world as to why the USSR risked so much in goodwill, especially in Moslem and Third World nations, by using military force to uphold the regime existing in Afghanistan.
Since you have raised the question of Afghanistan once more, I would like to make a general remark. I am not counting on persuading American or other Western readers to subscribe to the Soviet point of view on the problems connected with the events in Afghanistan, to support the April 1978 revolution there, to take Babrak Karmal's side, or to back the Soviet decision on rendering military assistance to the Kabul government. You see, it's not a matter of just knowing the facts, but of attitudes toward them. And those attitudes are determined not only by information but by class, ideological and political sympathies, and interests.
Then what would be the use of discussing these topics?
It seems to me that it still might be useful so that Americans and other Western readers have a clearer idea of the Soviet point of view. All the more so because so many lies about the real state of affairs have been spread in the West.
Why then did the USSR decide to risk so much by intervening militarily in Afghanistan?
We've sent our military contingent there for two closely interrelated purposes: to help the government formed after the revolution in Afghanistan ward off aggression from the outside, and to prevent the turning of Afghanistan into an anti-Soviet base on our southern borders. The contingent was sent after repeated requests by the Kabul government. And there is an important legal side: the assistance was given according to the treaty signed in 1978 between the USSR and Afghanistan. We do not plan to stay in Afghanistan permanently, or to turn it into some kind of a springboard for actions or threats against other countries. The troops will be withdrawn as soon as the reasons that led to their being stationed there disappear.
You said the Soviet aim in sending troops was to help the revolutionary regime. But the regime was headed by Hafizullah Amin, who was killed on the arrival of Soviet troops and replaced by Babrak Karmal, who
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denounced Amin and changed Kabul policies quite abruptly. It looks strange and contradictory.
Please remember that we are talking about a revolution, and any revolution is a most complicated historical event, with its rapid changes, sharp and unexpected turns, a constantly shifting balance of forces, people changing sides overnight. I've already spoken of the reasons for the Afghan revolution that started in April 1978. The government formed immediately after the revolution and led by Noor Muhammad Taraki received broad support. Babrak Karmal was among the other top leaders. Hafizullah Amin was also close to the top. The revolutionary government started a broad program of social change concentrating on land reform, development programs for ethnic minorities, women's rights, and education.
These policies encountered resistance. Why?
Because they went against the interests of the old ruling classes deposed in 1978 - forty thousand big feudal landowners who had to give their land back to their peasants. Before the revolution, 70 percent of all the land belonged to them. A rather typical thing in any revolution - people do not want to yield their power and privileges, and they use any methods to restore the status quo ante. The deposed privileged groups provided the backbone of the counterrevolution in Afghanistan. But they would not have presented such a great danger had it not been for the outside support.
Some opposition is inevitable in any revolution, but it definitely would not have grown into a serious threat to the new government had some of that government's policies not led to broad discontent.
There were mistakes made by the new government. Mistakes are inevitable in any revolution and are particularly understandable in such a backward country. The biggest mistake, to my mind, was to try to do too much too fast - in Marxist language, a typical leftist deviation. Serious mistakes were made in the area of relations between the state and the Moslem clergy. Most of the clergy was written off as a counterrevolutionary force; some were persecuted, some mosques were closed. And, of course, the situation was seriously aggravated by Hafizullah Amin and his group.
You named him as one of the leaders of the Afghan government?
Yes. As a matter of fact, Amin's personality had a lot to do with the difficulties of the Afghan revolution. He was a power-hungry plotter, an unscrupulous intriguer using the revolutionary upheaval to get to the top
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and become a dictator. History has seen such figures more than once. In September 1979, Amin staged a coup and killed President Taraki. Later he was accused by the government of direct treason.
If the USSR didn't approve of Amin, why did it agree to his request for Soviet assistance?
It was not done for Amin personally. It was done to save the Afghan revolution.
That sounds rather evasive. Amin was the leader of the country at that particular moment.
He usurped the leadership position. But despite Amin's repression and intrigues, there remained many people in the party, even some in the government, who resisted his policies and tried to do what was possible to retrieve the heritage of April 1978. And they removed him from power just on the eve of the execution planned by the Amin group of a large group of imprisoned revolutionary leaders.
But why did you permit the exile of Karmal and the crimes of Amin?
What do you mean ‘permit’? We assisted the Afghan government and advised them, but could not dictate the way the Afghan revolution proceeded. It could not have been and was not a Soviet-controlled process. As to the problem you mentioned, we had cautioned the Afghani leaders many times and given them advice, but it was they who had to make decisions, as it was their revolution.
