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De Zeventiende Eeuw. Jaargang 13 (1997)

De Zeventiende Eeuw. Jaargang 13

(1997)– [tijdschrift] Zeventiende Eeuw, De–rechtenstatus Auteursrechtelijk beschermd

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The overseas Spanish Empire and the Dutch Republic before and after the Peace of Munster
Carlos Martínez Shaw

In memoriam Charles Verlinden

As might be expected, the overseas world was affected in a direct way by the long period of hostilities between the Hispanic Monarchy and the Dutch Republic. So, during the time lapsing between the end of the Twelve Years Truce (1621) and the peace of Lisbon signed by Spain and Portugal (1668), relations between Spain and the Netherlands went through three well defined phases. A first phase (1621-1640) was characterized by the continuing Dutch offensive against the overseas bases of the Spanish and Portuguese Crowns, united since 1580 under the same sovereign, in Africa (conquest of Elmina) and Asia (attacks on Macao, blockade of the Philippines, blockade of Goa, progressive settlement in Ceylon, settlement in Taiwan, occupation of the Moluccas and siege of Malacca, not to mention the substitution of the Portuguese in the Japan trade), as well as in America (settlement in Brazil, first in the province of Bahia and later in the province of Pernambuco, sack of Surinam, occupation of the islands of Curaçao, Aruba and Bonaire, not to mention the permanent attacks on Spanish and Lusitanian traders).1.

The second phase (1641-1648) was conditioned by the independence of Portugal and the subsequent abandonment of the Spanish orbit by the Lusitanian colonies. This resulted in Dutch attacks now concentrating exclusively on Spanish dominions, although the divergent interests of the States General (inclined to favour the Portuguese secession) and of both India Companies (decided to maintain their conquests on the Portuguese in the three continents) did perpetuate the previous situation until the closing of the Dutch-Lusitanian 1661 treaty and even of the peace of 1669 (occupation of Malacca in 1641, invasion of Angola and Sâo Thomé in 1642, maintenance of Dutch Brazil until 1654). Meanwhile the conversations initiated in 1646 between Spain and the Netherlands helped establish the conditions that would be agreed upon in the Munster Treaty.2.

In this second phase, the supporters of Portuguese independence saw the rupture of Iberian unity as the consequence of the disastrous results of the previous union for the Portuguese overseas world, which Spain had been unable to preserve. Three arguments can be brought against this traditional view. First, the Netherlands would have launched their offensive with or without a pretext. In the second place, the Netherlands continued to attack Angola, Sâo Thomé and Malacca and to retain Brazil after 1640, regardless of the fact that they should have been helping Portugal in order to create difficulties to Spain, which still was the main enemy. And thirdly, we have new evidence of the effort carried out by the Spanish Monarchy in the defense of the Portuguese colonies in America as well as in Africa and Asia.3.

Thus, facing the Dutch settlement in 1624 in San Salvador de Bahía, the Span-

ish succesfully tried to reconquer the colony the following year; after the occupation in 1630 of Pernambuco a fleet was sent in 1638, although on this occasion the former success could not be attained. Likewise, in 1636 Philip IV ordered that the Conselho da Fazenda should dedicate the whole of its revenues to the defense of Brazil and of Angola, whence came the slaves needed by the sugar economy in the other side of the Atlantic.4.

Something similar happened in the Far East. The Philippine authorities sent two companies and twelve pieces of ordnance for the defense of Macao on the occasion of the Dutch attack in 1622. In the same vein the Spanish governor Juan Niño de Tavora offered to unify the jurisdiction of the Philippines with that of Macao, which in the opinion of his successor, Sebastián Hurtado de Corcuera, would have brought notable benefits to the defense of the strategic and economic interests of Hispanic-Portuguese in the region: ‘...if this had been done before, perhaps the town of Malacca would not have been lost, and these Philippine Islands, via the town of Macao, would have obtained more conveniences and comforts in the necessary dealing and trade’. Spain also undertook the defense of Taiwan, maintaining a presidio and a fortress in the north of the island until august 1641, as well as of the Moluccas, after the Dutch occupation during the thirties, by means of the installation of garrisons in the fortresses on the islands of Tidore and Ternate. Consequently, one cannot maintain that the Spanish Monarchy left the Portuguese colonies to their own resources.5.

Against this background the peace of Munster deeply influenced the subsequent trajectory of the United Provinces: ‘The conclusion of the Dutch-Spanish conflict was the most important factor in determining the conditions in which the Dutch world-trade system reached its zenith, the peak of its sway over the markets of the globe, during the quarter of a century down to 1672’.6. So, the signing of the Treaty meant the beginning of the third phase of the relations between Spain and the Netherlands (1649-1668).