Has the government of Babrak Karmal succeeded in strengthening the position of the revolutionary government?
They moved rapidly to bring the government's policies back on the right track. They freed fifteen thousand political prisoners jailed by Amin, punished those responsible for repression, and declared a general amnesty for those who had fled the country. They restored religious freedom and adopted sound economic policies. In foreign affairs they are trying to normalize relations with their neighbors, particularly with Pakistan. I think the key to the political settlement in the area would be an agreement on closing the bases of anti-Afghan terrorist activities on the Pakistani territory and banning the transition of armed groups through the border. Then the Soviet troops could be sent home.
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That brings us to the other Soviet motive in sending its troops to Afghanistan. Was it perceived in Moscow that a possible defeat of the revolution there represented a danger to the USSR?
Yes, it was. We had reason to believe that the United States and some other countries intended to turn Afghanistan into a base for hostile actions against the Soviet Union. Our border with Afghanistan is twenty-five hundred kilometers long. It was a very friendly and quiet border for several decades.
What do you think would have happened in Afghanistan if you had not sent your troops there?
Don't think, please, that it was an easy decision for the Soviet Union to make, and that all the possible negative reactions were not taken into consideration prior to this. The Soviet government came to a conclusion that, without assistance, the government of Afghanistan would not be able to save the revolution and repel attacks from abroad, and that further development of events in the area might create a threat to the security of the Soviet Union. To Afghanistan itself it would have meant the triumph of the counterrevolution, with all its logical attributes - terror, bloodshed, rage of reaction.
What specific threats to your security did you expect?
Afghanistan might have been turned into an anti-Soviet stronghold, which could be used for the establishment of military bases on our borders and other hostile activities.
Military bases?
Why not? There used to be U.S. military bases in Iran, and they are now searching all over the region for a substitute. Why not Afghanistan?
According to a widespread Western view of the Soviet motives for sending troops to Afghanistan, the USSR was trying to get direct access to a warm-water port and Middle Eastern oil.
That is baloney even from a purely military viewpoint. Both the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean are already close enough to the Soviet Union. And had we planned to get even closer, we would never have chosen Afghanistan, with its very difficult terrain, as a springboard. As an American friend of mine put it, it would be like Californians attacking Oregon through Nevada. But the most important thing is that the kind of push toward warm seas that the West ascribes to the Soviet Union would invite
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World War III. Contrary to the American propaganda, nobody is going to see Soviet tanks or soldiers on the shores of the Persian Gulf or the other warm seas.
What will the developments be around Afghanistan now?
We believe that a political solution is possible. Therefore, we fully support the proposal put forward by the Afghan government concerning normalization of the situation in the area. Kabul is ready to talk with its neighbors on normalizing their relations. In 1981 we also proposed to combine talks on the international aspects of the situation in Afghanistan with the broader talks on peace and security in the Persian Gulf area. I am sure that if Afghanistan's neighbors and the United States adopt a constructive position, it will be possible to achieve a settlement, including the withdrawal of Soviet troops. Afghanistan was and will remain nonaligned. But we do not want it to be hostile to us, and I think this concern is justified.
In the West it is maintained that the Soviet Union was afraid that the establishment of a military Moslem regime in Kabul could spark trouble among the Moslems in Soviet Central Asia.
Now, look, this is really incredible. Just compare poor, illiterate, backward Afghanistan with Soviet Central Asia, Azerbaijan, and other formerly Moslem parts of the USSR. They are prosperous, confident, and happy. Can anyone seriously believe that the obscurantist, repressive theocracy that the counterrevolution wanted to install in Afghanistan would present an ideological challenge to the Soviet Union? I've been elected to the Supreme Soviet of the USSR from the Republic of Azerbaijan, which has a large Moslem population. I've been representing a district of that republic for several years now, and I can tell you on the basis of firsthand experience that Islam presents no political problems to the Soviet Union. Those believing in Allah are free to worship. There are mosques, and the Moslem clergy is respected.
But do you feel in retrospect that the USSR misjudged Western reaction to the Afghan events?