From the viewpoint of the Iberian overseas Empires, the changes in the relations between the two powers were equally important. Regarding the Portuguese colonies, the Netherlands tried to maintain all positions conquered in the previous years, but the insurgence of Lusitanian settlers in 1645 resulted in the loss of Dutch Brazil after the fall of Recife, the Dutch capital of the province of Pernambuco, in 1654.7.

Thus was put an end to the Dutch presence in Portuguese America. However, the period of the Dutch occupation left its traces in the internal life of Pernambuco, as well as in the meridional regions of Rio de Janeiro and Sâo Paulo. In the former, the fact of almost 25 years of Dutch rule, together with the manner in which the insurgent Brazilian forces carried out the reconquest, fostered a strong nativist feeling which manifested itself in the reiterated claim of autonomy against the metropolis, in the sporadic outburst of open revolts and in the early apparition of an independentist conscience.8.

In the latter, the rupture of the union removed the merchants of Rio de Janeiro and Sâo Paulo from the profits made of smuggling the silver from Potosí and, secondarily, of other goods proceeding from Tucumán, in the port of Buenos Aires. This situation led to a reaction of the interested parties, who, after an attempt to oppose the Bragancist revolt during which they requested assistance

from the Spaniards at Buenos Aires, made use of the intercession of the Portuguese priest Francisco Pais Ferreira to convey to the government of Philip IV their proposal of a revolt of meridional Brazil in favour of the hispanic Monarchy. On the other hand the Spanish diplomatic service detected a manoeuver by the Portuguese Court tendent to get hold of the base at the River Plate.9.

However, the exclusion of the Brazilians from Spanish trade became more evident as time passed and the contention between the two Iberian monarchies continued. Precisely after the peace of Munster the Dutch openly appeared in in the contraband affairs of Buenos Aires. This was carried out under the very protection of the letters of marque issued by the Spanish monarch to the Dutch vessels pledging themselves to fight French and Portuguese, the two powers with whom Spain was still at war after the signing of the treaties of Westphalia. Madrid had disregarded the opposing voices of some governors who warned against ‘the disadvantages resulting from the licenses that Your Highness and His Lordship the Archduke do grant to the Dutch to practice piracy against French and Portuguese, with which pretext they come to the Indies and sell different merchandises from these kingdoms drawing the gold and the silver...’. The memorial also pointed out the complicity of Basque shipowners, who openly collaborated with the Dutch in the contraband, a practice that continued probably because the Spanish Crown prefered this gap in its monopoly in favour of the ancient rivals to the maintaining of the old connection between Buenos Aires and meridional Brazil, that benefitted who that had now become its new enemies.10.

More importantly, the peace of Munster forced the Dutch Republic to reorganize its military and economic strategies as embodied in its mercantile instruments, the VOC and the WIC.

In the Far East, even before the publication of the treaty a certain military equilibrium had been established. Spain had detached itself from the fate of Portugal in the area, which, though it was capable of keeping Macao, in 1641 lost its bases in Taiwan. On the other hand, Spain had successfully defended the Philippines against the attacks led by Martin Gerritszoon de Vries in 1645, 1646 and 1647 and by Abel Tasman in 1648, while in 1649, after the peace signature, it still was capable of waging the last battle of the Eighty Years War, keeping Ternate.11.

In its 79 clauses the peace of Munster included a series of sections relative to the Far East pending regulation, especially referring to the Philippines and the Moluccas. Spain acknowledged the status quo, accepting the Dutch conquests under the assumption that the Dutch would not try to extend their commercial area further than the limits at the moment. In return, it obtained the acknowledgement of the quiet possession of the Philippines, although the archipelago took long to recover from the Dutch menace: also, while respecting the Dutch control over the spice trade in the Moluccas, Spain kept its fortresses in Tidore and Ternate, although these were abandoned a few years later.12.

The peace of Munster sanctioned too the status quo in America. Spain acknowledged the occupation of Curaçao, but held on to the mercantile monopoly in its colonies, keeping the WIC out of the slave trade as it had kept the VOC out of the Philippines trade. However, this agreement did not prevent the Dutch Republic from trying to obtain from the Spanish Monarchy some concessions in the New World, along the two following decades. It obtained the letters of marque men-

tioned already, which allowed it to operate in the River Plate area. In 1650 it petitioned for an asiento to supply Cartagena de Indias and Havana with riggings and other naval supplies and in 1667 another asiento to defend the American coasts against European piracy; both petitions were unsuccesful, the Spanish authorities being fully aware that an affirmative answer would open the way to increased contraband traffic.13.

Nevertheless the three main issues following the signing of the treaty were the conversion of Curaçao into the main base of Dutch legal and illegal trade with Spanish and European America, the Dutch effort to enter the slave trade for the Hispanic colonies and the concessions for the exploitation of the salt pans of Puntade Araya. Curaçao was, in effect, the keystone permitting the Dutch to duly profit from the advantages presented by the end of hostilities. After its occupation in 1634, the island had frustrated all Dutch expectations of becoming a significant commercial port and a salt producing center; after 1648, the Dutch even considered to abandon it given its null output. Yet, from the end of the fifties and during the sixties, Curaçao became the very ‘jewell of the WIC’. Now, the potential represented by its excellent port and its splendid location in the vicinity of the Venezuelan and Nueva Granada coasts could be turned to profit thanks to the temporary weakness of the English and the French and the new collaboration with the Spanish Monarchy. Thus, if the occupation of Curaçao was the outcome of the war, its fortune was undoubtedly the consequence of the peace.14.

Spain had provided its American colonies with slave labor thanks to the assistance of the Portuguese, especially since the Iberic union allowed a higher interaction in trade relations between both countries. But the Bragancist rising put an end to this situation and left the Hispanic Monarchy with the serious problem of lack of provisions resulting in urgent appeals from the damaged settlers in Mexico as Peru.15.

The Dutch naturally were the first to offer to guarantee the supply of slave labor, even without waiting for the signing of the treaty, during the very course of the negotiations. However, Spain remained adamant in its refusal, rather looking for other solutions, as the concession of a licence to its Spanish subjects to acquire slaves in the African areas not controlled by Portugal, which did not yield good results; this led Madrid to consider the possibility of buying them in Angola, already liberated from the Dutch, although this measure was not carried out.16.

Indirectly, Spain's inability finally caused Curaçao to enter the slave trade. First fraudulently, as revealed by such isolated cases as that of Pedro Díaz Zorrilla and Manuel Luis Carnero, residents in Cádiz, who, provided with a license to acquire slaves in Guinea, bought them in Curaçao and introduced them in Portobelo. Later, the Crown, which had allowed the activity of Genoese merchants as genuine middlemen in the slave supply, took one further step and settled an asiento with two merchants from that nation, Domingo Grillo and Ambrosio Lomelín to introduce slaves in the Spanish America from other origins than Portuguese: these could not be other than the English Antillian possessions and, mainly, those of the Netherlands, that is, Curaçao.17.

Thus, the Dutch Republic came to control the indirect supply of slaves through the contract of Grillo and Lomelín, in force between 1663 and 1673. However, the Republic also entered the Hispanic-American slave market in other ways. On the one hand, a series of Dutch vessels, mainly from Zeeland, directly introduced An-

golan slaves evading the vigilance of the WIC's agents. On the other hand, a merchants' association from Amsterdam closed a deal with the representatives of the Genoese contract to directly supply them with slaves from Angola. This way, the Portuguese again supplied slaves to Spanish America, now with the assistance of the Genoese and the Dutch.18.

After 1668, the peace of Lisbon seemed to allow the progressive return to the situation previous to the 1640 rupture. Spanish shipowners now were able to obtain legal licenses to acquire slaves on the coasts of Portuguese Africa, although the effects of this freedom were deceptive, since the Lusitanians were not ready to renounce to the triangular trade in the benefit of a third party. Also, the Sevillian Consulado succeeded in denouncing the contract of the Genoese and in 1676 regained its previous control over the management of licenses, again adding the slave trade to the rest of its commercial monopoly, although in this case, too, the Spanish merchants prefered to act as front men serving foreign business established in the main port of the Carrera de Indias19..

So, through various means, Curaçao kept on being the main slave supply center from 1676 to 1689. Between 1676 and 1679, in the same informal way as before. Between 1679 and 1682, through the asiento of Juan Barroso, partner of the house of Balthasar Coymans, of Cádiz, and agent for Dutch interests. Between 1685 and 1689, in opposition to the supplier Nicolás Porcio, who represented the English interests against those of the Dutch and whom the diplomats of the Republic had tried to discredit in Madrid. Finally, between 1685 and 1689, under the most convenient way, the supply contract granted to the firm of Balthasar Coymans proper (the Generale Asiento der slaven), who not only obtained the privilege of bringing African slaves, but even kept permanent agents in Portobelo and Cartagena de Indias. It was the outstanding moment of Dutch intervention in the slave traffic destined to Hispanic America. After the supression of the contract in 1689, the gates were opened to the Portuguese, French and English successively.