Well, you can never foresee reactions of other nations to a particular event in all detail. There are always both pleasant and unpleasant surprises. But in general, I think we had evaluated the situation correctly. You see, we acted on the premise that American policies had changed. We came to this conclusion before Afghanistan. I think it could also be expected in Moscow that the United States and some other Western countries would use the events in Afghanistan as a pretext for an anti-Soviet campaign. I think that, having launched this campaign, Washington was overreacting terribly,
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contrary to everybody's interests, including those of the United States. This overreaction can to some extent be explained by the feverish attempts of the Carter administration to find a way out of its own difficulties, like those in Iran and the Middle East. In this connection, the events in Afghanistan seemed to present an opportunity to portray the United States as a force that might be useful to the Moslem world. This has not come true. To some extent, it was a mere explosion of emotions that some people in the Carter administration could not control.
Returning to the general question of how events in the Third World influence U.S.-Soviet relations, one hears more and more often today in the West that clashes in the Third World have become the main factor undermining détente.
Yes, it is quite a widespread point of view. But I have serious doubts about it. It is very important to see why it has gained such wide acceptance. I think the first reason is that the great powers realized long ago that a direct confrontation between them would be extremely dangerous, even suicidal. Therefore, they avoid direct clashes on the central lines of their relations, and this creates an impression that the major source of danger now is the Third World. Second, the situation in the Third World is very volatile, indeed. Third, some great powers, and here, alas, I have to point to the United States again, are exhibiting an unusual interest in the Third World for strategic considerations. In case there might be a conflict with the Soviet Union and other socialist countries, the West wants to have bases and well-protected communications lines in the Third World. Fourth, developing countries are of great interest to the United States and its allies as sources of raw materials, primarily oil.
In other words, you confirm that the Third World is now the main source of danger.
No. Far- from underestimating the importance of developing countries, I would still like to point out that the course of events there, particularly the gravity of conflicts and their impact on the international scene, to a very great extent depend upon the state of Soviet-American relations. Take the Yom Kippur war of October 1973. In the context of détente it was possible to localize this conflict and even to work out a basic framework for a comprehensive settlement in this area. I simply shudder at the thought of what might have happened if that war had occurred in a climate of tensions, even such as exists now. So, I think that what I said leads to a different conclusion, namely, that much depends on the political situation in East-West relations, that is, relations between socialist and capitalist countries, between the Soviet Union and the United States. If those relations should be ruled by a cold war, the Third World will become one of
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its most dangerous battlefields. But if the ideas of détente should gain an upper hand, the Third World could become a major sphere of cooperation among all economically advanced countries. They can cooperate in facilitating a speedier development of the Third World, in creating workable security systems in its various areas, in using its resources sensibly, all with due regard to its peoples' interests and aspirations.
The Third World nations are not going to make their history either for the West or the East. They will live and develop for themselves. A majority of the population on our planet lives out there, and those people are entitled to the same rights and opportunities for self-realization as the Europeans and Americans. What's more, they know it, and they are determined to struggle for a better life.
Many Western experts insist that without establishing certain rules of the superpowers' conduct in the Third World, perhaps even some sort of crisis-management mechanism, there is no hope for détente in the future.
Well, the idea of bilateral cooperation in crisis settlement and prevention was present in détente from the very beginning. On the Middle East, for instance, a kind of crisis-management mechanism was emerging in the form of the Geneva conference, and it is through no fault of ours that this approach was abandoned. The same idea is inherent in the broad program of the demilitarization of the Persian Gulf area, put forward by President Brezhnev in December 1980 and again in February 1981. Another Soviet proposal has been to ban the use of military force. We do not have an idea of the superpowers playing the global-policeman role, but we are sure that détente will remove a lot of the flammable stuff that feeds crises, and that joint efforts in crisis management and prevention may in turn become important components of détente itself.
Do you believe that East-West cooperation is possible in the Third World despite the existing difficulties?
Of course, the difficulties are tremendous, but if we succeed in securing a durable peace and in preserving and strengthening détente, such cooperation could become feasible. The situation is unparalleled in history and requires unusual wisdom from the economically advanced nations.
Do you expect America and Russia to increase or decrease their role in the world by the end of this century?
If developing countries succeed in their economic affairs, the share of all industrialized nations in the world gross national product is likely to decline. Generally speaking, the world scene by the end of the century is going to get increasingly diverse - politically, culturally, and philosoph- | |
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ically. This would be an appropriate and healthy development. But in the foreseeable future, the two great powers will continue to play a major role, if only because of the physical dimensions of their power. The important thing is that their military and economic potentials do not give them any special rights or privileges, only special responsibilities. They are responsible to all of mankind for avoiding nuclear war and keeping normal and peaceful relations between themselves, as well as for taking a constructive part in the solution of those problems that the world at large is facing.
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