Yet through participating for more than a quarter of a century in this trade the positive character of the peace of Munster for this branch of Dutch trade in the Spanish Indies was confirmed.20.

The third front opened in America by the Netherlands after the peace of Munster was that of the exploitation of the salt pans of Punta de Araya. Salt was one of the strategic lines in Dutch commerce in the XVII century, due to the needs of its fishing industry (nearly four thousand ships dedicated to herring fishing), as well as to its lucrative redistribution after the process of refining, which was considered the most perfect at that time and highly added to the value of the product. Thus, the Netherlands tried to procure the salt from pans in France and Portugal, especially those in Setubal. However, at the same time it discovered the high value of the Venezuelan salt pans of Punta de Araya, which it besieged from an early date. It was a siege so tight that it alarmed the Spanish Crown, which first conceived of the project of the Armada de Barlovento precisely to protect the salt pans from the Dutch.21.

The building of the castle of Santiago de Araya had the desired dissuasive effect, definitively excluding Dutch salt makers from the deposits. Such was the need to find alternatives that the occupation of Curaçao can be partly related to the expectations of Dutch traders to obtain salt in the island.22.

As in other cases, the peace of Munster also dealt with the problems over Araya. The Republic endeavoured to reestablish the tolerant conditions that had prevailed during the Twelve Years Truce, but sections 5 and 6 of the treaty, regulating colonial matters, left no room for Dutch pretensions. The following years witnessed the launching of a very diplomacy of salt, that, however, had no success at all. The diplomacy was influenced by the relations of the Dutch Republic with its customary suppliers, France and, mainly, Portugal. Thus, one of the most prolonged rivalries between the Netherlands and Spain in the colonial context came to an end, solving itself without having excesively clouded the good relations established between both countries after the peace of Munster.23.

The peace of Munster maintained intact the Spanish monopoly in America, as was proved by the exclusion of the Dutch from legal trade and from the exploitation of the salt pans of Punta de Araya. For this reason, Dutch traders were forced to establish themselves in the international colony that intensely participated in the Carrera de Indias. Dutch merchants, practically absent from Cádiz in 1605, in 1662 attained the number of 31, counting only those who have been identified, making of the Dutch nation the first among all those established in the Cádiz emporium.24.

The legal basis for their inclusion was the very treaty of Munster, more especifically the commercial suplement of February 1648, which gave the Dutch Republic the same position as the other friendly European nations and which, in fact, allowed a preferential treatment. These clauses allowed the Dutch merchants to enter the commercial structure of Seville and Cádiz, cleared their way to the obtainment of licenses and asientos, permitted their comfortable dedication to fraudulent activities (the contraband carried out in the ships at anchor off the bay, the export of textiles to the Canaries), stimulated the presence of their vessels in the Colonial Trade (at least more than 10% of the Cádiz fleet during the second half of the century was of Dutch construction) and, above all, spectacularly increased the silver drainage from Spain towards the mercantile towns of the Republic.25.

The estimated volume of this flow of silver deserves attention, since it may allow us to measure, probably better than any other instrument, the effects of the Dutch introduction in the Spanish colonial economy. Nevertheless, a convincing estimate is not yet possible, although recent studies tend to emphasize the progressive loss of control of metal shipments by the Spaniards and the parallel absorbtion of this flow by foreign trade, especially Dutch trade, which accurately followed the arrival of precious metals through the notes offered by the gazettes published in their towns.26.

To conclude, the peace of Munster powerfully prompted the Dutch presence in the Hispanic colonial world. First, the treaty acknowledged the conquests carried out in Asia as well as in America. Second, if the Spaniards kept the control over the American and Philippine trades, the Dutch gained the spices trade in the Moluccas and managed to find numerous ways to introduce themselves in specific areas of the New World economy, such as contraband commerce or the slave supply. Third, the commercial clauses of the treaty permitted them not only to establish themselves in the Carrera de Indias, but also gave them treatment as most favoured nation, resulting in the increase of silver in the Netherlands and, even possibly, of a real control of the precious metals Spanish trade. In return, Spain

rid itself of a powerful enemy; turned into an ally, though an interested one, it was very suitable as a counterweight against the France of Louis XIV and against England, that was just on the verge of establishing its hegemony, both in and outside Europe.


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